Chapter I: Historical Ilackground of The~ Xpandint; Pow0r• 5 Chapter II: M

TABLE OF COlJTJ:;NTS

Preface • • ...... l

Chapter I: Historical ilackground of the ~xpandint; Pow0r • 5

Chapter II: M.::thods of Lebislative Influence • • • • • • 14 A.. The Veto •• ...... 14 1. History of the Veto • • • • • • • • • • • • 14

2. nature of the Veto • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 B. Party Leadership • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 35

c. Recommendations by Eessages • • • • • • • • • • 49

D. Prescribing for Special Sessions • • • • • • • • 52 Chapter III1 The Power of Appointment • • • • • • • • • 57

A. Historical ~volution • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57 B. Effect of Reorganization • • • • • • • • • • • • 65

c. Restrictions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70

D. Effect on Administrative Control • • • • • • • • 77 Chapter IV: Control over Finances • • • • • • • • • • • 85

Chapter V: Miscellaneous Power and General Provisions • 104

.A.. Pardons, Commutations, and Reurieves • • • • • • 104 B. Control over Bilitia • ...... 109

c. Extradition • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 112

D. Control over Local Officers • • • • • • • • • • 114

E. Minor Powers and Duties • • • • • • • • • • • • 119

F. Removal and Succession • • • • • • • • • • • • • 122

858457 ii

Chapter VI: Conclusions and Proposals • • • 125

Appendix I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 135

Appendix II • • • • • • • • 141

Appendix III • • • • • • • 143

Bibliogre.phy • • • • 144

I. Govermnent Documents • • • • • • 144

II. Books • • • • • • 145

III. Magazine Articles • • • • • 148

IV• Newspapers • • • • • • • 149 1

PRID'ACE

Today the governor of the state of Ohio is a powerful figure in

determining the affairs of state government. This statement could

not be applied to the first governors of Ohio. In fact, Ohio's first

governors were inadequately endowed with power to deal with the pro

olems of their day. Gubernatorial power, then as now, fell into two

classes: (1) legal powers coming from constitutional provisions or

legislative delegation, (2) extra-legal powers corning from the gover nor's position as leader of his party and from the force of his

personality.

This pa.per will be primarily concerned with the legal bases of power. Some attention will, however, be given to the extra-legal powers which the governor has. However, such power is entirely depend ent on the individual. One governor may be able to exert much influ ence because of his position in the party and his personal magnetism.

His successor may not be able to utilize such sources of power ef fectively. In other words the legal powers of the governor remain constant while his extra-legal powers a.re subject to change depending on the personality of the individual and the changing social conditions.

In the Constitution of 1802, the governor was granted a meager measure of legal power. Although this legal base of power was enlarged by the Gonstitution of 1851, the governor's role as chief executive was not greatly enhanced. Indeed it was not until after the turn of

the century in 1900 that the legal power of the governor was expanded 2

to present day proportions. An analysis of the governor's role in public administration, financial control, and legislation will bear out this assertion.

The expansion of executive authority has been hindered by the theory of separation of powers formulated by the French thinker Mon- tesquieu and by the theory of checks and balances. The validity of these ideas has long been open to question. Nevertheless they have had tremendous impact on the executive-legislative relationship in

American government. ll".ontesquieu' s theory of separation of powers advocates division of the power of government among three coordinate branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. If this idea were rigidly adhered to, nothing would be accomplished, for each branch would thwart the others' purposes. However the government of the state of Massachusetts purports to operate according to this idea.

Its Constitution explicitly states:

The legislative department shall never exercise the executive and the judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.I The theory of separation of powers was never so verbalized in the Ohio Constitution. It has never been rigidly complied with in

1 Mass. Const., Part I, Art. xxx.. 3

this state, although as late as 1900 the Ohio supreme court gave

judicial sanction to the theory. In the case of City of Zanesville

v. Zanesville Telephone and Telegraph Colllpany, the court, commenting

upon the division of powers be"tPreen the executive and legislative

branches, stated:

In the preservation of these distinctions is seen, by many able jurists, the preservation of all the rights, civil and political, of the individual, secured by our free form of government; and it is held that any encroach ment by one upon the other is a step in the direction of arbitrary power.2

In opposition to the theory of separation of powers is the belief

that executive authority should be expanded. The move to increase the authority of the governor is based on the theory that concentration of

power will make the governor more responsible to the people. The

president of the Constitutional Convention of 1912, Herbert Bigelow,

a Cincinnati minister, expressed this view:

We desire the concentration of power in the hands of one man, not because we wish to give that man the power at the expense of others, but because if we so concentrate the power in the hands of one man we will keep our eyes on that rnan. He \vill be in the limelight all the time, and if anything goes wrong with his ad ministration he will be held responsible by the people.3

Perhaps the most difficult problem created by the desire for ex-

panded executive authority lies in maintaining effective control over

263 Ohio State, P• 442 (1900). 3c. B. Galbreath, sec., Proceedings· and Debates of the Constitu tional Convention of the State of Ohio, 1912, III (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1913), 1693. 4

the powerful executive. Harvey Walker of the Ohio State University believes that:

••• the reluctance to confer wide powers on the governor which exists in legislative bodies when re organization proposals are presented ••• can be traced to the conviction that the grant of such powers should be accompanied by correspondingly effective controls.4

The will of the people should be the criterion for either expansion or contraction of gubernatorial power. The people's interests must be served. Even when the state of Ohio had just been created the governor had certain obligations. but he had no authority to fulfill these adequately. In compliance with popular demand his authority gradually increased. A.t the present time his power can be utilized in meeting the many situations which arise. While the power of the gover- nor has expanded greatly since the year 1802. such expansion has been highly uneven in character.

The prevalent desire for a strong governor insured the Ohio executive•s rise from figurehead to leader. This rise was opposed by ad- herents to the theory of separation of powers and by legislators reluctant to surrender control over executive matters. Although this opposition has not prevented the governor of Ohio from becoming a powerful leader. his authority today remains subject to the will of the people of the state.

4Harvey Walker. "Theory and Practice in State Administrative Organization." National Municipal Review. XIX (April. 1930). 253. 5

CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TEE EXPANDHW POi'iER

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1802 apparently

had a limited view as to vrhat should be included in the realm of execu-

tive power. AlthouGh they vested in the governor the "supreme execu

tive power,"1 they actually delegated few functions to that officer.

Historians attribute this meager grant of power chiefly to the auto-

cratic methods employed by Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair.

George Hoadly, who was later to become governor of Ohio (1884-1886), was a delegate to the Convention of 1873. There he stated, "That

example was before their eyes; and it was natural to expect that while they were studiously aiming to avoid one extreme, they would

fall into the other. tt2

General St. Clair can perhaps claim the distinction of exerting more negative influence upon the office of governor of the state of

Ohio than has any other person who has ever guided the executive branch.3

St. Clair did not set an enviable record for later governors.

1ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 1.

2J. G. Adel, reporter, Official Report of the Proceedings and De bates of the Third Constitutional Convention of Ohio, II, part 2 (Cleve land: w. s. Robison and Company, 1874), 1074. 3 James K. Mercer, Ohio Legislative History (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1918 (?)), II, 105, and George B. Okey, "History of the Veto in Ohio," The Ohio Magazine, I (December, 1906), 570, are two among many who up hold this point of view. 6

Acting in the capacity of territorial governor, he made frequent use of the absolute veto power.4 This power was derived from the Ordin- ance of 1787, which reads

And all bills having passed by a majority in the house, and by a majority in the council, shall be re ferred to the governor for his assent; but no bills or legislative act whatever, shall be of any force without his assent.5

Governor St. Clair not only exercised this power in a high-handed fashion, but also antagonized the representatives of the people by his autocratic manner. When the representatives offered to reconsider bills not to his liking with a view to changing them to conform to his judgment, he repliedt

I am sorry to tell you it is altogether out of my power to comply with it. The Ordinance of the govern ment has placed in the Governor a.n absolute negative on the bills of both Houses and your request is that it may by me become vested into a kind of qualified veto. You do not indeed require that should the objections be thought of too little weight your acts may become laws without the Governor's assent. That would have been too directly in the face of the Ordinance, though with out it I must own I cannot see any use in sending the objections to you."6

Small wonder, then, that the members of the Territorial Legislature,

4 Okey, op. cit., 570, states that eleven out of thirty-tv10 legislative acts of the First Territorial Legislature (September 16 to December 19, 1799) were not approved. This is more than one-third of the legislative output.

5ordinance of 1787, as found in Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History {3rd ed.; New Yorkt F.S. Crofts, 1947), 130.

6Alonzo H. Tuttle, "History of the Executive Veto in the Ohio Constitution," The Ohio State University Law Journal, II (March, 1936), 101. 7

opposed to St. Clair's dictatorial manner, desired rapid admission to the Union. The executive could then be constitutionally shorn of such powers.

Many of the hardy pioneers, imbued with the democratic traditions of the Revolutionary era, probably did not widerstand the actions of the framers of the Ordinance of 1787, which made the absolute veto a prerogative of the territorial governor. Had not the long struggle with England been partially predicated on the Crown's absolute negs.- tive on colonial legislatures• bills? Had not Thomas Jefferson made articulate the colonists• thoughts on this subject in the great De claration of 1776?7 This enwiciation of anti-democratic thought needs explanation. The reputed authors of the Ordinance of 17878 are said to have bestowed the absolute veto on the territorial governor hoping thereby to encourage rapid formation of states.9

The governor's legal powers are granted by constitutional authorization or by legislative enactment. The Constitution of 1802 had enumerated the powers which were conferred upon the governor vrhen

Ohio achieved statehood in 1803. He was to be comnander-in-ohief

7Jefferson speaks of the King's refusal to assent to laws in The Dechration of Independence.

8The authorship of the Ordinance is a matter of controversy, but it seems probably that Nathan Dane and Rufus King were the principal authors. Commager, ed., op. cit., 128 supports this view.

9vvorkers of the ·writers Program, Ohio, The Ohio Guida (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), 39. 8

of the military forces of the state. He could appoint the adjutant

general, but he could make other appointments only during recesses of the legislature. He could call the General Assembly into special session, but he had no legal authority to control the course of action which that body might then take. He was empowered to grant pardons and reprieves, except in cases of impeachment, and to commission notaries public. If he was to have ari.y influence over legislative action, this had to come from sources other than the Constitution.

Political affiliation ari.d personality were two major sources of extra- legal power. (See Chapters II and III for a more comprehensive discussion of the methods of legislative influence, Chapter IV for a discussion of the appointive power, and Chapter VI for a discussior1 of the power to pardon and the control of the militia.)

Thus in the early 1800 1 s the position of the governor was, in the main, one of honor rather than of power. This was due to several factors: (1) difficulties with the territorial governor, Arthur St.

Clair, (2) general mistrust of executives during that post-colonial period, and (3) democratic tendencies of the Jeffersonians.lo

The legislature of the new state began as the dominant governmental branch and remained so for many years. The legal powers of the governor were to remain at the low 1802 level until changes could

l~ugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1934), 110. 9

be made in the basic document of government. Yet, despite a lack of

power, there were several prominent, powerful leaders who occupied

the governor's chair prior to the Civil War. One of the best known was

Governor Thomas Corwin (1841-1842). His fame rests mainly upon his eloquence and wit, his courage as a conservative, and his power and

influence as a political leader.11 .Another prominent figure during

this period was Wilson Shannon (1839-40, 1843-1844), the first native born governor of Ohio. Salmon P. Chase (1856-1860), who was later to become Secretary of the United States Treasury under Lincoln, had a

good record, even though his administration was marred by a $550,000 deficit in the state treasury. Although the governor possessed no

legal power to remedy this situation, Chase took immediate steps which, 12 supported by public opinion, forced the state treasurer to resign.

An expanding society created many political issues. A candidate's choice of side on such issues as slavery and the bank question could mean election or political oblivion. Gubernatorial campaigns were then decided to a great extent by the candidates' expressed opinions on these questions rather than on individual personalities. However, despite the popularity which a governor might achieve as a result of his stand on various issues, he was, for all practical purposes, a relatively powerless individual. The weak position of the governor

11simeon D. Fess, Ohio's Three Hundred (Chicago: The Lewis Pub lishing Company, 1937), 83. 12Roseboom and Weisenburger, op. cit., 250. 10

during the early part of the Nineteenth Century is illustrated by the observe.tion made by Alexis de Tocqueville, who visi tad America during the l830's• He remarked, "In America the legislature of each state is supreme; nothing can impede its authority ••• In juxtaposition to it, and under its illllllediate control, is the representative of the executive 13 power."

The government set up to function in a frontier atmosphere could hardly keep pace with the expanding times. Defects in th~ basic document became evident and the people of the state desired changes. In

1849, they voted to authorize the calling of a convention to revise the Constitution of 1802. In the Constitutional Convention of 1851 which followed consideration was given to (l) revision of the judicial system, (2) popular election of all public officials,14 (3) prohibition of charters granting exclusive privileges, and (4) limitation on the power of the legislature to create a state debt.15

The document formulated in the Constitutional Convention of 1851 did not greatly extend the power of the governor. He was still denied the veto and the legislative influence which could be derived from its use. However, his power of appointment was increased and a basis for further expansion in this area was provided, since the exercise of the

13 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Henry Reeve, trans., Henry s. Commager, ed. (Galaxy ed; New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 65.

14with the exception of governor, all were at that time appointed by the legislature.

15Roseboom and Weisenberger, op. cit., 228. 11

appointive power was explicitly denied the legislature. The governor

still had to rely on his personal influence and his party affiliation

to attain ends in harmony with his views.

Many illustrious figures occupied the office of governor in the

latter portion of the Nineteenth Century. They follow one another in

rapid succession. Rutherford B. Hayes (1866-1872, 1876-1877), later

President of the United States, was the first individual to be three

times elevated to the governor's chair by popular mandate. Hayes was a Civil War General, who was looked upon as the standard bearer of the

Republican party in Ohio, He was forced to deal with a Democratic

legislature during his first term in office, but this situation proved

politically advantageous to him.16 Other prominent governors during

the post-war period were Joseph B. Foraker (1886-1890) and James E.

Campbell (1890-1892). William McKinley served as Ohio governor from

1892-1896 and later became President of the United States.

The power of the governor had to expand to keep abreast of the changing social and industrial scene. More details demanded attention as the facilities of state government were expanded to cope with new problems. Much expansion ca.me in the area of appointment, for the

governor held the authority to name the members of each board or commis-

sion the legislature created. Still the chief executive had not

16 Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era, 1850-1873, which is Vol. IV of the State of Ohio, Carl Wittke, ed. (Columbusa Ohio State Archea logical and Historical Society, 1944), 462. 12

acquired a status equal to that of the legislative branch of government. In his comprehensive analysis of the American system during the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century, Lord Bryce, British e.mbas- sador to the United States and a noted historian, attests to this state of affairs when he says:

Of these several powers it is best to begin by describing the legislature, because it is by far the strongest and most prominent ••• Everything in the nature of state policy belong~ to the legislature and to the legislature alone.17

An attempt was made to expand further the legal basis of the governor's power in the Constitution submitted to the people in 1874.

One proposal included in this document gave the governor veto power and extended to the legislature power to override his veto by a three fifths vote.18 This Constitution ''l0.s rejected entirely, and many observers have attributed its defeat to the fact that the power to veto bills was included therein. In the main the governor's power was still dependent upon his party leadership and his ovm personality.

Since Constitutional gubernatorial authority could not cope with the increasing complexity of state problems, political boss control grew up to supplement official methods of influence. Mark Hanna's career exemplifies this sort of activity. Having organized an effective

17 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (3rd ed.; New York: Macmillan and Company, 1895), I, 480, 531. 18 Debates, 1873, II, 296. 13

"machine," Hanna stood for some twenty-five years (1880-1904) as

unofficial dictator of Ohio politics.19 Such machine control even-

tually generated great resentment, for the voters realized a need

for political leadership responsible to their desires. Gradually machine activity diminished as the people bestowed more power on the

governor.

The veto power was added to the governor's authority in 1903• by an amendment to the Constitution of 1851. Nine years later it was defined in its present day terms. The Reorganization Act of 1921 brought the governor into prominence as an administrator. However, even today he must rely largely on party politics and his own personality to achieve his ends, although his legal powers have expanded considerably.

This brief summary illustrates that the power of the Ohio governor has gradually been expanding since the inception of the state. In the chapters which follow significant elements of this changing scene will be examined one by one.

19 Lincoln Steffens, "Ohio: A Tale of Two Cities," McClure's Magazine, y;y;::;- (July, 1905), 293. 14

CHAPTER II: METHODS OF LEGISk\TIV.:£ INFLUENCE

A. TEE VETO

1. History of the Veto

One important method of legislative leadership which the governor can employ is the veto povrer. This power is a constant, legal one that will express the governor's will emphatically.

The veto is a fairly recent manifestation of the expansion of gubernatorial power in Ohio. Previous to the acquisition of the veto power in 1903, the ,jOVernor could do no more than rely upon his oersonal influence, his appeal to the people, and his position as leader of the party for assurance that the General Assembly would enact measures favorable to his program. Having been endowed with power to negative legislative action, he can force the General Assembly to reconsider measures which are contrary to his views on policy.

The lengthy controversy over veto power began when Ohi·::> was a territory. As has been pointed out, Governor St. Clair's autocratic use of the veto had generated great antagonism toward unrestricted executive power. Thus the Convention meeting in 1802 quickly agreed that the governor should be denied the power to negative legislative acts. The Constitution of 1802, under which Ohio was admitted to the

Union as the seventeenth state, does not refer to this power. The legislature was to be supreme. It was to pass the laws and appoint 15

most of the officers to execute them. The governor was little more than a figurehead, although by the document it was he in whom the

"supreme executive power" was vested.1 For nearly fifty years the governor was forced to acquiese to the legislative will. The proponents of the idea of giving the 0overnor more power were present at the Constitutional Convention of 1850-51. Various arguments were there advanced during the acrimonious debate concerning the guberna- toria.l veto. It we.s pointed out that in other states where the veto had been granted, the .governor had not become a tyrant.2 The tradi- tional mistrust of the executive had decreased as successive governors had gained the acclaim and respect of the people. Perhaps most important, the people had discovered that a governor powerless to do evil was also powerless to do good.3

Had wise laws been enacted during the half century of legislative supremacy? There are conflicting opinions on this topic. One opinion, coming from an opponent of the veto, should, perhaps, be ta.ken ~-[sr2no salis. Writing in 1906, Br. George Okey says,

"During that long period few objectionable laws were passed---none,

1ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. l.

2states mentioned were Louisiana, Texas, Iowa, 1;;isconsin, and California. Debates, 1851, I, 308.

3Leslie Lipson, The 1-.rnerican Governor from Figurehead to Leader (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), 24. 16

perhaps, that would have fallen under the axe of the veto.4 On the other hand Caleb Atwater, an early Ohio historian, writes of some effects wrought by the absence of the veto. He speaks particularly of financial matters:

Because of the absence of any veto power unconsti tutional acts have been passed in every period of our short history ••• In all such cases a power of prorogation in the Governor, or of rejecting such acts as unconsti tutional, as inexpedient or unnecessary, would have saved the people at least large sums of money.5

Both views were expounded in the Convention of 1850, but the majority of members opposed even a veto which could be overrliddEDby a simple majority of the Assembly. A proposal for such veto power was voted down in the Convention and never submitted to the people. The final vote on the motion to strike out the proposal was forty-six, yea; thirty-four, nay.6

The delegates to the Convention of 1850-51 had doubtless been influenced by Jacksonian democracy. They made constant reference to the people and to the government's responsibility to guard their interests. It was the people in whom all trust must be reposed. Mr.

Van Brown, delegate from Carroll County, denounced bestowal of veto

4okey, op. cit., 572.

5caleb Atwater, A History of the State of Ohio (2nd ed.; Cin cinnati: Glezen and Shepard, Sterotypers, 1838), 172. 6J. v. Smith, recorder, Debates and Proceedings of the Conven tion for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850- ~(Columbus: s. Medary, 1851), I, 313. 17

7 9ower as a sign of lack of trust in the people. This same gentleman believed that any gubernatorial power vrhich could not be overridden by a simple majority o::· legislative votes was anti-democratic. He felt that if further extension of executive power W9.s desired one might as well "vote f'or a monarchy at once.n8

In 1851 the :people of Ohio a.:9proved the document drafted :}y this

Convention. The new Constitution brouc;ht a considerable increase in gubernatorial appointive power. r",..:.ee '"""vii....:1.pve "'"" r IIT..... ) However, fear of executive tyranny vras still too prevalent to allow the governor veto power. Yd th veto power the e:x.ecutj_·ve could interfere in legislative mutters. The direct influence of St. Clair's regil:1e and the theory of separation of pov1ers had prevented the Cornrention of 1850-51 from submitting its modest veto propose.l to the people. Ohioans continued to prefer legislative supremacy in their government.

Ohio's third Constitutional Convention met in 1873. The question of gi vin.s the governor power to negative General 1:.ssembly ennctmerlts r,gain received close attention. The debates of this Convention closely resembled those of the (.onvention of 1850-51. The veto's opponents continued to aver that the veto wes contrary to the principles of' representative government. A. principal spokesm2.ll of this :;roup, lilr. John L. }liner, a delegate from Hamil ton County, said;

7 Ibid., 310.

8Ibid., 311. 18

It may prevent the best considered and most essential legislation, and would certainly do so where political parties are pretty equally blanaced, as, generally, they a.re most likely to be and thus be me.de to subvert the fundamental principle of representative Government, viz: that the majority shall govern. It is not a legitimate mode of checking the legislative department of a representative republican. government. It is a blending and con founding, to some extent, at least to the independent departments of such government, which all wise statesmen consider should be kept distinct, and as independent of ea6h other as possible.9

John B. Coats, a delegate from Union County, was even more vehement in his words. Should the veto become an actuality in Ohio he wished that he

••• might go down to posterity recorded in opposi tion to this grant of povrer---a power that I deem odious. inconsistent with the liberal, progressive spirit of the age in which we live, and subversive of the fundamental principles of free government.10

Not content to rest having said this much, Mr. Coats invoked the supreme authority of the Almighty. This delegate believed that

" ••• resistance to all forms of oppression, or centralization of power, iB in like obedience to God ••• 1111 With such religious devotion to the principle of legislative supremacy in their midst, delegates to the Convention of 1873 did wall to formulate a proposal calling for a veto power which could be overridden by a three-fifths vote of all the elected members of the legislature.

9 Debates, 1873. II, 1510. 10 Ibid., 1512. 11 Ib·1 d ., 1513. 19

Veto proposals which ca.me before the Convention of 1873 seemed to range from one extreme to the other. The first proposal was to grant the veto to the governor and require a two-thirds vote to override his objections. The friends of the veto, seeing that they could not secure the ratification of the convention on this proposal, next proposed a veto power in which only a majority of the elected memgers would be required for re-enactment. George Roadly, however, was not content with such a mild preventive to hasty, ill-advised legislation.

He seemed to be the motivating force behind the adoption of a third proposal, the one ultimately submitted to the voters, requiring a three-fifths vote of the elected legislators for repassage over the veto. In one of his appeals for this proposal Mr. Hoadly emphasized the fact thatt

••• there is not, today, anything between the people of Ohio and the worst species of sum.ptuary laws---l'Yly speciea ot sumptuary law, regulating the habits of the people---there is nothing between us and such laws, except the good sense of the General Assembly.12

This argument may have caused the delegates to fear that such laws would be passed in the future. At any rate, they included the proposal for executive veto in the new Constitution.

Perhaps the people rejected the Constitution submitted by this

Convention of 1873 because of the inclusion of the veto power. The

12Ib.d -2:...·· 1074. 20

proposals vrere not voted on separately. The entire Constiti.;tion had

either to be acceoted or rejected by the people of Ohio. The Conven

tion's work wa.s rejected overwhelmingly by a vote of 250,169 to 102,885, 13 and the r::overnment of Ohio continued under the Constitution of 1851.

But the fight for executive veto power vras not dead. Poli tica.l

intrigue we_s in the wind. Durir.g the lo_st quarter of the Nineteenth

Century, Iv'.ark He.nna and the Republican machine seemed determined to

make the governor an important political figure. Referring to the

executive veto, one delegate to the Convention of 1912, Harvey Watson,

a Guernsey County teacher, asked if it was " ••• not a fact that this

malodorous power originated in the brain of Marcus Aurelius Ifa.nna."

(Sici)l4 The voters had rejected the entire labors of the Convention

of 1873. The Constitution of }~51 provided an "automatic" submission

to the people every twenty ::'3f,rs of the quest ion of call inc; a eonsti

tutional convention.15 The vote in 1891 was a",ainst the calling of

a convention. The Republican machine did not choose to wait nnother

twenty years for expansion of gubernatorie.l poY.er. It sou,~ht some new method of change.

The way was found by the Republican General Assembly of 1902. In

13Roseboom and Yieisenberger, op. cit., 336.

14Debates, 1912~ I, 570.

15ohio Const. (1851), Art. XVI, sec. 3. 21

that year the Assembly passed rfr. Long,·worth Is bill providing that:

A state convention of any political party rray take aetion upon any constitutional amendment, which is to be voted. upon e.t the followinc election, and said con vention may declare for or against such e.mendment, and such declaration shall be considered as a portion of their ticket.16

The significance of this act was enormous in those days of almost

consistent straight-ticket -..roting;. If the I?.'>publicans fe.vored an amendment proposal, an "X 11 in the 13.ppropriate circle would be a vote

in favor of it. .Any voter who wished to vote the Republican ticket but to oppose the runendment could not vote a straight ticket but must vote separately for each office end each proposal. Since voters, then as now, were not likely to do this,, endorsement of the party's state convention ws.s sufficient to secure passage or rejection of a proposed amendment.

The provisions of this law resulted in the adoption, in 1903, of an amendment conferring upon the i3overnor the rip;ht to veto bills and items in appropriation bills enacted by the General Assembly. The veto adopted was like neither the modest proposals voted down in the

Convention of 1850-51 nor the three-fifths requirement rejected by the voters in 1873. The people of Ohio had bestowed upon their governor the most drastic veto power ever given any executive in this country.17

16ohio Laws 1902, P• 352-3.

17Tuttle, op. cit.,, 107. 22

The governor received more power than is evident on the face of the

amendment. If his objections were to be overriden. the General

Assembly must repass the measure by a two-thirds vote of the elected members. This in itself was strong, but the provision was added that

the vote for repassa;-r:e must not be less than that which the bill had

received in its original passa,~e. The implications of this are obvious. If a bill should pass with eighty per cent of each house in favor, the governor's veto could not be overridden with seventy-five per cent of the elected members voting for the bill.

The lessening of opposition to executive power can be explained

only through party alignment. It is usual for more votes to be cast for a personality than for an issue; however. the difference between

the vote cast in 1903 for the veto amendment and the vote cast for

Myron T. Herrick. Republican candidate for governor, was unexpectedly slight. The amendment to confer the veto power on the governor was accepted by a vote of 458.681 to 338,317. In the gubernatorial race

Herrick polled 475,560 from a total of 877,203, while his Democratic opponent, Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland, garnered 361,748.18 These results do not correlate perfectly, but the similarity is too great to be overlooked.

Veto power had scarcely been granted to the governor when move-

18 Report of the Secretary of State, Ohio Statistics for 1903 (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1903), 374. 23

ments to shear away this authority began. In 1906 a. proposal to modify veto power ca.me before the voters. This proposal, which had originated as a le ,sislritive Joint R.esolution, was desie;ned to amend

Article II, section 18, to require a. two-third 1 s majority in ea.ch house for repasse,g;e of a. vetoed bill. The provision requirine; as many votes on reconsideration as were received on original passage was to be deleted.19 However, when this proposal was submitted to the voters, the provisions of the Longworth law were not utilized.

No political party had pledged support to the proposal. The effec tiveness of the Loneworth law was demonstrated by the ensuing vote.

Mr. Tuttle reports, " ••• This proposal, lacking the aid of the Long worth law and the approval of a dominant political party, failed of adoption though it carried every county and received a vote of five 20 to one in its favor of those voting upon it." Still, the law had served its framers 1 purpose. The f;overnor had now become more than a. figurehead. He could force legisle.tive attention to his views on a subject by a. more direct method than cajolery and pleading.

Governor Myron T. Herrick (1904-1906) became the first governor to exercise the newly acquired eY~ecutive veto. The records show that he made use of the veto twenty-two times and the item veto two times.

(See l'-ppendix II.) He may not have realized just how powerful this

19ohio Laws 1906, P• 412.

20Tuttle, op. cit., 108. 24

weapon was; or the General Assembly may have been chac;rined by its loss of power and ready to enact only measures so obnoxious that the

,~:overnor could do nothing but veto them. Whatever the reason, the fact that Herrick we_s the first to have access to the veto power is said to be the chief reason for his defeat when he sought re-election.21

Neither the theory of legislative supremacy nor the opposition to executive tyranny was dead. Both were still powerful enough to cause delegates the the Fourth Constitutional Convention of Ohio in 1912 to attempt to restrict the governor's veto power. To most of the dale- gates complete removal of the veto power seemed politically inexpedient, but partial restriction did seem practical and desirable. Thus the final proposal submitted to the people suggested removal of the provision that required as many votes dn repassage as were cast in the original enactment; provided that the General Assembly could override the governor's objections by a three-fifths rather than a two-thirds majority; and limited the item veto to appropriation acts only.22

Debate concerning the initiative and referendum somewhat obscured the issue of the veto power in the Constitutional Convention held in

1912. Delegates who did not wish to restrict the powers of the governor

21charles B. Galbreath, History of Ohio (Chicago: The American Historical Society, Inc.~ 1925)~ 680; and Fess, op. cit., 367. Both these authors support this theory.

22ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 16 (A.mend. 1912). 25

faced the assertion that veto power would be needless when the people came to possess the veto through the referendum. Any delegate who wanted to give this power to the governor must be anti-democratic and an enemy of the people. Harry D. Thomas of Cleveland seemed to find the executive veto needless and anti-democratic. He declaredt

The governor's veto, in my opinion, is simply ex tending to an individual power that certain people in this Convention do not care to extend to all the people. This Convention, I think, is going to grant that veto power to the people themselves, and there will be no necessity in having a certain individual, whether the governor or someone else, to exercise this power over us in the future ••• The very fact that the Governor's veto will have to~~ extended proves representative government a failure.

2. Nature of the Veto

The veto proposal submitted to the people in 1912 was accepted by a vote of 282,412 to 254,186, a majority of 28,226.24 Today the governor exercises his veto power under that amendment. There has been no Constitutional addition to the governor's veto power, but some expansion has come through definition. This will be discussed later. The major points of the present veto power are (1) it can be overridden by three-fifths of each house, (2) items in appropriation

23Debates, 1912, I, 566.

24Galbreath, op. cit., 108. 26

bills can be disapproved without affecting the remainder of such a bill, (3) a bill will become law if it is not returned by the governor within ten days, unless the General Assembly by adjournment prevents the return, and (4) a bill becomes law after adjournment unless within ten days the.governor files the bill with his written objections in the office of the Secretary of State.25

Veto power has been used many times in Ohio since 1903. Whether every instance in which it has been employed has involved a political issue on which the parties were holding the line can never be more than a matter of conjecture. It is a restricted veto, yet ironically it is more absolute than that exercised by St. Clair, for any acts of the territorial governor and his council could have been disapproved by the United States Congress.26 Today there is no national authority that can supersede the power of the governor when exercised within

Constitutional limitations. The governor of Ohio is not the administrative subordinate of the president of the United States, nor is he under the domination of Congress, except in so far as he must abide by the Constitution of the United States and "all laws necessary and proper" to put that Constitution into effect. When the governor of

Ohio objects to a bill, there is no person or body other than the

25ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 16 (Amend. 1912).

26samuel p. Orth, The Centralization of Administration in Ohio (New Yorka The Columbia University Press, 1903), 166. 27

General Assembly which has further voice in the matter.27 This ex- eludes action by both the Emergency Board and the Controlling Board when an item has been vetoed in a current appropriation bill. The

Controlling Board cannot transfer funds from one item in an appropriation bill to another item which has been disapproved by the governor and has not been repassed by the General Assembly. The Emergency Board cannot grant funds to an agency to carry on activities provided for in the vetoed item. Once vetoed, the item no longer exists, for the legislature may not confer upon any administrative board authority that would result in thwarting or circumventing the governor's veto pmver.28

Under the veto power in Ohio a governor may not disapprove a section of a bill (other than an appropriation bill) which does not meet with his approval. To be subject to the item veto, the rejected portion of an appropriation bill must constitute a separate line item which can readily be severed from the rest of the bill without in effect amending the act. If the deletion did this, the governor's power would be a creative act and creative acts are not a prerogative of the execu tive.29 The separation of powers doctrine is still popular enough to prevent flagrant usurpation of legislative functions by the governor.

27 1936 Opinions of the Attorney General 5188, P• 230. 28 See The State ex rel Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. Con- trolling Board of Ohio et ai, 130 Ohio State Reports, 127, 131 (1935J;"

291945 O_pinions of the Attorney General 34&, P• 382. 28

the practices of other states with respect to the veto power will illustrate this. North Carolina grants no veto. Indiana, Iowa,

Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and hest Virginia give no item veto.30

The Ohio Constitution apparently is clear on the time period during which bills will become law if not returned by the governor.

Article II, section 16, plainly states:

If a bill shall not be returned by the Governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after being presented to him, it shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly by adjournment prevents it~ return; in which case it shall become a law unless, within ten days after such adjournment, it shall be filed by him, with his objections in writing in the office of the Secre tary of State.31

~ben does the ten day period begin? If a bill is presented at 11:59 p.m., does the tenth day start then or the following day? At the end of the period can a bill be delivered at the eleventh hour and the governor's objections still be valid? In computing the time element the Attorney General of Ohio advised the governor in 1945 that " ••• the day of presentation is to be excluded and the tenth day included.n32

This computation schedule is to be followed in the case of the item veto also. The returning of an item of an appropriation bill with

30 Book of the States, 1948-49 (Chicago: Council of State Govern- ments, 1948), 112. 31 ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 16 (Amend. 1912). 32 1945 Opinions of the Attorney General 496, p. 642. 29

the governor's objections to the legisle.tors on the eleventh day would

be useless, as the item would already be law.

The bill or item, together with objections. must be returned to

the house in which it orie;inated. Does this mean that the governor

is required to seek out the sponsor of the bill and ascertain that he

receives it back? To whom can the bill and pertinent objections be

delivered? The Attorney General, in the same opinion, advised the

governor that a proper return could be made to " ••• the presiding officer,

clerk, or other officer, or any member of the House in which the bill

originated.n33 This definition would not excuse the governor from making a proper return of a bill on the grounds that the sponsor or

presiding officer could not be found. It may be returned to any mem ber. 34

Should a bill be in the governor's hands when the General Assembly

adjourns, the governor may file this bill and his objections thereto with the Secretary of State. However, the General Assembly may recon-

sider this bill at its next regular session should it so desire. It may generally be stated that there is no "pocket veto" in Ohio.

The adjournment of the General Assembly is a matter of legislative

discretion only, notwithstanding the Constitutional provision that the

33 Ibid., 642 34 ~·· 642. 30

governor can adjourn the General Assembly when the two houses cannot agree on the time for adjournment. The governor's power to adjourn the Assembly is further curtailed by the proviso that he may not adjourn it beyond the time for its next regular meeting. Thus this power ca.n hardly be used to further a governor's designs to prohibit enactment of measures which he may not veto with political expediency or which would be overridden by the General Assembly should it remain in session.

When do the two houses disagree as to the time to adjourn? The only feasible disagreement occurs when one house desires to adjourn more quickly than the other. This was the case when Governor Harry

L. Davis prorogued the Eighty-Fourth General Assembly on May 28, 1921; the House of Representatives and the Senate could not agree on the date for sine die adjournment.35 Should both housea desire to remain in continuous session, the governor would be fettered in any action he might wish to undertake to dissolve them.

Adjournment means the final adjournment of the General Assembly and not a day to day or temporary adjournment.36 The adjournment of the Assembly is purely a legislative prerogative. Even the governor's power to call a special session of the General Assembly cannot be axer- cised if that body is in temporary adjournment at the time of the proc-

35 Journal of the House of Representatives of Ohio (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1921), CIX, 933.

361945 Opinions of the Attorney General 496, P• 642. 31

lamation calling the specis.l session. Reasoning on this wise,, the attorney general stateda

••• if the calling of a special session of the General Assembly at a time when that body stands adjourned to a future date would terminate the session of v1hich it is in adjournment,, the Governor could indirectly ~ccomplish that which the Constitution impliedly prohibits. 7

By never adjourning ~ die,, then, the General Assembly can force the governor to approve a bill, reject it, or permit it to become law without his signature.

The veto power does not extend to all proposals that become law in the state of Ohio. All bills passed by the General Assembly are subject to review by the governor, it is true, but measures which are passed by the people through the initiative procedure are not subject to the veto power.38

It has been proposed that the final judgment o~ vetoed bills be transferred from the legislators to the voters. Should a bill be passed by the legislators e.nd vetoed by the executive, the conflict between the legislature and the governor should be resolved by the 39 -- people rather than reconsidered by the formulating body. This pro- ' posal has some merit,, since both the governor and the members of the legislature receive their mandate from the people. If the individuals

371934 Opinions of the Attorney General 2927, P• 1052. 38ohio Const. (1851),, A.rt. II, sec. lb (Amend. 1912). 39Francis w. Coker, "Interworkings of State Administration and Di rect Legislation," reprinted from The Annals of the American A.cade of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia: March,, 1916 , 6. 32

whom the people select to formulate and administer the rules by v.chich all shall be governed cannot agree, the issue should perhaps be decided by the body which has the highest power, namely the people as a whole.

However, public ratification would be a slow method that could easily work to the disadvantage of the people during administrations like that of A. Vic Donahey (1923-1929), when the chief executive and the legislature seemed to be in almost constant disagreement.

In the state of Ohio no laws can become operative only when called into use by ~Lhe governor. Any law (except those relating to public schools) becomes operative on approval by the governor or on favorable reconsideration by the General Assembly.40 When the attorney general voiced his opinion, the law in question related to the power of the governor to declare a state of emergency and then apply the provisions of the proposed law. Such a law could not be enforced at any other time. The attorney general reasoned that this would f)e in direct violation of Article II, section 26, of the Ohio Constitution, which states:

All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; nor shall any act, except as relates to public schools, be passed to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembll, except as otherwise provided in this constitution.4

40 1937 Opinions of the Attorney General 269, P• 451.

4lohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 26 (Amend. 1912). 33

There was no provision relative to dormant laws which could become

eff'ective on the governor' i: proclamation.

Different governors have used the veto power in different degree.

There has also been great variation in the action of the General As-

sembly on returned bills. Considering the extremes in the use of the

veto power, there stands at one end of the scale "Veto Vic" Donahey,

who exercised this prerogative a grand total of 147 times (together

~~th six item vetoes) during his three terms in office. Appropriate

is the phrase, " ••• he earned his sobriquet ••• "42 At the other extreme stands John w. Bricker, who, during his three successive terms in office, felt the need of the veto power on only sixteen occasions.

Much of this difference was due to the situation existing at each time.

Donahey, a Democrat, was governor during years of Republican domination

in the General Assembly. Many of the acts he vetoed resulted from

political antagonism which arose. Bricker, a Republican, was blessed

with a General Assembly of his own political faith.

Donahey also had more bills reenacted notwithstanding his objec-

tions than any other governor. Again, this was the result of political

animosity. The record of Myers Y. Cooper illustrates that the General

Assembly and the governor ca.n concur on measures enacted and objections

thereto. Cooper's tenure symbolizes legislative-executive cooperation

42rra.ncis R. Aumann, "Ohio Government in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1938, Nash to White," which is in Chaps. I and II of Vol. VI of The State of Ohio, Carl Wittke, ed. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archealogical and Historical Society Press, 1942), 41. 34

in the highest degree. Cooper felt called upon to veto twenty-two bills. Not one was repassed. Professor Harvey Walker says, "In fact, the assembly did not even take a second vote on any of these 43 measures, thereby concurring in Governor Cooper's judgment. tt

The governor's possession of the veto power accounts for much of his leadership in legislative policy formulation. The veto is, in reality, a last resort which can be relied upon to emphasize gubernatorial views. It is constant, it can be utilized if measures conflicting with the governor's views are passed, and both parties know of its presence. The threat of the veto is thus often as effective as the actual use of it. The governor is not slow to inform the

General Assembly that he will use the veto. Lipson remarkst

It is only natural under such a system for the governor to make his wishes heard beforehand. The sponsor of a bill would usually prefer to make a com promise with the governor in the conmittee stage than run the risk of losing his whole iroposal when it comes up for the governor's signature.4

Governor Donahey's inaugural address of January 8, 1923, aptly demon- strates that governors are not hesitant in infonning the assembly that they will veto bills which they feel are not in keeping with their interests. Said Donaheyt

43Harvey Walker, Constructive Government in Ohio (Columbust The Ohio History Press, 1948), 39. 4 4tipson, op. cit., 55. 35

The Governor by law is given the power to veto acts of the General Assembly. If it becomes necessary to exercise this power, delegated by the people, I shall not hesitate a.nd will file with the veto a mes sage giving reasons therefor.45

The imports.nee of veto authority as a part of the Ohio governor's expanding power must be acknowledged. La.eking this power, early governors often found themselves equipped to become only nominal leaders. Through effective use of the veto a.nd the veto threat, present day Ohio executives stand as true, potent leaders, adequately equipped to deal with their legislative bodies.

B. PARTY LEADERSHIP

A second vital aspect of gubernatorial power is the influence the incumbent exercises within his own party. Such influence is not constant. Each individual possesses it in differing degree. Never- theless it is a vital factor in shaping every administration.

This discussion is not concerned with the political merit of a.ny particular governor. Certain governors have succeeded in having their recommendations adopted by the General Assembly, while others, engaging in a political battle ~~th the members of the legislative body, have failed. Was success or failure entirely dependent on political alignment? How much did the personality of the governor influence the

45Mercer, Legislative History_, V, 11. 36

members of the assembly? These questions cannot be completely answered, but it can perhaps be illustrated that a governor's party leadership often hinges on his personality and that his party leadership is often the basis for his executive leadership.

The separation of powers doctrine is not adhered to rigidly in

Ohio. The General Assembly does not in itself originate, formulate, and enact every measure which ulti:ril.a.tely becomes law. Vital in suggesting, if not in shaping, the Assembly's course of action are the views of the chief executive of the state.

The General Assembly's reaction to gubernatorial reconunendations usually indicates both the incumbent's strength as party leader and the strength of his party in the legislature. It is not safe to assert dogmatically that legislative-executive relations would be thoroughly harmonious should one party capture both houses and elect the governor. Nor is it inevitable that no wise legislation can be produced when the governor and his assembly are of different political faiths.

Governor Frank J. Lausche's first term illustrates to some degree that a Democratic governor can work harmoniously and constructively with a Republican General Assembly. Lausche was obliged to work with a Republican majority in both,Houses. His procedure was effective, although displeasing to many Democratic leaders. Maher rem.arks,

"He (Lausche) wooed the G.O.P. leaders, consulting them more frequently 37

than he did the Democrats."46 Lausche felt the need for the veto only seven times. Only two of these seven measures were subsequently repe..ssed.

Harmonious legislative-executive relations will generally result when both the governor and the majority of both houses of the Assembly are of.the same political affiliation. Because such instances have been rare during the latest half century of Ohio history. they have become outstanding. The most notable two instances of such relationship came during the first administration of James M. Cox and during the incumbency of Myers Y. Cooper. Perhaps the latter instance is more notable, for the Assembly acted favorably on every gubernatorial recommendation. Walker calls this " ••• a record for legislative- executive coopera.tion seldom equalled in any state at any period in our history."47 Following on the heels of Dona.hay's outstandingly poor legislative-executive relations, the cooperation of the Cooper administration seems almost incredible. However, practically the same results had been accomplished during the first term of Governor James

M. Cox. His, too, was a record seldom matched. In his autobiography

Cox quotes from the Ohio State Journal of March 11, 1913:

46 Richard L. Maher, "Ohio: Oxcart Government," in Our Sovereign State, Robert s. Allen, ed. (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1949), 179. 47 Walker. Constructive Government, 39. 38

Every reconunendation of Governor Cox, as set forth in his message of January 9th, has been enacted into law in a two months session of the present legislature, the shortest in years. Distinctly unusual is the fact that both labor and capital appear to be satisfied with the new legislation affecting them. In a majority of in stances the so-called administration bills were passed without respect to party lines.48

Cox himself does not speak so dramatically when he says, "The legis-

lative work of' my first term was now completed; every mandate of'

the constitution had been carried out and the major reforms promised

in our party platform had been adopt~d.49

Few governors can equal the record of Governors Cox and Cooper.

If' they could perhaps the people of the state would benefit. As has been mentioned, the low point in Ohio legislative-executive cooperation was reached during the three consecutive terms of A. Vic Donahey. His proposals to the Assenilily received little favorable action. In a message on March 23, 1923, Donahey appealed for cooperation and reminded the legislators that they had not followed his recommendations:

Thus far none of the recommendations made in my messages has been carried into effect by the General Assembly. No bill embracing any of' my suggestions has passed either house of the legislature; in fact, most of them are still in committee, where they have received scant consideration.SO

48As found in James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 195.

49Ib.d__.:_., 178. 5 ~ercer, Legislative History, V, 36. 39

The antagonism betvl~en the executive and the legislature was so great that the Assembly not only refused to heed the Governor's reconnnenda- tions, but a.lso atte1npted to usurp the executive appointment prerogative by refusing to assent to his nominations for positions that were to be filled 11by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." In his second message on the subject of public utilities, March 30, 1923,

Donahey declareda

The Senate has so far blocked my efforts to place even one new member on the U"t:;ilities Connnission. In other words, the Senate has presumed to become the appointing power, whereas the law placed this in the Chief Executive.51

When the governor wishes to insure due legislative consideration for one of his proposals, he may urge those of his political faith to uphold party traditions and fulfill campaign promises. This method was employed by Governor Judson Harmon (1909-1913), who issued a call for a caucus, reminded the legislators of their duty to the 52 people, and urged them to keep faith. One writer has termed his speech to the caucus a "father-to-son" talka

The Governor talked to them very much as a grieved father would reason with an erring son. There was no threat of war or discipline, no brandishing of a club. It was just a plain case of reasoning with them. He talked about the responsibility that

51 Ibid., 37. 52 Mercer, Legislative History, I, 129. 40

lay upon the legislators jointly with himself, and of the certain condemnation that would be visited upon him and them if they failed to keep their pro mises. 53

When his party subordinates got out of line Harmon perhaps left

behind his ttfatherly" attitude and clearly became the party leader.

William Hale quotes a speech by Harmon which would indicate this:

Oh, no, I don't feel that I have any right, as Governor, to impress on the legislature any views I may have. But as head of the party I have some right to insist that the platform pledges shall be fulfilled. I may have to do something.54

Could this threat have been carried out? The same writer comments,

"Governor Harmon is the head of his party in the sense that it will

give him anything he wants ••• It would be foolish to dispute his authority in his party, if he chose to exercise it.55 This was

direct, open party control by the governor.

Governor James Cox (1913-1915, 1917-1921) had another method of control through his own special device which prevented bills backed by the administration from bogging down in the mire of legislative processes. He knew the status of every proposed bill at any given moment. He outlines his method:

5311Judson Harmon--His Record and His Views," The Outlook, C (January 27, 1912), 179. 54 willirun B. Hale, "Judson Harmon and the Presidency," World's ~, XXII (June, 1911), 14450.

55Ibid., 14450. 41

After bills were presented, they were carefully catalogued by Robert s. Hayes, our executive secretary. So systematically card-indexed was every measure that we knew exactly where it was, whether it was in committee or out of it, what progress was being made and what ob structions were encounterect.56

This filing system was no control measure per se. The Governor might know the whereabouts of a bill, but this would be of little value if this information did not help the executive determine its final disposition. Cox had also seen to that, for he continues:

A careful organization was effected under the majority leader, Milton Warnes of Holmes County. He designated captains to head up groups of from twelve to fifteen members. When bills regarded as adminis trative were up for consideration and passage, the leader and his aides saw to it that there were few, if any, absentees. In this way, matters progressed.57

Here was a method of legislative leadership which should produce the desired results. If the above discussion of the excellent record achieved by Cox is to be considered worthy evidence, it did prove workable.

The governor often encounters a minor rebellion within the ranks of his party. This must be dealt with as quickly and as effectively as any major opposition which might arise. The leaders may either be placated, further antagonized, or ignored. However, it is usually unwise for the governor to increase hostility toward his program. During the tGnure of John w. Bricker (1939-1945) there was a minor

ssc ox, op. ci·t ., 163 •

57Ibid., 163. 42

insurrection led by five senators of the Republican party. The governor's method for dealing with the situation was direct and potent. Bricker•s biographer tells how Bricker quelled the insurrection:

A meeting between Bricker and the five senators was arranged. Knowing that the trouble was factional within the Republican party, since no charges had been made against him or any reasons stated during the deliberations, Bricker took the senators at a disadvantage by asking them outright to give their reasons for opposing (him) ••• The senators liked his answer and the insurrection petered out.58

Such an instance of party rebellion tests the governor's strength as party leader. He may not be able to quell the rebellion so effectively as did Governor Bricker. An incumbent's entire administration may be altered by such a failure. This is the story of

Martin L. Davey and the "Hatchet Men of Ohio." Richard L. Maher relates that the Governor had split with a powerful lobbyist, causing this man to '\'\Teak revenge by thwarting the Governor's program.. "After Davey and Wilson split, the lobbyist organized a group of Democratic Senators into what he called the 'Hatchet Men,' and they proceeded to ax the Governor and his program. at every turn.1159 With the exception of the method employed by Cox, these devices

58Ka.rl B. Pauly, Bricker of Ohio (New Yorks G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), 64.

59Maher, op. cit., 177. 43

to enhance the position of the governor in the area of legislative action have been dependent on personal influence as well as on the prestige err.anating from the position of party leader. They have been chiefly in the realm of indirect influence. Their practicality can be guaranteed only so long as the eovernor can demonstrate to the legislators that he is the head of the party. Even when this can be demonstrated, the legislators can act contrary to party policy and oppose the governor a.s did the 0 Hatchet Men" of the Davey administration. However, such a course may well prove disastrous to their further political ambitions.

It seems, then, to behoove a governor to tighten his legislative controls through various means. Frank J. Lausche seems to have discovered the key to legislative leadership during his second term in office. Through the Democratic party secretary he passed the word that certain members should be elected as officials in each house.60

The legisle.tors followed his suge;estions. 61 With men of the governor's choosing filling important legislative offices, it seems only reasonable that executive proposals would receive prompt, careful considera- ti on.

These examples of party leadership by the governor present an • 6 ~aher, op. cit., 179-80. The parties were aligned as follows: House of Representatives-sixty-nine Democrats, sixty-six Republicans; Senate-nineteen Democrats, fourteen Republicans.

61rnfonnation from personal interview wi~h Mr. Delbert Nixon, present Clerk of the House of Representatives. 44

important question. Does the body politic inherently desire one individual to look to as leader? If• so, the various govermnents of the world could well dispense with the le.rislative bre,nch of gover:nr.i.ent and concentrate all power in one individual. If not, then perhaps the Ohio governor has already acquired as much power as can wisely be concentrated in one man. Although one can scarcely determine whether or not the body politic desires one leader, many vrriters agree that much of the governor's influence and power is derived from the tendency of his constituents to l6ok to him as the natural leader in the affairs of state.62

If a tendency exists runong the people to desire one individual for a leader, perhaps this desire is not due to incompetent legislative bungling, but to a wish to fix responsibility on one certain individual who then may be praised or berated as the situation warrants. A fa.ct of great political import~nce is, of course, that the governor is elected from the state at large, whereas the legislative members are chosen from certain districts. A person living in one district has no voice in selecting the representatives of another district, but he does ca.st his vote for governor. Since it is the people as a whole who elect the :;overnor, it is natural that he should turn to them for approval of his policies. Since his is a continuous task and the legis-

62Harold Zink, Governnent and Politics in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), 732; and Galbreath, op. cit., 11, are two who hold this view. 45

lature is in session, under normal conditions, only for a few months every two years, the governor has more opportunity to appear publicly in an official capacity. Appearances may be on ceremonial or official occasions. Whatever the event, it brings the governor's name before the public. Thus the executive gains power over the legislature.

Lipson remarks, " ••• The governor, in order to lead the legislature, makes his appeal directly to the people. He comes before the public eye and focuses popular attention on issues which he favors."63 If the governor can appeal in such a manner that the legislative branch is overwhelmed with demands from the electorate to enact certain measures, his program will, in all probability, be executed. It would be politically inexpedient for the legislature to do otherwise.

Another question could well be posed at this point. Can a legislative body enact measures without the guiding hand of a leader? Most sources tend to answer this negatively. Mussey remarks, "All legis lation must and will be the result of leadership."64 If leadership is actually needed in all legislation, the desire of the governor to become the leader will not seem quite so strange as it might at first.

If Ohio were operating under a unicameral system of government, a leader selected by the legislature could, perhaps, serve as its leader.

63Lipson, op. cit., 52.

64Henry R. Mussey, ed., "Participation of the Executive in Leg islation," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, V (New York: Columbia University, 1915), 137. 46

Since there is at present a bicameral system and little opportunity for one legislator to exert influence over both houses, perhaps the governor feels that it is his duty to exercise his control over the legislature. His role in the formulation of legislation has expanded to such a point that he has been referred to as the "chief legis lator. "65

Legislators have tried from time to time to provide the needed leadership from among their own ranks, but generally their efforts have been abortive. Perhaps the best known device tested has been the legislative cornrrattee. Commenting on the general failure of the legislature in providing leadership, Coker writes, "None of these devices could satisfy the fundamental need---from the standpoint of the public, rather than of the political pa.rty---for an open, respo11- sible, and unified leadership in legislation.066 In recent years the legislative bodies have tried to remedy the situation by other methods. Of these attempts, the two most important have been the legislative council and the movement for unicameralism.

The legisle.tive council, which has been crea.ted in twenty-two states (including Ohio) for the purpose of studying proposals and

65Arthur N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (3rd ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), 352.

66 Coker, "Interworkings of State Administration and Direct Legislation," 2. 47

doing the research necessary to acquaint the legislators with the numerous social implications of proposed laws, has been assuming added prominence as a group for leadership. The Ohio council, created in 1947, is now composed of twenty-one members. With an annual budget of $60,000, this group should do some effective work.67

The precedent established by Nebraske. in creating a unicruneral legislative body had a great deal of effect on the Ohio General Assembly.

Beginning in 1935, proposals were introduced in three successive

Assemblies designed primarily to bring before the people a Constitu- tional amendment to establish a one-house legislature. One proposal, submitted in 1935, proposed a unicameral body whose members would be elected from ten districts established by the Secretary of State. The total membership vvas never to exceed sixty. Reapportiorunent was to be automatic following each decennial census. The people were to have power to propose laws to this body and to adopt or reject laws or any item of any law by a referendum vote.EB would this tend further to increase the power of the governor by giving him only one body to deal with? Should his party be in the majority his course might be easy. On the other hand, if the opposite p~rty had the majority, there would be no second house to deliberate on the measures and possibly

67 .A.mended Senate Bill 230 in Advance Copy Ohio Laws 1949. Approved by Governor Lausche, July 29, 1949.

68 Journa~ of House of Representative~, 92nd General Assembly, CA'VI, 430. See also Vol. C~lfII, 148, 152, for proposals made in 1937 and Vol. CXVIII, 71, 165, for 1939 proposals. 48

delay or defeat them if they were not in line with the governor's

program. It is to be assumed that the veto power would be retained,

since it was not mentioned in the ve.rious proposals.

If the legislature could not provide leadership from its own

ranks, where would it turn for a leader? The answer was the executive department and especially the governor. The governor's position as a legislative leader was strengthened by the demands of the people.

They desired a person to whom they could turn to demand correction of abuses. A more logical leader than the governor could not be found.

Was he not vested with the supreme executive power of the state? Could he not protect the people against the encroachments of business?69

It is from the people, then, that much of the governor's influence over the action of the legislature emanates. However, this situation has another side. Often the Governor does not possess the power to provide the leadership his constituents expect from him. Lipson says the people are " ••• taking his title at face value ••• They sought from him a remedy of' abuses over which he had little or no control.'' 70

69 .A.nonymous, "The Strengthening of Our State Executive," The Out look, XCVII (February 11, 1911), 293, reads: "In a strong executive lies the protection of the people against the oppression of big busi ness and the exploitation of corrupt politics." 70 Lipson, op. cit., 45. Also see Mercer, Legislative History, I, 136, speech of Governor Harmon in which he said, 11 Rightly or wrongly the people have come to look to the Governor as the chosen leader of his party, as the Chief Executive chosen by the people." 49

With respect to influence derived from his position as the leader of the party, the governor may encounter many difficulties. It is quite possible that the governor may not be the actual head of the party. Maybe he is merely a tool for machine politics. JI. governor in this position has three courses open to him. Professor w-. Brooke

Graves suggests that he may (1) adopt a policy of abject subservience to the state party organization, (2) defy the organization, or (3) a- dopt the more moderate and more sensible e:;:pedient of consulting the party leaders and then using his own judgment.71 Bruce Bliven, writing in 1924, suggests that the Governor of Ohio might at any time be a men elected by a machine and, in all probability, forced to accede to demands of political bosses. He believes that " ••• the history of Ohio for fifty years past is a history of government of, by and for the machine.1172

C. RECOJ

The governor is obliged to make recommendations to the legislature.

Article III, section 7, of the Constitution states: "He shall comm.uni- cate at every session, by message, to the General Assew~ly, the condi-

71w. Brooke Graves, American State Government (3rd ed.; Boston: D. c. Heath & Co., 1946), 379. 72Bruce Bliven, "The Ohio Gang, II,"New Republic, XXXVIII (May 14, 1924), 306. 50

tion of the State, and recommend such measures as he shall deem ex pedient. "73 Through such messages the governor transmits the majority of his views to the legislature, although most governors have also made use of party channels and the press for publication of their views.74

Public and press attention focuses on a gubernatorial message, which is likely to be reiteration of the campaign platform. The governor's object in delivering messages to the Assembly is to secure enactment of legislation he favors. The message is more than a mere listing of proposals to which the Assembly should pay heed. It is often a statement of political ideology and Walker characterizes it as " ••• quite often designed more for public consumption than for the 75 guidance of the legisle.ture." How, then, can this be much of a spur to le,:;isla.tive action? The same author continues:

Much that is contained in it is worded carefully to stimulate public action without committing the chief executive. If he and the leaders of his party find that his suggestions a.re well received by the press and the public,, action by the legisle.ture may follow. If strong protestsarise~ the suggestions are quietly withdrawn in a personal conference between the governor and the legis lative leaders.76

73ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 7. 74 Maher,, op. cit., 179. Press publication was one of Governor Lausche's favorite methods.

75Harvey Walker,, "Governor's Messages, 1930," The .American Political Science Review, XXIV (May, 1930), 381.

76 Ibid.,, 381. 51

It would appear, then, that favorable action by the Assembly on propose.ls contained in the message often is more a result of public opinion than of the intrineio merit of the actual proposals.

The governor may be able further to increase his influence over legislative enactments through having once served in the Assembly himself. He would thereby better understand what legislation would receive most favorable treatment and how far the legislators could expediently be pushed. Lipson believes, "Some of the most effective governors have been drawn from legislative ranks."77 The record shows that twenty-five Ohio governors had previously served in the

General Assembly. 78

The force of a recommendation may depend upon any or all of the powers discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Reconnnending various measures for enactment is more forceful than merely sugi:i;esting a possible course of action. As one writer phrases it, 11A new meaning and interpretation is being placed upon that word 'recommend' until 79 it seems to be synonymous with the word 'dictate. 'tt The amount of truth in this statement is undoubtedly directly proportionate to the governor's political e.nd personal popularity.

77 Lipson, op. cit., 217.

78F. E. Scobey e.nd B. L. McElroy, The Biographical Annals of Ohio (Springfield, Ohio: Springfield Publishing Co., 1905), II, 548.

79okey, op. cit., 573. 52

D. PRESCRIBING F'OR SPECIAL SESSIONS

In his messages to regular sessions of the legisle.ture, the

governor can only reconunend measures for consideration. In case of special sessions, his method of influencing legislative action is much more direct and potent. A Constitutional amendment approved in 1912 gives him the power to limit the General Assembly to a consideration of those measures outlined in the proclamation calling for the special session.80 Previous to this time he had possessed the power to call soecial sessions81 and inform the legislators as to why they were convened, but the Assembly was not limited to con sideration of only the suggested measures. 82 Many state governors lack this power. The legislature itself by majority vote may determine the subjects to be considered in special session in Connecti- cut, Dela·ware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,

New Hampshire, New York, !forth Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,

South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. In Alabama and 83 Florida this must be done by two-thirds of the elected members.

80ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 8 (Amend. 1912).

81 The legislature can call itself into special session in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire. In Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska., Vermont, and West Virginia it must be done by petition of two-thirds of its members. Book of the States, 1948-49, 106.

82ohio Const. (1851), A.rt III, sec. 8.

83Book of the States, 1948-49, 106. 53

This restriction in Ohio is so absolute that the General Assembly ms.y not consider any measure which is not set forth either in the proclarnation calling it into session or in a subsequent gubernatorial message. The validity of the restriction was litigated and upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1932 in the case of The State ex rel. v.

Braden. Justice J. Jones giving the opinion, "Had the General Assembly legislated upon a subject not within its call,, or had not adhered to the limitations placed upon it in the proclamation, its action in that respec t wou ld b e voi. d • 11 84 This even includes action designed to submit a Constitutional amendment to the voters. If it was not set forth in the governor's proclamation, such action is contrary to Article III, section 8, of the Constitution of Ohio. 1851, as amended in 1912, 85 even though it may be in accordance with Article XVI,, section 1.

The decision as to whether to convene the General Assembly in a special session rests with the governor alone. His decision is dis cretionary and is not subject to challenge or review by the courts.86

However, as already pointed out, this power to convene the Assembly in a special session cannot be utilized to adjourn a regular session of that body. That would be giving the governor power to dissolve the legislative branch,, and he has no power to adjourn that body

84125 Ohio State 307, P• 314 (1932). 85 1936 Opinions of the Attorney General 5091, P• 43. 86 1934 Opinions of the Attorney General 2927, P• 1051. 54

except in cases of disagreement as to the time of adjournment.87

The General Assembly in special session is limited as to the subjects it may consider, but the details of the legislation may not be prescribed by the governor. That is a legislative prerogative, and the amendment does not purport to give the governor any legislative power.88 The power to call special Assembly sessions and prescribe subjects for consideration is an effective source of influence on that body's action. If the governor feels that a special session is warranted and issues the necessary proclamation the General As- sembly might convene and then refuse to act upon the governor's proposals. Should this happen, the people of the state would probably remember such refusal at the next election. The governor does, however, have legisl&tive power through the provisions of this amendment submitted to and ratified by the voters in 1912. However, the opposition the proposal met in the Convention of 1912 was particularly strong. Mr. Edward Doty, a Cleveland manufacturer, vehemently opposed this grant of power. In his discussion of this matter, he remarked:

Yes, and to that extent (the veto) he has a legisla tive function; but you ws.nt to go ahead of that and have him. say what the legislators shall pass. You want to set up the governor as the beginning and the end, and if the legislature gets a shot in the middle they are lucky! 89

87ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 9.

881945 Opinions of the Attorney General 413, P• 529. 89Debates, 1912, II, 1352. 55

Obviously the people did not feel that this grant of power would result in executive usurpation of the legislative prerogative or the amendment would not have passed by such an overwhelming majority.

The vote cast for the amendment totaled 319,100, while the votes op 90 posed to the amendrnent numbered only 192,130.

During his first administration Governor James M. Cox had the first opportunity to utilize this newly-added power. Adverse reaction ca~ perhaps chiefly from his enemies who " ••• raised the cry of boss ••• loud and long ••• n91 These enemies denounced the Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate for adhering to the die- tates of the Constitution. The same book continues, " ••• The burden of the cry being that the Governor would not permit the legislators to exercise any freedom in the subjects of legislation but insisted on confining them to those things which they were called together to pass upon."92

These various methods by which the governor can influence the

General Assembly's action go far in making him a prominent legislative figure. However, much of his influence over legislators comes from his ability to dispense patronage. Charles B. Galbreath writes,

90secretary of State, Statistical Report for 1912 (Springfield, Ohio: Springfield Publishing Co., 1913), 656.

91.Axionymous, The New Ohio (Columbus: publishing company not given, 1913), 6.

92__Ib"di_., 6 • 56

MThe privilege of recorrunending measures would not in itself be very effective were it not backed up by the alluring and nersuasive power of patronage.n93 The effectiveness of this power the succeeding

section will discuss.

93Galbreath, op. cit., 10. 57

CHAPTER III: THE POWER OF APPOIWTMENT

A. HISTORICAL E\iOLUTIOlJ

The appointive power looms large as one of the governor's chief weapons. By wisely using this power he can bargain effectively with the General Assembly should he find this desirable or necessary.l

This would probably not have been true in in early Ohio under the

Constitution of 1802, for the governor did not have much appointive power. The only officer of any importance whom the governor could select was the Adjutant General.2 He could make recess appointments, it is true, but these were not too effective, since his appointees 3 would hold office only until the end of the next session of the Assembly.

This power and the power granted him to call special elections as provided in Article I, section 12, were rarely used, as a speech of

H. D. Clark, a delegate from Lore.in County to the Convention of 1850-

51 aptly illustrates. Clark was describing the office and duties of the governor and illustrating how little the officer had to do. "He is to fill vacancies in certain offices until the legislature meets. He is to call special elections to fill vacancies in certain other oases.

He seldom had occasion to do either, as vacancies rarely occurred, and

lL.ipson, op. cit., 60.

2ohio Const. (1802), A.rt. v, sec. 6.

3ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 8. 58

never by resignation."4 The governor received little effective power from these two provisions.

Under the Constitution of 1802, the bulk of appointment power was reserved to the General Assembly. The Assembly was empowered to appoint by joint ballot the secretary of state, 5 the state treasurer and the state auditor, 6 and, encroaching upon the i~overnor's authority as commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia, the majors general and the quartermasters general. 7 There seems to be an inconsistency between this fact and the duty of the governor under other sections of the Constitution. The governor could determine neither who would hold offices nor what methods of administration they might employ.

He had no power to remove appointees should they act in opposition to his will or to the general welfare of the people. Yet the governor was charged to ''take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and was vested with the supreme executive power of the state.8

The fact that the governor could not remove any incompetent official, regardless of how he might conduct himself in office, was described by Mr. George Hoadly, a delegate from Hamilton County, in

4Debates, 1850-51, I, 314.

5ohio Const. (1802), A.rt. II, sec. 16.

6ohio Const. (1802), A.rt. VI, sec. 2. 7ohio Const. (1802), Art. v.' sec. 5. 8ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 7, 1. 59

the Convention of 1873. To illustrate his point he quoted from

3urnet 1 s Notes on the North Viestern Territory: "He has not any participation in the appointing power. He is not permitted to nominate candidates for office, nor can he remove an officer or even suspend his functions. temporarily. however mischievous his conduct in office may be. 119 In directing the policies of adminis trative affairs, the governor was practically powerless. The theory of legislative supremacy prevailed in this area of state government.

This condition existed until the people approved the new Consti tution in 1851. Then the power of appointing the major executive officers was withdrawn from the legislative branch, but it was, in the main, still denied the governor. The secretary of state, the auditor, and the treasurer were made elective officers; the execu tive department was expanded to include a lieutenant governor and an attorney general, both of whom were to be elected by the people.10

The resulting executive branch included these various elected officials responsible directly to the people and not subject to the direction of the governor. Lipson attributes the change to upsurging democracy which " ••• concluded that the more officials the people elect, the more truly responsible will the government become. ull Perhaps .:~overnment

9 Debates, 1873, II, 1074. Descriptive of the period before 1851.

lOohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 1

11Lipson, op. cit., 20. 60

would be more responsible to the people at election time, but how could continuous direction be achieved? The same author concludes that the people did not desire continuous direction, for this would be akin to rule,, and, "The new maxim of democracy seemed to be:

'Divide your government, and it cannot rule you. 11112

Whatever the motivating ideology, the ;:;overnor gained some important powers in the area of appointment. The General Assembly re- linquished the power to appo~.nt quartermasters general. This power was transferred to the governor, to whom it logically belonged since he was conuna.nder-in-chief of the military forces of the state.13

The General Assembly lost the authority to appoint majors general,, but these were then to be elected by persons subject to military 14 duty by district. :More important, although it may not have seemed so at the time,, was the power gr'Ocnted to the governor by Article VII, section 2, which states:

The directors of the penitentiary shall be appointed or elected in such manner as the general assembly may direct; and the trustees of the benevolent, and other state institutions, now elected by the general assembly and of such other state institutions as may be hereafter

12Ibid •• 23. 13 ohio Const. (1851), Art. IX, sec. 3.

14ohio General Code, section 5180, giires the governor authority to appoint all military officers. However the Constitution has not been changed on this matter and still states that certain officers will be elected. 61

created,, shall be appointed by the governor,, by and with the advice a.nd consent of the senate ••• 15

Not only did the new Constitution endow the governor with significant

power of appointment; it also expressly denied the General Assembly

the exercise of the appointive power,, except as provided by the Con

stitution.16 This denial soon became important. It would be imprac-

tical to outline in detail the various a~encies,, boards,, and institutions created in the yea.rs following the adoption of this Constitution.

As one writer has phrased it:

In the years following the Civil War,, state functions increased somewhat,, and during the late eighties and throughout the nineties many new fields of activity were occupied. After 1900 this increase gathered speed and new statutory boards and commissions were added with regularity,, as Ohio followed the trend of the day.17

Boards may have been created,, but since they la.eked power to achieve the purpose for which they were originated,, it would seem that they became more of a hindrance to the expanding power than a.n aid. Orth

relates that ,

The entire history of administration in the State reveals a constant struggle against .e;i ving authority to a board, or a commissioner or any other administrative officer. This is especially true of those administra tive functions that were developed earlier,, such as state charities,, state finances,, and public education.18

15 ohio Const. (1851),, Art. VII,, sec. 2. 16 ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 27. 17Aumann,, op. cit.,, 4. 18 orth, op. cit.,, 12. 62

The same author continues, " ••• The history of administration proves

that the ler~islators have been true to the traditions of the past ••• "

with respect to providing for administrative details.19

The legislature desired to retain control over administrative

functions. To accomplish this they set policy by statute. As the

personnel of the General Assembly changed, policy changed. An ad-

ministrative agency having no discretion as to details cannot function

effectively. Situations arise requiring innnediate policy change to

conform to the needs of the moment. If administrative details have

been strictly specified by statute, changes are relatively impossible.

Such procedure tended to keep the control of the executive branch in

the hands of the legislature. Legislative control was not effective

from an administrative point of view. John A. Fairlie writes, "The

general situation before the recent movement for administrative re-

organization was one of disintegration and disorganization of the

state executive department, with no concentrated and effective con-

tro1.n20 If the executive appointive power brought only disorganiza-

tion and lack of effective control, was the solution in restricting

the governor's power or in consolidating the agencies to insure more responsibility to the governor?

19 Ibia., 12. 20 John A.. Ii'airlie, ttThe Executive Power in the State Constitu tion," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLXXXI (September, 1935), 61. 63

The latter seems to be the more workable proposal. The first

obviously would not be acceptable. There is a limit to the number of

subordinates that can effectively be controlled by one executive.

One study indicates that an executive should not have more than four

or five persons reporting directly to him. As the number increases, the relationship between the executive and those reporting to him becomes more complex.21

The movement toward reorganization received its first major emphasis during the tenure of Judson Harmon. The major efforts at consolidation resulted in abolition of some 126 boards, commissions, or agencies, and the creation of four others with a total of twelve members to carry out the same work.22 Usually when effective reorgani-

zation is carried out, some persons lose their positions. Viben a party member loses his job because of reorganization supported by the governor, political reverberations usually result. Harmon, speaking of his major achievement, declared that the reorganization " ••• made me considerable trouble, for it legislated some of my friends out of office, and several of them were not pleased."23

21 John G. Glover, Business Operational Research and Report (New Yorks American Book Co., 1949), 11.

22 The New Ohio, 11-14, gives a breakdown of the agencies involved. Harmon was instrumental in one of the major reorganizations; the others came during the first term of JSl!les Cox and during the term of Harry L. Davis (which will be discussed later).

23-..rudson Harmon---His Record and His Views," 180. 64

The governor's choice seems to lie between retention of the

greatest possible nunilier of patronage appointees and consolidation

of agencies to further administrative efficiency. Fortunately for the people as a whole, the great majority of governors seem to have

chosen the latter course of action. However, one incumbent of the office complained that one of the methods whereby the governor ac-

quired power was through increasing the number of commissions to be appointed by him. He believed that many of these should be abolished and demanded " ••• a positive check on the further extension of executive authority by the creation of additional expensive co:m.r.i.issions of doubtful value ••• " 24

However strange this proposal does seem, it may have much merit when considered in relation to the situation at that time (1915-1917).

The legislative body had the prerogative of creating new a{iencies.

Persons with an interest or a grievance appealed to the legislature for help in dealing with their particular problems. The legislators

seemed content to create a new body to satisfy nearly every appeal.

This made for a disorganized, irresponsible administrative branch.

Lipson writes, "Without studying the established government to see whether their proposal could be placed under an existing officer, they (the legislators) would draw up a statute that created a new

24Mercer, Legisl9.'=ive History, II, 115,, speech of Governor Frank B. Willis, 1915-1916. He appears to be the only governor who desired that the powers of his office be curtailed. 65

25 body and vested in it certain powers and duties."

This deplorable method tended to decrease what pc>wer the governor did possess in the area of administrative control. Leonard Blue writes that this rapid addition of new agencies outside the control of the governor has decreased the power of that official. An analysis of the situation tended " ••• to show how the power of the governor has been distributed among recently created administrative agencies to such an extent that the present day governor is shorn of much power which legitimately b"'longs to him.n26 Written just after the turn of the century, this illustrates once more the need for reorganization in administrative agencies if the governor was to ever exert effective control.

B. EFFECT OF ID.;QRGANIZATION

These conditions aroused a demand for change, and it was during the administration ·of Governor Harry L. Davis that the most comprehensive reorganization plan ever to be effected in Ohio was enacted as House Bill No. 249. Passed as an emergency measure to insure its speedy execution and to free it from a possible referendum vote, the plan consolidated some fifty-one distinct agencies into eight departments, each to be under the control of a director appointed by the

25Lipson, op. cit., 27.

26Leonard A. Blue, The Relation of the Governor to the Organiza tion of the Executive Power in the States (University of Pennsylvania, Thesis Ph.D., 1902), 5. 66

governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Diredtors were to be chosen by the governor and to serve at his pleasure with a few exceptions. These were Constitutional offices such as the Super- intendant of Public Instruction, who had a four year term, and the

Director of Public "VVorks, who had a one year term. The governor was also restricted in his choice of the Director of Health, who was to be chosen from a list of at least six physicians certified by the

Public Health Council.27

This reorganization bill was enacted as an emergency mdasure. The

Constitution provides that " ••• emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, shall go into immediate effect." The exemption from the referendum reads, "The laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to the referendum.1128

The validity of the Reorganization Act as an emergency measure was upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, in which the opinion readei

Indulging the presumption in favor of the legis lation,, and in the absence of positive, judicial lmow ledge to the contrary, this court is bound to accept as true the reasons assigned by the legislature for making the a.ct in question an emergency law.29

27 Ohio Laws 1921,, P• 105-6. Thirty-seven agencies of the execu tive department were abolished. 28 ohio Const. (1851),, Art. II, sec. ld (Amend. 1912).

29102 Ohio State 591, 606 (1921). 67

Eight departments were created by this reorganization act. Under them were grouped the great majority of the existing statutory administrative a,,:·encies. Created by this a.ct were the departments of finance,,

COI!U'!terce,, highways and public works,, agriculture,, health,, industrial 30 relations,, education,, and public welfare. The directors of these departments were chosen by the governor and other appointments within the various agencies were made by the directors. ~ne governor's appointive power was considerably reduced. This followed the reco:mrnenda- tions proposed by the Joint Committee on Administrative Reorganization.

Don c. Sowers,, who made the study of the office of the chief executive,, states that if

••• one new member (for the existing boards and conunissions) is appointed by each governor,, it means that each governor has to appoint no less than forty-two administrative officials. It is a physical impossibility for the governor to exercise supervision and control over this large number of independent and unrelated departments of government.31

~ne governor's control of administration was increased substantially.

One writer states that the " ••• major effect of the Reorganization Code was to make the chief executive the 'most powerful 1;overnor Ohio has had since the time of '£erri torial Governor St. Clair. 11132 The power of the executive was,, perhaps,, expanding so as to be commensurate with his

30ohio Laws 1921,, P• 105,, 106-7. 31 Report of the Joint Committee on Administrative Reorganization (Columbus: F. J. Heer,, 1921). 91. ·--- 32 Aume.ru1,, op. cit.,, 39. 68

responsibility. This was seen as desirable by the legislature; in all probability it marks the end of adherence to the theory of legish.tive supremacy. The legislB.ture felt, and rightly so, that the governor's power wes too restricted to deal with the problems the day brought to the supreme executive officer of Ohio. The purpose of the Reorganization Code as expressed in section 1 is to bring authority a.nd responsibility on a par with each other. The

E:ection reads:

In order that the governor may exercise the supreme executive power of the state vested in him by the consti tution and adequately perform his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the adminis trative functions of the state are organized as provided in this chapter.33

Was there eny political motive involved in the enactment of the

Reorganization Code? It granted a tremendous increase to the gover- nor's power by making the administrative agencies readily controllable.

Regardless of the merits of the law, Lipson states:

Those who were responsible for the adoption of reorganization in Ohio in 1921 under a Republican administration are quite frar:k in their statement that it was used as a means of ousting a large num ber of Democratic officeholders who had been appointed by two preceding administrations.34

On the other hand, James K. Tu'{ercer, e.uthor of the legislative history of Ohio, declares, "This power (to appoint all heads of departments)

33ohio Laws 1921, p. 105.

34Lipson, op. cit., 105. 69

is now given to the Democratic successor of Governor Davis and most

Democrats express themselves as being satisfied that the law is a

wise provision for both political parties."35 Had a Democratic

n:ajority in the General Assembly .. together with a Democratic governor ..

. been elected following the administration of Governor Davis, it is

hard to say whether any changes would have been made. The issue could well have become a political football.

In 1927 the number of departments was increased when the Depart ment of Highwe.ys and Public Works was divided into the Department of

Highways and the Department of Public 'fiorks.36 This was the only major change made in the F.dministre.tive structure provided for by the

reorganization act. In 1950 this structure is still the organizational

pattern under which the administrative duties o.re performed by the

state government. However, a number of new departments have been added:

Department of Liquor Control (1935), 37 Department of Taxation (1939). 38

Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (1947), 39 and Department of Natural

Resources (1949).40 These are among the more importent. There is also

35 Mercer. Legislative Histor~, IV. 5. Words in parentheses added. 36 ohio Laws 1927, P• 436, 477. 37 ohio Laws 1935. P• 5ll, 515. 38ohio Laws 1939 .. P• 344. 39 ohio Laws 1947. P• 576. 40senate Bill 13. approved May 9• 1949. 70

a discernable tendency to cree.te new agencies outside the code structure. Some of these include the Racing Commissionfl the

Boxing Connnission,42 and the Board of Aviation.43 c. RESTRICTIONS

The trend seems to be awa.y from uncontrolled use of patronage by the governor, perhaps because the people of Ohio have witnessed enough of the corruption tha.t usually goes hand in hand with the spoils system. Continuous service to the people ca.n hardly be effected with a complete turnover in state administration following each election.

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1912 probably realized this. One of the Constitutional amendments approved by the people in

1912 provided the basis for a merit system in the civil service. The amendment states:

Appointments and promotions in the Civil Service of the state, the several counties, and cities shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained as far as practicable, by competitive examinations. Laws shall be passed providing for the enforcement of this provision.44

Subsequent laws to implement this provision were enacted in 1913 and a.gain in 1915. These laws provided for appointments on the basis of

41 ohio Laws 1933, P• 368. 42 0hio Laws 1935, P• 456. 43ohio Laws 1945., P• 253. 44 ohio Const. (1851)., Art. T:!' sec. 10 (Am.end. 1912). 71

merit and fitness.45 The Civil Service laws enacted by the General

Assembly pursuant to the amendment added to the Constitution in 1912 restricted the use of patronage greatly. From the standpoint of ef fective direction of policy by removal of officials vrho were to serve at the pleasure of the ,~overnor, the laws were not a serious hindrance.

The heads of the principal departments, boards, and commissions,who were appointed by the governor or by and with his consent, were placed in the category of "unclassified" civil service and were to be exempt from competitive examinations and the restrictions on the power of removal. The grcs.t rr.ajori ty of former patronage appointments were placed under the classified service and such civil service employees 6 were to continue to hold office durine; good behavior.!1 These laws were in effect when the Republican candidate Myers Y. Cooper was victorious at the polls in 1928. Few incunbents of the office of governor have defended the classified system against the demands for patronage as did Governor Cooper. His administration coming after a drought in Republican patrona~e appointments, the party bosses were, in all probability, eager to have their faithful friends re warded with political positions, no matter how these would have to be obtained. Walker relates that Cooper had " ••• no more than 211 positions subject to his appointment outside the civil service. Temporary ap-

45ohio Laws 1913, P• 698 and Ohio Laws 1915, p. 400.

'6ohio General Code, sections 486-8 and 486-17a. 72

pointments re.ised this to some 450.1147 Governor Cooper. however. stood firm in his decision to abide by the principles of the merit system. Walker continues.

He was firm in tell in rs politic al leaders the.t he would not permit the removal of classified employees without cause. He once told one of the Republican leaders on such an occasion, "You must remember we have a civil service in Ohio." and the leader saw the force of the argument.48

In all probability much of the vituperation which has been directed at the various governors concerning the use of patrona~e has been leveled for purely political purposes. No attempt will be made herein to determine political merits or to attempt to show that either party has used the civil service for rewarding its friends. Much of the literature which has been written concerning the governor's use of patronage has a distinctly political tinge. The following quotation can be contrasted with the record of Governor Cooper to show that all officials were not so conscientious e.s he in defending the principles of the merit system. Speaking of the case in the Donahey era in which the matron of a state institution ws.s removed, Neva Deardorff rerne.rks.

The divided vote (of the Civil Service Commission) sustains the action of the director of public welfare. Mrs. Stannard is removed. There appears to be no legal appeal from this decision. Thus word is passed a.long

47 Walker, Constructive Government, 41. 73

by the Civil Service Commission of Ohio that it will not stand in the v.ray of any poli ticie.n in power who chooses to return to the essentials of the spoils system.49

· Had this been followed by a series of similar experiences, it is

likely that administrative affairs of the state would once again

be in an unorganized, inefficient, and irresnonsible condition.

The governor's power of appointment has been restricted by

the civil service laws and by the provision that the appointments

must be made 11 by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

A vast majority of positions to be filled by the governor must

follow this latter provision. A few positions (for exrun.ple, the

Superintendents of Public Instruction and of Public Works) the

governor may fill without consulting the Senate.50 In all other

cases, however, the Senate could, if it so desired, thwart the

governor's purpose by refusine; to a.ssent to his nominations for the

various positions. Such was the case when the Senate refused to

confirm Governor Donahey' s nominee to the Public Utilities Commission. 51

This was an unusual case. The regular practice is for the legislature

to confirm appointments, although some debate often arises.52 ~batever

49Neva R. Deardorff, "Ohio Reverts," The Survey, L (Aug,ust 15, 1923), 529.

501945 Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 95, and Ohio General Code, sec. 404.

51 See page 39. 52 1·ipson, op. Clv••·+ 197 • 74

justification exists for this legislative partic:ipation in matters

of administration can, oerhaps, be explained by the still-lingering

desire for legislative supremacy in state govern.ment. If the governor

is forced to appoint sonewhat less competent men in order to secure the consent of the Senate, th~t body in large measure can control

the affairs of administration, notwithstanding the fact that such con-

trol is deemed an executive prerogative. On the other hand, Lipson states, "It is urged that the governor will make better appointments if he must run the gantlet of legislative scrutiny. 1153 Better appointments from whose point of view? That of the legislature, that of the governor, or that of the general 9ublic?

The governor is empowered to fill certain vacancies which may occur when the General Assembly is not in session without securing the assent of the Senate.54 These appointments must be reported to the Senate at its next session. The next session means precisely that. If the next session is a special one called by the governor to consider certain business, the advice and consent of the Senate must be solicited at that time. 55 'rhis does not violate the Constitutional provision that the General Assembly may consider no matters other than those set forth in the proclamation made by the governor calling for

53 Ibid., 197. 54 ohio Const. (1851), Art. VII, sec. 3.

551945 Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 94, P• 129. 7:5

the session.56 If an appointment is made to an office, the holder

of which serves for a fixed term, and such appointment has been

confirmed by the Sen~te and the term expired during a recess of the

General Assembly, the governor may fill the vacancy created. This

appointee holds office until the next session of the General Assembly.

If the appointment is confirmed, the appointee serves for a full term.57

The governor's duties in making appointments are of great impor-

tance in securing a successful, efficient administration. He must make wise appointments in the first instance and insure that these positions are kept filled by competent men, for, according to the state-

11 ment of Professor Graves, ••• The success of an administration rests

in no small measure upon vrise use of this power."58 Necessary, it

seems, to the efficiency of administration is the power to make appointments and the discretion to choose competent men to fill the offices.

The power of appointment seems to be an effective method of exerting control over the administrative affairs of state :SOYernroent.

The governor will appoint those officers whom he feels he can trust to see eye-to-eye with him on matters of policy. Had the governor the authority to make appointments to all administrative offices

56Ib'd__i_., 128. 57 1940 Opinions of the Attorney GBneral 1903, P• 205.

58Graves, op. cit., 377. 76

which are important in the matters of execution of policy, he could exercise his control more effectively. Yet he is restricted by Con-

stitutional provisions for elective officers and by statutory provisions for elective officers and by statutory provisions calling for definite terms of office for certain appointed officie.ls. In many instances the governor does not have the opportunity to appoint

such an important official as the Superintendent of Public Instruc- tion, because the present appointee's term continues beyond his own.

To the present time (June l, 1950) Governor Lausche has made

246 of the possible 275 appointments authorized by statute. This

seems a fair proportion of the appointments; however, the appointments made by the incumbent governor have included such relatively insignificant offices, from the standpoint of administrative control, as unexpired judgeships caused by death or resignation and members of boards of trustees of hospitals in the process of construction.

Such appointments include thirty-six of the total which Governor

Lausche has made. There have been only twenty-six positions filled by the governor in which appointees are to serve at his pleasure.

However, these include ten heads of administrative departments, through whom much control can be exercised. The remainder of the positions are appointed for a fixed term. These terms range from three to seven years.59

59rnformation as to the governor's appointments was given by Mr. John O'Keefe, Executive Secretary to the Governor. 77

D. EFYSCT ON Am'ILJISTBATIVE CONTROL

An executive department was created by Article III, section 1, of the 1851 Constitution which was to be composed of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor of stato, treasurer of state, and attorney general. Since each of these officers was given many purely executivs duties,, the resulting ";overrunent had what might be termed a plural executive. The Constitution conferred upon these various officers power and authority independent of the governor.

In 1925, the state supreme court verified tnis independence and the independence of other offices created by the legislature when it declared:

The governor may not control the discretion and judgment of any other state officer within the limits of the power conferred upon such officer unless the povrer of review or the requirement of approval has been imposed in the act which creates such other state officer and defines his powers.60

This means that unless these other officers are made specifically responsible to the governor he cannot exercise control over them.

This decision judicially sanctioned the independence of the other officers of the executive department.

The only Constitutional power the governor has over the other members of the executive department is the authority to require information in writing from the other officers in the executive depe.rt- rn.ent upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective

60state ex rel. v.· Baker, 112 Ohio State, 356, 371 (1925). 78

offices.61 This power could become an important source of indirect

control. Should some member of the department become in11olved in

a violation of the hw, the governor could bring pressure to have

him removed as did Myers Y. Cooper in the Buckley case.62 Bert B.

Buckley, treasurer of state, resigned when Cooper sugGested to the

House of Representatives that it investigate the matter and, if desir

e.ble, bring articles of impeachnent against l3uckley. A method such

a.s this seems the only available one for controlling the members of

the executive department.

What information the governor will obtain upon request rests

under the discretion of the officer in charge of each department.63

If one of these officers were not seeing that the laws were being

fa.i thfully executed, the governor could probably turn public opinion

against that officer, thereby forcing him into line.

The movement for the short ballot be1r,an shortly after the turn

of the century. This ballot would eliminate the elective officers

of auditor, treasurer, attorney general, lieutenant governor, and

secretary of state; and empov1er the governor to fill these offices by appointment. A proposal for the short ballot was denounced soundly

in the Convention of 1912. Mr. s. A. Hoskins, delegate from Auglaize

61ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 6.

62vvalker, Constructive Government, 30.

63state ex rel. v. Baker, op. cit., 371 (1925). 79

County, upbraided the Convention for introducing this proposal.

I think of all the propositions that have been pre sented to the Convention that are undemocratic, unrepub lican, and smacking of Czarism and Russia, this is the worst. I cannot conceive of anything so monstrous a.s this proposition ever having been introduced in a legis lative body or a constitutional convention in modern times. It beats anything I ever heard or.64

The same delegate held that this was a raothod of adding to the appointive power of the governor to build up a machine that it would be almost impossible to eliminate. At any rate, this argu.i11ent against the short ballot is more emotional than logical.

The record discloses that when the Convention voted to submit the short ballot amendment to the people Mr. A. Vic Dona.hey ca.st his vote in the negative. 65 Perhaps I1Ir. Donahey then aspired to be state ~'-udi tor and could not foresee that he would ever be governor.

However this may be, the short ballot proposs.l was later t:J.bled and not submitted to the people in 1912.66

It did become part of the Democratic platform in 1912. Governor

Cox advocated this method of selection for administrative officers

" ••• as a means of securing greater security in the selection of public 67 o ff1c1a. .. 1 s and f or r·1x1ng . a cent ra l"1z1ng . respons101.. ·1·t 1 Y• n He urged

64Debates, 1912, II, 1694.

65Ib.__i_., d 1374. The vote was eighty-two yeas; twenty-four nays. 66 Ibid., 1696. 6 7c ox, op. ci·t ., 161 • 80

the General Assembly to propose a.n amendment to the Constitution providing that the positions of secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, and auditor would be filled by gubernatorial appointment.

The governor, lieutenant governor, and judges of the supreme court would still be elected. This reorganization would tt ••• insure harmony of action in the state departments and center responsibility in the executive. The several executive department heads could then act in an advisory capacity with the governor, as his cabinet.1168 Cox's suggestion was never made law.

If the governor must direct the state's executive department without possessing substantial control over the major officers, how is his power affected? Lipson says, "As long as there are several officers separately elected, the governor will be relatively weak.

No matter whether the people or the legislature chooses them, they will be independent of one another and of their nominal chief."69

Not all governors have advocated the short ballot or increase in the power of the chief executive of the state. Frank B. Willis felt that the people should control the selection of executive of ficials and keep these officials directly responsible to them. He remarked a

68Mercer, Legislative History, I, 33.

69tipson, op. cit., 14. 81

Fortunately for the people in our state not all the executive power is vested in the Governor. The Constitution provides for the election of (the pre viously named officials). Officials so chosen by the people themselves are responsible to the people and have duties to perform but little if any less ~ in importance than those assigned to the Governor. 70

It seems obvious that the more important the duties of these officials become, the less power the governor would be able to exercise.

The delegates to the Convention of 1850-51 seemed afraid to increase power in the executive branch by any method. In the debates upon the question of adding a lieutenant governor to the executive department is the following statement:

Mr. Morris moved further to amend the section by striking out the words "Lieutenant Governor." This was a new wheel which was about to be placed in the machinery of our government. He thought that there were already enough wheels to be kept in order.71

The addition was ma.de, however, and the office was made elective along with the other major ones. Today there are eleven states which do not provide for this of fice---Arizona, Florida, Georgia,

Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah,

West Virginia, and Wy.oming. 72

Control of administration implies the power of appointment. The

70Mercer, Legislative History, II, 100. Parenthetical material added.

71Debates, 1850-51, I, 300. rsaiah Eorris, Clinton County.

72Graves, op. cit., 355. 82

administrative affairs of our state government have been consolidated

into a far more effective organization than was in operation at the

turn of the century. Yet there is still a problem for the governor.

He has too many duties ever to become an effective administrator.

One proposal for alleviation of this situation sugi:,ests that the

governor's term be increased from two to four years. This proposal

has been made both to the legislative body and to the people as a

whole. Through this increase in term. in the words of the Joint

Committoe on Economy in the Public Service. the governor would be-

come 11 ••• the responsible head of the state government and would pos

sess the power and authority conrrnensurate with his responsibility.1173

However. none of the suggestions to increase the term of office to

four years has been carried out.74

Harvey Walker makes another recommendation for securing more

effective administration of state affairs. He asks, '~Vhy maintain

the fiction that the governor is the responsible head of ad.ministra

tion if experience shows he cannot assume that role?1175 He proposes

to remove altogether the governor's control of administrative depart-

ments, except that he would exercise joint control with the General

Assembly in matters of appointment and removal. Administrative work

73 Report of Joint Committee on Economy in the Public Service (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1929). 8. 74Ib.d --2:....·· 10. 7£\valker, "Theory and Practice in State Administrative Organiza tion." 252. 83

would be performed by a chief administrator who would conduct the routine business of the state along scientifically sound lines.76

The governor would then be freed from overseeing the performance of petty administrative details and could devote his time to policy.

Walker believes that the Ohio governor's future lies in legislative leadership and that the creation of the office of chief administrator would free the governor to do what he is best fitted for---"to act as the voice of the whole people in the formulation of legislative policy.1177 In all probability proponents of the theory of legislative supremacy would never permit this broad expansion of gubernatorial power, since it would tend to give the executive more voice in policy formulation.

Walker's proposal would, in all probability, provide more competent control over administrative affairs. Many of the governor's duties are, in reality, only administrative tasks. In fact, one article advances the theory that the " ••• Governor is simply a great office manager. 1178 If details can effectively be administered by someone who has been trained in the theory and practice of administration and who is politically subordinate to the governor, both the

76 !...:...··b"d 252 •

77Ib"d--2:_•1 254.

78Anonymous, ''Ylhat is a Governor?" The Outlook, XCVI (December 24, 1910), 893. 84

governor's political leadership and benefits to the people would probably increase greatly. 85

CHAPTER IV: FINANCIAL CONTROL

According to the age-old maxim,, "He who controls my purse controls also my will." This applies well in the area. of government.

Money is needed to provide services. In the modern era vast sums are used to provide necessary services and to carry on the many activities of government. To decrease substantially or withhold entirely the finances needed to keep a government agency in operation will curtail that agency's activities as effectively as would a

statute abolishing it.

In the past legislatures have jealously guarded controls over government finances. The only provision relating to financial control appearing in the Constitution of 1802 reads,, "No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations 1 made by law. 11 Since no agency other than the legislature could

pass law,, this po~~r lay safely in the hands of the representatives of the people. The governor had no voice in the matter of appropri- a.ting money.

Any money used to fine.nee state activities must be obtained either through taxation, from the sale of goods or services, or by borrowing on the credit of the state. The major portion of the revenue of the state of Ohio comes from taxation. The governor has

1 Ohio Const. (1802),, Art. I, sec. 21. 86

no authority to levy taxes. That is purely a legislative prerogative and his voice in this matter is limited to those procedures which can be followed in the case of eny bill.

From an administrative point of view, it is the control of expenditures rather than of collections that is of prime importance.

For many years the governor had no authority over expenditures. He could neither correlate the estimates of agencies nor influence elected officials to conform to his own program. He was virtually forced to stand aside while other officials and agencies vied with each other for legislative favor and necessary funds.

No work has been published on the financial chaos which must have existed throughout the Nineteenth Century and the early years of the Twentieth Century. Some understanding of how agencies acquired necessary funds may be gained by picturing the situation which seems to have existed. The General Assembly was in full control of the financial situation. An agency needing money for activities to be carried on during the next two years2 would approach the House of

Reoresentatives Coilllnittee on Appropriations literally with hat in hand to solicit the needed funds. If the agency were particularly favored, the money would be forthcoming; but if it happened to have antagonized the committee by some previous deed, its requests would

2ohio Con st. (1851), Art. II, sec. 21, provides that no anpro priations shall oc at:.de for n longer period than two years. 87

be scaled down accordingly or even refused entirely. The Committee held its own hearings,, re1:whed its own conclusions,, and drafted its

OV'i!l bills. When it came to requesting funds,, the governor was on a pe.r with the department heads. He had no power to coordinate the requests of the agencies or the other elected officials.3

This situation did not tend to ple.ce administrative a·encies under gubernatorie.l control. If the executi~1e is to have any effective voice in the direction of policy that an agency pursues,, he needs some voice in financia.l control. Lipson remarks, "This weapon (financial control) is essential to executive authority.

Agencies that are financially independent will operate with administrative independence in all spheres. 4 Lacking financial control, the governor we.s an executive without s.dequa te authority to direct the execution of policy. So long as an agency did not have to con- sult the governor on matters of finance, it could easily deviate from the governor's directives.

This situation continued until 1913. In that year a bill vre..s introduced in the Senate " ••• c1esigned to establish a budget system for state officers, departments,, and institutions." This, Senate

Bill 227, provided that the several agencies of the government

3 rnforma.tion for the most part given by Dr. Harvey ;•;alker, Depart ment of Political Science, Ohio State University.

4Lipson, op. cit., 37. Parenthetical words added. 88

would in the even numbered years submit to the governor on or before the fifteenth day of November an itemized estimate of money needed for their wants for the biemlial period beginning the first of July next.5 The estimates were to be submitted on special forms provided.

Section 270-4 of the act provided the.t the governor would submit the estimates to the General Assembly. Thus the practice of e.gencies' beeeeching the Assembly directly for their respective allocations was ended. F'urther, the new law provided that the governor, without notice, could appoint disinterested persons to examine the affairs of any department with a view to increasing the efficiency and curtailing the expenses thereof. To insure that this provision would become more than a mere statement of ideal objectives, the section also provided that the governor or his appointed examiners could compel tes- timony and the productiC)n of books and papers relative to the investi gation. 6 When this proposal became law the situation with respect to gubernatorial control over finances had brightened considerably.

There was a way for the governor to check on what was requested and what was being spent. Still, however, he had no effective control over how the money was spent.

The Budget Act vras passed as an administration measure and Ohio became one of the first states to install the executive budget. With

5ohio Laws 1913, P• 658.

6 ~·· 659-60. 89

the estimates from the departr:ients and information from the Atit~i tor of State as to past expenditures, the governor or his aides could com pile a budget and transmit it to the legislature with his reconunenda tions formulated in the light of varying needs and availe,ble or po tential sources of revenue. 7 This procedure was expected to decrease the size of what is termed "deficiency a.ppropriDtions." If the gover nor saw that the requests would far exceed the forthcoming revenue, he had three plausible courses. He could transmit the requests 2!: toto and recoI!llnend to the General Assembly that taxes be increased; he could transmit the estimates back to the various departments and direct them to revise their estimates and dacree.se the amounts re quested; or ha himself could revise the estimates. Since the first plan would generally be politically inexpedient, the other choices were more often made.

The General Assembly still retained the power of the purse. The governor could recommend that the legislators adopt the budget, but the determining voice in the matter we.s theirs. True, the governor had the item veto, but no money could be appropriated by use of this power. The legislators set the maximum a.mounts to be spent during the doming biennium. The governor was powerless should the Assembly decide to reduce the requested a.mounts seriously. Except for the weapon of the i tern veto, he we.s helpless should the legisle.tors decide

7.A.une.nn, op. cit.~ 22. 90

to increase the amount for some favored agency or comrnission. If he had pi:.red the requests to the bare necessities in an attempt to balance the budget end this occurred,, what could he do? His reaction might be something like that of Governor Cox,, who in his message.of June 18,, 1919,, informed the General Assembly that once transmitted,, the budget was theirs and that they should act accordingly.

His vigorous statement reads:

I run not prepared to say that the budget contains a single item that ought not to be there. I don't ques tion the propriety of its disbursements in themselves because the needs of the government are required in the aggregate amount in this bill,, but I do question your right to give state officers the right to spend the money when you know the money will not be there.8

In even stronger language he continued,, "It is not creditable to you nor to me that the agencies of government should be used as a mere chess board,, political or otherwise. You have your duty and I have 9 mine. Provide the money or reshape your budget."

The only way the legisla.ture could provide for more money would be by increasir1g taxes and this was politically inexpedient for members of the body. By use of forceful language the ,::;overnor could arouse public opinion and thus compel the Assembly to follow his budget more closely. During the Cox administration the governor related to the General Assembly that these estimates,, which had been

8Mercer,, Legislative History, III,, 49.

9Ibid.,, 52. 91

prepared through the budget commissioner, had so far as he knew

" ••• never been diminished by legislative investigation or enactment,

but alvrn.ys added to. ttlO This wcs not the situation in the years

thereafter.

This legislative practice of increasing the requested amounts bothered Governor Cox a great deal. In fact, he specifically urged

a. Constitutional eJnendment prohibiting i t.11 His recommendation was designed to eliminate deficits. He recommended that the budget be transmitted to the Assembly some three to four weeks after it had

convened and that the executive budget

••• show plainly the maximum expense for the con duct of our institutions ••• The legislature shall have the right to diminish any item by a majority vote or to strike out any item. It shall not be privileged. however, to increase a.n item or to add a new one unless it makes legislative provision for the added cost.12

In 1921, the Joint Cormnittee on Administrative Reorganization realized the need for closer control over expenditures. Don c. Sowers, who made the study of the office of chief executive for the Joint

Committee, reported that " ••• the office of budget commissioner is the only agency which the governor has for keeping in touch vri th the activities of the various departments except through the filing of

lOibid., 29.

11Maryland's Constitution prohibits the legislature from in creasing the budget submitted by the governor. See Fredric A. Ogri: and P. Orman Ray, Introduction to American Government (7th ed.; New York: D. Appleton Century, 1942), 843.

12Mercer, Legislative History, III, 29. 92

the annual reports of the several departments.n13 The annual reports

showed that money had been expended, but were not a device conducive

to effective control over the expenditures of the departments.

The comprehensive reorganization act passed in 1921 provided the

needed controls, if the governors would make use of them. Of utmost

importance was the creation of the Department of F'ina.nce. This de

partment was charged to (1) prepare and report to the governor, when

requested, esti~ates of income and revenue and devise new forms of

revenue, (2) prepare and submit the budget estimates to the governor biennially, not later than the first day of January preceding the

convening of the General Assembly, (3) publish bulletins of the work

of the department for the information of the several departments and

of the general public, and (4) investigate duplication of work in the

departments, the efficiency and organization of them, and formulate

plans for the further coordination of the departments.14

The Department of Finance was to collect estimates of the several agencies, revise and compile the requests, and submit to the governor an overall estime.te. The director was to distribute blanks to the various departments not later than the fifteenth of September in the

year preceding the regular session of the General Assembly. The forms were desiGned to procure information for the director of finance con-

13Report on Administrative Reorganization, op. cit., 41.

14ohio Laws 1921, PP• 105 et seq. 93

cerning (1) revenue end expenditures for the two preceding years.

(2) appropriations made by the previous General Assembly. expenditures therefrom. encumbrances thereon,, and amounts unencumbered and unex pended• (3) an estimate of the revenue and expenditures for the cur rent fiscal year. and (4) an estimate of the revenues and a.mounts needed for the two succeedine; fiscal years for which appropriations were to be me.de. These estimates were to be filed in the office of the director of finance not later than the first of November. The departments were also required to file a duplicate copy of these estimates with the chairmen of the finance coillr.l.ittees of the Senate end the House of Hepresenta.tives.15 This provision was an important control measure. The department heads could not give the finance co:mmi ttee chairmen a different estimate ifth~were called in for a hearing. Their reports could probably be used by the legislature to check e.s to how much certein estimates had been decreased by the finance director and the governor. The director of the finance de partraent was empowered to investigate any item and to approve. dis approve. or alter any estimates excepting those of the legislative and judicial departments. His revision would constitute the budget estimates to be submitted to the governor.16 The governor was obliged to submit the ste.te budget to the General Assembly not later than

15Ibid.. 114 •

16Ibid. • 114. 94

17 four weeks after the organization of that body.

Governor Donahey' s views on the subject of the state budget ,.,ere

somewhat simila.r to those of Governor Cox, for he informed the Assembly

that the budget was " ••• subject to such re-e.djustments as you deem

it proper to make, provided you keep within the estimated income above 18 set forth." If the governor had the responsibility for formulating

the budget, he could, by the indirect method of throwing political

responsibility on the Assembly restrict the power of that body as to appropriations. Even should the le:;isle.tors happen to be in a benevolent frame of mind toward certain agencies, they would consider

carefully before taking political responsibility for increased expendi-

tures. If they chose to take this responsibility, let them increase

to suit their convenience. If they were not disposed to take the

responsibility, they would be ready to follow the governor's suggestions.

Lipson feels that " ••• the executive budget, perhaps more than any other

single factor, has strengthened his executive authority.1119

Governor Donahey apparently did not appreciate the signific~..nce

of the methods of financial control set up by the Reorganization Code.

Perhaps this was because he had once been state auditor. 'Walker writes that this experience " ••• led him to feel that all financial control should be centered there and that the practices and procedures

17Ibid., 115.

18Mercer, Lee:islative History, VI, 12.

19Lipson, op. cit., 243. 95

20 of the auditor's office were adequate to provide the needed control."

He did not make use of these devices by which he could 0ain financial control and in large measure increase his control over the other as- pects of administration. Neither did he attempt to add new ones.

In fact, his chief contributions to state finances were ttretrench ment and economy. 11 21

The implementation of the financial control 0rovisions of the

Reorganization Code of 1921 came during the adininistration of

Myers Y. Cooper. Previous to that time there had been no means whereby the expenditures of the several agencies could be controlled as a matter of policy. In other words, no pre-audit existed. The pre- audit is inspection by an executive officer to determine " ••• the vn.s- dom of the particular projects, to see whether they harmonized with a general administrative plan."22 The pre-audit instituted under the

Cooper administration consisted of two operations. In the words of

Harvey Vvelker, who became Superintendent of the Budget in 1929, " ••• the purchase order and supporting papers were checked for correctness and compliance with lP.w. Second, if there wa.s e.ny question as to the pro- 23 priety of the expenditure, it was raised and settled." By this

20walker, Constructive Government, 55. 21 Ib"ia.., - 9 •

22Lipson, op. cit., 39.

23walker, Constructive Government, 56. 96

method the governor could insure that the broad outlines of his policy were being followed.

If a department is granted a certain amount by the appropriation act, that amount should, barring unforeseen developments, be sufficient to finance its operation for the succeeding two year period. However, some departments, like some people, tend to spend available money at too rapid a rate. At the end of a year and a half of a biennium, their money is gone. For the remainder of the oeriod they must either sus pend activities or spend money they do not have in order to perform the a.Hotted duties. The new system of financie.l control instituted by the Cooper sdministration made this si tuu.tion pre.ctically impossi ble. The appropriation a.ct (House Bill No. 510) provided for the sub mission of schedules of proposed ~xpenditures to the director of finance. These were to be submitted in accordance with the director's orders. These schedules had to meet with the approval of the director and until they did, no expenditure could be made nor any obligation incurred. This is the allotment system.24 These schedules of proposed expenditures had to be followed as approved. This would prevent an agency from spending its entire ellotment in the first quarter of the year and then soliciting more money to carry on its activities or else letting its operations virtually cease. Control was exerted over the time of the expenditure as well as over the item for which the expense 97

was to be incurred.

Used for the first and only time during the governorship of

Cooper WcS the lump sum method of appropriation. The former method

(and the one in use at the present time) consists of segregated items.

The lump sum appropriation bill was a mark of the confidence which the

General Assembly had in the financial skill and integrity of Governor

Cooper and his administrative officers.25 The value of the lump sum type of appropriation can be seen when it is realized that under it the departments do not have to appeal to the Board of Control for a transfer of funds from the balance under one item to pay for obliga tions incurred under another item. The money can be allotted from the lump sum to each item in accordance with the proposed schedules, which can be ad.justed from quarter to quarter in order to meet current needs.

Another development during the administration of Cooper was the installation of a system of accrual accounting for expenditures.

This was carried on by the Depa.rtment of Finance and caused no small amount of friction between that agency and the Constitutionally pro 26 vided accounting officer, the auditor of state. The auditor exer cises what is termed post-audit control. The money has already been expended or an obligation has already been incurred before the validity

25Ibid., 54.

26Ibid., 58. 98

of the obligation can be ascertained by post-audit. For purposGs of control this s~rstem is " ••• too late to be of much value.n27

By the institution of this new system of accrual accounting for expenditures, the overs:oending of an ac;ency was automatically e 11m1na. . t e d • 28

Through use of this method the governor could check on all members of the executive branch over whom he had no administrative control. Even the auditor's work was being checked and Walker be

11 1129 lieves that this was ••• a sound and wholesome situation. The governor would know if the a.udi"cor were performing his duties faithfully. He had his ovm auditing system which could inform him of the facts should the auditor be overstepping his bounds. This new method of accounting was carried out by the use of I.B.1:1. machines.

These, however, became a political football and a campaign issue in the 1930 guberna.toric.l race. Vfoen Governor YJhi te entered upon his duties in 1931,, the I.B.M. Company ·withdrew the machines and the state was left 'Ni th only the bookkeeping machines in tha Department of Finance. Governor Cooper's accounting; system was thus discarded.

However, other procedures installed by his administration were retained.30

27Ibid., 56. 28 Ibid., 57. 29D "d OJ. • .J 58.

30Ib.d1 ., 60. 99

The General Assembly of Ohio does not usually have opportunity to make supplemental appropriations to agencies that exceed their budgets as does the Congress of the United Stat::s. The Bnergency

Board was created in 1921 to provide funds for deficits occurring under certain conditions. The General Assembly makes a biennial appropriation to this board to handle cases of

••• any deficiency in any of the appropriations for the expenses of e.n institution,, department or conunission of the state for any biennial period,, or in case of an emergency requiring the expenditure of money not specifically provided by la.w.31

A.Hotting funds to cover such deficiencies and e.pprovine; out-of-state travel pay for state officials and employees constitutes the work done by the Emergency Board, whose chairman is the Director of Fine.nee.

Other members are the Auditor of State, the Attorney General,, the

Chairman of the House ~ inance Conuni ttee, the Chairman of the Senate

Fine.nee Committee,, and the Superintendent of the 3udget, who acts as secretary in a non-voting capacity. An affirmative vote of four of the five voting members is necessary to secure favorable action by 32 the board.

A device necessitated by the segregated appropriations system is the Board of Control or the Controlling Board, as it is sometimes called. This boa.rd is not a nermanent statutory board, but it is

3lohio Laws 1921,, P• 130.

32ohio Laws 1921, P• 233. 100

created anew by each appropriation a.ct. 'l'he membership is the same as

the.t of the Emergency Board and favorable action requires the same voting

majority. This board acts to transfer certain amounts within the de-

tailed appropriations at the request of operating ahencies. If the need

under one item exceeds the e.pnropriation while there is a surplus under

another item, the department he£i_d may apply to the Controlling Board for

authority to transfer the funds to the item or service which needs them.

Appropriations which were me.de in lump sum form and expended according

to quarterly schedules permitted revision of the schedules to allow funds

as exigiencies required without the services of the Controlling Boarct.33

Both the t;overnor and the General Assembly are Constitutionally

limited as to the amount in excess of the current revenue that may

be snent. Article VIII, section l, limits the debt of the st(1_te to

~>750,,000, unless a popular vote is taken on the matter ·which would

bring the debt to a hi?,:her figure. 34 In the minds of the delegates

to the Convention of 1850-51 this was no doubt an enormous amount.

One ~Titer, Karl B. Pauly,, suggests that this Constitutional mandate

has not always been strictly obeyed. He reports that when the Davey

administration retired in 1939, the state debt was set at the record

33For creation of the Controlling Board see Appropriation Acts for the various years in Ohio Laws. In some years these acts have a.lso been published as a supnlement.

34ohio Const. (1851), Art. VIII_, sec. 1. 101

figure of $40,000,000. The debt was raised to such a high figure 35 b y " ••• some f"1sca 1 an d i egis· 1 a t·1ve s i eight-of-hand· ••• n Mr. Pauly evidently manufactured these figures from other sources than the records of the Office of the Auditor of State. The annual report of that office shows a balence of $33,670,239.48 subject to draft 36 on December 31, 1938. This figure may have been encumbered by outstanding drafts at that time which are not shown on the report.

A deficit of ~12,012,996.25, whiah had been incurred by school districts to provide money not available under the school foundation program, did exist. However, there was a balance of $7,000,000 to 37 apply against this debt.

The deb·t of the state of Ohio as of July, 1950, is $194,000,000.

Part of this is an irreducible debt of ~~6,000,000, while the great majority of the sum is made up of the bonded indebtedness which was authorized by the people in a referendum vote in November, 1947,

(and hence is not a violation of the Constitution) to provide payment of compensation to citizens of the state who had served honorably in the nation's armed forces during World War II.38

35Pauly, op. cit., 97. 36.Annual Report of Auditor of State, 1939 (Columbus: F. J. Hear, 1939), 32-3. 37Information given by M:r. Raymond Bartholomew, Office of Auditor.

38Infor:mation from the Office of Treasurer of State, unpublished memoranda. 102

The irreducible debt was established because of a violation of the Constitution of 1851, Article VI, section 1, which states:

The principal of all funds, arising from the sale, or other disposition of lands, or other pronerty, granted or entrusted to this State for educational or religious purposes, shall forever be preserved inviolate and un rl.iminished; and the income arising tl-lerefrom shall be faithfully applied to the specific objects of the ori gins! grants or appropriations.

The legislature did not adhere to this provision. The money was spent for other purposes. Then, to provide a way out, the "sinking fund" was created in 1853. This fund was to include, among other items, the " ••• proceeds of sales of canal, school, and ministerial lands ••• n39 The legislature decided that these trust funds could be appropriated for other purposes ?rovided that an appropriation equal to an interest rate of six per cent on the total of such funds be made periodice.lly.40 An interesting situation would arise should some future Assembly refuse to' make such an rrnpropriation.

The governor may not contract a debt in the name of the state.

The power to contract belongs to the legislature.41 However, if the governor and other members of the executive branch have a certain amount appropriated to them by the General Assembly, contracts may be entered into within the limits of the appropriation. The various

39 ohio Le}VS 1853, P• 460.

4oibid., 461-2. 41 1933 Opinions of the Attorney General 800, P• 677. 103

contracts entered into by the Department of Highways illustrate this.

Since the ,~overnor is not permitted to contract beyond specific auth

orization, any contractor dealing with him would probably make sure

that the governor was acting within his power oef·ore signing an agree

ment. The limitation on the power to contract is essentially a wise

restrictiJn. Were the governor able to contract at his pleasure, he

would have power little different from the legislative power to ap

propriate funds.

The governor's financial control has progressed from a stage where he had no participation whatsoever in either the appropriating

or the expending of state funds to a stage where he has statutory

control over expenditures and political responsibility with which

to confront the legislators should they attempt to alter his budget

substantially. Financial control by the governor was probably more effective during the administration of Governor Myers Y. Cooper than at any other time to the present. The ground gained during the Cooper

administration has not been lost entirely and today the gov-ernor is

the deciding voice in determining how much and for what purposes state

funds will be expended. Tnis is an effective vra.y of controlling the

administrative affairs of the several agencies and as such it operates

to increase the governor's control throughout the executive branch. 104

CID.PTii;R V: MISC.i!LLA.NEOUS Pffi1r.t!:RS AND GENERAL PROVISIDN'S

A. PARDONS, CO:MhffiTATIONS, AND IhlPRIEVES

The power to pardon criminals and grant reprieves has been in the hands of the governor since the inception of the office under the Constitution of 1802. This power was restricted,, however,, in the sense that he had no power to pardon or reprieve in cases of impeachment.1 The legislature may not revoke or cancel any penalty 2 or punish..~ent imposed by an impeechment court. The same situation exists in other states. A bill was introduced by the lesislature of

Texas which would have revoked the sentence imposed by the Senate of that state during the impeachment trial of Governor James E.

Ferguson. The Texas attorney general ruled that the legislature had no power to alter the original sentence.3

The power to pardon and the authority to grant reprieves con- stituted a large portion of the governor's power during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. One author suggests,, 11 The pardon power is historically attached to the executive,, for he is supposed

1ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 5. This power is denied in all st~tes.

2In Ohio the Senate is to try impeachments. Ohio Const. (1851),, Art. II, sec. 23.

3Finla G. Crawford,, H.ee.dings in .American Government (New York: F. s. Crofts,, 1933),, 546. 105

to be able to determine whether the e.pplication of the L,w will 4 work an wireasonable hardship in individual cases." Of what value was the power of pardon in influencing legislative action? Could the governor bring the legislators to terms by threatening them with wholesale pardoning of criminals incarcerated within the state's various institutions? This is quite unlikely, for even contempla- tion of such an act would doubtless be politically inexpedient. Could' he influence the execution of the law be setting large numbers of criminals at libe~ty? The same author suggests that " ••• only in rare cases can a conscientious governor expect to contriiJute to the orderly 5 operation of the law by ~ranting a pardon."

The pardoning power was of major importance to the early governors., one author implies., because it was one of the few powers the governor had. Leonard A. Blue relates that Governor Thomas Corwin had spent the first week in office and had had nothing to do. Upon taking an inquest, he found that the sole "flowers of the preroga.tive 11 were re 6 prieving criminals and appointing notaries public.

The Cons ti tuti on of 1851 made sig;nificant changes in the pardoning power. It was at the same time expanded and.restricted. The governor gained the power of commuto.tion, while in cases of treason he was re-

4zink., op. cit., 740.

51bid • ., 750. 6 . Blue., op. cit., 13. 106

stricted to suspending the sentence and reporting his action to the

General Assembly. That body could either pardon, commute the sentence,

grant a further reprieve, or direct the execution of the sentence.

The governor was also compelled to report at the regular meetings of the Assembly his action in all cases in which he granted a pardon, commuted a sentence, or granted a reprieve. To be included in this report was (1) name and crime of convict, (2) the sentence, (3) the date of sentence, and (4) the date of the pardon, reprieve, or commutation granted. This was to be accompanied with the governor's reason for altering the original sentence.7

The power of pardon, commutation, and re?rieve has also been expanded by interpretation and definition of the attorney general. The governor can exercise the power of pardon after conviction and before the sentence has been passed, or before the crbninal has been incar 8 cerated in a penal institution. The governor has power to fix a maximum term should he commute a definite sentence to an indefinite one. However, his power to fix this sentence is restricted in that he cannot fix a maximum term tha.t would exceed the maximum time the prisoner vmuld serve under the definite sentence imposed by the court deducting the ti~e off for good behavior provided for by the Ohio

7ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. ll.

81931 Opinions of the Attorney General 3239, P• 686. Commutation can also be granted at any time after conviction and passing of sen• tence. 107

General Code, section 2163. He cannot pre scribe a maximurn. term under

an indefinite sentence that would exceed the maximum term imposed by

the trial court after he has commuted this sentence to an indefinite

one. 9

The power of pardon extends to a Federally-imposed sentence in

one instance: when the person has been indicted on a charge of man

slaughter under the laws of the state of Ohio and the prosecution has been removed to the District Court of the United States before trial, by virtue of the provisions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code of the

United States, but the prisoner is ultimately sentenced to the Ohio

penitentiary.lo

The legislature placed one type of restriction on the governor's unlimited power of pardon. This was the establishment of the Board

of Pardons in 1888. It is safe to assume that the idea of restricting

the governor's pardon power was not uppermost in the minds of the

legislators, for the governor was ..still free to exercise bis discre tion, regardless of the recornroendations the board roif;ht make. F...e was compelled, however, to await the board's action on all applications for pardon, reprieve, or commutation of sentence. While this was a minor restriction, the bee.rd met only once in three ir:onths. Should an urgent appeal be made, it was clear that the oetitioner would be

91931 Opinions of the Attorney General 3271.

101929 Opinions of the Attorney Gen~ral 675, P• 1027.

110ltio Laws 1888, P• 188. 108

forced to remain incarcerated until action by the Boa.rd. The gover- nor's hands would be tied.

Expansion of the pardoning power ha.s come ma.inly through the media. of court interpretation and decision. The power of pardon rests wholly vd th the governor except in ca.ses of treason a.nd impeachment. No other authority can exercise any power ·whatsoever in the matter of pardoning.12 An unconditional pardon, once granted, is irrevocable. If such a pardon is obtained in a fraudulent manner, it 13 does not alter its effect at au. The governor may attach any rea sona.ble condition to a pardon should he so desire.. 14 However, it must be realized that the governor, in all probability, would not exercise this power indiscriminately. The governor can also release the criminal from paying the uncollected costs. The pardon, however, must always be so worded as to include every desired stipulation.15

Consideration of applications for pardons is now he.ndled by the four-member Board of Pa.role under the Department of Public Welfare.

This board was created in 1931 by the same statute which abolished

12Jiha v. Barry, 3 Ohio Nisi Prius (New Series, 65, 73 (1901). Decided in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, this decision was affirmed by the next higher court without an opinion, January 26,1903.

13Kns.pp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio State, 377, 394 (1883).

14Huff v. Dyer, 4 Ohio Circuit Court Reports, 595, 597 (1890). Decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Franklin County. 15 tibby v. Nicola, 21 Ohio State, 414 (1871). 109

the Board of Clemency which had been created in 1917. This old board

consisted of two members.16 The governor's Constitutional power to

grant pardons, commutations of sentence, and reprieves is not re

stricted in any manner by the creation of the Board of Parole.17

The governor is not bound by any recommendation which it transmits

to him if, in his judgment, the public interests would not thus be 18 best promoted. This board, as well as the two previous boards in

the same area, was mainly created for the purpose of relieving the

governor of some of the overwhelming investigative work connected with the exercise of this power.

B. CONTROL OVBR MILITIA

The most important power granted the governor by the Constitution

of 1802 was that of being commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia of the state, except when they shall be called into the service

of the United States.19 There were undoubtedly many occasions to axer-

cise this power to repel attacks by Indians and other hostile forces.

The power was not used to a very large extent and as an influential

16ohio Laws 1917, P• 598.

17 ohio Laws 1931, P• 593.

18ohio Genere.1 Code, section 93.

19ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 10. The same wording is carried over to the Ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 10. 110

\'leapon to hold over the hea.ds of legislators, it was, in all probability, of no effect at all. Mr. E. D. Cls.rk, delegate from Lorain County to the Convention of 1850-51, remarked that " ••• this duty was not arduous" a.nd that the governor spent no time with the militia.. Clark could conceive of no navy for the Ohio governor to control other tha.n the canal boats on the different ditches of the state. He presuined that the governor did not spend too much time commanding these.20

The governor does have the power to ca.11 forth the organized militia for service within the state to aid the civil authorities in supressing or preventing riot or insurrection or in repelling or pre

·v-enting invasion.21 This power has been used by various u;overnors on various occasions. If the governor deems it necessary to use the state militia to aid civil authorities in enforcing the law, he alone possesses the povrer to call it forth. He may order the militia to aid in local law enforcement, even though the mayor of the particular municipality in question may not request aid.22 The Constitutionally endowed prerogative of commander-in-chief is applicable only when the militia of the state is not in the service of the United States. Con-

20Debates, 1850-51, I, 314. 2lohio General Code, section 5202. 22Heimlich v. the Dispatch Printing Compa.n , 18 Ohio Nisi Prius (New Series , 505, 510 1916 • Decided in Common Pleas Court, Franklin County. The court stated, " ••• The supreme police power of the state is not circumscribed or lirnited by any statute, the same being vested with in the exclusive discretion a.nd judgment of the governor. 111

tingent upon that situation and only durinr: that period when over

one-half of the national guard is in the federal service or until

4,800 of the national guard have returned to the state and been or-

ganized, trained, and equipped for the defense of the state, the

governor is empowered to organize a state guard and a state naval

militia. These forces e.re not to be organized in excess of 4,800

or to contain less than 1,000 members. This force is to be employed

in defense of the state and the same provisions concerning aid to

local law enforcement officials in the perforrnmce of their duties

apply to this force as apply to the national guard.23 There was no

state guard during World War I. In April, 1941, the State Guard was . . 24 organized within the above limits. It was used at various times

on flood duty during the absence of the Ohio National Guard and was

disbanded in 1946.

The governor's power to organize, train, and discipline the

militia has been superseded to a great extent by the National Defense

Act of 1916. This act established the National Guard of the United

States. The national guard of the several states is a part of the

Nati.anal Guard of the United States.25

23ohio General Code, section 5201.

24ohio Laws 1941, p. 93. This was passed as an emergency mea sure. See P• l09.

2539 United States Statutes, 166 (1916). 112

One interesting aspect of how the governor's power was restricted in relation to his status as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the state came during the incumbency of Martin L. Davey. In 1937 the

General A.ssembly passed a law which gave the adjutant general life tenure.26 Mr. Karl B. Pauly remarks, "The law probably was unconsti tutional, in that it would have deprived the governor, the constitu tional commander of the ne.tional guard, of the power to appoint his top officers."27 This situation was not long in being rectified once

John w. Bricker assumed office. The life tenure of the adjutant general and his two principal a.ides was abolished. 28

C • EXTRADITION.

Another power which might properly be termed more a duty than a power is that which is granted by the Constitution of the United

States relative to demanding fugitives from justice that have fled from one state to another.29 This power is outlined in the Federal

Constitution, but it need not be strictly adhered to should the gover nor of Ohio be presented with a demand for a fugitive from another state. There is no Federal authority to compel the governor to de-

26ohio Laws 1937, p. 164.

27Pauly, op. cit., 122.

28ohio Laws 1939, P• 146, 152.

29 u. s. Const., Art. r:v, sec. 2. 113

liver to another state a fugitive from that sta.te.30 If the case

clearly comes under the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitution,

he has no course but to deliver up the fugitive. However, he is

the sole judge of whether or not this is the situation.31

Sections 109 et seq. of the General Code of Ohio prescribe the

procedures and the limit of the powers of the governor in this respect.

The governor's authority is not limited in any manner by the General

Assembly. His power to make demands on the governors of other stRtes

is of no value unless the executive authority of the state in question

decides to, comply with the demand. The Court of Appeals of Stark

County, speaking in the case of In re Extradition of Williams, held:

In extradition proceedings ••• the delivering government and not the one making the demand for the surrender of such fugitive is the final judge as to the propriety of the demand and of the suf ficiency of the evidence in its support.32

The extradition clause of the Constitution of the United ~tates

has been the basis for much litigation pertaining to the governor's

discretion in delivering up a fugitive from justice. It is doubtful,

however, that much influence could result from this grant of power.

Perhaps if a certain case were widely publicized and the governor re-

fused to deliver the fugitive upon demand by the executive head of

3°Kentucl:y v. Dennison, 65 United States, ·55, 16 L. Ed., 717, 730 (1861).

3lwork v. Corrington,,34 Ohio State, 64, 68 (1877).

32rn re Extradition of Williams, 5 Ohio Appeals, 55, 60 (1915). 114

another state, he might be either praised or condemned for his action. according to the sentiment of the people at the moment. This might result in legislative coopere.tion or hindrance at the next session.•

D. CONTROL OVER LOCAL OFFICEIIB The Constitution provides that the governor " ••• shall see that the laws are faithfully executed."33 Yet there is no provision in the document by which the governor can carry out this mandate. If the governor is charged with seeing that the laws are faithfully exe cuted and a local officer is not executing the l'.lw, then some pro vision for removal or discipline of the local law-enforcing officer should be made. However, very little authority has been conferred upon the governor to insure that local officials e.re performing their duties in accordance with law. The Constitution commands the governor to see that the laws are faithfully executed; no laws are excluded. If the section had provided that the governor should see that some of the laws were enforced_, the governor could only be re sponsible for that quantum. As it is, he is held responsible for the execution of all laws in all parts of the state. Yet his power to enforce that duty has not been commensure.te with his responsibility.

The governor may suspend or remove :raayors of municipalities in certain instances and may remove sheriffs if they permit lynching of

33ohio Const. (1851)_, Art. III., sec. 6. 115

a.ny persons under their jurisdictions. These oowers have been conferred by legislative action. The Ohio General Code provides that a mayor can be removed or suspended " ••• in case of misconduct in office, bribery, any gross neglect of duty, gross imrrrorality, or habi• tual drunkeness ••• "34 This power was not conferred on the governor in these terms until 1902. It has been used sparingly by the various incumbents. Governor Judson Harmon was the first to use this povrer.

He removed Mayor Atherton of Newark in 1911; Governor James M. Cox removed Mayor Poorman of Canton in 1919, and Governor Harry L. Davis removed the mayor of Hewark (the son of the mayor removed by Harmon) in 1921. During 11.. Vic Donahey' s first administration two mayors, a director of public service, and a police chief were removed. Donahey also threatened five other mayors with removal if they did not change their methods of conducting their duties.35 Governor Myers Y. Cooper removed Mayor P. J. Groh of Dover for failure to enforce the liquor law in his city.36

When this power over local law enforcement officers was first granted, it was little used. William Edwards relates the story of

34ohio General Code, section 4268.

35vfillia.m H. Edwards, "Governor Dona.hey and the Ohio Mayors," National Municipal Review, XIII (June, 1924), 350-6.

36vra.lker, Constructive Government, 219. 116

Governor Nash's refusal to use th~s power to remove from office a tramp who had been elected after his name had been placed on the ballot as a joke.37

Recently the power to remove a local official was invoked by

Governor Thomas J. Herbert to suspend tha mayor of Pomeroy. No hearing 38 was held because this mayor resigned. Currently (August, 1950)

Governor Frank J. Lausche has threatened the mayor of Russell's Point with removal for knowingly permitting gambling to exist in the village.

The councilmen of the village ha.d asked Governor Lausche to remove the mayor for alleged failure to prevent operation of slot l;J.a.chines.

An i;:ivestigation is being conducted at the present time.39

Ohio General Code, section 4269, re-enforces the. governor 1 .s power by making his decision in such instances final. 'rhis provision was litigated in the twin cases of State ex rol 1logt v. Donahey, Governor and State ex rel Vogt v. Kirchoffer.40 Referring to these cases, the attorney general was of the opinion that the court might inquire only as to whether there is any evidence tending to support the charges brought against a mayor in removal proceedings by the governor. The court may judge neither the validity nor the quantum of evidence required

37Edwards, op. cit., 354. 38 columbus (Ohio) Even~ng Dispatch (November 24, 1948), 1.

39columbus ~Ohio) Evening Dispatch (July 19, 1950), 20-A.

4010s Ohio State, 440 (1923). 117

by the govr.;Jrnor in removal proceedint:;s. 41 The governor is the final judge as to v;hether there is sufficient evidence to warrant removal. 42

The power to remove sheriffs is grs.nted by Ohio General Code, section 2855-1 and 2855-2. This is to be used only in the event that

' sheriff permits the lynching of a person or persons under his pro tection. This power was gre.nted in 1910. Added power of removal was

Given the governor as a result of the many acts passed to enforce the

Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The office of the

Commissioner for Prohibition was established in 1921, subject to re moval by the governor for neglect of duty and inefficiancy in office.

Removal of the deputy conunissioner was sL~ilarly provided for. This act was known as the Miller Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1921.43

These laws have since been repealed.

Of raore recent concern to the governor has been the question of his power to remove local law officials for knowin;>;ly ?ermitting gam bling to exist in their communities. This question was posed before the attorney general in 1945 and it was his opinion that the governor could remove local officials for that reason only in cases of mayors of municipalities. Charges must come within causes enumerated in

411945 Opinions of the Attorney General 152, p. 123.

42Ibid., 129.

43ohio Laws 1921, P• 4. 118

Ohio General Code,, 4286.44 The ri:overnor may not remove a local law- enforcement offici::tl under the 1Jrovisions of section 10-1 of the Ohio

General Code. This section provides for the remow1l of any official of the state or any of its political subdivisions

••• who willfully and flagrantly exercis3s authority or power not authorized by law, refuses or willfully neglects to enforce the law,, or to perform any official duty now or hereafter imposed upon him by law, or who is guilty of gross neglect of duty, gross i:rrunorality,, drunkeness, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance •••

However, the provisions of this section can only be invoked after charges have been emunerated in writing and signed by not less than fifteen per cent of the total qualified voters of that subdivision 45 who voted in the last preceding election for governor. The attorney general was of the opinion that " ••• those methods are specified and are not concurrent v:ith that of quo warranto and hence it must be con- eluded that the latter will not lie!'46

These few instances constitute the whole of the governor's power in this area. It is seriously restricted. No power of removal can be exercised unless it is expressly granted by statute.47 Perhaps local enforcement officials resent ev-en this narrm< grant of authority.

They may.feel that the state government is encroaching on their own

441945 Opinions of the Attorney ~£._eral,, 152, 129.

45ohio General Code,, section 10-1 a.nd 10-2.

461945 Opinions of the Attorney General,, 152, 129.

47Ibid., lW. 119

private domain. -vvhenever a governor does invoke this power, the case is proba-oly so gross a violation that he is forced to act.

In any instance, it is unlikely that he will exercise this power arbitrarily.

The direction of the executive branch entails much responsibility.

The governor's power is still too limited to permit him to cope with every situation that arises in 1•1hich action by him would perhaps solve the problems. This is especially true in the area of local law en forcement. He is practically "hamstrung" by absence of authority, but he now has more authority to cope with such problems than he did at the state's inception. As problems loom larger, perhaps the people will come to realize how powerless the executive is to enforce the laws and will increase gubernatorial authority for effective treatment of executive problems, at the same time devising and in sisting upon adequate controls to pre-vent abuse of this poV!er.

E. MINOR POWEHS AND DUTIZS

The governor is empowered to sign all grants and commissions that are issued in the name of and by the authority of the State of Ohio; these are to be sealed with the great seal and countersigned by the secretary of state.48 The governor is also keeper of the seal of the state which is officially known as "The Great Seal of the State of

48 ohio Const. (1851), Art. III, sec. 3. 120

Ohio.tt49 The executive power derived from the two ?rerogatives here mentioned is, in all probability, slight.

Another grant of power which is more duty than power is that one delegating to the governor the prerogative of commissioning notaries public. The f~overnor may commission as many as he may 50 deem necessary. The only restriction is that such appointees must be citizens of the state.

The governor is also authorized to appoint, on such evidence of qualifications as he may require, commissioners for the state of Ohio from among citizens living in any other state, any terri tory of the United States, or in any foreign state.51

The governor is also granted the power to call an election52 to fill vacancies in the Congr3ss of the United States, the General

Assembly of Ohio, and the United States Senate.53 He may appoint to the Senate pending the next election if he so desires. An effort was made during the regular session of the Ninety-Eighth General As- sembly to change the method of filling vacancies in these offices.

49Ibid., sec. 12. The seal is in the governor's office and is used by the governor. 50 ohio General Code, section 119.

51Ibid., section 132.

52The use of this power is determined by the vacancies which occur. It is seldom used. See Appendix III.

53ohio General Code, sections 4828-3 and 4829. 121

House J'Oint Resolution Number 1, introduced by Mr. Robert Shaw of r'ranklin County,, proposed the su0mission of a Constitutional arnend- ment to alter Article II,, section 11,, so that the vacancies would be filled by the "county central cornrni ttee of the political party of the deceased member."54 This resolution was not passed.

Often in dire emergency the governor is given special powers.

One instance will sufficiently illustrate this. Go·1ernor Harry L.

Davis was empowered in 1922 by the General Assembly to appoint a state fuel commissioner to regulate the price of coal. This officer was to be paid by the state and subject to gubernatorial removal.55

The chief executive of the state is often called upon during war tir:ie to assist in the National Defense Program. As the head of the selective sc~rvice system of the state,, the governor is charged with the responsibility of see in,.::: that the draft law is fairly and promptly adninistered. The sovernor usually delegates this duty to 56 the adjutant general or a state director of selective service.

In January,, 1941, Governor John ~~. Bricker appointed the Ohio State

Council of Defense to prepare plans for the defense of the state and

54Journal of the House of Repres~ntatives,, CXXIII (Columbus: F. J. Heer,, 1949),, 65-6.

551Jercer,, Legislative History, IV,, 37.

56Graves,, op. cit., 974. In 1950, the Ohio Director of Selective Service is Colonel Chester Goble. 122

coordinate defense activities. All states had such an organization during the Second World War. 57 At the present time (August. 1950)

Governor Frank J. Lausche has divided the state into defense areas and has appointed directors for the various districts.

F. RELIOVAL AND SUCC~SSION

The governor may be impeached for any misdemeanor in office.

The term misdemeanor is used in a very general sense in this instance.

1n the Ohio General Code the term is strictly defined as any crime not requiring the death sentence. 58 The judgment may not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under authority of the state. However. if the governor is impeached, regardless of whether or not he is convicted, he is liable to indictment. trial, and judgment according to law.59 An amencL~ent added in 1912 authorized the General Assembly to enact laws providing for the prompt removal from office of any officers for any misconduct involving moral turpitude or for any other cause provided for by law.60 To implement

57 Book of the States, 1943-44 (Chicago: Council of State Govern- ments, 1943), 82-3, lists the type of defense orgo.niz!Jtion for ea6h state.

580hio General Code. section 12370. Obviously the governor could be impeached for the cor.imission of a felony. 59 ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 24.

60ohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 38. 123

this a.Jnendment the General Code was revised. Section 10-1 specifies the reasons whereby officers shall be removed, while section 10-2 prescribes the procedure of removal. This was mentioned previously in reference to the removal of ~ocal officials.

The provision for a successor to the governorship in case of death,, impeachment,, resignation, removal, or other disability is outlined in the Constitution. The powers and duties of the office for the residue of the term, or until the elected ~overnor shall be acquitted or his disaoility removed, devolve upon the lieutenant covernor.61 Carrying the line of succession further, should the lieutenant go'1ernor be unable to perform the duties for any of the reasons set forth, the president of the senate exercises the powers of the office. Should he be unable to nerform the tasks of governor, the mantle of office next and finally falls upon the speaker of the house of representatives.62

It would seem that these provisions were such as to nermit no differences of opini·'.)n to arise concerning who would succeed to the office. Yet the question did arise relative to who would be the governor should the governor-elect die subsequent to his election and prior to his inauguration on the second Uonday of January next fol lowing. The attorney general was of the opinion that should such an

6lohio Const. (1851), Art. II, sec. 15.

62ohio Const. (1851),, Art. III, sec. 17. 124

event occur, the person presently in office would bt? entitled to hold the office beyond the regulo.r term for which he had been elected. He would continue therein until his successor could be elected and qualified. Further, the attorney general stated that

" ••• the term 'governor' as the same appears in section 15 of Article

III of the Constitution of Ohio does not include 'governor-elect' and, consequently ••• the duties and powers would not devolve upon the lieutenant t;overnor. 1163

631947 Opinions of the Attorney General.1562. 125

CiiAPi'EH \iI t co;:cLUSIO,JS i\.XD PiWP08.t'i.LS

The governor of the state of Ohio had very little.executive power v:hen the office ·wus created in 1802. This was attributable,, for the most part,, to popular reaction against the autocratic methods employed by Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair. Today this feeling has been largely for·~otten. The governor is now the executive in fact as v.ell as in name. This expansion of power has not been easily achieved.

The theory of separation of powers coupled with the memory of St.

Clair's use of the absolute veto has had a negative effect on pro posals to incree.se the governor 1 s authority so as to make it commen surate with his responsibility.

Perhaps the most notable me.nifestation of this expansion of power has been the granting of authority to veto legislative enactments.

This prerogative, first ~;iven in 1903, was first proposed in the Con stitutional Convention of 1850-51. The veto power given in 1903 was the most drastic extended to any governor of any state of the Union.

Later it was restricted to the more moderate provisions under which the governor exercises his authority at the present time. This 6rant alone is evidence of' the expanding power of Ohio's governor.

The influence which the c;overnor can exert by means of his per sonal qualities and his position as party leader cannot be called evidence of expansion,, inasmuch as such power expands or contracts with the individual t':overnor. The ler_:;al powers, once given, are 126

relatively fixed. Unlike the extra-legal powers, they do not have to be re-acquired by each incumbent.

Since 1803 the governor has been authorizec1 to deliver messa;;es to the General Assembly concerning measures he deems expedient. Under the present system the Assembly is not compelled to give attention to the governor's recommendations. The Assembly has every riGht to deter mine the necessity of legisktion on any subject, but it should be required to at least consider the governor's proposals.

When the governor calls a special session of the legislature, he can limit A.ssembly consideration to specific subjects outlined either in his proclamation calling that session or in his subsequent rnessac;c'ls.

Under the present Constitutional framework this povmr to call special sessions seems to be a wise provision. However, should the legislative branch be authorized to meet que.rterly or remain in continuous session, the provision for calling special sessions would probably be unneces sary.

The power of appointment, once the exclusive prerogative of the

General Assembly, has gravitated toward the executive branch. However this power has not reached its maximum effectivoness wherein all key appointees would serve at the pleasure of the governor. The governor's power is today sericmsly restricted becRuse many officials are ap pointed for terms which overlap his incumbency. The primary question in this matter seems to be this: Should the entire ad.r:linistrative branch be reorganized at every inaugural or should such turnover 127

occur only at top levels? In other words, should the basic policy be patronage or uninterrupted service? While the governor's influence

over the entire executive branch would be greatly increased by com

plete turnover after each new go7ernor assumes office, the lack of

continuous service necessitated by such an arrangement would probably not permit effective service to the people of the state.

The Reorganization Code enaeted in 1921 served to consolidate the executive branch's a:;encies into eic;ht newly-cr'"ated departments.

This greatly incr~ased the governor's influence over Dolicy, for he was empowered to appoint directors for these departments to serve at his pleasure.

The influence of the governor in financial control was non-exis tent prior to the installation of the executive bud:'.:et in 1913.

Since then the governor has been able to exert some control over expenditures and revenue. The greatest gubernatorial financial con trol came during the tenure of !· 1Iyers Y. Cooper. Control was then effected through the lump-sum appropriation, the system of accrual accounting, and other related devices. Prior to that time there had been no effective financial control. Since then control has been exercised mainly by the Superintendent of the Budget, the Director

of Finance, and the Auditor of State.

A proposal to increase the governor's authority in financial

11 matters has been made by Harvey Yialker. He sug1;ests that ••• the 128

governor be empowered to reduce amounts in a:siproprie.tion acts, subject to reeonsiderstion by the General Assembly in like manner as item vetoes and vetoes on other r.1easures. 111 'rhis r:1ight preclude the veto of an entire item and circumvent such embarrassment f'.S hartin L.

Davey experienced in connection with his vetoes. Through such a system e.gencies which happened to be in higher favor than others with the leg- islntors could be restricted in excenditures. Also, "oork barrel" ap- proprie.tions mie;ht be minimized or even halted.

The expanding power of the governor hes received little impetus from such provisions as the pe.rci.oning power, the authority to commission notaries public, and the extradition authority. However, the

;;overnor has perhaps gained prestige in the eyes of t:-ie neople of the state because he possesses the povmr to pardon, commute sentences,, and grant reprieves.

The authority of the national g;overrunent over military affairs has le.rt;ely superseded the ·:;overnor' s authority as commander-in-chief of the state forces. However, he can still direct military ~'olicy to some extent through his pov.'er to appoint the adjutant general. The roovernor's authority to order the militia to duty to help enforce the le,w has often proved valuable in times cf crisis.

The governor's control ever law-enforcement officials of political sub-divisions of the ste.te is slig:ht. He may remove such officials only for reasons specified by statute. Thus these local of-

11nforr::1s.tion from oersonal interview. "· 129

ficia.ls e.re relatively independent of executive authority .. yet the governor is responsible for the enforcement of the 18.ws. This poses an important question: Should power be centralized or diffused? It seems that it should be centralized to the extent that laws of the state will be enforced with the same degree of' rigidity in all counties of the state. The governor should have the authority to require that the laws be enforced in a prescribed manner. He should possess more power to remove local law enforcement officials than is now granted him.

Many proposals have been me.de for further increasing the power of the governor. Perhaps the one which has had the lon,:::;est history is t.he proposal to increase the .;uberDstorie.l term of .office from two to four y•2ars. If this incree.se ·were me.de .. the chief executive of the state would not be forced to spend approxi~ately one-half his incum r.~ency preparing and conductint his car.rne.i;_,;n for re-election should he wish s.nother term. The delegates to the Convention of 1850-51 con sidered this sugr;estion .. but did not submit it to the people. Mr.

Samson l,:ason believed that should the term be increased " ••• lt YJ'Ould be a. decided improvement and would prove very beneficial."2 Later

Governor Harry Davis recommended that the General Assembly submit to the voters an 8.l'•end:rnent to incree.se the term of r;overnor to four years

2Debe.tcs .. 1860-51 .. I .. 306. 130

and restrict him to a single term to avoid political cornplica.tions.3

Davis' proposal v-.'8.s never submitted to the voters. Other like proposals have been made.

Two facts meet any proposal concerning guberne.torial term: (1)

The voters take little or no interest in state elections in what is termed "off" years. (2) The voters tend to disregard state issues v1hen national campair.;ns are being conducted. Should the governor's term be increased and the eleetion time ch::wg:ed to odd-nu.rnbered years, or even should it reme.in the same as e.t present, the people must be educated to pii.rticip8.te more actively in the election of state officir;.ls. It would seem that more voter e.ttention to state issues can be gained by completely divorcing state and national elections in point of time.

It has been suggested that the :;;overnor be made the only elected executive official. He would then appoint the other officials of the executive department, ·who are not popularly elected. Such an arran,,~e-

:!!lent would surely operate to incre:.se the pow-er of the ;;overnor over the executive branch. He would be -the executive, not one of the executives. Hov,rever, this proposal has some disadvantages. The governor vrould be e.ble to appoint an auditor of his own choosing; to e.'::prove accounts drawn on the state. This would be tantamount to a "self- s.udi t" and woulG. not be a very desirable situation in many instances.

3Mercer, Le['~isle.tive History, IV, 102. 131

To offset this the legislature could appoint the auditor and keep in close touch v."i th the e::x:nendi turc; s.

Another proposal that has been advanced would revamp the system of government so as to permit the governor and his department heads to sit in either house and defend bills drawn up under the governor's direction. The legisle.ture would be required to vote on these bills within a reasonable lene;th of time after their introduction.4 This proposal does not purport to create a cabinet system of government such as exists in Great Britain. The mer:i.bers of the e:{ecutiva branch would hav-e no voice in final determination,, but would only pe:rticipe.te in debate surrounding the measure. This sugr~estion has some m'::rit in that it might bring victory to certain :Jills which the governor desired enacted,, but it could just as well bring about a stinging defeat to the D.dministration' s program. ;:tather than risk he.vint;; e. program defeated after personally upholding its measures on the floor or both houses,, it would probai;ly be wiser for the _:;overnor to exert his influence by the methods now in use. Defeat on an im portant administrative measure could be more easily explained to the voters if the members of the executive branch were denied a chance to defend its merits iJefore the leg;islLture.

Not everyone will a.g;ree to the thesis that the executive power has expanded in recent years. One former governor of Ohio• Thomas

4i.11ussey,, op. cit.,, 140. 132

J. Herbert, believes that this power is :shrinking in present e;overn-

:r::ente.l trends. He bases his observation in large part on the recent creation of a great number of boards and conunissions to handle executive functions. The power of the governor, he feels, is limited to the power of appointment and in some cases, the power of removal for cause. The creation of these boards and commissionsmay be necessary to handle the details of a specific project, but if the governor is to assume the responsibility for a task to be completed, then he should have the authority to require that his desires and v.ishes on the matter be obeyed. This former governor also feels that much of the executive power is being usurped by federal agencies under the 11 grant-in- sid11 program. This program does set up certain standards which must be followed ·when federal money is used. 5

This reason listed by Herbert as limiting gubernatorial power was e.dvanced by Governor l•rank Viillis as e. factor bringing about the expansion of gubernatorial power. Speaking to the General Assembly, he stated, "One of the methods whereby much po·wer has been placed in the hands of the executive in recent years has been through the gradual increase in the number of commissions appointed by the Go'rernor. 116

Perhaps Governor Willis w2.s speaking of power v1hich seemed much

5Iv1aterial from letter from Thomas J. Herbert,, r;)ay 17 I 1950, in possession of author.

6wercer, Legislative History,, II,, 115. 133

grsater on the surface than it actually was,, while Governor Her

bert desired actual administre,tive control over policies of the

boards and commissions rather than the -oerhe.ps superficial power

of appointing e.dministre.tors for fixed terms.

For the most part, however,, there is consensus of opinion

that the power of the governor has increased. This increase has

come in ve.rious ways a by Constitutional authorization,, by legis

ls.tive delegation,, and by judicial interpretation. Had the leg

islature or conventions to revise the Constitution desired to

limit the power of the e;overnor still :'urther than had the Conven

tion of 1802,, Ohio might today be governed entirely by a legisla tive body. From the meager authority with v;hich the office of

governor was orii:;inally endowed,, pov;er could only increase through development of the executive as a branch coordinate with the legis

lative and the judicial.

Is the governor now granted the optimum amount of authority?

Although the "optimum amount" is scarcely definable,, nearly evor~rone will agree that the executive should have a.uthori ty com.m.ensurate with

his responsibility. The questions which confront those who advocate further increase in the governor's power seem to be two. How much power should he be given? ~:ould further incre&se operate to make him a more responsible and effective governor or an autocratic tyrant? The

problems of controlling power and keeping its holders responsible to 134

the people have be8n faced at every forward step in the expansion

of the executive power. Lipson asks, " ••• can the people retain

control over those whose povrer they increase?"7 Some methods of

control are now available. The governor can be impeached should

the situation warrent. The legislative body can refuse assent to

his proposals. foost effective of all, they can cut off the "life

blood of government .. by reducing; his budt:;et estimates substantially.

Above any possible antagonisr.i. directed toward further increase

of executive povrer is the need for better meeting the greater public

interest. The criterion which determines governmental efficiency

is not whether the legislative, executive, or judicial branch is

supreme, but whether the services rendered by that government a.re adequately performed. 8 The expD.nsion of executive power seems to have proved beneficial to the public interest.

7Lipson, op. cit., 74.

8Ibid., 75. APPENDIX I

GOVERNORS OF OHIO*

Name Politics County Elected Served Reme.rks

Ed"W-a.rd Tiffin Republican-Democrat Ross 1803 1803-1805

Edward Tiffin Republican-Democrat Ross 1805 1806-1807 Resic;ned ~1arch. 1807

Thomas Kirker Republican-Democrat A.dru:n.s Acting 1807-1809 R.J. Meigs de clared ineli gible

Samuel Huntington Republican-Democrat Trumbull 1808 1809-1810

Return Jonathan l:ieigs, Jr. Republican-Democrat ·washington 1810 1811-1812

Return Jonathan lieigs, Jr. Republican-Democrat ·washington 1812 1813-1814 Resii:;ned March, 1814

Othneil Looker Republican-Democrat Hamilton Acting 1814

ThOI!lAS Worthington Republican-Democrat Ross 181'-1· 1815-1816

Thomas Worthington Republican-Democrat Ross 1816 1817-1Bl8

Ethan Allen Brown Republican-Democrat Hamilton 1818 1819-1820

•Wilbur H. Seibert, The Government of Ohio ('ew York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), 240-1. There are other lists which show slit;ht discrepancies; for example. see Elliot H. Gilkey, The Ohio Hundred Year Book (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1901). 327-8. Table from 1903 to 1950 compiled with the assistance of ~Arthur Schwartz, Director of the Legislati-;re Reference Service of Ohio. APPENDIX I (continued)

Nrune Politics County Elected Served Remarks

Ethan Allen Brown Republicun-Democrat Hamilton 1820 1821-1822 Resigned, .Jan- ua.ry. 1822

Allen •rrimble Federalist Highland Acting 1822

Jeremiah Morrow Democrat Warren 1822 1823-1824

Jeremiah I\~orrow Democrat Warren 1824 1825-1826

Allen Trimble Federalist Highland 1826 1827-1828

Allen Trimble Federalist Highland 1828 1829-1830

Duncan McArthur Federalist Ross 1830 1831-1832

Robert Lucas Democrat Pike 1832 1833-1834

Robert Lucas Democrat Pike 1834 1835-1836

Joseph Vance Whig Cha.m.paie;n 1836 1837-1838

Wilson Shannon Democrat Belmont 1838 1839-1840

Thomas Corwin Whig 1'ia.rren 1840 1841-1842

Wilson Shannon Democrat Belmont 1842 1843-1844 Resif:ned. April 15. 1843

Thomas W. Bartley Democrat Richland Acting 1843-1844 I-' (J;J Mordecai Bertley VJhig Richland 1844 1845-1846 m APPENDIX I (continued)

Name Politics County Elected Served Remarks

William Babb Whig Butler 1846 1847-1849

Seabury Ford ·whig Geauga 1848 1849-1850 Ford not noti- fied until Jan- ue.ry 22, 1849

Reuben Wood Democrat Cuyahoga 1850 1851-1852 JUection date changed

Reuben Wood Democrat Cuyhoga 1851 1853 Resigned July, 1853

William }liedill Democrat Fairfield Acting 1853

William r1iedill Democrat Fairfield 1853 1854-1856

Salmon P. Chase Republican Hamilton 1855 1856-1858

Salmon P. Chase Republican Hrunilton 1857 1858-1860

William Dennison, Jr. Republican Franklin 1859 1860-1862

David 'rod Republican Mahoning 1861 1862-1864

John Brough Republican Cuyhoga 1863 1864-1865 Died, August 29,, 1865

Charles Anderson Republican Montgomery Acting 1865-1866

Jacob Dolson Cox Republican Hamilton 1865 1866-1868 ..... CN --:i APPENDI1. I (continued)

Na.me Politics County Elected Served· Remarks

Rutherford B. Hayes Republican Hamilton 1867 1868-1870

Rutherford B. Hayes E:epublica.n Hamilton 1869 1870-1872

Edward F. Noyes Republican Hamil ton 1871 1872-1874

William Allen Democrat Ross 1873 1874-1876

Rutherford B. Hayes Republican Sandusky 1875 1876-1877 Resigned Feb- ruary 28., 1877

Thomas L. Young Republican Hamilton Acting 1877-1878

Richard M. Bishop Democrat Hamilton 1877 1878-1880

Charles Foster Republic~ Seneca. 1879 1880-1882

Charles Foster Republican Seneca 1881 1882-1884

George Headly Democrat Hamilton 1883 1884-1886

Joseph B. F'oraker Republican Hamilton 1885 1886-1888

Joseph B. Foraker Republican Hamilton 1887 1888-1890

James E. Campbell Democrat Butler 1889 1890-1892

William ILcKinley Republican Stark 1891 1892-1894

...... William McKinley H.epublican Stark 1893 1894-1896 Cl~ CXl Asa S. Bushnell ffopublican Clark 1895 1896-1898 t>.PPBNDI:~ I (continued) Name Politics County ---Elected Served Remarks Asa s. Bushnell Republican Clark 1897 1898-1900

George K. Nash Republican Franklin 1899 1900-1902

George K. Nash Republican Franklin 1901 1902-1904

Myron T. Herrick Republican Cuyahoga 1903 1904-1906

John It. Pattison Democrat Clermont 1905 1906 Died June 18, 1906

Andrew L. Harris Republican Preble Acting 1906-1909 Election date changed

Judson Harmon Democrat Hamilton 1908 1909-1911

Judson Harmon Democre.t Hamilton 1910 1911-1913

James B. Cox Democrat };lontgomery 1912 1913-1915

Frank B. Ylillis Republican Delaware 1914 1915-1917

James M. Cox Democrat I,,~ontgomery 1916 1917-1919

James H. Cox Democrat Montgomery 1918 1919-1921

Harry L. Davis Republican Cuyahoga 1920 1921-1923

A.. Vic Donahey Democrat Tuscarai"/8.S 1922 1923-1925 ...... UI A. Vic Donahey Der.locrat Tuscarawas 1924 1925-1927 (() APPENDIX I (continued)

Na.me Politics County Elected Served Remarks

A.. Vic Donahey Democrat Tuscarawas 1926 1927-1929

Myers Y. Cooper Republican Ramil ton 1928 1929-1931

George -vihi te Democrat Washington 1930 1931-1933

George White Democrat Washington 1932 1933-1935

hi.art in L. Davey Democrat Portage 1934 1935-1937

Martin L. Davey Democrat Portage 1936 1937-1939

John w. Bricker Republican Franklin 1938 1939-1941

John w. Bricker Republican Franklin 1940 1941-1943 John w. Bricker Republican F'ra.nklin 1942 1943-1945

Frank J. Lausche Democrat Cuyahoga 1944 1945-1947

Thomas J. Herbert Republican Cuyahoga 1946 1947-1949

Frank J. Lausche Democrat Cuyahoga 1948 Incumbent 141

APPENDIX II

VETO RECOli'.D OF :JOV.SlWORS 3 Y 'I' .8fo!I*

Na.me Date Veto Item Laws Repassed Veto Without Signatures

Myron T. Herrick 1904-1906 22 2 0 0

John M. Pattison 1906 0 0 0 0

Andrew L. Harris 1906-1909 2 l 0 0

Judson Harmon 1909-1911 20 2 57 0

Judson Harm.on 1911-1913 27 1 54 1

James M. Cox 1913-1915 13 3 0 ** Frank B. Willis 1915-1917 24 2 0 ** James M. Cox 1917-1919 25 0 18 ** James Me Cox 1919-1921 36 0 43 7

Harry L. Davis 1921-1923 2 0 4 0

A. Vic Donahey 1923-1925 74 0 29 16

A.. Vic Donahey 1925-1927 43 3 28 34

A.. Vic Donahey 1927-1929 30 3 27 8

Myers Y. Cooper 1929-1931 22 0 3 0

George White 1931-1933 30 1 6 0

*Compiled from Governor's Office, Veto Record I, 1904-1909, un published; Governor's Office, General Record, 1910-1916, unpublished; and Final Edition of the General Assembl~, 83-98, published under the direction of the Clerk of the Senate of Ohio at the state printers.

**Information buried in archives and not readily accessible. 142

APPENDIX II (continued)

Name Date Veto Item Laws Repassed Veto Without Si~natures

George White 1933-1935 6 0 5 0

Martin L. Davey 1935-1937 12 0 l 0

Martin L. Davey 1937-1939 34 3 0 0

John Vl. Bricker 1939-1941 2 0 0 0

John w. Bricker 1941-1943 6 0 0 0

John w. Bricker 1943-1945 8 0 0 0

Frank J. Lausche 1945-1947 7 0 3 2

Thomas J. Herbert 1947-1949 5 0 3 2

Frank J. Lausche 1949-1951 7 1 1 2 plus 1 partial 143

APPENDIX III

TO FILL VACP~NCIGS IN CONGRESS AHD THE OHIO GKr,iE~.AL /,Ss::;r,:BLY*

1850-1950

Year Vacancy to Be Filled

1890 Representative to General Assembly from Preble County

1893 Representative to General Assembly from Champaign County

1893 Representative to Congress from 10th Congressional District

1894 Representative to General Assembly from Fairfield County

1894 Representative to Congress from 3rd Congressional District

1896 Representative to General Assembly from Hamilton County

1896 Representative to General Assembly from Stark County

1898 H.epresenta.tive to General Assembly from Stark County

1899 Representative to Congress from 16th Congressional District

1903 Representative to Congress from 16th Congressional District

1904 Representative to Congress from 14th Congressional District

1904 Representative to Congress from 19th Congressional District

1940 Representative to Congress from 17th Congressional District

1940 Representative to Congress from 22nd Congressional District

I 1947 Representative to Congress from 4th Congressional District

•Compiled from Secretary of State, ~o Statisties and Ohio Election Statistics for the several years. These volumes are printed by the state printers. No records are available for years prior to 1850. 144

J3 IBLI 0 Jiitl.PHY

I. Government Documents

Massachusetts Constitution.

Ohio. Attorney General. Informal Opinions (1945).

----Opinions (1929, 1931, 1933, 1934, 1937, 1940 1945, 1947).

Ohio. Auditor of State. Annual Report, 1939 (Colum bus: F'. J. Heer, 1939 •

Ohio. Legislature. Journal of the House of Repre sentatives, Vols. CIX, CXVI, C~VII, c:~i/III, C:OCIII (published biennially at the sta.te printers).

•---Report of the Joint Committee on Administrative Reorganization (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1921).

----Report of the Joint Conunittee on Economy in the Public Service (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1929).

Ohio. Secretary of State. Ohio Statistics, 1890- 1949 (published annually at the state printers).

Ohio Appeals, 5.

Ohio Circuit Court Reoorts, 4.

Ohio Constitution, 1802.

Ohio Constitution, 1851 (Amended, 1912).

Ohio General Code Annotated (Page, 1946).

Ohio Ls.ws (1853, 1888, 1902, 1906, 1913, 1915, 1917, 1921, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1939, 1941, 1945, 1947).

----Advance Copy (1949). 145

Ohio Nisi Prius (New Series), 3, 18.

Ohio State Reports, 21, 34, 39, 63, 102, 108, 112, 125, 130.

United States Constitution.

United StatasReports (1861).

United States Statutes-at-large (1916).

II. Books

Adel, J. G., reporter. Official Report of the Pro ceedings and Debates of the Third Constitutional Convention of Ohio, Cleveland: W. s. Robison, 1874. 3 vols.

Anonymous. The New Ohio. Columbus: publishing company not given, 1913.

Atwater, Caleb. A History of the State of Ohio, 2nd ed. Cincinnati: Glezen and Shepard, Sterotypers, 1838.

Aumann, Francis R. "Ohio Government in the Twentieth Century," which is Chapters I and II of Ohio in the Twentieth Century, which is Vol. VI of Wittke, C~rl, ed., The State of Ohio. Columbus: Ohio State Archea.logical and Histori.cal Society, 1942. 6 vols.

Blue, Leonard A. The Relation of the Governor to the Organization of the Executive Power in the States. University of Pennsylvania., Thesis Ph.D., 1902. Bryce, James. The funerican Conunonwealth, 3rd ed• New York: The Macmillan Co., 1895. 2 vols. 146

Council of State Governments. Book of the States, 1943-44. Chicago: Council of State Govern ments, 1943.

----Book of the States, 1948-49. Chicago: Council of Ste.te Governments, 1948.

Cornmager, Henry s., ed. Documents of Americnn History. 3rd ed.; New York: F. S. Crofts, 1947.

Cox, James l,I. Journey Through Hy Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946.

Crawford, Finla G. Readings in American Goverrunent. New York: F. s. Crofts, 1933. Fess, Simeon D., ed. Ohio's Three Hundred, which is Vol. IV of Fess, Simeon D., Ohio. Chicago: Lewis, 1937.

Galbreath, Charles B. History of Ohio. Chicago: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925. 2 vols.

----R~c. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitu tional Convention of the State of Ohio, 1912. Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1913. 2 vols.

Gilkey, Elliot H. The Ohio Hundred Year Book. Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1901.

Glover, John G. Business aperational Research and Report. Uew York: American Book Co., 1941.

Graves, w. Brooke. Ar:1erica.n State Government. 3rd ed.; Boston: D. c. Heath, 1946.

Holcombe, Arthur N. State Government in the United States. 3rd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931.

Lipson, Leslie. The American Goveri:ior from Figure head to Leader. Chicag;o~ 'fhe University of Chicago Press, 1939.

Maher, Richard L., "Ohio: Ox Cart Governnent, "in Allen, Robert s., ed. Our Sovereign State. Nevr York: Vanguard, 194g:--· · 147

L1ercer, James K., ed. Ohio Legislative History. Cohu:ibus: F. J. Heer, 1913 to l927 (published :periodically). Vol. I, Ad.ministration of Go7ernor Jud son""'"H'a'rinon, 1909-1912. Vol. II, Administrations of Governor James M. Cox, 1913-191,1; Governor Frank B. Willis, 1915-1916; Gover nor James 1E. Cox, 1917-1918. Vol. III, Administration of Governor Je.mes M. Cox, 1919-1920. Vol. IV, Administration of Governor Harr'y"i. Davis, 1921-1922. Vol. V, Adeinistration of Governor A. Vic Donahey, 1923-1924. Vol. Vt, Administration of Governor A. Vic Donahey, 1925-1926.

Ogg, Rrederic A. and Ray, P. Orman. Introduction to American Gover~ent. 7th ed.; New· York: D. Appleton Century, 1942.

Orth, Samuel P. The Centralization of Administra tion in Ohio. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1903.

Pauly, Karl B. Bricker of Ohio. New York: G. Pe Putnam's Sons, 1944;

Roseboom, Eugene H. The Civil 71ar Era, 1850-1873, which is Vol. IV of The State of Ohio. Wittke, Carl,,ed. Columbus: Ohio State 1G=C.h'ealogical and Historical Society, 1944. 6 vols.

---->i..nd 1/feisenburger, Francis P. A History _of Ohio. Ne1tv York: Prentice-Hall, 1934.

Tocqueville, ..~lexis de. Democracy in America. Galaxy ed., Henry Reeve, trans., Henry s. Commager, ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Scobey, F. E. and llicZlroy, B. L. The Biographical Annals of Ohio. Sprin[field, Ohio: Springfield Publishing co., 1905.

Seibert, liilbur H. The Government of Ohio. New York: The l1iacmilla.n Co., 1908. 148

Smith, J. V., rec. Debates and Proceedin[~S of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51. ColU.m.bus: S. Medary, 1851. 2 vols.

Walker, Harvey. Constructive Government in Ohio: The St::iry of the Administration of Governo.z:. ~Kyers Y. Cooper, l9Z~11. Columbus: The Ohio ~istory Press, 1948.

ilorkers of the liriters Program, Ohio. The Ohio Guide. New Yorks Oxford University Press, 1940.

Zink, Harold. Government and Politics in the United States. New York: The liacmillan Co., 1946.

III. Magazine Articles

Anonymous. "Judson Harmon---His Record and His Views," The Outlook, C (January 27, 1912), 175-183.

----nThe Strengthening of Our State Executives," The Outlook, XCVII (February 11, 1911), 292-293.

----nwhat is a Governor?" The Outlook, XCVI (December 24, 1310), 893-894.

Bliven, Bruce. "The Ohio Gang," New It.spublic, XX.XVIII (May 14, 1924), 305-308.

Coker, francis W. "Interworkings of State Adminis tration and Direct Legislation," reprinted from The Annals of the American Academ of Poli tica.l and Social Science 11arch, 1916 •

Deardorff, Neva R. "Ohio Reverts," The Survey, L (Aur;ust 15, 1923), 529. 149

Edv.'ards, ·william H. "Governor Donahey and the Ohio lfa=rors, 11 National Uunicipal Reviei'., XIII (June, 1924), 350-356. -

!t'airlie, John A. "The Executive Power in the State Constitution," The Annals of the American Aca demy of Political and Social Science, -cr..Xx:a: (Septenber, 1935), 59-=73.

Ha.le, William B. "Judson Harmon and the Presi dency," ·world's \fork, XXII (June, 1911), 14446-14459 ••

Mussey, Henry R., ed. "Participation of the ~xecu tive in Legisletion," Proceedings of the Aca demy of Political Science, V (Hew York: Colum ~University, 1915), 134-140.

Okey, George B. "History of the Veto in Ohio, 11 The Ohio Eagazine, I (December, 1906), 570-573.-

Steffens, Lincoln• "Ohio: A Tale of 'l'wo Cities, 11 J:icClure' s Magazine, ~G0/ (July, 1905), 293-311.

Tuttle, Alonzo H. "History of the Executive Veto in the Ohio Constitution," 'rhe Ohio State University Law Journal, II {March, 1936), 99-114.

Walker, Harvey. "Governor's Ivlessages, 1930.," The American Political Scie~eview, XXIV (:tlay, 1930), 380-392.

----"Theory and Practice in State .Administrative Org;F~nization," 1Je.tiona.l Ll.unicipal H.eview, XIX. (April, 1930)., 249-254.

rl • Newsps.pers

Columbus (Ohi~ Evenin[~ Dispatch, November 24, 1948

----July 19, 1950.