i TABLE OF COlJTJ:;NTS Preface • • . l Chapter I: Historical ilackground of the ~xpandint; Pow0r • 5 Chapter II: M.::thods of Lebislative Influence • • • • • • 14 A.. The Veto •• . 14 1. History of the Veto • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 2. nature of the Veto • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 B. Party Leadership • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 35 c. Recommendations by Eessages • • • • • • • • • • 49 D. Prescribing for Special Sessions • • • • • • • • 52 Chapter III1 The Power of Appointment • • • • • • • • • 57 A. Historical ~volution • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 57 B. Effect of Reorganization • • • • • • • • • • • • 65 c. Restrictions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 70 D. Effect on Administrative Control • • • • • • • • 77 Chapter IV: Control over Finances • • • • • • • • • • • 85 Chapter V: Miscellaneous Power and General Provisions • 104 .A.. Pardons, Commutations, and Reurieves • • • • • • 104 B. Control over Bilitia • . 109 c. Extradition • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 112 D. Control over Local Officers • • • • • • • • • • 114 E. Minor Powers and Duties • • • • • • • • • • • • 119 F. Removal and Succession • • • • • • • • • • • • • 122 858457 ii Chapter VI: Conclusions and Proposals • • • 125 Appendix I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 135 Appendix II • • • • • • • • 141 Appendix III • • • • • • • 143 Bibliogre.phy • • • • 144 I. Govermnent Documents • • • • • • 144 II. Books • • • • • • 145 III. Magazine Articles • • • • • 148 IV• Newspapers • • • • • • • 149 1 PRID'ACE Today the governor of the state of Ohio is a powerful figure in determining the affairs of state government. This statement could not be applied to the first governors of Ohio. In fact, Ohio's first governors were inadequately endowed with power to deal with the pro­ olems of their day. Gubernatorial power, then as now, fell into two classes: (1) legal powers coming from constitutional provisions or legislative delegation, (2) extra-legal powers corning from the gover­ nor's position as leader of his party and from the force of his personality. This pa.per will be primarily concerned with the legal bases of power. Some attention will, however, be given to the extra-legal powers which the governor has. However, such power is entirely depend­ ent on the individual. One governor may be able to exert much influ­ ence because of his position in the party and his personal magnetism. His successor may not be able to utilize such sources of power ef­ fectively. In other words the legal powers of the governor remain constant while his extra-legal powers a.re subject to change depending on the personality of the individual and the changing social conditions. In the Constitution of 1802, the governor was granted a meager measure of legal power. Although this legal base of power was enlarged by the Gonstitution of 1851, the governor's role as chief executive was not greatly enhanced. Indeed it was not until after the turn of the century in 1900 that the legal power of the governor was expanded 2 to present day proportions. An analysis of the governor's role in public administration, financial control, and legislation will bear out this assertion. The expansion of executive authority has been hindered by the theory of separation of powers formulated by the French thinker Mon- tesquieu and by the theory of checks and balances. The validity of these ideas has long been open to question. Nevertheless they have had tremendous impact on the executive-legislative relationship in American government. ll".ontesquieu' s theory of separation of powers advocates division of the power of government among three coordinate branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. If this idea were rigidly adhered to, nothing would be accomplished, for each branch would thwart the others' purposes. However the government of the state of Massachusetts purports to operate according to this idea. Its Constitution explicitly states: The legislative department shall never exercise the executive and the judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.I The theory of separation of powers was never so verbalized in the Ohio Constitution. It has never been rigidly complied with in 1 Mass. Const., Part I, Art. xxx.. 3 this state, although as late as 1900 the Ohio supreme court gave judicial sanction to the theory. In the case of City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Telephone and Telegraph Colllpany, the court, commenting upon the division of powers be"tPreen the executive and legislative branches, stated: In the preservation of these distinctions is seen, by many able jurists, the preservation of all the rights, civil and political, of the individual, secured by our free form of government; and it is held that any encroach­ ment by one upon the other is a step in the direction of arbitrary power.2 In opposition to the theory of separation of powers is the belief that executive authority should be expanded. The move to increase the authority of the governor is based on the theory that concentration of power will make the governor more responsible to the people. The president of the Constitutional Convention of 1912, Herbert Bigelow, a Cincinnati minister, expressed this view: We desire the concentration of power in the hands of one man, not because we wish to give that man the power at the expense of others, but because if we so concentrate the power in the hands of one man we will keep our eyes on that rnan. He \vill be in the limelight all the time, and if anything goes wrong with his ad­ ministration he will be held responsible by the people.3 Perhaps the most difficult problem created by the desire for ex- panded executive authority lies in maintaining effective control over 263 Ohio State, P• 442 (1900). 3c. B. Galbreath, sec., Proceedings· and Debates of the Constitu­ tional Convention of the State of Ohio, 1912, III (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1913), 1693. 4 the powerful executive. Harvey Walker of the Ohio State University believes that: ••• the reluctance to confer wide powers on the governor which exists in legislative bodies when re­ organization proposals are presented ••• can be traced to the conviction that the grant of such powers should be accompanied by correspondingly effective controls.4 The will of the people should be the criterion for either expan- sion or contraction of gubernatorial power. The people's interests must be served. Even when the state of Ohio had just been created the governor had certain obligations. but he had no authority to ful- fill these adequately. In compliance with popular demand his authority gradually increased. A.t the present time his power can be utilized in meeting the many situations which arise. While the power of the gover- nor has expanded greatly since the year 1802. such expansion has been highly uneven in character. The prevalent desire for a strong governor insured the Ohio execu- tive•s rise from figurehead to leader. This rise was opposed by ad- herents to the theory of separation of powers and by legislators reluctant to surrender control over executive matters. Although this opposition has not prevented the governor of Ohio from becoming a powerful leader. his authority today remains subject to the will of the people of the state. 4Harvey Walker. "Theory and Practice in State Administrative Organization." National Municipal Review. XIX (April. 1930). 253. 5 CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TEE EXPANDHW POi'iER The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1802 apparently had a limited view as to vrhat should be included in the realm of execu- tive power. AlthouGh they vested in the governor the "supreme execu­ tive power,"1 they actually delegated few functions to that officer. Historians attribute this meager grant of power chiefly to the auto- cratic methods employed by Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair. George Hoadly, who was later to become governor of Ohio (1884-1886), was a delegate to the Convention of 1873. There he stated, "That example was before their eyes; and it was natural to expect that while they were studiously aiming to avoid one extreme, they would fall into the other. tt2 General St. Clair can perhaps claim the distinction of exerting more negative influence upon the office of governor of the state of Ohio than has any other person who has ever guided the executive branch.3 St. Clair did not set an enviable record for later governors. 1ohio Const. (1802), Art. II, sec. 1. 2J. G. Adel, reporter, Official Report of the Proceedings and De­ bates of the Third Constitutional Convention of Ohio, II, part 2 (Cleve­ land: w. s. Robison and Company, 1874), 1074. 3 James K. Mercer, Ohio Legislative History (Columbus: F. J. Heer, 1918 (?)), II, 105, and George B. Okey, "History of the Veto in Ohio," The Ohio Magazine, I (December, 1906), 570, are two among many who up­ hold this point of view. 6 Acting in the capacity of territorial governor, he made frequent use of the absolute veto power.4 This power was derived from the Ordin- ance of 1787, which reads And all bills having passed by a majority in the house, and by a majority in the council, shall be re­ ferred to the governor for his assent; but no bills or legislative act whatever, shall be of any force without his assent.5 Governor St. Clair not only exercised this power in a high-handed fashion, but also antagonized the representatives of the people by his autocratic manner. When the representatives offered to reconsider bills not to his liking with a view to changing them to conform to his judgment, he repliedt I am sorry to tell you it is altogether out of my power to comply with it. The Ordinance of the govern­ ment has placed in the Governor a.n absolute negative on the bills of both Houses and your request is that it may by me become vested into a kind of qualified veto.