Ambushes and Unprovoked Attacks: Assaults on Our Naton’s Law Enforcement Ofcers

Jefrey A. Daniels, Ph.D. West Virginia University College of Educaton and Human Resources Department of Counseling, Rehabilitaton Counseling, and Counseling Psychology

James J. Sheets, Ph.D. Federal Bureau of Investgaton Criminal Justce Informaton Services Division Crime Statstcs Management Unit

Philip D. Wright Federal Bureau of Investgaton Criminal Justce Informaton Services Division Crime Statstcs Management Unit

Brian R. McAllister Federal Bureau of Investgaton Criminal Justce Informaton Services Division Crime Statstcs Management Unit

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS i This report is in the public domain. Authorizaton to reproduce this publicaton in whole or in part is granted. The accompanying citaton is as follows: Daniels, J., Sheets, J., Wright, P., & McAllister, B. (2018). Ambushes and Unprovoked Atacks: Assaults on Our Naton’s Law Enforcement Ofcers. West Virginia University and the Federal Bureau of Investgaton, U.S. Department of Justce, Washington, D.C.

ii AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS NOTICE

This publicaton was prepared by the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Justce, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any informaton, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that in use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specifc commercial product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily consttute or imply its endorsement, recommendatons, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or refect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

Photographs in this publicaton are for illustratve purposes only and are not intended to be an accurate portrayal of real events or the people involved in the real events.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS iii CONTENTS

Notice ...... iii

Table of Contents ...... iv

Executive Summary ...... v

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: Defnitons and Framework ...... 7

Chapter 2: The Ofcers ...... 13

Chapter 3: The Ofenders ...... 35

Chapter 4: Areas of Concern for Law Enforcement ...... 57

Chapter 5: Case Analysis ...... 95

Chapter 6: Summaries of Selected Incidents...... 109

Appendix A: Methodology ...... 119

Appendix B: LEOKA Studies and Ofcer Safety Awareness Presentatons...... 127

Appendix C: Human Reactons to Trauma ...... 131

Appendix D: References ...... 135

Appendix E: Author Biographies ...... 139

iv AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over a number of years, data collected by the FBI’s Law Enforcement Ofcers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program began to demonstrate an alarming trend in the number of ofcers who were killed in ambushes and unprovoked atacks. While the overall number of ofcers who were feloniously killed was declining, the percentage of ofcers feloniously killed during surprise atacks was increasing. The LEOKA Program launched a thorough examinaton of ambushes and unprovoked atacks in an efort to gain insight into the phenomenon and to provide informaton to enhance training programs for law enforcement ofcers. The research focused on the mindset and perceptons of ofcers involved and ofenders who carried out those acts. In partcular, why the incidents may have occurred and how those involved reacted to the situaton.

Researchers selected incidents that met the LEOKA defnitons for ambushes and unprovoked atacks, researched those cases, conducted in-depth interviews of ofcers and ofenders involved in those incidents, and methodically analyzed the interview transcripts for useful informaton. Partcipants included both law enforcement ofcers and ofenders who willingly agreed to partcipate. The ofcers had survived or witnessed an ambush or an unprovoked atack. The ofenders had been tried and convicted of engaging in such incidents on one or more law enforcement ofcers.

Thirty-three ofcers were interviewed, and researchers identfed several topics that ofcers frequently addressed when discussing the ambushes and unprovoked atacks. Some of the most commonly mentoned themes included: Ambushed (describing the atack), Altered perceptons (during the incident) Backup, Refectons (lessons learned), Post-incident-Social support, Ambush cognitons (thoughts during the incident), Psychological impact, and Injuries sustained.

Thirty ofenders partcipated, and the LEOKA research team conducted interviews with them in various prisons throughout the United States. Most of the ofenders were male (96.7 percent) and had a history of drug abuse (73.3 percent) and/or alcohol abuse (66.7 percent). Fify percent of the sample reported one or more suicide atempts in the past. The transcripts of the interviews with ofenders demonstrated that many lived lives of stress and strain, ofen coming from unstable homes and engaging in criminal actvites early in life. From the informaton gathered from the ofenders, the research team identfed fve overall motves behind their atacks:

Personal—the overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was for personal reasons (to accomplish a personal objectve, e.g., avoiding arrest). Expressive—the overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was related to the ofender’s emotonality or experience of crisis—including suicidality. Economic—the overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was for economic gain. Politcal—the overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was politcal reasons, or to make a politcal statement. Social—the overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was for social reasons. As a result of atacking the ofcer, an ofender stood to gain social standing within his circle.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS v In additon, researchers identfed micromotves from the ofenders’ interviews. Micromotves are defned as biopsychosocial infuences that set the stage for the ambush or unprovoked atacked. These infuences could include “the ofender’s worldview, or the actual needs, values, or desires that were involved” (Daniels et al., 2016, p. 252). Examples of the most common micromotves include: Street life (prior criminal involvement), Substance use (history of drug use), Prepared for batle (access to or obtaining weapons), Negatve background as a minor (partcularly family instability), Mental state (including cognitve reactons and remorse), and Escape (from the atack).

Whatever the impetus for an ambush or unprovoked atack, it is not known ahead of tme, and such assaults seem impossible to mitgate. Even so, the analysis of the interviews LEOKA staf conducted with ofcers and ofenders found common subjects that can, at the very least, be discussed and, in some cases, addressed with training. LEOKA staf compiled a list of issues and training suggestons for ofcers. The discussion includes topics such as altered perceptual acuity, engaging ofenders, mental preparaton, communicaton, backup, and the will to survive. Ofcers also cited specifc trainings that they felt directly contributed to their survival.

Several narratves describing ambushes and unprovoked atacks included in this study provide further insight into the situatons and reactons of both the ofcers and the ofenders. In eight of the cases reviewed, researchers were able to interview both the victm and/or witness ofcers and the ofenders who perpetrated the ambushes or atacks. Two in-depth case studies present the context surrounding each incident and the viewpoints of both the ofcer and the ofender. The presented perspectves demonstrate how diferent the ofcers’ perceptons of what happened were from the ofenders’ perspectves.

The appendices present informaton about the methodologies used in the study, the LEOKA Program itself, and a discussion of human reactons to trauma. The last topic is partcularly useful to place the themes of this study in context. In the afermath of a traumatc event, such as being ambushed or involved in an unprovoked atack, humans respond on four primary levels: physiologically, psychologically, behaviorally, and spiritually. All of these aspects are interrelated, so a negatve response in one area may have a negatve impact in another area. Despite receiving injuries and being psychologically and spiritually traumatzed, people can develop efectve coping strategies by relying on the resources in their environment. Such resources may include family, friends, coworkers, the community, one’s religious/spiritual community and beliefs, and professional counselors and psychologists.

The ofcers, LEOKA staf, researchers from West Virginia University (WVU), and others involved in this study have spent hundreds of hours in sharing and gathering informaton, reviewing thousands of pages of case reports and interview transcripts, and preparing the results. As many of the ofcers shared during their interviews, they hope their experiences will help other ofcers by impactng the discussion and training practces concerning these surprise assaults. While ambushes and unprovoked atacks cannot be prevented entrely, hopefully, with the help of what has been learned from this study, ofcers can go into the feld with a greater understanding of why these atacks occur, specifc circumstances in which they have occurred, and what some ofcers have done to survive the atacks and handle the afermath.

vi AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS INTRODUCTION

Every day, nearly one million police ofcers in the United States don their badges, depart their homes, and set out to work as patrol ofcers, detectves, undercover agents, administrators, or to perform other dutes that preserve law and order in their communites. Law enforcement ofcers swear “to serve and protect” the citzenry of their jurisdictons; a noble undertaking that is not without risks. While the vast majority of citzens respect law enforcement ofcers and do not pose a threat to them, a small element of the populaton presents potental danger to the health and safety of ofcers. The FBI’s LEOKA Program presents the research in this study in an efort to provide some explanatons and insights into incidents in which ofcers are intentonally harmed during ambushes and unprovoked atacks.

The LEOKA Program is a subprogram of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reportng Program, which ofers a natonal view of crime in the United States. The primary goal of the LEOKA Program is to reduce the number of law enforcement ofcer deaths and assaults by providing data, research, and instructonal services related to law enforcement safety. The LEOKA Program collects data concerning incidents in which law enforcement ofcers are killed or assaulted in the line of duty. The statstcs are used to identfy circumstances and trends in the data. Law enforcement agencies can use the results to develop policies and training programs to improve ofcer safety. This informaton is directly shared via the program’s annual publicaton on www.fi.gov, responses to special data requests from the public, special studies available to law enforcement on the FBI’s Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal, and LEOKA ofcer safety awareness presentatons. See Appendix B for more informaton about previous LEOKA studies and presentatons available to law enforcement.

Why study ambushes and unprovoked atacks? Over a number of years, LEOKA data began to demonstrate a dis- tressing trend in the number of ofcers who were killed in ambushes and unprovoked atacks. Overall, the number of ofcers who were feloniously killed was declining, but the percentage of ofcers feloniously killed during surprise atacks was increasing. To learn more about the nature of such atacks, LEOKA Program staf initated this study. LEOKA staf, WVU researchers, ofcers who have been victms or witnesses to ambushes or unpro- voked atacks, and others have spent hundreds of hours in sharing and gathering informaton, review- ing thousands of pages of case reports and inter- view transcripts, and preparing the results. Several of the ofcers said during their interviews that they hope their experiences will help other ofcers by impactng the discussion and training practces concerning these assaults. While ambushes and unprovoked atacks cannot be prevented entrely, hopefully, with the help of what has been learned from this study, ofcers can go into the feld with

1 According to an estmate of the Natonal Law Enforcement Memorial Fund in 2016, there were approximately 900,000 sworn ofcers in the United States.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 1 a greater understanding of why these atacks occur, specifc circumstances in which they have occurred, and what some ofcers have done to survive the atacks and handle the afermath.

The data. As depicted in Figure 1, the total number of ofcers feloniously killed declined consecutvely for each 10-year tme period between 1987 and 2016. However, the percentage of ofcers whose deaths involved ambushes or unprovoked atacks steadily increased during the same 30 years.

Figure 1 Law enforcement ofcers feloniously killed, percent killed in ambush/unprovoked atack circumstances, 1987-1996, 1997-2006, 2007-2016

Source: LEOKA database, 1987-2016, retrieved April 11, 2017

LEOKA Program staf took a closer look at the most recent data available for a 10-year period in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 represents 10 years of data, from 2007 through 2016, and shows the percent distributon of the circumstances of the incidents during which 509 ofcers were feloniously killed. According to the data, circumstances involving ambushes or unprovoked atacks exceeded all other categories and were the reason for 20.6 percent of all deaths (105 ofcers). The next closest category was arrest situatons, which accounted for 17.5 percent of ofcers (89) killed during the 10-year tme period.

2 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Figure 2 Law enforcement ofcers feloniously killed, percent distributon* by circumstances at the scene of the incident, 2007-2016

Handling, transportng, custody of Investgatve prisoner 2.2% actvity 5.3% Handling person with a mental illness 1.6%

*Due to rounding, percentages may not add to 100.0 percent. Source: LEOKA database, 2007-2016, represents 509 ofcers who were feloniously killed, retrieved April 11, 2017

Figure 3 presents the percent distributon by the types of assignments the ofcers were on at the tmes of the incidents. This graph includes data for the 105 law enforcement ofcers who were feloniously killed during an ambush or an unprovoked atack from 2007 through 2016. The data show that ofcers who were on assignment alone (60 ofcers) made up 57.1 percent of the felonious deaths that were connected to ambushes and unprovoked atacks.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 3 Figure 3 Law enforcement ofcers feloniously killed, percent distributon* by circumstances at scene of incident by type of assignment, 2007-2016

*Due to rounding, percentages may not add to 100.0 percent. **Other includes detectves, ofcers on special assignment, ofcers on foot patrol, undercover ofcers, and ofcers on other types of assignments not listed.

Source: LEOKA database, 2007-2016, represents 105 ofcers who were feloniously killed as a result of ambushes and unprovoked atacks, retrieved April 11, 2017

To give these data context, Figure 4 represents the same 10-year period, 2007 to 2016, and shows the total number of ofcers feloniously killed per year and the number of ofcers slain as the result of surprise atacks. Even as overall death rates fuctuate, ambushes and unprovoked atacks contnue to be a serious issue for U.S. law enforcement ofcers.

4 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Figure 4 Law enforcement ofcers feloniously killed, number killed in ambushes and unprovoked atacks by year, 2007-2016

Source: LEOKA database, 2007-2016 retrieved April 11, 2017

Overview of this study

This study of atacks on law enforcement ofcers presents the results of several years of metculous research concerning specifc occurrences of ambushes and unprovoked atacks. A 2015 ofcer ambush report that was coordinated by the Department of Justce’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Ofce (Fachner & Thorkildsen, 2015) recommends that more in-depth studies should be conducted about ambushes on ofcers. Specifcally, the COPS report suggests that researchers use “mixed-methods approaches that incorporate case studies, interviews, and other qualitatve methods to help uncover why certain conditons do and do not give rise to police ambushes” (p. 27). Ambushes and Unprovoked Atacks: Assaults on Our Naton’s Law Enforcement Ofcers represents such research in which mixed methods were employed to understand why people ambushed or atacked police ofcers.

Researchers reviewed informaton from 40 cases of ambushes and unprovoked atacks and received input from 33 law enforcement ofcers and 30 ofenders. LEOKA staf conducted standardized, in-depth interviews with all 33 of the law enforcement ofcers and 27 of the ofenders. To examine the informaton gathered, the LEOKA Program partnered with WVU’s Department of Counseling, Rehabilitaton Counseling, and Counseling Psychology within the College of Educaton and Human Services. The department chair, Jefrey A. Daniels, Ph.D., and a team of counseling psychology doctoral candidates methodically analyzed transcripts of the interviews to identfy notable concepts and recurring details addressed by the ofcers and ofenders. Records and accounts of the incidents were also reviewed.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 5 Strengths and limitatons

Previous studies of police ofcer ambushes have relied heavily on quanttatve analyses of natonal data or data from focus groups. The Internatonal Associaton of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conducted what is perhaps the most comprehensive study in 1974. That study included comprehensive records reviews and interviews with victm ofcers when possible.

A primary strength of this study is that the data includes reviews of case records, interviews with victm and witness ofcers, and interviews with ofenders. No other ambush study has included the ofender perspectves. A second strength of this study is the systematc methodology that was used to collect and analyze the data. A third and related strength is that, for the qualitatve analyses, researchers used techniques to mitgate individual bias or expectaton. (This study’s methodology is detailed in Appendix A.)

Every study has limitatons. Perhaps the greatest limitaton of this study is that the sample is not random, but is a convenience sample of individuals involved in an ambush or unprovoked atack who were willing to be interviewed. Therefore, the ability to generalize the fndings to any and all ambushes or unprovoked atacks is limited. Perhaps others who did not choose to partcipate and be interviewed hold diferent perspectves from those who did choose to partcipate. Chapter descriptons

Each of the following chapters presents another piece of the larger puzzle that must be considered when studying an ambush or unprovoked atack.

• Chapter 1: Defnitons and Framework provides the defnitons for ambushes and unprovoked atacks that were used to choose incidents to analyze for this study and describes the theoretcal concepts used as a framework to beter understand ambushes and unprovoked atacks. • Chapter 2: The Ofcers discusses the results of the study pertaining to the victm ofcers. • Chapter 3: The Ofenders provides the informaton analyzed from the ofenders’ perspectves. • Chapter 4: Areas of Concern for Law Enforcement describes topics that law enforcement identfed as concerns. • Chapter 5: Case Analysis contains the case studies of three events. The authors of this study compare and contrast the perspectves of ofenders and the victm ofcers. • Chapter 6: Summaries of Selected Incidents provides case summaries for 28 of the ambushes and unprovoked atacks that were studied. • Appendix A: Methodology details the methods used for this research, along with a discussion of this study’s strengths and limitatons. • Appendix B: LEOKA Studies and Ofcer Safety Awareness Presentatons describes additonal resources available to law enforcement from the LEOKA Program. • Appendix C: Human Reactons to Trauma shares research that can assist a reader to understand the host of physical and psychological perceptons and reactons a person may experience during a traumatc event in the moment it occurs and soon afer it ends. • Appendix D: References provides a bibliography of the resources used in this study. • Appendix E: Author Biographies

6 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER ONE Defnitons and Framework

As mentoned in the introducton, the research in other reports, such as the 2015 study issued by the conducted for Ambushes and Unprovoked Atacks: COPS Ofce, Ambushes of Police: Environment, Incident Assaults on Our Naton’s Law Enforcement Ofcers Dynamics, and the Afermath of Surprise Atacks Against involved choosing incidents that met the defnitons for Law Enforcement. The authors of the COPS study, ambushes and unprovoked atacks, researching such Fachner and Thorkildsen (2015), defned an ambush cases, conductng in-depth interviews of ofcers and as “a planned surprise atack on a human target” ofenders involved in those incidents, and methodically (p. 2). The authors went on to identfy four characteristcs analyzing the interview transcripts for useful informaton. of ambushes, as initally described by the IACP (IACP; In such a process, consistency is important. This chapter 1974). Those characteristcs are: suddenness, surprise, provides the precise defnitons used for ambushes lack of provocaton, and excessive force. and unprovoked atacks and discusses the framework used to analyze the data. (For a detailed descripton of Ofcer core ideas methods used in this study, see Appendix A.) During interviews with ofcers, LEOKA staf asked them Defning ambushes and detailed questons about their backgrounds and the ambushes and unprovoked atacks they experienced. unprovoked atacks The interviews were transcribed, and researchers at Untl recently, the LEOKA Program reported ambushes WVU metculously examined the informaton. Topics and unprovoked atacks under one category as “ambush that came up frequently in the interview transcripts situatons.” But now, the incidents are reported in were categorized into major themes or core ideas. separate categories. The LEOKA Training Manual Many of these core ideas were divided into one or more distnguishes between assaults that entail entrapment subordinate topics, or domains. For example, one core and premeditaton, and unprovoked atacks where an idea identfed by ofcers was Injuries sustained, and a individual spontaneously atacked an ofcer who was domain under it was Medical treatment. The analysis of not engaged with the individual in a law enforcement the ofcers’ transcripts identfed 30 major core ideas capacity. The specifc defnitons are: presented by the law enforcement ofcers. Chapter 2 details the most common core ideas the ofcers shared Ambush (entrapment and premeditaton): Situaton during their interviews. where an unsuspectng ofcer was targeted or lured into danger as the result of conscious consideraton and Ofender motve planning by the ofender. LEOKA staf tried to ascertain the overall motve for Unprovoked atack: An atack on an ofcer that, at the ambush or unprovoked atack from every ofender the tme of the incident, was not prompted by ofcial they interviewed. Researchers used a combinaton of contact between the ofcer and the ofender. broad and narrowly focused questons in an efort to understand each ofender’s motvatons from a lifespan Based on these defnitons, all of the assaults included perspectve, including questons such as: in this study are atacks that came with no warning. While this study uses the LEOKA defnitons to analyze ambushes and unprovoked atacks on ofcers, the incidents included here also largely ft within the framework of the defnitons for ambush presented

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 7 • What were your childhood, family, and social life captve-taking including the ofender’s worldview, or like? the actual needs, values, or desires that were involved” • More specifcally, what were your experiences (Daniels et al., 2016, p. 252). The current study’s in school, in the community, and with law defniton of micromotves is “the multple infuences on enforcement? the individual that led up to him or her believing that • What was your adolescence like within each of ambushing a law enforcement ofcer was not only an these environments? opton, but an acceptable idea.” • How do you view the world, view authority, view Researchers examined the interview transcripts and the sanctty of life (or not)? identfed a total of 31 micromotves for the atacks. • Just prior to the ambush, what was your life like? Many of these micromotves also have one or more submotves. Chapter 3 details the ofenders’ specifc • What led up to the event? micromotves. Appendix A describes the process used to • What were you thinking, feeling, and doing during arrive at core ideas and domains derived from the data the atack, and immediately afer? that ultmately defned the motves and micromotves. • How has the atack afected you since? Contextualized understanding Questons such as these present a picture of the interacton between the ofender and his or her Afer conductng the interviews and inital analyses, environment, which provides insight into the individual’s the researchers evaluated the details reported motves for atacking an ofcer. In a 2016 study of by the ofcers and ofenders, along with records kidnapping (Daniels, Angleman, Vecchi, Bilsky, Leonard, concerning the incidents, using a framework known Page et al.), one of the authors of this study, Jefrey A. as contextualized understanding (Broomé, 2011). Daniels, Ph.D., defned motve as being “any stmulus, Contextualized understanding involves examining the internal or external to the individual, which propels him full range of psychological phenomena that infuence or her to act.” how a law enforcement ofcer or an ofender recalls and makes sense of an incident. This constructon This defniton of motve takes a biopsychosocial gives context to the incidents because it takes into perspectve (Bronfenbrenner, 1977) which considers consideraton that the viewpoint of any actor or witness the person’s biological needs, urges and impulses; the to a traumatc event is impacted by who is involved, by person’s psychological makeup of personality, needs, what occurred in the moments of trauma, and by why values, perceptons and attudes; and his or her social each actor thinks the incident occurred. Contextualized environment, including family, school, community and understanding also takes into account any informaton other infuences. An act such as commitng an ambush contaminaton—experiences that may have altered a or an unprovoked atack on a law enforcement ofcer subject’s memories—that may have occurred in the involves the complex interplay of all of these infuences. tme since an incident happened. As these infuences were examined, motves, or the reasons why the ofender acted, began to emerge. Overall motves were categorized as either personal, expressive, economic, politcal, or social (these are defned in Chapter 3).

This study further processes an ofender’s motves into micromotves, another concept used in the previously mentoned kidnapping study. Micromotves are biopsychosocial infuences “that set the stage for the

8 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Who. Within the contextualized understanding framework, who is represented by statements that ofer insight into who the ofcer, witness ofcer, or ofender is as a person. Researchers identfed 11 core ideas/domains that helped them understand who the ofcers are as people. These include:

• Infated self-perceptons • Post-incident • Ambush cognitons • Psychological impact • Premoniton • Ofcer’s explanaton for survival • Dedicaton to police work • Ofcer composure • Vigilance • Refectons • Training

The viewpoint of any actor or witness to a traumatc event is impacted by the who, what, and why.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 9 For the ofenders in this study, 15 micromotves involved Why. Ultmately, study authors and researchers tried characteristcs that demonstrated who they are: to fnd an answer to the queston, why did this person choose to ambush one or more law enforcement ofcers. • Victm mentality From the ofcers’ perspectves, researchers identfed • Actng on instnct four core ideas that ofcers reported contributed to the • History of substance use atacks: • Suicide • Confrmed psychopathology • Distracted • Inferred psychopathology • Underestmated the threat • Negatve background as a minor • Lack of awareness/alertness • Negatve experiences as an adult • Ofcer’s understanding of why • Few Constraints • Prepared for batle Afer reviewing the ofenders’ interview transcripts, • Street life researchers identfed 10 overall micromotves that • Mental state point to why the ofenders decided to atack the law • Attudes toward authority enforcement ofcers: • Extremist beliefs • Overall motve • Denial • Maintain freedom What. What represents informaton that illustrates the • Opportunity events surrounding the atacks. Researchers identfed • Mistaken identty 15 core ideas/domains pertaining to what happened • Retaliaton during the event from the ofcers’ perceptons: • Survival • Substance-use incident • Awareness of surroundings • Premeditaton • Routne response • Kill authority fgure • Procedures • Triggers to violence • Lack of informaton • Constraints Studying ambushes and unprovoked atacks against • Seeking cover law enforcement through the lens of contextualized • Engaged ofender understanding provided a broad perspectve based • Backup on the perceptons of both the ofenders and the law • Ofender conclusion enforcement ofcers involved. Evaluatng the who, what, • Injuries sustained and why helps to frame and understand each incident. • Prior encounters This study expands on the deadly mix model presented • Ambushed in previous LEOKA studies to include practcal preventon • Environmental conditons strategies for future ambush atacks. More importantly, • Physical altercaton it leads to a fourth major queston: Now what? • Conductng investgaton For the ofenders, the researchers identfed seven micromotves that answer the queston of what happened: • Escape • Neutralize the ofcer • Involvement with others • Threats • Arming self • Incident resoluton • Altercaton

10 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Now what represents using the practcal informaton from the data to inform, educate, and prepare law enforcement ofcers to consider and respond to ambushes and unprovoked atacks.

The following chapters further investgate the results of this study, and look more closely at the who, what, why, and now what? Chapter 2 examines results of interviews with victm and witness ofcers, and Chapter 3 reviews the results of interviews with ofenders. In Chapter 4 the authors detail the issues that concerned the ofcers in this study and provide recommendatons to address the maters whenever possible.

For those readers who would like to understand more about the host of internal and external physical and psychological phenomena that may impact how a person perceives a traumatc event in the moment it occurs and soon afer it ends, please see Appendix C. Some readers may fnd it helpful to further understand these complex, emotonally charged incidents.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 11 12 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER TWO The Ofcers

The law enforcement ofcers who partcipated in this study shared their backgrounds and experiences and provided key informaton to examine the topic of ambushes and unprovoked atacks of ofcers. Thirty-three ofcers who had been victms of or witnesses to 27 incidents voluntarily contributed their insights. Some of the partcipatng ofcers were critcally injured during these incidents, and others witnessed ofenders killing their fellow ofcers who were on the scene with them. The partcipatng ofcers were aware that sharing their experiences might expose them to critcism of their actons from the law enforcement community. However, the ofcers who took part in the study recognized that if other ofcers could learn from their experiences, and if their contributons to this study could save lives, then it was well worth their tme. None of the police ofcers with whom the LEOKA research team requested an interview declined partcipaton, further demonstratng their dedicaton and commitment to the law enforcement community.

This chapter frst provides quanttatve details about the ofcers’ backgrounds and experiences. Quanttatve informaton includes statstcs that can be measured or demonstrate paterns or identfy facts about the data. The quanttatve data is followed by the qualitatve analysis of the interview transcripts in which the ofcers described their experiences before, during, and afer the ambushes and unprovoked atacks. The goal of the qualitatve analysis is to share the ofcer’s insights about the incidents, such as their reasons, opinions, and motvatons. When 50.0 percent or more of the ofcers discussed a partcular topic, such as “psychological impact,” the topic was included in the qualitatve secton. A topic may have also been included if it was partcularly unique. (Conclusions and recommendatons based upon the informaton in these analyses are provided in Chapter 4.)

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Ofcer demographics Thirty-three ofcers were interviewed in this study. The following statstcs provide demographic informaton, including the ofcers’ educatonal and military experiences.

Gender • 29 ofcers were male. • 4 were female.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 13 Race/ethnicity • 30 ofcers identfed as White, including 4 ofcers of Hispanic or Latno ethnicity. • 1 ofcer identfed as Black or African-American. • 1 ofcer identfed as Asian. • 1 ofcer identfed as being more than one race, choosing the category of “other.”

Average ages • 36.1 years old was the average age of victm ofcers. • 35.9 years old was the average age of witness ofcers.

Educaton • 21 ofcers reported they had educaton beyond high school. o 7 ofcers had associate’s degrees. o 12 had bachelor’s degrees. o 2 had master’s degrees. • 7 had high school diplomas or equivalencies. • 4 reported they had no degree. • 1 did not report his educatonal level.

Military service • 7 ofcers served in the military prior to their law enforcement careers. o 4 ofcers who served were in the military police. o 1 was in a medical positon. o 1 was in the infantry. o 1 was a training instructor. • 22 ofcers had not served in the military. • 4 did not respond to this queston. • 4 ofcers reported military experience with a reserve component. o 2 of these 4 ofcers were enlisted previously o 1 who served in a reserve capacity was in the military police o 1 was in intelligence o 2 classifed their dutes as “other” (These two were the training instructor previously mentoned and a supply clerk.) Ofcers’ training experience All of the ofcers in this study atended a police academy. • 19 ofcers went to local academies. • 7 went to regional academies. • 7 went to state academies. • None of the ofcers atended a federal academy. • Academy training tmes ranged from 5 to 36 weeks, with an average of just under 22 weeks. • Most of the ofcers reported their class standings. o 18 reported they graduated in the top third of their class. o 12 ofcers reported they graduated in the middle third. o 3 ofcers did not report their class standing.

14 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Ofcers were asked to describe the training they had received prior to the assault under study. • All of the ofcers (33) reported they had obtained sidearm training. o 117 hours was the average tme they received sidearm training. • 32 ofcers received shotgun training. o 28 hours was the average training tme with a shotgun. • 10 ofcers reported rife training. o 333 hours was the average tme spent in training with a rife. • 27 ofcers partcipated in interactve combat training. o 72 hours was the average tme spent in interactve combat training. • 15 ofcers were trained in Simunitons® using nonlethal ammuniton. o 35 hours was the average tme of training. o Some ofcers indicated this type of training did not exist at their academies. • 32 ofcers learned defensive tactcs such as martal arts, boxing, or wrestling. o 70 hours of defensive tactcs was the average tme spent. • 27 ofcers received physical survival/mental conditoning training. o 24 hours was the average tme ofcers partcipated in this training.

Law enforcement ofcers answered questons related to in-service training, including the length of tme between their most recent in-service training and the atacks under study. • All ofcers (33) reported that their agencies required in-service training with their sidearms. • 30 of the 33 ofcers reported the length of tme between their last in-service sidearm training and the incident. o 25 ofcers had sidearm training within 12 months before the atack. o 1 had sidearm training within 24 months. o 1 had sidearm training within 36 months. o 3 reported the tme since their training as “other.” • Of the 33 ofcers, 27 had in-service shotgun training. o 17 ofcers had shotgun training within 12 months prior to the atack. o 1 ofcer had shotgun training within 24 months of the atack. o 1 ofcer reported “other.” o 14 ofcers did not respond to this porton of the queston.

Rife in-service training was reported by 16 of the law enforcement ofcers in this study. • 14 of those 16 ofcers received training within the 12 months prior to the assault. • 2 ofcers reported “other.” The ambushes and unprovoked atacks Ofcer experience at the tmes of the atacks • The ofcers in the study had been in uniform from just under 4 months to 32 years at the tme of the atack. • 11.5 years was the average years of service of the ofcers. • Of these 33 ofcers, 22 were victm ofcers, and 11 were witness ofcers. • 15 ofcers had been the victm of at least one prior assault. • 10 ofcers reported being called to the locaton of the assault in at least one other instance. • 7 ofcers knew the ofender prior to the atack. • 25 ofcers had no prior encounter with the atacker. • 1 ofcer did not respond to the queston about prior experience with the atacker.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 15 Times of the atacks (See Table 2.1) • Of the 27 incidents reported by ofcers, 22 occurred between 3:01 p.m. and 6 a.m. • The seasons of the atacks were reported for 16 of the incidents.

o 8 atacks occurred in the winter. o 3 occurred in the summer. o 3 occurred in the fall. o 2 atacks occurred in the spring

Table 2.1 Times of the assaults

Time span Number of assaults Percentage

Midnight – 3 a.m. 6 22.2

3:01 a.m. – 6 a.m. 2 7.4

6:01 a.m. – 9 a.m. 2 7.4

9:01 a.m. – 12 p.m. 0 0.0

12:01 p.m. – 3 p.m. 3 11.1

3:01 p.m. – 6 p.m. 5 18.5

6:01 p.m. – 9 p.m. 4 14.8

9:01 p.m. – 11:59 p.m. 5 18.5

Nature of the dispatch call Of the 33 ofcers, 22 responded to a queston about the nature of the dispatch call that led them to the scenes of the atacks. • 8 ofcers answered calls for shots fred. • 2 answered calls of rape. • 1 responded to an assault. • 1 answered a call to the scene of a vehicle incident. • 10 ofcers reported their calls under the category of “other.”

Danger signals prior to the atacks In some cases the ofender atacked before the ofcer saw him; in other situatons, there was some interacton prior to the atack. • 18 ofcers reported no danger signals were apparent before they were atacked. • 11 ofcers notced some danger signals prior to the atack. • 4 ofcers did not answer this queston.

16 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Ofcers who notced danger signals reported these specifc signs (they could choose more than one). • 2 ofcers notced the ofenders’ facial distortons. • 2 reported threatening language. • 2 reported the presence of a weapon. • 1 ofcer notced profuse sweatng. • 1 ofcer noted the ofender’s eye movements. • 7 ofcers reported “other.”

Backup • 16 ofcers reported they requested backup,2 either during or immediately afer the atack. • 13 ofcers said they did not request backup (in these cases, ofen another ofcer did). • 4 ofcers did not provide data for this queston.

Use of deadly force and weapons • 16 ofcers responded they had the opportunity to use deadly force during the assault. • 16 reported they did not have the opportunity to use deadly force. • 1 ofcer did not respond to the queston.

Ofcers were asked when in the atack tmeline were they able to use their weapons, 16 ofcers responded. • 7 of these ofcers used their weapons afer the ofender injured them. • 5 used their weapons as they were being injured. • 3 used their weapons as another ofcer was being injured. • 1 used his weapon prior to being injured.

Ofenders’ access to weapons When asked how the ofender accessed his or her weapon for the ambush or unprovoked atack, 31 ofcers provided an answer3. • 25 ofcers reported that the ofenders involved in the incidents brought their weapons to the scenes. • 2 ofcers said the ofenders obtained their weapons at the scenes. • 1 reported that the ofender used the ofcer’s weapon. • 3 reported the ofenders accessed their weapons through “other” means.

Survival tactcs and training Interviewers asked several questons about what the ofcers believe aided their ability to survive the atacks. • 29 of the 33 ofcers wore bulletproof vests prior to the assaults. In many of the atacks, the vests prevented bullets, knives, or other objects from fully penetratng the ofcers’ bodies. • 12 ofcers used some form of cover or concealment, including automobiles, buildings or other structures, vegetaton, or other available resources. • 10 reported there was no cover available to them. Eighteen ofcers responded to a queston identfying training instructon they received at the academy or during in-service training that the ofcers felt contributed to their survival. Their answers are summarized in Table 2.2.

2 These numbers vary from the numbers presented in the qualitatve analyses of ases. Qualitatvely, if an ofcer called or requested in any way, Backup was coded. Quanttatvely, ofcers were asked only if he or she requested backup. In some cases, it was another ofcer or citzen who made the call. 3 Details about the ofenders’ weapons are provided from the ofenders’ perspectves in Chapter 3.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 17 Table 2.2 Survival training*

Training Number of ofcers Percentage

Street survival 7 38.9

Self-defense 3 16.7

Psychology 2 11.1

Firearms 1 5.6

Other 5 27.8

*Based on 18 ofcers who responded.

Injuries and hospitalizaton Two-thirds of the ofcers (22) in this study received injuries that required hospitalizaton. • 9 of the ofcers wounded received bullet wounds. • Additonal injuries included knife wounds, machete wounds, and others. • 14.5 days was the ofcers’ average stay in the hospital, with a range of 1 to 112 days. • 12.2 days was the average tme from an assault to the ofcer’s return to duty.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS This secton describes the qualitatve results of the Most common core ideas and domains interviews of ofcers, including the issues and topics The qualitatve analysis of ofcer data for this study discussed most frequently by the ofcers. It is important involved documentng recurring themes from the to note while some numbers and percentages may ofcers’ interview transcripts and creatng a codebook appear similar to those in the quanttatve analyses, for the most common topics. The topics addressed by the informaton in the following qualitatve analyses the ofcers were categorized into major themes or core may difer and is, therefore, complementary but not ideas. Many of these core ideas were divided into one or comparable. This discrepancy is the result of two main more subordinate topics, or domains. For example, one factors. First, some ofcers did not respond to all of core idea that was identfed was Injuries sustained, and the quanttatve questons. Second, for the qualitatve a domain under it was Medical treatment. The analysis analysis, the researchers only documented a topic identfed 30 major core ideas presented by the law or issue if an ofcer specifcally discussed it. It was enforcement ofcers. Table 2.3 lists all the core ideas the necessary for an ofcer to provide more detail than a researchers identfed. simple “yes” or “no” response for the informaton to be included in the qualitatve analysis.

18 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Table 2.3 Number of ofcers who addressed each core idea

Core idea Number of ofcers Percentage CQR label

Injuries sustained 33 100.0 General Ambushed 33 100.0 General Backup 32 97.0 General Post-Incident 31 93.9 Typical Refectons 31 93.9 Typical Ofcer’s understanding of why 30 90.9 Typical Psychological impact 28 84.8 Typical Engaged ofender 28 84.8 Typical Ofender conclusion 28 84.8 Typical Ofcer’s explanaton for survival 26 78.8 Typical Awareness of surroundings 25 75.8 Typical Ambush cognitons 24 72.7 Typical Training 22 66.7 Typical Vigilance 21 63.6 Typical Routne response 21 63.6 Typical Environmental conditons 21 63.6 Typical Lack of informaton 19 57.6 Typical Constraints 17 51.5 Typical Seeking cover 17 51.5 Typical Prior encounters 17 51.5 Typical Dedicaton to police work 16 48.5 Variant Ofcer composure 16 48.5 Variant Underestmated threat 14 42.4 Variant Conductng investgaton 13 39.4 Variant Premoniton 8 24.2 Variant Procedures 7 21.2 Variant Distracted 5 15.2 Variant Lack of awareness/alertness 4 12.1 Variant Invincibility 1 3.0 Unique Physical altercaton 1 3.0 Unique

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 19 The second column in Table 2.3 represents the number of ofcers who made one or more statements that refect either the core idea or the domain(s) that comprise(s) the core idea. The percentage of ofcers who mentoned the core idea or its corresponding domain(s) follows in the next column. The fnal column of Table 2.3, Label, is a classifcaton based on the number of ofcers who addressed each core idea. These labels are standard labels used in Consensual Qualitatve Research (CQR) to describe how common each topic is (Ladany, Thompson & Hill, 2012). See Appendix A for more informaton on CQR.

Table 2.3 shows that three of the 30 core ideas (10.0 percent) received the General label, meaning at least 32 of the 33 partcipants addressed each. The most commonly mentoned core ideas were Injuries sustained, Ambushed, and Backup. The largest number of core ideas (56.7 percent, or 17 core ideas) developed in this study received the Typical label. These core ideas were addressed by at least 17, and at most 31 partcipants. The Variant label was applied to 26.7 percent of the core ideas, and these core ideas were addressed by at least four and at most 16 individuals. Finally, two core ideas (6.7 percent) were identfed as Unique. Although mentoned by only one ofcer each, these core ideas, Invincibility and Physical altercaton, played an important role in those cases, so the researchers decided to keep them in the analyses rather than to delete them. The extent to which they are important for future research, or for ofcer training, remains to be seen.

While Table 2.3 listed all the core ideas mentoned by the ofcers, Table 2.4 lists the core ideas and the domains that were discussed the most. The topics included on this list were described by at least 50.0 percent of the law enforcement ofcers interviewed for this study.

20 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Table 2.4 Most common core ideas and domains

Code Number of ofcers Percentage

Ambushed 32 97.0 Backup – Backup arrived 26 78.8 Ambushed – Altered perceptons 26 78.8 Refectons 26 78.8 Post-Incident – Social support 25 75.8 Ambush cognitons 24 72.7 Psychological impact 23 69.7 Injuries sustained 23 69.7 Awareness of surroundings 21 63.6 Vigilance 21 63.6 Injuries sustained – Medical treatment 21 63.6 Refectons – Mental preparaton 21 63.6 Engaged ofender – Armed self 20 60.6 Backup – Called for backup 20 60.6 Ofcer’s understanding of why 20 60.6 Ofcer’s explanaton for survival – Will to survive 19 57.6 Refectons – Enhanced training 19 57.6 Post-Incident 18 54.5 Engaged ofender 18 54.5 Injuries sustained – Other ofcer 18 54.5 Training 18 54.5 Psychological impact – Mental health treatment 17 51.5

NOTE: Codes that are in bold font are core ideas; the codes in italic font are specifc domains under the core idea.

Discussion of core ideas and domains

The following paragraphs detail the core ideas and domains from Table 2.4. Each topic includes a defniton of the core idea or domain and an explanaton of the topic, if needed. For the most part, the topics follow the order from Table 2.4 with the excepton of domains under the same core idea, which are grouped together. Examples for each

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 21 core idea and domain are provided by brief incident a shotgun. I turned around just in tme to see descriptons and sample statements from an ofcer who the debris and everything coming out of the experienced an ambush and an ofcer who survived an shotgun—smoke and everything. unprovoked atack. The LEOKA defnitons for ambush and unprovoked atack are: During the ambush, the ofcer who was interviewed and another ofcer were wounded, and a third ofcer was Ambush (entrapment and premeditaton): killed. The ofender was later wounded in a shootout Situaton where an unsuspectng ofcer was with police and arrested. targeted or lured into danger as the result of conscious consideraton and planning by the Unprovoked atack example. While patrolling in a ofender. residental area, the ofcer passed an outdoor party. Someone from the area of the party threw an object Unprovoked atack: An atack on an ofcer that hit the ofcer’s vehicle. The ofcer recalled that he that, at the tme of the incident, was not stopped and atempted to get out of the cruiser. “When prompted by ofcial contact between the I opened the door, grabbed the baton, and went to exit, ofcer and the ofender. he [the ofender] was on top of me as I was trying to come out of the car.” In the altercaton, the ofcer was Ambushed stabbed and beaten but never quit fghtng. Eventually, backup arrived, and the ofender was ultmately subdued Descriptons of the actual ambush incident (or and arrested. unprovoked atack), from frst atack and throughout.

Thirty-two of the 33 ofcers (97.0 percent) interviewed Ambushed—Altered perceptons for this study spoke in general about the atack. These Feeling like tme was altered during the ambush, or discussions were labeled as Ambushed. (During the altered perceptual acuity. interviews, ofcers didn’t diferentate between the technical defnitons for ambush and unprovoked Altered perceptons is a domain under the Ambushed atack.) The Ambushed core idea was comprised of core idea. Altered perceptual acuity simply means the eight domains: Confusion, Unable to see ofender, ofcer’s perceptons of tme and/or acuity were seen Altered perceptons, Physiological reacton, Tunnel as diferent from one’s normal daily experiences. With vision, Approached by ofender, Bystander involvement, 78.8 percent of the ofcers reportng this phenomenon, and Assisted by other law enforcement ofcer. Every altered perceptons is one of the more commonly ofcer discussed some aspect of their atacks, and most described codes in this study. addressed more than one of the Ambushed core ideas. Ambush example. The ofcer in this case initated a Ambush example. Two ofcers responded as backup trafc stop for an expired registraton in a known gang to the scene of a domestc assault. The victm of the neighborhood. While she was addressing the occupants assault stated the ofender was probably sleeping in the in the car, an unknown assailant fred a weapon at her nearby trailer and had been taking methamphetamines. from down the street. The ofcer reported experiencing The ofcers went to the ofender’s property and did not altered percepton while under fre. fnd him in the trailer. One of the ofcers provided this account of what happened next as they were preparing It seems like my thoughts were so fast. My the crime scene. thoughts were very fast, but it seemed like it was in slow moton. You know? But it was like I could hear the rounds passing by us and I As I was tying some tape, fagging tape, could see everything like in slow moton, but around the trees, the deputy was standing everything was really actually fast speed. behind me . . . of to my right rear. Coming from the wood line, I heard a shotgun rap The ofcer was not wounded during the incident, but a and immediately following that, a blast from backup ofcer was killed.

22 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Unprovoked atack example. The law enforcement praying that they would get there. So they get there, and ofcer was assistng with the impound of a vehicle we form a perimeter around that wooded area.” involved in a driving under the infuence (DUI) situaton early in the morning when a man approached on the Unprovoked atack example. Two ofcers responded sidewalk. Without warning, the man pulled out a gun to an auto accident on the interstate. Unbeknownst to and fred at the ofcer. The ofcer recounted “. . . it’s just the victm ofcer and his partner (the witness ofcer), amazing how tme stands stll all the way around you. I the driver had crashed his car and then began shootng mean, everything just stops. And it was very alarming others who stopped to assist him. The victm ofcer not to be able to hear and to have that loud ring. I didn’t described the arrival of backup ofcers, “…my cover know what it meant. I didn’t know what it was.” squad started pulling up. I remember seeing a pickup truck just drive right up to me and two ofcers got out in The ofcer was not able to hear any of the additonal plain clothes, and then I saw a squad car pull up…” shots fred at him, demonstratng both the percepton of altered tme and the alteraton of senses. It was later Backup—Called for backup learned that the ofender who fred on the ofcer was The law enforcement ofcer or others called for backup, the partner of the woman who had just been arrested either before the ambush or during it. for the DUI, and he was trying to free her. Twenty ofcers (60.6 percent) who were interviewed Backup for this study talked about calling for backup. Most Statements about backup ofcers at the scene of the commonly, backup was called during the ambush, but atack. in some cases, backup was called before the actual Among the top codes in this study were two domains ambush, usually for an unfolding situaton. under the Backup core idea: Backup arrived and Called Ambush example. Two ofcers were getng ready for backup. to enter the police staton to start their shif. As they approached the door, somebody approached them Backup—Backup arrived from behind and said, “Hey guys, how are you doing?” Descriptons of the arrival of backup or other ofcers, Immediately afer asking this, the individual opened fre including the ofcer’s thoughts or feelings about their on the two ofcers. One victm ofcer took a bullet to arrival. the back of the head and died. The surviving ofcer said of the call for backup, “They dropped our Code 99, or With respect to the Backup Arrived domain, the majority whatever departments call it, where ofcer down or of the ofcers (78.8 percent) talked about the arrival ofcer needs assistance…. our dispatch center did that.” of backup once the ambush or unprovoked atack commenced. Unprovoked atack example. Two ofcers responded as backup on a shots-fred call at an apartment complex. Ambush example. The ofcer responded to an ofcer- Many ofcers were already on site when these two down call. The downed ofcer was lying in a feld with arrived, so they pulled into the parking lot and were a tree line just beyond his body. As the arriving ofcer going to disperse the crowd that had gathered. As the crawled to check on him, she came under fre from the ofcers exited their cruiser, they came under fre. This area of the trees. She was able to crawl back to safety witness ofcer reported “I called [for backup] afer I and call for more backup. “So then all my [state patrol] fred my round, and he [the ofender] took of running. people get there. Finally, they get there. I mean I’m just That’s when I got on my radio.”

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 23 Refectons The ofcer’s thoughts about the event and responses to lessons learned. Difers from Post-Incident in that it is the law enforcement ofcer’s here-and-now refectons.

Ofcers in this study were asked to think back on their experiences and discuss what they learned; if they could have done anything diferently, what it would be; and what advice they would have for other ofcers who may encounter a similar ambush or unprovoked atack. The ofcers’ answers to these questons are categorized under the core idea of Refectons.

To prevent overlapping Refectons with other core ideas and domains, the researchers decided if the law enforcement ofcer refected on a specifc topic that fell within another code, they would rate the other code, rather than double code. For example, if, in his or her refectons an ofcer talked about his or her thoughts during the atack, that block was rated Ambush cognitons rather than double-coding it as both Ambush cognitons and Refectons. Twenty-six ofcers in this study (78.8 percent) made statements that were classifed as Refectons. Those statements were not beter categorized within one of the six domains that make up the Refectons core idea, which are: Enhanced training, Spiritual commitment, Mental preparaton, Backup, Professional conduct; Recommending help.

Ambush example. The ofcer who shared this refecton was on a stakeout in a feld behind a fugitve’s house. The fugitve, who was wanted for a prior shootng of a police ofcer, shot the ofcer and another ofcer, who later died. The surviving ofcer refected on the ways he thought the ambush may have been prevented or mitgated.

24 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS But I think if we would have had three people, Ambush example. This example is taken from a situaton we could have split our 360 into thirds and in which two ofcers pursued a suspect into his house then, that way, when one person was looking on foot afer a car chase. While the witness ofcer was at the house you don’t have one other person atemptng to contain the ofender’s sister, the ofender to cover the remainder of your 360. Would shot and killed the other ofcer in an adjacent room. In that have . . . helped? You know, we may this example, the witness ofcer provided his perspectve have stll been shot. But I believe that we, we on how the ambush has altered his approach to law probably would have at least been able to get enforcement. He stated, “In your ordinary and everyday the suspect at that point. training, every once in a while you have to think of what could go bad, what could be the worst, and train like that Unprovoked atack example. In this example, an of- as well.” The noton of mentally preparing for worst-case duty ofcer was working as a security guard at a grocery scenarios was echoed by several other ofcers in this store. Near the tme for the store to close, the ofcer study. was standing near the cash registers at the front of the store when an assailant atacked him from behind by Unprovoked atack example. In a case previously hitng him in the head. The assailant struggled with described (see Backup—Called for backup), the victm the ofcer and atempted to gain control of the ofcer’s and witness ofcers came as backup to a shots-fred service weapon. As the ofcer refected on the struggle call at an apartment complex. The ofcers intended to for his weapon, he stated: move the crowd back, but as they were getng out of their cruiser, they came under fre. Refectng on mental I guess the main thing is don’t; what I would preparaton, the witness ofcer stated, “Stay in the game, do—I did it and I’ll do it again—is don’t let you know. A lot of people get complacent afer a while. that person get separaton because if you In this line, you just never know when it’s going to hit the back up you don’t have any weapon. I mean, fan. Just stay on your toes, and if you do encounter some he has your weapon. If happens to you, if he situaton like that, just stay in the game.” The noton of has your weapon—don’t back up and give not getng mentally complacent and staying in the fght some guy 3 or 4 feet to shoot you, to draw was refected by other ofcers in this study. down on you. Stay on top of them. Glue yourself to them. Keep hitng. Refectons—Enhanced training The law enforcement ofcer stated that as a result of the ambush he or she has enhanced his or her training Refectons—Mental preparaton as an ofcer, OR the ofcer recommended others to The law enforcement ofcer suggests that others enhance their training methods. enhance their mental preparaton for similar incidents Another commonly described Refecton is the (e.g., imagining diferent violent scenarios and how one Enhanced training domain; 57.6 percent of the ofcers would respond). discussed this point. Enhanced training may relate to In additon to the statements that represented the adding something new to one’s training or refocusing overall core idea of Refectons, 63.6 percent of the on something that has already been taught through the ofcers refected on the importance of its domain, academy or in-service trainings. Mental preparaton. Some ofcers talked about running “what-if” scenarios through their minds as they are on patrol and then thinking about how they would respond. They also mentoned that this was an important exercise that had implicatons during the atacks reviewed in this study.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 25 Ambush example. In a case that was described earlier, Post-incident the witness ofcer was the frst to respond to an ofcer- down call (see Backup—Backup arrived). When the Descriptons about thoughts, feelings, or outcomes ofcer arrived, she saw another ofcer was down in the following the incident. middle of a feld. The ofender had ambushed the ofcer The Post-incident core idea was a commonly described by fring a weapon from an area of trees at the far end of topic by partcipants in this study (54.5 percent). Because the feld. In her refecton about enhanced training, the this core idea was comprised of eight individual domains, witness ofcer said: a specifc topic was labeled Post-Incident only if the ofcer’s discussion of his or her thoughts, feelings, or I never thought of a foxhole. Never. I never outcomes of the atack were not specifed within any of even imagined that. But now, if I ever go to the domains. These domains included Relief, Concern for another scene like that ever again, that would victms, Legal dispositon, Recuperaton, Social support, be the frst thing; he could have this. But see, Critcism, Concern for family, and Altered procedures. out of all my training that I have ever had, none of that—that partcular word—came up Ambush example. In the previously described example in training. They could be in a foxhole. Never. of the domestc incident in which two ofcers were shot That’s sort of like a military something. So, and a third was killed (see Ambushed), the second victm you know, I’ve never been in the military so ofcer talked about how his family found out about the that never came. I never had any training in shootng. that. So, I always was trying to look above the land, you know, up in a tree or on a structured I was fnally getng transported to the building or something like that. So, I think if hospital. I asked them to radio and tell my anything out of this, there should be more wife that I was OK, but they never did that. training with that type of thing, like a foxhole. So when the frst ambulance arrived at the hospital, the school had already brought my Unprovoked atack example. This example is taken from son there. My wife and my son were standing the previously described case in which the ofender outside with my brother at the ER. wrecked his car on the freeway and fred on people who approached to help him (see Backup—Backup arrived). Unprovoked atack example. One ofcer who had been The victm ofcer in this case refected on training. shot in an unprovoked atack was asked about intrusive thoughts (the psychological impact of the shootng). I’ve always enjoyed training, but it opens up Instead, he described a lack of psychological trauma the foor to where maybe we need to expand post incident. training and think of beter ways to do things, or more things to think of while we’re out . . . when I’m having more pain in my leg than there. At least so we have it on our mind usual, then I’m—like for the past month it’s that this could happen. This could happen. been driving me crazy—but that’s usually And the only way you know that is by getng when I . . . can’t help but think about it. You’re informaton from other agencies where it has like, “D---, that leg’s killing me. Oh yeah, I got happened. You know, you can’t say that’ll shot there.” You know, [the thoughts are] not never happen. Well, it has happened. really intrusive, just annoying.

26 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Post-incident—Social support Statements about the social support the law enforcement ofcer received following the incident.

Under the core idea of Post-incident is the domain, Social support, which was mentoned by 75.8 percent of the ofcers. Social support could come from a number of sources, including family and friends, the department, or the community at-large. The ofcers who mentoned Social support endorsed it as a positve factor in their recoveries.

Ambush example. The victm ofcer who was on a stakeout (see Refectons) gave an example of family support. The ofcer stated, “Parents, sisters, brothers, you know, helping out, coming over, taking me [to] doctor’s appointments, things of that nature. Yeah, they were supportve.”

Unprovoked atack example. In this case, the ofcer was a victm of an unprovoked shootout at a campground. While he was talking about the day he was released from the hospital, he spoke about the level of support showed by his own and other departments.

. . . when I was coming back into the valley with my wife and her sister, we come to the county line and there’s 15 police cars parked right there and highway patrol and our cars and our department cars. You know, some of my coworkers—all my coworkers basically—and they piled in behind us with one of the sergeants in front and then lined up behind us and escorted us all the way to my residence. Ambush cognitons The ofcer’s thoughts during the assault.

The Ambush cognitons core idea was not a part of the Ambushed core idea, because rather than a descripton of the atack, this core idea pertains to the ofcer’s thoughts during the atack. A total of 72.7 percent of the ofcers addressed their thoughts during the ambush.

Ambush example. This example comes from the previously described ambush on two police ofcers as they were arriving at work (see Backup—Called for backup). The ofcer described what he was thinking as the atack occurred.

The importance of social support was mentoned by 75.8 percent of the ofcers.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 27 The thing that ran through my mind the most same house for something. I was prety much was how quickly it happened. The whole told not to go by myself, but I would have. I thing took like 45 seconds. I mean, it was don’t know if I can sit here and describe to just—boom—and then it was done in a hurry. you what it was like to go back—same road, I just kept thinking to myself, This happened same driveway, same stairs, same living so fast. What did I do? What did I see? What room, same kitchen—and have to go in there did I miss? That kind of stuf was running and deal with a situaton that didn’t have through my mind. What did I not miss? I was anything to do with this. But to go back down trying to recollect everything that happened there and step in there and do my job, that . . . was a big turning point of maybe handling the situaton. I wasn’t scared to go back down Unprovoked atack example. This case involved the there, but I wasn’t allowed to go by myself. victm ofcer who responded with his partner to a shots- fred call at an apartment complex (see Backup—Called Unprovoked atack example. Three ofcers were eatng for backup). When they arrived, they atempted to lunch at a diner when a man came up to their table with disperse the gathered crowd. The victm ofcer talked a machete. The man slashed the machete at the ofcer about his inital confusion when he took a hit. “I thought who provided this statement. maybe my car door slammed on me, you know, that’s my inital thought. But then, I see the muzzle fash, and It kept popping into my mind, reliving it. Just I’m like, ‘Holy crap’ . . . ” . . . it was a horrifying incident what he did. Coming in like that, and coming so close to Psychological impact death. I think what bothered me the most was getng stunned, dazed, and not being aware Statements about how the ambush emotonally and of my senses. It could have been worse. psychologically impacted the law enforcement ofcer.

Not surprisingly, many ofcers discussed the The atacker was shot once by one of the other two psychological impact of the ambush or unprovoked ofcers and then arrested. The victm ofcer sufered a atack. Twenty-three ofcers (69.7 percent) reported severe wound to his hand, but his injuries were not life- informaton related to this core idea. The Psychological threatening. Stll, the psychological efects of the atack impact core idea includes nine domains: Mental health lingered more than a decade later. treatment, Spiritual resources, Social support, Catharsis, Work as coping, Trauma, Revisitng, Impact on others, Psychological impact—Mental and Reassess priorites. The statements in the next two health treatment examples didn’t ft into any of the nine subcategories The law enforcement ofcer indicates that she or he and are overall thoughts about the Psychological impact saw a mental health professional as a means of coping core idea. with the psychological impact of the ambush. Ambush example. This statement comes from the Of the nine domains under the core idea Psychological witness ofcer who was at a house, trying to contain impact, Mental health treatment was the only one of a suspect’s sister when another ofcer was shot in an the nine addressed by at least half of the partcipants. adjacent room (see Refectons–Mental preparaton). These ofcers (51.5 percent) spoke about mental The ofcer talked about the psychological impact of health services they received to help them cope with getng another call at a later date to respond to the the aferefects of the atack. In some cases, accessing same house at which the shootng occurred. mental health treatment was mandatory, and in other cases, ofcers sought treatment voluntarily. Most . . . Sometme right afer the situaton, [I] law enforcement ofcers who discussed this domain received the call to go right back down to the

28 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS stated that the treatment was helpful and suggested if Injuries sustained consultng a mental health professional was mandatory it would diminish any stgma associated with seeing a Descriptons of injuries sustained to the law “shrink.” enforcement ofcer or others as a result of the ambush.

Ambush example. In this situaton, the ofcer responded In each of the atacks studied, one or more individuals to an ofcer-down call at a campground in a rural area. received injuries, many serious and some life- (This is a diferent incident than the one described threatening. Injuries sustained is a core idea comprised under Post-incident–Social support, which was also at a of fve domains: Other ofcer, Atending to injuries, campground.) The ofender shot an ofcer and then took Unaware of injuries, Medical treatment, and Ofender cover inside a trailer. Afer a long standof, police opened injuries. Injuries Sustained was addressed by 69.7 fre on the trailer. The ofcer interviewed for this study percent (23) of the ofcers in this study. unloaded his weapon at the trailer, and when a cease- Ambush example. This statement was taken from the fre was called, the ofender shot him. Concerning his victm ofcer who was ambushed while on a stakeout mental health treatment afer the incident, the ofcer (see Refectons).The ofcers reported that afer the stated the following. ofender stopped shootng, the ofcer turned his atenton to his injuries, “Yeah, I assessed my injuries, I I think counseling should be made tried to verbalize with my partner to try and get an idea. mandatory—if it’s not already—by our Initally, I tried to verbalize with him to try and fnd out department. It might be. I might just be the extent of his injuries so I could relay that.” In this ignorant to that fact. I think it needs to be case, the ofcer’s partner later died at the hospital. made mandatory to everyone involved, whether you’re involved directly or indirectly. Unprovoked atack example. In this example, the ofcer You need to be able to, at the very least, you was sitng in his patrol vehicle in the parking lot of a need someone to talk to. convenience store. It was near the end of his shif, and he was completng some paperwork. A subject approached Unprovoked atack example. The ofcer who was shot the patrol vehicle and asked a queston, and then began at a campground (see Post-incident–Social support) to atack the ofcer through his car window, stabbing talked about the quality of the mental health treatment him multple tmes with a screwdriver. he received. I was using my lef hand to block the majority of The individual they use, he’s really like the strikes with the screwdriver. So, as a result, squared away and the good thing about him my lef hand kind of took a lot of the beatng is he’s involved with other agencies in our from the screwdriver because I got stabbed a area, and it’s all ofcer stuf so he knows bunch of tmes with it, and then mostly all over what ofcers need and how to help them, the side of the lef side of my neck. I think there and he doesn’t rush. He doesn’t rush. He has was a total of like four or fve stab wounds later parameters, and he has steps that he goes that we had identfed . . . through, and if you make it through those steps, then you go back to work. If you don’t and you need more tme, then he makes that determinaton. And my agency, I think, was great about it because they allowed that. No mater how much that afected stafng, they allowed that. He was the frst and last say so on whether you come back to work, and they allowed him to be that.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 29 Injuries sustained—Medical to our close proximity to the hospital, we got into his vehicle and went to the hospital on treatment our own. That was a quicker response than Descriptons of medical treatment from either waitng for an ambulance. paramedics or hospital staf for injuries sustained in the ambush. Injuries sustained—Other ofcer In additon to the 23 ofcers who reported about the Descriptons of injuries to another ofcer on the scene. core idea of Injuries sustained, 63.6 percent also In many cases more than one ofcer responded to a call. described the medical treatment they received as a It is not surprising, then, that 54.5 percent of the ofcers result of their injuries. Ofcers may have remarked on interviewed mentoned the domain Other ofcer in the immediate, on-site medical treatment and/or medical context of Injuries sustained. treatment received later at the hospital; both are part of the defniton for the domain of Medical treatment. Ambush example. In a previous case concerning the three ofcers who responded to a domestc violence Ambush example. One ofcer, who was shot while call (see a descripton of the case in the Ambushed investgatng a domestc violence incident (see paragraphs), one of the victm ofcers described seeing Ambushed), discussed his treatment when the medics the other victm ofcer get shot. arrived on-site. He [the ofender] came out of the woods They had the medics there. They started here, [and] engaged Joe4. Joe was behind the taking of all my clothes, cutng of all my door of this car, and I was here at this point stuf, taking of all my clothes, which I thought waitng for anything this way. When I heard was really weird at the tme. What they do is the gunshot, I actually saw Joe, and it was when they take you in, if you’re in a traumatc surreal because when he got hit with the incident and they take you into the hospital, slug—with the pellet—I could literally see it you have to be stripped. Plus, they collected go through his leg. So I was like, “Oh my God! all my stuf for evidence. They took everything That looks like a femoral shot. He’s going to away from me. Everything was gone. Threw bleed out!” I was really worried at that point me in an ambulance, drove me somewhere about Joe. But Joe returned fre, and he . . . everything happened so quick . . . a few returned fre enough to back him of. blocks away, put me in a helicopter, and of we went. Unprovoked atack example. The following is an example of a witness ofcer’s descripton of the case Unprovoked atack example. In this situaton, an ofcer where another ofcer was injured during a machete pulled to the side of a highway to assist a motorist whose atack (see Psychological impact). truck had broken down. Fearing he would be arrested for drunk driving, the ofender pulled out a shotgun and . . . I thought his fngers—I don’t know if—we opened fre on the ofcer. The victm ofcer described were looking around to see if his fngers were the medical treatment he initally received from the frst on the foor. Luckily, looking back on it, the backup ofcer on the scene, who was also a paramedic. machete wasn’t as [sharp] . . . I’ve seen some machete fghts out here on the street, and He’s a paramedic and a registered nurse they can do some damage, and luckily this and has a lot of medical knowledge, and he wasn’t as sharp as some of these machetes, assessed the injuries at that point and, due because, if not, he would have cut right through his fngers.

4 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

30 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Awareness of surroundings Somewhat related to the core idea of Awareness of surroundings, Vigilance goes beyond mere awareness to The ofcer talked about the importance of being aware a more purposeful awareness. Vigilance is alertness as a of his/her surroundings or made statements about his/ means of seeing potental problems before they become her awareness of the surroundings. problems. Twenty-one ofcers (63.6 percent) who were Twenty-one ofcers in this study (63.6 percent) discussed interviewed in this study mentoned remaining vigilant. the importance of being aware of their surroundings Vigilance was a core idea that did not have any other in any encounter. Statements categorized under this related domains. core idea, Awareness of surroundings, relate to the Ambush example. The victm ofcer who was shot while importance of being aware or to descriptons about the coming to work (see Backup—Called for backup) talked ofcer’s awareness of the setng. This core idea had one about how, since the ambush, he is extremely vigilant at domain related to it, Awareness of cover. In order to be all tmes. rated as Awareness of surroundings, the statement by the ofcer could not be related to cover. Guys are like—to this day—guys are like, Ambush example. From a previous example in which an ‘Man, you stll stay prety vigilant when we’re ofcer pulled a car over for expired tags (see Ambush— looking in these windows and we’re doing Altered perceptons), the ofcer was well aware of the this, and there’s nothing in there.’ I’m like, potental danger in the neighborhood in which the car ‘What are you going to do if there’s something stopped. She remarked, “. . . according to my partner and in there? You need to be prepared if there’s I, we were like, ‘This is really not a good neighborhood something in there.’ to have them impound the car, [it may be dangerous to] have [the car’s occupants] walk from here . . . So what The ofcer uses his heightened level of vigilance as we’re going to do is, we’ll give them a citaton. Have them an instructonal opportunity for fellow (ofen newer) be on their way.’” In this case, the ofcer’s awareness of ofcers. her surroundings led her to consider the safety of the occupants of the car prior to the ambush. Unprovoked atack example. One of the witness ofcers to the machete atack that was previously described (see Unprovoked atack example. In this example, an of-duty Psychological impact) spoke of how he remains vigilant, ofcer was working as a security guard at a grocery store. even when of duty. (This is a diferent incident than the one described under Interviewer: “Do you fnd yourself more Refectons, which also involved an of-duty ofcer.) The vigilant now?” ofcer reported being aware of a person who had been Ofcer: “Even when I go to a restaurant when sitng across the street. “I was working an extra job and I’m not at work, I’m of duty. I sit watching the throughout the evening, I saw an individual sitng across door, I’m aware of the surroundings more. . .” the street, and I thought he was a panhandler.” It turned out, the person across the street had just purchased a gun and was actvely psychotc. Later that night, the Engaged ofender individual opened fre on the ofcer as he walked the Descriptons of eforts to engage the ofender once the store’s manager to her car. ambush/shootng commenced.

The core idea, Engaged ofender, relates to responding Vigilance to the ofender once the ambush or unprovoked atack Statements about remaining or actng alert at all tmes begins. Engagement is when the ofcer returns or or as a means of preventon or mitgaton of atacks. prepares to return fre. This core idea is comprised of

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 31 three domains: Armed self, Prepared to engage ofender, Ambush example. This statement came from the ofcer and Pursue ofender. Just over half of the ofcers in this mentoned earlier who responded to an ofcer down study (54.5 percent) described eforts to engage the call at a campground (see Psychological impact–Mental ofender. health treatment). The ofcer commented, “I got there. I parked my car and lef it right in the middle of Ambush example. In this incident, a group of ofcers the street—lights on—and got the door open, run out, approached an apartment to arrest a suspect in a un-holster my weapon.” Knowing that one ofcer had diferent crime. The ofcer who was interviewed already been killed, he prepared to engage the ofender described his engagement with the ofender afer his by arming himself as soon as he arrived on the scene. partner had already been shot. Unprovoked atack example. In this example, the The suspect then opened the door as I was perpetrator shot and killed his infant daughter and reaching for him [the ofcer’s downed texted pictures of the baby’s body to his estranged partner], and [the suspect] realized who I wife. He then killed his estranged wife’s mother and was, and then shot at me. Luckily another set her house on fre, while he was stll in it. When the ofcer was there behind me, and pushed me responding ofcers arrived, the ofender began shootng out of the way as he shot that round. At the at them, injuring one of the two ofcers. When asked same tme, I returned fre one tme with my about the tming of drawing his weapon, the ofcer handgun. responded that afer he pulled up to the scene and got out of his patrol vehicle, he drew his weapon. “I never In this case, returning fre was the ofcer’s engagement had a target to shoot at but I always had it out in a ready of the ofender. positon if I needed to, based on the nature of the call.” Unprovoked atack example. An ofcer was sitng in his patrol vehicle in a parking lot and witnessed a Ofcer’s understanding of why driver speed through a stop sign. While responding to The ofcer’s response to the queston: Why do you think an unrelated call for service, the ofcer encountered the ofender atacked you? the same vehicle stopped in the road in a residental neighborhood. As the ofcer pulled up, the driver Each of the ofcers was asked why they thought the jumped out of the vehicle and started shootng at him. ofender chose to ambush or atack him, her, or another The ofcer slid out of his cruiser, “And I thought he was ofcer. While some did not know how to respond to this stll walking toward me. So when I rolled over, I started queston, 60.6 percent ofered their understanding. A shootng under the door. Well, he was running back to variety of reasons were given, which resulted in seven his vehicle.” It was later determined the driver started domains that make up this core idea–Opportunity, shootng because he was afraid he would lose his license Revenge, Maintain freedom, Suicide by cop, Substance if he received a DUI. use, Social decay, and Mental illness. Ambush example. In the situaton where an ofcer Engaged ofender—Armed self responded to an ofcer-down call at a campground (see Descriptons of drawing his/her weapons or getng Psychological impact–Mental health treatment), the weapons to fght back. ofcer revealed the ofender gave his reason for the shootngs afer he was apprehended. Engaged ofender—Armed self pertains to actons taken by the ofcer once the ambush or unprovoked atack He [the ofender] was in the cruiser when had commenced. Twenty of the ofcers (60.6 percent) they were arrestng him, and in jail and in this study addressed arming themselves to fght back court it was recorded that he hates police against the perpetrator. ofcers. ‘I like you, but when you put on your

32 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS uniform, I don’t like you.’ He hates police for Ambush example. One of the ofcers who was shot no apparent reason. He just hates police. He during an investgaton of a domestc disturbance (see doesn’t hate me; he hates the police, and Ambushed) described Will to survive very clearly. I think that’s what he did that day, and the ofcers arrived on scene to investgate. I I think mindset is important. I can only go think he thinks he perceived them as a threat, based on mine, and mine was always—I felt so he shot and killed one of them. like I always came out of things one way or another. I don’t know that it really crossed Unprovoked atack example. The ofcer who was shot my mind that I maybe wasn’t going to survive on the side of the road during a DUI auto impound (see it. I always survived everything that I ever Ambushed—Altered perceptons) ofered what he had encountered, so it really didn’t cross my learned about the shooter’s motve. mind so much. I think the only real reality check was seeing the deputy lay there. That Well, it turned out that it [the ofender] defnitely was a reality check. Beyond that, was the husband of the female that was I felt like we were going to succeed and win arrested for driving under the infuence. this batle one way or another. The investgaton showed that she, from the back of the patrol car, had been able to text Unprovoked atack example. The ofcer who was him, though we don’t know what was in the atacked by a man wielding a screwdriver while the texts. There were a number of them back ofcer was parked in a convenience store parking lot and forth in a very short period of tme afer (see Injuries sustained) refected on the will to survive. she had been arrested. She should never have been allowed to have a telephone, but . . . my mindset was . . . Ok, I’m in a fght right unfortunately that wasn’t caught. I think that now, and I’m going to win this fght. A litle he came there to either rescue her, or we had bit of that fghtng blood kicks in. I wanted to heard there was a relatonship issue. Maybe catch him. I wanted to go run afer him and he was there to hurt her. handcuf him myself. It’s like, you took the fght to me, and now I’m taking the fght to It was never clear to this ofcer whether the ofender you. was atemptng to rescue his wife or if he was there to hurt her. However, given that the ofender shot the Once he was able to fend of the atacker, the ofcer ofcer and not his wife, it ultmately appeared he was made an efort to chase him on foot, but his injuries atemptng to rescue her. prevented him from doing so. The ofcer told backup ofcers the directon in which the ofender ran, and they Ofcer’s explanaton for were able to apprehend him shortly thereafer. survival—Will to survive The ofcer atributes his/her survival to the will to survive/reliance on will to survive training.

The core idea, Ofcer’s explanaton for survival, was defned as “Descriptons of why the ofcer believes she or he survived the ambush.” This core idea was composed of three domains: Spiritual, Will to survive, and Reliance on training. Only Will to survive was addressed by more than half of the partcipants (57.6 percent).

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 33 Training The ofcer’s descriptons of any and all training he or she received, or the importance of training. It was not rated under Training if the example was given as the reason for his/her survival or refectons.

The Training core idea consisted of two domains: Self-training and Automatcity. Only the core idea was addressed by more than half of the partcipants (54.5 percent). A topic was labeled as Training only if the ofcer reported on the training he or she had received or talked about how important training is for ofcers.

Ambush example. The ofcer who was ambushed as he approached the front door of an apartment (see Engaged ofender) discussed how his training kicked in during the ambush. The ofcer said, “I believe that when we actually had some training afer the academy where you go out there and you have some scenarios where things go bad, it does kick in, and it does help you when something like this does happen.”

Unprovoked atack example. The following ofcer was called to respond to a shots-fred call in a rural locaton. The ofender had been shootng at his mother and girlfriend, and then he shot a car that was passing on the road in front of their house. This ofcer refected on his extensive training in the Marine Corps and as a member of the SWAT team.

A lot of it, I think, came from Marine Corps training. I had a drill instructor in boot camp [who] was really big on, ‘You don’t quit.’ As long as you’re breathing, you don’t stop. You keep coming and coming and coming, and you don’t stop. I think that also went into a lot of the SRT [special reacton team] SWAT training we did. Hey, you’ve got to roll with it. OK, you’re getng ready to make an entry and you get spoted, you roll, you go, and you don’t stop. I think that’s part of it.

34 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER THREE The Ofenders

Thirty ofenders partcipated in this research; 21 of them (70.0 percent) were connected to unprovoked atacks, and 9 (30.0 percent) to ambushes. All of the ofenders were previously tried and convicted of the murder or atempted murder of one or more of the law enforcement ofcers they assaulted. Of the 30 ofenders who contributed informaton, 27 partcipated in interviews. The LEOKA research team conducted the interviews in various prisons throughout the United States. The three ofenders who declined to be interviewed consented to the collecton of statstcal informaton. This chapter describes the quanttatve informaton, or measureable statstcs, about the 30 ofenders including demographic data and details about their backgrounds and experiences. Following the statstcal informaton, a qualitatve analysis is presented from the transcripts of the interviews with the 27 ofenders. The qualitatve data provides the perspectve of the ofenders, including descriptons of ofender motves. While some inferences from the data are discussed in this chapter, additonal conclusions and recommendatons are provided in Chapter 4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Ofender backgrounds Gender • 29 ofenders were male. • 1 co-ofender was female

Race • 12 ofenders were Black or African-American. • 9 ofenders were White. • 6 were Asian/Natve Hawaiian/Other Pacifc Islander. • 2 were American Indian/Alaska Natve. • 1 ofender did not report race.

Average ages • 28 years old at the tme of the atacks was the average age of the ofenders. • Ofenders’ ages ranged from 16 to 55 years.

Educaton • 18 ofenders reported they had a General Educatonal Development (GED®) certfcate or a high school diploma. o 12 of the 18 held a GED®. o 6 held a high school diploma.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 35 • 9 ofenders neither graduated from high school nor earned a GED®. • 3 ofenders did not report their educatonal level.

Military service • 18 ofenders reported they never served in the military. • 1 ofender reported military service with an honorable discharge. • 11 ofenders did not respond to this queston.

Employment • 17 ofenders reported they were employed at the tmes of the assaults. o 4 were laborers. o 1 was a technician. o 1 was in a service occupaton o 11 ofenders described their employment as “other.” • 1 ofender was a student • 10 ofenders were unemployed. • 2 ofenders did not respond to this queston.

Youth and home life growing up Parents • 15 ofenders reported growing up with a father present. • 14 stated that their fathers were either mostly absent or had never lived with them. • 26 lived with their mothers most of the tme. • 2 never lived with their mothers. • 18 ofenders stated they had warm and close relatonships with their mothers growing up. • 7 reported their relatonships with their mothers to be cold and distant or hostle and aggressive. • 12 ofenders reported warm and close relatonships with their fathers. • 10 reported negatve relatonships with their fathers. • 5 reported variable relatonships with their fathers. • 3 ofenders did not respond to this queston. Mental health and placements • 4 ofenders said they experienced physical abuse. • 7 experienced psychological abuse. • 12 ofenders reported they ran away from home at some tme during their youth. • 6 stated they had been thrown out of the homes before the age of 18. • 10 of the ofenders were insttutonalized during their adolescence. o 3 were placed in orphanages or state homes. o 2 were placed into the foster care system. o 5 reported “other.” o 5 ofenders stated that they were frst insttutonalized between the ages of 14 and 15 years. o 2 ofenders were frst insttutonalized between the ages of 12 and 13 years. o 2 ofenders reported they were insttutonalized at age 11 or younger. o 1 ofender reported he or she was frst insttutonalized at age 16 or older.

36 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Substance abuse by caregivers • 12 ofenders reported known or suspected substance abuse by their fathers. • 3 reported known or suspected substance abuse by their mothers. • 5 of the ofenders reported known drug abuse by their fathers. • 5 reported known drug abuse by their mothers. Substance abuse by ofenders Of the 30 ofenders, 25 said they had a history of regularly consuming alcohol. • 20 ofenders reported drinking between once per week to daily. • 14 reported consuming 4 to 11 or more drinks in each instance. • 22 ofenders reported regular use of illicit drugs prior to the atacks. o Frequency of use ranged from 2 uses per week to daily use. o Marijuana was the most commonly used drug. o 2 ofenders reported they exclusively used marijuana. o 7 ofenders engaged in polysubstance abuse, which included marijuana plus a variety of other drugs. When researchers asked ofenders if they had ever commited a crime in order to get money for drugs: • 13 of the 30 ofenders said they had never commited a crime to get money for drugs. • 8 ofenders said they had commited crimes to get money for drugs. • 9 ofenders either reported no drug use or did not answer the queston.

Suicide • 15 of the 30 ofenders reported they had atempted suicide one or more tmes prior to the ambush. • The number of atempts reported for each ofender ranged from 1 atempt to as many as 20 atempts. Prior criminal involvement Ofenders in this study reported numerous encounters with law enforcement prior to the ambush or unprovoked atack. Age of ofenders when they frst commited a crime. • 14.5 years old was the average age the ofenders frst commited a crime, with a range from 6 to 25 years old. • 10 of the ofenders reported being involved in confrontatons with law enforcement ofcers before being involved in the incidents in this study.

Table 3.1 lists the crimes that ofenders reported they had previously commited.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 37 Table 3.1 Prior crimes reported by ofenders*

Crime Number of ofenders Percentage

Murder 3 10.0

Assault 19 63.3

Robbery 1 3.3

Burglary 7 23.3

Larceny/thef 16 53.3

Vandalism 5 16.7

Weapons ofenses 8 26.7

Drug ofenses 11 36.7

Disorderly conduct 10 33.3

Other 8 26.7 *Based upon informaton for 30 ofenders. **The percentage for these crimes do not add to 100 because some ofenders listed multple crimes.

The ambushes and unprovoked atacks The 30 ofenders in this study were involved in 27 ambushes or unprovoked atacks. Please note: The data concerning the incidents from the ofcers’ perspectves (Chapter 2) are not comparable with the data in this chapter. This discrepancy is due the fact that only eight of the incidents in this study included interviews and informaton from both the ofcer(s) and ofender(s). Therefore, readers should interpret these fndings with cauton.

Times of the atacks • Ofenders reported the tmes of the atacks in 18 total cases. (See Table 3.2) o 14 assaults happened between the hours of 6:01 p.m. and 6 a.m. o No ambushes or unprovoked atacks occurred between 9:01 a.m. and 3 p.m. • The seasons of the atacks were reported for 27 incidents. o 12 incidents occurred in the summer months. o 7 incidents happened in the winter. o 4 took place in the spring. o 4 incidents happened in the fall.

38 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Table 3.2 Times of the assaults – reported by ofenders*

Time span Number of assaults Percentage

Midnight – 3 a.m. 6 33.3

3:01 a.m. – 6 a.m. 1 5.6

6:01 a.m. – 9 a.m. 2 11.1

9:01 a.m. – 12 p.m. 0 0.0

12:01 p.m. – 3 p.m. 0 0.0

3:01 p.m. – 6 p.m. 3 16.7

6:01 p.m. – 9 p.m. 2 11.1

9:01 p.m. – 11:59 p.m. 4 22.2

*Based on 18 cases (3 of these incidents had more than one ofender).

Locaton of the assaults/arrival at the scene The ofenders responded to questons about the locatons of the incidents and when they arrived on the scene. • 24 of the 27 assaults did not occur at the same locaton in which the ofender frst encountered the ofcer(s) according to the ofenders’ answers to this queston. Note: The interview transcripts contradict this conclusion, and indicate most of the assaults did occur in the locaton of their frst encounter. • 23 ofenders provided data on the means by which they arrived at the scene of the assault. o 12 ofenders arrived via motor vehicle. o 6 ofenders walked to the scene. Ofender’s frame of mind Researchers asked the ofenders about their frame of mind immediately before, during, and afer the atack • 26 of the 30 ofenders reported their frame of mind prior to the assault. The most frequently reported emotons prior to the atacks were: o Angry/hostle o Anxious o Scared o Calm • 25 responded for their frame of mind during the assault. Once the assaults commenced, the most common emotons were: o Scared o Angry/hostle o Anxious • 23 reported their frame of mind immediately afer the assault. As the atacks ended, the ofenders most frequently reported feeling: o Scared o Confused

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 39 Tables 3.3 through 3.5 list the responses for each of these circumstances. Table 3.3 Ofender's frame of mind prior to the assault*

Reported mood Frequency Percentage

Angry/hostle 6 23.1

Frustrated 2 7.7

Agitated 1 3.8

Anxious 6 23.1

Excited 1 3.8

Scared 4 15.4

Confused 0 0.0

Calm 4 15.4

Desperate 0 0.0

Other 2 7.7

*Based on 26 ofenders who responded. Table 3.4 Ofender's frame of mind during the assault*

Reported mood Frequency Percentage

Angry/hostle 4 16.0

Frustrated 2 8.0

Agitated 2 8.0

Anxious 4 16.0

Excited 0 0.0

Scared 6 24.0

Confused 3 12.0

Calm 1 4.0

Desperate 0 0.0

Other 3 12.0

*Based on 25 ofenders who responded.

40 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Table 3.5 Ofender's frame of mind afer the assault*

Reported mood Frequency Percentage

Angry/hostle 2 8.7

Frustrated 1 4.3

Agitated 2 8.7

Anxious 2 8.7

Excited 1 4.3

Scared 6 26.1

Confused 5 21.7

Calm 1 4.3

Desperate 1 4.3

Other 2 8.7

*Based on 23 ofenders who responded.

Table 3.6 reviews the most frequent emotons reported by the ofenders by the type of atack—ambush or unprovoked. Those who engaged in an unprovoked atack most commonly felt angry and hostle before the atack, but as the event unfolded, these feelings become less intense. Ofenders who ambushed ofcers reported feeling calm before the atack. Calm feelings diminished as the incident progressed, and ofenders noted feeling scared during and afer the ambush. Note: The ofenders who engaged in an ambush were a smaller sample size and had fewer similar responses.

Table 3.6 Ofender's frames of mind at diferent tmes during the ambush or unprovoked atack*

Reported mood Ambush Unprovoked atack

Prior During Afer Prior During Afer

Angry/hostle 1 2 1 5 2 1

Anxious 1 0 0 5 4 2

Scared 1 3 3 3 3 3

Calm 3 0 0 1 1 1

Confused 0 2 1 0 1 4

*Based on 26 ofenders who responded to “Prior to the atack,” 25 who responded to “During the atack,” and 23 who responded to “Afer the atack.” AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 41 Ofender’s behavior surrounding inital confrontaton Partcipants were also asked to describe their behavior surrounding the inital confrontaton with the law enforcement ofcer(s). Of the 30 ofenders, 14 provided an answer, but no clear patern of responses emerged. The remaining 16 ofenders did not provide an answer. The descriptons of their behaviors concerning the inital confrontatons are presented in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7 Ofender's behavior surrounding inital confrontaton*

Behavior Frequency Percentage

Went for weapon 3 21.4

Atempted to feign cooperaton 2 14.3

Sudden blitz 2 14.3

Atempted to fee 1 7.1

Atempted to verbally intmidate 1 7.1

Looked for opportunity to escape 1 7.1

Other 4 28.6

*Based on 14 ofenders who responded.

Ofender’s reported stressors prior to the assault The researchers asked the ofenders about whether they had experienced a precipitatng stressor in their lives prior to the assault. • 17 ofenders responded that they had experienced one or more stressors. • 4 did not respond. • At least 2 ofenders responded “yes” for 10 stressors each.

The list of stressors and the number of ofenders reportng them are presented in Table 3.8.

Ofender’s descriptons of the assaults When asked to describe the assault, 26 ofenders responded and 4 ofenders did not provide an answer. • 13 ofenders described the assault as “impulsive.” • 5 said the assault was “planned.” • 3 reported the assault was “premeditated.” • 5 described the assault as “other.” When researchers asked ofenders how long the atack lasted, 25 ofenders responded. • 11 reported that the atack started suddenly and was a blitz atack. • 4 of the ofenders said the incident lasted longer than 10 minutes. • 3 said it lasted 30 to 60 seconds.

42 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Table 3.8 Ofender's reported stressors prior to the assault*

Number responding Stressor yes Change in sleeping habits 4

Separaton 3

Divorce 2

Jail 2

Marriage 2

Pregnancy 2

Change in fnancial conditon 2

Death of a close friend 2

Change in spousal arguments 2

Other 9 *Based on the responses of 17 ofenders, some ofenders provided more than one response.

• 3 more reported a length of 1 to 10 minutes. • 2 ofenders said 10 to 30 seconds. • 2 ofenders answered this queston “other.”

Weapons Twenty-six ofenders reported on how they obtained their weapons during the incidents. • 20 used weapons they had brought with them during the assaults. • 2 ofenders used weapons of opportunity. • 1 ofender used the law enforcement ofcer’s service weapon. • 3 ofenders reported “other” when asked about how they obtained their weapons on scene.

Consideraton of ofcer’s body armor • 1 ofender reported he took the victm ofcer’s body armor into account. • 15 ofenders did not consider the ofcer’s body armor. • The remaining ofenders did not respond to this queston.

Ofender’s intentons for the assault Twenty-one ofenders responded to the queston concerning their intentons behind their assaults on law enforcement. These results are presented in Table 3.9.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 43 Table 3.9 Ofender's intentons for the assaults*

Intenton Frequency Percentage

Frighten the ofcer 3 14.3

Immobilize the ofcer 2 9.5

Avoid arrest 2 9.5

Escape 2 9.5

Kill the ofcer 1 4.8

Kill the ofcer + avoid arrest 1 4.8

Immobilize + frighten the ofcer 1 4.8

Wound + immobilize the ofcer 1 4.8

Other 8 38.1

*Based on 21 ofenders who responded. Post-Assault Following the incidents, very few ofenders tried to conceal their identty or hide any evidence of the assault. • 3 ofenders said they used a disguise. • 1 ofender took evidentary items from the scene to dispose of them. Twenty-eight ofenders reported the ways in which they were apprehended. • 9 ofenders said they turned themselves in. • 4 were arrested following a police investgaton. • 4 were caught in the act. • 3 ofenders reported multple means by which they were apprehended. o 1 captured through a combinaton of a police investgaton, crime scene evidence, and a third-party informant. o 1 turned himself in, following a police investgaton that was aided by a third-party informant. o 1 was apprehended afer being turned in by a third-party informant and then caught by a citzen. • 1 ofender’s apprehension involved a third-party informant. • 1 was identfed by the victm ofcer. • 1 was caught by a citzen. • 5 ofenders reported their apprehensions ft within the category of “other.”

Twenty-seven of the ofenders who provided data concerning their apprehensions also shared the locatons of their arrests. The majority of the ofenders were not arrested at the site of the assault. • 9 were arrested at their residence. • 5 ofenders were arrested while feeing the scene of the atack. • 4 ofenders were arrested at the crime scene. • 9 of the ofenders said they were arrested “elsewhere.”

44 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS micromotves (core ideas and domains). Note: Although the ofenders did not diferentate between the technical Researchers assembled the statstcal informaton defnitons for ambush and unprovoked atack during presented in the frst secton of this chapter from the their interviews (see Chapter 1 for defnitons), the quanttatve analysis of the data for all 30 ofenders, researchers categorized the incidents accordingly during unless otherwise reported. This secton describes their analyses. the qualitatve results, or the insights and concepts identfed, from the in-depth interviews conducted Overall motves with 27 ofenders. These interviews lasted an average The research team identfed fve overall motves, of 4 hours, and subjects answered questons about Personal, Expressive, Economic, Politcal, and Social. their background, family structure and environment, Afer reading through each transcript, each member of entertainment preferences, attudes toward authority, the team made a determinaton regarding the motve for criminal history, weapons training and use, characteristcs each assault. In cases where the group could not reach of the scene and encounter, and their descripton of the total agreement, team members discussed the motve ofense. Just as with the data about the ofcers, the untl they atained 100.0 percent consensus. Through informaton about the ofenders may difer between the this method, an overall motve was determined for 26 quanttatve and qualitatve analyses. The results are of the 27 ofenders. In one case, the interviewee was a complementary but not comparable. co ofender and was not the individual who atacked the law enforcement ofcer, so the team did not determine Most common codes: overall motves and a motve for that partcular subject. Therefore, for the micromotves Overall motves secton only, percentages are based Analysts documented recurring themes from the on the 26 ofenders for whom the research team ofenders’ interview transcripts and created a codebook established motves. Each overall motve is listed below for the most common topics. Further analysis of the and includes a defniton in italics, an explanaton of the codes resulted in the identfcaton of overall motves motve, and quotes from ofenders for an ambush and/ that infuenced the ofenders to commit the atacks. As or an unprovoked atack. with the ofcers’ data, several major themes, i.e., core ideas, emerged from the transcripts, with some of the Personal core ideas being divided into one or more subordinate The overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack topics, or domains. Only for ofenders, researchers was for personal reasons (to accomplish a personal used the core ideas and domains from the transcripts objectve, e.g., avoiding arrest). to identfy micromotves. Micromotves are the multple The most common motvaton for the ofenders to infuences that contributed to the ofender’s decision to assault law enforcement ofcers was Personal, with 13 atack an ofcer. of the 26 ofenders (50.0 percent) reportng their ofens- Based on the review of the ofenders’ transcripts, es were carried out for this reason. researchers pinpointed: Ambush example. The ofender tried to collect money • 5 overall motves, which were not labelled as core owed to him by another individual. The two began to ideas or domains. fght, and while the struggle was going on, the other • 31 core ideas. individual called 911. The fght ended with the ofender • 58 domains. shootng the victm. As the ofender was leaving the resi- In line with previous ofender research conducted by dence, a police car pulled up. The ofender opened fre one of the authors of this study (Daniels et al., 2016), the on the car, killing the ofcer. The team categorized the core ideas and domains represent micromotves that motve as Personal because the ofender was atempt- contributed to the ofenders’ reasons for perpetratng ing to fee another crime and was trying to avoid being the assaults. The frst part of this secton is about arrested. the fve overall motves, followed by a discussion of

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 45 Unprovoked atack example. When interviewed, percent) initated assaults on ofcers due to an the ofender stated that a partcular ofcer had been Expressive motve. harassing him for years. On the day of the atack, the ofender was already in a state of crisis. He encountered Ambush example. In this case, the ofender was a the ofcer at a gas staton, and the two exchanged words. passenger in a car that had been pulled over by a law The ofender went outside and waited in his vehicle enforcement ofcer. As the ofcer approached the for the ofcer to drive by. When the ofender saw the vehicle, the driver sped of, leading two ofcers in ofcer’s patrol vehicle passing by, he rammed it with his separate cars on a high-speed chase that ended at the vehicle. When the ofcer exited his patrol vehicle, the ofender’s house. The ofender and others fed into the ofender had already exited his own vehicle in order to house, followed by the ofcers. The ofender ran into his assault the ofcer. The team categorized the ofender’s bedroom, emerged with a 16-gauge shotgun, and shot reason for the atack as a personal motve because he the victm ofcer in the head at point-blank range. The believed he was retaliatng for a long list of perceived team categorized the motve as Expressive because the mistreatment by the victm ofcer. ofender was sufering from mental illness and was in a state of psychological crisis at the tme of the assault. Expressive Unprovoked atack example. The ofender had been out The overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack drinking with friends. As he was driving them home, he was related to the ofender’s emotonality or experience ran a stop sign. When the ofender saw fashing lights in of crisis—including suicidality. his rearview mirror, he panicked. He worried if he received The team determined that nine partcipants (34.6 a DUI, he would lose his license, and consequently,

46 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS his job. Instead of pulling over, the ofender drove of, parents’ property and resisted their eforts to work on and the ofcer followed him. The ofender temporarily the project. Afer several weeks of resistance, an ofcer lost the ofcer in a residental neighborhood, then fnally came to the residence to address the issue. stopped in the middle of the street. While responding According to the ofender, the frst ofcer kicked in the to an unrelated call for service, the ofcer then came door, so the ofender shot and killed him. When other upon the stopped truck. As the ofcer pulled up, the ofcers arrived, the ofender shot and killed a second ofender jumped out of the truck and started shootng ofcer in the yard. However, the ofender claims he at him, wounding the ofcer. The ofender escaped but missed the second ofcer and insists that a third ofcer, turned himself in several days later in another state. The who was behind the second victm ofcer, returned fre team categorized the ofender’s overall motve for this and killed the second ofcer. The team determined the incident as Expressive because of the combinaton of the shootng to be politcally motved because the ofender ofender’s drunken state and his panic. believed he was within his rights to kill trespassers. The remaining overall motves were expressed by one Social ofender (4.0 percent) each. These overall motves included Economic, Politcal, and Social. Because these The overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack motves were applicable to 1 ofender each, only one was for social reasons. As a result of atacking the ofcer, example incident is available for each motve. an ofender stood to gain social standing within his circle. One partcipant (3.8 percent) initated an assault on an Economic ofcer due to a Social motve. The overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack was for economic gain. Ambush example. The ofender never felt like he ft in, so he complied with his brother-in-law’s request to One partcipant (3.8 percent) initated an assault on an borrow the ofender’s gun in order to shoot an ofcer ofcer due to an Economic motve. the brother-in-law disliked. The ofender claims he did Ambush example. The ofender was selling drugs for a not think his brother-in-law was serious, but he also gang. He claimed he was paying a “dirty cop” to ignore worried about becoming an outcast in the family if he his operaton. The ofender and some of his associates did not comply. The ofender though his wife’s family grew resentul of the money they were giving the would like and respect him more if he provided the gun. ofcer and the harassment they received from him. In his words: The ofender and two others ambushed the ofcer and It was something to do with pressure, killed him. They believed they stood to gain fnancially accepted pressure, I guess you could call it. by eliminatng the ofcer. I’m saying because I felt this is my brother-in- law. We’ve only been married [the ofender Politcal and his wife] for three months. You know The overall motve for the ambush or unprovoked atack what I’m saying? Let me make an impression, was politcal reasons, or to make a politcal statement. not an impression as much as, you know, he might hold this against me if I don’t help him One partcipant (3.8 percent) initated an assault on out. ofcers due to a Politcal motve.

Ambush example. The ofender in this incident reported This ofender is now serving a life sentence for Accessory he had spent his life studying antgovernment laws to Capital Murder. He was motvated to partcipate and had experienced several run-ins with the police. in this ambush incident in order to gain social status, He held extremist antgovernment views and believed recogniton, etc. from his brother-in-law. the government contnuously infringes upon citzens’ rights. Prior to the ambush incident, the state needed to widen a highway that ran in front of the residence that belonged to the ofender’s parents. The ofender claimed the state workers were trespassing on his

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 47 Table 3.10 Number of ofender responses for each micromotve (core idea)

Micromotve (core idea/domain) Number of responses Percentage CQR label

Mental state 26 96.3 General Negatve background (Minor) 24 88.9 Typical Negatve experiences (Adult) 24 88.9 Typical Street life 24 88.9 Typical Incident resoluton 23 85.2 Typical Substance use – History 21 77.8 Typical Prepared for batle 20 74.1 Typical Escape 16 59.2 Typical Victm mentality 16 59.2 Typical Inferred psychopathology 15 55.6 Typical Neutralize the ofcer 14 51.8 Typical Suicide 14 51.8 Typical Attudes toward authority 13 48.1 Variant Substance use - Incident 13 48.1 Variant Involvement with others 12 44.4 Variant Triggers to violence 11 40.7 Variant Maintain freedom 10 37.4 Variant Survival 10 37.4 Variant Premeditaton 10 37.4 Variant Arming self 10 37.4 Variant Denial 9 33.3 Variant Altercaton 9 33.3 Variant Opportunity 7 26.0 Variant Threats 7 26.0 Variant Confrmed psychopathology 7 26.0 Variant Actng on instnct 6 22.2 Variant Retaliaton 5 18.5 Variant Few constraints 5 18.5 Variant Mistaken identty 4 14.8 Variant Kill authority fgure 3 11.1 Variant Extremist beliefs 1 3.7 Unique

48 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Micromotves (Core Ideas/Domains) Complementng the overall motves, micromotves (core ideas and domains) provide additonal insight into the reasons why these ofenders assaulted law enforcement ofcers. Researchers used the CQR methodology to analyze the topics addressed by ofenders in this study (Ladany, Thompson & Hill, 2012). Table 3.10 lists each of the most commonly occurring micro-motves and displays how frequently ofenders mentoned each one. The Number of Responses column in Table 3.10 represents the number of ofenders who made one or more statements that refect the micro-motves listed. The percentage follows in the next column. The fnal column, CQR Label, is a classifcaton based on the number of responses each micromotve received. Researchers used the standard labels from CQR to classify how frequently partcipants addressed each topic. See Appendix A for more informaton on CQR.

As shown in Table 3.10, researchers labeled one of the 31 core ideas as General, meaning at least 26 of the 27 partcipants addressed the topic. The team labeled 11 of the core ideas as Typical, which meant between 14 and 25 ofenders discussed them. The group labeled most of the core ideas, 18, as Variant. Two to 13 partcipants addressed Variant core ideas. Finally, the team labeled one core idea as Unique. One individual mentoned this core idea, Extremist beliefs, but it was included in the list because his beliefs served as a motve for the ofender’s assault on law enforcement. The micromotves (core ideas and domains) categorized as General or Typical (mentoned by at least 50 percent of the partcipants) are detailed in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11 Most common micromotves (core ideas and domains)

Core idea – domain Number of ofenders Percentage

Street life – Prior criminal involvement 23 85.2

Substance use – History - Drugs 21 77.8

Prepared for batle – Access/obtaining weapons 20 74.1

Negatve background (Minor) – Family instability 19 70.4

Mental state 17 63.0

Mental state – Cognitve reactons 17 63.0

Mental state – Remorse 16 59.3

Negatve background (Minor) 16 59.3

Escape – From the ambush 15 55.6

Mental state – Afectve reactons 14 51.8

NOTE: Codes that are in bold font are core ideas; the codes in italic font are specifc domains under the core idea.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 49 Discussion of most common micromotves This statement refers to a possession of marijuana (core ideas and domains) charge, several charges related to arguing with a police ofcer, and a third, unmentoned crime for which he was The remainder of this chapter presents each of the on probaton. most mentoned micromotves (core ideas/domains) from Table 3.11. Just as with the overall motves, each Unprovoked atack example. The ofender in this micromotve is defned and an explanaton is included, unprovoked atack had been taking pills and drinking if necessary. Each secton provides a brief synopsis of for more than a day. He wanted to go buy more pills an ambush and/or an unprovoked atack associated and became aggravated with his girlfriend because she with the micromotve. Some cases include pertnent would not give him her car keys. He retrieved a frearm quotes from the ofender. Additonal conclusions and and started shootng the residence and her car. Then he recommendatons are located in Chapter 4. shot the responding ofcer as the ofcer approached the residence. The ofender had a history of similar crimes. Street life The interviewer asked him, “You’ve only been arrested The ofender describes how street life shaped his/her for the DUI?” The ofender responded, “I had three of attudes, beliefs, values, and/or thoughts, feelings, and them [DUIs] and a domestc violence prior to this crime, behaviors. prior to [the reason] I am here.” This core idea consists of two domains: Prior criminal Substance use–History involvement and Drug sales/dealing. The ofender reports a history of substance use or abuse. Street life–Prior criminal involvement The core idea Substance use—History is comprised of Descriptons of prior involvement in, or convictons of two domains, Drugs and Alcohol. Of the two, more than criminal actvites, separate from negatve experiences half of the ofenders discussed a history of drug use. with law enforcement ofcers, including delinquency. In the qualitatve porton of the interviews, ofenders Twenty-three of the 27 (85.2 percent) ofenders in this did not menton history of alcohol abuse frequently study addressed Prior criminal involvement. LEOKA staf enough to be analyzed in this chapter. This in contrast advised the partcipants they should only discuss crimes to what they reported for the quanttatve porton of the for which they had been convicted, otherwise the interviews (see Quanttatve Analysis, Substance abuse research team would be required to inform the authori- by ofenders, earlier in this chapter). tes of any details of unsolved crimes that were men- Substance use–History—Drugs toned in the interviews. The ofender reported a history of drug use/abuse. Ambush example. On trial for rape, the ofender Twenty-one ofenders (77.8 percent) reported a atacked a court guard, shot the judge and the court history of drug use. Drugs ranged from marijuana to reporter, and then went on a spree throughout the city, methamphetamines and illegally obtained prescripton ultmately killing four people and injuring several others. pills. The ofender reported several prior crimes, including the rape for which he was charged, although he denied that Ambush example. Afer several days of being high on the incident was rape. He related the following incident. methamphetamines, the ofender sped past a patrol ofcer in his vehicle. The ofender rammed another I was on probaton for possession of police car and fred shots at an ofcer but managed to marijuana and there was an incident where escape afer leading ofcers on a high-speed chase. The I was arrested for obstructon of justce, and next morning, the police came to his house, where a it was several diferent charges that resulted shootout and standof ensued. This individual admited, from an argument with the police ofcer, and “I smoked a litle weed, but what was my downfall was it happened while I was on probaton, so I I ended up taking methamphetamines, and it just took had to go to the jail, for like 30 days. . . control of me prety well.”

50 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Unprovoked atack example. The ofender was another DUI. Regarding being armed in certain places, delusional at the tme of the atack. The ofcer he the ofender said: atacked was his neighbor. The ofcer was preparing to It [the gun] would be at the house. I don’t take his daughter to the doctor because she was ill, but know if I just had it on me unless I was about the ofender believed the ofcer was harming the child. leave the house. And there’s certain places Consequently, the ofender killed both the ofcer and the you can’t go into with them so I’d have to ofcer’s wife. When asked about prior substance use, he leave it in the vehicle, but other than that I responded that in additon to frequent marijuana use, “I always had it on me. did some methamphetamines, but I had quit all of that.” Negatve background as a minor Prepared for batle Negatve events and experiences in the ofender’s history The ofender had taken steps to prepare him or herself (while a child or adolescent). for batle in general (not for this incident). Sixteen of the partcipants (59.3 percent) in this study Ofenders who expressed this core idea had the mindset talked about the core idea Negatve background as a that one must be prepared to fght at all tmes. Three minor. These general negatve experiences included domains make up this core idea: Mental preparaton, reports of poor living conditons, poor relatonships Street combat Veteran, and Access/obtain weapons. with peers, and other factors. The core idea Negatve background as a minor is comprised of eight domains, Prepared for batle – Access/obtaining weapons including: Exposed to violence, Family instability, Gang The ofender reported a history of obtaining and/or violence, Poor academic performance, Substance use/ using weapons. abuse, Sexual assault, Incarceraton, and Negatve This domain was discussed by 20 of the partcipants experiences with the police. Examples for the overall (74.1 percent). Researchers noted this domain if the core idea follow. ofender’s intent for the weapons was for self-protecton or for use to commit crime. Researchers did not code Ambush example. An individual who was going through this domain if, for example, the ofender talked about a divorce had been drinking all day. While fghtng with collectng guns for huntng or sport—unless those guns his wife, he declared he was going to commit suicide were then used for self-defense or to commit a crime. in the garage. The man’s family called the police, and while the ofender fumbled with the shotgun in the Ambush example. The ofender sufered from paranoia dark, a blast from the gun killed an ofcer who was and was delusional at both the tme of the ambush outside of the garage window. The ofender claimed and at the tme of the interview. Before the ambush, he dropped the weapon, causing it to discharge. When the ofender stole a friend’s gun and hid in the desert. discussing his background, the ofender talked about When the police came searching for him for stealing being disrespected by a teacher when he was younger, the weapon, he ambushed one of the ofcers and killed saying, “They threw a chalk eraser at me.” Although him. When asked why he stole the weapon, he stated, many people would not be unduly distressed by this “If necessary to get them out of the way, I was going to experience, it had a negatve impact on this partcipant. kill them, but this is why I stole the assault rife, just to prepare for it, just in case it was necessary.” When the Unprovoked atack example. The ofender grew up ofender referred to “they” and “them,” he was talking in an impoverished environment. His father had been about demons that were part of his delusions. deported to his home country afer being arrested for a DUI. The ofender’s father, afer returning to the United Unprovoked atack example. Previously described in States, was stopped by police in front of the ofender’s the unprovoked atack example of the Expressive overall home for another drunk driving ofense. A backup ofcer motve, this incident involved an ofender who had been arrived, and the father was arrested without incident, out drinking. The ofender failed to stop for an ofcer but the ofender went into the house and came out the because he was afraid he would lose his job if he got back door with a rife. The backup ofcer had driven

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 51 around the corner when she spoted the ofender actng similar crimes. Relevant to the Family instability domain, suspiciously. As the ofcer pulled into a parking lot, the the ofender stated his parents divorced when he ofender opened fre, emptying his 30-round magazine. was 16. Despite being struck six tmes, the ofcer survived and was able to return fre. When describing his childhood, Interviewer: What was the reason for your this ofender stated: father leaving? Ofender: I believe it was infdelity. [I was] trying to look for something, happiness, you know? Trying to, you know, Mental state have to have much, you know, but trying to The ofender described his/her mental state surrounding help someone out, you know, when they’re the ambush. down. Things like that. That’s what I was The Mental state core idea is composed of three looking for, you know, a handout. I never got domains: Afectve reactons, Cognitve reactons, and one. And the people that would give them to Remorse. This is the only core idea that was not only me, they were in the same situaton I was. discussed by more than 50 percent of the partcipants, Negatve background as a minor–Family instability but all of its three domains were also discussed by more than 50 percent of the partcipants. Seventeen (63.0 The ofender was exposed to violence during his/her percent) of the ofenders addressed this core idea. formatve years (e.g., domestc violence, abuse, broken home). Includes history of family criminal actvites. Ambush example. This incident was previously described Nineteen ofenders (70.4 percent) talked about family in the Social motve. The ofender’s brother-in-law had instability while growing up. This domain does not asked to use his frearm to harm a police ofcer. Here, include sexual abuse—which was included in the Sexual the ofender gave his thoughts about whether his assault domain of this core idea. brother-in-law was serious about his intenton to shoot the ofcer. Ambush example. The ofender and two other individuals robbed a gun store, using a stolen truck to As a sense of acceptance, you know what drive through the front window. Early in the morning, I’m saying? But in the back of my mind, I told they were in a park transferring guns from the truck to myself several tmes, There’s no way that a car, when an ofcer pulled into the park to investgate he’s going to go through with this over some their actons. The ofender opened fre, empted his trafc tckets. This is an atenton grabbing— magazine, ran over the ofcer with the car, and ordered what do you call it? A fasco. ‘Hey look at one of the co-ofenders to shoot the ofcer in the head. what I can do!’ You know what I’m saying? During his interview, the ofender described a bit of his childhood. The ofender believed his brother-in-law was just atemptng to get atenton by talking about shootng Interviewer: As far as your biological father, the ofcer. you never knew him at all? Any reason why he lef, or was he never in the house at all? Unprovoked atack example. The ofender in this example was experiencing a psychotc episode at the Ofender: My mother threw him out when I tme of the atack. He had decided he needed to kill an was two because he was molestng my sister. authority fgure, so he bought a gun and waited outside Unprovoked atack example. This incident was of a grocery store untl closing when he knew an of- previously described under the Street life–Prior criminal duty ofcer would arrive. The ofcer worked part-tme involvement example. The ofender had been taking pills as a security guard at the grocery store. The ofender and drinking. When an ofcer arrived at his residence, the described both his thoughts and his feelings around the ofender fred on him. The ofender had a prior history of atack.

52 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS I see him come out. He had a broom or a mop Unprovoked atack example. The ofender in this or something like that, you know a few litle incident was driving drunk when his truck broke down groceries in his hand. So I say “OK it’s tme” on an interstate. A car flled with his relatves stopped, again. So I dropped the bag and take the gun and then a passing ofcer stopped to ofer assistance. out, drop the bag and now its prey. I’m on the The ofender feared being charged with a DUI and was hunt. Then I don’t know what happened or also afraid the ofcer would see the shotgun in his truck, for the moment of why. I guess it was just my so he opened fre on the ofcer. Afer feeing the scene, heart–I had never done anything like that, the the ofender described his thought process. anger or nothing like that. It just exploded, fred of. Maybe fve more yards, you know, [I] went out to this park, ditched the ride, and would have been what I needed to complete I ended up hitchhiking a ride. Then I ended up the actual murder. on this back road and my plan was—I sat out there trying to think what to do. And then my The ofender wounded the ofcer, but the ofcer man- plan was to walk back in and turn myself into aged to return fre. The ofender fed on foot and was the sherif’s ofce. captured shortly thereafer by responding ofcers. Before he could enact this plan, a hunter turned him Mental state – Cognitve reactons in, and he was arrested. Although wounded, the ofcer Descriptons of the ofender’s thoughts/cognitons survived the atack. during the tme of the ambush. Mental state–Remorse Seventeen partcipants (63.0 percent) described this The ofender expresses regret over the incident or the domain, sharing their cognitve reactons to the atack. loss of life. Ambush example. The ofender was a high-level A total of 16 of the ofenders (59.3 percent) reported member of a street gang, although he used the word feelings of remorse for their actons. “organizaton” rather than “gang” during the interview. The ofender was at a gas staton when several of-duty Ambush example. In this example, the ofender was a ofcers arrived. The ofender and one of the ofcers passenger in a car that fed from an ofcer. A high-speed had a long-standing dispute and got into an argument. chase ensued, and the driver drove to the ofender’s Another ofcer threatened the ofender, and the house, where they jumped out of the car and ran into ofender went out to his car. In the ofender’s words, the the house. The frst two ofcers to arrive exited their ofcers escalated the situaton, and he ambushed them vehicles and followed on foot. While one ofcer ran into by pulling a gun and shootng. One ofcer died, and the the back of the house to apprehend another subject, the other was paralyzed. In describing his thoughts about ofender ran into his bedroom and retrieved a 16-gauge this situaton, the ofender stated: shotgun. He then walked into the living room, placed the gun to the other ofcer’s head, and pulled the trigger. Ofender: When he made the statement, I When asked how he felt about the ambush, the ofender lef. “Come on outside.” And he chose not to, stated, “I feel bad about it, yes, sir.” which was smart because I was already in the state of being where something [was going Unprovoked atack example. The ofender’s situaton to] happen. was previously described (see Personal motve, unprovoked atack example). The ofender discussed Interviewer: You already called me out so being harassed for years by a partcular ofcer, and now I’m going to have to. . . he atacked the ofcer at a gas staton. The ofender Ofender: Yeah, I’m going to show you now. expressed regret for losing what he had and for almost killing the ofcer. The ofender’s thoughts revealed his great ofense when I have no idea why I’m even here. I had a he believed he was disrespected and his need to save good family. They took care of me, but it was face by “showing” the ofcer “how [he] really get[s] just something stupid I did, you know. I regret out.”

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 53 it. I won’t lie to you, you know. Again, I’ve got Ofender: Yeah, that’s when I snapped. I feelings of guilt constantly because I nearly couldn’t take it anymore. It was just too much took another man’s life, and this man was stress, too much depression, anger, all that, a police ofcer, you know. And I’m not into you know. Every single downfall in my life killing cops, you know. Otherwise I wouldn’t came at that moment, you know? The whole even be here. weight of it came down on me. . .

Mental state–Afectve reactons Escape–From the ambush Descriptons of how the ofender felt at any tme during Following the ambush or unprovoked atack, the ofender the ambush event. atempted to escape. The third domain of the ofender’s mental state The Escape core idea encompasses using the ambush surrounding the ambush or unprovoked atack is his or or unprovoked atack as a means for escape. Fifeen her afectve, or emotonal reacton. Fourteen of the partcipants (55.6 percent) reported escaping or feeing partcipants (51.8 percent) in this study discussed their from the atack. afectve reactons to the atack. Ambush example. The ofender in this example had a Ambush example. The ofender in this example was long history of criminal actvity and incarceraton. Before involved in a high-speed chase and shootout in which the ambush that was the focus of the interview, the an ofcer was injured. The ofender escaped and went ofender had been jailed for shootng an ofcer during to his house, which was in another county. The next a trafc stop. The ofender escaped jail and was on the morning, the police arrived, and the ofender engaged in run for a couple of months. The police were staking a standof with them. During the standof, the ofender’s out his wife’s house, and as the ofender approached mental state went through a progression from a desire the residence, he came upon two ofcers facing away to kill the ofcers, to anger, and fnally to calm afer from him. He claims his intent was to sneak up on them, some tme had passed. Signifcantly, the ofender said strip them, and te them up just to humiliate them. But his fashpoint came when his dog was killed by the police when they heard him approach, the ofender fred at the in the shootout. ofcers, hitng both of them. One ofcer later died at the hospital. Afer the shootng, the ofender addressed I mean, that was, my mind set at the tme his escape. “When the sirens got close, I took of, ran was, ‘You want me get me; I want to get you.’ toward the woods. Ran toward the north; the back part And I just—like I said, I started fring then, but there is north. Put a fresh magazine in the gun and kept afer that had inital, you know, anger of them going.” He was captured several days later. killing my dog was gone, you know, maybe 15 minutes later. Whenever I had [gone] upstairs Unprovoked atack example. This incident was and could see them, I’d done, you know, [I] previously described in the unprovoked atack example calmed down and wasn’t in that mind frame in the Negatve background as a minor–Family [any] more. instability secton. When an ofcer came to investgate the three subjects, the ofender shot the ofcer multple Unprovoked atack example. This incident was tmes, drove his car over the ofcer, and ordered one of previously described (see Negatve background as a his co-ofenders to shoot the ofcer in the head. When minor, unprovoked atack example). The ofender’s asked what they did next, the ofender stated: father had been pulled over for drunk driving, and the ofender feared his father would be deported again. I jump back in the car. . . I threw the fashlight Here, the ofender describes “snapping” because of a and jumped back in the car, and one of the mixture of several intense emotons —stress, anger, and other guys starts going through the cop’s car. depression. So I get out and I yell at him, ‘We got to go, Interviewer: OK. At some point in tme, you man! We got to go!’ So we all get in the car elected to go into the house and retrieve the and the other guy is asking me, ‘Are you all frearm?

54 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS right, are you shot?’ because the ofcer fred at me twice. I say, ‘Yeah,’ and we lef. We went back up to where we were at the camp area. Summary This study of ambushes and unprovoked atacks did not have a random sample of partcipants. Rather, the sample was drawn from cases in which the ofender survived, was convicted, and agreed to be interviewed. Therefore, the researchers could not develop a profle of the “typical” person who is likely to assault an ofcer. However, the team found some common characteristcs among the 30 ofenders described here. Most frequently, the ofender was male (96.7 percent), who was a member of a racial minority (66.7 percent) with an average age of 28 years. Most (73.3 percent) of the ofenders had a history of drug abuse, and the majority (66.7 percent) of the ofenders (some of whom had abused drugs) had a history of alcohol abuse, as demonstrated in the quanttatve data. A third of all the ofenders had been involved in prior confrontatons with law enforcement, and the majority of all ofenders had engaged in prior criminal actvites. Unexpectedly, 50 percent of the sample reported one or more suicide atempts in the past. Finally, most ambushes and unprovoked atacks enacted by these individuals occurred between the hours of 6:01 p.m. and 6 a.m., with the most common tme being between midnight and 3 a.m. The transcripts of the interviews with ofenders demonstrate many of them lived lives of stress and strain, ofen coming from unstable homes, engaging in criminal actvites early in life, and using and abusing alcohol and/or drugs. For some of the partcipants, this lifestyle related to frequent atempts to end it all through suicide. Their lifestyle, depression, and perhaps hopelessness may have steered these ofenders on a path that ultmately led to their decision to kill, or atempt to kill, one or more police ofcers.

Many of the ofenders lived lives of stress and strain, ofen coming from unstable homes.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 55 56 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER FOUR Areas of Concern for Law Enforcement

Although the LEOKA Program defnes ambushes and Awareness of surroundings, Distractons, and Closer unprovoked atacks diferently, both types of assaults atenton to potental atacker. contain the element of surprise. Ofcers do not suspect the assault is coming, undoubtedly contributng to Unable to see the ofender a sense of uncertainty every tme they put on their While ofcers noted a number of awareness issues that uniforms. Some of the reasons ofenders atack ofcers, impacted their responses to an ambush or unprovoked as identfed in this study, include avoiding arrest, atack, being unable to see the ofender was one of the retaliaton, politcal motvaton, social pressure, and most frequently mentoned concerns in this category. mental illness. Whatever the impetus for an ambush Of the 33 ofcers interviewed, 16 ofcers (48.5 percent) or unprovoked atack, it is not known ahead of tme, never saw the ofender prior to the atack or did not and such assaults seem impossible to mitgate. Even so, know the locaton of an ofender who was shootng at the analysis of the interviews LEOKA staf conducted them. with ofcers and ofenders found common issues that can, at the very least, be discussed and, in some cases, In one such case, a uniformed ofcer was assaulted addressed with training. This chapter identfes the most while working a department-approved security detail frequent areas of concern acknowledged by ofcers and at a grocery store. The ofcer was standing near the includes recommendatons whenever possible. Some of front checkout area of the store when he was physically the topics identfed by the ofcers overlap one another, atacked from behind. The momentum caused the but each one is addressed individually to allow readers ofcer and the ofender to fall into the display racks and to use this chapter as a reference guide. While this onto the foor. During the struggle, the ofender was informaton was gathered specifcally from instances of able to remove the frearm from the ofcer’s holster and ambushes or unprovoked atacks, readers will fnd that fre one round. Fortunately, the round only grazed the most of the recommendatons apply to any ongoing ofcer. The struggle contnued outside the store where event. the ofcer was able to subdue the ofender untl backup arrived. The ofcer described the situaton:

AWARENESS, ATTENTION, Well, I was there a few moments, and it all DISTRACTION happened very quickly. I felt a nudge or Many ofcers in this study understood before they were something from behind, kind of on my right- assaulted that the circumstances involved higher-than- hand side. I thought maybe someone just average threat levels, but they were stll caught unaware bumped into me with a cart or something as when atacked. Most of the 33 ofcers interviewed they were going past, and in the second that referenced at least one aspect of awareness, atenton, I thought about it, I felt myself . . . actually and distracton. Examples include being aware of the get thrown up against the checkout line. I setng, the people involved, and the circumstances, as got thrown up against a magazine rack. Now well as contnuing to pay atenton in order to recognize I know it’s not an accident, and that same and respond to danger as quickly as possible. This instance, I feel something pulling on my secton presents the informaton related to the topics holster. So I . . . try to spin to my right and of awareness, atenton, and distracton that the ofcers throw my hands down on top of the gun to most commonly mentoned: Unable to see the ofender, keep it in the holster. And, at that point in tme, I knew I had a problem.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 57 Awareness of surroundings Law enforcement ofcers can become a target of opportunity for no other reason than the uniform they wear and the authority they represent. An ofcer’s awareness of his or her surroundings is essental to increase the chance of preventng or surviving an atack. When analyzing the ofcers’ interview transcripts, the topics of Awareness of surroundings and Vigilance both came up regularly during the discussions. Of law enforcement ofcers interviewed, 63.6 percent (21 ofcers) made reference to awareness of his/her surroundings. Seventeen (51.5 percent) of the of- cers’ comments partcularly mentoned closer atenton to surroundings, stressing the importance of being vigilant at all tmes in order to recognize and proactvely address possible threats. Many of the ofcers had no warning what- soever they were about to experience a life-threatening encounter. Even so, there were cases during which ofcers could have employed precautonary measures to minimize the efects of an atack if they had been able to beter assess their physical environment and/or recognize their tactcal disadvantage.

Ofcers can become a target of opportunity for no other reason than the uniform they wear and the authority they represent. An ofcer’s awareness of his or her surroundings is essental to increase the chances of preventng or surviving an atack.

58 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Distractons rear, coming from the wood line, I heard a shotgun rap and immediately following that, Several ofcers noted distractons as a contributng factor a blast from a shotgun. I turned around just in in their critcal incidents. Distractons prevented ofcers tme to see the debris and everything coming from giving their full atenton to their surroundings, out of the shotgun, smoke and everything. At creatng an opportunity for ofenders to ambush or the tme I didn’t know it, but I had been hit. atack them. I’d been peppered with birdshot in my arm On this topic, 15 (45.5 percent) of the law enforcement and my face. study partcipants talked specifcally about the need to remain focused on the greater task at hand and minimize Closer atenton to potental atacker distractons. In at least two of the cases, ofcers assumed Five (15.2 percent) of the ofcers specifcally they were responding to the afermath of a shootng, mentoned the importance of paying closer atenton and that the ofender had already lef the area. In both to a potental atacker and minimize distractons. One cases, ofcers were ambushed by ofenders who were of the partcipatng ofcers told of being atacked stll actvely on the scene and armed. without provocaton while he assisted another ofcer with an arrest for DUI. The ofcer agreed to process In one case, an ambush occurred when three ofcers towing the vehicle. The ofcer and the tow truck driver responded to a domestc violence call to investgate were preparing the vehicle for towing when a subject allegatons of physical abuse and sexual assault. The approached them on foot and asked what they were complainant indicated the ofender was living in a small doing with the car. The subject turned out to be the camper on the property where she was assaulted. The husband of the woman who had just been arrested for ofcers also learned the ofender was armed and had DUI. When he learned about the decision to tow the made statements implying he would shoot the frst law vehicle, the subject became angry and lef the area enforcement ofcer he saw. The ofcers arrived and on foot. Due to the man’s behavior, the ofcer was cleared the camper and surrounding area. They did not concerned for his safety—concerned enough to watch locate the ofender, so ofcers turned their atenton to the subject leave the area before he resumed processing placing crime scene tape to cordon of the area and begin processing for evi- dence. While the unsus- pectng ofcers were distracted with this task, the ofender appeared from the wood line with a shotgun and killed one ofcer and injured two others. The ofcer recounted the situaton:

As I was tying some tape, fagging tape, around the trees, the deputy was standing behind me, so of to my right

Ofcers should complete a preemptve assessment of their surrounding area and safeguard themselves as much as possible against a potental atack.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 59 the vehicle. The ofcer expressed the sentment in this same spot forever, that’s usually where I go way, “I knew there was a concern. I thought there might to type if I’m in that area, that side of town. be a threat. I even made the statement of, ‘Something’s I’m typing, so every now and again I’d scan, wrong with this guy. I’m not doing anything untl he’s just stretch, kind of look around. In this gone.’ And yet he stll was able to sneak up on me and partcular moment, I looked up. From my [shoot me].” lef eye peripheral I could see a fgure that wasn’t there before, obviously. So by the tme Once the subject walked out of sight, the ofcer began I turned my body, and my complete atenton, working with the tow truck driver to complete a vehicle I saw a male, probably at this tme within 3 inventory report. While the ofcer and the tow truck yards of my car, approaching me. driver were distracted with the inventory, the subject returned to the scene and shot the ofcer in the back RECOMMENDATIONS: Awareness, of the head, resultng in a nonfatal injury. Here are the atenton, distracton ofcer’s refectons on that moment: • Ofcers should complete a preemptve assessment of their surrounding area and safeguard themselves as The tow truck again was idling very fast. much as possible against a potental atack. It was a diesel truck, and I couldn’t hear anything. I started to count. . . I saw some As found in research for other LEOKA studies, the dollar bills in the wallet, and I counted, I think ofender’s motve is ofen to catch the ofcer of guard. twelve. And the tow truck operator thought Ofcers can always prepare for a potental atack and there were thirteen. He said, ‘Count it again.’ think about preventve measures they can use. A few So I thumbed through them, and this was suggestons are: happening fairly quickly. Again, it was the end • Positoning oneself in a locaton that is less likely to of my shif, and I’ll admit I was in somewhat be atacked from a blind side. of a hurry to get done and get home. • Surveying the area upon arrival and contnuing to pay atenton to the surroundings. In another example, an ofcer experienced an • Follow sound training practces and procedures. unprovoked atack while sitng in his marked police vehicle in a well-lit public area with high trafc. The The uniformed ofcer who shared his experience of being ofcer frequently parked in that area to complete work atacked from behind while working at the supermarket on his laptop computer. While the ofcer was distracted said the following when he was asked what he would with typing, the ofender approached the ofcer’s vehicle have done diferently: from the driver side. Through his peripheral vision, the ofcer observed the ofender as he approached the I may have picked a litle diferent spot. Where vehicle. For safety concerns, the ofcer always exited I was standing . . . lef a part of my back and the vehicle when speaking with someone; however, the part of my right hand side, my gun side, open. ofender was at the driver side door before the ofcer If I’d been able to do it again, I would have could get out. The ofcer became uncomfortable when thought a litle diferently, I may have picked the ofender displayed odd behavior. Concerned for his the other end because there [are] nice big safety, the ofcer decided to try to exit the vehicle to walls that you can stand against, and no one speak with the ofender. As the ofcer atempted to open can get behind you or alongside of you. You the door, the ofender leaped through the window and would see them coming. began atacking the ofcer with a screwdriver, stabbing Applying sound practces every day will mitgate a him multple tmes. The ofcer commented: potental risk of an atack or, at least, give the ofcer I’d say I’d been there for about 15 to 20 a greater advantage of seeing the atacker before the minutes typing, and every now and then incident occurs. I’d glance up and kind of scan, make sure • Ofcers must ensure the scene is no longer actve and everything was OK. So I had been in that all ofenders are either gone or neutralized before

60 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS initatng containment and scene protecton procedures.

Because it is very difcult to assess those people who are actve threats to law enforcement, all individuals require the ofcer’s undivided atenton. A common rule of thumb that applies in this situaton is that it is best to consider all people present as a threat untl proven otherwise. In a related case in the study, a shooter fed the scene only to double back and ambush ofcers who were in the process of securing the crime scene. One of the ofcers commented, “Basically it was just a case study to let everybody know that . . . just ‘cause you’re on a crime scene, doesn’t mean there’s not a threat there stll. You’ve got to be ready for it.” • Distractons cannot be avoided; however, ofcers can train themselves to recognize distractons as they occur and to make the necessary adjustments to redirect their atenton.

Distracton comes in various forms and ofcers noted it as a contributng factor to several incidents in this study. An ofender can use an ofcer’s distracton as an avenue to gain advantage over the ofcer. Ofcers can distract themselves with assignments, actvity, and interactons with the public. Ofcers making a trafc stop can be distracted while writng a trafc citaton, drawing their atenton away from the occupant(s) of the vehicle or other approaching threats. Although these types of distractons are necessary to complete a law enforcement functon, ofcers can take steps to mitgate the risk of an atack. Ofcers must make a concerted efort to contnually and frequently check their surroundings when involved with distractng actvites. Managing distractons is similar to wearing a seat belt. If ofcers make it a habit to put on their seat belts, they will instnctvely do it without thinking about it. Managing distractons is no diferent—this learned behavior can increase ofcers’ chances of preventng or surviving an atack.

Distractons cannot be avoided, however, ofcers can train themselves to recognize distractons as they occur and to make necessary adjustments to redirect their atenton.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 61 PERCEPTION to do what we normally do, which is respond to the scene, gather informaton, fgure out Perceptons can have a powerful impact on the decisions what charges we have, and then look for our ofcers make and could be the diference between life bad guy. We’re not going to do anything any and death. Of the ofcers interviewed, 17 (51.5 percent) diferent than any other call, because at that made statements indicatng percepton infuenced their point that’s what we had always done. decisions and/or reduced their awareness. Percepton is defned as “the way you think about or understand Routne behavior can have the same efect. Examples of someone or something; the ability to understand or routne behavior include such things as eatng lunch at a notce something easily, and the way you notce or restaurant, sitng in a vehicle at a trafc light, or tending understand something using one or more of your senses” to court maters. Over tme, ofcers may not perceive (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). As found in a previous LEOKA these locatons or actvites as areas of vulnerability, study, Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults causing them to lose their sense of awareness and their on our Naton’s Law Enforcement Ofcers (Pinizzoto, ability to potentally avoid or prevent an atack. Davis & Miller, 2006), the way ofcers process and perceive the circumstances of an incident can infuence An incident in this study occurred during the ofcers’ how they act. This phenomenon is referred to as an routne actvity of reportng to work. Two ofcers arrived ofcer’s perceptual shorthand. An ofcer’s percepton at their precinct during the shif change to begin their of the situaton can diminish their awareness, making tour of duty. One ofcer said he notced a box truck them more vulnerable to an ambush or unprovoked sitng in the parking lot of the precinct and believed its atack. Ofcers in this study most ofen addressed four driver was making a delivery. Unknown to the ofcers, an areas of concern about percepton: Repettve/routne ofender had murdered the driver of the box truck and calls for service or routne behavior, Percepton based on drove the truck to the precinct with a plan to kill police the ofender’s behavior, Mispercepton of the ofender’s ofcers. Both ofcers walked by the box truck and were locaton, and Ofender’s percepton. at the entrance door to the precinct when someone behind them said, “Hey guys, how are you doing?” Repettve/routne calls for service or followed by gunshots. One ofcer was killed while the routne behavior other ofcer was shot in the face as he returned fre. Repettve or routne calls for service as well as the The surviving ofcer described how being cautous of ofcer’s own routne behaviors were found to be an the situaton never occurred to him: area of concern for ofcers in this study. Ofcers who About the only thing I can think of that perceived a situaton to be common and predictable felt maybe I could have done a litle beter was it made them more vulnerable to an atack. Awareness look around the front side of the truck. But can diminish when an ofcer responds to several similar in hindsight, who does that? It just looks like types of calls over a period of tme without serious a delivery truck that’s parked there to me, as consequences. One of the partcipatng ofcers provided innocent as could be. Maybe if I’d have taken an example of how his percepton of a routne call led a look around the front side of the truck. to complacency. The ofcer was investgatng a suspect who made threats to shoot the frst law enforcement In another case previously mentoned in the Distractons ofcer he saw: secton, an ofcer was atacked while sitng in his marked police vehicle typing on his computer. The ofcer I would say at that point in my career I was a frequently stopped in the same area to complete this litle naïve, probably, because I’d heard people type of work because he felt it was a safe area. “Keep in say, ‘Oh, they’ll shoot you, they don’t like you,’ mind,” he said, “I’m at this place where you would think or, ‘He’s going to fght you,’ or, ‘He’s going to it was fairly safe because I had been there before, it’s a run.’ Those are statements I had heard on the good locaton, high trafc area, well lit, all the check-of radio before, so it wasn’t something unusual list.” Over tme, his familiarity and percepton of the area at that point in my career. So I kind of took it as a safe place may have led to a false sense of security with a grain of salt, and fgured we’re going and a decreased awareness of his surroundings.

62 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS In one case, two ofcers responded to a townhouse Mispercepton of the ofender’s locaton where an individual was reportedly threatening suicide. Mispercepton of an ofender’s whereabouts can impact The ofcers arrived and encountered a man standing an ofcer’s behavior at the scene of an alleged crime on the balcony of the two-story townhouse. The man or during an investgaton. In this study, eight ofcers indicated his roommate was inside taking drugs and (24.2 percent) believed the ofender had lef the scene threatening suicide. When the ofcers asked the man or was somewhere other than where the victm ofcer to open the door, the man stated he was afraid to walk was located prior to the ambush or unprovoked atack. downstairs. Instead, he tossed the key for the front door Misleading informaton from witnesses, dispatchers, to the ofcers. The ofcers gathered more informaton, third hand, or concluded through the investgaton then they entered through a gate and directed their caused ofcers to believe the threat was no longer atenton to the front entrance. Unfortunately, the imminent. ofcers were not aware that the individual on the balcony had made a fcttous complaint to lure the In one of the case studies, two ofcers working together ofcers there to kill them. He had purposefully acted responded to an actve shooter complaint occurring at compliant to alter the ofcers’ percepton and create a an apartment complex. As both ofcers pulled into the false sense of security. One of the ofcers commented: complex, dispatchers provided updated informaton indicatng the suspect had lef the scene in a pickup He [the man on the balcony] drops the keys truck. Based on this informaton, the ofcers’ atenton down to us, we open that gate, we go down was now directed to containing the crime scene. The the walkway, which is a fence on one side ofcer involved said, “Mater of fact, we’re all handling it and the garage on the other; we go down like we’re protectng a crime scene, like an afer-incident that walkway to the front door. My partner’s type deal.” As the ofcers exited the vehicle to begin on the right side where the door handle is moving innocent bystanders from the crime scene, the because he has the keys. I’m on the lef side ofender fred on them. One of the ofcers was struck in of the door, not in front of the door but, the calf and the femur. outside of the door frame, and when he [the partner] goes to put the key in, that’s when In another case, ofcers responded to a recreatonal we get fred on. vehicle (RV) park to investgate a shots-fred complaint. As soon as the frst ofcer arrived, the ofender began The ofcer further described how the behavior of the fring his weapon. The ofcer interviewed for this study ofender infuenced their percepton, in turn, directng responded to assist and was directed to enter the RV their atenton away from him: park from the rear to avoid crossfre. The ofcer went to the rear of the park and began to make his way on I don’t know what his mindset was, but from foot to the scene. Based on the informaton provided, my interacton, my verbal interacton with the ofcer believed the ofender was stll located inside him, everything . . . was normal. I mean, his RV, “[I] believed he was stll in his RV . . . I did not it didn’t . . . cause me to have any type of believe he had exited the structure at all.” As the ofcer heightened sense of security around that was making his way to the RV in queston, he was shot person that I [was] talking to. His behavior three tmes by the ofender who was hiding in the cover seemed 100 percent normal to me at the of darkness among some large rocks. tme. I remember he was 100 percent calm, I mean no indicaton he was nervous that he The ofender’s percepton was about to partake in an atack like this . . . Ofenders’ perceptons of ofcers or circumstances can our mindset was [on] the suicidal roommate impact their decisions. What an ofender sees or hears that was supposedly downstairs that we could infuence whether or not he or she will atack an were dealing with. I never had a second ofcer. As mentoned in the previous study, In the Line of thought about the suspect [actually being] Fire: Violence against Law Enforcement (Pinizzoto, Davis the reportng party behind us. & Miller, 1997), two-thirds of the ofenders interviewed

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 63 were looking for an opportunity to assault the ofcers the ofcers. Note: The ofender refers to the boyfriend’s they atacked but only when the opportunity presented cellmate as “kid.” itself. These same principles applied to the ambushes and unprovoked atacks in this study. Ofenders ofen While they [my boyfriend and the kid] were formulated a percepton of an ofcer based on such in there together, they paid atenton. They things as the ofcer’s mannerisms, appearance, didn’t want to do it when one specifc ofcer awareness level, professionalism, distractons, and was working. They wanted to do it when two deviaton from training. In one incident, a uniformed specifc ofcers were working so they paid ofcer was ambushed as he was working a department- atenton to and learned the ofcer’s days approved overtme detail at a local supermarket. As the of. The kid said the one [ofcer] is young ofcer walked across the parking lot, the ofender began and dumb, and the other one is fat and slow shootng a frearm at the ofcer. A gun batle ensued, . . . The kid made the comment about one of and the ofcer received a nonfatal gunshot wound to them being real naïve and being too nice. the leg. The ofender reported he wanted to kill a police RECOMMENDATIONS: Percepton ofcer and selected the supermarket parking lot based on past observatons of ofcers who worked this detail. • Ofcers should never treat calls for services as routne The ofender discussed how he viewed the ofcers in and should consistently follow protocols to evaluate that locaton as easy targets: their surroundings.

It was just me knowing it, you know. I could Ofcers who face routne or repettve calls for service kill one of them any tme I wanted to and can, unintentonally, fall into the mispercepton that the that’s what it was about. Who, male or outcome will be the same. Training and practce can female, it didn’t mater. It was about lashing help ofcers to recognize this tendency and make the out on authority because I know, hey they necessary adjustment to refocus their awareness level. sit up there and they don’t look or pay aten- ton or nothing, what is or what’s going on. I can just walk up, blow his brains out and walk of, you know, and that was the plan.

In another case study, an inmate convinced his soon- to-be-released cellmate to assist him in breaking out and feeing from the correctonal facility. Once released, the cellmate ploted the inmate’s escape with help from the inmate’s girlfriend. During the atempted escape, two of- cers were fatally shot. The LEOKA staf interviewed the Most ofenders had a history of drug abuse, and the inmate’s girlfriend, who was convicted for her part in the majority abused alcohol. crime. She described how her accomplices’ perceptons of the ofcers in the correctonal facility infuenced their decisions and led them to believe they could overtake

64 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS • Ofcers should identfy their routne behaviors (like a common lunch spot, doing paperwork while sitng in the police unit, etc.) and make a deliberate efort not to perceive it as a safe situaton.

As indicated in a previous study, In the Line of Fire (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 1997), ofenders look for areas of opportunity to assault ofcers. When ofcers lower their guards during a routne or monotonous actvity, it creates an opportunity ofenders may be seeking.

• Ofenders may intentonally be nice and/or compliant to delude the ofcer, causing him/her to be more relaxed and less atentve.

As discussed in a previous case study, the ofender standing on the balcony lured the ofcers to his apartment for the purpose of killing them. The ofender’s cooperatve demeanor misled the ofcers to believe he was not a threat. The ofcer reiterated, “Prior to the assault, I gave him the beneft of the doubt. You know, I don’t know this guy. I don’t understand why he wanted to do what he did.”

• Arriving on a scene, ofcers should consider all individuals a threat.

Related to the previous recommendaton, ofcers should not give anyone the beneft of the doubt. Opportunites for ofenders to assault ofcers can occur when ofcers direct their atenton away from a potental ofender, or formulate a wrong percepton of an individual that causes ofcers to lower their guards. Ofcers should

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 65 go into every situaton with an understanding of how audio exclusion. The brain slows down the intake of their perceptons of those on the scene could infuence informaton, creatng a variance in sensory perceptons. their awareness. Keeping vigilance high and calling for Ofcers may experience one, two, or all three altered backup when necessary can eliminate the opportunity a perceptons during the same ordeal. These are the same potental ofender may be seeking to assault the ofcer. altered perceptons as those reported in a previous study, Violent Encounters (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 2006). Of • Ofcers must contnue to evaluate and maintain the ofcers interviewed for the current study, 26 (78.8 an awareness of their surroundings, even when the percent) reported some form of altered percepton. informaton or investgaton indicates the ofender(s) are no longer in the area. Time distorton The most common altered percepton experienced Even if an area has been cleared, if the whereabouts of by ofcers was the altered percepton of tme or tme the ofender is not known, or even if it is believed to be distorton. This phenomenon is not uncommon for known, ofcers should be mindful of the possibility the ofcers to experience during highly intense situatons. ofender is nearby. For example, three ofcers on the What took only 20 to 30 seconds to occur may seem like scene of a domestc assault/sexual assault investgaton 2 to 4 minutes to an ofcer. One ofcer explained, “Even cleared the area and concluded the ofender had lef. though it only lasted about 45 seconds to a minute total, Even though the ofender had threatened to kill the it seemed like it was forever to us out there on the scene.” frst ofcer he saw, and although there were places to As explained in Violent Encounters (Pinizzoto, Davis & hide surrounding the scene, the ofcers directed their Miller, 2006), when overwhelmed with informaton, the atenton to interviewing the victm and putng up crime brain slows its processing down in an atempt to collect scene tape. It was then that the ofender appeared informaton, to rapidly make sense of it all, and control from a nearby wooded area and shot the unsuspectng what is occurring. In additon, as tme appears to slow ofcers. down, ofcers may experience enhanced vision, recalling • An ofcer’s mannerisms, appearance, distractons, vivid details as the event unfolds. In some cases, ofcers lack of atenton, lack of professionalism, deviaton report actually seeing the bullets as they are fred from from training, etc. may be the reason an ofender the weapon. As one ofcer explained, “Your slide does decides to atack. its thing, you get your muzzle fash, out pops your round. I could see that plain as day, and I could see the bullets.” If ofcers understand that perceptons impact the way ofenders view and react to ofcers, then they can take Tunnel vision necessary measures to mitgate potental red fags. One Another altered percepton ofcers commonly of the ofenders clearly stated during an interview; “Lack experience is tunnel vision—a focused, narrow window of atenton. That’s one of the big ones . . . somebody of sight decreasing the ability to see what is occurring slips up when they’re supposed to be watching you, and outside the narrow window or peripheral view. Several they don’t. It’s a common factor in prison, too. That’s ofcers interviewed for this study experienced tunnel how a lot of guys get hurt. They’re not paying atenton.” vision during their situatons. Tunnel vision is a safety Every tme ofcers put on the uniform, whether to concern for law enforcement ofcers because it prevents investgate a circumstance or directly deal with a the ofcer from identfying potental threats outside the potental suspect, they must ask themselves, “How will narrow view. One ofcer explained how he experienced an ofender perceive me and my behaviors?” both tunnel vision and tme distorton during his ordeal: ALTERED PERCEPTUAL ACUITY I redirected my bullets there, I could see them leave the gun, enter the trailer and fy The brain functons in unique ways, especially during through, it was that clear, and it was tunnel high-alert or high-stress situatons. One common theme vision . . . You lose your peripheral vision. demonstrated in this study was altered perceptons, You have tunnel vision, but that tunnel vision or altered perceptual acuity, which includes such is so, so clear. It’s amazing how clear it was experiences as tme distorton, tunnel vision, and before me.

66 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Audio exclusion seeing the video and everything else, it was only about 30 seconds. Time stops. Several ofcers in this study experienced audio exclusion. They recalled a reducton in noise or even complete RECOMMENDATIONS: Altered perceptual hearing loss during their situatons. Some ofcers who acuity experienced audio exclusion during an incident reported • Ofcers should be aware of altered perceptual acuity the gunshots sounded more like popping noises while and familiar with its characteristcs, such as tme others did not hear the gunshots at all. One ofcer distorton, tunnel vision, and audio exclusion. explained how audio exclusion and tme distorton impacted him upon arriving at an apartment complex to Ofcers in extreme situatons commonly experience investgate an actve shooter incident. The ofcer was altered perceptual acuity. As previously mentoned, fred upon once he exited his marked police vehicle: 78.8 percent of the ofcers in this study experienced some form of altered percepton. By understanding this I stepped out; as soon as I stepped foot out, phenomenon, the efects of altered perceptual acuity shots start ringing . . . I hit the ground and then, can potentally be reduced, or at least be recognized by everything, all of sudden as I remember, just the ofcer as a natural reacton when involved in high- goes quiet. He [the ofender] is stll shootng, stress situatons. [it] goes quiet. Next thing I remember, I have my gun in hand, and I remember pulling slack • Ofcers should partcipate in realistc scenario-based nice and slow, aiming. I fre; round goes. It’s training that addresses altered sensory experiences. kind of like The Matrix, it was slow moton. Round goes, he ducks. The round hits the Realistc scenario-based training can prepare ofcers pillar right behind him. I even see the dust to deal with one or more of these altered perceptual just come up, and he takes of running. acuites and possibly mitgate the efects and increase ofcer safety. In another case, an ofender barricaded himself inside an RV afer shootng and killing an ofcer. The assistng TAKEN BY SURPRISE AND ofcer was shot in the arm afer becoming engaged in a shootout with the ofender. The ofcer experienced both ENGAGING OFFENDERS audio exclusion and tme distorton during the incident: When discussing the circumstances of events, several ofcers said that the surprise elements of the atacks All of a sudden, I lost my hearing. I couldn’t required them to engage with ofenders under hear anything. It was almost like I had earplugs tremendous pressure. and earmufs on; I could hear nothing. We’re talking about at least four weapons that I Taken by surprise knew of that were just going of, and I could Although some ofcers had an indicaton there was a hear nothing. But I had never seen more potental for danger prior to the assault, 13 of the ofcers clearly in all my life during those 30 seconds. (39.4 percent) interviewed were completely unaware. I could see the bullets leaving my gun, fying through the air, and I knew exactly where For instance, the ofcer whose case was previously they were going. I could see them go through mentoned in the Unable to see the ofender secton, there and a part of me says, I don’t know if was working department-authorized overtme in a it was a mind trick or what, but I could see grocery store when he was caught completely of guard him in that trailer afer he fred his weapon by an unprovoked atack. He reported, “It all happened again. Those 30 seconds seemed like forever. very quickly. I felt a nudge or something from behind, I think I told the inital investgator, when I kind of on my right-hand side. I thought maybe someone was giving my frst story, the frst tme afer just bumped into me with a cart or something.” Within it happened, I told him it was like a minute seconds, the ofender threw the ofcer against the and a half, maybe even 2 minutes long. Afer checkout line. The ofcer went on to say, “Now I know

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 67 it’s not an accident, and that same instance I feel something pulling on my holster. At that point in tme, I knew I had a problem.”

Another ofcer was surprised by an atack as he fnished a tour of duty. He was outside in a supermarket parking lot at the tme and recalled, “As I started walking across the parking lot I hear what sounded like gunfre . . . I looked to my lef. That’s when I saw the actor coming toward me fring his weapon.”

Other ofcers who were completely surprised indicated that although, in their partcular incidents, they were in some way engaged in a law enforcement capacity with the suspect, the context of the situaton did not indicate an assault was imminent. These atacks stll caught the ofcers unaware. One ofcer described a citzen making contact with him while he was parked in his patrol car in front of a convenience store. “I saw a male, probably at this tme within 3 yards of my car. . . At the tme, I didn’t think anything of it.” Afer conversing with the man, the ofcer indicated the individual seemed a litle odd but, “At that point, I had no immediate concern that this guy was going to do anything abnormal, crazy.” The ofender in this partcular case forced himself through the open window of the patrol car and stabbed the ofcer. Another ofcer described how he understood the potental for an armed confrontaton as he responded with other ofcers a routne call, but he was stll taken by surprise. He said, “We were dispatched to just a report of shots fred, which happens in our area all the tme. Deputes responded. First deputy arrived and started taking fre and needed additonal units.”

Ofcers should contnue to regularly engage in realistc and efectve training that includes situatonal awareness, weapons training, and mindset.

68 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Engaging ofenders down, and I simultaneously got up, drew on him. Then he looked at me. That’s when he Because of the element of surprise, ofcers indicated looked at me. He was startng to wind up at they were forced to respond and to engage with ofenders me, but he saw that I had the draw on him, so under duress. Eighteen of the 33 ofcers (54.5 percent) he turned his back on me. I actually shot him described their eforts to engage ofenders and defend in the back, the back shoulder blade, and he themselves during the incidents. Of those 18 ofcers, went down. 44.4 percent reported they fought back afer sustaining Unfortunately, the victm ofcer struck with the machete critcal injuries. Fourteen of the 18 ofcers (77.8 percent) sufered serious permanent injuries to his hand, but his described their atempts to arm themselves during the partner prevented the ofender from contnuing the incident. Ofcers artculated various defensive optons atack. they either atempted to use or were successful in using: personal weapons (hands, fst, or feet), less than lethal RECOMMENDATIONS: Taken by surprise optons, and the use of deadly force. In 14 instances and engaging ofenders where an ofcer was able to deploy defensive measures, Ofcers who provided details about being surprised by 3 (21.4 percent) of the ofcers used personal weapons, the atacks and/or how they defended themselves once 1 (7.1 percent) used less than lethal optons, and more they were under atack also discussed recommendatons. than half, 71.4 percent, used frearms. The cases below Common themes that emerged from these ofcers’ illustrate such examples. statements included situatonal awareness, training, An ofcer fghtng to retain control of his service weapon and mindset. stated, “I’m trying to keep [the ofender’s hand] of my • Ofcers should contnue to regularly engage in gun and trying to hit him with my elbow. . . I was using realistc and efectve training that includes situatonal my right elbow to hit his forearms and they weren’t awareness, weapons training, and mindset. budging . . . [with] my right hand, I was hitng him trying to hit him in the head, hit anything.” Maintain Situatonal Awareness. Ofcers who sensed an atack may be coming and those caught unaware One ofcer described being atacked while exitng his both identfed maintaining situatonal awareness as patrol car afer observing a subject throw something at important. In some cases, lack of situatonal awareness his vehicle. He used a side-handle baton to successfully placed the ofcers at a disadvantage and afected their defend himself: ability to successfully arm themselves and engage the When I opened the door, grabbed the baton, ofender. The ofcer who was atacked while in his and went to exit, he was on top of me as I parked vehicle explained it was his practce not to speak was trying to come out of the car. When I to citzens while sitng in his patrol car. On the evening thought he had ran on, he had ducked down he was assaulted, he noted that he was distracted, which in behind my car, and as I was getng out allowed the subject to advance on the ofcer, prevent of the driver’s door, he came from behind him from exitng, and stab him through the window. the car and stabbed me. . . I came up with The ofcer was pinned against the console and was my baton weighted across my arm, and he unable to draw his frearm. This was just one example stabbed me in the arm at that point, and I that demonstrates the need for ofcers to maintain used the baton to force him of so I could fully situatonal awareness at all tmes, remain cognizant of exit the vehicle. their positoning, and have unfetered access to their weapons. Another ofcer described using a frearm to stop a machete-wielding atacker who drew the concealed Weapons Training. Law enforcement agencies identfy machete and struck the ofcer’s unsuspectng partner weapons training as a common area of concern. The in a restaurant. current research, including the discussions about engaging ofenders, only further emphasizes an ofcer’s I saw the victm go down, my partner go need to maintain profciency with all weapons issued

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 69 and available to them. Of 18 ofcers who discussed ers knew that evading law enforcement would be a pos- defending themselves, 14 (77.8 percent) of the ofcers sibility and had at least thought about how to escape, in this study used with a variety of weapons ranging from and in some instances, had taken steps to facilitate personal weapons (hands, fsts, or feet), less than lethal, their escape. Eight (29.6 percent) of the ofenders fed and lethal force. An automatc response developed from on foot, with one ofender hitchhiking. Sixteen ofend- efectve training was also cited as critcal to the ofcers’ ers (59.3 percent) escaped in vehicles. Several of the survival. One ofcer stated, “. . . the only thing that you vehicles were stolen, and one ofender carjacked several can rely on is your training, and that’s what kicks in and vehicles. that’s why it’s so important to fght as you train, and train as you fght. . .” An examinaton of the cases in this study shows that ofenders commonly exhibit determinaton and com- Mindset Training. Ofcers also indicated that training mitment to escaping at all costs. Afer startng to fee a was not only critcal in developing profcient defensive scene on foot or by vehicle, ofenders would not hesi- skill sets but it also signifcantly contributed to develop- tate to use violence against law enforcement or citzens ing a mindset to overcome and win. One ofcer com- if they believed it would improve their odds of escaping mented: and maintaining their freedom.

We do in-house academies in our agency, and Case study: Unplanned escape they have a tendency to make it a very big One ofender, who had murdered for vengeance and point that if the situaton ever comes about expected to die at the hands of police, described his that you should never give up. The way they mindset before the murders. “It was almost a euphoric state it is untl your dying breath you should type of feeling, because . . . you know, this was my day contnue to fght. . . I never once thought to die, and I was happy.” The ofender commited the about giving up, and even when I was shot, murders, walked outside, and ran into a responding of- my mind was to stll bring the fght to him or cer who was surprised by the sudden appearance of the else he’s going to bring it to me. ofender. The ofender shot and killed the ofcer. Afer surviving the encounter, the ofender decided to fee. All three of these topics—situatonal awareness, weap- The ofender explained the moment, “. . . I didn’t have a ons training, and mindset training—are discussed in place in my mind, a plan on where I was going.” other sectons of this chapter, including Awareness, atenton, and distractons; Training; Mental prepara- Although lacking in prior planning and initally hoping to ton; and Will to survive. die in a shootout with police, he switched to a mindset of lethal determinaton to escape. He carjacked several OFFENDER ESCAPE FROM cars at gunpoint. Later, he shot and killed another unsus- AMBUSH/UNPROVOKED ATTACK pectng law enforcement ofcer and stole the ofcer’s personal vehicle before taking a hostage and barricad- Of 27 the ofenders who partcipated in the research, 15 ing himself in the hostage’s apartment. The ofender’s (55.6 percent) escaped the inital ambush or unprovoked hostage escaped and called the police, who responded atack and described their eforts to escape the area and outside the apartment with personnel that included elude capture. This secton provides some of the ofend- snipers. An interviewer asked the ofender, “You see the ers’ descriptons of their escapes from crime scenes afer snipers. You know they have the ability to end your life. assaultng ofcers. Some of the escapes turned deadly, What changed your mind?” The ofender stated, “You and it may be helpful for ofcers to be familiar with what know, maybe I realized that I was scared to die.” could happen and, in the case of these examples, what happened when ofenders fed the scene. Case study: Planned escape Mindset and methods of escape Just as problematc as an ofender actng on emoton and impulse are the ofenders who have planned to Some ofenders did not have a plan, and their escapes escape crime scenes. One ofender admited to having from the crime scenes were reactonary. Other ofend-

70 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS throwaway cars to help facilitate his escape. Another Disposing of evidence afer escaping the ofender explained how he and his associates planned scene to burglarize a gun store and created a detailed escape Of 15 ofenders who said they escaped the inital atack, strategy to avoid arrest: 8 (53.3 percent) reported they atempted to hide or dis- First of, to get into the place, we decided. We pose of evidence. Ofenders stated they hid the weap- were going to a car lot—steal a pickup truck. ons they used in the atacks in wooded areas or holes, We fgured if you steal from a car lot on the or completely buried them to evade detecton. Other weekend that plates aren’t going to come up ofenders stated they threw weapons out of car win- stolen or anything, because car lots always dows, ofen cleaning the weapon frst before disposing have a repair place and a place when the car of it. One ofender said he lost his automatc rife when is done for people to come and pick it back he tripped while running through a wooded area in the up. So we took somebody’s personal truck dark and was unable to locate it. that was fnished being fxed. . . Arrests of ofenders during or afer These ofenders then placed another car in a park with escapes the intent to transfer the stolen weapons, leave the Six (40.0 percent) of the 15 ofenders who were arrested stolen truck, and evade arrest in the car. Afer success- during their escapes were apprehended while trying fully burglarizing the gun store, the ofenders were in to escape on foot. Of the ofenders who successfully the middle of transferring the stolen goods in an empty escaped the immediate vicinity of the scene, 6 (40.0 parking lot when a deputy arrived. The ofender remem- percent) were arrested afer they escaped to a resi- bered the events this way: dence. With the excepton of one case, most ofenders were arrested at residences other than their own. In I’m lying on the ground, on the edge of where some cases, neighbors or family members provided tps the truck is. I just tried to duck out of the way, to law enforcement about the ofenders’ whereabouts, and I didn’t know it was a cop untl he came enabling local law enforcement to surround the homes in . . . it kind of caught me of guard. I didn’t and apprehend the ofenders. In one case, the ofenders know it was going to be a cop, and when he were at their residence and were asked to come to the came and walked around, and I [saw] him, police department for questoning. They were escort- and then it was a split-second reacton. ed by several ofcers and were arrested once inside. Ofenders in 20.0 percent of these cases turned them- The ofender empted a magazine toward the depu- selves in. In two cases, law enforcement ofcers knew ty, who then collapsed. The deputy stll atempted to ofenders were hiding in residences. In one of these defend himself with his weapon, so the ofender ran cases, ofcers waited for the ofender to exit the house, over the deputy with the vehicle. Another subject came enter his car with his family, and start driving. They over, picked up the deputy’s weapon, and fred three moved into positon, blocked the road, executed a trafc more rounds at the deputy’s face. The subjects then stop, and apprehended the ofender without incident. escaped the scene in their car. In the other case, an acquaintance of the ofender coop- Despite all their prior planning, the ofender claimed erated with law enforcement by calling the ofender to the frearms they carried during the burglary were never invite him to meet at a nearby locaton. The ofender part of a plan to be used against police to help them walked out of his house unarmed and was apprehended escape. Even so, these ofenders demonstrated not only without incident. Only one ofender in this study actvely prior planning to escape but the determinaton and resisted arrest. commitment to use extreme violence to avoid being arrested. Following an investgaton, law enforcement coordinated a team of ofcers to outnumber and sur- prise the ofender. He was arrested without incident.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 71 RECOMMENDATIONS: Ofender escape of the ofcers requested backup preceding the atack. from ambush/unprovoked atack, One ofcer who was atacked from behind stated, “I disposing of evidence, and arrests never had a chance to use my radio because it happened so [quickly], but other people were calling 911. . .” • Ofcers should contnue to receive training on sce- narios related to escapes and arrests, as well as being Thirty-fve percent of the ofcers interviewed requested familiar with ways in which ofenders may dispose of backup during the ambushes or unprovoked atacks. evidence. Three ofcers who were securing a crime scene came under fre and immediately radioed their situaton in the An agency’s training likely addresses arrest tactcs and midst of the atack. One of them commented, “I didn’t when to pursue an ofender. This secton concerning know if it was a long rife or a shotgun, but it was def- ofender escapes serves as a reminder of the impor- nitely three loud shots, and immediately I hear Tony yell, tance of such training and provides examples that can ‘Shots fred! Shots fred!’ I again came up on (the) radio increase ofcers’ understanding of these topics. and said, ‘Shots fred! Shots fred!’”

BACKUP OFFICERS Most of the ofcers who requested backup (45.0 per- Ofcers who experienced ambushes or unprovoked cent), did so afer the atacks. One ofcer who was shot atacks called for backup in 60.6 percent of the 33 six tmes radioed immediately afer her atacker started incidents in which they were involved. This secton to fee. She said, “I put out a radio trafc call saying that reviews the use of backup and the responding ofcers’ I had been shot, my locaton, and that I needed . . . medi- actons during these incidents. Ofcers called for cal personnel.” assistance at varying tmes during the course of the assaults. Prior LEOKA research has studied backup Targeted atacks on ofcers in groups requests in relaton to various types of incidents, such As noted before, there were two or more ofcers on as arrest situatons. One conclusion of that research the scene when most of the atacks began and backup was that some ofcers may have been spared critcal ofcers were called to the scene in 60.6 percent of injuries if they had called for backup prior to engaging ofcers’ cases. Having multple ofcers in an area may an ofender. As one would expect, calling for backup can have created a false sense of security for the ofcers, be challenging at the onset of an ambush or unprovoked while also being an appealing scenario for some atack. Although backup ofcers in this study were not a ofenders. Interviews with ofenders made it clear that signifcant factor in preventng the inital assaults, they in some incidents, they were consciously targetng ofen played a role in resolving the incidents. police ofcers—and the more they could kill, the beter. Backup analysis In one incident, several ofcers responded to a shots- An interestng circumstance of the ambushes and fred call from an apartment complex. When ofcers unprovoked atacks examined in the study was the num- arrived on the scene, they did not hear gunfre, and ber of ofcers already in the area prior to the assaults. could not identfy a visible and immediate threat. Twenty (60.6 percent) of the ofcers interviewed stated Because of these observatons, inital responding of- they were on scene with one or more ofcers when the cers proceeded to render frst aid to a victm. Two other atacks began. Many of these circumstances began with ofcers stood nearby and held a conversaton. When the radio calls that typically elicit a multofcer response, last unit arrived to the area, the ofcers were surprised such as shots fred, person threatening with a frearm, to encounter the ofender, who was armed with a semi- or domestc violence complaints where the ofcers automatc rife that fred .308-caliber rounds. A frefght were advised that the suspect had frearms and posed ensued. One ofcer, wounded during the exchange, a threat. shared this observaton:

Because of the element of surprise and the fact that I think we interrupted what he really wanted most victm ofcers were already present with other to do, which was work his way up to where ofcers, it is not surprising that the research found none the other ofcers were. . . There were two

72 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS ofcers up atending to the victm, and there were a couple more ofcers downstairs in front of their car. They’re just hanging out, just waitng on the ambulance to get there. I believe that he [the ofender] was working his way up there to ambush them and take them out.

It was not a lack of backup during an atack that was an issue, but rather the responding ofcer’s lack of situatonal awareness and his deployment when arriving on the scene.

Another ofcer involved in this incident also stated, “When we look back on it, we actually think he came back to the scene to kill as many police ofcers as he could. . .” The ofender in this case was killed by one of his own weapons when it accidentally discharged while he was trying to climb a fence.

In a previously mentoned case, an ambush occurred during a shif change at a metropolitan-area police precinct. A meetng for all precinct ofcers was scheduled, and on-duty ofcers were in a parking lot in their patrol cars fnish- ing reports, while incoming ofcers were walking into the precinct. As one ofcer held a door open for another, the assailant approached from behind them and opened fre on the ofcers, killing one and seriously wounding another. Several of the other ofcers came to investgate the shots, and the ofender was killed in a shootout. Family and friends of the assailant later provided investgatng ofcers with some insight into his mindset in the weeks leading up to the atack:

He [the ofender] had been going around the two weeks prior to that telling his family and telling all of his friends that he was tred of being pushed down, tred of being oppressed, and basically, in general, just sick of white people and ofcers, presidents, and authority bothering him . . . he was going to make something happen, and that everybody needed to just hold on and watch.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 73 Backup units should evaluate the scene and not drive into the line of fre or into the threat.

Situatonal awareness when arriving on the scene A number of the ambushes and unprovoked atacks lasted for extended periods before being resolved. Ofcers inter- viewed for this study discussed arriving on the scene while the situaton was ongoing. In several cases, responding units, either in their rush to assist a fellow ofcer in imminent danger or to prevent fight by the ofender, placed themselves in unsafe situatons which either did, or could have, made a bad situaton worse. One ofcer noted that the “fog of war” played a factor during the incident in which he was involved. Another discussed responders park- ing their vehicles in locatons that blocked the ambulance. Another backup ofcer related the difculty he had in responding to the scene where an ofcer down call had come from an ofcer who had been ambushed:

I was unfamiliar with where we were . . . I’m on the radio trying to fgure out where everybody is . . . ‘Where are you guys?’ They’re trying to explain it to me, and I’m like ‘I stll don’t know where you’re at.’ So I run untl I fnd an ofcer. I ask him, ‘What’s going on?’ ‘Where are we at’? ‘What’s going on here?’ He says, ‘I think it’s this trailer right there.’ So I see the trailer, I’m looking, I’m like, ‘All right, this is not a good spot. There’s a beter positon to get into.’

In another incident, ofcers conductng a trafc stop were atacked without provocaton by ofenders who were not involved in the stop. As rounds began to hit around them in the dark, the ofcers were unable to locate the shooters. One ofcer was hit in the inital barrage of rounds, leaving the other ofcer to identfy where the shots were coming from and to radio for backup. She stated her concern for the backup ofcers when they arrived on the scene:

74 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS So some [ofcers] arrived and got out of the vehicle, and they were in the middle of the intersecton, like right in the middle of the street, and I was scared because I stll didn’t know if the aggressors were stll there in the darkness. Handling injuries, knowledge of frst aid In many cases, the backup ofcers responding to ambush or unprovoked atack calls arrived to fnd ofcers critcally injured and in need of frst aid. Responding ofcers had to move injured ofcers from the line of fre to safe locatons. In one incident, a feld training ofcer was shot from the front porch of a house and collapsed in the middle of the street, stll exposed to gunfre. A rookie ofcer described his efort to retrieve his feld training ofcer and get him to cover:

At that point, I know I’m not going to leave him there by himself, so I run across the street. While I’m doing that, trying to like to back pedal/side step while keeping my gun pointed at the house just in case this guy comes back out. Once I get to my partner, I’m trying to fgure out how I’m going to move him across the street, how am I going to get him to a positon to cover while I have my gun out pointed at the house, all of this is in a mater of a second or two. (I) decided the only way I’m going to be able to move him is if I put my gun away. So I put my gun away and then do a freman carry which is what we learned in the academy. . .

In many cases, the backup ofcers responding to ambush or unprovoked atack calls arrived to fnd ofcers critcally injured and in need of frst aid. Responding ofcers had to move injured ofcers from the line of fre to safe locatons. Ofcers should contnue to train and maintain profciency on frst aid and CPR.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 75 An ofcer who was shot three tmes described the were unable to identfy a threat, ofcers began con- eforts of the backup ofcer to remove him from the ductng law enforcement business and did not maintain ambush scene, “I hear rounds going of behind me, and situatonal awareness. For example, in a case previously my partner picks me up, puts me in her patrol car, and discussed, ofcers arrived at the scene where a violent exits me out of the area.” crime had been commited by a man with a frearm, but they did not locate the ofender there. Three of the In some jurisdictons, emergency medical service (EMS) responding ofcers started hanging police tape to mark personnel cannot come to a downed ofcer’s aid untl the crime scene. In another case, two ofcers started the scene is declared safe. Backup ofcers, in some rendering frst aid to a victm while two other ofcers instances, had to assess an injured ofcer and make were talking nearby. None of the ofcers were paying immediate decisions on what course of acton to take, atenton to their surroundings. In both of these cases, whether to wait for EMS or, if tme was critcal, rush an ofender concealed himself and then atacked while the ofcer to the hospital in their patrol vehicles. Two the ofcers were distracted. ofcers who received gunshot wounds when they were ambushed made it to a safe area and waited for backup. Untl a scene has been declared safe, at least one of- They discussed the responding ofcer’s decision-making cer should remain on guard for a possible atack while process, “They . . . got informaton from us and assessed other ofcers conduct police business. One ofcer rec- some of our injuries, and then waited for EMS to get ommended: there and take us to the hospital.” Let everybody know . . . just [because] you’re Another ofcer, ambushed and shot in the feet, was on a crime scene, doesn’t mean there’s not a unable to walk. He shared that the ofcers arrived before threat there stll, and you’ve got to be ready EMS and provided frst aid, “It’s those burning bullets in for it . . . Don’t get in those litle cliques at my boots that hurt. . . And that’s what I wanted relief these scenes. Know when you’re doing trafc from . . . that trooper came in . . . the ofcer came in the detail or whatever the case may be . . . Don’t other way at about the same tme, and they started cut- make [yourself] an easy target . . . . tng my boot of.” Note: Atacks on groups of multple ofcers seems to be An ambushed ofcer, shot in the head but stll conscious a more common occurrence in recent years, with media noted: coverage of such events increasing, as well. The fndings of this study and the percepton that these incidents are The minute the two ofcers pulled in. . . . I more prevalent provide a ratonale for researchers to just told them which way the person ran, conduct additonal, in-depth studies of the motves of what he was wearing, and I got right into atackers who assault ofcers in groups. the patrol car and headed to the hospital. I knew an ambulance would not come in to a • Backup units should evaluate the scene and not drive shootng scene without clearance if one was into the line of fre or into the threat. en route. I had to have the ofcer, the young ofcer, help me into the hospital. In the situatons described as well as some of the other cases, it was not a lack of backup during an atack that RECOMMENDATIONS: Backup ofcers was an issue, but rather the responding ofcers’ lack of • Regardless of the number of law enforcement in the situatonal awareness and their deployment once arriv- area, ofcers should not lower their guards afer ing on scene. Backup units should be cognizant that they arriving to a scene where a report has been made of a are responding to a dynamic situaton. As one of the of- person with a frearm and/or of shots fred. cers in the study commented, “ . . . everybody is rolling at that point, and we have ofcers showing up to the Even if multple ofcers are on the scene, ofcers should front . . . they are in direct line of fre so we’re trying to take steps to safeguard themselves and mitgate risk. In yell, ‘Hey you guys, get out . . . move of our line of sight several cases where a number of ofcers responded and right there.’”

76 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS • Backup units must ensure they do not block access to just in case they didn’t hear that one, which EMS vehicles. they hadn’t. So, I again tell them I’ve been shot . . . An ofcer who received a gunshot wound discussed the difculty his rescuers had getng him to medical care in An ofcer who had been shot in the head and pinned the midst of a chaotc scene: down by gunfre away from his patrol vehicle had no way to call for backup. The batery for his portable radio died I think they said about 110 [police vehicles] 30 minutes before the critcal encounter, but he did not responded from all over the place before it go to get a fresh batery at that tme. Fortunately, a civil- was over with . . . They loaded me into an ian called 911 and handed the seriously injured ofcer ambulance and a whole bunch of police cruis- the cell phone so he could get help. ers pulled in, so we were stuck. [They] had to unload me and take me a block and a half out In some incidents, ofcers were unable to broadcast to the main street [and] put me in another their calls for backup due to radio trafc, not knowing ambulance . . . their radio functons, or forgetng they even had a por- table device on them. One ofcer remarked, “I remem- • Ofcers should contnue to train and maintain ber trying that a couple of tmes. Press the buton and profciency on frst aid and CPR. there’s a distnct bonking noise that you’re not getng through to anyone . . . I’m waitng for that chirp. . . So, Time and again, backup ofcers were the frst to initate that didn’t work out." lifesaving measures to critcally injured ofcers. One crit- ically injured ofcer expressed his relief when a partcu- Another critcally injured ofcer explained, “One of the lar backup ofcer arrived on scene: “He’s a paramedic deputes on scene was running the license plate over the and a registered nurse and has a lot of medical knowl- radio of a vehicle that he thought was involved in the call edge. He assessed the injuries at that point, and, due . . . it ended up being the perpetrator’s vehicle. But, in to our close proximity to the hospital, we got into his that same instance while he was talking, and I keyed up, vehicle and went to the hospital on our own.” I didn’t transmit. Only he did.” For a more in depth discussion on responding to injuries RECOMMENDATIONS: Communicaton and frst aid, please see the secton on Injuries and medi- Ofcers would never think of startng a tour of duty with- cal treatment in this chapter. out a properly functoning weapon. However, the radio, another life-saving device, either malfunctoned or was COMMUNICATION lef behind during critcal incidents. The recommenda- Some of the ofcers reported equipment issues led to a tons seem obvious, but that is exactly why ofcers may breakdown in communicaton when they were atempt- become complacent about their communicaton tools. ing to call for backup or medical assistance. Unfortunate- ly, a number of their calls did not broadcast in a tmely • Training scenarios should include the use of the radio fashion, resultng in a loss of precious tme. Delays were to ensure ofcers understand its functons. especially troublesome if the ofcer was gravely wound- Law enforcement ofcers routnely train to have auto- ed. One ofcer, having been shot six tmes, spoke of her matc responses in defensive measures and weapons atempts to call for both medical assistance and to let use, yet less emphasis is placed on training ofcers to backup ofcers know the descripton of her atacker: quickly and efciently use their communicaton technol- I’m . . . listening in the background, and I’m ogy during a critcal incident. Trainers should develop not hearing sirens. I’m not hearing radio traf- realistc scenarios for ofcers to practce using radios fc, which afer making a call like that, those under duress in order to form automatc responses. are things you will think you will hear. So, I’m In some cases during the ambushes and unprovoked wondering why . . . I decided to get on my atacks included in this study, a soluton was readily avail- hand-held radio and make another radio call able, but it did not automatcally come to the ofcers’

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 77 minds. For instance, one ofcer was stabbed repeatedly who described being in a house with his weapon drawn, and fghtng for his life. He explained his predicament standing over a fatally wounded police ofcer. He was and how he eventually overcame the challenges he met facing nine highly-agitated individuals and had no idea in calling for backup: who shot the ofcer lying beneath him. He depicted the scene: So I grabbed the mic, because it was next to me and we were fghtng, but I couldn’t get I stood over him, probably my way of trying to through to the radio. This side of the county protect him . . . I described it as people actng is usually busy, so sometmes you [have] to like animals . . . just screaming and hollering, wait for radio trafc untl you get your oppor- no control. They went to prety much scream- tunity to say something . . . I think I remem- ing at me over and over and over, saying that ber trying a couple of tmes . . . I need to hear you shot your own man, over and over. They somebody on this other end so I can scream didn’t seem fearful at all that I was standing for help . . . there with a weapon.

The ofcer contnued to struggle and fred his weapon To call for backup, the ofcer was forced to leave the in self-defense, causing the ofender to fee. The ofcer fatally wounded ofcer alone with the individuals and tried again to radio for help. run out to his car. He stated, “I didn’t have a cell phone on me. I didn’t have a radio on me. I had one issued to I wasn’t successful with the radio, again. It me, there was one in the car.” probably took an extra second or so to really think, ‘Ok, now what? So now what do I do?’ • Ensure ofcers are on the proper channels for their I remember that we have an emergency but- patrol locatons. ton on our radios where…it kills all the feeds to everyone else’s radio, so I was able to do Another problem that can easily be addressed is set- that. I pressed my emergency buton, and tng the radio to the proper channel to reach dispatch- that gave me a direct line to our dispatcher. ers. One ofcer working overtme in a diferent locaton than his normal patrol area was atacked in a parking Time was critcal for this ofcer. Simply depressing the lot while walking to his patrol car at the end of his tour emergency buton at his frst opportunity would have of duty. Afer shootng the ofcer, the ofender fed the expedited the crucial emergency response. area. The ofcer recalled, “So I got my radio, I changed it to the channel for the locaton that I was at. I mean, I Another ofcer, who was shot multple tmes and was worked on the other side of town so my radio was set for unable to walk, forgot he was wearing a portable radio that locaton.” The ofcer hadn’t thought to change the and dragged himself into his patrol car to radio for assis- channel at the beginning of his tour of duty. Fortunately tance. He explained his struggle that day. for him, he had the tme to fnd the appropriate channel and call for assistance. Ofcers may not always have the Well, nobody knows where I’m at. So, I tried tme to search for the correct channel during an atack. to stand up and I couldn’t. Well I’ll crawl over, and I’ll crawl up in the car and get a hold of the radio. I’ll call for help. Tunnel vision. I’m INJURIES AND MEDICAL wearing a portable radio. Never crossed my TREATMENT mind untl I couldn’t get in the car. I was so physically drained I couldn’t get in the car. Analysis of injuries sustained Of the ofcers interviewed, 22 received serious to life- • Ensure ofcers have radios. threatening injuries. Of those, 19 (86.4 percent) were injured by an ofender using a frearm, and 3 (13.6 per- As simple as this sounds, in several cases, ofcers did not cent) were injured by a knife or other cutng instrument. have this life-saving piece of equipment with them to Of the 86.4 percent of the ofcers injured by frearms, call for backup. An example was provided by an ofcer 7 (36.8 percent) of the weapons used were handguns,

78 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 5 (26.3 percent) were rifes, and 4 (21.0 percent) were that I’ve been able to describe it, it was like shotguns. This informaton is supported by the annual someone took a hot steel rod iron and put it data collected by the LEOKA Program, which shows 92.0 right through my entre chest area. It was so percent of ofcers were killed by frearms in the most hot. The heat was unbelievable. recent 10-year period. For some ofcers, the injuries rendered them somewhat When asked to describe their degree of pain or how immobile, unable to efectvely use their legs, yet able their injuries impacted their mobility, victm ofcers in to stay composed and remain in the fght. One ofcer this study provided varied responses. Previous LEOKA experienced this when he located a vehicle that had research studied the efects of pain and described the eluded him minutes earlier. The vehicle was sitng in pain sensaton as a complicated neurological and psy- the middle of the roadway, and the ofcer recognized an chological experience that may vary from person to immediate concern—the driver’s side door was slightly person. Persons with the same or similar injuries may open. Before the ofcer could get out of his vehicle, the experience pain diferently (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, ofender had exited his own vehicle and fred several 2006). In this study, the pain described by some ofcers rounds as he advanced on the ofcer, striking him fve seemed to depend on the type of frearm with which tmes. they were shot. For example, some ofcers shot with a handgun or rife described the pain as “hot” or “heat” as When I bailed out of the car, [the] frst round if they were stabbed with a hot steel rod or hot poker. As hit me just below the right knee. I knew I had one ofcer, shot in the leg with a .22-caliber rife, said, been hit. It stung a litle bit. It never knocked “I could see the blood bubbling up through my uniform me down, [I] never missed a step. I was try- pants, and it felt like you were on fre. Like you were ing to get out past the door. Second one hit being stabbed with a hot poker . . . just hot, extreme me just above the boot on the right leg. Third heat.” one hit me center mass, knocked me on my a--. I’ve never been hit so hard . . . Shot me For some ofcers, the pain was not immediate or felt at through the botom of the right foot, right in all. Some reported not feeling pain untl their adrenaline the center. Shot my big toe of on my lef foot. decreased. A delayed feeling of pain occurred for one Those are the ones that hurt. ofcer who was shot three tmes with a .45-caliber hand- gun. The frst round struck him in the stomach area but In another incident, an ofcer exited his patrol vehicle was stopped by his sof body armor. The second round and was hit three tmes with .308-caliber rounds fred entered between the vest panels into his rib cage and from a semiautomatc rife. One round hit the ofcer in exited out his back. As the ofcer spun around, the third the upper thigh area (just below the holster), striking round struck him in the back, actually entering the exit him in the femur. Another round hit behind the holster, wound caused from the second round. Here, the ofcer while the third round struck him in the calf. The ofcer describes the experience and the onset of his pain. described how being struck by the frst round afected his mobility. It wasn’t untl afer I got to the hospital and the investgaton that they found out that I That frst round . . . it just felt like somebody had been shot three tmes. But at frst it was hit me with a baseball bat and blasted me up just the wind was knocked out of me. I knew against the car. That’s how intense it was of a right away that I was shot but you know, the shock to my body and . . . I thought maybe my wind, I couldn’t catch my breath. And then I car door slammed on me, you know, that’s my knew I had to get out of there . . . When I got inital thought . . . I couldn’t hold myself up out of there and got picked up, then it kicked anymore, and that’s when I fell to the ground. in. You know, I’m to safety and now I need to How the ofcers in the current study experienced trau- fnd out how bad I’m hit. Then that’s when matc injury to their bodies varied, but their experiences the pain started coming in. It wasn’t so much provide insight into how individuals may experience pain like pain, but it was heat and the best way

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 79 diferently. The descriptons of the impact and pain are experience as an Army medic. His partner ofcer, who helpful for ofcers who have not experienced gunshot had no medical training, was unable to communicate wounds to understand the variatons. Ofcers can antci- the extent of his wound. The medic ofcer was able to pate the pain and mentally prepare to fght through it. self-administer frst aid and said this of their ordeal:

Medical treatment I was on my back and my partner, I could tell, Several ofcers in this study mentoned their concern was . . . having some difculty breathing. So I about having life-saving medical treatment provided thought maybe he took a round to the lungs. immediately afer receiving a critcal injury. Ofcers As it turns out, he had been shot through the faced diferent degrees of injuries and had various fac- leg [and] that separated his femoral artery, tors to consider, such as severity of injury, medical per- so he was losing a lot of blood. Due to the sonnel response tme, and their proximity to an area extent of our injuries, we, neither one of us, where the threat was stll imminent. The victm ofcer, if were really capable of providing frst aid to possible, or assistng ofcers evaluated the situaton and the other. So at that point, I always carried an determined the necessary steps to increase the chances aid bag on my leg, so I just tried to administer of survival. Possible responses included waitng for an what litle frst aid I could to myself . . . I knew ambulance to arrive, transportng the injured ofcer by from my past medical experience that most a police vehicle to a nearby ambulance or medical facil- of my injuries were prety much internal at ity, self-administered frst aid, or frst aid administered the tme. by assistng ofcers. RECOMMENDATIONS: Injuries and medical Of ofcers interviewed for this study, more than half treatment reported they received their frst form of medical care • Law enforcement training staf must take a proactve from ambulance personnel. The second leading acton approach by evaluatng their training program and regarding medical care was when assistng ofcers trans- including comprehensive frst aid training (including ported the injured ofcer by police vehicle either to self-administered frst aid) in their curriculum. remove them from the area where the threat was stll Agencies and training academies should incorporate frst imminent to meet an ambulance, or to transport them aid training with new ofcers, civilian staf, and annual to the nearest medical facility. In three cases, injured in-service training to veteran ofcers. Not only should ofcers used self-administered direct pressure to control ofcers know how to provide emergency medical care their bleeding. In one of those three cases, the injured to an injured ofcer, but they should also be trained on ofcer reported he was also treated with frst aid by an self-administered frst aid. Receiving immediate frst aid assistng ofcer who instructed him to apply pressure to could increase the changes of a gravely injured ofcer’s the wound on his arm. survival. While frst aid from emergency medical person- Self-administered frst aid proved crucial in situatons nel is ideal, in cases where medically trained personnel where ofcers were injured in the line of duty and did are not available, ofcers themselves can provide treat- not have immediate medical assistance available to ment. them. One of the ofcers who self-administered frst aid The medic ofcer who was on a stakeout and shot in reported his injuries occurred while he and his partner the abdomen demonstrated the importance of medical were on a stakeout seeking a wanted fugitve. The of- training while discussing his atempt to prevent him- cers were positoned in a wooded area surrounding the self from going into shock. When ofcers are critcally residence of the fugitve’s wife. Near the end of their injured with a frearm or cutng instrument, the loss of watch, the fugitve moved to a locaton behind the of- blood could lead to a conditon known as hypovolemic cers and began fring on them with a rife. One ofcer shock. If not recognized and treated quickly, hypovole- was shot in the abdomen, while the other ofcer was mic shock could lead to death. The ofcer provided this shot in the leg. The ofcer with the abdominal wound advice for others who are critcally injured and experi- was the team medic—he had a nursing degree and encing signs of shock:

80 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS You can loosen any restrictve clothing; elevate your legs, which I did. I actually bent my knees to relieve some of the pressure on my abdomen at the tme. Try to control your breathing . . . controlling the bleeding too . . . keeping the patent warm . . . But frst and foremost is controlling the bleeding, obviously.

• Ofcer training should specifcally include hemorrhage- control procedures.

Knowing how to properly control bleeding through the use of a tourniquet or direct pressure could potentally save a life. Physicians afliated with the American The American College of Surgeons recommends that tourniquets be College of Surgeons (ACS) led a available to every law enforcement ofcer. commitee that brought together trauma surgeons with law enforcement and other relevant frst responders and health professionals. The commitee, known as the Joint Commitee to Create a Natonal Policy to Enhance Survivability from Intentonal Mass Casualty and Shootng Events, discussed strategies and made recommendatons to address injuries involving life-threatening blood loss. While the overall discussion centered on injuries from mass-casualty shootngs, the practces suggested by the commitee are relevant to any atack resultng in such wounds.

The ACS commitee used the acronym THREAT to describe necessary steps to respond to actve shooters and the resultng trauma.

• Threat suppression • Hemorrhage control • Rapid Extricaton to safety • Assessment by medical providers • Transport to defnitve care (Jacobs, L.M. et. al., 2015).

In additon, the ACS commitee made recommendatons specifcally for law enforcement to assist them in evaluatng their atenton to hemorrhage control interventons. These recommendatons are:

• Identfy appropriate external hemorrhage control training for law enforcement ofcers. • Ensure appropriate equipment, such as tourniquets and hemostatc dressings, is available to every law enforce- ment ofcer. • Ensure assessment and triage of victms with possible internal hemorrhage for immediate evacuaton to a dedi- cated trauma hospital. • Train all law enforcement ofcers to assist EMS/fre/rescue in the evacuaton of the injured (Joint Commitee to Create a Natonal Policy to Enhance Survivability from Mass-Casualty Shootng Events, 2013).

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 81 The ACS commitee and its fndings are just one resource personal space or a safety zone, making one’s weapon available to law enforcement agencies to address frst less accessible, looking for preassault indicators, aid for ofcers who are victms of shootngs or stabbings recognizing environmental traps, and assessing who and are hemorrhaging. holds the tactcal advantage. Afer having survived their encounters, most of the study ofcers expressed the • Training should reinforce that ofcers can receive a value of having a plan and stressed the importance of serious injury and stll contnue to fght. proactvely considering “what-ifs.” Fifeen (45.5 percent) of the ofcers had formulated a plan of acton prior to Several ofcers in this study received serious to life- their atacks; 13 (39.4 percent) had no plan going into threatening injuries, yet they were able to fght through their encounter; and 5 (15.2 percent) reported their the situaton and survive. Understanding how these assaults occurred without any contact or warning, ofcers were impacted by their injuries yet able to fght making formulaton of a plan irrelevant. One of the through their ordeal could be benefcial to law enforce- ofcers reported he had previously considered the exact ment training. A will-to-win mentality combined with event that occurred to him—being atacked while in his profcient training increase an ofcer’s chances of sur- patrol unit: viving an atack. As one ofcer asserted, “I believe train- ing kicked in, and instnct, the will to survive, kicked in I spend a lot of tme when I’m on patrol run- and helped me through it.” ning scenarios in my head . . . ‘What would I do if this would happen? What would I do See the secton on Will to win for further informaton. if that would happen?’—mentally preparing • Ensure ofcers have the appropriate frst-aid for things. I had mentally prepared myself for equipment. someone atacking me before I got out of my car a half a dozen tmes before it happened. As mentoned in the ACS commitee’s recommendatons about hemorrhage control, ofcers should have proper Pause buton/slow down medical equipment available to them. Equipment such Six (18.2 percent) ofcers reported that “hitng the as medical bags containing pressure bandages, safe and pause buton” or slowing down a response is another efectve hemostatc dressings, efectve tourniquets, strategy to consider. Some training encourages of- and personal protectve gloves should be issued to of- cers to press a threat and take the fght to an ofender cers to carry with them at all tmes. Immediate access when the safest opton might actually be containment to a medical bag with the equipment needed for quick untl additonal resources arrive. One of the ofcers in emergency medical care greatly improves the injured this study commented, “Slow down when you’re going ofcer’s chance of survival. to these things. Make sure you [have] a litle bit of a plan together.” It is important to menton not all cases MENTAL PREPARATION ft this profle, most notably in the case of an actve Twenty-one (63.6 percent) of the ofcers in this study shooter. In such a scenario, tme for strategy and plan- specifcally discussed the value of mentally preparing ning may not be an opton and immediate mitgaton is for ambushes or unprovoked atacks, both as a general necessary. However, when the situaton permits, ofcers practce, as well as in the moments before an incident should take advantage of the tme and pause to consider appears imminent, when possible. Many of the thoughts optons, resources, and strategies. and suggestons they covered on this topic overlap and RECOMMENDATIONS: Mental Preparaton complement informaton covered in other sectons, such as Ambush cognitons, Will to win, and Training. • Agencies should consider adding to or contnuing their training repertoire as it relates to mental preparaton Prior planning and preplanning.

A plan can be anything an ofcer has in place to minimize Any tme an ofcer is readily identfable as a member risk and raise awareness. Examples include maintaining of law enforcement, the threat of an ambush or unpro-

82 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS voked atack exists. Whether an ofcer is in uniform or Time is of the essence in an assault, and the quicker in casual clothes, wearing clothing with police logos, ofcers can react to a surprise atack, the beter their on-duty or of-duty, the threat exists. Research suggests chances are of surviving the encounter. Practce and there are nearly always actons ofcers can take to bet- repetton help develop muscle memory or automatcity, ter protect themselves against an atack, and ofcers thus making necessary actons into automatc paterns should expect the unexpected. Expect it and plan ahead or habits. Automatcity enables an individual to per- to act, both proactvely and reactvely: form tasks without occupying the mind with low-level details, which minimizes the delay between recogniton • Preplanning using what-if scenarios, maintaining and reacton (Nugent, 2013). More informaton about situatonal awareness at all tmes by making obser- muscle memory/automatcity is included in the Training vatons and, when possible, recognizing indicatons secton later in this chapter. that an assault is imminent, actng decisively to avoid injury, taking control, and possibly prevent- Will to win and Mental preparaton work hand-in-hand, ing an atack from occurring altogether. and putng both in acton at the same tme considerably • Reactng to quickly minimize the efects of an increases the chances of winning or surviving an atack. unforeseen atack, to the point of taking eva- Both are discussed further in the Will to survive secton sive actons and employing countermeasures to of this chapter. increase the chances of survival. WILL TO SURVIVE It is important to note several ofcers who were inter- Most of the ofcers interviewed mentoned the will-to- viewed reported there was nothing they could have done survive mindset, which is touched on in several sectons to recognize an atack was imminent or prevent their of this chapter. Ofcers who received some form of will- encounter. These atacks occurred for the most part, to-survive training considered it vitally important. Nine- without any contact or engagement with an ofender, teen ofcers (57.6 percent) atributed their personal and at a tme and place where the ofcers least expect- survival to the will-to-survive mentality— constant focus ed it. In some cases, such conditons may have been the on positve thoughts during atacks. Prior to the atacks, very reasons the ofenders chose those partcular tmes most ofcers had partcipated in mindset training either and places to launch atacks. from past military service or from police training. How- • Develop training scenarios where ofcers recog- ever, a few ofcers, with no prior formalized training, nize tmes in which pausing or slowing down would reported they also used a winning mindset to endure enhance ofcer safety when facing a life-threatening the ambush or unprovoked atack and to survive. atack. One of the ofcers who was shot twice during an Sometmes an immediate response or rushing into a ambush said his thought at the tme was, “For the love situaton is not the best course of acton. Ofcers par- of God, just fght!” This statement characterized many of tcipatng in the study suggested a delayed response the responses ofered by ofcers who found themselves provides an ofcer with more opportunites to consider under atack and engaged in fghtng for their lives. additonal optons and strategies. One ofcer stated, “. Ofcers in the current study who discussed the will-to- . . maybe telling guys that if you’re going to a gun call, survive mindset provided descriptons of their thoughts slow it down a bit. Don’t become one of the people that during and afer the ambushes and unprovoked atacks, need to be saved by trying to go in there and save every- as well as their preparaton and mindset prior to the body. Just kind of hang on a second.” Ofcers suggested assaults. backup as another strategy. See the Backup ofcers sec- During the assault ton in this chapter. As indicated earlier, the key component of an ambush • Ofcers should train for essental behaviors to become or an unprovoked atack is the element of surprise. Of- automatc. cers are suddenly forced to fght for their lives, requir- ing their thoughts and attudes to instantly shif to their

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 83 survival. One ofcer said he had parked his patrol car Ofensive mindset. Ofcers, afer quickly recover- in a convenience store parking lot and was taking care ing from the inital shock of being atacked, described of administratve maters. He was suddenly atacked by switching from an immediate defensive mindset to an ofender who repeatedly stabbed him through the an ofensive mindset. One ofcer who was injured in car window. The ofcer was pinned against the console the arm and face by birdshot from a shotgun, initally and was unable to draw his frearm. He described his retreated to cover. He stated, “I realized that I had to thoughts during the atack: do something ofensive here, rather than just defen- sive.” The ofcer who was stabbed through the window I was thinking defnitely self-preservaton of his patrol car realized the ofender was atemptng was a big thing for me, survival. I recognized to disarm him. Afer a struggle for his service weapon, the disadvantage I was in. As I alluded to the ofcer was able to gain control, draw the weapon, earlier, with him [the ofender] having the and fre several rounds while seated in the vehicle. The advantage, it was just survival to me at that ofcer’s shots missed, and the ofender immediately point. I wasn’t really concerned about any- retreated and fed on foot. As the ofender was feeing, thing else other than ‘I need to make it out of the ofcer exited his patrol car and his mindset changed here alive.’ That’s prety much what kept me to taking the ofensive, “It’s like, you took the fght to going. ‘I don’t want to die right now. I don’t me, and now I’m taking the fght to you.” The ofcer, want to die here.’ My mindset was . . . ‘Ok, critcally injured, wisely fought his instnct to engage I’m in a fght right now, and I’m going to win in a foot pursuit alone and decided to call for backup. this fght.’ Other resources in the area arrived quickly. Even though he called backup and waited for assistance, the ofcer Defensive mindset. Thrust immediately into a fght, felt that had he followed his inital thought to pursue some ofcers described their frst will-to-survive and catch up to the subject, he would have survived. thoughts as defensive in nature. One ofcer collapsed He commented, “. . . no doubt in my mind I would have to the ground afer being shot in the protectve vest and won. I know I would have won. Good guys always win, I both legs while exitng his vehicle during a trafc stop. He believe in that. . .” was unable to stand, but he drew his weapon and start- ed to defend himself. He stated, “The fght wasn’t over. In another case, a deputy was fred upon when respond- The fght was defnitely not over. And I never thought ing as backup to a call at an RV park. When the on-scene it would be. It never crossed my mind that I wasn’t deputy called for backup, he advised incoming units that going to win.” Another ofcer, exitng his vehicle near the ofender was stll in the RV. The backup deputy was a neighborhood party, was atacked from behind by an working his way to the side of the RV to avoid a crossfre ofender who had concealed himself behind the ofcer’s when he was shot twice by the ofender, who had lef patrol car. The ofender used a mole trap to stab the of- the RV and was hidden behind some rocks. The deputy’s cer. (A mole trap has numerous sharp blades meant to ballistc vest stopped a round in the stomach area but impale moles caught in the trap.) The ofcer noted there another round penetrated the vest’s panels and entered were many citzens in the surrounding area and did not his lef rib cage area. The deputy fell down a steep hill atempt to use his service weapon for fear of harming but mentally prepared for batle. “I was posted backup a bystander. The ofcer explained how he immediately directly toward him. I immediately thought in my mind . defended himself with a side-handle baton—the ensu- . . my main thought was that he was going to come fnish ing fght went through several neighborhood yards. The me. So I immediately discharged my service frearm fr- struggle ended when backup arrived to help subdue the ing three rounds back at him.” The deputy artculated his ofender. The ofcer shared his positve thought process, ofensive mindset, “I never once thought about giving “I never quit fghtng. I never let it enter my mind that I up, and even when I was shot, my mind was to stll bring was hurt or I was done. I was going to win, and I never the fght to him or else he’s going to bring it to me.” stopped moving forward. Just always move forward and atack. Don’t give up.”

84 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Post assault/fghtng through injuries That’s where the training part kicked in, The study Violent Encounters (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, because I remembered both in the military 2006) noted that many law enforcement partcipants and in training in law enforcement that if you who had received life-threatening injuries were deter- get shot, you can’t feed into that. You have mined not to succumb to their wounds. According to to remember that you can fght through an the study’s fndings, once the atacks were over and the injury, and just because you’re shot doesn’t immediate threat was gone, ofcers who received life- mean you’re going to die. If you believe you’re threatening injuries, either real or perceived at the tme, going die, then guess what, you’re going to said their will-to-survive mindset training allowed them die . . . once I checked and assessed, I was to mentally contend with their wounds and survive. The back in the fght. research in this study supports those fndings. A fnal example that epitomizes the determinaton to Among ofcers interviewed in this study, those who had survive injuries involved a deputy responding to a call of either received or believed they had received a poten- domestc violence. A man under the infuence of drugs tally life-threatening injury said their resolute deter- demanded his family members give him the keys to the minaton to survive their injuries —whether imparted car so he could purchase crack cocaine. When the family through training or developed through personal prepa- declined, the man grabbed a frearm and started shoot- raton—directly afected their ability to overcome their ing the foor in the house. His mother called 911 and situatons. The ofcer who was shot twice with buckshot requested help. by a shotgun-wielding subject ofered this refecton: The supervisory deputy responding to the call was I remember a lot of instances went through unsure of the exact locaton of the residence because of my head during that tme frame of videos I some confusion concerning the address. As the deputy had watched of ofcers [who] succumbed to got closer to the proximity of the home, he came across injuries that maybe they shouldn’t have suc- a car stopped in the middle of the road for no appar- cumbed to . . . because of, I don’t know if I ent reason. The deputy pulled up next to the vehicle want to say giving up, but . . . I did not want and asked the driver if everything was OK and why she to be that person. So I told myself, ‘You’re not stopped in the middle of the road. The driver stated that laying down. You’re not going to your knees. a girl who had just ran out of a residence and up over You’re not giving up.’ I stayed on my feet untl the hill appeared to be covered in blood. The deputy one of the sergeants that was working arrived notfed dispatch he had arrived on scene and exited his on scene. At that point . . . I reluctantly gave vehicle. As he was gathering further informaton from up [my] weapon to him, but that’s when the driver, the ofender appeared from the back exterior essentally I collapsed . . . the point when he corner of the house and opened fre on the deputy. was there. But I wasn’t willing to give up, and The deputy immediately told the driver and her son you can’t be willing to give up because if you to go. He took cover and was pinned down behind his give up you’ll die. And just because you’re patrol vehicle with no cover on either side and no way to shot, you’re not dead. retrieve his shotgun or rife from the back of his vehicle Another ofcer, shot in the leg stated, “I look down at without exposing himself to further fre. Concerned his my leg, and I mean it was like crimson. My boot flled up vehicle could be disabled by additonal shootng from with blood so fast, and I’m like, ‘God, I hope I didn’t hit the ofender, the deputy decided to get back into his an artery, because it’s flling up with blood fast.’” When patrol vehicle and exit the immediate area for a safer asked how long it was before he knew he had been shot locaton. during the frefght, the ofcer stated, “Immediately.” So I went ahead and leaned back a litle bit, The ofcer shared why training in the will-to-survive and I opened my door and I laid my hand- mindset was a critcal factor for him afer being injured. gun on my seat, and I jumped in and I leaned

over like this. I reached down, and I put [the

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 85 patrol vehicle] in drive and I foored it . . . it provide periodic locaton checks while en route. “. . . I’m just seemed like the whole side of my [vehi- telling dispatch where I’m at and what I’m doing . . . just cle] exploded. Glass few in. I could hear him in case I pass out. I don’t know what’s going to happen at shootng, and then in my right eye, I saw a that point. I don’t know if I’m going to lose blood or pass fash of red and black, and then I went blind out, whatever. I just kind of wanted them to know where in my right eye . . . at that point, I realized I’d to fnd me.” The deputy made it to the frehouse where been shot . . . I put my hand up to my eye he was treated for his injuries. He stated his prior mili- socket and blood was pouring out, and I could tary mindset training helped him focus even though he feel everything. There was stuf hanging was critcally injured, “As long as you’re breathing, you down and I’m like, ‘Oh, man.’ So I didn’t know don’t stop. You keep coming and coming and coming, where I had taken the shot in the head, I just and you don’t stop.” In spite of his injuries, the deputy knew that I was shot in the head somewhere. refused to give up. “. . . I’m also thinking, ‘Hey, I’ve got to survive’. . . Let me put it this way, I didn’t think I was The deputy realized the quickest and closest emergen- going to die, but if I did, my a-- was going out fghtng cy medical assistance was back in the directon of the trying to get to help or get out of there.” ofender’s residence within 5 or 6 miles. If he contnued going in his current directon away from the ofender, Ofcers’ mindsets before the assault medical assistance was 10 or 15 miles away. The deputy As reported previously, 57.6 percent of the ofcers dis- briefy considered staying where he was and waitng cussed the importance of having a positve mindset to for EMS to get to him. He quickly realized the closest push themselves through the assault itself and the tme EMS would not be allowed to drive to him through an immediately following. Many ofcers reported they unsecure scene. Choking on his own blood, the deputy developed their proactve thinking and will-to-survive came to the conclusion that the most expedient way to mindset during agency trainings and individual personal get to emergency medical treatment was to drive back preparaton, such as running through scenarios and tac- past the ofender’s residence again exposing himself to tcs in their minds. Because of the ofcers’ comments, potental fre. The deputy stated: which support ideas explored in other LEOKA studies, the following recommendatons are some of the most So I started spitng blood out. I went ahead important ones provided in this study. and set the mic down there (in his lap), and I jammed the palm of my hand in my eye sock- RECOMMENDATIONS: Will to Survive et, and I had to shif with my other hand . . . I’m going to have to go back by that house. • If they do not already provide it, agencies should So if he lights me up again, I’m just going to ofer a will-to-survive course in the context of have to deal with it. So I foored it—went fy- surviving critcal injuries. ing back by the house and did not see him. About will-to-win training, one ofcer said, “I remember The deputy contacted dispatch and provided a descrip- seeing a video . . . during the academy. I believe it was ton of the ofender. He then orchestrated his own emer- [there], or one of the trainings we had. [During the inci- gency response by informing dispatch which frehouse dent] I saw [the video] fash through my head . . .” This he was driving to and instructed the squad personnel statement exemplifes most of the ofcers’ comments to meet him there. “What I would do was occasional- regarding their recall of survival mindset training during ly while driving, I’d stop and take a deep breath, and I an atack. One ofcer, shot during an unprovoked atack, would blow the blood out of my mouth, pick the micro- also credited his agency for the training he had received. phone up and talk, and say, ‘Hey, this is what I’m doing . . . ’” Although critcally injured, the deputy was the That is something that was instlled in us in supervisor that evening and he shifed his focus from his the police academy and, even more so, being injuries to coordinatng his backup units and setng up a on the department. I mean all the training perimeter. Afer completng this, the deputy wasn’t sure we go through, whether it is arrest control or if he would make it to the frehouse, so he decided to whether we fght the RedManTM [in training

86 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS gear], or whatever it is, our training instructor LEOKA Program developed the Take A.I.M. (Awareness, is always, ‘Don’t give up. Whatever you do, Image, and Mindset) safety resource following the Vio- do not give up. Get up and fght through it. lent Encounters study (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 2006). Or, if it hurts, you know, mind over mater.’ Take A.I.M. is a guide for ofcers that includes short statements such as, “I will refuse to quit—no mater When provided a list of various law enforcement train- what.” The fyer includes thoughts that can assist of- ing actvites and asked which one benefted him most, cers to mentally prepare to handle and survive a per- one ofcer responded, “Survival—the will to survive.” ilous encounter. The Take A.I.M. poster is included in The ofcer went on to explain how mindset training con- Appendix B. Ofcers are encouraged to read and con- nected all the law enforcement training he had received. sider these safety reminders before their tour of duty, “Will to win, will to survive. Because when you take that, several tmes during a tour, or whenever tme permits. along with your muscle memory, you are doing anything you can, even if you are going to get out there and fght TRAINING with a stck, you are just not going to lay down.” Ofcers train to be prepared for encounters like the • Ofcers should perform mental preparaton exercises ambushes and unprovoked atacks detailed in this study. on their own. Violent Encounters (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 2006) pre- sented a discussion on the importance of preparaton. Ofcers can build a foundaton for a survival mindset Its authors explained, “Training ofen determines which with mental exercises. One ofcer noted the importance persons survive and which ones sufer injury or death.” It of developing his personal mindset. was in this context that partcipants in the current study were asked the relevance of their training leading up to I had been taught in an ofcer survival train- each incident. More than half of the ofcers interviewed ing class . . . to do the mental preparedness (54.5 percent), stressed the importance of training. It is while you’re driving around. You know, take reasonable to suggest the remaining ofcers believed the tme to think about diferent scenarios strongly in the concept of training as well. However, the and how you would react. I had taken that study’s statstcs only refect the ofcers who specifcally training to heart and had been doing it, and mentoned its importance during their interviews. I think it really helped when this incident occurred. Training Analysis Another example of this mental preparaton process Most training involves studying incidents from the past, involved an ofcer who was unexpectedly shot several learning from mistakes or positve actons, and imple- tmes from behind. The ofcer explained how he had mentng best practces into current training curriculum. previously mentally prepared to be shot and planned Sometmes a training course on a partcular subject how he was going to survive. exists, but because a law enforcement organizaton has not faced the specifc situaton, the topic is not included You always try to put yourself in that situa- in the agency’s training plan. In other cases, a complete- ton saying, you know, ‘What if? What if I get ly new scenario occurs that is worthy of addressing with shot at? What if I get hit? I mean, what am I training. One ofcer in the study discussed training con- going to do? What is it going to feel like? Am cerns in this way: I going to be able to fght my way through it? Am I going to be able to get up and get cover I’ve always enjoyed training, but, [the atack] if need be, or get up and take some type of opens up the foor to where maybe we need acton?’ I have always told myself, ‘OK, when- to expand training and think of . . . beter ever I get shot, it is going to hurt like hell, but ways to do things, or more things to think of you are going to be able to handle it.’ while we’re out there. At least so we have it

Because personal mindset and will-to-survive tech- niques are such integral factors in surviving atacks, the

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 87 Self-Defense was cited as a key training for survival.

on our mind that this could happen, [or] this Afer shootng both ofcers, the ofender ran into the lot could happen. And the only way you know where he had parked the truck. The ofender was pur- that is by getng informaton from other sued by other ofcers who engaged him in a frefght. agencies where it has happened. You know, Although the ofender was struck numerous tmes, he you can’t say ‘that’ll never happen.’ Well, it did not quit returning fre right away. According to the has happened. surviving ofcer, some of the gunfre was exchanged at a distance of 75 feet. The ofender eventually collapsed In the cases studied, some of the ofcers discussed the and died. changes made to training and other practces following an ambush or unprovoked atack. An example is the inci- Afer a critcal analysis of the case by the agency involved, dent in which two ofcers were ambushed from behind they concluded that their training standards should be by a lone gunman as they walked toward their police sta- enhanced. The agency changed their frearms train- ton at the beginning of their shifs. The ofcers did not ing by increasing the distance from 50 feet to 75 feet. have their radios, which were in the staton. One ofcer They also replaced their ammuniton with a more robust was killed, and the other ofcer sufered critcal injuries. round and purchased and issued all ofcers take-home Before the shootng, the ofender parked a stolen truck radios. Eventually, the agency moved their police facility in a lot that was shared by the police department, other to a secure locaton several miles away where they could government service agencies, and several businesses. maintain complete control of access to the site.

88 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS RECOMMENDATIONS: Training ing rounds. This caused the ofender to change course and fee into the woods. Although 5 (15.2 percent) of the law enforcement par- tcipants felt that no training could have prevented the Another ofcer, who sufered a shotgun blast to the leg, outcome of their atacks, most partcipants cited spe- atributed his survival to his training as he talked about cifc training topics that directly contributed to the sur- how quickly he realized he was injured: vival of their atacks. The ofcers were asked, “What course of training, if any, helped most in surviving this Immediately. But again, that’s where the assault?” Specifc training categories were provided to training part kicked in, because I remem- all study partcipants. Sixteen (48.5 percent) of the of- bered both in the military and in training and cers responded. The top responses included: First aid in law enforcement that if you get shot you training, Street survival training—will to survive, Self- can’t feed into that. You have to remember defense, Firearms training, Communicaton, Preplanning that you can fght through an injury, and just (What ifs), Self-body drag, and Muscle memory. because you’re shot doesn’t mean you’re going to die. First aid training Ofcers cited frst aid as a critcal factor for ofcer sur- Self-defense vival. See the Injuries and medical treatment secton of Self-defense was also cited as a key training for survival. this chapter for more informaton. One ofcer believed self-defense training with a tact- cal baton was the reason he survived his encounter. The Street survival training/will to survive ofcer stopped in an area to monitor neighborhood Of the 16 ofcers who responded to the questons about actvites. While he was seated in his patrol vehicle, training, 12 ofcers (75.0 percent) reported that street an ofender approached the ofcer from the rear and survival training, or will to survive, helped considerably atacked him with a razor-edged mole trap. The ofcer in their encounters. Ofcers credited the training for giv- was able to draw his tactcal baton and use it as a block- ing them a mental advantage over their atackers. The ing tool to keep from sustaining critcal injuries. ability to react quickly to a perceived threat, not giving up, fghtng through pain, and taking the fght to the Firearms training ofender were all seen as valuable tools. In one of the Ofcers also noted that frearms training was critcal for cases under study, an ofcer who was shot and critcally surviving assaults. One ofcer credited his agency for injured spoke of the need to quickly recognize and react teaching ofcers to shoot on the move and from vari- to a situaton. ous positons and angles. He reported the practce had instlled confdence in his ability to neutralize a threat. Having a strong mind, like I said, I told myself my brain was thinking and I had to make my Another example of successful use of frearms occurred body do it. I had to get out of there and get when an ofcer, along with a partner, responded to to an ambulance. ‘I need to get home and an apartment complex for a report of a shootng. The see my kids. I’m not dying today, not like this. ofcers arrived on scene behind several other ofcers Now we need to make that happen.’ and assumed they were there to locate and protect a crime scene. As they exited their patrol vehicle, the of- One ofcer credited his survival to a will-to-survive video cers were immediately fred upon, and one ofcer was he watched during training. In the video, an ofender struck several tmes and collapsed. The uninjured ofcer stalked and shot an ofcer who was sitng in a patrol recalled how quickly his prior frearms training kicked in, vehicle. The ofcer’s real-life experience was eerily simi- “As soon as I saw the muzzle fash, it just went quiet for lar to the training video. The ofcer observed the armed me. It just happened so quickly; rounds are fred, I hit ofender walk alongside a patrol vehicle toward an area the ground. The next thing I know I’m up, halfway on my where other ofcers had sought cover. At that moment, knees, and I’m pulling the slack. Just like they teach you . the video fashed through the ofcer’s mind, and he . . acquire your target—nice and slow—and that’s what I quickly reacted by running toward the ofender and fr- was doing.” During the exchange of gunfre, the ofcer’s

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 89 round struck a light pole just above the ofender’s head, You’ve got to be able to know what to do resultng in the ofender feeing the scene. (The injured before it happens. So, yeah, do I ever sit ofcer’s actons are further addressed in the Self-body around when I’m in my patrol car and think drag porton of this secton.) of things that could happen to me and how am I going to get out of them? Yeah, I think Communicaton about things like that all the tme. Just like the Ofcers also referenced previous communicaton train- job I do now. If I have somebody that’s a sex ing. The practce with communicaton tools prompted ofender, [I’ll ask myself] what if they get me? some ofcers to use any and all available resources. For How am I going to get out of it? What am I instance, an ofcer was working a security post at a local going to do? Yeah, I’m always thinking ahead grocery store when an ofender, reportedly larger and to try and out-think somebody. stronger than the ofcer, sneaked up behind the ofcer and snatched the service weapon from the ofcer’s hol- The second ofcer stated that he regularly uses preplan- ster. While struggling with the subject for control of his ning and “what if” scenarios prior to handling every weapon, the ofcer remembered the orange emergency operaton and tactcal assignment. buton on his police radio and actvated it. Assistance Ordinarily when I frst set up, one of the things I do, you arrived quickly, and he was able to survive and recover know, you always try to get an idea of your surround- his service weapon. Although the ofcer’s agency only ings, what’s around you. Escape points, things like that. briefy covered the use of the emergency call buton, it If he is going to come out the window, you know, going was this resource that quickly brought the backup of- to our lef, going to our right, so I tend to play scenarios cers who saved his life. out in my head when I frst get there. ‘OK, if he comes from this way, this would be our approach.’ And these Other/preplanning (“what-if” scenarios) things, you know, just kind of go through your mind. When ofcers were asked what other trainings helped Other–self body drag them besides the categories provided, some mentoned trainings that taught them to think ahead, run through The ofcer who was injured at the apartment complex in scenarios, and plan ahead for what might occur. Such the incident previously described in the Firearms train- actons can be key to changing, gaining, and maintain- ing secton found his training on the self-body drag to be ing a tactcal advantage. For instance, when an ofcer crucial to his survival. The ofcer and his partner arrived arrives at a residence for a welfare check, the ofcer on the scene behind numerous other police vehicles can assess the situaton. Then, instead of walking up a and, as previously mentoned, assumed they were there dark sidewalk toward a house with all the lights out, the to assist in locatng and guarding a crime scene. As the ofcer can direct the dispatcher to ask the complainant ofcers exited their patrol vehicle, they immediately to walk out to the patrol unit. Such precautons could came under rife fre, and one of the ofcers was struck prevent an ofcer from walking into what could be a several tmes by large-caliber rounds. The frst round premeditated trap. It also afords an ofcer more tme struck the ofcer in the leg and threw him up against his to consider strategies and optons to beter assess and patrol car. The second round shatered his femur, and he address risk. collapsed. The wounded ofcer drew his service weapon but could not identfy a target. At this point, the ofcer Two of the ofcers who partcipated in training that could hear the rounds striking the pavement near him involved proactve preplanning and discussions of and realized he needed to get to cover, so he began the “what-if” scenarios reported these skills assisted them self-body drag. He commented, “Yeah, I remember, I’m during their encounters. Prior to the atacks, both of- dragging myself backwards, and I’m getng to the back cers regularly engaged in “what-if” training by men- of the car, I can stll hear the bullets bouncing of the tally envisioning possible scenarios, interjectng various pavement and I’m like, you know, d--- it, this guy’s stll probabilites, and determining a variety of optons they shootng at me. He can see me stll.” could employ to safely mitgate a scenario. The frst of- cer credited proactve thinking as the best plan of acton During that ofcer’s self-body drag training, the train- when handling situatons. ees had been required to lay down, draw their service

90 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS weapon, and point it in the directon of a threat while using the other arm to drag themselves to cover. The ofcer described the training in this way, “[It lasted] for two hours, it seemed like, one day. It was but-kicking . . . basically you were to get your gun out and drag your- self backwards all the way across the defensive tactcs room.”

Muscle memory (automatcity) Of the respondents, 18.8 percent believed training to develop muscle memory was critcally important to reactng and handling ambushes and unprovoked atacks. Muscle memory, also called automatcity, refers to behaviors that are carried out rapidly and without efort or intenton. It is ofen the result of repeatedly When handling an atack that comes with litle (if any) practcing a behavior (Nugent, 2013). When handling an warning, the ability to quickly recognize, assess, and address atack that comes with very litle (if any) warning, the a threat is key to survival. ability to quickly recognize, assess, and address a threat is key to survival. As one ofcer put it,

You always need to practce what you’ve already learned to the point that you just react. You don’t have to think about doing it. It’s built in—it’s memory. You automatcally go to it. You automatcally use it to defend that threat and defeat that threat.

Ofcers who were interviewed ofered several accounts of muscle memory guiding their actons. One ofcer, shot in the head and dazed, reacted automatcally when the ofender returned to the scene to “fnish him of.” Of the respondents, 18.8 percent believed training to develop The ofcer had no recollecton of circling a tow truck muscle memory was critcally important to reactng and and taking cover behind it, although he believes this act handling ambushes and unprovoked atacks. saved his life.

Another ofcer credited his training as being so ingrained that he stated, “Whatever I did that night, I did on instnct.” Another ofcer further artculated:

When you’re in a traumatc incident, what was going on during the shootng . . . the body takes over, and you’re going to resort to your training. You might think you do, but you have no control over what you are doing. I mean, you know what you’re doing, you just can’t really control it. It’s going to be muscle memory. Whatever you’ve learned, whatev- er you’ve trained your body to do, told your Muscle memory, also called automatcity, refers to behaviors body to do, that’s what it’s going to do. that are carried out rapidly and without efort or intenton. It is ofen a result of repeatedly practcing a behavior.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 91 Another ofcer was sitng behind the wheel of his patrol down, and bringing the fght to the ofender. One of vehicle when an ofender exited his truck and advanced the study partcipants said he recognized an indicator toward the ofcer. The ofcer perceived if he did not that gave him a few critcal seconds to react defensively get out of the vehicle, the ofender would gain tactcal immediately before the shootng began. The driver’s advantage. The ofcer quickly exited and took cover door of the suspect’s vehicle was slightly ajar, and it behind the driver’s door; the ofender opened fre. The was the puzzle piece the ofcer needed, combined with ofcer was able to return fre, and the ofender fed the other factors, to alert him to the imminent atack. The scene. Although the ofcer took rounds to his legs and ofcer relayed what went through his mind: feet, he survived the encounter. Just as I approach where I can see the [vehi- AMBUSH COGNITIONS cle’s] tag, I reach down for the mic and I notce the driver’s side door open about that Ambush cognitons refers to a law enforcement ofcer’s much (hand gesture indicatng a couple of thoughts during an ambush or unprovoked atack. This inches) and I thought, ‘Oh, s---,’ It just came secton does not include recommendatons but describes to me all at once, this is going to get ugly. I the wide array of thoughts that raced through the of- drop the mic, throw the car into park, slam cers’ minds while they were actvely involved in the life- my door open and, before I could get out of threatening events. Thoughts ranged from inital shock my vehicle, he’s out shootng. and surprise to what actons to take at a precise moment to mitgate an atack, neutralize an ofender, save their Safety of others own lives and save the lives of others. Of the ofcers The second most commonly reported cogniton category who partcipated in this study, 26 (78.8 percent) report- was safety of others. The data revealed 14 (42.4 percent) ed having multple thoughts during their encounter. Of- of study partcipants had thoughts involving protecton cers were provided categories of specifc thoughts they of others, and of those, 18 percent rated this cogniton may have had, including the opton of “other.” They were as the most important one they experienced. These asked to select the thoughts they considered to be most ofcers regarded thoughts about the safety of others as important to them at the tme. The specifc thoughts the more important than their own self-preservaton. In one ofcers reported they experienced during the atacks example, ofcers responded at 2 a.m. to the scene of an included: self- preservaton, safety of others, how to win, accident and a shootng on a freeway. Upon arrival, one I will win, family, expletve, fear, oh no!, weapon reten- of the ofcers exited the police unit and ran to a victm ton, and other. Not all the categories applied to all the who was lying in the roadway sufering from a gunshot ofcers’ situatons. For instance, the category safety of wound to the stomach. The ofcer dragged the victm others was not a relevant factor in cases that did not to the front of a vehicle for cover. At that point, several involve a third party. Likewise, distance or circumstanc- more shots rang out from an unknown directon. When es may have rendered the weapon retenton category the interviewer asked if the ofcer had his service weap- irrelevant. The remaining categories cover more general on out, and he replied: thoughts and are considered relevant to all the incidents in the study. The following informaton covers the four It seemed to happen so quickly. I remember categories of thoughts most reported by the ofcers. it racing through my mind; however, the rea- son I did not [have my service weapon out] Self-preservaton was because I didn’t know where the gunfre The most prevalent ambush cogniton was self- was coming from. Would I put these people preservaton. Of the 33 study partcipants, 25 (75.8 in more jeopardy or would I help, be of more percent) had thoughts of self-preservaton. Of those, 11 assistance, with my gun out? Because even- (44.0 percent) considered it the most important of all tually, helping the victm, I was going to have the cognitons they experienced. Ofcers reported they to put my gun up anyway. specifcally thought about how to mitgate an imminent threat: fght or fight, pressing the threat, covering

92 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS How to win/I will win The next most prevalent categories, How to win and I will win, were captured as two separate categories, however both are usually covered in will-to-survive training.

In the category, How to win, 13 (39.4 percent) of the study partcipants recalled having thoughts about strategy and how to win their encounter. None of those ofcers rated it as the most important cogniton they experienced. One of the study partcipants who was shot multple tmes shared thoughts on winning and whether giving up ever came to mind:

Oh, no. No! And I wasn’t going to sit. . . I’ve seen so many tmes, so many flms [of] police ofcers getng killed sitng behind the wheel. They don’t get out of the car quick enough; they don’t pay atenton to what’s going on. Why? I don’t know. I knew what was going to go on.

In the I will win category, 11 (33.3 percent) of the study partcipants reported losing was not an opton in their sce- nario. Six percent (6.1 percent) of the ofcers considered this thought, I will win, as most important. In one case studied, the victm ofcer recalled that, although he took a shotgun blast to the face, the fght was not over for him. Here’s how he described those thoughts:

I kind of think that was like a teetering moment where I probably could have panicked and you know, gone into shock, or who knows what would’ve happened. I just chose a diferent path; I chose to focus . . . My inital thought was to get back in the fght.

See the Will to survive secton for additonal discussion on these topics. Final note on ambush cognitons The topics department rules and lawsuits were both listed as categories of thoughts ofcers could choose to report, but none of the ofcers interviewed had any thoughts of department rules or lawsuits while involved in the life- threatening atacks. These thoughts more than likely came to mind, as in most cases, afer the smoke cleared and the threat was neutralized. As shown in the previous paragraphs, most of the surviving ofcers experienced cognitons related to preserving their own lives and the lives of others.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 93 94 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER FIVE Case Analysis

Previous chapters examined the demographic data into danger as the result of conscious consideraton and and personal accounts of victm ofcers and ofenders planning by the ofender. involved in ambushes and unprovoked atacks. A key strength of this study is that in eight of the cases Summary of the Ambush Incident reviewed, researchers were able to interview both the One spring, a middle-aged male was serving a sentence victm and/or witness ofcers and the ofenders who for auto thef. With two weeks of his sentence remaining, perpetrated the ambushes or atacks. This chapter the man escaped from jail. Later that summer, two police presents detailed case studies of two such incidents: one, ofcers conducted a trafc stop. Unknown to the ofcers, an ambush, the other, an unprovoked atack. These case the driver of the car was the escaped prisoner. As the studies present the context surrounding each incident frst ofcer approached the stopped vehicle, the fugitve and the viewpoints of both the ofcer and the ofender. shot him in the torso with a handgun then sped of. Afer Each case concludes with an analysis of key similarites the gunman was identfed as the escaped prisoner, and diferences in the perceptons of the victm and the ofcials issued a warrant for his arrest for atempted atacker. murder of a law enforcement ofcer. Law enforcement initated an extensive manhunt throughout the state A third case study concludes the chapter with the and region. Then, in late August, an unknown subject analysis of an unprovoked atack that, according to burglarized a gun store, stealing 35 frearms5 (long rifes, friends and family members of the ofender, was racially assault rifes, shotguns, and handguns). The evidence in motvated. However, researchers could not fully analyze the case pointed to the fugitve as the primary suspect. the ofender’s motves and perspectve because he was killed in a shootout. The study authors included this case At some point during the search for the fugitve, because it involves elements that seem related to some extenuatng circumstances led authorites to remove of the more recent ambushes that have been publicized the fugitve’s granddaughter from his then-wife’s rural in the United States since researchers originally collected home. When the granddaughter was returned to the the data for this study. residence, two ofcers set up surveillance behind the home under the belief that the fugitve would return to CASE STUDY #1 - AMBUSH OF visit his granddaughter. POLICE OFFICERS Two months afer the fugitve shot the ofcer during the This case involved a fugitve who ambushed ofcers trafc stop, the two ofcers began their surveillance at while they were conductng surveillance. The ambush 8 a.m. in a slightly wooded area in a cow pasture behind occurred in a rural area near a residence where the the residence. About two hours from the end of the fugitve’s then-wife and granddaughter lived. The ofcers’ 12-hour watch, the fugitve walked through descripton of this case is based upon interviews with the the woods behind the house. He saw an ofcer’s head surviving ofcer and the ofender. As stated in Chapter 1, moving within the cover of foliage, so he crept up on the this study uses the LEOKA defniton of an ambush: pair and opened fre. One ofcer, struck in the leg, later died on the operatng table. The other ofcer survived, Ambush (entrapment and premeditaton): Situaton even though he was shot in the torso through his body where an unsuspectng ofcer was targeted or lured armor.

5 The ofcer who was interviewed regarding this case reported 35 frearms were stolen. The ofender reported he stole 41 frearms.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 95 The ofender’s perspectve Barry reported a lifelong patern of incarceraton, beginning at age 12. He started stealing cars afer he Subject Background (Who). At the tme of the ambush, stopped going to school, so he was in-and-out of juvenile the fugitve, Barry,6 was 44 years old, 5 feet 11 inches facilites. Frequently beaten up by older juveniles, he tall, weighed approximately 180 pounds, and described escaped ofen. Barry served his frst jail sentence at age himself as lean. He self-identfed as Natve American. 16 for the burglary of a police ofcer’s house and was He was married at the tme of the assault, although he incarcerated for 18 months. At the tme of the burglary, has since divorced. he did not know the residence belonged to a police Barry was the eldest of his parents’ four biological ofcer. children; his siblings include two sisters and one brother. Barry had a long history of gun use and has owned He grew up with both parents in the home. His father hundreds of frearms over the years. When he was not in was 61 years old when Barry was born, and his mother prison, Barry practced shootng 5-6 days per week, fring was in her 20s. Barry had a good relatonship with his at least 100 rounds per session. He is a gun enthusiast mother, but in general, he tried to avoid his father. Barry mainly because he uses them to hunt. “I like to kill to described his father as being “old school,” and said, “You eat. That’s it. I don’t think about how big a rack is on a did something wrong, you got knocked down . . .” His buck. I’ll shoot a doe faster than I will [a buck] because father was also psychologically abusive, ofen calling they’re all over the place, you know. I like to eat meat. I Barry stupid. Barry atributes his negatvity toward the like wild meat. That’s what I do,” he said. police to his father. “I had an attude, you know, from dealing with my father so much, so when the cops came, During the interview, Barry seemed to be trying to of course they were the bad guy. I’ve been seeing it that provoke the interviewer. More than once, he referred way ever since.” Barry ran away from home at least fve to embarrassing police ofcers. It was clear during the tmes when he was young and was subjected to physical interview that Barry was not completely forthright with violence when he returned home. the interviewers, and he did not accept responsibility for his actons. When asked about his regrets, Barry Although he read a lot outside of school, Barry performed stated, “I should have been the person they wanted poorly academically and frequently missed school me to be, the bad guy. There would be a lot more dead because his classmates viewed him as “the dumb a--, people, though. They turned something into a mess. the dork, and [I was] always picked on.” At the age of 12, It didn’t have to be a mess, but that’s what they do.” he had had enough. “I got my shotgun, a bandoleer of Barry believes he should not be in prison because he did 50 rounds, and I start walking to school. And had I made not kill the ofcer he ambushed. He explained why he it to the school, I would have went of.” He waited for the believed it wasn’t his fault. school bus, but when it arrived, the bus driver saw the shotgun, closed the door and drove of. Instead, Barry The one that got shot in the leg died. And spent the day huntng and never returned to school. that’s something else I need to point out to Barry did not atend high school; “I’ve never seen high you about that. They’re saying that I killed school outside [prison],” he said. He has since earned him. I didn’t kill him; he died. You don’t bleed a GED® certfcate and has taken some college courses. to death in 3 days, you know what I mean. When you get shot in your femoral artery As a result of multple imprisonments, Barry does in your leg, you die in minutes, not 3 days. not have a consistent work record. Prior to his most He died on the operatng table through a recent incarceraton, he worked as a manual laborer in procedure–they were trying to do something a warehouse. At the age of 7, Barry began his frst job with his leg. He bled to death on the operatng working on a farm. That job ended when, at the end of table. I didn’t kill that man. the year, the farmer did not pay him his wages, so Barry reported that he plowed over the farmer’s crops with the tractor.

6 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

96 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Throughout the interview, Barry blamed the police for backpack flled with ammuniton. He kept two handguns everything that transpired, never acceptng responsibility and four magazines, then took of deeper into the woods. for his own actons before, during, or afer the incident. The manhunt concluded with Barry’s arrest 8 days later.

The Ambush (What). As previously described, Barry Motve (Why). The research team classifed the overall ambushed two police ofcers who were staking out motve for this ambush as Personal. As explained in his wife’s residence. The ofcers were in a cow pasture Chapter 3, this study defnes the Personal motve as among some bushes. As the ofcers suspected, Barry “personal reasons (to accomplish a personal objectve, intended to visit the residence to see his granddaughter e.g., avoiding arrest).” Barry had been avoiding arrest for before leaving the area. He was well-versed in using 3 months, living mostly in the woods. He was also angry frearms and, having recently burglarized a gun store, at “the system” for arrestng his wife, his daughter, and was heavily armed. Barry antcipated that the police had his daughter’s boyfriend for harboring a fugitve. As a the house under surveillance. As he crept through the result, the authorites removed his granddaughter from woods, he came upon a wrapper from a protein bar, so the home. He believed law enforcement arrested his he knew someone was close by. As he made his way to family members in order to lure him out, thus escalatng the cow pasture, which was between the tree line and the situaton. “When they frst got arrested, the charges the house, he saw one of the ofcers momentarily raise were harboring a fugitve, right, which is bull s---. But his head. Barry stated, “Them two dudes, they were full this is why the cops did it, to pull me out, to make me camoufage. If they hadn’t have moved, I would have fip,” he said. walked right by them, and I wouldn’t be here today.” Barry decided the situaton was out of control, so he Next, Barry described the shootng in his own words. decided to visit his family to say goodbye. “I was done. I said, ‘I done made jacka--es out of the whole state police They should have never moved. That was force and a bunch of other people too,’ and that’s all I their mistake. They were kneeling down next wanted to do was say goodbye, and they were waitng to each other, talking. I snuck up on them. I for me.” Barry did not artculate where he intended to got about from here to that wall [about 50 go afer saying farewell to his family. feet] and one guy turned around and I said, ‘Oh s---.’ I had an idea of what I was going Barry blames the ofcers for what happened because to do, and he didn’t give me a chance to do they fred frst and failed to identfy themselves as police it. He just opened fre, and I said, ‘F--- this.’ I ofcers. He asserts he was responding to them when let him have it. Nine rounds from the hip. I he returned fre. He did not intend to kill anyone; he heard somebody yell, ‘Get down!’ I stopped wanted to embarrass the ofcers. shootng. I’m a jokester when it comes to doing a lot of Barry thought the two men were bounty hunters because things, you know, and I had a roll of duct tape they were dressed in full camoufage without any police in my backpack . . . and I fgured, you know identfcaton showing, and they started shootng frst. “I what, I’m going to catch these two idiots. . . didn’t know who it was, though. But when they started I wanted to be right on top of them when I shootng, cops don’t do that. Cops say, ‘Freeze, drop told them to drop their weapons, you know, your weapon.’ These guys didn’t say none of that, they presuming they had them, and I planned on just started shootng. So, I did what I do.” Note: The stripping them both, but naked, duct tape ofcer’s descripton of what happened at this moment them up, take my cell phone out and call in the incident is diferent. the cops. I said, ‘What beter way?’ By then, of course I would have known they were Once the shootng stopped, Barry ran back into the troopers, and that would have been all the woods because he could hear sirens. He buried his beter. What beter way to have two troopers weapon, a Cetme .308-caliber rife with a 30-round here hog-ted for their boys to come and fnd? magazine and a sniper scope; several other guns; and a Most embarrassing thing you can do.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 97 Despite his claim that he intended to embarrass the consistently satsfactory. Roger is currently a defensive ofcers, Barry was clearly motvated to avoid arrest at tactcs instructor. any cost in the 4 months leading up to the ambush. He knew that a large number of law enforcement ofcers Seven to eight months prior to the ambush, Roger had and bounty hunters were searching for him, and he been a member of a mobile response team (MRT). On had prepared for a shootout. When he burglarized the assignment with the MRT, he was involved in a home gun store, instead of just a few weapons, he stole 35 entry/warrant service incident in which two fellow frearms and numerous rounds of ammuniton. He had ofcers were shot. Roger did not discharge his service already demonstrated his readiness to shoot a police weapon during that incident because there were other ofcer by fring on the ofcer during the trafc stop. At ofcers between him and the ofender. the tme of the second shootng behind his then-wife’s The Ambush (What). Roger and another ofcer were residence, Barry was carrying a signifcant number of on special assignment and had worked a 12-hour shif frearms, including rifes, assault-style semiautomatc (3 p.m. to 3 a.m.) as part of the larger manhunt for rifes, handguns, and many rounds of ammuniton. Barry. Afer 3 hours of sleep, he and his partner were The victm ofcer’s perspectve called in to work another 12-hour shif, startng at 8 a.m. on the day of the ambush. Their assignment that Ofcer Background (Who). The surviving ofcer in this day was surveillance of the residence of Barry’s wife. case, Roger,7 was 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighed 162 pounds The ambush occurred at approximately the 10th hour of at the tme of the interview, and self-identfed as White. their assignment, around 6 p.m. He grew up in a household with both parents present and is the second of four children. Roger has an older Roger and his partner dressed in camoufage fatgues sister, a younger brother, and a younger sister. At the that day. It took approximately 1 hour for them to get tme of the ambush, he had 8 years of law enforcement into positon because they were moving in daylight and experience and was 38 years old. He was married but were staying in as much cover as possible. They set up a did not have any children at the tme. Roger is currently surveillance post in a slightly wooded area in the middle in his second marriage. of a cow pasture, positoned approximately 10 feet apart. One ofcer watched the house while the other was on Roger holds a bachelor’s degree in nursing and a the lookout in the other directons. Their main focus master’s degree in public administraton. In additon, was on the residence because they did not know if the he served four years in the U.S. Army as a medic. Afer fugitve was inside. Roger expressed his understanding an honorable discharge from the Army at the age of 30, that the situaton was potentally volatle. he became a police ofcer “mostly to help people” and to serve the community. Roger atended 26 weeks of We had known. . . prior to that. . . I think it training at the state police academy and graduated in was 4 days prior to this, it was confrmed the top third of his class. that he had broken into a gun store and stole approximately 35 guns—both handguns and Roger’s academy experiences included several hundred long guns; high-power automatc weapons as hours of sidearm training; 200 hours of combat frearm well. So we knew now that he was potentally, training; 100 hours of baton training; 100 hours of you know, had access to a much higher level Simunitons®; 20 to 30 hours of shotgun training; of weapons than he had prior to this. So we and more than 200 hours of rife training, including knew that it was, it could [be], potentally sniper training with a .223 caliber rife. Roger also dangerous entering that day. received training in crisis negotaton, physical/mental conditoning, and general driving skills. He stays up-to- Approximately 2 hours before the ambush, the ofcers date with in-service training and qualifcatons, and his heard gunshots approximately a mile away, occurring performance evaluatons prior to the ambush were about every 30 seconds. Roger thought he was hearing

7 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

98 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS somebody sightng in a weapon. He said, “It wasn’t So I dropped to the ground on my back for enough to say ‘Yeah, that’s him,’ but it was enough to fear I was going to get hit again. And then the pique interest [and] to have somebody to check it out.” fring stopped. I said to him, ‘Are you hit?’ Other ofcers were not able to locate the ofender at And he shook his head yeah, and I could tell that tme. The ofender admited in his interview that he by the look on his face that he was probably had, indeed, been sightng in the rife that was later used inefectve at that tme because, you know, for the assault. my fear was that this guy realized he just shot us and was prety much going to come over The ofcers’ surveillance site was so remote that and fnish us of. their radios were inefectve. At 4:30 p.m., the unit leader called via cell phone and informed them their When Roger realized the ofender was not coming back, replacement would be coming around 6:30 p.m. Roger he called via cell phone to report he and his partner and his partner decided they would start toward the had both been hit. He knew it would be a while before extracton point around 6:10 p.m. backup would arrive because the command center was about 7 miles away. Neither ofcer could move because The ambush occurred less than 2 hours afer the phone of their injuries, so they were incapable of providing frst call, about the tme Roger and his partner had planned aid to each other. Roger’s partner had been shot in the to leave their positons. Roger described the incident in leg and was losing a lot of blood through the femoral detail. artery. Roger did the best he could to administer frst I wanted to make sure we had solid eyes aid to himself, even though he could feel himself going on [the area] because we were getng into into shock. His priority switched to trying to remain that tme frame where he had been known conscious untl the backup arrived. He also atempted to move around. So I moved up to the tree, to talk contnually with his partner to keep them both and I was looking through the binoculars at conscious. Eventually four backup ofcers arrived, and the house, and then just out of the blue, my two of them administered frst aid to the victm ofcers partner just screamed, ‘Get down!’ And I’m untl a medical helicopter landed and took them to the going to talk about it—it’s going to sound hospital. Roger underwent several life-saving surgeries long, but we’re talking fractons of a second while in a 30-day drug-induced coma. He eventually here. As he yells ‘Get down,’ I start to turn, recovered from his injuries. His partner died 3 days afer and as I start to turn, I hear the frst shot go the ambush. of. And then out of the corner of my eye, I can see my partner diving to the ground because Motve (Why). Roger’s understanding of why the atack his rife was sitng on the ground. He’s diving occurred comes from a combinaton of his knowledge of to the ground as I’m turning, the second shot the situaton before the ambush, informaton he received goes of, which hits me, and I felt it hit me, afer the atack, and speculaton. Simply, Roger believes and it stood me up for a second. And then Barry atacked them to avoid arrest, the Personal motve again, we’re only about 1 maybe 2 seconds previously described. Roger summarized the fugitve’s into this thing. He just starts throwing a rain motve, “He was a runner, basically. He tried to avoid of bullets down on us. My partner was able confict at all costs. He just wanted to keep running and to get behind his gun and start returning fre not go back to jail.” Moreover, the following exchange in his directon. And all this tme, I know my further clarifes Roger’s theory. partner can see him, but I couldn’t see him . . . he was able to get behind his weapon, Interviewer: In your percepton, why do you and I believe he got of nine rounds before think the assaulter atacked you? he was struck. This probably all lasted maybe Ofcer: I think that . . . it was growing 12 to 15 seconds. At a certain point I could frustraton and desperaton on his part. I stll see, with like the rounds ficking in the think that we were just basically a symbol of leaves as they’re coming through the trees. what he hated. He didn’t like the police. He

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 99 always had bad encounters with the police, Because the actual ambush was brief, the descriptons and we were the people who were trying to of the experiences provided by those involved had litle put him back in jail. And . . . that’s it. overlap. The most signifcant discrepancy between the ofcer and ofender accounts of how the event unfolded Additonal analysis related to who fred rounds frst. Specifcally, Barry stated Refectng on the ambush, Roger described a few the ofcers shot at him frst. However, Roger reported administratve decisions that may have complicated the he heard shots and saw his partner trying to reach for situaton. One of these was the lack of area coordinaton, his weapon. Several shots had already been fred before which Roger felt resulted in a lack of intelligence about his partner could return fre. their assignment. Roger described it in this way: CASE STUDY #2 - UNPROVOKED The one thing that was almost a red fag moment—and I think it was when we arrived ATTACK OF POLICE OFFICER at the staton—I was expectng there to be This case involves a young man who shot a backup this briefng and a lot of people. And it was police ofcer as the ofcer was leaving the scene of kind of like, to me, it was very odd that we’re the DUI arrest of the young man’s father. Researchers being told, ‘Hey, you need to get into the interviewed the surviving ofcer and the ofender and woods ASAP.’ But then you show up and there determined the shootng was an unprovoked atack. As is nobody there. And even to the point where previously included in Chapter 1, an unprovoked atack you have to bum a ride from investgators just is defned by the LEOKA program as: to get out there. Unprovoked atack: An atack on an ofcer that, at Roger also mentoned that if there had been another the tme of the incident, was not prompted by ofcial person covering the rest of the terrain surrounding contact between the ofcer and the ofender. the house, one of them would have seen the ofender approaching. Here’s how he described it: Summary of the unprovoked atack An ofcer atempted to conduct a trafc stop late one We obviously needed more than just two evening, but the driver did not pull over immediately. people. I think three people would have been Instead, the man kept driving untl he reached his own minimum. They’ve changed their policy since home, fnally pulling over in front of his residence. then. But I think if we would have had three Because the man did not stop immediately, the ofcer people, we could have split our 360 into approached the man’s vehicle with his weapon drawn. thirds. And then that way, when one person Dispatch had radioed for backup, and an ofcer who was looking at the house, you don’t have one was about a mile away responded to assist. The backup other person to cover the remainder of your ofcer arrived just as the driver’s wife and two sons came 360. out of the house. The frst ofcer had his service weapon in his hand and was giving the driver commands to exit Roger also addressed the inadequate amount of sleep the vehicle. The backup ofcer drew her weapon as well. he and his partner had goten prior to their tour of duty She notced the family members and began interactng on the day of the ambush: with them while the other ofcer conducted business I think at a certain point fatgue sets in. When with the driver. you frst initally get in the woods, all your The driver was driving under the infuence and was in sensors are working really well. And then the country illegally, so the frst ofcer placed him under afer tme goes by, they all start to diminish arrest. Aferward, the backup ofcer returned to her a litle bit. And then you throw a litle sleep patrol vehicle to drive to a nearby parking lot where deprivaton on top of that and [it] gets, you she could complete her paperwork. As she neared the know, it gets tough. parking lot, she observed a subject standing with his back to her. The subject realized the ofcer was there

100 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS and jumped as though startled by her presence. The Afer leaving school at age 14, Juan entered the darkness prevented the ofcer from seeing what the workforce and joined his father as a seasonal roofer, subject was doing. She angled her patrol vehicle as if working primarily during the summer months. Juan had she were going to pull into the parking lot but stopped his own apartment at the tme of the assault and lived short so she would not be head on with the subject. alone. He was not married and had no children. She intended to exit the vehicle and make contact with the subject, but before she had a chance to open her Juan spoke of two atempted suicides. When he was door, the subject advanced on her and opened fre. The incarcerated at age 14 for the stabbing at school, he was ofender fred rounds from a .223 caliber semiautomatc feeling depressed and tried to hang himself. He was also rife. Six rounds struck the ofcer, and 23 rounds hit her feeling depressed at the tme of the unprovoked atack car. She sustained multple injuries, but she managed to and did not care whether he lived or died. Although return fre from inside her vehicle, discharging 11 rounds he did not state it explicitly, Juan did not contradict before the ofender fed. The ofcer exited her vehicle to the interviewer when the phrase “suicide by cop” was pursue the ofender on foot but was unable to do so as a mentoned to him. result of her injuries. She used her shoulder radio to call Although Juan grew up with a father who he said was for assistance. frequently drunk, Juan reported he has never consumed Upon hearing the shots, a neighbor called the police. The alcohol. He also denied any illicit drug use, except for ofender was arrested a short tme later and is currently smoking marijuana once. Juan’s criminal history includes serving a life sentence. two incidents: his arrest for stabbing another student at age 14 and the atack on the backup ofcer. The ofender’s perspectve Juan admited having thoughts or fantasies about Subject Background (Who). The ofender, Juan,8 a assaultng police ofcers twice in his life. The frst tme Hispanic male, was 18 years old at the tme of the atack was when he was about 6 or 7 years old during an and 24 years old at the tme of the interview. He was incident similar to the one that was analyzed for this of average height (5 feet 9 inches) and weight (160 study. Juan was in the car with his father, and an ofcer pounds). Juan is the eldest of four children and has atempted to pull his father over. Instead of stopping, one brother and two sisters, all from the same parents. his father tried to fee from the police, fnally stopping Although both parents were present while he was in front of their residence. Juan said the police “threw growing up, Juan indicated his father was usually drunk. a K-9 on him, and they abused him.” He remembered His father worked seasonal constructon, and his mother wantng to hurt the ofcers at that tme. This incident ofen worked in positons such as cleaning and laundry. resulted in the deportaton of his father. The second His father was deported once during his childhood, but tme he had thoughts of assaultng an ofcer was when he returned to the United States sometme later. Juan he was 14 years old. He and his girlfriend skipped class, described his family’s socioeconomic level as marginal, and a police ofcer subsequently took his girlfriend to given the unstable employment of both parents. the principal’s ofce. Juan wanted to beat up the ofcer As a child, Juan had some interpersonal difcultes for turning her in. He denied ever having any thoughts or in school. Around the age of 8 or 9, he struggled with fantasies about killing a police ofcer. anger management. Because of this, the school referred The Unprovoked Atack (What). As previously described, him to an alternatve school he described as a “mental Juan’s father did not stop when an ofcer frst atempted health hospital.” During high school, Juan was involved to pull him over for a trafc stop, but he kept driving and in a fght at school in which he stabbed another student. led the ofcer to his residence before coming to a stop. He was held at a detenton facility for 2 weeks before his When Juan’s father arrived at his residence, his family father posted bond. Juan neither completed school nor saw the fashing lights, so Juan, his mother, and brother earned a GED®.

8 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 101 exited the house. Juan was worried his father would be whole weight of it came down on me,” he said. deported again, so he and his family atempted to talk to the ofcers in hopes they would only give his father When Juan frst exited the house, he saw that the a warning. However, because Juan’s father had not arrestng ofcer had pulled out his gun. This, too, served immediately pulled over, and he was not a legal resident as a fashpoint for his emotonal crisis. He has since of the United States, the ofcers did not issue a warning. learned that drawing a weapon is standard procedure for ofcers when they are apprehending somebody who Juan became very frustrated and distraught when his has atempted to fee from the police. Juan talked about father was arrested. He said, “The only way I knew how that moment. was to pick up a gun or fght, that’s the only way. So, I ran into the house and grabbed my rife, and loaded it The police ofcer was right behind him with up for a 30-round clip, and I set to ambush ‘em. I went his gun pulled out, you know? I thought that out through the backdoor, and through a back alley.” He was too much, you know? It was excessive . . further stated: . but at that tme I didn’t know that that was one of their procedures or whatever, to pull As I was walking out through the alley, I met up the gun out on a person that’s been evading with a cop car, and I was like well, you know, them . . . it just triggered me, so you know, to this is it. This is where it all ends, you know? act out in my depression and my anger and This is where I prove, you know, whatever I everything. It was like a bomb. I was just a thought of I’m going to fulfll it, you know? tcking tme bomb, and that just set me of. Try to help my dad. Try to do everything I can to save the litle that I have. Before turning to violence, Juan said he atempted to talk with the ofcers. Juan perceived the ofcers’ response Juan opened fre on the police ofcer’s vehicle. He as further mistreatment and described it this way: thought if he were a martyr, his family would learn to treat each other beter. He explained, “Even though it They gave me a bad attude, you know. was going to cost my life, but you know, I thought I was They’re telling me that they will fgure it out going to help them. I was like, ‘I really don’t care if I get when we get back to county, but the way they killed,’ so I started shootng at the cop, the cop car. Shot were saying it was just harassment. Like, you at it 30 tmes.” Of those shots, six hit the ofcer. know, like you’re nothing, a piece of scum, you know? They treat you like you’re an Once the clip was empty, Juan ran back into the house to animal or like when the dog pound grabs a reload. Note: The ofcer’s descripton of what happened dog. They just te him around the neck and at this moment in the incident is diferent. Juan’s intent drag you in. was to fnd the other ofcer and kill him. However, when he got back into the house, his younger brother Although his father had been arrested for DUI and stopped him and took the gun. Juan was arrested shortly deported only once before, Juan seemed to view it as thereafer. a frequent occurrence. He described how the incident distressed him. Motve (Why). The researchers assigned two overall motves for this unprovoked atack, Expressive and I knew he was going to get deported, but I Personal. thought, you know, if they do that . . . they basically [are] just killing him. So, you know, The Expressive motve was chosen because Juan that’s when they didn’t want to work with revealed he was in a state of mental crisis when he saw me. That’s just it, I had had enough. I got tred his father getng arrested. Juan believed the ofcers of seeing that scene too many tmes. I mean, were harassing his father. “That’s when I snapped. I like I told you before, I was just 6 or 7 years couldn’t take it anymore. It was just too much stress, too old when the same scene happened, and my much depression, anger, all that, you know. Every single dad got arrested, you know? It was just too downfall in my life came at that moment, you know? The many reoccurring scenes, you know? It just

102 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS happened too many tmes. [Italics added to divorced when she was 3 years old. Karen is the second represent the ofender’s emphasis.] of two children, and she has a younger half-sibling. At the tme of the interview, she had never been married, Not only was the incident emotonally difcult for Juan, had no children, and was not in a signifcant relatonship. but he also felt responsible for his father’s arrest. Earlier that evening, he had refused to drive his father to a strip Karen holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justce and club because he felt it would be disloyal to his mother. decided to become a police ofcer afer college at the He stated, “I caused this whole thing. If I would have age of 23. She chose a law enforcement career to serve just taken my dad to the strip club, you know, drove him her community. Her police academy training lasted 6 everywhere, like I used to, I don’t feel like this would months, and she graduated in the top third of her class. have happened.” She exercised 5-6 tmes per week. Before the unprovoked atack, Karen’s annual performance evaluatons were all Researchers assigned the Personal motve to this case above satsfactory. because Juan intended to free his father. He believed that if he could eliminate the ofcers, his father could At the tme of the atack, Karen had been on the police escape without going to jail and being deported, as the force for 4 years, and she had been involved in several following excerpt from the interview demonstrates. previous violent encounters. In one, she witnessed another ofcer get shot in the head. Interviewer: So, obviously your intenton was to kill the ofcer? The Unprovoked Atack (What). Karen was alone in Ofender: Yeah. Stop ‘em, yeah. Shoot ‘em, her patrol car 1 mile away from the scene when she you know? Anything that will stop the cop responded to dispatch’s request for assistance for from going anywhere else, calling backup, or another agency’s ofcer who was making a DUI arrest. anything like that, to where it helped me. You As previously described, the driver had failed to pull over know, trying to do what I was trying to do. and had fnally stopped in front of his house. Karen had Trying to . . . save my family. been on duty for 1 hour of her 10-hour shif scheduled for 9:30 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. She was dressed in a uniform Juan’s statements refect the frequently illogical and driving a marked patrol vehicle. Upon arrival, she thinking of a person in crisis. A behavior that seems saw the other ofcer giving commands to the driver. incomprehensible to most people (atemptng to shoot The ofcer had his service weapon in his hand. Karen and kill the police ofcers) made perfect sense to him at described the scene. the tme. During his emotonal crisis, Juan reasoned that his family would be beter of if he killed the ofcers. I’d been on the passenger side of the deputy’s vehicle as he’s giving the driver commands What I was thinking is some people learn to exit the vehicle. I had my gun drawn, also from tragedies, you know, they don’t make pointed at the vehicle. As he’s giving the the same mistake twice. That’s what I thought driver commands, I notced him [Juan] and this was going to be. I knew this would be a his younger brother and mother come out tragedy, you know? I was probably going of the house, which is where the trafc stop to be dead. Even now, I stll hope they [his was . . . I notced them walk out of the house family] learn from this, you know? and walk about half way into the yard. . . I stopped them and asked them to stay where The victm ofcer’s perspectve they were. Ofcer Background (Who). The victm ofcer in this case, Karen,9 is a White female and was 27 years old While at the scene of the trafc stop, Karen said the at the tme of the unprovoked atack. She was 5 feet, family readily followed her requests. Neither she nor 5 inches tall and weighed 120 pounds. Her parents the other ofcer could later recall any signs of potental

9 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 103 danger in the behaviors of Juan or the other family members. Karen described how the would-be ofender assisted the ofcers during his father’s arrest.

[He was] cooperatve, compliant, nonthreatening, polite, and helpful. He was actually translatng. The father that was being pulled over, the driver, did not speak English, so he actually started translatng in the yard and telling his father everything we were saying to get out of the vehicle at that point. The father started complying and getng out of the vehicle. So he was helping us by translatng on the scene.

Afer 10-15 minutes, the driver was in custody, and the other ofcer said he no longer needed Karen’s assistance. She returned to her patrol car at approximately 10:30 p.m. At that point, Juan had gone back into the house.

Karen pulled around the corner, intending to fnd a place to park her car and fll out her paperwork. That was when she notced an individual at the far end of the parking lot.

As I drive and I make that view where I can see into the parking lot, I notce the subject and his back was toward me, and he kind of jumped as if I’d startled him—a shocked reacton in seeing me. So my frst thought was, ‘This guy’s up to no good. I’m going to get out and see what he’s doing.’

Unknown to her, the individual in the parking lot was the driver’s eldest son who had retrieved an assault rife and a full clip with 30 rounds in it from inside the house. As soon as she put the car in park, he lifed his rife and opened fre on Karen. Her inital reacton was disbelief.

I felt like I just froze, kind of in that startled, like, Is this really happening? reacton. Then, I immediately went into thinking I need to get my gun out. I was also at the tme, I didn’t know what type of gun he was fring, so I didn’t realize the rounds were coming through my car. So my thought was, I need to get my head out of the “The fght was defnitely not over.” window so one of the rounds doesn’t take my head of.

Karen prepared to return fre, “As I’m going to get my gun out, I realize he’s advancing on me, stll contnuing to shoot contnuously.” She returned fre with her service weapon, a .45-caliber Glock 21 SF. As soon as she started shootng, Juan turned and ran into his backyard. Karen was able to fre 11 shots before Juan ran away, none of which hit him. In all, Juan fred 26 rounds. Of the 23 rounds that struck the car, 6 hit Karen. She was conscious and realized she was injured.

104 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS I was aware that I was hit at least once, Additonal analysis because I remember the lef side of my leg; Perhaps the most informatve lesson from this case is it started tngling. So I knew I had at least how diferent the ofcer’s perceptons of what happened been hit there. I also remember blood on my were from the ofender’s percepton. For instance, forehead, and I didn’t know if I had been hit in during his interview, Juan explicitly described hostlity my head or if that was just fragments or glass between the ofcers and his family: “. . . they gave me a or whatever that had hit me. So I didn’t know bad attude, you know, they’re telling me that they will if a full round; I knew that I had been shot in fgure it out when we get back to county, but the way my lef side somewhere, and I remember the they were saying it was just harassment. Like, you know, blood on my face, but I didn’t know why. like you’re nothing, a piece of scum, you know?” Once the ofender disappeared, Karen called for backup. On the other hand, Karen reported the interactons Interviewer: You were able to get on the radio with the driver’s family were very positve and the aferward and call for assistance? ofender was translatng between the ofcers and his father. Again, in her words, the family was “cooperatve, Ofcer: Yes, I got on twice. One of my radio compliant, nonthreatening, polite, and helpful.” trafc, it didn’t make it out. Because I did it from the car, and something had happened to In additon, Juan stated he had been pleading with the the radio inside the car during the shootng, ofcers to let his father of with a warning, but they and so that one never made it out, and I was would not listen to him. When asked about this, Karen able to get on my handheld radio outside the remembered something diferent. car and make another radio trafc. Interviewer: Did this young man sound like In additon, a neighbor heard the shootng and called he was asking you for a break? Was he asking 911. Backup and medical assistance arrived quickly. you to “Let my dad go?” Do you remember Karen was of work for 4 months while recovering from anything that he was saying? her injuries. Ofcer: No. I don’t remember him ever asking Motve (Why). In retrospect, Karen speculated that to “Let my dad go.” Juan’s motve was to free his father. She stated: Karen speculated that Juan knew his dad would be It almost seemed like he came out there, out deported and came back outside to get his dad out of back initally, and planned on coming around the patrol car. On this issue, her thoughts were very the front to maybe to get his dad out of the much in alignment with Juan’s, except that Juan said he patrol car, because he knew he was an illegal intended to kill the ofcers as a means of freeing him immigrant, and if he went to jail he would be and expected to die himself. deported. So my thoughts were maybe he Difering perspectves are also evident between the was planning to come around and try to help ofcer’s and ofender’s perceptons of Juan’s leaving his dad escape from the car. Didn’t intend on the scene. Karen reported that as soon as she started me already leaving the scene, and so when to return fre, Juan exited the area. Juan said that he lef I saw him, he was shocked that I was there, the area to go into his residence to reload his weapon, maybe, and that was maybe the shock factor, not necessarily because the ofcer was returning fre. and he just turned and started fring on me. These accounts are not in confict with each other, Karen’s assessment of the ofender’s motve concurs just diferent experiences based on their perspectves. with the Personal motve identfed by the research Either way, Juan reported his brother intervened when team. Juan was inside and stopped the incident by taking his frearm.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 105 CASE STUDY #3—UNPROVOKED that radios and bateries must remain at the staton unless an ofcer was on patrol. This ambush led to a ATTACK OF POLICE OFFICER policy change—ofcers are now permited to take radios WITH POSSIBLE RACIAL home with them.)

MOTIVATION AND MENTAL While one of the ofcers atempted to draw his weapon, ILLNESS OF OFFENDER the ofender shot the other ofcer in the back of the In the tme since researchers collected the data for head, fatally wounding him. The ofender then ran this study, media accounts of police use-of-force toward the delivery truck. The surviving victm ofcer and ambushes of ofcers due to racial tensions have opened fre on the ofender, as did two other ofcers become more prevalent. Ofentmes, these incidents are who came out of the building to respond. Moments retaliaton for unrelated events. For example, in 2014, later, the ofender died from multple gunshot wounds. an individual shot and killed two New York City police The surviving ofcer underwent reconstructve facial ofcers as they sat in their patrol car. The perpetrator surgery and was hospitalized for approximately 6 days. was reportedly motvated by the deaths of two Black men in incidents with police that occurred in other parts About the ofender of the United States (Mueller & Baker, 2014). In 2016, 12 Because the ofender was ultmately killed in a shootout police ofcers in Dallas, Texas, were ambushed by a lone with the police, this analysis is drawn from informaton gunman; 5 of them died as a result of the atack. The provided by police reports and news reports (Associated Dallas police chief reported that the suspect “wanted to Press, 1996) following the incident, as well as the kill White people, especially White ofcers.” The suspect interview conducted for this study with the surviving told a hostage negotator that he “was upset about the victm ofcer. Black Lives Mater Movement and the recent police shootngs of Black men elsewhere in the U.S.” (Bruton, Subject Background (Who). The ofender, a 24-year-old Smith, Chuck & Helsel, 2016). Black male, was reportedly struggling with emotonal problems in the weeks prior to the shootng. His family One incident included in this study may involve racial said he was troubled by race relatons. His mother motvaton as well as another important issue to stated to news reporters, “The last couple of days consider—mental illness. This case involved a man who he said there wasn’t any hope, and White people shot two police ofcers in an unprovoked atack as were going to keep Black people in slavery.” The local they walked from a parking lot toward the back of their newspaper covered the 20th anniversary of the incident police staton minutes prior to a shif change. One of the and reported that authorites commented, “During the victm ofcers and the ofender died in the shootout. hours and days before the shootng, [the ofender] had Researchers interviewed the surviving victm ofcer and been preoccupied with whether he had been given analyzed police reports and media sources. opportunites in life and whether he had been receiving the appropriate respect by people of his race and other Summary of the unprovoked atack races (Dayton Daily News staf writer, 2016).” Two ofcers arrived outside their police staton just before a 3:30 p.m. shif change on a summer day. At 3:15 From these accounts, the subject appeared to have p.m., the ofcers parked their cars in a lot across the experienced psychological deterioraton in the weeks street from the police staton about 50 or 60 yards away. leading up to the shootng. There were no known reports The ofcers approached a smaller parking lot behind of negatve encounters with police, other authority the building, where a delivery truck was parked in the fgures, or White people in general, so researchers cannot loading zone. As the ofcers were opening the rear door know for certain if there was a partcular precipitatng of the police staton, the subject moved in behind them event that led to the ofender’s state of mind. and opened fre, striking both ofcers. The Unprovoked Atack (What). The events leading Neither ofcer could call for backup because they did up to the ambush help establish a complete picture of not have radios. (At the tme, the agency’s policy was the incident. At approximately 3 p.m., the ofender was

106 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS working at his parents’ convenience store while a vendor The Unprovoked Atack (What). As Michael and another was making a delivery of potato chips. Reportedly, the ofcer approached a small parking lot behind the police vendor gave a free bag of chips to a girl who was in staton, they notced a delivery truck in the loading zone. the store. Some accounts indicate this acton set the Deliveries were frequently made to the ofce and to following chain of events into moton. When the vendor the recreaton center sharing their parking lot, so the reentered the store, the ofender put a gun to the ofcers paid litle atenton to the truck. They did note vendor’s head, then shot and killed him. He then took the the driver was not in the truck. Michael stated, “It just vendor’s delivery truck and drove to the police staton. looked like a truck there, that I assumed, and I think Police ofcers who responded to the convenience store anyone else would have assumed, was delivering stuf, to investgate the murder of the delivery driver did not supplies or whatever, to us or to the rec center, to make realize that the ofender had driven to the police staton. the building run.”

Motve (Why). Because the only informaton available Near the rear door of the police staton, just as they about this case is from the victm ofcer, police reports, were opening it to step inside, the ofcers encountered and newspaper accounts, the subject’s motves for this the subject. Michael provided his account. shootng cannot be unequivocally explained. It appears the case involves elements of both Personal and the The assailant came up behind us, and he said Politcal motves. Analysis of this incident suggests the something that was not out of the ordinary, ofender may have had a personal objectve he hoped rather friendly. He just said, ‘Hey guys, how to accomplish with the unprovoked atack, thus the are you doing?’ I didn’t think anything of it. Personal motve. Although there is no concrete evidence I kept looking forward heading into the door, of specifc incidents of racism or discriminaton that and I just waved, because I thought it was prompted the ofender’s actons, there may have been someone being polite behind us. And just in a precipitatng event or circumstances. Researchers can that instant, the next thing I know, three very, only speculate that the ofender was psychologically very quick gunshots were fred within about unstable, but it seems probable a mental health issue 10 or 15 seconds. may have contributed to his anger and possible paranoia. Michael’s partner was hit in the hand, and he dropped Anecdotal reports implied the ofender appeared to his gun belt that had been slung over his shoulder. have been deterioratng psychologically and was in a Michael said he got shot in the chin. “It went in and out, state of personal crisis. The ofender’s previous focus on busted my jaw and defected out underneath . . . luckily race was indicatve that he had a Politcal motve for the . . . my tongue and everything, [the round] missed all of ambush and may have been making a statement about that.” the conditon of race relatons in the United States. These are just two conceivable motves based upon the While Michael was trying to get his gun out, his partner available informaton. Because there are no statements was on his hands and knees on the ground also trying to or manifestos from the ofender, it is impossible to get to his gun. Michael described what happened next, speculate beyond the accounts of others. “The assailant came right to the back of his [partner’s] head, put the gun on the back of his head and pulled The Victm Ofcer’s Perspectve the trigger.” His partner died. The ofender then ran Ofcer Background (Who). The surviving ofcer in this back to the truck. The surviving ofcer reported, “As he case, Michael,10 was 5 feet 10 inches tall, and weighed was getng in the truck, that’s when I returned fre and 215 pounds at the tme of the interview. He self- opened fre on him. He made it into the truck. I could see identfed as White. that I had hit at least a tme or two. . . .”

10 Names presented in this research have been changed to protect the identtes of the individuals involved.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 107 Because the incident happened at the police staton as ofcers were arriving and leaving for shif changes, many ofcers converged on the scene quickly. Michael recalled it this way:

It was our shif change, and we had people coming and going. There were guys coming across the lot. There were guys coming out of the building. A couple of other ofcers, actually two of our sergeants, came out and returned fre, and there were several shots fred . . . there were 70 shots fred overall, total.

Motve (Why). The victm ofcer recalled that the ofender was concerned about race relatons and said the ofender’s friends had reported that he had been increasingly troubled:

He had told all of his family and all of his friends that he was tred of being pushed down and tred of being oppressed by . . . basically, White people, and he said before the holiday he was going to make something happen, and that everybody needed to just hold on and watch. Additonal analysis Investgaton showed the subject had become increasingly antagonistc toward authority fgures in general, and White people specifcally, in the weeks leading up to the unprovoked atack. On the surface, this case seems racially motvated. However, further analysis indicated that elements of the ofender’s pre-ambush behavior could also be explained by mental illness. For instance, the subject was at a common age for the onset of schizophrenia and could have been experiencing a psychotc break with reality. Unfortunately, the contributng factors will never be known for certain.

108 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS CHAPTER SIX Summaries of Selected Incidents

This chapter includes brief narratves of the events from 28 of the 40 cases examined in this study. The majority of these incidents involved ofenders who have been tried and convicted of engaging in an ambush or an unprovoked atack on one or more law enforcement ofcers in the United States. In a few cases, the incidents involved ofenders who either died by their own hand or were justfably killed by ofcers at the scene. Case 1 Approximately 3:30 on a warm spring afernoon in the Midwest, two uniformed ofcers, each with 1 year of law enforcement experience, arrived at the parking lot of their precinct to begin their tours of duty. The ofcers walked together through the parking lot and passed a white box-type delivery truck parked near their building. Unknown to the ofcers, a 24-year-old ofender had just shot and killed the driver of the delivery truck at a nearby store, stole the vehicle, and drove it to the police precinct with the intent to shoot and kill ¬police ofcers. Both ofcers were at the precinct’s rear entrance when the ofender approached them from behind and said, “Hey guys, how are you doing?” He immediately began fring at the ofcers with a 9 mm semiautomatc handgun. The frst ofcer was struck in the hand, causing him to fall to the ground. The ofender then turned to the second ofcer and shot him in the face. The ofender turned his atenton back to the frst ofcer and shot him in the head, killing him. As the ofender retreated to the delivery truck, the second ofcer retrieved his service weapon and began fring at the ofender. A round struck the ofender, but he made it to the delivery truck and atempted to drive away. The incident occurred during a shif change, so several ofcers quickly responded. A shootout ensued, and the ofender was justfably killed. The injured ofcer later recovered from his injuries and returned to full duty. Case 2 Around 6 o’clock on a rainy, summer evening in the South, a 27-year-old ofender ambushed his next-door neighbor, a law enforcement ofcer. The of-duty ofcer, who had 8 years of law enforcement experience, accompanied by his wife, was getng into his personal vehicle to take his ill child to see a doctor. The wife and child were already seated in the vehicle when the ofender shot and killed the ofcer. Then the ofender shot and killed the ofcer’s wife with the same .270-caliber rife. The ofender spared the life of the child. The ofender, who lived with his parents, was related to the ofcer. A few days before this incident, the ofcer had assisted another law enforcement agency in serving a mental health warrant on the ofender. The ofender had been held for 72 hours for observaton and then released. Later, during the investgaton, ofcers discovered the ofender had murdered his parents before atacking the ofcer. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Case 3 Approximately 3 o’clock on a winter afernoon in the South, an ofcer, who had 6 years of law enforcement experience, accompanied the owner of a mobile home to serve a dispossessory warrant for non-payment of rent. The 55-year-old tenant answered the door and quickly shut it upon learning of the warrant. The ofcer pursued the tenant inside the residence; however, the tenant exited through the back door and ran toward a wooded area behind the residence. Unbeknownst to the ofcer, the tenant had dug a foxhole in the woods and stored frearms and ammuniton inside. With the ofcer in pursuit, the man produced a frearm and they exchanged gunfre; one round grazed the ofender’s clothes. Afer reaching the foxhole, the ofender used a .30-.30-caliber rife to shoot and kill the ofcer. A nearby ofcer, who had 9 years of experience, was alerted to the incident and responded to

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 109 assist. Upon her arrival, the assistng ofcer learned that the downed ofcer was located in an overgrown feld just before the wooded area. The assistng ofcer crawled to the downed ofcer to check his status. Meanwhile, another backup ofcer responded and positoned himself near the residence. However, the ofender also shot and killed him with a .30-.30-caliber rife. Once she determined the downed ofcer had been killed, the assistng ofcer crawled back to the residence and found the backup ofcer had also been killed. The assistng ofcer waited for specialized forces, ground support, and air support to arrive. Ofcers eventually located the ofender, who surrendered without further incident. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Case 4 On a warm spring afernoon in the Midwest, an ofcer, who had 2 years of law enforcement experience, was working at the recepton desk of a correctonal facility. Unknown to the ofcer, an inmate,11 his 27-year-old girlfriend, and his 19-year-old former cellmate had planned the inmate’s escape. Around 12:30 p.m., the inmate’s girlfriend and former cellmate entered the facility and approached the ofcer at the desk. The former cellmate engaged the ofcer in a brief conversaton before pulling a .22-caliber revolver from his waistband and fatally shootng the ofcer. He turned toward the jail supervisor and shot him in the head and face, then atempted to locate the keys to the cell block to free the inmate. While looking for the proper keys, the ofender shot the jail supervisor two more tmes in the head, killing him. When they were unable to locate the cell block key, both ofenders fed. They were arrested in another state later the same day. The inmate and his girlfriend both received life sentences; the former cellmate who killed the ofcers was sentenced to death. Case 5 Approximately 3:30 on a summer afernoon in the Northeast, an ofcer, who had 13 years of law enforcement experience, faced an unprovoked atack while checking a local park during his routne patrol. Unknown to the ofcer, three ofenders broke into a business earlier that day, stole several frearms, and loaded them into a stolen truck. Before the break-in, the ofenders had lef their personal vehicle at the park with plans to exchange the stolen frearms from the stolen truck to their personal vehicle. During this exchange, the ofcer pulled into the park’s parking lot. The three ofenders saw the approaching ofcer and ran to hide. Two of the ofenders hid just inside the nearby wood line while the third ofender atempted to hide under the truck. The ofcer exited his patrol vehicle and approached the front of the truck where he saw the 22-year-old ofender, who was partally hidden under the truck. The ofender fred 13 rounds from a .40-caliber semiautomatc frearm, striking the ofcer several tmes, causing him to fall. The ofender then got into his vehicle and backed over the ofcer. One of the other ofenders, also 22 years of age, lef the wood line, approached the downed ofcer, and used the ofcer’s .40-caliber semiautomatc frearm to shoot him three tmes in the head, killing him. The ofenders then rummaged through the ofcer’s vehicle and stole some items before feeing the area. A couple of days later, the ofenders were arrested. Two of the ofenders were sentenced to life in prison. Case 6 Around 4:30 on a clear, summer afernoon in the Midwest, two law enforcement ofcers, one with 32 years of experience, the other with 3 years of experience, were going over paperwork while sitng in a marked patrol vehicle along the roadway. A 27-year-old man approached the ofcers’ vehicle in a full-size pickup truck. The man accelerated to approximately 70 mph and, using his truck as a weapon, intentonally crashed broadside into the patrol vehicle, killing both ofcers. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.

11 The inmate’s age was not available.

110 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Case 7 Approximately 9:20 on a winter morning in the South, three uniformed ofcers, who had 3, 8, and 20 years of law enforcement experience, respectvely, received a domestc violence/sexual assault complaint from a woman concerning her boyfriend. Additonal details indicated the boyfriend had threatened to shoot any law enforcement ofcer who showed up at his residence. The ofcers met with the complainant at a locaton near the residence and, afer gathering informaton, drove to the property to search for the suspect. Afer a fruitless search, one ofcer remained at the patrol vehicle to obtain a statement from the complainant while the other two ofcers cordoned of the area with crime scene tape. While the ofcers were otherwise occupied, the suspect appeared from the nearby woods with a 12-gauge shotgun and fred at them, striking one ofcer in the face and arm and another in the head and chest. Both ofcers sought cover. One entered the wooded area while the other retreated to the patrol vehicles where the third ofcer was located, with the ofender in pursuit. A shootout ensued; the pursued ofcer died from a fatal shot to the head, and the ofcer at the patrol vehicle was shot in the leg. During the shootout, the ofcer in the wooded area made his way back to the patrol vehicle to assist the injured ofcer and was also struck in the leg. One round fred by the ofcers struck the ofender in the butocks, promptng him to fee the area. Afer an in-depth search, ofcers eventually located the ofender in a wooded area, where they shot and apprehended him. The 29-year-old ofender was convicted and sentenced to prison. Both surviving ofcers recovered from their injuries and returned to full duty. Case 8 Around 10 o’clock on a winter night in the South, an ofcer, who had 16 years of law enforcement experience, lef his ofce for the night. While driving, he came upon an ofcer who was conductng a trafc stop, so he slowed down to assist. Just as the ofcer approached the stopped vehicle, the driver accelerated in an atempt to fee. Both ofcers began pursuing the vehicle. A number of ofcers from diferent law enforcement agencies joined the chase, which lasted several minutes. The ofcers knew the identty of the 16-year-old driver and deduced from the directon in which he was traveling that he was driving to his residence. As suspected, the driver stopped at his house, where he and three companions exited the vehicle and ran inside. The ofcers pursued the suspects into the residence, where they encountered several family members. One ofcer detained two combatve females in the laundry area as the other ofcer, who had 7 years of law enforcement experience, began questoning relatves in another secton of the home. Unknown to the ofcers, the ofender had obtained a single-shot, 16-gauge shotgun from his bedroom. The ofender approached from behind the ofcer who was questoning relatves and shot him in the head, killing him. The ofender dropped the frearm and ran back into his bedroom. He was eventually arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. Case 9 Approximately 6 o’clock on a summer evening in the Northeast, two law enforcement ofcers were assigned to a task force working to locate a fugitve who was wanted for shootng an ofcer during a trafc stop. Both ofcers, each with 8 years of experience, were outside a residence where the fugitve was believed to be hiding. The ofender, who was on foot, quietly approached the ofcers from behind. One of the ofcers saw the ofender’s movement and yelled out just as the ofender began fring multple rounds from his .308-caliber semiautomatc rife. One ofcer immediately returned fre, shootng nine rounds, none of which hit the ofender. One round from the ofender’s rife severed one of the ofcer’s femoral arteries. Another round penetrated the other ofcer’s protectve vest, injuring his abdomen. The ofender fed on foot. One of the ofcers notfed the command center of their situaton, and a rescue team was deployed, along with fight support. Both ofcers were airlifed to nearby hospitals. The ofcer who was shot in the leg died from complicatons due to his injury. Afer a long rehabilitaton period, the ofcer who was shot in the abdomen recovered from his wounds and returned to full duty. The ofender was later located in a wooded area and arrested. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 111 Case 10 Around 6:30 on a clear winter evening in the West, an ofcer, who had 2 years of law enforcement experience, was assistng another ofcer with a trafc stop in a neighborhood known for gang actvity. The ofcer was issuing a trafc citaton when a gang member shot several rounds at both ofcers with a .22-caliber semiautomatc rife from about 385 feet away. One of the rounds struck the assistng ofcer in the area under his arm, penetratng his heart. The victm ofcer took cover as the other ofcer fred a round at the ofender but missed. In the dark, the ofcers did not see the ofender and other gang members fee into nearby residences to elude capture. The uninjured ofcer maintained cover untl backup ofcers arrived. The victm ofcer was transported to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead. During the subsequent investgaton, ofcers discovered that a group of gang members had observed the ofcers on the trafc stop and decided to shoot at them to increase their status with the gang. The investgators also found a 9 mm casing around the same area that the .22-caliber casings were found. Two ofenders, ages 17- and 16-years-old, were convicted as adults and sentenced to life in prison. Case 11 Approximately 6 o’clock on a warm spring evening in the South, eight law enforcement ofcers, who were working on a specialized task force, were atemptng to serve a felony warrant on a known suspect. The task force had gathered intelligence that indicated the suspect was located at a specifc apartment. The group of ofcers developed a plan of acton and converged upon the apartment complex, positoning themselves at the front entrance of the suspect’s apartment and around the perimeter. The ofcers at the front entrance knocked on the door but did not announce themselves. When the ofender opened the door and saw the ofcers, he atempted to close the door quickly. One of the ofcers tried to prevent the door from shutng, but the ofender fred three shots at him from a .38-caliber revolver. One of the rounds struck the ofcer in the face, instantly killing him. When another ofcer atempted to retrieve the fallen ofcer, the ofender opened the door and fred a round at him but missed. Ofcers gave loud verbal commands for the ofender to exit the apartment. The ofender, along with two other occupants, exited the apartment without further incident. The ofender claimed that, as the ofcers did not identfy themselves when they knocked on the door, he did not know they were police ofcers when he fred his weapon. The 26-year-old ofender was later convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. Case 12 On a cloudy winter day around noon in the Midwest, two uniformed law enforcement ofcers were investgatng a complaint of shots fred at an RV park. Based on their inital observatons, the ofcers concluded that the suspect had lef the area, and they began processing the scene. As one of the ofcers advanced toward the door of the suspect’s RV, a man shot her from inside with 12-gauge shotgun. The victm ofcer fell wounded just a few feet from the RV’s front door. The assistng ofcer, who was processing the scene nearby, called for additonal units when he heard the shot. He sought out the source of the gunshot and found the victm ofcer near the RV door. The ofcer saw the ofender holding a shotgun inside the RV and alerted dispatch. Assistng ofcers arrived on scene and surrounded the RV. The ofender had barricaded himself inside and would not respond to communicaton eforts. Due to their uncertainty regarding the victm ofcer’s medical conditon and their inability to remove her from the scene safely, ofcers decided to shoot the ofender. Ofcers and the ofender exchanged gunfre for several seconds, and then a cease-fre was called. Shortly afer, the ofender fred at an ofcer positoned next to a neighboring RV, striking the ofcer with multple rounds in his lef arm, side, and back. Eventually, assistng ofcers removed the wounded ofcers from the area without further incident. A specialized unit gained entry to the RV, where the 57-year-old ofender was found deceased. The frst victm ofcer died from her wounds. The second ofcer recovered from his injuries and returned to full duty.

112 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Case 13 Around 1 a.m. on an autumn night in the Midwest, an ofcer, who had 24 years of law enforcement experience, was working an overtme detail when he observed a vehicle being driven in a reckless manner. The ofcer followed the vehicle to a residental area, but the driver eluded him. While atemptng to locate the vehicle, the ofcer received a radio assignment to assist another ofcer with a person suspected of driving under the infuence. As the ofcer was turning around, he saw the vehicle he had been pursuing now parked in the middle of the street. The ofcer actvated his emergency lights, pulled behind the suspect vehicle, and notced the driver’s side door was slightly ajar. The ofcer did not have tme to notfy dispatch of his locaton before the ofender lef his vehicle and advanced on the ofcer while fring multple rounds from his 9 mm semiautomatc frearm. Five rounds struck the ofcer as he was exitng his patrol vehicle. Two of the rounds struck him in the legs, and one round hit him in the center of his body but was stopped by his protectve vest; the last two rounds hit him in the feet. The ofcer drew his service weapon and returned fre, causing the ofender to retreat to his vehicle. None of the ofcer’s rounds struck the ofender. Accompanied by four other people, the ofender fed in his vehicle. He drove to another state and turned himself in the same day. The 25-year-old ofender was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The ofcer recovered from his injuries and returned to full duty. Case 14 At approximately noon on a warm winter day in the West, a uniformed ofcer, who had 31 years of law enforcement experience, was sitng in a booth at a restaurant eatng lunch with two plain-clothed ofcers. A man entered the restaurant and made his way over to the ofcers. As the man approached the ofcers, he removed a machete from behind his back and raised it to strike the uniformed ofcer in the head. One of the plain-clothed ofcers alerted the uniformed ofcer of the man’s actons just in tme for the uniformed ofcer to raise his hand to defend himself. The machete struck the ofcer’s hand, causing serious injuries. The ofender was raising the machete to strike the ofcer again when one of the plain-clothed ofcers pulled out his 9 mm semiautomatc frearm and shot the ofender once in the shoulder, causing him to fall to the ground. The 30-year-old ofender was taken into custody without further incident. He was convicted of the atack and sentenced to several years in prison. The ofcer sufered a career-ending impairment to his hand. Case 15 Around 3:30 a.m. on a cool autumn morning in the West, two uniformed ofcers, who each had 2 years of law enforcement experience, received a radio assignment to check on the welfare of a complainant’s suicidal roommate. The ofcers arrived at the complainant’s townhouse and saw him standing on a balcony. The complainant stated that his suicidal roommate was inside the unit. The ofcers asked the complainant to walk downstairs and open the door, but he said he was scared. The ofcers asked the man for the door key, so he tossed his keys from the balcony to the ofcers below. The ofcers positoned themselves on each side of the door. As the ofcers put the key into the lock, the man fred several rounds from a .45-caliber semiautomatc handgun from the balcony. Rounds struck the wall, door, and both ofcers. One of the ofcers was hit with two rounds in his leg, one round to his groin, and a round in the back, which was stopped by his body armor. He also sufered graze wounds on his wrist and lower back. The other ofcer was struck in the leg. Both ofcers retreated and found cover behind a block wall where they waited for backup units and emergency medical services. The 25-year-old ofender died at the scene from a self-inficted gunshot wound. The investgaton later revealed the ofender had lured the ofcers to the apartment with the intent to kill them. Both ofcers recovered from their injuries and returned to full duty.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 113 Case 16 Approximately 5 o’clock on a clear summer evening in the West, two law enforcement ofcers—one a feld-training ofcer with 4 years of experience and the other an ofcer-in-training with 1 year of experience—responded to a call involving an actve shooter. The suspect’s wife notfed authorites that she had received a message from her husband on her cellphone that indicated he had possibly shot her mother and set fre to her mother’s home. The message included photographs of the fre. The ofcers learned the suspect’s estranged wife had recently fled for divorce. The suspect had been granted visitaton rights for their 14-month-old daughter and had picked her up a few days before but did not return the child on the specifed day. On the day of the incident, the man drove his daughter to his mother-in-law’s residence, parked his truck on the street in front, and shot his daughter twice in the head, killing her. Witnesses saw the man walk into the residence carrying a frearm. While inside, the ofender shot and killed his mother-in-law and set fre to her residence. When the ofcers arrived at the scene, they observed smoke coming from the residence. The feld-training ofcer took a tactcal positon of cover behind the ofender’s truck where the 14-month-old-victm was located, stll seated in her car seat. The ofcer-in-training approached the residence from the side. The ofender, who was on the front porch, fred several rounds from his .45-caliber semiautomatc frearm at the feld-training ofcer, who was stll located behind the truck. One of the rounds struck the feld-training ofcer in the head, causing a nonfatal wound; the round traveled down his skull and exited his neck. The injured feld-training ofcer fred three rounds from his .45-caliber semiautomatc handgun, but none of the rounds hit the ofender. The ofcer-in-training, who had taken cover behind the patrol vehicle, was within sight of the victm ofcer. The victm ofcer atempted to run to the ofcer-in-training, but due to his diminished motor skills, fell onto the roadway. The ofcer-in-training ran to the aid of the fallen ofcer and dragged him to safety. Additonal ofcers arrived and transported the victm ofcer to a nearby ambulance, which took him to a local hospital. The fre department, with assistance from law enforcement, extnguished the house fre. Inside, emergency personnel found the bodies of the ofender and his mother-in-law. The 32-year-old ofender died from a self-inficted gunshot wound to his head. Case 17 On a warm summer night around midnight in the South, an ofcer, who had 4 years of law enforcement experience, was sitng in his marked patrol vehicle at a local convenience store. A man approached the ofcer on foot and began talking to him at the driver side door. When the ofender displayed odd behavior, the ofcer decided to exit the vehicle to speak further with him. As the ofcer started to open the door, the ofender lunged through the open window and began stabbing the ofcer with a screwdriver. The ofcer could not reach his frearm because of the way the ofender had positoned himself. The ofender grabbed the ofcer’s frearm but could not pull it from the holster due to the holster’s retenton-level safety features. Afer being stabbed several tmes in the hand and neck, the ofcer was able to shove the ofender away slightly and pull his frearm out of the holster. The struggle contnued as the ofender again tried to grab the ofcer’s frearm. The ofcer managed to fre six rounds from his .45-caliber semiautomatc frearm; however, none of the rounds hit the ofender, and he fed. The ofcer alerted dispatch, and additonal police units responded and located the ofender a short tme later. The ofcer fully recovered from his injuries and returned to duty. The 18-year-old ofender was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Case 18 Approximately 5 o’clock on a spring evening in the Midwest, a law enforcement ofcer, who had 4 years of experience, was slowly driving past a group of people gathered in a private parking lot. Without warning, a 42-year-old man threw a large knife, striking the hood of the patrol unit. The ofcer recognized the ofender as he fed. The ofcer stopped his vehicle and equipped himself with a side handle baton, preparing himself for a foot pursuit. When the ofcer opened his driver’s side door, the ofender came from behind the patrol car and stabbed

114 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS the ofcer in the forearm with the sharp prongs of a mole trap. The ofcer used his baton to force the ofender backward so he could exit his vehicle and contnued using his baton to prevent the ofender from stabbing him again. Eventually the ofcer gained enough space to remove his service weapon. As the ofcer was preparing to use his frearm, he realized that several children and innocent bystanders were close enough to be in his line of fre. The ofender threw the mole trap at the ofcer, striking his shoulder and neck area and causing serious laceratons. The ofcer pursued the ofender, tackling him a short distance later. The ofender was able to free himself from the ofcer’s hold, and another foot pursuit ensued. The ofcer caught up to the ofender and tackled him once again. The ofender grabbed a nearby can of gasoline and began swinging it at the ofcer, spraying him with gasoline. The ofcer used his baton to keep the ofender at a distance. The ofender threw the gas can at the ofcer and atempted to fee again, only to be tackled a third tme. A backup ofcer arrived to assist; however, the ofender managed to break free from both ofcers. He positoned himself on the other side of a fence, then pulled a lighter from his pocket and threatened to ignite the ofcer. Both ofcers drew their service weapons and ordered the ofender to drop the lighter. The ofender complied and fed the area. The injured ofcer had cuts on his arm, neck, and shoulder, and he had gasoline in his eyes. He was transported to a medical facility where he was treated for his injuries. The ofender was arrested 3 days later without further incident. He was convicted and sentenced to 8 years in prison. The ofcer recovered from his injuries and returned to full duty. Case 19 Around 2:45 on a dark autumn morning in the West, law enforcement ofcers were dispatched to an area near a casino and RV park where shots had been fred. When the frst ofcers arrived, a subject shot at them from his RV. Backup was coordinated, and an ofcer, who had 5 years of law enforcement experience, entered the park from the rear to avoid potental crossfre. At that tme, the ofcer believed the ofender was stll inside his RV. The RV park was circular and surrounded by a dirt mound approximately 15 feet tall. Moonlight provided the only light, so visibility was poor. The ofcer was making his way across the mound when he heard a noise that was quickly followed by muzzle fashes and gunshots. The ofcer received three gunshot wounds: one round hit his stomach but was stopped by his protectve vest, the second round hit his rib cage area entering between the vest’s panels and exitng the ofcer’s back, and the third round struck him in the back. The wounded ofcer lost his balance and fell down the hill but was able to get back up and shoot at the ofender. The ofcer began working his way back to his patrol vehicle and came upon another ofcer in a patrol vehicle. The assistng ofcer transported the wounded ofcer away from the area and sought medical treatment. Shortly thereafer, three ofcers surrounded the ofender. The ofcers and the ofender exchanged gunfre untl a round struck the ofender in his leg and he surrendered. The 46-year-old military combat veteran was convicted and sentenced to several years in prison. The injured ofcer later recovered from his wounds and returned to full duty. Case 20 On a warm night around 10 o’clock in the Midwest, an ofcer, who had 15 years of experience, was dispatched to a domestc dispute involving a 33-year-old man and his mother, with whom he lived. That night, the man had become angry and had fred rounds into the foor of the residence. Due to the nature of the call, backup units also responded. The ofcer arrived in the area and atempted to locate the residence when he encountered a vehicle sitng in the middle of the road. The driver of the vehicle informed the ofcer that a female covered in blood had crossed the road and ran into the darkness. The ofcer was stll speaking with the driver when he saw a man standing approximately 40 to 50 yards away at the rear corner of a residence. The man disappeared around the corner of the house. When the ofcer began questoning the driver again, the man reappeared at the same corner of the residence armed with a .22-caliber semiautomatc rife. The ofcer drew his .40-caliber semiautomatc handgun and ordered the man to drop the weapon. The man fred a round at the ofcer, who then ordered the driver to

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 115 leave the area to avoid being shot. The ofcer took cover behind his patrol vehicle as the ofender contnued to shoot at him. The ofcer, realizing he could not access his shotgun or rife without being in harm’s way, decided to drive away from the line of fre and wait for the backup units to arrive. The ofcer got into his patrol vehicle and accelerated as the ofender contnued shootng multple rounds at him. One of the rounds struck the ofcer in the inner part of the right eye and nasal cavity, causing blindness in his right eye. While stll driving, the ofcer applied direct pressure to his face to control the bleeding while simultaneously requestng medical assistance and providing informaton about the ofender to dispatch. The ofcer drove to meet medical personnel and was transported to the hospital. Following the shootng, the ofender barricaded himself in the residence. Tactcal teams arrived and the ofender was taken into custody several hours later. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison. The ofcer returned to duty approximately 10 days following the shootng. Case 21 Around 10:30 on a warm summer night in the Midwest, an ofcer, who had 5 years of law enforcement experience, assisted with a trafc stop that ended at the intoxicated driver’s residence. Some of the driver’s family members gathered outside to see what was happening. The driver, an immigrant, did not speak English well, so his young adult son translated for him. Afer the driver was arrested, the assistng ofcer drove away from the residence and drove to an adjacent street so she could park and complete paperwork. As she pulled into a parking lot, she observed a fgure standing in the alley behind the ofender’s residence. As the ofcer stopped the vehicle, the subject raised a .223-caliber semiautomatc rife, advanced toward the ofcer, and fred 26 rounds at her while she was stll seated in the vehicle. The ofcer was struck by six rounds that hit her face, ear, back, butocks, and legs. She also sustained several wounds from shrapnel. The ofcer drew her .45-caliber semiautomatc handgun and fred 11 rounds, but none hit the ofender. The ofender then fed into the darkness. The ofender, the driver’s young adult son, retreated to his residence to reload, but a younger brother convinced him not to. Investgators later learned that the ofender loaded the rife afer the arrest of his father. The ofender intended to walk from the alley to the front of the house to kill both ofcers. He was interrupted when the ofcer stopped her patrol vehicle at the entrance of the alley. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The ofcer recovered from her injuries and returned to full duty. Case 22 On a warm spring night around 9:35 in the Northeast, a law enforcement ofcer, who had 8 years of experience, was working a department-approved overtme detail at a grocery store when an ofender tackled him from behind. During the struggle, the ofender atempted to remove the ofcer’s 9 mm semiautomatc handgun from his holster. Although the ofcer struck the ofender multple tmes with his elbows to prevent the ofender from getng his frearm, the ofender ultmately succeeded. The ofcer turned his body to face the ofender, held tghtly to the ofender, and used his lef hand to grab the ofender’s right hand, which was holding the weapon. The ofender broke free from the ofcer’s grip and struck the ofcer in the head with the gun, causing the ofcer to become dizzy. The ofcer grabbed the ofender’s hand again and contnued the fght. During the confrontaton, the ofender fred one round, grazing the ofcer’s shoulder and causing powder burns to his ear and damage to his eardrum. The ofender dropped the weapon and atempted to run out of the store, but the ofcer maintained his grip on the ofender as the struggle contnued outside the store. The ofcer managed to take the ofender to the ground, and backup units arrived to assist. The ofcer received treatment for his injuries and returned to duty. The 20-year-old ofender pled guilty to ofenses related to this incident and was sentenced to 5 to 10 years in prison.

116 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Case 23 Around 11:30 on a summer night in the South, a law enforcement ofcer, who had 10 years of experience, was working a department-approved overtme detail at a grocery store. At closing tme, the manager locked the store and the ofcer escorted her to her vehicle. As the ofcer was walking to his vehicle, he heard gunfre. The ofcer turned to see someone shootng at him. No immediate cover was available, so the ofcer ran to avoid being shot while atemptng to fank the ofender. The ofender fred fve rounds at the ofcer using a .38 caliber revolver; one round struck the ofcer in his lower leg. The ofcer fred 14 rounds at the ofender using his service weapon, but no rounds struck the ofender. The ofender fed the scene and, in the process, discarded his gun behind a business. The ofcer immediately contacted dispatch and provided the ofender’s descripton and directon of travel. Assistng ofcers apprehended the 24-year-old ofender within minutes. The ofender was distraught over a previous relatonship and was suicidal. He was convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison. The ofcer returned to duty afer being treated for his injuries. Case 24 Approximately 2:30 a.m. in the darkness of a summer morning in the South, two law enforcement ofcers, who had 17 and 19 years of experience, respectvely, responded to assist with the investgaton of shots fred at the scene of a vehicle accident. Upon arriving at the scene, the ofcers saw four vehicles on the side of the roadway. An individual was lying on the roadway with a gunshot wound to the stomach, and two more gunshot victms were nearby. One ofcer stayed with the frst victm, and the other ofcer approached a vehicle with darkly tnted windows. From inside the vehicle, a 20-year-old ofender shot the ofcer in the upper body with a 12-gauge shotgun, knocking the ofcer down. As the ofcer got up and turned to retreat, the ofender shot him in the back of the leg. The ofcer fell to the ground again. The ofender then turned his weapon on himself and died of a self- inficted gunshot wound at the scene. The ofcer recovered from his injuries and returned to full duty. Case 25 Around 9:30 p.m. on a cool autumn night in the South, two ofcers, who had 15 and 7 years of law enforcement experience, respectvely, responded to a call concerning an actve shooter at an apartment complex. When the ofcers arrived at the complex, the driver positoned the vehicle to help secure the area. As the ofcers exited their patrol unit, the ofender fred several rounds from a .308 SKS rife, striking one of the ofcers with two rounds in the pelvic area and one round in the leg, shatering the ofcer’s femur bone and causing him to fall. The ofcer used his arms to drag himself behind the patrol unit and maintained cover with his weapon at the ready. The second ofcer saw the ofender positoned between two vehicles approximately 60 feet away. The second ofcer shot one round, which missed the ofender but caused him to fee. The injured ofcer was loaded into the back of the patrol unit and transported to a nearby ambulance. The 31-year-old ofender was found dead from a self-inficted gunshot wound. The ofcer recovered from his injuries and returned to duty. Case 26 Approximately 7 o’clock on a cold winter evening in the West, a law enforcement ofcer, who had 3 years of experience, stopped to investgate a pickup truck that appeared to be broken down. The ofcer exited his patrol vehicle and made contact with the truck’s two occupants. The ofcer was familiar with the driver from past encounters, but he did not recognize the passenger. The ofcer smelled alcohol and suspected the passenger was providing false informaton to him. During this tme, someone driving another vehicle arrived to assist the driver with his disabled truck. The driver of the truck asked the ofcer if he could go speak to the occupants of the other vehicle. The ofcer allowed the driver to walk to and from the second vehicle while he atempted to learn the true identty of the truck’s passenger. Unbeknownst to the ofcer, the driver obtained a 12-gauge shotgun from the other vehicle. The man rounded the vehicle and raised the shotgun to shoot the ofcer. The ofcer simultaneously raised his .40-caliber semiautomatc weapon but was shot in the upper right chest with several rounds from the

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 117 ofender’s weapon. The ofcer retreated for cover behind his patrol unit, but the ofender pursued him and shot him a second tme in the lef arm and side. The ofcer wove back and forth as he crossed the road to seek cover to avoid being shot again. However, the ofender shot the ofcer a third tme in the side of the head and stopped his pursuit. As the ofcer found cover behind a parked vehicle, he relayed the incident informaton to dispatch, including his locaton and the name of the ofender. An assistng ofcer arrived and transported the victm ofcer to a nearby hospital for treatment. The 30-year-old ofender fed the area and was arrested the following morning. The ofcer’s body armor stopped several rounds from causing more serious injuries. He returned to duty approximately 7 weeks later. The ofender was later convicted and sentenced to several years in prison. Case 27 Around midnight on a winter night in the West, a law enforcement ofcer, who had 27 years of experience, assisted another ofcer with a trafc stop. The second ofcer arrested the driver of the vehicle for DUI and transported him in a police unit for processing. The assistng ofcer stayed on scene to oversee the impounding of the subject’s vehicle. A tow truck arrived, and the operator began prepping the ofender’s vehicle for towing. About this tme, the ofcer observed a male subject walking down the sidewalk in their directon. The subject approached the tow truck driver and began questoning him about the vehicle being towed. When the ofcer heard the subject’s heated questons, he exited his patrol vehicle, approached the man, and asked him if he could help with anything. The man replied in a loud, aggressive tone as he walked out of sight. The ofcer began flling out an impound form, which included an inventory of the vehicle’s contents. The tow truck driver acted as a witness for the contents. As the ofcer and tow truck driver were involved in the inventory process, the man returned, approached them from behind, and shot the ofcer in the back of the head with a .22-caliber semiautomatc handgun. The ofcer took cover around the other side of the tow truck as the ofender atempted to fee. The unarmed tow truck driver began chasing the ofender down the street. The ofender shot at the driver, so the driver stopped and hurried back to the ofcer to tell him that the ofender was returning. The ofcer maintained a positon of cover and fred two rounds at the ofender with his .40 caliber semiautomatc handgun. Although the rounds did not strike the ofender, they caused him to fee. An assistng ofcer arrived on scene and transported the victm ofcer in a patrol car to the hospital. The ofcer was treated and released from the hospital afer 4 days with additonal medical care to follow. Two days later, an extensive investgaton and search for the 49-year-old ofender ended successfully. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Case 28 Approximately 6 o’clock on a warm spring evening in the South, multple ofcers were serving a warrant at the residence of a suspect who was wanted for the atempted murder of law enforcement ofcers. The warrant stemmed from a shootout that had occurred during a vehicle pursuit the previous day and had involved several ofcers. When serving the warrant, ofcers approached the front door of the residence and announced their presence. The ofender fred several rounds from an SKS semiautomatc rife through the door and wall, striking two ofcers. A 13-hour standof ensued when several ofcers surrounded the residence, and the ofender barricaded himself inside. During the standof, hundreds of rounds were exchanged, and one ofcer received a nonfatal injury. Finally, a specialized entry team gained access to the residence and arrested the 29-year-old ofender without further incident. The ofender was convicted and sentenced to several years in prison.

118 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS APPENDIX A Methodology

The results of any research project are only as good critcal during this phase of the study so the fnal prod- as the methods used to collect and analyze the data. uct is pertnent and useful to the identfed stakeholders. Researchers must clearly describe their methodology so Phase 2, composed of steps 7-12, is the data collecton others may be able to judge the veracity of the study and and analysis phase. During phase 2, the study is piloted, its results. In additon, every research study has inherent alteratons to the interview protocol are made, the data strengths and limitatons. Some limitatons are a func- are collected and analyzed, and deliverables are devel- ton of the design the researcher chooses, and some are oped and deployed. Relevant deliverables may include a result of the scope of the net that has been cast to training materials, such as this document, and profes- try to capture a given social or behavioral problem. The sional research publicatons. methodology employed for this study is described in this secton. Interview Team Staf members from the FBI’s Criminal Justce Informa- Research Design ton Services (CJIS) Division made up the interview teams For the data collecton phase, this study used the Per- for this study and mainly included trainers from the FBI’s petrator-Motve Research Design (PMRD; Vecchi, Van LEOKA Program. The interview team consisted of a pri- Hasselt & Angleman, 2013). Prior research on criminal mary interviewer who was responsible for developing motves has sufered from a lack of standardizaton, rapport with the interviewee and asking most of the which renders comparisons across studies problematc questons. The secondary interviewer wrote responses (Daniels, Angleman & Grinnan, 2015). PMRD ofers a to the questons in an interview protocol booklet and standardized method of collectng data via semistruc- confrmed that every queston was asked and adequate- tured interviews. Through a 12-step process, interview ly answered. In additon, a videographer was present at questons are developed and veted, interview teams every interview. The videographer recorded the inter- are trained, and data are collected. The 12 steps are: views and assured that the equipment was working properly. The interview teams traveled to locatons with- (1) Defne the need for research. in the United States for each interview. These locatons (2) Defne the stakeholders. included the communites where law enforcement of- (3) Identfy the ofender populaton. cers lived and the prisons where ofenders were being (4) Obtain authorites and access. held. (5) Develop and refne protocols. (6) Employ protocol training. Research Team (7) Develop subject dossiers. The frst author of this study, Jefrey A. Daniels, Ph.D., led (8) Conduct a pilot test. the research team that analyzed the data for the study. (9) Retool the protocols and process. Dr. Daniels is the chair of the Department of Counseling, (10) Collect data for the larger study. Rehabilitaton Counseling and Counseling Psychology (11) Analyze the data. at WVU. His research has focused on various aspects of (12) Develop and deploy deliverables violence, including school shootngs that were averted, (Daniels, Angleman & Grinnan, 2015). school-barricaded captve-taking events, and global hos- tage-taking. Previously, Dr. Daniels collaborated with the Daniels, Angleman & Grinnan (2015) identfed two pri- FBI on the Global Hostage-taking Research and Analysis mary phases of the PMRD method. In phase 1, which Project. The methods for both the hostage-taking proj- encompasses steps 1 through 6, the project is in research ect and the current study are based upon the PMRD and study preparaton. The input of subject mater experts is

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 119 consensual qualitatve research (Daniels, Angleman & PARTICIPANTS Grinnan, 2015). Partcipants in this study were drawn from two popu- Under the leadership of Dr. Daniels, the research team latons. One group of partcipants consisted of law included 15 doctoral students in the Counseling Psychol- enforcement ofcers who survived an ambush or an ogy program at West Virginia University. The team was unprovoked atack. These ofcers were the victms of broken into subgroups of 3-4 members and included the atacks or, if the victm ofcer did not survive, one or these students: Sarah Berkey, Chelsey Bohr, Britany more witness ofcers were interviewed. In some cases, Catania, Steven Craig, Ben Darling, Craig Foster, Melissa a surviving victm ofcer was interviewed, along with Foster, Rachel Gingles, Chelsea Latorre, Audrey Molder, one or more witness ofcers. The other group partci- Olivia Scot, Jeneice Shaw, Tim Swiger, Erin Teaf, and patng in the study was comprised of ofenders who had Brandon Webb. been tried and convicted of engaging in an ambush or Bracketng an unprovoked atack on one or more law enforcement ofcers. At the tmes of the interviews, these individu- In qualitatve research, it is customary for the research- als were serving their sentences in prisons throughout ers to communicate their biases, expectatons, and expe- the United States with no ongoing appeals or other legal riences pertaining to the topic before the study begins. issues pending. This process, known as bracketng (Fischer, 2009), dem- onstrates the researcher’s eforts to “shelve” his or her Table A - 1 assumptons as much as possible for the data analysis. Before startng this study, each member of the research Ambushes and unprovoked atacks case team submited a writen narratve of their experiences summaries with law enforcement ofcers and ofenders and their Number of Who was interviewed biases (both positve and negatve). The bracketng cases process enables researchers to contnuously view the results they are uncovering in light of their own experi- Single ofender 14 ences and perceptons. It also ofers the opportunity for Victm ofcer + ofender 9 the reader to atempt to view the data and results from 12 the perspectves of the researchers. Victm ofcer only 5 Sampling Victm ofcer + witness 4 All cases were selected from the FBI’s LEOKA Program ofcer(s) databases. Cases that were categorized as ambushes Witness ofcer only 4 or unprovoked atacks from a 10-year period startng in 2001 and ending in 2011 were chosen. Because a Multple victm ofcers 2 small number of ofenders were available for partcipa- ton, the FBI’s Insttutonal Review Board approved the Multple ofenders 2 research team’s request to select additonal cases from a 5-year period startng in 1995 and ending in 2000. These In total, 40 cases were reviewed and included interviews cases were selected based upon the same criteria as the of 33 law enforcement ofcers and 27 ofenders. cases chosen from 2001 to 2011. Among these cases, 14 involved interviews with single ofenders, 9 entailed interviews of individual victm ofcers as well as their respectve individual ofenders, 5 involved interviews of only individual victm ofcers, and 4 included interviews with the victm ofcers and at

12 Bracketng informaton is available and may be requested from the LEOKA Program.

120 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS least 1 witness ofcer for each incident. In additon, four history, family structure, and reasons for becoming a cases involved interviews with only individual witness police ofcer. The researchers asked additonal ques- ofcers, two cases included interviews with two or more tons about the ofcer’s history of physical confronta- victm ofcers, and two cases with multple ofenders tons, including how old the ofcer was at the tme of his included two interviews with two ofenders each. Table or her frst fght, and if he or she had been involved in A-1 summarizes these cases. any altercatons as an adult (including as a law enforce- ment ofcer). Procedures and protocol The LEOKA research team applied two sets of standard Secton B: Family structure. In this secton of the procedures and interview protocols, one for law enforce- interview, researchers focused on the ofcer’s family ment ofcers and one for ofenders. Those protocols of origin while growing up. For example, one queston were developed by the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit, asked the ofcer to indicate the number of siblings, step now known as the Behavioral Analysis Unit 5: Research siblings, and/or half siblings in his or her family. Addi- and Program Management. tonal questons focused on the ofcer’s relatonship status during the assault, and his or her relatonship Interview procedures for law enforcement status at the tme of the interview. Questons included ofcers whether or not the ofcer had any children at the tme The LEOKA research team contacted potental law of the ambush or unprovoked atack, and if he or she enforcement partcipants by telephone. The caller had children at the tme of the interview. described the purpose and methods of the study and Secton C: Law enforcement training. Secton C explained that an ofcer’s partcipaton was entrely focused on the ofcer’s prior training. Researcher’s voluntary. If the ofcer agreed, an interview date was questons probed for specifc topics of training and the scheduled. As previously mentoned, the interview amount of tme spent on that training during the of- team consisted of three members: the principal inter- cer’s professional development. This included courses, viewer, a member to complete the protocol book, and such as weapons training, that the ofcer was enrolled a videographer. Before beginning each interview, the in during an academy and during any post-academy LEOKA research team reiterated the purpose and meth- training (in-service, recertfcaton, etc.). ods of the study and explained that partcipaton was strictly voluntary. If the partcipants agreed to contnue, Secton D: Before assault. In this secton of the inter- they were asked to sign two forms: a research consent view, each ofcer was asked about recent performance form indicatng that they were volunteering to partci- evaluatons, physical examinatons/conditon, and the pate in the study, and a training form which allowed the extent to which life events created distracton. Ques- research team to use recordings for the purpose of law tons examined drug, alcohol, and tobacco use, and pre- enforcement training. Transcripts for analysis were cre- scripton drugs that may have been taken in a tmeframe ated from the recorded interviews. before the assault. The law enforcement ofcer was also asked about any previous line-of-duty assaults, use of a Interview Protocol for Law Enforcement service frearm, and any use-of-force encounters. Ofcers The law enforcement ofcer interview protocol consist- Secton E: Assault under study. This secton and the ed of seven sectons: Background Material, Family Struc- remaining portons of the interview centered on the ture, Law Enforcement Training, Before Assault, Assault ambush/unprovoked atack and what happened during under Study, Characteristcs of Scene, and Post-Assault and afer the incident. In this ffh secton of the inter- Actvity. view, the ofcer was asked to talk specifcally about the ambush/unprovoked atack that was chosen to be Secton A: Background material. In this segment of included in this research. Ideally, the ofcer’s narra- the interview, researchers obtained the ofcer’s back- tve provided enough detail to complete the specifed ground informaton, such as his or her current demo- questons, but in most cases, additonal questons were graphic informaton, occupatonal and educatonal required to complete these sectons.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 121 Secton F: Characteristcs of scene. Researchers housed. The purpose and methods of the study, as well asked ofcers to describe the scene of the assault and as the voluntary nature of the ofender’s partcipaton, questoned each ofcer about his or her physical and were explained to prison ofcials. Upon approval from mental status immediately before the assault. This infor- the correctonal insttuton, an interview date was estab- maton included the tour of duty (morning, afernoon, lished with prison personnel. night), characteristcs of the assault scene such as light- Ofenders were not notfed of the pending interview ing and other environmental conditons, the ofcer’s in advance. The frst reason for this was that there was atre, and previous encounters at the locaton for simi- concern if ofenders had extended tme to consider the lar calls. Detailed informaton was also solicited about interview they could possibly invent responses concern- the ofender—what he or she was doing when the of- ing their incidents. Second, without tme to prepare, cer frst observed him or her and any preassault behav- immediate responses to the interviewer’s questons iors that the ofcer may have notced. In additon, the were considered to be more authentc. ofcer was asked to describe the actual assault, the res- Upon arrival, a member of the research team explained oluton of the incident, what he or she learned from the the purpose and methods of the study, as well as the assault, and recommendatons for other ofcers who voluntary nature of partcipaton to the ofender. If the may encounter a similar situaton. ofender agreed to contnue he or she was asked to sign Secton G: Post-assault actvity. In this secton, of- both a research consent form confrming the ofender’s cers were asked about their lives afer the ambush or voluntary partcipaton in the study and a training form unprovoked atack. They were asked about the process which allowed the research team to use recordings for of their recovery and any lingering physical or psycholog- the purpose of law enforcement training. As was done ical difcultes. Questons also focused on who support- for the interviews with ofcers, the interview team con- ed the ofcer following the atack, such as the ofcer’s sisted of the principal interviewer, a member to com- department, family, friend(s), or community. Research- plete the protocol book, and a videographer. Transcripts ers asked the ofcer if he or she performs their police for analysis were created from the recorded interviews. work diferently as a result of the atack, such as wear- Interview protocol for ofenders ing a protectve vest or making changes to training. The ofcer was also asked about counseling or other profes- The interview protocol for ofenders contained nine sional services he or she may have received to help cope sectons: Selected resources, Background informaton, with the trauma. Finally, each ofcer was provided an Family structure and environment, Entertainment, At- opportunity to share any advice he or she would ofer tudes toward authority, Criminal history, Weapons train- to other law enforcement ofcers that could help them ing and use, Characteristcs of scene and encounter, and survive or prevent similar atacks. Self-reported ofense data. Interview procedures for ofenders Secton A: Selected resources. The interview team completed Secton A by compiling informaton from Researchers used a diferent method to secure inter- data sources concerning the ofender. Examples of these views with study partcipants who were ofenders. sources include police, medical, psychiatric, or criminal Because of an ofender’s criminal actvites, the LEOKA records; the ofender’s level of intelligence (and the research team had to ensure that potental partcipants instrument used to assess this); chronic behavior pat- did not have a current appeal or pending charges for terns noted in the records; and medical history. other unrelated criminal acts. To verify that no pending appeals or charges existed, the research team contacted Secton B: Background informaton. In this secton correctonal ofcials as well as staf at the ofces of the of the interview, researchers asked the ofender about atorneys general for the states where the ofenders his or her background at the tme of the ambush and were being housed. If no legal constraints were ident- at the tme of the interview. Questons pertained to an fed, the LEOKA research team coordinated access to ofender’s family constellaton, race and ethnicity, and an ofender with the prison in which the ofender was other demographic details.

122 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Secton C: Family structure and environment. These practce with the type of weapon the ofender used. questons solicited additonal details about the ofend- Researchers started with questons about weapons used er’s family of origin, childhood/adolescence, and prior during the ofender’s childhood and moved to questons insttutonalizaton. Some of the questons centered on about the weapon(s) used in the ambush or unprovoked the ofender’s parents and their parentng methods, assault. Partcipants were also queried about when they including their parents’ involvement with drugs, alcohol, frst began to carry a weapon, the locaton(s) where it and criminal endeavors. was kept, and the reasons for carrying it. Researchers also asked about the access and disposal of weapons, Secton D: Entertainment. During this porton of the again with the warning that informaton about any interview, researchers asked about the ofender’s inter- crimes for which the ofender was not prosecuted would est in and involvement with various forms of entertain- be turned over to the authorites. ment, such as sports, reading, music, movies, video games, and the Internet. The questons included topics Secton H: Characteristcs of scene and encounter. concerning involvement with drugs, alcohol, and actvi- This secton of the interview protocol examined tes with friends. the ambush or unprovoked atack under study. The interviewee was frst asked to give a narratve of the Secton E: Attudes toward authority. The ques- event, including the circumstances that led up to the tons in this secton pertained to the ofender’s attudes atack, the atack itself, and its conclusion (arrest). Most toward authority fgures. This included an ofender’s of the qualitatve data was collected during this secton views on diferent authority fgures throughout his or of the interview as the researchers sought to understand her life. Types of authority fgures discussed included what happened and why the ofender chose to ambush/ police ofcers, teachers, parents, and military superi- atack a law enforcement ofcer. ors (if the ofender was in the military). Questons also assessed any thoughts or fantasies an ofender may Secton I: Self-reported ofense data. In this secton have had about harming or killing a police ofcer prior the researchers asked the ofender about his or her to the ambush. mindset immediately prior to the assault/ambush; any precipitatng crises; thoughts, feelings, and behaviors Secton F: Criminal history. If the ofender had a prior during the atack; and thoughts, feelings, and behaviors criminal history, researchers asked about the ofenses afer the atack. Other questons assessed whether any for which he or she had been prosecuted. The inter- substances had been consumed prior to the assault, viewee was warned that if he or she provided details whether or not the ofender was actng alone, and the about ofenses for which the ofender had not been extent of planning that may have gone into the assault/ prosecuted, then the informaton would be turned over ambush. to the authorites for investgaton and a possible pros- ecuton. Researchers asked at which ages these prior DATA ANALYSIS crimes occurred; the individual’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors surrounding the event; and the legal outcome Data collected during this study from the semistructured of the case. The ofender was also asked to describe the interviews were analyzed both quanttatvely and quali- circumstances surrounding each crime he or she had tatvely. The quanttatve informaton that was gathered commited. contained measureable event characteristcs, such as ofcer and ofender demographics. Qualitatve informa- Secton G: Weapons training and use. In earlier stud- ton collected from the interviews was data that was not ies of felonious assaults against law enforcement of- easily measured but provided insight into the incidents cers, a common fnding among ofenders was that they studied. The qualitatve informaton included notable were likely to practce with the type of weapon used in concepts and recurring details from the narratves of the atack much more frequently than the police practce the ofcers and the ofenders. Most of the analyses con- with their weapons. Therefore, in this secton, questons ducted for this study involved these qualitatve details. were asked about prior formal and informal training and

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 123 Quanttatve Analyses CQR For the quanttatve analyses, two databases were cre- The hallmark of CQR is that members of a research team ated—one for the ofcer interviews and one for the independently analyze the data and then come together ofender interviews. All questons that could be quan- for frequent meetngs to discuss their results. The aim of tfable were included in each database and were then the discussions is to come to consensus on the meaning entered for every interview. Many of the items consisted of each piece of data. Thus, inital inter-rater agreement of categorical data. For example, all the ofenders were is not of high concern in CQR because it is the fnal con- asked about the types of weapons they had practced sensus that is most important. There are three stages of with, and their answers were grouped into categories by analysis with CQR: blocking, ratng, and auditng. In this specifc types of weapons. For all such questons, non- study, the researchers included three additonal steps: parametric statstcal analyses were conducted to exam- inital read through, two-phase ratng (inital and mas- ine possible signifcant diferences across the categories. ter), and cross analysis. These steps, which ultmately Other items included contnuous variables, or variables led to the development of codebooks that defned the that can be measured, such as the ofender’s age of frst behaviors and characteristcs identfed from the quali- arrest. For all such questons, researchers analyzed data tatve data, are detailed below. with descriptve statstcs (means, standard deviatons, medians, etc.). Note: Because of rounding, groups of Inital read through. When a transcript was delivered percentages in this study may not add to 100.0. from the LEOKA coordinator of the FBI’s CJIS Division to the lead researcher, it was prepared by adding a ttle page Finally, the researchers ran a series of predictve equa- and numbering all lines of the text. The lead researcher tons (e.g., log-linear analyses and multple regression then sent the transcript to members of the team, who analyses) to predict various outcomes. For example, were instructed to read it in its entrety before analyzing using an equaton that evaluates several variables relat- it. The purpose of this inital read through was two-fold. ed to the event characteristcs to predict ofcer survival First, the reader gained an overall understanding of the would be helpful informaton. However, none of these ambush from the interviewee’s perspectve. This global analyses resulted in statstcally signifcant results due knowledge was later used to aid in the understanding partally to small sample size. Therefore, none of these and analysis of specifc statements. Second, during the results were reported in the ofcer or ofender chapters. inital read through, the reader was asked to pay aten- Qualitatve Analyses ton to the interviewee’s verbal style, idiosyncrasies, and note any changes in his or her use of paralinguistc uter- Qualitatve data analysis involves sifing through large ances. The later may include an increase in the use of volumes of data, and identfying themes, paterns, and uterances such as “um,” “ah,” false starts, or stuters, relatonships among them. For the qualitatve compo- and may indicate heightened anxiety. nent of this study, the researchers analyzed the data using CQR. CQR was developed by Clara Hill and her Blocking. Afer the inital read through, each member of associates to qualitatvely analyze psychotherapy ses- the research team independently reread the transcript sions (Hill, Thompson & Williams, 1997) and has since and highlighted segments of text that addressed the three been used to study multple social and behavioral sci- main areas of emphasis for the analysis: Who? What? ence phenomena (Hill, 2012; Hill et al., 2005). The lead Why? These highlighted segments of text represented researcher on this study, Jefrey A. Daniels, Ph.D., has blocks of data that were later analyzed. Blocks may be used CQR for more than 10 years to study other violent a single phrase, a sentence, or a paragraph and should ofenders, such as individuals convicted of kidnapping represent a single thought or idea. Each member of the or hostage-taking (Daniels, Angleman & Grinnan, 2015; research team then sent his or her blocks to the lead Daniels, Angleman, Vecchi, et al., 2015). He has also researcher. The lead researcher collated the blocks into used CQR to study averted school shootngs (Daniels et a table that included the line numbers from the text al., 2010).

124 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS where the block was located. One column of the table Auditng. Upon completon of the master ratngs, a was reserved for individual researcher’s ratng of each member of the research team who had not been involved block of text. These ratngs are described in the next in the analysis of that interview served as an auditor and secton. reviewed a spreadsheet of the ratngs (Schlosser, Dewey & Hill, 2012). (An ideal auditor is familiar with CQR as a Inital ratngs. The lead researcher sent the collated methodology and the research topic being studied, but table of blocks to each member of the research team, is not involved in the data analysis.) The auditor’s roles who then independently rated each block of text, using included providing an independent, fresh perspectve of inital codebooks developed from previous LEOKA the data, checking for the trustworthiness of the team’s studies (i.e., the frst three LEOKA studies: Pinizzoto & analysis, and assuring that any blocks that had been Davis, 1992; Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 1997; Pinizzoto, rated with an earlier version of the codebooks were Davis & Miller, 2006). These codebooks include lists of updated with the fnal codes. overall topics. One codebook was used for the ofenders and included topics such as mental state and attudes The auditor looked at the master ratng of each block toward authority. A separate codebook was used for of data and, using the appropriate codebook, decided if the law enforcement ofcers with topics including a block’s code was appropriate. If the auditor believed awareness of surroundings and seeking cover. (More a block was miscoded, he or she indicated what she or informaton about codebooks may be found later in this he believed the correct code should be and wrote a jus- CQR secton.) Because all the blocks identfed by the tfcaton. This spreadsheet was sent back to the lead researchers were inserted into the table, some blocks researcher. Then, the team met and reviewed any dis- were deemed unrelated to any of the three areas of crepancies between their master code and the auditor’s emphasis (who, what, why) or ofered insufcient detail. ratng and considered the auditor’s justfcaton. At this Thus, in the inital ratng stage, members of the research tme, they could either disregard the auditor’s ratng team could choose to drop a partcular block. In additon, and maintain their original code, or change their original if a block of data did not readily ft into the existng code to the code ofered by the auditor. codes, a team member could rate that block with “new Cross-analysis. Afer all of the data have been fnalized, code” and then identfy the new code. Every member the last step in CQR is to compare and contrast the cases. of the research team then sent their ratngs to the lead The cross-analysis is conducted to determine similari- researcher for collaton into one table of ratngs. tes and diferences across all cases (Ladany, Thompson Master ratngs. Next, the research team met to discuss & Hill, 2012). This is most commonly accomplished by discrepancies among the collated ratngs. If most team semiquantfying the results by assigning labels to codes members identfed a given block with a specifc code, based on their frequency. The following labels were then that block was considered rated. Therefore, if three applied to each code, followed by the number of partci- or more of the fve team members rated a block the pants who addressed each. same, then that block was given that code as the mas- General All or all but one partcipant addressed ter ratng. For example, if three team members rated a a code given block of a law enforcement ofcer’s text as 17.1, Typical More than half, up to General Bystander safety, then 17.1 was the master code for that block, and no discussion occurred. However, if a given Variant Less than half, but at least two block was not rated the same by at least three of the Unique Only one, but it was deemed to be fve team members, then the entre team discussed that important block untl full consensus was atained for that master code.13

13 Given the length of transcripts and the sheer amount of data to be analyzed, the research team decided to not discuss every discrepancy untl 100 percent agreement was atained. Transcripts, from inital read through untl completon, averaged 1 month to analyze–discussing every block in which 100 percent agreement was not initally atained could easily have added 3 or 4 weeks to the process.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 125 This iteratve process of discussing blocks of data and multple minor revisions. A total of 31 major codes were their meaning led to the development of two new code- developed, with an additonal 62 subcodes being estab- books, an ofcer codebook and an ofender codebook, lished.14 which defned the results of this study. The development of both codebooks is described in the following para- Strengths and Limitatons graphs. Previous studies of police ofcer ambushes have relied heavily on quanttatve analyses of natonal data or Law enforcement ofcer codebook development. The data from focus groups. To date, perhaps the most development of the ofcer codebook took place over comprehensive study was conducted by the IACP in 1974. a period of approximately 2 years. In the frst iteraton, That study included comprehensive records reviews and inital codes were extracted from previous studies interviews with victm ofcers when possible. of ofcer assaults (i.e., the frst three LEOKA studies: A primary strength of the current study is that the data Pinizzoto & Davis, 1992; Pinizzoto et al., 1997; Pinizzoto, includes records reviews, interviews with victm and et al., 2006). As the team began reading transcripts witness ofcers, and interviews with ofenders. No other for this study, they deleted some of these inital codes ambush study has included the ofender perspectves. because the codes did not pertain to ambushes or A second strength of this study is the systematc unprovoked atacks. The team developed more codes as methodology that was used to collect and analyze the they atempted to make sense of each new transcript. In data as detailed above. A third, and related strength, some cases, new codes were developed, or defnitons is that the qualitatve analyses were conducted with of existng codes were altered to account for new data techniques to mitgate individual bias or expectaton. that emerged. If most of the researchers did not initally agree on a In the end, the law enforcement ofcer codebook specifc code for a block of data from the transcript, experienced seven major updates, with many other that ratng was discussed untl a majority consensus was minor updates occurring untl the team reached data atained for each disputed block. In additon, an auditor saturaton. In qualitatve research, saturaton occurs with a fresh perspectve evaluated the codes assigned to when no new themes or codes emerge from the data each block of data and provided feedback for discussion (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In the current study, no new if the auditor deemed it necessary. substantve codes emerged afer roughly 25 transcripts Every study has limitatons. Perhaps the greatest were rated. The team began looking at transcripts in limitaton of this study is that the sample is not random September 2013 and fnalized the codes on September but is a convenience sample of individuals involved in 30, 2015. A total of 30 major themes were developed, an ambush or unprovoked atack who were willing with 87 subcodes also being established. to be interviewed. Our ability to generalize to any Ofender codebook development. The ofender code- and all ambushes or unprovoked atacks is therefore book went through a similar process as that of the ofcer questonable. Perhaps others who did not choose codebook. Inital codes were also developed from the to partcipate and be interviewed hold diferent results of the three previous LEOKA studies. Likewise, perspectves from those who did choose to partcipate. these codes transformed over tme, with some being dis- carded, some defnitons being altered, and many new codes being developed. Data saturaton occurred afer approximately 20 transcripts, with no new codes emerg- ing. Between September 2013 and October 1, 2015, the ofender codebook went through six major revisions and

14 1.0 Overall Motve, and the six primary motves, are not included in these numbers as they qualitatvely diferent data.

126 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS APPENDIX B LEOKA Studies and Ofcer

PREVIOUS LEOKA STUDIES The third LEOKA study was Violent Encounters: A Study of Felonious Assaults on our Naton’s Law Enforcement The LEOKA Program conducted three previous stud- Ofcers (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, 2006). In this study, ies regarding atacks against law enforcement ofcers. researchers examined felonious assaults and lethal These three studies ofer unique perspectves on vio- encounters, and the concept of the “deadly mix” was lence against police that is based on the analysis of struc- ofered as the lens through which to view these atacks. tured interviews of both victm ofcers and ofenders. The deadly mix is a descripton for the factors that con- The frst study, Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study of tribute to an assault becoming deadly for an ofcer. Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Ofcers (Piniz- These factors include an ofcer’s perceptons, actons, zoto & Davis, 1992), examined 51 events in which 54 and assumptons; the ofender’s perceptons, actons, law enforcement ofcers were killed. In this study, only and assumptons; and the circumstances of the incident. ofenders were interviewed. The authors focused on Researchers reviewed 40 cases that included 50 law the circumstances surrounding the atacks, characteris- enforcement ofcers and 43 ofenders. tcs of the victm ofcers, characteristcs of the ofend- ers, and the psychological makeup of the ofenders. The ABOUT LEOKA’S OFFICER SAFETY study details the motves reported by the ofenders as AWARENESS PRESENTATIONS well. The authors also studied strategies for interrogat- Perhaps the most notable outcome of the research con- ing ofenders with antsocial and dependent personality ducted for LEOKA studies is the informatonal presenta- disorders and ofered training recommendatons for law tons that the LEOKA Program has developed based on enforcement ofcers. In additon, the study document- the fndings. The LEOKA Program’s on-site presentatons ed several variables that were involved in the deaths of are designed to assist law enforcement managers, train- law enforcement ofcers such as interactons between ers, and personnel in the identfcaton of training points an ofcer and an ofender, their life experiences and per- for the purpose of preventng the deaths and/or serious ceptons, and the situatons that brought them together. injuries of law enforcement ofcers. The presentatons The second LEOKA study, In the Line of Fire: Violence consist of in-depth analyses of the research conducted against Law Enforcement (Pinizzoto, Davis & Miller, in Killed in the Line of Duty, In the Line of Fire, and Vio- 1997), concentrated on felonious, nonlethal assaults. It lent Encounters, as well as explanatons of the scientfc included data from 40 incidents in which 52 law enforce- fndings of the research in operatonal terms. The TAKE ment ofcers were assaulted by 42 ofenders. In this A.I.M. poster, included at the end of this appendix, is one publicaton the authors provided greater detail about example of the practcal informaton presented from the the methodology and the interview protocols, and again research. focused on the circumstances surrounding the assault, In additon to LEOKA’s statstcal data, the FBI shares the the victm ofcers, and the ofenders. Adding new per- informaton collected through interviews with surviv- spectve, this study included interviews with the ofcers ing ofcers and convicted ofenders during their OSAT. as well as the ofenders. Therefore, post-assault conse- Excerpts from videos of the research-based interviews quences for ofcers, such as traumatc responses, were are a vital part of the experience. A common theme dur- considered. ing the presentatons is the sobering efect these videos

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 127 have on law enforcement ofcers as they observe frsthand accounts from victm ofcers who were critcally injured and from the ofenders who assaulted them. This unique ability to share both perspectves of a critcal encounter is the hallmark of a LEOKA presentaton.

The LEOKA Program’s presentatons enhance ofcer safety through research, resource allocaton, the development of follow-up training, improved policies and procedures, and, perhaps most importantly, an increase in an individual ofcer’s personal situatonal awareness. Ofcers who complete evaluatons of the course consistently indicate the value of the training with high approval ratngs. As of this study, more than 82,396 law enforcement ofcers rep- resentng 26,924 law enforcement agencies have received the informaton on safety and strategies to prevent or mitgate atacks.

Law enforcement agencies interested in having a LEOKA presenter to their agencies can request one by e-mailing the liaison staf at [email protected].

128 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 129 130 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS APPENDIX C Human Reactons to Trauma

Internally, people respond diferently to overwhelming stmuli. For instance, during a traumatc event, actors may experience tunnel vision (the tendency to focus on only one aspect of the event); they may be overcome by emotons or anxiety; or they may be unable to focus on anything but their injuries. The victm must quickly take in a tremendous amount of informaton and may easily experience cognitve overload, especially if the atack was initated without warning. The human brain can consciously process only a certain amount of input, and once that threshold has been reached, no new informaton can be processed. A victm may cease to respond on a ratonal level once this occurs.

While reactons to a crisis are not the same for each person, trauma researchers, Levers and Buck (2012, pp. 323-324), have reported that people respond to crisis on four primary levels: physical/physiological, psychological, behavioral, and spiritual/existental.

Figure 2.1 Schematc illustraton of the defense cascade as it progresses along the 6-F course of acton. The ‘‘uproar’’ sympathetc arousal reaches a maximum at the fright stage, eventually superseded by the onset of dissociatve “shut down” (gray area). Reproduced with permission from ZeitschriffurPsychologie / Journal of Psychology 2010; Vol. 218(2):109– 127©2010, Hogrefe Publishing www.hogrefe.com DOI: 10.1027/0044-3409/a000018

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 131 Physical/physiological reactons to trauma the body’s escalaton for acton. It is at this fourth stage that the body makes its turn to the “shut down” phase As an individual encounters a threatening situaton, a (see Figure 2.1). In the previous stages, the sympathetc number of physiological or biological responses may nervous system was actvated and pumped the body occur. In their research on traumatc stress, Schauer full of adrenaline. In the fright stage, the sympathetc and Elbert (2010) detailed a six-stage model of physical nervous system is stll actvated, but this is also when reactons to traumatc events, composed of six Fs. the parasympathetc nervous system is triggered. The These include freeze, fight, fght, fright, fag, and faint, result of the body’s dual system actvaton may be an as shown in Figure 2.1. Freeze, fight, and fght are increased risk of cardiac arrest in these moments. While characterized by the body’s preparatons to run away or the person is involuntarily immobile at this stage, he or to fght back. Fright, fag, and faint are characterized by she is stll very much alert and cognitvely processing the body’s shutng down as a way to minimize injury or informaton. Thus, the victm will retain memories of death. details of the atack. Consequently, survivors of atacks Not all people experience all six of the stages described. who entered this stage may experience guilt or anger When a threat is frst encountered, the inital reacton is because they do not understand why they didn’t fght the freeze response, also known as atentve immobility. back. Physiologically, though, they were unable to do so. The person momentarily ceases movement and gathers Stage fve, fag, occurs when the body, which stll informaton about the threat. He or she focuses cannot move, transitons from immobility due to atenton on the source of the threat (in humans this muscle tension (stage 4) to faccid immobility (Schauer is mostly focused visual atenton). This focus is ofen & Elbert, 2010). That is, the muscles now relax to the referred to as hypervigilance. At the same tme, several point of losing any form of rigidity and become loose physiological/bodily systems are actvated, including or sof. It is not uncommon for a person at this stage a decrease in heart rate and inhibiton of movement. to lose control of his or her bladder and/or bowels. It is Within seconds, the body has a reverse in physiological also at this tme that mental functons shut down, the reacton, which includes increased heart rate and an person becomes cognitvely and emotonally numb, and increase in the startle response. This is the body’s way of she or he surrenders to the threat/atack. This is the preparing for the next stage of the stress reacton. In the precursor to the sixth and fnal stage, faintng, or loss of second and third stages, the body is prepared for fight consciousness. or fght. According to the model proposed by Schauer and Elbert (2010), the person will frst atempt to fee As previously mentoned, not all victms of trauma if the threat is perceived to be serious. If fight is not experience all six stages of the bodily responses to a possible, then the body prepares to fght of the threat. threat. Indeed, many soldiers and frst responders, such In this stage, the body’s sympathetc nervous system is as police ofcers, may only experience the frst three actvated, meaning that the body reaches its peak level stages in dangerous situatons, with fewer experiencing of arousal via the release of adrenaline. Physiological the immobility described in the later stages. reactons at these stages include increased heart rate, increased blood pressure and blood fow to the large Psychological reactons to trauma exoskeletal muscles, and restricton of blood fow to In conjuncton with the physical reactons to a traumatc the skin in order to decrease blood loss should an injury event, a victm’s psychological reactons are also occur. As this bodily process peaks, the person begins important to consider. For this study, psychological to experience fear, which is represented by “dizziness, reactons were reviewed for both the immediate nausea, palpitaton, drowsiness, light-headedness, tmeframe and for long-term eforts to process the event tension, blurred vision, feelings of irreality, numbing, and cope with the possible efects of the trauma. and tngling” (Schauer & Elbert, 2010, p. 112). Immediate psychological responses Stage four of Schauer and Elbert’s (2010) model is termed During a crisis, several immediate psychological reactons fright, and is characterized by immobility. Up untl now, are possible. For instance, some people immediately the body has been in what Schauer and Elbert termed experience the cognitve overload mentoned previously. an “uproar” phase, which has been accompanied by

132 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS Other people may fnd their atenton sharpens, taking memories accessed for the current study are episodic, in minute details that can be clearly recalled later. This which may be altered as one atempts to make sense of sharpening of atenton may lead to tunnel vision—losing an event. the ability to focus on anything except one stmulus. Some experiencing trauma may develop symptoms that Longer-term psychological responses meet the criteria for acute stress disorder (ASD), which Following a traumatc experience, such as an ambush can be a precursor to post-traumatc stress disorder or unprovoked atack, people spend tme atemptng to (PTSD). “come to grips” with what happened to them. They ofen Because of the varying responses that can occur in the rely on existng thought paterns and belief systems to moment and the tme period soon afer a traumatc process their experience. Statstcs demonstrate most event, persons involved may recall the situaton people (80 percent) who endure trauma do not develop diferently. The most common conceptualizaton of PTSD and return to a psychologically healthy level of human memory is called the dual-store theory (Terry, functoning (PTSD Alliance, 2017). Others, however, 2009). In this theory, there are two components of develop symptoms of psychological disorders, such as memory: short-term and long-term. Each component ASD, PTSD, depression, or other problematc reactons. afects how a person remembers an incident. ASD is characterized by an intense emotonal reacton to Short-term memory (STM), also called working memory, a trauma from 2 days to 4 weeks following the trauma is limited in both duraton and capacity. Under most exposure. The criteria for diagnosing ASD as described in conditons, unless a person works to keep something the Diagnostc and Statstcal Manual (DSM-5) is: in the STM longer, informaton remains in the STM …the individual has at least three of the between 15 and 30 seconds. The capacity of the STM is following: (a) a subjectve sense of numbing generally between fve and nine items of informaton. or detachment, (b) reduced awareness of During cognitve overload, the capacity of the STM, also one’s surroundings, (c) derealizaton, (d) known as the executve functon of the brain, becomes depersonalizaton, or (e) dissociatve amnesia overwhelmed and stops processing new informaton (Bryant, Friedman, Spiegel, Ursano & Strain, (Jaeggi et al., 2007). This is parallel to what was 2010, p. 2). described previously when the body experiences the fag response (a cognitve shutdown). A person in this Additonal symptoms of ASD include: the traumatc state may not be able to respond appropriately to the experience is persistently reexperienced, the individual environment because of confusion and disorientaton avoids stmuli that reminds him or her of the experience, that may accompany cognitve overload. and the person may feel elevated levels of anxiety and increased arousal. These symptoms must cause the To recall informaton from the STM at a later tme, a person signifcant distress or impairment in social or person must also process it in their long term memory occupatonal functoning and cannot be due to substance (LTM). One widely held theory is that once human use or other medical conditons. beings learn something they will always retain it in the LTM (Terry, 2009). With regard to capacity, the LTM is Ofen ASD is a precursor to PTSD (Bryant et al., 2010). thought to be unlimited in capacity (to date, no one has The symptoms are comparable, but whereas ASD may ever learned so much that he or she was unable to learn be diagnosed within 2 days and up to 4 weeks post- anything more). The problem with the LTM is humans trauma, PTSD cannot be diagnosed untl afer 4 weeks ofen fail to remember items in their LTM. However, if have elapsed. Thus, the main diference is duraton of given the right cues, they should be able to remember. the symptoms. The LTM is divided into episodic and semantc memory. It is important to note that although most people Episodic memories are personal and relate to a person’s experience stress reactons to trauma, the majority do experiences. People tend to remember episodic not experience the level of distress associated with a memories as if they were a movie. Semantc memories diagnosis of ASD or PTSD. Some protectve factors that are the facts and informaton that have been retained safeguard an individual from the development of a throughout a person’s lifetme (Terry, 2009). Most of the psychological disorder like ASD or PTSD afer a traumatc

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 133 experience include previous exposure to trauma, good Spirituality has many defnitons, but in one study, social supports, and psychological hardiness (Fyhn, Fjell spirituality referred to fnding meaning in life, hope, & Johnsen, 2015). Hardiness has been defned as “a idealism, and connectedness with others (Tovar, 2011). personality style that infuences the individual to cope Another study of policing defned spirituality as “related with challenges in a constructve and proactve way” to meaning, purpose, and connectedness to what (Fyhn et al., 2015, p. 2). one considers sacred and how one aligns with that sacredness” (Charles, Travis & Smith, 2014, p. 231). Behavioral reactons to trauma In response to trauma, some people may queston their Exposure to traumatc events can result in changes core values, such as their religious or spiritual beliefs, in a person’s behaviors. Sometmes the resultng and their beliefs in the goodness of people. They may behaviors are positve coping strategies, and sometmes begin to queston the meaning or purpose of life, and the behaviors lead to further problems. Among the fnd themselves on a slippery slope that leads toward positve coping behaviors are seeking out support from self-destructve behaviors. In one study of Chicago- friends, family, and other ofcers and partcipatng in area police ofcers who worked juvenile sex abuse professional counseling. Among many law enforcement cases, Tovar (2011) found that some ofcers reported ofcers, there is a stgma atached to seeing a “shrink,” “relatonship problems . . . change in worldviews, and a but one of the consistent fndings of the current study loss of sense of meaning.” on ambushes and unprovoked atacks is that counseling Charles, Travis, and Smith (2014) also studied the can be very helpful following such assaults. Another spirituality of police ofcers and found that many positve coping strategy several ofcers in this study ofcers relied on their spiritual beliefs and practces to described was going back to work as soon as possible. help them cope with the difcultes they faced every These ofcers reported that it was therapeutc to get day. One ofcer in their study described his depression back into a routne. and alcoholism following a school shootng but also On the negatve side, some people emotonally recounted his recovery that followed an enhanced withdraw from friends and family afer a traumatc commitment to his spiritual practces. For an ofcer who event. This behavior may lead to relatonship problems has been traumatzed by an atack and holds spiritual and possibly an increased risk of divorce for those who beliefs, it is important to consider the ofcer’s history are married. Increased alcohol consumpton and illicit and how spirituality and spiritual practces can assist in drug use by victms of trauma are commonly used coping recovery. mechanisms. Although these behaviors may work in the short-term by numbing the emotonal pain, in the Summary long run, they are inefectve strategies to deal with the In the afermath of a traumatc event, such as being efects of trauma. ambushed or involved in an unprovoked atack, Spiritual/existental reactons to trauma humans respond on four primary levels: physiologically, psychologically, behaviorally, and spiritually. All of these Over the past several years, there has been a growing aspects are interrelated, so a negatve response in interest in the law enforcement community to one area may have a negatve impact in another area. study and address the spiritual needs of ofcers. Despite receiving injuries and being psychologically and For instance, a course ofered at the FBI’s Natonal spiritually traumatzed, people can develop efectve Academy is Spirituality, Wellness, and Vitality Issues in coping strategies by relying on the resources in their Law Enforcement Practces (Willis, 2010). Many police environment. Such resources may include family, friends, ofcers are immersed in the darkest levels of humanity coworkers, the community, one’s religious/spiritual on a daily basis. Such experiences can take a toll on their community and beliefs, and professional counselors and emotonal well-being and on their spirituality. As a result, psychologists. burnout, depression, and other negatve outcomes may develop.

134 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS APPENDIX D References

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AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 137 138 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS APPENDIX E Author Biographies

Jefrey A. Daniels Dr. Jefrey A. Daniels earned a B.A. in Psychology at Metropolitan State University—Denver, an M.S. in Counseling Psychology from Central Washington University, and a Ph.D. in Counseling Psychology from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Since earning his Ph.D., he has served in academic appointments at Central Washington University and Indiana University. He is currently the Chair of the Department of Counseling, Rehabilitaton Counseling and Counseling Psychology at West Virginia University.

Dr. Daniels has been engaged in research pertaining to violence and violence preventon for more than 16 years. Specifcally, he has studied averted school shootngs and school captve-takings. Dr. Daniels has also been conductng collaboratve research with the FBI for more than 12 years using Perpetrator-Motve Research Design. He has conducted research on hostage-takers’ motves and modus operandi, and partcipated in the current study of police ofcer ambushes. Dr. Daniels’ research is published in peer-reviewed journals and presented at natonal and internatonal conferences. He has also authored two books. James J. Sheets Dr. James J. Sheets is a liaison specialist with the Law Enforcement Ofcers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Program at the FBI’s Criminal Justce Informaton Services (CJIS) Division. He is the lead researcher for ofcer safety studies, an FBI-certfed instructor, and conducts ofcer safety presentatons natonally.

A 30-year-veteran of the FBI, Dr. Sheets started his career at the J. Edgar Hoover building in Washington, D.C. He joined the FBI Police and graduated from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in 1990. Dr. Sheets later transferred to the CJIS Division in Clarksburg, WV. He was promoted to sergeant in 2003 and lieutenant in 2008. He remained with the FBI Police untl joining the LEOKA Program in 2012.

During his tme with the FBI Police, Dr. Sheets was a patrol commander, supervised various operatonal programs, and completed FBI SWAT training. Dr. Sheets served as the FBI’s agency representatve to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, GA, and graduated from the FBI Natonal Academy’s 226th Session. He commanded uniformed ofcers deployed to major natonal events and incidents such as the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Dr. Sheets holds a Ph.D. in Business Administraton, with a specializaton in Homeland Security: Leadership and Policy from Northcentral University, a Master of Criminal Justce from Boston University, and a B.S. in Criminal Justce from Fairmont State University. Philip D. Wright Mr. Philip D. Wright is a liaison specialist with the FBI’s LEOKA Program. He is an FBI-certfed training instructor and has lectured and trained law enforcement ofcers throughout the country. Since Mr. Wright joined the FBI’s CJIS Division in 2012, he has researched felonious assaults and deaths of law enforcement ofcers and authored several artcles relatng to law enforcement safety. He has also consulted and advised local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies regarding law enforcement safety issues.

AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS 139 Mr. Wright began his law enforcement career in 1994 as a patrol ofcer with the Clarksburg (WV) Police Department, where he worked undercover in a multjurisdictonal drug task force and was also a member of the Special Response Team. In additon, he was a certfed instructor of RADAR and LIDAR enforcement.

In 2000, Mr. Wright joined the West Virginia State Police and spent the majority of his career working criminal investgatons. He was a member of a specialized unit that investgates physical abuse and sexual assaults against children. He also taught ofcer survivability to cadets at the West Virginia State Police Academy.

Mr. Wright has a degree in Applied Science--Police Science from Marshall University. Brian R. McAllister Mr. Brian R. McAllister joined the FBI in 2011 and serves as a liaison specialist assigned to the LEOKA Program of the FBI’s CJIS Division. He is an FBI-certfed training instructor and a graduate of the 208th session of the FBI Natonal Academy. Mr. McAllister has lectured and trained law enforcement personnel both natonally and internatonally, and he has authored ofcer safety artcles based on best practces learned from researching critcal injury assaults, line of duty deaths, and the study of LEOKA data. He has also consulted and advised numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies regarding safety issues.

Mr. McAllister retred as a lieutenant from the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., afer 28 years of service. During his tenure, Mr. McAllister commanded uniformed patrol and oversaw many of the department’s high profle units, including the Homicide Major Case Team, FBI Safe Streets Task Force, Force Investgatons Team, Forensic Science Services Division, Violent Criminal Apprehension Program—Female Murder Project, and the Arson Homicide Task Force. He also oversaw the creaton and supervision of the Special Victms Unit and the Bait Vehicle Program. Mr. McAllister has extensive experience in conductng investgatons, analyzing case data, studying crime analysis, identfying trends and addressing paterns, overseeing high profle investgatons, and managing resources and personnel.

140 AMBUSHES and UNPROVOKED ATTACKS