Chapter 4 the Korean Peninsula: “Nuclear Weapons State” North Korea Aiming to Become an Economic Power, ROK Seeking Active Deterrence Capability
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Chapter 4 The Korean Peninsula: “Nuclear Weapons State” North Korea Aiming to Become an Economic Power, ROK Seeking Active Deterrence Capability n the year since the death of Chairman of the National Defense Commission IKim Jong Il, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) has taken steps to bolster the Kim Jong Un regime and Park Geun-hye of the conservative Saenuri Party has been elected as the next president of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). There has been no easing of North- South confrontation, and the problems posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile program grow more serious, so the security situation in the region remains as challenging as ever. In February 2012, the United States and North Korea had direct dialogue more than three years after the Six-Party Talks were suspended. This was followed by announcement of an agreement between the two countries (the so-called Leap Day Agreement). The agreement was effectively scuttled, however, when the new North Korean constitution drawn up under Kim Jong Un described the country as a nuclear weapons state and North Korea launched a missile under the guise of putting an earth observation satellite into orbit with an Unha 3 rocket on April 13. This missile launch was a failure, but North Korea proceeded to launch another missile on December 12, 2012, demonstrating improvements in the technology relating to flight stability and flight accuracy. On February 12, 2013, the country conducted its third nuclear test, driving home its claim to be a nuclear weapons state. Internally, the Kim Jong Un regime has initiated steps aimed at turning North Korea into an “economic giant” to complete the process of building a “strong and prosperous nation.” According to reports, on June 28, 2012, North Korea made an internal announcement of new economic management measures and reported a decision to transfer all authority for economic policy to the party and cabinet, whose role will be to manage the economy while controlling the Korean People’s Army. On the personnel level, Chief of General Staff Ri Yong Ho was abruptly relieved of all posts on July 15. In December, it was learned that Kim Jong Gak, appointed minister of People’s Army in April, had been replaced by Kim Kyok Sik, former chief of general staff. These events reflect efforts to shake up the military leadership by filling posts with people seen as loyal to First Chairman Kim Jong Un. Other signs that Kim Jong Un is consolidating his control over the military include reports that the vested interests of the military are to be transferred to the party and cabinet. North Korea continues efforts to strengthen its economic cooperation with East Asian Strategic Review 2013 China, but at the same time, there were signs it had been ramping up diplomatic activities aimed at receiving advice on economic growth and attracting investments from Southeast Asian countries, in particular. However, North Korea’s so-called July 1 measures in 2002 ended in failure, and the latest initiative is likely to meet a similar fate. South Korea’s presidential election in December was won by the conservative candidate, Park Geun-hye. One of the diplomatic and security goals of the new Park administration is to reopen the North-South dialogue, which was suspended under the Lee Myung-bak administration, but North Korea’s latest nuclear test poses an obstacle to early realization of this goal. Moreover, at a time when North Korea is enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities and its ability to instigate regional provocations, wartime operational control (OPCON) is due to be transferred to the ROK and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) dissolved in December 2015. The challenges this poses for the ROK are how to build a US- ROK cooperative framework to defend the country and how to strengthen its military once these changes take place. During the five years he held office from February 2008, President Lee Myung-bak succeeded in diversifying and strengthening the alliance with the United States, earning a reputation for raising US-ROK relations to their highest level ever. The ROK’s ties with China have also deepened, but there have been differences of opinion over how to approach the denuclearization of North Korea. President Lee showed interest in strengthening relations with Japan, but actions he took towards the end of his presidency had the effect of raising tensions between the two countries, to the disappointment of Japan. It will now be up to the Park Geun-hye administration to repair Japan-ROK relations, but the new administration is likely to move cautiously out of concern for South Korean public opinion. In August 2012, the Lee Myung-bak administration released the Defense Reform Plan 2012-2030, a national defense blueprint through 2030. This plan reflects the ROK’s policy— formulated after the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and Yeongpyeong Island shelling in 2010—of bolstering jointness and securing active deterrence capabilities. The administration of Park Geun-hye, who is from the same conservative Saenuri Party as former President Lee Myung-bak, is expected to maintain a similar basic policy. 142 The Korean Peninsula 1. Growing Concern over North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Development (1) North Korea’s Scrapping of Leap Day Agreement with the United States More than three years after the suspension of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, Kim Kye Gwan, first vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had two days of direct meetings in China with Glyn Davies, special representative of the secretary of state for North Korea Policy, February 23-24, 2012. The discussions were followed by announcement of a US-DPRK agreement, known as the Leap Day Agreement. Under the Leap Day Agreement, the United States would, according to Pyongyang’s announcement, offer 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance with the prospect of additional food assistance. Once the Six-Party Talks were resumed, priority would be given to the discussion of issues concerning the lifting of sanctions on the DPRK and provision of light- water reactors. Both North Korea and the United States reconfirmed their intention to implement the September 19, 2009 US-DPRK joint declaration issued following a round of the Six-Party Talks. North Korea, upon request by the United States and with a view to maintaining a positive atmosphere for the DPRK-US high-level talks, agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activity at Nyongbyon, and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the moratorium on uranium enrichment while productive dialogues continue. However, nearly two weeks later, Pyongyang announced on March 16 that it planned to launch what it called a “satellite,” and then carried out the launch on April 13, effectively scuttling the agreement. North Korea has been suspected for some time of possessing weapons-grade plutonium (WGP) and of producing weapons-grade uranium (WGU). After allowing for the nuclear devices used in two earlier nuclear tests, North Korea is believed to have possessed enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons in 2012, but securing precise information on the number of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s possession and their accuracy remains a challenge. It is practically impossible to obtain a complete picture of the country’s uranium enrichment plants. In August, David Albright, director of the Institute for Science and International 143 East Asian Strategic Review 2013 Security (ISIS), who has visited North Korea’s nuclear facilities, and Christina Walrond, research fellow of ISIS, released a report entitled North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium. The report explores three potential scenarios on the assumption that North Korea had enough WGU to make between zero and eleven nuclear weapons and enough plutonium to make between six and eighteen nuclear weapons by the end of 2011. In the first scenario, North Korea would not produce any more plutonium for weapons, but would produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) to supply to an experimental light-water reactor that it is constructing in Nyongbyon. In the second scenario, North Korea would produce LEU and WGU, while also producing WGP at the light-water reactor. In the third scenario, North Korea would pursue WGU only without supplying LEU to the light-water reactor. The report concludes that North Korea would possess enough fissionable material to make between fourteen and forty- eight nuclear weapons by 2016. The estimates contained in the report are wide ranging, but if North Korea succeeds in miniaturizing warheads and is able to extend the range and accuracy of the missiles used to deliver them, it could pose a significant threat to regional security. The nuclear test site at Punggeri, Hamgyongpukdo, where North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test in 2006, sustained typhoon damage in August and September 2012, but then apparently underwent rapid repairs that restored it to a test-ready state by the end of December. The government announced that it conducted its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. The nuclear device detonated in this test is believed to have been an atomic bomb that was smaller and lighter than the devices used in the previous two tests but produced a greater yield. Further analysis, including detailed validation, will be needed to assess North Korea’s current nuclear capability. (2) April and December 2012 Missile Launches and Technological Improvement North Korea’s April 13 missile launch was a failure, but the country later announced that it would put into orbit another working satellite for the advancement of science and technology.