University of North Florida UNF Digital Commons Philosophy Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy Fall 1994 Are Functional Accounts of Goodness Relativist? David E.W. Fenner University of North Florida,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Fenner, David E.W., "Are Functional Accounts of Goodness Relativist?" (1994). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 1. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Digital Projects. © Fall 1994 All Rights Reserved Reason Papers Are Functional Accounts of Goodness Relativist? David E.W. Fenner, University of North Florida The short answer, which will no doubt fmstrate those who read to find the short answer, is yes and no. Yes in respect of the fact that all agents are not the same and so what is good for (or judged good by) one agent may be different from what is good for another agent. No in respect of the fact that normativity, or standards which range over agents relevantly similar, is still quite present. The point of this paper will be to unpack this position. I want to begin by talking about functional accounts of goodness. Credit for their origination is owed to ~ristotle.'However, I mean less to write about Aristotle and more about functional accounts themselves. My first attempt at such an account is the following: (Al) X is good if X is a highly functioning one of its kind.