North Korea--2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Europe and Central Asia

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North Korea--2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Europe and Central Asia UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 29 December 2010 Open Source Center Report North Korea -- 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Europe and Central Asia This report updates portions of the 2008 OSC North Korean Overseas Diplomatic Directory1 and introduces a few modifications and stylistic enhancements to facilitate its use. This directory is fourth in a series of reports that cover DPRK diplomatic missions by geographic region.a The directory includes photos, when available, of overseas diplomatic personnel as well as such standard information as facility addresses, phone and fax numbers, and e-mail addresses. Personnel changes and new ambassadorial appointments also have been noted when relevant. Information in this directory is current as of December 2010. As an additional reference, direct links to applicable foreign ministry websites have been provided to enable readers to monitor ongoing developments in DPRK diplomatic activity. Names in the directory have been transliterated using OSC's modified versions of the McCune-Reischauer (M-R) Romanization system. The North Korean-preferred orthography of names -- written as given by each foreign diplomatic sourceb -- has also been included in brackets after each entry. Where an exact transliteration cannot be determined due to the unavailability of the original Korean in source materials, approximations of names have been provided. The 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory makes use of the same open-source materials used to compile the 2008 version, including various official foreign ministry websites. A thorough review of these sources yields the following data on DPRK diplomatic missions in Europe and Central Asia: Abkhazia No current diplomatic activity observed between the DPRK and Abkhazia. Albania Ambassador: Cho Su'ng-chu [Jo Sung Ju] (resident in Bulgaria) Official Albania Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mfa.gov.al/dokumenta/mfa%20diplomatik%20list%202010.pdf a See the 25 February OSC Reports, North Korea -- 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for East, Southeast Asia (KPP20100225429001), North Korea -- 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for South Asia (KPP20100225429002), and 19 November OSC Report, North Korea -- 2010 Overseas Diplomatic Directory for Americas (KPP20101119433001). b Some diplomatic sources list the given name (first name) before the family name (last name). OSC transliteration of Korean names puts the family name before the given name. This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Andorra No current diplomatic activity observed between the DPRK and Andorra. Armenia Ambassador: Kim Yo'ng-chae [Kim Yong Jae] (resident in Russia) Ambassador Kim Yo'ng-chae presents his credentials to Armenia's Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian (21 July 2008).2 Official Armenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/ministry/mid_2009.pdf Austria Ambassador: Kim Kwang-so'p [Kwang Sop Kim]; Spouse: Kim Kyo'ng-chin [Kim Kyong Jin] Counselor: Ham So'n-hun [Son Hun Ham]; Spouse: Paek Sun-okc [Sun Ok Paik] Kim So'ng-ch'o'ld [Song Chol Kim] Ri Il-ch'u'l [Il Chul Ri]; Spouse: Kim Myo'ng-hu'i [Myong Hui Kim] Ambassador Kim Kwang-so'p with Mayor Matthias Stadler of St. Polten, Austria (11 January 2010).3 Kang Hune [Hon Kang]; Spouse: Hwang Ok-songf [Hwang Ok Song] c Another possible transliteration: Paek So'n-ok d Another possible transliteration: Kim Song-ch'o'l e Another possible transliteration: Kang Ho'n f Another possible transliteration: Hwang Ok-so'ng This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO First Secretary: Hong Ch'ang-po'mg [Chang Bom Hong]; Spouse: Kim So'ng-suk [Song Suk Kim] Ri Nam-su [Nam Su Ri]; Spouse: Kim Mi- so'n [Mi Son Kim] Third Secretary: Ri Kil-son [Kil Son Ri] Pak Kang-sonh [Kang Son Park]; Spouse: Ch'oe U'n-hye [Un Hye Choi] Attaché: Ms Kim Ok-Suni [Ok Sun Kim] Cho'n Myo'ng-sin [Myong Sin Jon] Kim Kwang-ch'o'l [Kwang Chol Kim] Address: Beckmanngasse 10-12, 1140 Vienna Phone: (43 1) 894 23 13 Counselor Ham So'n-hun with Austrian political representatives in St. Polten (11 January 2010).4 Phone (Counselor): (43 1) 894 23 11 Fax: (43 1) 894 31 74 E-mail: [email protected] Working Hours: Monday-Friday, 1000- 1200 (local) Address (Third Secretary Pak Kang- son): Hertha-Fimberg-Straße 3/Top 35, 1100 Vienna Phone: (43 1) 894 20 82 g Another possible transliteration: Hong Chang-po'm h Another possible transliteration: Pak Kang-so'n i Another possible transliteration: Kim Ok-So'n This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 3 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Fax: (43 1) 894 20 84 Concurrent Posts: Kim Kwang-so'p holds concurrent nonresident ambassadorship to E-mail: [email protected] Hungary and Slovenia. Personnel Detail: Ambassador's spouse Kim Kyo'ng-chin is the half-sister of Kim Jong Il and sister of DPRK Ambassador to Poland Kim Py'o'ng-il. Official Austria Foreign Ministry Website: http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/service/foreign-representations-in-austria-in- german.html Azerbaijanj Ambassador: Ri Tong-p'al [Ri Tong Phal] (resident in Uzbekistan) Belarus Ambassador: Kim Yo'ng-chae [Kim Yong Jae] (resident in Russia) Official Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/about/foreign_missions/ Belgium Ambassador: Cha So'ng-nam [Ja Song Nam] (resident in Great Britain) Official Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Development Cooperation Website: http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/services/embassies_and_consulates/foreign_embassies_and_co nsulates_in_Belgium/index.jsp j Derived from South Korea's Ministry of Unification website (www.unikorea.go.kr) This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Bosnia and Herzegovina Ambassador: Cho Su'ng-chu [Jo Sung Ju] (resident in Bulgaria) Ambassador Cho Su'ng-chu with Bosnia and Herzegovina's Minister of Foreign Affairs Mladen Ivanic (10 January 2006).5 Official Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mfa.ba/ambasade_konzulati_misije/ambasade_u_bih/Default.aspx Bulgaria Ambassador: Cho Su'ng-chu [Jo Sung Ju]; Second Secretary (Administrative Spouse: Kim Wo'n-suk [Kim Won Suk] Affairs): Paek Mun-so'k [Paek Mun Sok]; Spouse: Cho'ng U'n-ok [Jong Un Ok] Counselor (Political Affairs): Ch'oe Yun- cho'nk [Choe Yun Chon]; Spouse: Sim Third Secretary (Political and Consular Yo'ng-hu'i [Sim Yong Hui] Affairs): Kim Ch'o'l-min [Kim Chol Min]; Spouse: Chu So'ng-hu'il [Ju Song Hui] Counselor (Political and Cultural): Rim Chu-nam [Rim Ju Nam]; Spouse: Pak Hye- Third Secretary (Commercial and ran [Pak Hye Ran] Economic Affairs): Counselor (Commercial and Economic Han Hong-sam [Han Hong Sam]; Spouse: Affairs): Cho Ho-so'ng [Jo Ho Song]; Paek Yo'ng-hu'i [Paek Yong Hui] Spouse: Yun Sung-hu'i [Yun Sung Hui] Cho'n Ch'an-ho [Jon Chan Ho]; Spouse: First Secretary (Science and Technology Kim Myo'ng-po [Kim Myong Bo] Affairs): Ri So'k-so'ng [Li Soc Song]; Spouse: Cho'n Yo'ng-ok [Chon Yong Ok] Kim Kwan-ch'o'l [Kim Kwan Chol]; Spouse: Cho'ng Myo'ng-hu'i [Jong Myong Hui] k Other possible transliterations: Ch'oe Yun-ch'o'n, Ch'oe Yo'n-cho'n, Ch'oe Yo'n-ch'o'n l Another possible transliteration: Chu Song-hu'i This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 5 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Third Secretary (Economic and Cultural Fax: (359 2) 974 55 67; (359 2) 974 61 11 Promotions): Rim Ch'o'l-min [Rim Chol Min]; Spouse: Ri So'ng-hu'im [Ri Song E-mail: [email protected] Hui] Working Hours: 0900-1230, 1430-1730 Third Secretary (Financial Affairs): Kim (local) T'ae-chin [Kim Thae Jin]; Spouse: Kim Concurrent Posts: Cho Su'ng-chu holds Myo'ng-suk [Kim Myong Suk] concurrent nonresident ambassadorship to Address: 3 Sofiisko pole St., Sofia, 1756 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Phone: (359 2) 975 33 40; (359 2) 974 61 and Turkey 00 Official Bulgaria Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mfa.bg/bg/pages/view/4041 Croatia Ambassador: Cho Su'ng-chu [Jo Sung Ju] (resident in Bulgaria) Ambassador Cho Su'ng-chu presents his credentials to President of Croatia Stjepan Mesic (22 November 2005).6 Official Croatia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mvpei.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1614&dmid=73#pocdrz Cyprus Ambassador: Han Tae-so'ng [Han Tae Song] (resident in Italy) Official Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/AF6D4F948C4E2D1FC22571B200372FFB?Ope nDocument m Another possible transliteration: Ri Song-hu'i This OSC product is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO 6 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Czech Republic Ambassador: Ri Pyo'ng-kap [Pyong Gap Ri]; Spouse: Ri Yo'n-hwa [Yon Hwa Ri] Counselor (Political Affairs): Kim Yo'ng- iln [Yong Il Kim]; Spouse: Ch'oe Myo'ng- sun [Myong Sun Choe] Counselor (Consular Affairs): Kim Ch'o'n-sae [Chon Se Kim]; Spouse: Kim Ambassador Ri Pyo'ng-kap meets with
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