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DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY OF WORLD VISION
GHANA IN SABOBA DISTRICT
BY
ZECHARIAH LANGNEL
(10281364)
THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.
JULY, 2015 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
DECLARATION
I do hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own research undertaken under
supervision and has not been submitted in part or in full to this institution or any other
institution for academic award. All citations and quotations have all been identified and
acknowledged. I bear sole responsibility for any shortcomings.
………………………. ………..…………….
ZECHARIAH LANGNEL DATE
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this thesis was supervised in accordance with the laid down rules and
procedures as required by the University of Ghana.
………………………………… ……………
JUSTICE NYIGMAH BAWOL (PhD) DATE
(SUPERVISOR).
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DEDICATION
This phenomenal work is dedicated to the entire Langnel‟s family whose greatest desire is to
see me achieved greater academic laurels.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am extremely grateful to God whose grace has sustained me throughout my master‟s
programme. I am particularly appreciative to my supervisor, Dr. Justice Nyigmah Bawole
(HOD, Public Administration and Health Services Management) whose strict supervision,
pieces of advice and financial support has brought me this far. May the good Lord bless you
and strengthen you in your quest to nurturing others. I salute you “prof”. My next
appreciation goes to all faculty members and administrative staff of the Department of
Public Administration and Health Services Management.
This work would not have seen the light of the day without the candid opinions of my
respondents and all those who assisted me in diverse ways. I would like to express special
thanks to World Vision Ghana for allowing me to use their satellite office in Saboba for the
investigation. I want to particularly mention Mr. Thomas, Mrs. Cynthia Tonkodor, and Mr.
Twum-Barimah Frank (Staffs of World Vision Ghana, Saboba) whose views have enriched
my work. Also, thanks to Mr. Samuel Gmalu (Staff of World Vision Ghana, Regional
Office), Mr. David Nsila (Teacher at Saboba Technical School), Mr. Gershon Nagbija
(Former CHRAJ Director, Saboba District), and Mr. Barnabas Biyam (NCCE Director,
Kpandai District) who through their effort I was able to speak to the official respondents.
Moreover, my sincere thanks to the respondents in the five beneficiary communities for their
cooperation during data collection.
I am equally grateful to my course mates for their encouragement and support. I am
particularly thankful to Ms Mabel Mensah whose constructive criticisms has brought me this
far.
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My final thanks go to my family especially Langnel Ndabiche whose financial commitment
made this work to see the light of the day. May God richly bless you bro.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ...... i
CERTIFICATION ...... ii
DEDICATION ...... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vi
LIST OF TABLES ...... xi
LIST OF FIGURES ...... xii
LIST OF BOX ...... xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... xiv
ABSTRACT ...... xvii
CHAPTER ONE ...... 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1.0 Introduction ...... 1
1.1 Background of the study ...... 1
1.2 Statement of the research problem ...... 5
1.3 General objective ...... 7
1.4 Specific objectives ...... 7
1.6 Significance of the study ...... 8
1.7 Limitation of the study ...... 8
1.8 Organization of the study ...... 9
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CHAPTER TWO ...... 10
LIERATURE REVIEW ...... 10
2.0 Introduction ...... 10
2.1 The concept of accountability ...... 10
2.2 Exploring NGO accountability ...... 11
2.3 The global trend in NGO accountability ...... 12
2.4 Mechanisms for NGOS‟ accountability ...... 13
2.4.1 Participation and beneficiary involvement ...... 14
2.4.2 Disclosure statements and reports ...... 14
2.4.3 Performance assessment and evaluation ...... 14
2.4.4 Social auditing ...... 15
2.4.5 Self-regulation ...... 15
2.5 Beneficiary/ Downward Accountability (DA) of NGOs ...... 15
2.6 Downward Accountability and project effectiveness and efficiency...... 16
2.7 Strategies for NGOS‟ accountability to beneficiaries ...... 18
2.7.1 Participatory accountability at project planning or decision making stage ...... 18
2.7.2 Participatory accountability at project implementation stage ...... 21
2.7.3 Participatory accountability at the project evaluation stage ...... 22
2.8 Obstacles to NGO accountability to beneficiaries ...... 24
2.9 Theoretical review ...... 25
2.9.1 Arnstein‟s (1969) ladder of citizen‟s participation ...... 26
2.9.2 Vernooy (2005) framework of participation ...... 28
2.9.3 White‟s (1996) typology of participation ...... 29
2.10 Conceptual framework ...... 30
2.10.1 Operationalization of the framework ...... 31
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CHAPTER THREE ...... 34
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 34
3.0 Introduction ...... 34
3.1 Research Paradigm ...... 34
3.2 Research Approach ...... 35
3.3 Research Design ...... 36
3.4 The study area profile ...... 38
Source: Saboba District Assembly ...... 38
3.5 Overview of operational areas of the NGO in Saboba District ...... 39
3.6 Target and study population ...... 42
3.7 Sampling technique (s) and procedure ...... 42
3.8 Data gathering instruments ...... 43
3.9 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)...... 44
3.10 Sample size ...... 44
3.11 Data management and analysis ...... 45
CHAPTER FOUR ...... 46
DATA ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS ...... 46
4.0 Introduction ...... 46
4.1 Participatory accountability at planning stage ...... 47
4.1.1 Needs analysis or assessment ...... 47
4.1.2 Preparation of the project‟s action plan ...... 51
4.1.3 Information disclosure ...... 52
Financial disclosure ...... 54
4.1.4 Meetings/contributions ...... 56
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4.1.5 Committees ...... 62
4.2 Participatory accountability at implementation stage ...... 66
Source: Author‟s own construction, 2015...... 66
4.2.1 Materials ...... 66
4.2.2 Physical labor ...... 68
4.2.3 Welfare services ...... 69
4.2.4 Finance ...... 70
4.3 Participatory accountability at evaluation stage ...... 71
4.3.1 Participatory reviews ...... 72
4.3.2 Monitoring and evaluation team ...... 75
4.3.3 Management activities ...... 76
4.4 CONCLUSION ...... 82
CHAPTER FIVE ...... 85
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 85
5.0 Introduction ...... 85
5.1 Summary ...... 85
5.1.1 Participatory Accountability at planning stage ...... 85
5.1.2 Participatory Accountability at implementation stage ...... 88
5.1.3 Participatory Accountability at Evaluation stage ...... 89
5.2 CONCLUSION ...... 91
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 92
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REFERENCES ...... 94
APPENDICES ...... 104
APPENDIX A ...... 104
APPENDIX B ...... 107
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Adopted from Arsntein (1969) ladder of citizen Participation...... 26 Table 2: Adapted from Vernooy (2005) as modified by Boon et al., (2013)...... 28 Table 3: Adapted from White (1996) participation interest...... 29 Table 4: Author‟s own construction (combination of Arnstein, Vernooy, and White framework of participation and their implications for downward accountability of the NGO)...... 31 Table 5: Summary of respondents ...... 45 Table 6: Author‟s modified Framework (combination of Arnstein, Vernooy, and White approaches of participation) ...... 80
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Saboba District in National Context ...... 38 Figure 2: Activities participatory accountability at planning stage: ...... 47 Figure 3: Activities of participatory accountability at implementation stage: ...... 66 Figure 4: Activities of participatory accountability at evaluation stage: ...... 72
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LIST OF BOX
Box 1. Summarized explanation of Arnstein‟s ( 1969) rungs of participation...... 27
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ALPS : Accountability Learning and Planning Systems
CLTS: Community Led Total Sanitation
CVA: Citizen Voice and Action
CWSA: Community Water and Sanitation Agency
DA: Downward Accountability
DA: District Assembly
DCE: District Chief Executive
DPCO: District Planning and Coordinating Office
EU: European Union
FGDs: Focus Group Discussions
HAP: Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
IDC: Integrated Development Centre
IGO: Intergovernmental Governmental Organizations
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LEAP: Learning through Accountability and Evaluation Programme
LPMET: Local Project Monitoring and Evaluation Team
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding xiv
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NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
PA: Participatory Approaches
PHC: Population Head Count
PRA: Participatory Rural Approach
RB: Rights-Based
RBA: Rights-Based Approach
RWS: Rural Water Supply
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SD: Saboba District
SDA: Saboba District Assembly
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF: United Nations International Children‟s Fund
UNOHCHR: United Nations Office of the High Commission on Human Rights
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WASAN: Water and Sanitation
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WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB: World Bank
WV: World Vision
WVG: World Vision Ghana
WVI: World Vision International
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ABSTRACT
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have become major players in Community Development Agenda and perform intermediary roles between donors and intended beneficiaries. Unfortunately, highly publicized corruption scandals are discovered in literature often associated with the activities of NGOs especially in developing countries. To sanitize the aid delivery chain, NGOs are required to be accountable to donors (upward accountability) and beneficiaries (downward accountability). However, over dependence on upward accountability have failed to produce the desired results owing to the fact that donors are remotely located amidst weak regulatory frameworks in developing countries, thus, making it extremely difficult to ensure effective accountability of NGOs. It is against this backdrop that this study was qualitatively conducted through the lens of an interpretive research paradigm. Three participatory models (i.e Arnstein‟s ladder of participation, Vernooy‟s framework of participation, and White‟s typology of participation) were adopted to investigate the extent to which NGOs involve beneficiaries across the three stages of a project life cycle – planning/decision, implementation and evaluation stages. Data were collected through in depth interviews and documentary reviews. In all, 21 interviews and 5 FGDs were conducted in five beneficiary communities. The study discovered generally that downward accountability of the studied NGO was rhetorical. The findings suggest that participation at the planning stage was tokenistic as the project‟s goals and objectives were formulated long before the NGO got into the communities. Though the implementation stage recorded the highest involvement of beneficiaries, it was quite exploitative as the NGO might have used beneficiaries‟ free labor to achieve project‟s cost effectiveness. The evaluation stage recorded the lowest involvement of beneficiaries across the three stages. Thus, participatory review meetings were not held to rigorously review the success of the project. As a result, beneficiaries were not empowered to be the main drivers of their own development.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
This chapter consists of the background to the study, the research problem, research
objectives and questions, significance of the study, research limitation, and the organization
of the study.
1.1 Background of the study
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been recognized since 1980s by bilateral
and multilateral donors as one of the most credible and effective conduits to alleviating
poverty of underdeveloped countries compared to state governments (Makuwira, 2013).
This recognition emanated from the new development thinking that NGOs strategically
positioned themselves in delivering more cost-effective services to the poor (Baluku, 2010).
The basic tenet of new development paradigm argues that development needs to be more
sustainable, just, participatory, democratic, and more environmentally friendly (Zaidi, 1999,
Martusewicz, Edmundson, and Lupinacci, 2014). This has led to the redefinition of the state
with good governance as the formidable tool to addressing development challenges (Zaidi,
1999). Western political theorists sometimes divide society into three basic components: the
public sector, private sector, and civil society sector (Atack, 1999). In a utopian world
where the state (public) and private sectors are responding effectively and efficiently to the
needs of the poor, Non–governmental organizations (NGOs) would not exist.
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The modern state is brought under what I refer to as „new and wide‟ demands from the
citizenry, yet the state is constrained in terms of resources. This view is upheld in literature
that NGOs have become critical agents in sustainable development in that states are
constrained in terms of resources in their bid to meeting the needs of the people (Edwards &
Hulme, 1996). This view was re-echoed by Asamoah (2003), when he avers that NGOs are
particularly critical in circumstances where state funds are limited, political situations are
fluid, natural disasters resulting from both predictable and unpredictable environmental
circumstances occur, ethnic strife is rampant, and the level of per capita incomes severely
restricts the ability to purchase needed goods and services: social, educational and economic
resources. The state is “considered to be corrupt, oppressive and anti-poor” (Ghosh,
2009:234). Empirical analysis of the available literature speaks volume of the fact that
NGOs fill development gaps left by the state and are deemed to be more efficient than
government agencies (Nair, 2011; Batley & Rose, 2011; Ezeoha, 2006; Zaidi, 1999).
The mushrooming of NGOs across the globe from 1980s marked a paradigm shift in
international development cooperation. The growth in the number of NGOs was to mitigate
the negative impacts of policies pursued by government across the globe (Jalil, 2011; Gina,
2003). In Africa for instance, NGOs mushroomed to mitigate the social impacts of Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP) pursued by African governments. It was a widely held view that
as advocates for the vulnerable in society, NGOs are better positioned to address the social
impact of SAP implemented by African governments (Jalil, 2011). NGOs are also
pronounced in African countries as they have found favor with bodies such as United
Nations (UN), European Union, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other
bilateral and multilateral Organizations who believe that NGOs are formidable force that can
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put African governments in check on issues of mal-administration, abuse of human rights
and genocides as well as bringing development to the poor (Voohies, 1993; Jalil, 2011).
Ghana was among the first African countries to have implemented „poverty ridden‟
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983 and has since become a „patient‟ of the
World Bank (Gina, 2003). There are myriad of NGOs‟ activities in Ghana more especially
in the northern part of the country where they are engaged in variety of interventions to
better the lot of beneficiaries who are generally considered as deprived. It was noted in
United States Agency for International Development-USAID (2009) annual report that there
are 4463 registered NGOs in Ghana and a lot more is being registered every year.
Scholars argue that many governments, individuals, bilateral and multilateral agencies of
developed nations are committed in spending large and sums of money as development aid
to less developed countries with primary aim of lifting many people from extreme poverty
and deprivation through NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; O‟ Dwyer & Unerman, 2010).
This may be fueled by the belief among donors that NGOs are more cost effective than
governments in providing basic social services, and are better able to reach the poor, and
serve as catalyst in democratization process (Ebrahim, 2003). However, Edwards and Hulme
(1996) and Mackintosh, (1992) argue in other jurisdiction that there is not enough evidence
to support that claim. Literature argues in some cases that NGOs themselves are responsible
for exaggerating their claim to legitimacy in order to continue to enjoy support from donors
(Riddel, 1999; Ghosh, 2009). This view was well articulated by Zaidi (1999) when he
asserts that NGOs and consultants forged data to suit the beneficiaries‟ needs in order to
continue to receive funds from donors. Whatever the case may be, I argue here that
accountability of NGOs is being brought under scrutiny in recent times. This worrisome
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situation about NGOs triggered the call for the return of the state (Nega & Schneider, 2014)
as the most effective and efficient way to deliver development to the poor. It is as a result of
highly publicized scandals that have eroded public confidence in NGOs that practitioners in
the field began to call for accountability of NGOs to stakeholders (Young, Bania &
Bailey,1996; Ebrahim, 2003;Bano,2008; Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; Rahmani, 2012
).These views however, are being increasingly supported by other scholars who advocated
moving beyond seeing NGOs as magic bullets to thinking more concretely about issues of
NGOs accountability (Najam, 1996; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). According to O‟Dwyer
and Unerman (2010), the proportion of multi-billion dollar aid being channel through the
medium of NGOs for alleviating poverty in global south countries raises accountability
questions in accountability and business research literature.
NGOs are accountable to multiple actors (Najam, 1996). They are accountable upwards to
patrons, downwards to beneficiaries/clients, and inwards to themselves (Najam, 1996;
Fowler, 1996). NGO-patron accountability or upwards accountability (Edwards & Hulme,
1996) refers to accountability to donors, governments, and foundations which often focused
on “spending designated moneys for designated purposes” (Fowler, 1996; Najam, 1996, p.
342). They are also downwardly accountable to clients/beneficiaries, thus, the groups to
whom NGOs provide services or speak on behalf of in policy fora and symposiums (Najam,
1996; Ebrahim, 2003a; Lioyd, 2005). The third category is to NGOs themselves - their
organizational vision, mission, and staffs (Najam, 1996; LIoyd, 2005).
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1.2 Statement of the research problem
In spite of the greater call for NGO accountability ( Ebrahim, 2005; Gray, Babbington &
Collisson, 2006; Jordan & Van, 2006; Unerman & O‟Dwyer, 2006a; Unerman & O‟Dwyer,
2006b, Crespy & Miller, 2011; Marshall & Suarez, 2013; Ahmed & Hopper, 2014), there
are limited scholarly works investigating specific NGO accountability settings (Unerman &
O‟Dwyer, 2006b). These scanty works on NGOs accountability focused on upward
accountability to patrons instead of downward accountability (Ebrahim, 2005; Kilby, 2006;
O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Andrews, 2014; Sawardi & Thomson, 2014; Noor, 2015;
Awuah-Werekoh, 2015). The reason is that whilst donors provide funds for the sustainability
of NGOs, governments ensure legitimacy by enacting laws to regulate activities of NGOs
(LIoyd, 2005). This point was well articulated Andrews (2014) when she reiterated that
economic resources provided by the donors and coercive power of the government
restructure NGOs away from their beneficiaries in terms of accountability.
In the developed countries where political institutions are strong coupled with strong law
enforcement agencies, and also the fact that donors are situated in those countries, NGOs are
accountable to their beneficiaries (LIoyd, 2005; Andrews, 2014). However, in Ghana as well
as other developing countries where institutions are weak, political instability is
predominant, and poverty is pervasive (Besley & Persson, 2010), the situation may be
different.
Not surprisingly, NGO accountability is generating significant research interest in recent
times both in theory and in practice because: first, that beneficiaries of NGO interventions
are the weakest in NGO power and accountability relationships (Andrews, 2014); second,
that donors are remotely located making it extremely difficult to ensure effective
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accountability (Dupuy, Ron, & Prakash, 2014); third, NGOs hold goal owners to account to
their clients and must do same (Slim, 2002); and four, that highly publicized scandals are
reported on the activities of NGOs (Trivunovic, Johnson & Mathisen, 2011).
NGOs‟ downward accountability to beneficiaries in Sub-Saharan Africa is “shaped by moral
and ethical imperatives” instead of being grounded in law (LIoyd, 2005: 4). Taking Ghana
for instance, a place where this study was conducted, effort over a decade ago to regulate the
operations of NGOs received fierce rebuttal from NGOs with unflinching support from their
donors (Trust Bill and NGO policy Guidelines, 2007). The intended legislation was
abandoned and the option was given to NGOs to self- regulate, a pledge yet to be realized.
Notwithstanding, it is increasingly being recognized by development NGOs that downward
accountability to beneficiaries would enhance effectiveness and sustainability of NGO-led
development interventions (Ebrahim, 2005; Kilby, 2006; Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman
& O‟Dwyer, 2009; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014).
The limited research works on downward accountability of NGOs looked at „empowerment
of beneficiaries‟ (Kilby, 2006), using „Listen first model‟ to manage downward
accountability of NGOs (Alex & Wilford, 2010), „explaining NGOs responses to Zapatista
Demands‟ (Andrews, 2014), „enhancing the role of accountability in promoting the rights of
beneficiaries (O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010), and using „Rights-Based approach to strengthen
downward accountability of NGOs‟ (Kim, 2007). Though it is explicit from the
demonstration above that little research works have been done on downward accountability
of NGOs, the extent to which NGOs are accountable to their beneficiaries throughout entire
project life cycle in a specific NGO setting is still underexplored. This is the focus of this
research. The researcher seeks to investigate the extent to which World Vision Ghana
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(WVG) is accountable to her beneficiary communities in Saboba District throughout the
entire project life cycle (planning/decision making, implementation, and evaluation).
Downward accountability of NGOs in this study emphasizes the use of participatory
approaches to assessing NGOs‟ effectiveness that centrally involve beneficiaries and or their
representatives in service delivery (O‟Dwyer & Unerman. 2010). Participation in this study
is defined as the discharge of power to those lower down the aid chain (beneficiaries).The
study assumes that when beneficiaries are actively involved in the programmes that affect
them, downward accountability of NGOs would be enhanced.
1.3 General objective
The study seeks to investigate the extent to which the NGO involves beneficiaries in the
entire project life cycle in Saboba District.
1.4 Specific objectives
The study seeks to realize the following specific objectives:
1) To investigate the extent to which the NGO involves beneficiaries in project planning
stage.
2) To investigate the extent to which the NGO engages community members in project
implementation stage.
3) To investigate how beneficiaries are involved in the evaluation stage of NGO-led
development project.
1.5 Research questions
1) To what extent are beneficiaries involved in the planning stage of NGO-led intervention?
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2) To what extent does the NGO engage community members at project implementation
stage?
3 How are beneficiaries involved in the evaluation stage of NGO-led development project?
1.6 Significance of the study
This study has successfully filled NGOs‟ downward accountability gap in the literature. The
findings of the study are useful to researchers who are interested in beneficiaries‟
involvement in NGOs‟ projects design, implementation, and evaluation.
Since it is common to see projects being abandoned by community members, policy makers
and other development agencies would realize the need to involve beneficiaries in the
delivery of services.
1.7 Limitation of the study
There are a number of NGOs operating in Northern Ghana. However, this study was limited
to World Vision Ghana and Saboba District. The study was further limited to five
beneficiary communities and the limited mechanization water project. Hence, the findings
are specific to the studied communities and cannot be generalized to be the case for other
NGOs and their beneficiary communities.
Again, the face to face interviews were conducted in the local language. As a result, there is
a possibility of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of interview questions. This was
properly handled because of the fact that I speak the same language with the beneficiaries.
The interview questions were translated into the language they (beneficiaries) best
understood without employing the services of the outsiders.
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1.8 Organization of the study
The entire study consists of five chapters. Chapter one consists of the introduction and the
background of the study, the research problem, the research objective(s), research questions,
and the significance of the study.
The chapter two comprises the empirical literature and theoretical literature reviews. The
empirical review consists of the following thematic areas: the concept of accountability,
exploring NGOs‟ accountability, the global trend in NGOs accountability, and the
mechanisms for NGOs‟ accountability. The others are: beneficiary or downward
accountability of NGOs, Strategies for NGOs‟ accountability to beneficiaries, and the
obstacles to downward accountability to beneficiaries. The theoretical review also consists
of Arstein‟s ladder of participation, Vernooy‟s framework of participation, and Sarah
White‟s interest of participation.
Chapter three focuses on the methodology.
Chapter four is devoted to the data analysis and the discussion of findings.
Chapter five comprises the summary, conclusion, and recommendation.
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CHAPTER TWO
LIERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This section comprises the review of literature on downward accountability of NGOs and
theories of participation. The literature review on downward accountability of NGOs covers
areas such as the definition of accountability, explores NGOs‟ accountability, the global
trends in NGOs‟ accountability, and mechanisms of NGOs Accountability. The others are:
Downward or Beneficiary Accountability of NGOs and projects efficiency and
effectiveness, and strategies of NGOs‟ Accountability (i.e. participatory accountability in
project planning, participatory Accountability in project implementation, and participatory
accountability in project evaluation). The theoretical literature presents and attempts to
explain theories that underpin the study and the subject matter in general.
2.1 The concept of accountability
In accounting, auditing, accountability, and Development studies literature, accountability is
viewed as an efficient mechanism for the achievement of justice, good governance, ethical
governance, cost effectiveness and efficient service delivery in both the public and private
organizations (Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007). By definition, accountability may be seen as
the “means through which individuals and organizations are held externally responsible for
their actions and as the means by which they take internal responsibility for continuously
shaping organizational mission, goals and performance” (Ebrahim, 2003a: 194).
Accountability “defines a relationship between an organization and a set of stakeholders and
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assumes that being responsive to those stakeholders will be beneficial to the organization
and its mandate” (Baur & Schmitz, 2012: 14).
The origin of accountability can be traced to both political and financial roots. Politically,
accountability can be traced to the Athenian democracy where directly elected leaders were
held accountable for their actions and inactions (Day & Klein, 1987: 5). Accountability was
also veiled in the responsibilities of the state Auditor in the Greek city states, who was made
to discharge financial duties (Behn, 2001; Walker, 2002; Dubnick & Justice, 2004).
Though the meaning of accountability is still nebulous (Davis, 2007), there is a general
consensus as regards aspects of the definition of the concept. There is general agreement on
the notion that accountability places responsibility on individuals or groups to account,
answer, and be responsible for their actions (Davis, 2007).
2.2 Exploring NGO accountability
The accountability of NGOs is complex as a result of the environment in which NGOs
operate (Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman & O‟Dwyer, 2009; Awio, Northcott, &
Lawrence, 2011). NGOs act as intermediary organizations (Agyemang et al., 2009) and are
faced with multiple demands from stakeholders (Jordan & van Tuijl 2006; O‟Dwyer, 2007).
Funds and other resources are often provided for locally-based-service-delivery NGOs by
governments and donor agencies in developed nations. Hence, “Local NGOs and the local
operations of INGOs therefore act as an interface between international donors and local
beneficiaries” (Agyemang et al., 2009:10).
In the context of complex social interventions, NGOs initiate accountability mechanisms
through dialogue with diverse stakeholders (Alex & Wilford, 2010). To Alex and Wilford
(2010), NGOs are expected to negotiate contracts with donors as well as design potential
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interventions with local partners. In effect, NGOs are held accountable for these
commitments. The biggest question here is how do NGOs manage these complex set of
relationships? Well, the challenge for NGOs is how to align these commitments that it
makes, and the dialogue it pursues, with multiple stakeholders; who have little power over it,
but are immediately affected by its work, and some who have substantial power over it, but
are distant from the field of action (Alex & Wilford, 2010). The situation exacerbates when
NGOs as intermediary organizations, grow larger and develop their own internal systems,
politics and bureaucracy.
These complexities in NGOs accountability are given due attention in literature. Literature
distinguishes between various types of NGOs accountability (Bendell, 2006; Baur &
Schmitz, 2012). Thus, upward accountability defines a bottom-up approach to NGOs
accountability where donors, governments, and foundations use accountability mechanisms
to influence the implementing NGO (LIoyd, 2005; Andrews, 2014). In practice, NGOs
respond to the demands of the most powerful actors in terms of accountability. Again,
NGOs are downwardly accountable to their beneficiaries who are less powerful in NGO
power and accountability relationships (Baur & Schmitz, 2012), but wield non-economic
resource such as „information‟ which is necessary for the effectiveness of NGOs‟ mission
and vision (Andrews, 2014).
2.3 The global trend in NGO accountability
More and more questions have been raised about NGOs‟ legitimacy and accountability by
scholars and policy makers as NGOs have become increasingly prominent players in global
affairs (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; Chegu, 2013). This point was well articulated by Jamal
(2014) when he opined that the growth in the number of NGOs in global south, coupled with
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constant rise in funding from western world has made NGOs more powerful in global
politics and international development. This enviable role of NGOs in international
development called for public scrutiny on how they NGOs moblize and spend money
(Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman & O‟Dwyer, 2009; Unerman & O‟Dwyer, 2010).
Besides, increased financial rewards to NGO leaders and „well-publicized‟ scandals, has
fueled criticisms at the sector (Bano, 2008; Ebrahim, 2003; Gibelman & Gelman, 2001;
Rahmani, 2012). To maintain legitimacy with stakeholders, organizations in the third sector
have carved for themselves Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) in 2003 with the
revised versions in 2007 and 2010. The HAP Standards compel organizations that assist or
act on behalf of people affected by or prone to disasters, conflict, poverty, and other crises to
design, implement, assess, improve and recognize accountability programmes that meet
international standard. The HAP principles of accountability include “commitment to
humanitarian standards and rights, setting standards and building capacity, commitment,
communication, participation in programmes, monitoring and reporting on compliance, and
addressing complaints” (HAP, 2010: 25). The participation principle highlights the need for
humanitarian organizations to involve beneficiaries in the “planning, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of programmes, and report to them on progress, subject only to
serious operational constraints” (HAP, 2010: 25).
2.4 Mechanisms for NGOS’ accountability
In practice, literature identifies five broad mechanisms through which NGOs are held
accountable: disclosure statement and reports, performance assessment and evaluation,
participation, self-regulation, and social auditing (Ebrahim, 2003; Agyemang et al., 2009).
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2.4.1 Participation and beneficiary involvement
In the management of NGOs, participatory approach is used as a mechanism to ensure
NGOs are accountable to beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 2003; Kilby, 2006; Alex & Wilford, 2010;
O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2011; Andrews, 2014). To them, downward accountability to
beneficiaries is synonymous to the „concept of participation‟. It allows NGOs to engage
beneficiaries in decisions making about project delivery. It also involves sharing information
with beneficiaries and consulting with them. In some cases, beneficiaries are required to
provide labor for service delivery. Participation may take two forms: community
consultation and dialogue and participatory reviews.
2.4.2 Disclosure statements and reports
NGOs produce summative annual reports and make legal disclosures on all their activities.
Legal disclosures according to Ebrahim (2003), are to ensure that activities of NGOs are in
accordance with the host country‟s tax exemption law, and particularly prove that its
activities are for education, charity, religion, scientific advancement, and other poverty
alleviation programmes without any profit motive ( Ebrahim, 2003). NGOs also submit
annual reports to donors to meet the requirements for funding. These reports according to
Agyemang et al., (2009) could be annual or interim reports (monthly, quarterly or half
yearly basis). The annual reports as well as legal disclosures emphasize upward
accountability (to donors and government) at the expense of downward accountability (to
beneficiaries) and other stakeholders (Ebrahim, 2003; Agyemang et al., 2009).
2.4.3 Performance assessment and evaluation
Performance assessment and evaluation is used by NGOs to generate data at various times
during the life of the project. Information is provided on the extent to which predetermined 14
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project‟s aims and objectives have been achieved (Ebrahim, 2003). While performance
evaluation is written at the end of the project or funding stream, performance assessment is
conducted on the continuous basis. Performance assessment and evaluation mechanisms are
meant to meet donors‟ requirements for NGOs‟ accountability (Agyemang et al., 2009).
2.4.4 Social auditing
According to Gonella, Pilling, & Zadek (1998: 21) social auditing is the process whereby
NGO assesses and reports on its social performance and ethical behavior”. It combines the
features of other accountability mechanisms and allows the views of a wide-range of
stakeholders (beneficiaries, donors, and NGO officials) in order to facilitate the achievement
of organization‟s goals and objectives.
2.4.5 Self-regulation
Here, NGOs strive to develop “standards or codes that guide behaviour and performance”
(Ebrahim, 2003: 819). This allows NGOs to exert control on their own internal operations in
line with the host country‟s legal framework.
2.5 Beneficiary/ Downward Accountability (DA) of NGOs
In this study, downward accountability of NGOs looks at the extent of the engagement of
beneficiary communities in NGO-led development projects. Downward accountability is
also known as Humanitarian accountability (HAP, 2010). The goal of DA is to release
power from the NGOs to their clients by including them in the aid chain (Rahman, 2014). It
is evident in literature that downward accountability of NGOs is rooted in the concepts of
participation and empowerment (Kilby, 2006; Alex & Wilford, 2010; O‟Dwyer & Unerman,
2011; Andrews, 2014). Downward accountability stresses on the use of „participatory
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approach‟ to evaluate NGOs effectiveness and efficiency by involving beneficiaries and or
their representatives in project delivery (O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2011). Participatory
approach dictates that NGOs engage their beneficiaries in the needs analysis through project
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation as well as providing feedbacks. In effect,
community-based, community-driven, and participatory approaches remain a priority for
many in the field of international development (Andrews, 2014). Community participation
theorists argue to the effect that community members develop a strong sense of ownership to
development projects when they are made to participate in key decision making process in
project planning, implementation and evaluation (Marks & Davis, 2012).
While powerful actors ( donors, governments, and foundations) within NGOs accountability
relationship can demand accountability from the implementing NGO, those lower the aid
chain or less powerful ( beneficiaries) cannot easily demand same from the NGOs ( Alex &
Wilford, 2010). Here, NGOs need to commit themselves to the dictates of „downward
accountability‟ so as to release some of their powers to the beneficiaries through
participatory approach to development. By so doing, their legitimacy would be strengthened
in the face of the beneficiaries as well as their donors.
2.6 Downward Accountability and project effectiveness and efficiency
NGOs and their funders have realized that in practice as well as in theory, accountability to
beneficiaries has the potential to invigorate efficiency and effectiveness in development aid
delivery (Ebrahim, 2005; Agyemang et al., 2009; O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Wellens &
Jegers, 2014). In support of this view, O‟Dwyer and Unerman ( 2010) opines that Irish Non
-governmental Development Organizations ( NGDOs) need to commit themselves to the
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dictates of DA if full utility of Rights–Based approach ( RBA), thus, (where beneficiaries
have the rights to demand accountability from service providers) is to be realized as
currently being strongly advocated by development NGOs. By so doing, NGOs become
learning organizations, interacting and mutually learning with their beneficiaries and thereby
developing deeper understandings of the aid delivery solutions that are likely to be most
effective in practice in each aid situation (O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010). This point was well
articulated by Agyemang et al., (2009) when they asserted that implementation of DA
mechanisms will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of aid delivery in individual
project by taking into account the views and experiences of those closest to the delivery of
the aid. Unfortunately, some aspects of existing upward accountability mechanisms hinder
the progress of downward accountability (Agyemang et al., (2009). Thus, in the midst of
robotic reporting formats to donors, specific project requirements by donors, and no
opportunity for beneficiaries to report directly to donors, NGOs rarely deliver projects to
suit local conditions (Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013; Rahman, 2012). Contributing to the
debate, Flint and Natrup (2014) intimated that beneficiary involvement in NGO-led
development projects from problem identification, planning, implementation to monitoring
and evaluation produces greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, and value for money in
service delivery. However, Tagarirofa and Chazovachii, (2013) and Rahman (2014)
disclosed that non-involvement of the beneficiaries in the entire project cycle reduces
NGOs‟ legitimacy, and subsequently threatens projects effectiveness and empowerment of
beneficiaries. In another jurisdiction, Trivunovic (2011 p. 11) revealed that effective DA
measures of NGOs to their beneficiaries have the “potential to reduce risks of NGOs
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corruption” as well as optimizing efficiency and effectiveness of development oriented
outcomes.
However, a study conducted in the Ghanaian setting by Kanlisi and Aasoglenang (2014) to
investigate the effectiveness of NGOs in poverty reduction revealed that beneficiaries of
NGO-led projects are incapable of holding NGOs accountable in terms of corruption. This
revelation was made when they posed a question as to whether or not beneficiaries would
react when it was evident that an NGO was corrupt. Per the response, 5% did indicate they
have no power to do so, 44% said they will report to the district assembly, 14% intimated
that they will insist that the right thing was done, and 36% indicated that they will rather
hold their leaders accountable.
2.7 Strategies for NGOS’ accountability to beneficiaries
Strategies for NGOs‟ accountability consider the extent to which NGOs engage beneficiary
communities in the entire project life cycle.
2.7.1 Participatory accountability at project planning or decision making stage
Decision making or planning stage is the foundation of any development project, and
proceeded by implementation and evaluation stages. The governing body of any
organization including NGOs is the central point for decision making. Rahman (2014)
reports that most often, beneficiaries are not represented in the governing body or the
Executive Board or committee of NGOs. As a result, beneficiaries‟ participation at the
decision making phase is very poor, and that beneficiaries are almost totally excluded from
the decision making process (Rahman, 2014).
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According to Boon, Bawole and Ahenkan (2013), development projects are supposed to be
designed and implemented by and for the people, however these stakeholders hold varied
interests in community projects. As a result, stakeholder participation in community
development projects is still a difficult task (Boon, Bawole & Ahenkan, 2013). The story is
not different in NGO management. As intermediary organizations, NGOs respond to
demands from donors, governments, and beneficiaries (LIoyd, 2005; Andrews, 2014).
Though beneficiaries are the weakest in NGO-power relationship and are often neglected in
decision making process, beneficiaries of NGO-led interventions wield non-economic
resource (information) that may provide leverage for NGOs (Andrews, 2014). Besides,
NGOs interventions come with projects that have definite life span, but their impacts are
expected to be long lasting (Jalil, 2011). This bring to the fore the need to foster proactive
engagement to empower beneficiaries to be able to own and sustain NGO-led interventions.
Unfortunately, since beneficiaries depend solely on NGOs for support, they rarely hold
NGOs accountable (Andrews, 2014; Agyemang et al., & O‟Dwyer, 2009; O‟Dwyer &
Unerman, 2010).
Participation is a tool often used to produce accountability within aid projects (Haddad,
Lindstrom & Pinto, 2010). Lindstrom and Pinto (2010) aver that beneficiaries need
information about development projects as well as other services that are supposed to be
rendered to them by service providers, so that they can be in position to hold NGOs
accountable. This implies that beneficiaries need to have enough information on the full cost
of the projects, the name and where the contractor is coming from, where the contractor
stays during the implementation of the project, and other vital issues that could aid the
community members to hold NGOs accountable. According to Arnstein (1969), citizen or
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beneficiary participation in project planning starts with information about planned project
being made available to the people through series of meetings or public hearings, surveys, or
a formal dialogue on project options. At this level, consultations with community members
get strengthened but the decision making power remains with the project planners (Arnstein,
1969).
Agyemang et al., (2009) identified community participation and dialogue at the planning
stage of a project. This ensures that NGO consults with beneficiaries before the start of the
project. The chief traditionally uses drumming to summon all local community members for
a meeting, and during which NGO officials attempt to assess the needs of community
members (Agyemang et al., 2009). As a mechanism for downward accountability,
participatory planning meeting is held separately for men and women to take varied views at
the request of donors (Agyemang et al., 2009). Agyemang et al. (2009) revealed that
practically, financial issues are not part of the agenda during participatory planning
meetings. Beneficiaries are not privy to the cost of projects or the total amount of funds
available for a specific project or programs (Agyemang et al., 2009). In an exceptional case
however, NGO disclosed its finances to the beneficiaries though they were not being
compelled to do so (Agyemang et al., 2009). This view was confirmed in literature when
Andrews (2014) and Kilby (2006) reported in Mexico and India respectively that whilst
some NGOs deserted their beneficiaries others stayed on and sought flexible funding
because the beneficiaries demanded that NGOs‟ financial account be made available to
them.
Tagarirofa and Chazovachii (2013) revealed that NGOs come to the leaders of the
communities, request for them to sign and authenticate documents to claim that community
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members were duly consulted. NGOs are too powerful in the face of the poor beneficiaries,
and are able to subvert and threaten local leadership with „exit‟ if they resist their request
(Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013). After problem identification through needs assessment,
involvement of beneficiaries in other three stages of the project life cycle becomes a mere
tokenism or sham participation or a formality (Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013; Arnstein,
1969). In support of this view Cooke and Kothari (2001) concede that participation has
been misconstrued by many with effect of creating false illusions of local community
involvement and empowerment while at the same time reinforcing norms and existing
power relations between the local people and implementing agents. The caveat here is that,
for purpose of ownership, beneficiaries should be allowed to identify their own problem,
design their own solutions and monitor and evaluate every activity as the project progresses
without any hindrance, else NGOs risk building houses that people would not live in, since
NGOs lack understanding on local peoples‟ needs (Congrave, 2006 as cited in Alex and
Wilford, 2010: 800; Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013). This view was conceded by Boon et
al., (2013) in Ghana that community members abandoned toilet facilities, markets stalls,
boreholes, classroom blocks, and other community level projects initiated by both central
and local governments due to little or no stakeholder or beneficiary participation.
2.7.2 Participatory accountability at project implementation stage
According to Arnstein (1969), project implementation phase sees actual or active
involvement of citizens or beneficiaries in project-related activities, and may be in the form
of community contributing labor as well as financial resources toward project
implementation, and possibly in the maintenance of services or facilities. The rationale is
that active involvement of citizens or beneficiaries in the phases of a project empowers them
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to be able to exert greater control of local resources and development activities (Arnstein,
1969). This point was forcefully brought home by Boon et al., (2013:39) when they
intimated that “proactively and systematically working towards improving the levels of
participation in the various stages of a project, the outcomes are more likely to suit local
circumstances, ensure community ownership, and increase the sustainability of a project,
enhance societal harmony, and increase social learning”. In practice, beneficiaries are
required to contribute labor during the implementation stage of project delivery (Agyemang
et al., 2009). This point was noted by Domfeh & Bawole (2009) when they asserted that
beneficiaries of a specific NGO-led project engage actively in projects such as potable
water, health facilities and school buildings by providing communal labor towards their
successful completion.
Whilst some scholars argue that beneficiary participation in projects contribute significantly
to speedy and successful implementation and completion of projects (Ofori, 2013; Chegu,
2013), others centrally revealed that beneficiary participation leads to waste of time,
resources, and general delay in project delivery (Agyemang et al., 2009). Though several
meetings and consultations must be held with beneficiaries which seem to be a waste of
time, these consultations and engagements enhance project sustainability and ownership.
2.7.3 Participatory accountability at the project evaluation stage
As the end users of NGO-led development projects, participatory accountability with
beneficiaries is undertaken through beneficiaries‟ involvement in the monitoring and
evaluation of projects (Agyemang et al., 2009). This is done by the facilitation of learning
and reflection through participatory reviews. Proactive involvement of the beneficiaries
during the planning and implementation stages would aid them to be able to ascertain the
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exact cost of a particular project. Similarly, “participatory accountability enables
communities to identify and specify key performance indicators during planning stage of the
new project, and to comment on the achievements of these performance indicators during
the participatory review process at the evaluation stage” (Agyemang et al., 2009:28).
However, the research conducted by Kanlisi and Aasoglenang (2014) revealed that
community involvement in monitoring and evaluation of projects turns to be very low. This
point was intimated by Tagarirofa and Chazovachii (2013) when they observed from their
respondents that after the identification of problem, community participation in the
subsequent phases of the project is nothing to write home about. Even where they are
involved, they are not able to criticize NGOs during evaluation of projects (Agyemang et al.,
2009). This may be fueled by the dominant view among NGOs that accountability to
beneficiaries would weaken the ability of NGOs to be able to exert control over projects and
programmes, thereby generating tensions, the recipe to deviate from their core mandate
(Kilby, 2006). This may also be due to the acute poverty and resultant vulnerability of
beneficiaries which create fear and prevent beneficiaries from questioning NGOs
(Agyemang et al., 2009). In the midst of all these, interventions of NGOs are seen as a
„favor‟ rather than obligation. As noted earlier, beneficiaries generally entertain fears that
NGOs may exit from their community if they question or criticize NGOs. To increase the
capacity of beneficiaries for effective participatory evaluation, community members must be
given more information, duties and decision making powers at different project areas
including the implementation and assessment (Burger, Dasgupta & Owens, 2014).
Participation in project management shows beneficiary involvement in needs analysis, the
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planning or design and application of solutions, as well as monitoring and assessment of
performance.
2.8 Obstacles to NGO accountability to beneficiaries
In spite of the aforementioned utilities of DA in the delivery of NGO-led interventions,
previous studies in NGO management suggest that DA is rhetorical and not real in practice
(O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Walsh, 2014; Tharapos & Sidaway, 2014; Tagarirofa &
Chazovachii, 2013). Examining the effort of ActionAid to improving downward
accountability through Accountability Learning and Planning Systems (ALPS) launched in
2000, Walsh (2014) identified the following operational obstacles that militated against
ActionAid in her quest to implementing downward accountability: NGOs retention of
control, power dynamics at community level, Trend-jumping by NGOs, and staff pressures
and interests.
O‟Dwyer and Unerman (2010) found that NGOs are not able to implement effective
downward accountability as a result of insufficient NGO attention to oversight of downward
accountability within locally–based partner NGOs, not allowing community members to
take part in NGO governance, focusing on local elites who may or may not be representing
the interest of the communities, and the notion that locally based partner NGOs do not need
downward accountability.
In another jurisdiction, Tagarirofa and Chazovachii, (2013) intimated that there is a strong
perception being held by service providers that beneficiaries of NGO-led interventions are
passive recipients of externally crafted models of development. Thus, power dynamics
within and between the community members as well as preferential treatment of other tribal
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groups by service providers, and intra group conflicts and bureaucracy are seen as factors
hindering effective implementation of downward accountability to beneficiaries.
2.9 Theoretical review
Participation is an effective mechanism through which beneficiaries can hold NGOs
accountable (Ebrahim, 2003, Agyemang et al., 2009 & Rahman, 2014). Illuminating the
importance of participatory approach in development, Boon et al., (2013: 194) intimated that
participation “enhances egalitarian redistribution of power, resources and democratization of
the political process at both national and local level”. It is for this and other reasons that
Ebrahim (2003) asserted that any work on community participation in development projects
must examine different levels of participation. It is against this background that this study
sought to examine some theories of stakeholder participation which would invariably give
the study theoretical foundation. These are: Arstein‟s ladder of citizens‟ participation,
Vernooy‟s framework of participation, and Sarah White‟s typology of participatory
approach and meanings of participation for stakeholders.
Arstein‟s ladder of citizen engagement gives the levels at which community members could
be involved in projects and programmes and their power dynamics. Vernooy‟s framework
gives a clear understanding of who maintains decision making power at every level of
engagement. Whit‟s typology explains the reason behind such engagement processes and
what it means to the various stakeholders.
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2.9.1 Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen’s participation
Sherry Arstein‟s much touted framework of citizen‟s participation has provided a blue print
for community development practitioners and researchers. His ladder of participation is
shown below:
Table 1: Adopted from Arsntein (1969) ladder of citizen Participation. Citizen control
Delegated power Degree of citizen control
Partnership
Placation
Consultation Degree of Tokenism
Informing
Therapy
Manipulation Non participation
In her work, Arstein asserted that stakeholder participation in development projects is not a
one off events but occurs in a continumm. The therapy and manipulation rungs ( stages of
non-participation), placation, consultation, and informing rungs ( show degree of tokenism),
and citizen control, delegated power and partnership ( degree of citizen control).
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Box 1. Summarized explanation of Arnstein’s ( 1969) rungs of participation.
Manipulation and Therapy: These rungs represent the levels of non-participation. The rationale is not to engage beneficiaries in planning and conducting programs but to allow power holders to “educate” or “cure” participants. The manipulation stage allows duty bearers to place participants on “rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards where people sign to give power holders pre-determined decisions” ( Rahman, 2014). Rahman expanded that in therapy form, the participants are requested to come with a complain, which is treated as participants weaknesses instead of identifying the root cause of problems and their solutions. Informing and Consultation: Rungs 3 and 4 represents the levels of “tokenism” that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice. Though information is given and opinions of participants are sought, Arstein is of the view that the participants lack the power to ensure that their views are considered. As a result, the status quo is maintained. Placation, the 5th rung is the higher level of tokenism as the set rules allow the participants or have-not to advice but the right to decide is still the preserve of power holders. Partnership : The partnership rung allows decisions to be made through the collaborative effort of both the have-nots and the power holders. Power is redistributed through negotiation and responsibilities are shared between the participants and the power holders. Partnership rung becomes more effective when the beneficiary community has organized power structure in the community as well as financial resources to pay committee members. Delegated power: Delegated power allows the beneficiaries to gain dominance over some decisions. As a result of negotiation, participants now have greater control over decisions regarding projects and programs. Citizenship control: In this rung, citizens lead the entire development agenda. Thus, participants have greater control and demand power over policy and managerial aspect of the organization. Participants demand for control over programs and projects. Though Arnstein‟s theory is
criticized for over simplification of the reality, it enlightens us on different levels of participation.
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2.9.2 Vernooy (2005) framework of participation
Vernooy‟s phenomenal work on participation details who participates and who decides
about what, when and how. The framework is shown below:
Table 2: Adapted from Vernooy (2005) as modified by Boon et al., (2013). Types of participation Key features
Contractual One stakeholder has sole decision- making power over most decisions. Stakeholder defines role for others. Others formally and informally “contracted” to provide services and support. Consultative Most key decisions made by one stakeholder Stakeholder consults and gathers information from others. Other stakeholders help identify constraints and opportunities, priority setting and / evaluation Collaborative Different stakeholders collaborate Stakeholders deemed equally important Stakeholder linkage through knowledge sharing Sharing of decision-making power during the innovation process. Collegiate Stakeholders work together as colleagues or partners Ownership and responsibility are equally distributed Decisions made by consensus or agreement by all actors.
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2.9.3 White’s (1996) typology of participation
Sarah White‟s approach to participation explained the types of participation and the benefits
it accrues to the various stakeholders.
Table 3: Adapted from White (1996) participation interest. Form Meaning of Meaning of participation Why participation to the to the beneficiaries participation? NGO Nominal Legitimation – to Beneficiaries think A showcase prove that that they stand to something is benefit from the being done. programme through their participation Instrumental Efficiency – to Community members A mechanism reduce projects‟ spend their resources to attain cost- cost through on projects and effectiveness beneficiaries‟ programmes. in NGO-led provision of interventions. physical labor. Representative Sustainability – the Leverage – the To ensure that rational is to do beneficiaries would be development away with able to determine how is community dependency they want the facility led. To also syndrome. to look like. ensure sustainability of NGO-led interventions Transformative Empowerment – Empowerment – A means to the capacities of Beneficiaries ensure the community have decisive role effective members are in service participation. built for them to delivery. make major decisions
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2.10 Conceptual framework
The operationalization of the conceptual framework for this study was guided by the concept
of participation. Although several frameworks are proposed for analyzing participation, this
study adopts a combination of Arnstein (1969), Vernooy (2005), and White (1969)
frameworks of participation due to different participatory activities and interests adopted at
each stage of the project by the NGO. Arnstein‟s framework was able to explain the extent
of beneficiaries‟ involvement at project planning and evaluation stages, but could not
explain the engagement of beneficiaries at the implementation stage. The reason being that
at implementation stage, NGOs actively engage beneficiaries (exploit beneficiaries‟ free
labor) as a strategy to achieve project cost-effectiveness. Hence, White‟s participatory
interest framework was found useful for analyzing the extent of beneficiary involvement at
project implementation stage. Vernooy‟s framework was used to explain power relationship
between the NGO and beneficiaries at the various stages of the project. The detailed
description is shown the table 4 below:
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Table 4: Author‟s own construction (combination of Arnstein, Vernooy, and White framework of participation and their implications for downward accountability of the NGO).
Project Elements of Arnstein Vernooy White phases project phases (1969) (2005) (1996)
Planning Needs analysis Placation Contractual Legitimation Stage Preparation of Consultation Action plan Informing Information manipulation Consultation disclosure Meetings and feedbacks Committees
Implementa Materials Contractual tion Physical labor Welfare Consultative Instrumental Stage services Finance Evaluation Participatory reviews Contractual Stage Monitoring Consultative and evaluation Informing team
Management activities
2.10.1 Operationalization of the framework
In order to ascertain the extent to which beneficiaries were involved in NGO-led interventions,
key participatory activities or elements were identified at each stage of the project phase based
on the literature review. Literature suggests that NGOs go to beneficiary communities with pre-
decided goals and objectives (Rahman, 2014; Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013). Other scholars
also disclosed that as a result of poverty, powerlessness, and resultant vulnerability,
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beneficiaries are not able to demand accountability from NGOs (Agyemang et. al., 2009;
O‟Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Tagarirofa & Chazovachii, 2013).
For the precise analysis of downward accountability of the NGO, the participatory
approaches were applied to the various phases of the project as shown in table 4 above.
Consequently, the involvement of beneficiaries in any NGO-led projects would reveal the
degree of tokenism (placation, consultation, informing, and manipulation) and non-
participation (manipulation) rungs of Arnstein‟s (1969) ladder of participation at the
planning stage. The engagement of beneficiaries at the planning stage is expected to further
reveal consultative, contractual, and legitimation levels of Vernooy (2005) and White (1996)
approaches respectively. Thus, the NGO maintains decision making process, set rules for
behaviour, and minimally consult with the beneficiaries to meet donors‟ requirements of
beneficiaries‟ involvement.
Literature suggests that beneficiaries‟ involvement in NGO-led projects is relatively high at
the implementation stage (Rahman, 2014; Agyemang et al., 2009), but quite exploitative as
the NGOs usually use community members‟ free labor to achieve project cost-effectiveness.
This reveals instrumental level of White‟s (1996) framework of participation interest.
However, NGOs maintain decision making powers.
The application of participatory approaches at the evaluation stage shows informing,
contractual, and consultative stages of Arnsten (1969) and Vernooy (2005) theories
respectively. Thus, NGOs usually hold durbars in communities to commission projects
(Agyemang et al., 2009). Also, NGOs only inform beneficiaries about the completion of
projects. However, participatory meetings, a tool for enhancing downward accountability of
NGOs are not held to rigorously review the success of projects.
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As a result of poverty, powerlessness, and resultant vulnerability of beneficiaries of NGO-
led projects, NGOs usually deny beneficiaries the opportunity to be actively involved in the
determination of services that directly affect them. Consequently, the full realization of
downward accountability of NGOs may be derailed, as participation has not reach a point
where beneficiaries are able to negotiate with the NGOs for decision making, and take
control of their own development. Thus, active involvement of beneficiaries as articulated
by Arnstein (1969), Vernooy (2005), and White (1996) where beneficiaries become sole
drivers of their own development are not fully realized.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction
This section presents the philosophical assumptions that guided the conduct of this study,
and the methodology that was used to collect and analyze data on the phenomenon under
discussion. The study looked at the extent to which WVG engages beneficiary communities
in project planning/ design, implementation, and evaluation in Saboba District. The chapter
specifically covers the research method, the study area profile, the sampling techniques,
research instruments, the data collection process and the analyses procedure, and ethical
consideration.
3.1 Research Paradigm
A paradigm is “a set of beliefs, values and techniques which is shared by members of a
scientific community, and which acts as a guide or map, dictating the kinds of problems
scientists should address and the types of explanations that are acceptable to them” ( Kuhn,
1970: 175). It is a worldview that shapes the practice and conduct of a qualitative research
(Creswell, 2003). Hence, it is “a basic set of beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990:17).
Creswell (2003), identified four worldviews or philosophical assumptions that shape the
practice and conduct of a research; positivism, constructivism/interpretive,
advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism.
The research paradigm that guided the conduct and practice of this study was the
constructivism/interpretive research orientation. In this philosophical assumption or
worldview, individuals develop „subjective meanings‟ of their experiences and seek
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„understanding‟ of the world in which they „live and work‟ (Creswell, 2003). To Creswell,
these meanings are “varied and multiple” which challenges the researcher to make decisions
on the complexity of views. The aim of constructionism/interpretive assumption is to allow
the researcher to make decisions based on the participant‟s views of the phenomena
(Creswell, 2003). The focal point of constructionist is the context in which people live and
work in order to understand the „„historical and cultural settings‟‟ of the participants, and
recognize that their own background shapes their interpretation. Whereas positivism is
premised on the assumption that there is an objective truth to be discovered, the proponents
of constructionism opposed this and argue that “truth, or meanings comes into existence in
our engagement with the realities of the world…Meaning is not discovered, but socially
constructed” (Crotty, 1998:9). The constructionism/interpretive assumption fitted into this
study to the extent that it enabled the researcher to make meaning out of NGOs downward
accountability to beneficiaries based on the beneficiaries‟ cultural setting and the meanings
they associate with the phenomenon.
3.2 Research Approach
The focus of constructionism/interpretive philosophical assumption on different
understandings of individual actions and the significance of culture and context, leads
naturally to qualitative research approach. The qualitative research is deemed appropriate to
this study in that it does not seek out for a general or universal truth or test a particular
hypothesis but sought to construct meaning out of people‟s experiences in their natural and
cultural setting. This enabled the researcher to do in-depth analysis on how NGOs involved
their beneficiaries in the planning, implementation and evaluation of water project. Denzin
and Lincoln (2005: 3) concedes this and summarize that “Qualitative researchers study
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things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms
of the meaning people bring to them”. NGOs accountability is a complex and intricate
phenomenon. Literature seems to conclude that downward accountability to beneficiary is
rhetorical rather than real. It is against this background that the researcher interacted with the
beneficiaries of NGO-led interventions in their natural settings through face-to-face
questions to be able to establish the extent to which NGOs are accountable to them
(community members) throughout the entire project life cycle.
According to Creswell (2007), qualitative study is employed by researchers for varied
reasons. These are: the need to explore complex issues by allowing participants to tell their
own stories, the need to identify variables that can be measured through the study of a group
or population, and to empower participants to share their views, hear their voices, and
reduce the power relations that often exist between the researcher and the participants. The
others are the need to understand the context in which participants in the study address a
problem, and the intention is not for generalization, but to interpret issues based on their
historical and cultural settings. These features of a qualitative research justified why I
selected qualitative method as a research regime that guided the conduct of this study.
3.3 Research Design
The research design suitable for this study is a case study. A case study allows the
researcher to explore a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over
time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information
(observations, interviews, audio-visual materials, documents, and reports), and report a case
description and case-based themes (Creswell, 2007). Yin (2009:16) defines a case study as
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its
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real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident”.
Two key features of Yin‟s definition justify why I selected the case study as appropriate to
my research questions. Case study research emphasizes on depth which is important for my
study as the researcher sought to find out the extent to which the NGO engages its
beneficiaries in service delivery. As illuminated by Casley & Lury (1981: 62), “depth is a
key strength of a case study”. Literature has not delved deeply into Downward
Accountability of NGOs in a specific NGO setting. Hence, in-depth study is required to
make room for the exploration of the complex issues. Again, Yin‟s emphasis on the
importance of the context surrounding a case, and its influence on the participants deem
appropriate for this study as the settings of the participants was relevant for this study.
The main criticism of a case study research is that it is “not generalizable, in that one case is
not necessarily representative of a larger set of cases” (Welsh, 2014: 39). According to
Creswell (2007), establishing a boundary for a case or cases for study is also a challenge.
Being mindful of these challenges, the study investigated mainly NGOs‟ downward
accountability to beneficiaries and the results were specific to the cultural and natural
settings of the participants under the study.
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3.4 The study area profile Figure 1: Saboba District in National Context
SABOBA DISTRICT MAP GHANA MAP
Legend: Research Communities
Source: Saboba District Assembly
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Saboba district is located in the north eastern part of the Northern Region of Ghana. The
district shares boundaries with Gusheigu district to the west, Yendi Municipality to the
south–west, Chereponi district to the north, Zabzugu and Tatale districts to the south and
River Oti to the east which serves as the international boundary
N an N. The landmass of the district is about 1,100km2 (Saboba
District Assembly Composite Budget, 2014). The district has a total population of 65,706
people (Ghana Statistical Service Report, 2014). The female population constituted 50.4%
and that of the male population was 49.6% (2010 PHC).
The rainfall pattern of the district is generally single maximal with the average annual
rainfall between 1,000mm and 1,400mm as the district is located within savannah climatic
belt. The district records high rainfall from May to October. However, most parts of the
district get flooded during the peak seasons (between July and September) and after which
there is a protracted dry season from November to April. At the peak of the rainy season,
the district is usually cut off from others as a result of flooding. The network of roads is in a
deplorable state throughout the district.
3.5 Overview of operational areas of the NGO in Saboba District
There are four NGOs operating in Saboba district namely: the World Vision Ghana (WVG),
School for life, Integrated Development Centre (IDC), and IBIS. The WVG has operated in
the district for close to twelve (12) years now.
The district is divided into four area councils: Saboba area council, Wapuli area council,
Kpalba area council, and Demon area council. In other to ensure that the resources of the
organization are not spread all over the district, WVG limited its programmes to Kpalba and
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Saboba area councils (known as programme impact areas) where the NGO can make impact.
Initially, Wapuli area council was covered but was later disengaged and concentrated on
Kpalba and Saboba area councils. WVG has been operating in Saboba District since 2003. It
has rolled out programmes in the areas of education, livelihood and economic
empowerment, integrated Health, sponsorship management, and food security (e.g. bee
keeping, livestock rearing or small ruminant, rabbit farming etc.) and resilience (eg. disaster
mitigation, irrigation, dry season gardening, tree planting and greening etc.) The
organization also engages in WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) programme in the
district. The rationale is to focus on access to water in order to improve the sanitation
situation in the district. The activities involve drilling to find out point sources, dugout wells,
and rain water harvesting. School children are engaged in the school health programmes to
be able to properly handle water and hygiene issues in their respective schools. Besides,
communities are facilitated through Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) to be able to
initiate and implement their own sanitation programmes.
The mechanized system in Saboba Township was established way back in 1970s. In 1995, it
was expanded and rehabilitated to its current status. Before the rehabilitation, it was under
Ghana Water and Sewage Cooperation. However, a law was enacted in 1990 empowering
communities to be in charge of Rural Water System (RWS). The system was then handed
over as the community water under Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA). The
district assembly then constituted a board to manage the system. As a result of an increase in
population, extreme pressure is brought on the mechanized system and that explains the
perennial water challenges the district is undergoing.
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The WVG has implemented limited mechanization water system in five (5) main
communities in Saboba district in the past four (4) years. These communities are: Sanguli,
Konkonzoli, Kpalba, Kujooni, and Lifuur. These communities as at the time of this study
were not connected to the national grid, and hence the decision to power the project with
solar energy.
NGOs do not engage in any formal registration with Saboba District Assembly (SDA). At
best, NGOs sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the district assembly
detailing the programmes they would like to carry out in the district. In the MOU, the
district only ensures that programmes of the NGOs are designed in line with the district‟s
long term development plan. In effect, when an NGO is operating in education sector, their
activities are expected to be monitored by the District Education Directorate, if in health
sector, their activities are expected to be monitored by the District Health Directorate, and
the same applies to other sectors in the district. The District Planning and Coordinating
Office (DPCO) are also in charge of monitoring all developmental projects in the district. In
the area of water and sanitation, there is a WASH or WASAN committee members in charge
of monitoring water and sanitation progrmmes in the various communities.
As part of the effort to be accountable to the beneficiaries, World Vision (Ghana and
International) is guided by a core value: “Our pledge is to be accountable, effective and
efficient for the children and communities we serve…” To achieve this value, the field
officers are expected to implement the following participatory approaches: Citizens Voice
and Action (CVA) Learning through Accountability and Evaluation Programme (LEAP), the
use of participatory Rural Approach tools (PRA), and hotline for the beneficiaries to be able
to call and make complaints.
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3.6 Target and study population
This study sought for reliable information to make conclusion that reflected the reality on
the ground. The target population for this study was the staffs of the organization (WVG)
and the beneficiary communities in which WVG has rolled out limited mechanized water
project in the district.
3.7 Sampling technique (s) and procedure
Two sampling techniques were employed in this study. These are: Convenience and
Purposive sampling techniques. Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling
technique which entails the selection of subjects due to their accessibility and/or closeness to
the researcher (Creswell, 2008).
Northern Ghana has since been a hub for both international and local NGOs with the aim of
bridging development gap between the north and the south (Andrews, 2014). These NGOs
have implemented similar projects across districts, including Saboba district. Hence, Saboba
district was conveniently selected for this study. Again, conducting rural research requires
that the researcher understands the local language or uses research assistants who understand
the local language. Saboba district was selected because language was not a problem.
Though there are other NGOs in the district, WVG was conveniently selected because it has
rolled out programmes across the district. The organization has implemented water project
extensively in most of the communities. Also, WVG has a well-established office with
permanent staff that made it easier for data collection.
The five beneficiary communities were conveniently selected because they were the only
communities in the district, in which WVG implemented limited mechanization water
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project. Hence, the limited mechanization water project in these communities presented a
unique feature for the study.
Purposive sampling was used to select respondents for this study. The three senior officials
(local manager, officer in charge of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, and the finance officer)
of the NGO were selected purposively because they are directly involved in the
implementation of projects in the district. Hence, they wield vital information as regards the
NGO‟s accountability to the beneficiaries. The district respondent was purposively selected
because he superintends community development projects in the district, and provided vital
information for the study.
The assembly members, chiefs or community Heads, youth leaders, and women leaders in
each of the five beneficiary communities were also selected purposively because they
represent and or speak on behalf of their respective communities on developmental issues.
The data reflected only the views of community members who were present during the
implementation of the project.
3.8 Data gathering instruments
The instruments used for data collection for this research were face-to-face interviews and
FGDs. This afforded the respondents the opportunity to express their opinions on the extent
to which they (beneficiaries) are involved in the NGO-led project. Interviews are considered
appropriate qualitative research data collection instruments (Myers & Newman 2007; Talmy
2010; Mann 2011) and deemed appropriate for this study as it is used to investigate the
experiences of people in their natural settings. The interviews were semi-structured and
modified to suit the diversity of the respondents. Whilst interviews with staffs of the NGO
and the District Assembly officer in charge of Water and Sanitation were conducted in
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English, that of community key respondents were conducted in local language (Konkomba).
The interviews were all recorded and the notes were also taken alongside. The face-to-face
interviews lasted for 45 minutes each. The local language versions were transcribed
personally and used for the analysis.
Both primary and secondary data were sourced for this research. The primary source of data
was collected through interviews from five beneficiary communities of NGO-led
interventions. Primary data was again collected from official (s) of the NGO, and the
District Assembly. The secondary sources of data included articles, reports, conferences,
seminars, and other documents on downward accountability of NGOs.
3.9 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
Five FGDs were organized in the study communities (one in each community). The FGDs
were made up of six (6) members (three men and three women). Water and Sanitation
(WASAN) Committee members were used for FGDs. Hence, useful information was
provided about the extent of engagement of community members by the NGO in project
delivery. However, effort to hold separate meetings for men and women could not
materialize because of the belief among community members that women are not allowed to
talk to strangers in the absence of their husbands. The FGDs were conducted in local
language (Konkomba) and lasted for an hour each. The discussions were tape recorded and
notes were also taken alongside. The recorded versions were transcribed personally and used
for the analysis.
3.10 Sample size
A total of 21 informants were interviewed for this study. Initially, nineteen (19) respondents
were targeted. However, the number increased to twenty-one (21) during the data collection
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as it became necessary to interview the officer in charge of district water and sanitation.
Also, one other assembly member was interviewed because the five communities are spread
in two electoral areas. Hence, the total sample size included three institutional respondents,
two assembly members, three community leaders (Chiefs or community Heads, youth
leaders, and women leaders) from each of the five communities, the district officer in charge
of water and sanitation, and five FGDs.
The summary of the respondents are shown below:
Table 5: Summary of respondents MALE FEMALE CATEGORY RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS FGDs TOTAL SANGULI 2 1 6 9 KONKONZOLI 3 1 6 10 KPALBA 3 1 6 10 KUJOONI 2 1 6 9 LIFUR 2 1 6 9 STAFFS OF NGO 2 1 - 3 DISTRICT ASS. 1 - - 1 RESPONDENT GRAND TOTAL 15 6 30 51 Source: Author’s own construction
3.11 Data management and analysis
The result or data was analysed qualitatively. Recordings from the interview session as well
as FGDs were transcribed and analysed. The content analysis and interpretation of data
became the analysis regime that guided the researcher. The new themes were carefully
analysed and interpreted. The primary data was used to confirm or contradict the literature
on the downward accountability of the NGO. The classification of the data collected was in
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents analyses and discusses the findings of the data generated through in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions on the beneficiaries‟ involvement in NGO-led
project in Saboba District of the Northern Region of Ghana. The data addresses the
following research questions: First, to what extent are beneficiaries involved in the planning
stage of NGO NGO-led interventions? Second, to what extent does the NGO engage
community members at project implementation stage? Third, how are beneficiaries involved
in the evaluation stage of NGO-led development project? The data analyses and the
discussions of findings were based on the following thematic areas: participatory
accountability at planning stage, participatory accountability at implementation stage, and
participatory accountability at evaluation stage. The analyses for each of the areas were
based on sub-themes as they emerged during data collection.
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4.1 Participatory accountability at planning stage
The data gathered from the field revealed the following Participatory activities at the
planning stage of the water project:
Figure 2: Activities participatory accountability at planning stage:
Action plan Information
Participatory Needs Accountability Meetings analysis at planning stage
Committees Contributions
Source: Author’s own construction, 2015
4.1.1 Needs analysis or assessment
A community project that reflects the traditional aspirations and needs of the beneficiaries
would enable them to comment on its success or otherwise. The data gathered from the
field revealed that the interventions of the NGO are demand-driven. That is, the
organization animated potential beneficiaries to identify their own need and make a
demand. In the case of the water project, the NGO encouraged communities to identify
water as a need and send an application to the District Assembly (DA). The DA then
prioritizes the applications and forwards the list to the NGO. This view was captured in an
interview below:
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We make sure that our interventions are demand driven and
that is the core principle for sustainability. People do not see
intervention as their own; they turn to consider the
interventions as yours no matter what you do. A community
should meet and say that they need water and since the district
Assembly is the goal owner, they write to the district assembly
(interview with NGO staff, 2015)
What goes into the prioritization of the applications at the District Assembly? The
respondent replied:
We don’t just go ahead to approve a community upon receipt of
the application. The District Assembly prioritizes the
applications based on the pressing needs of various
communities. When community A brought their application first
before community B, we assess the needs of the two, and settle
on the one that urgently need the intervention (District
Assembly respondent, 2015).
However, data gathered from the staffs of the NGO disclosed that for the purpose of
ownership and sustainability, a community was considered for an intervention when it
shows signs of cooperation, ownership, and willingness to sustain an NGO-led
intervention. The respondent intimated:
In our animation, we want to be sure that they have really
started the process themselves. We want to be sure that there
are systems and structures that support the sustainability of
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our interventions. We are looking at whether or not the people
are cooperative and work together as one people. If those
parameters are not there, there is no way that they can
support an intervention that is community based. We also look
at their willingness to participate and ownership. By
ownership, we mean that they should be able to own the
process and not somebody somewhere imposing it on them.
They should be able to contribute a minimum amount of 500
Ghana cedis in their account which would be used to maintain
the facility (an interview with NGO staff, 2015).
These assertions were corroborated by responses ascertained from the community leaders
and FGDs. The key respondents and FGDs from the various communities reported that they
met, constituted a committee, agreed, and contributed a minimum amount of five hundred
(500) Ghana cedis together with an application letter to the District Assembly. An account
was opened and the money was deposited to prove that the communities were capable of
managing the facility. One of the community respondents disclosed:
Before the NGO came to our community, we didn’t have good
drinking water. Guinea worm and other water related diseases were
worrying us. Teachers and nurses came and run away from us
because of water. We used to walk a long distance before we could
get water. So, we met and contributed some money and sent an
application to the DA (interview with women leader, 2015).
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The NGO sought to deepen downward accountability to beneficiaries by making its
interventions demand-driven. The aim is to ensure that community members are able to own
the entire project process by having a say in the interventions that directly affect them.
However, the need assessment in the studied communities was done in accordance with the
criteria set by the NGO which eventually limited its effectiveness as downward
accountability tool. Again, NGOs receive specific funds for specific project with a specific
time span; as a result, little room was given to the beneficiaries to decide on different needs
rather than the one the NGO was ready to provide.
The needs analysis in the studied communities is contrary to the findings of Agyemang et
al., (2009) in some parts of northern Ghana. Agyemang et al., (2009) discovered that
meetings were summoned in the communities by the chiefs (through drumming) and the two
parties (NGOs and beneficiaries) agreed on the needs of the beneficiary communities.
However, this study found that the beneficiaries alone met and settled on their needs and
wrote application to the District Assembly. Unfortunately, the communities were expected
to meet some requirements set by the NGO and this has limited the effectiveness of the
needs assessment process. Though the study areas are the same (northern Ghana) the reasons
for the variations in findings may be due to the projects in question. There is a legal
requirement (Community Water and Sanitation Agency‟s Act 564) in Ghana that the
provision of community water must be demand-driven. Again, water project is capital
intensive and demands communities‟ commitment and ownership. Hence, the imposition of
the facility on the beneficiaries may affect its sustainability.
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4.1.2 Preparation of the project’s action plan
Interviews with the staffs of the NGO revealed that beneficiaries lacked expertise in the
mechanized water system, and could not contribute to the formulation of the action plan.
This view was captured below:
Beneficiaries were not consulted in the formulation of action
plan or objectives because they are not educated and lacked
technical expertise in mechanized system; hence, they cannot
contribute to the formulation of the action plan for the water
project (interview with the NGO staff, 2015).
The responses from the community leaders and FGDs confirmed that the views of the
beneficiaries were not sought in the preparation of the action plan as well as projects‟ goals
and objectives. Community members could not also tell why they were not consulted during
the formulation of project‟s goals and objectives. The respondent intimated thus:
After we had submitted our application to the district assembly, we were
there and they (NGO) sent people to inform us that they were ready to
come and start the water project. We didn’t know what went into the
planning (interview with a chief, 2015).
The exclusion of beneficiaries from the formulation of the action plan (including goals and
objectives of the project) has negative implications for the subsequent stages of the project‟s
life cycle. The downward accountability of the NGO becomes mere rhetoric and sham ritual
rather than purposeful engagement with the communities as the NGO maintained decision
making power and set over all agenda. Hence, beneficiaries are not empowered to take
major decisions on their own. This may account for one of the reasons why beneficiaries
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continue to make persistent demands on the NGO instead of owning the process themselves.
The respondent lamented thus:
Everyday community members keep calling us (NGO) with so many
complains. Whilst some complain about leaked overhead tanks, others
report about spoilt solar panel, burst pipelines and others (interview
with the staff of the NGO, 2015).
This finding confirms Rahman‟s (2014) study conducted in Bangladesh that the action plan
as well as projects‟ goals and objectives were decided long before NGOs got into the
communities. To Rahman, beneficiaries were not represented in the governing body or
Executive Committee of the studied NGOs which happened to be the focal point of decision
making. Interview with the respondents as well as analysis of the governing body/
Executive board/ committee of the case study NGO revealed no beneficiary representation.
This point was forcefully brought home by Agyemang et al., (2009: 28) when they reported
that the “overall agenda are largely being set by the NGOs”.
4.1.3 Information disclosure
Information is a powerful resource. NGOs are supposed to be transparent by disclosing vital
and accurate information on programmes and activities to beneficiaries during the design
stage for efficient participatory. Though the views of the beneficiaries were not sought in the
formulation of the action plan for the project, it was prudent to ascertain from the
beneficiaries the extent to which relevant information (regarding the objectives of the
project, the cost and sources of funding) were disclosed to them.
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Objectives
The institutional responses suggest that the objectives of the project were made known to the
beneficiaries during the first meeting held in the various communities. The role of the NGO
and the beneficiaries were clearly defined. This view was confirmed in an interview with the
community leaders as well as FGDs. This was what a community member had to say:
In the meetings, we were told that they have responded to
our request to give us water. So, we needed to support them
by contributing something in the form of labor and others.
They added that the water would eliminate a lot of water
related diseases that we were suffering from (interview with
youth leader).
The FGDs corroborate thus:
We were told that they (NGO) had also realized that there
were a lot of water related diseases such as guinea worm,
typhoid, diarrhea and others. But before we are given the
facility they wanted to be sure that we would be able to
handle it after they have left the district. So, we needed to
contribute a minimum amount of 500 cedis and must be able
to constitute a WASH committee, the membership of which
should be drawn from the various sections of the community,
and the community must have a united front (FGDs, 2015).
It was however clear from the responses of the beneficiaries that although objectives of the
projects were formulated long before the NGO consulted the beneficiaries, these objectives
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were clearly made known to the communities members. But really, there was no
disagreement (especially from the beneficiaries‟ point of view) over the pre-decided
objectives. The community members seem to be satisfied with the objectives without any
question. This may explain the extreme vulnerability and weak negotiating position that
beneficiaries often consider themselves in NGO-power relations. This may be fueled by the
belief that beneficiaries stand the risk of losing the benefits of NGO-led interventions if they
attempt to criticize the NGO. This notion may hinder the full realization of downward
accountability benefits. The beneficiary respondent solemnly disclosed:
Let me tell you that we don’t have and somebody came to
help us. Who are we to challenge him? (Interview with the
chief, 2015).
Financial disclosure
The data discovered that disclosure of financial issues to the beneficiaries has no debilitating
effects on the operations of the NGO as a donor funded organization. This is what an
interviewee had to say:
No, I don’t think that we are secret organization. Let me
put on record that discussing financial issues with the
communities would not have any debilitating effect on the
operations of the NGO. If you know that it costs the
organization 80 thousand dollars to put up a project, you
would then ask yourself what is my contribution? But if
you don’t tell them they think that it is just some 5 cedis
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something after all. We even tell them the pain we go
through to secure funding for our interventions (staff of
the NGO, 2015).
All respondents from the various communities confirmed that the NGO did mention to them
the total cost of the projects and where the funds are gotten from. However, they could not
mention the exact figure or express it in their local language, but used hand gestures to
portray the quantum of money involved. This view was reflected in an interview below:
We were told that it costs them (NGO) a lot of money to put
up the facility, hence, we should complement their effort by
keeping our surroundings clean. (Interview with the chief,
2015).
The FGDs corroborated thus:
Is about four years now since the project was established.
We have forgotten the exact cost that was mentioned, but
we were told that a lot of money had been pumped into
the mechanized water project, and so the facility should
be handled with care and support them when we are
called to do something (FGDs, 2015).
The disclosure of relevant information as regards the objectives and the cost of the project
to the community members is a powerful participatory tool to ensure efficient downward
accountability of the NGO. However, the exclusion of beneficiaries from decision making
amidst poverty and resultant vulnerability of beneficiaries thwarted the effective
engagement of beneficiaries by the NGO.
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The disclosure of objectives to the beneficiaries appear to be cosmetic and seem to confirm
Arnstein‟s (1969) argument that participation becomes merely tokenistic when beneficiaries
are just informed about projects‟ goals and objectives, but are not empowered to demand
accountability from the duty bearers. This also confirms Agyemang et al., (2009) finding
that most often beneficiaries are not able to negotiate with NGOs for decision making due to
powerlessness and acute poverty.
The disclosure of financial matters to beneficiaries contradicts the dominant view in
literature that financial issues are not discussed in meetings with beneficiaries (Agyemang et
al., 2009; Andrews, 2014). However, in an exceptional case, Andrews (2014) disclosed that
beneficiaries in Mexico demanded full disclosure of financial accounts from NGOs. As a
result, some NGOs deserted their beneficiaries, but others stayed on and sought other
sources of funding because donors stopped funding for breach of trust (Andrews, 2014).
Although formal financial disclosures (such as monthly or yearly reports) are not made
known to the beneficiaries, this study revealed that the NGO disclosed specific projects cost
ad funding sources to the community members.
4.1.4 Meetings/contributions
The responses from the staffs of the NGO and community members suggest that the NGO
held several meetings with beneficiaries in the various communities. Whilst some of the
meetings were held with the community leaders, others were held with Water Committee
(WASAN) members. It was further discovered that most of the meetings were held with the
partner organization (as limited mechanization water project was undertaken through
partners). The meetings were held weekly, monthly or yearly.
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In the meetings, both men and women were combined. However, there were „intentional
meetings‟ to separate men from women such that the views of women could be captured
since the water project concerns women most. Unfortunately, women refused to talk in the
meetings without the presence of their husbands on the reason that they would be accused by
their husbands of divulging information to strangers. This is reflected in an interview below:
We held several meetings with community leaders. All
meetings were held with the beneficiaries in their various
communities. Though both men and women were mixed, there
were some intentional meetings where women were separated
from men to ensure freer discussions. Unfortunately, women
refused to talk until their husbands came because they felt that
men knew what was good for them, and would be accused of
divulging information to strangers (staff of NGO, 2015).
The above assertion was corroborated by responses ascertained from the community
leaders and FGDs. This was what an interviewee had to say:
As for this mechanized water project, several meetings were
held with us as leaders as well as committee members or with
the ‘Whiteman’ (the contractor or partner organization). Both
men and women were mixed in the meetings, but we the
women didn’t like the idea that we should be separated. Our
husbands know what is good for us. They (men) would accuse
us of disclosing information to strangers (women leader,
2015)
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The data further discovered that issues such as project‟s goals and objectives, beneficiaries‟
contributions towards the project, siting of the project, and the likes dominated discussions
in community level meetings. The meetings were quite interactive as the beneficiaries were
given the opportunity to speak to issues. However, the ground rules governing the
discussions in the planning meetings were set and facilitated by the NGO or partner
organization. The siting of the project generated a lot of disagreement among community
members. The households in the various communities are widely scattered, and so they
(households) wanted the project to be sited closer to their homes. This posed a serious issue
for the NGO or partner organization to manage during planning meetings. However, the
choice of the project and the nature of the technology were used as the basis by the NGO to
build consensus among community members. A respondent intimated:
They communities showed us the areas that they (community)
think we could get water. They told us that there used to be or
there is still cemetery here and nobody will drink water from
that place. There are our ancestral gods here and others. You
know, the communities are widely scattered, and so they all
wanted the facility to be sited closer to their homes. We
animated them for them to know that the survey would tell
where our hydrologists would find water (NGO staff, 2015).
Interviews with community leaders as well as FGDs confirmed the above assertion. A
community respondent disclosed:
The siting of the project was decided by the NGO. Though
they consulted us and we showed them where we wanted the
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facility to be located, they said they could not guarantee us
that the facility would be sited as we demanded. According to
them, they would use their machine to locate water. We only
showed them our sacred places (shrine, cemetery, gods etc).
After their survey, the then came to us and told us that they
had found water large enough for mechanization (youth
leader, 2015).
The beneficiary communities seemed to be satisfied with the siting of the Water project due
to the choice of the technology which is beyond human intervention. However, the data
discovered that one of the chiefs disagreed with the NGO over the location of an overhead
water tank. The NGO therefore avoided discussions with the chief in that community and
rather dealt with the WASAN committee members. The chief then liaised with the
contractor on the ground, the District Chief Executive (DCE) and the facility was extended
closer to his (the chief) house at the blind side of the NGO. The respondent revealed:
The entire community met at my house and sent an
application to the district assembly. When it was time
for them to start the facility, the contractor told us
that the chief’s area was not part of the NGO’s
demarcation. In one of the meetings, we disagreed
with the NGO. As a chief, I discussed with the
contractor and the DCE and the project was
extended to my house (the chief, 2015).
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The beneficiaries were asked to point to an aspect or aspects of the water project that could
attest to the fact that their views were considered during the discussions in the meetings. It
was surprising that whilst some respondents pointed to the entire mechanized water system,
others referred to some extensions or aspects of the project that they thought were borne out
of their own contributions. The rationale for this question was to find out whether or not the
discussions in the meetings were just to “inform” as asserted by Arnstein‟s (1969: 217). The
contrary responses are presented below:
We met, agreed, and wrote an application to the District
Assembly. So, the entire project was borne out of our own ideas
(Community 2 respondent, 2015).
They wanted to site the overhead water tank at a place which
was too far from the community, so we pleaded with them
(NGO) in one of our meetings before it was sited close to us
(community 1 FGDs, 2015).
The overhead water tank that the NGO wanted to give was too
small, and we complained to them (NGO) before this larger one
was provided (Community 3 respondent, 2015).
Women were also encouraged to express their views in the meetings with the NGO officials.
The interviewee intimated:
Yes, in one of the meetings I thanked the NGO for
accepting our request to provide us water. I told them
that we were suffering too much. In the dry season, we
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have to wake up like 2am to search for water and return
the next morning. Some of us even had snake bites as a
result (Interview with the women leader, 2015).
The NGO widely used meetings as a participatory approach to be accountable to
beneficiaries. Though the action plan as well as the objectives of the project was formulated
long before the NGO visited the communities, efforts were made to ensure that beneficiaries
were still the drivers of their own development. The strict adherence to community-led
development ethos was paramount to the NGO as provisions were made in the meetings for
freer expressions and contributions from community members. However, the downward
accountability effort of the NGO was hampered for two main reasons. Firstly, the NGO
officials acted as facilitators in the meetings, and largely set the ground rules. Secondly,
though efforts were made by the NGO to ensure that siting of the project (overhead tanks,
pipes stands, pipelines etc.) was under the dictate of the beneficiaries, the engagement
process was hampered by the nature of the project in question and the choice of the
technology.
Siting of community projects has since become a challenge in Ghana as citizens abandoned
toilet facilities, market stalls, boreholes, classroom blocks, and others due to no or little
citizens‟ engagement (Bawole et al., 2013). There was no evidence of fierce resistance or
threat to abandon the project as in the case of central or local government funded projects.
This could be attributed to the effort made by the NGO to engage its beneficiaries at every
level of the project and the perception among beneficiaries that NGO-led interventions are a
favor.
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The findings confirm the reports by Rahman (2014) in Bangladesh and Bawole (2013) in
Ghana that meetings are one of the most effective medium to discuss and disclose
information to the beneficiaries. Other mediums such as public hearings, sign posts,
symposia, public lecture, workshops, and others (Bawole, 2013) could also engender
participatory accountability to beneficiaries.
4.1.5 Committees
The committee system is an effective way to ensure participatory accountability in NGO-led
development interventions (Rahman, 2014). The NGO allowed the beneficiary communities
to constitute committees and the membership of which were drawn from all sections of the
communities. A committee is made up of ten (10) members with different professional
backgrounds (teachers, farmers, traders etc.). Women constituted fifty percent (50) of each
committee.
Interview with both the NGO staffs and the community members suggested that the mandate
of committees was to assist the workers at the site, and acted as a link between the NGO and
the other community members. Again, the committees were charged with the responsibility
of managing the facility in their respective communities as well as mobilizing other
community members for communal work. The committees were also allowed to set up
tariffs for the usage of the facility in their respective communities. The respondent remarked
thus:
As part of our community entry strategy, we animate
communities to constitute their own committee
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members. We don’t dictate to them the constituents of
the committees. We only informed them (committees)
of their responsibilities. However, the committees
invite us occasionally to facilitate their meetings with
other community members. The formation of a
committee gives us the confidence that the beneficiary
communities were ready to support our workers at the
site and as well manage the facility after we (NGO)
have left (NGO staff, 2015).
This view was corroborated by the responses ascertained from community leaders and
FGDs. The respondent intimated:
Yes we constituted our own committee members to assist
activities at the site, and to also mobilize other
community members for communal work. But let me tell
you that the committees are not being paid. I know
because I am part of the committee for this community
(Assembly member, 2015).
Whether or not the committees in various communities had oversight responsibility over the
contractor and the workers at the site, the community respondents were unanimous in their
responses that the committees had no power to monitor the activities of the project. One of
the community respondents remarked:
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NO! We were not asked to monitor the entire project
activities. We don’t have that power (interview with the chief,
2015).
The data further discovered from the beneficiary respondents that they (community
members) were not aware that they (community members) had the right to question the
inactions of project implementers (the NGO, contractor, and workers). A respondent
remarked:
We don’t know that we have the right to question the NGO
or the contractor. We were not told and we don’t know, but
you are now telling us (FGDs, 2015).
An analysis of the above interviews is indicative of the fact that committees in the various
communities were formed to merely assist the workers at the site and to manage the facility
by instituting sustainable management practices. However, the oversight responsibility
which was supposed to deepen the accountability process to the communities was not
entrusted to the committees. The committee members were not being paid and this may
inform apathetic behavior being put up towards activities of the project. Effort to get some
of them for FGDs was extremely difficult as one of them lamented:
I am fed up with this their water meetings. We always go there
to waste our time without even a penny instead of going to weed
under our farms. I am even planning to stop (interview with the
youth leader, 2015)
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The beneficiaries‟ involvement in the planning phase of the water project reveals the non-
participation (manipulation and therapy) and degree of tokenism (placation, consultation,
and informing) rungs of Arnstein‟s (1969) framework participation. According to Arnstein,
the rationale is not to engage the beneficiaries in planning and conducting programs but to
“educate” or “cure” participants (Arnstein, 1969: 217). Thus, beneficiaries were excluded
from the formulation of objectives for the project and were subsequently put in
rubberstamped committees to authenticate the pre-determined decisions of the NGO. Thus,
the committees had no oversight responsibility to demand accountability from the NGO.
Hence, the participation has not reached a point where the beneficiaries worked as partners,
exert control over the entire process and be the main drivers of their own development.
The data further confirms the “contractual” and “consultative” stages of Vernooy‟ (2005:
62) framework of participation. Thus, the NGO monopolized key decision making powers in
the formulation of the action plan (including project‟s goals and objectives) and only defined
the minimal role ( assisting workers at the site, mobilizing other community members for
communal work etc.) of the beneficiaries. As a result, beneficiaries could not assume equal
position with the NGO in decision making to be able to work together as colleagues or
partners. Hence, beneficiaries‟ involvement at project implementation phase is rhetorical,
mere tokenism or legitimate garnishing.
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4.2 Participatory accountability at implementation stage
The data gathered from the field revealed the following themes at the implementation stage:
physical labor, welfare, material, and finance.
Figure 3: Activities of participatory accountability at implementation stage:
Physical labor
Participatory Welfare Materials Accountability at the implementation stage
Finance
Source: Author’s own construction, 2015.
4.2.1 Materials
The data suggests that though the beneficiaries were not involved in the procurement of
materials meant for the projects, the materials were kept under the watch of the community
members. Thus, either the chief or WASAN committee chairperson or an assembly member
(depending on the community) had the key to the room in which the materials were kept.
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Hence, both the workers and the WASAN committee members were involved in the
movement of the materials. This was what the respondent had to say:
For security reasons, materials were kept under the
watch of the community leaders. You see, it is their
water and so we want them to own it. However, we did
not involve the community members in the procurement
of the materials (NGO staff, 2015).
The above responses were confirmed by interviews with the community leaders as well as
the FGDs. One of the community respondents revealed thus:
The materials were kept under the watch of the
water committee chairman and he had the key to
the room…we don’t know where the materials we
bought and how much it costs (interview with the
youth leader, 2015).
However, the staffs of the NGO were of the view that formal introduction of the contractor
to the community members was not necessary. One of the respondents intimated:
Formal introduction was not done for the community to
know the contractor at the site. There is no need. The
most important thing is that the project should be
completed as scheduled (staff of the NGO, 2015).
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Though the materials were kept under the watch of the community members for security
reasons, it eventually empowered the beneficiaries to exert some level of control over the
materials. This may prevent a situation where materials meant for the project are sold back
to the beneficiaries by the workers at the site. However, an interview with one of the
respondents in the study communities revealed that bags of cement and other sellable
materials meant for the construction of household toilet facilities (not the mechanized water
project) was sold back to some community members by the workers at the site. This was
reflected in an interview below:
Let me tell you the truth, bags of cement and sand that were
meant for the construction of household toilet facilities were
sold to some of our family members some time ago by the
workers at the site (interview with women leader, 2015).
Accountability in the procurement of materials is a significant issue for enhancing downward
accountability of NGOs. Unfortunately, beneficiaries were not involved in the procurement of
materials meant for the mechanized water project. This has the tendency of breeding corrupt
activities such as bribery, rent-seeking, contract-client payoffs, kick-backs and the likes which
often characterize procurement processes. This usually results in the execution of shoddy
contracts which have far-reaching consequences on the beneficiaries.
4.2.2 Physical labor
The respondents were unanimous in their responses that community members provided
physical labor towards the implementation of the project. The data further revealed that
whilst men dug trenches and cleared the site, women fetched water and sand to aid the
implementation of the project. The respondent said:
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Yes we were called to help. Whilst our husbands dug trenches
and cleared the site, we fetched water and sand to support
the workers (interview with women leader, 2015).
Communal labor involving community members was the efficient means to ensure
community participation. Since the communities were far apart and pipes needed to be laid
to the various communities, the sections in the communities were made to dig trenches to
their respective homes. This phase of the project makes beneficiaries feel good, own and
support the project and this translates into the successful completion of the said project
(Domfeh & Bawole, 2009).
However, White (1996) asserted that community members are often used as instruments to
achieve project‟s efficiency through cost reduction. By implication, beneficiaries contributed
physical labor free of charge towards the implementation of the project. There was no
evidence of beneficiaries‟ demand for compensation, but they (beneficiaries) considered it
as their contribution towards the project. This may explain why the involvement of
beneficiaries at the implementation stage was high compared to the planning and evaluation
stages. Unfortunately, beneficiaries are not empowered to make transformative decisions
(White, 1996).
4.2.3 Welfare services
All respondents were unanimous in their views that beneficiaries provided „welfare services‟
towards the implementation of the project. The institutional respondents intimated that
without any compulsion, the beneficiaries provided accommodation and food for the
workers at the site. Additionally, other welfare services such as gifts (in the form of animals)
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were given to motivate the staffs of the NGO as well as the contractor at the site. A
respondent revealed:
Beneficiaries provided accommodation for our workers at the
site and also fed them. They also appreciated us (the staffs of
the NGO and the contractor) by other donations such as goats,
guinea fowls etc. (interview the staff of the NGO, 2015).
This gesture from the beneficiaries has a bearing on the downward accountability of the
NGO. On one hand, the gesture could be seen as the participation of beneficiaries in the
implementation phase through voluntary contributions to the project. On the other hand, the
gesture may indicate the extreme vulnerability of beneficiaries in the face of the NGO. The
net effect of the latter is that the beneficiary communities are likely to be complacent with
the services rendered to them by the NGO and would avoid criticizing the NGO even if
standards are compromised. This may inform the reason why the NGO was commended in
the studied communities.
4.2.4 Finance
The respondents did indicate that community members did contribute money as a
requirement to prove that they (beneficiaries) were capable of managing the project after the
NGO has closed operations in the district. The money was not given to supplement the cost
of the project but accounts were opened in the name of the various communities.
The beneficiary communities were made to contribute money
to prove that they would be able to manage the facility when it
is finally handed over to them (staff of the NGO, 2015).
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There are two main reasons why communities contribute money towards community
projects: (a) to share in the cost of the project, and (b) to prove that beneficiaries were
capable of managing the project. Though the data shows the later, the possibility of
demystifying the negative attitudes associated with „free-riding‟ concept in service delivery
cannot be overemphasized. Since their financial effort has gone into the project, they
(beneficiaries) are likely to exert ownership of the project and hold the NGO accountable.
This is contrary with respect to central/local government funded projects where people view
those projects as government owned and nobody seems to take responsibility and
accountability for them.
The application of White‟s (1996) participation interest framework to the findings at the
implementation stage reveals „nominal‟ and „instrumental stages‟. At the nominal stage, the
NGO consulted the beneficiaries to meet donor requirements of beneficiary involvement.
Although the involvement of beneficiaries was found to be high at implementation stage, the
NGO used beneficiaries‟ free labor to achieve project cost-effectiveness (White, 1996). It
was again found that at implementation phase, the NGO maintained sole decision making
process as beneficiaries were not involved in the procurement of materials meant for the
project.
4.3 Participatory accountability at evaluation stage
Participatory accountability at the evaluation stage allows community members to assess the
achievement of projects‟ objectives, performance and to meet the set standards of a project
(Rahman, 2014). The data revealed the following participatory approaches at the planning
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stage: participatory reviews, monitoring and evaluation, and institution of management
activities.
Figure 4: Activities of participatory accountability at evaluation stage:
Participatory reviews
Participatory accountability Monitoring and at evaluation evaluation team stage
Management
Source: Author’s own construction, 2015.
4.3.1 Participatory reviews
Participatory review is an effective means of involving community members in the
evaluation of projects (Agyemang et al., 2009). It provides opportunity for the success of the
project to be measured against the set standards at the planning stage (Agyemang et al.,
2009). The data revealed that there were no participatory reviews of the water project in the
beneficiary communities. The staffs of the NGO did indicate that evaluation of the project
was done by the external people who have in-depth knowledge in the installation of the
water project. Though formal meetings were not held to rigorously review the success of the
project, durbars were held in each of the beneficiary communities where feedbacks were
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given to beneficiaries about the achievement of the set objectives. This view was
corroborated by all respondents in the beneficiary communities. This was summarized in the
following FGDs:
A durbar was held and in which we were told that the project
has been completed and that we can start the usage. Since we
could see that the project was duly completed, it means that
the objectives of the project were achieved (FGDs, 2015).
Clearly, there were no formal participatory meetings held in the beneficiary communities
where both the NGO and the beneficiaries sat down as colleagues to review the success of
the project. In spite of the utilities accruing from the engagement of beneficiaries in
accountability mechanisms, it was clear from the respondents that full benefits associated
with downward accountability have not been achieved. This was further worsened by the
dominant view among beneficiaries that NGOs are „God sent‟ people and NGO-led
interventions are a favor, hence, NGOs must not be disturbed with accountability issues.
This was what the respondent had to say:
The interventions of the NGO are a favor to us. NGOs are ‘God
sent’
people to us. They are ‘whites’ from somewhere who came to help
us. We cannot go there to help them (interview with a chief, 2015).
This perception revealed a sense of powerlessness among beneficiaries of NGO-led
interventions who often shun from criticizing NGOs in the delivery of aid projects. As a
result, beneficiaries have no bargaining power to negotiate with the NGO. The discussions
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in the focus group meetings across the beneficiary communities also revealed that
beneficiaries were careful in post construction meetings not to be seen criticizing the NGO.
This seems to confirm assertion in literature that providing opportunity for criticisms of
NGO-led projects would weaken and deviate NGOs from their core mandate (Kilby, 2006).
This unfortunate situation is a reflection of what happens at the national level where the
decision of the government of Ghana to legislate activities of NGOs received fierce rebuttal
from the NGOs and their donors (Trust Bill, 2007). In the midst of extreme poverty and
deprivation, NGOs seem to be over mighty, over bearing, and over winning.
The sense of powerlessness of beneficiaries was further revealed when all community
respondents except in one community did indicate that they would report to the district
assembly when it was evident that the NGO was corrupt, indulged in non-performance or
discrimination. However, a respondent in one of the communities retorted that they
(community members) would organize and beat the officials of the NGO if they indulge in
corruption, non-performance or discrimination. These contrary views are presented below:
From the beginning, we sent application to the District
Assembly, so we would report back to them if the NGO is
corrupt (interview with the chief, 2015).
We would beat them if the NGO indulges in corruption (interview
with the youth leader, 2015).
But the interview with the officer in charge of the district water and sanitation revealed that
activities of NGO would be terminated if NGO misconducted itself and breached the MOU
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signed with the district. As to whether or not the district would be able to sanction NGOs
for breach of trust is yet another task. The respondent lamented:
It means that particular NGO has not kept their trust to
the MOU we signed. In that sense, the Assembly has
every right to stop that NGO from operating in the
district. (Staff of the district assembly, 2015).
However, the data further revealed that no NGO has been sanctioned since the inception of
the district for breach of trust, and as to whether the district will do that in future, the
respondent replied:
No! The Assembly has never sanctioned any NGO and I
don’t think the Assembly will ever do that. The reason is
that we go to solicit for NGOs and any attempt to
sanction an NGO will deter others from coming to assist
the district (Staff of the District Assembly, 2015).
It can be deduced from the above findings that the beneficiaries could not question the NGO
during the post construction meetings because of the fear that any attempt to do so may exit
the NGO from the community. The data suggest that the NGO uses threat of exit to win the
cooperation of beneficiary communities. Hence, poverty and the resultant vulnerability are
likely to render the beneficiaries of NGO-led interventions incapable of holding NGOs
accountable.
4.3.2 Monitoring and evaluation team
The NGO did not make any provision for project monitoring and evaluation team to be
constituted in the beneficiary communities neither were the beneficiaries made part of the
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official project monitoring and evaluation team. The NGO contracted external technical
team to monitor and evaluate the project, and to them (NGO) any attempt to constitute local
monitoring team would lead to duplication. This was what the respondent had to say:
We don’t constitute local level project monitoring and
evaluation team. External people are usually contracted to
evaluate our projects and programmes. So, any attempt to
constitute local level monitoring and evaluation team would
lead to duplication of functions. Beneficiaries are not educated
and have no skills in our projects and programmes (staff of the
NGO, 2015).
This was collaborated by the responses from the community members. In effect, the NGO
did not see the need of constituting local level project monitoring and evaluation team in the
beneficiary communities. The absence of community or local level project monitoring and
evaluation team (LPMET) might have contributed to the absence of participatory reviews at
the evaluation stage. Participatory monitoring and evaluation is expected to empower the
communities, engender the negotiation of conflicts between the service providers and the
beneficiaries, increase capacity building for clients, ensure partnerships and collaborations
in service delivery, and foster effective downward accountability (Estrella, 2000).
4.3.3 Management activities
The institution of management activities was to ensure that beneficiaries exerted
responsibility and control over the project after it is handed over to them. The data revealed
capacity building and user charges (tariffs) as a participatory mechanisms instituted to
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Capacity building
Some of the committee members were trained (as pump maintenance volunteers) to be able
to fix the system in case of minor breakdown. More so, the partner organization (thus,
organization contracted for the installation of the facility) was invited and introduced to the
beneficiaries so that they (beneficiaries) could consult them in case of major system
breakdown. Some of the WASAN committee members from various communities did
receive skills training in the areas of greasing, tightening of bots and nuts, and minor repairs
during breakdown. These measures are to ensure that community members would be able to
fix the system or contact the technical team even after the NGO has finally closed operations
from the district.
User charges
Beneficiaries were allowed to institute their own tariffs system if they so desire. The NGO
never dictated to them as to how much to charge. However, interviews held with the
beneficiary communities revealed that community members fiercely resisted the tariffs
system instituted by the committees on the basis that they don‟t have money to pay for the
usage of the facility. For the sustainability of the project, one of the communities (Kpalba
community) agreed that specific amount be contributed every month per a household. This
could not work out and at the time of data collection, the facility had broken down.
Other communities have instituted user tariffs, but the money was too small to sustain the
facility. This may explain why at the time of data collection, the overhead water tanks in
almost all the communities except one (Lifuur community) was leaking and water could no
longer be pumped into them. Others have complained about spoilt solar panels. The
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communities have no money to fix the system and relied on the NGO. This was what the
respondent had to say:
Once the facility has been handed over to them, it is their water.
Unfortunately, some of them still come to us to complain that
their system has broken down, their overhead tank has spoilt
and others (staff of the NGO, 2015).
It can be deduced from the above interview that the sustainability of the mechanized water
project in the study communities is at stake. This is a confirmation of the study conducted by
McCommon, Warner & Yohalem (1990 as cited in Tesfaye, 2012) that the sustainability and
ownership of Community-Driven Development projects would be at stake if the facility does
not reflect the economic capacity of the beneficiaries. It would even be worse if the
communities are not empowered to make decisions that would allow them to own the
process (Tesfaye, 2012). The decision to mechanize the water project in the study
communities did not receive wider consultation with beneficiaries, and if it did, the NGO
would have realized that the facility may not have been within the economic means of the
people. Once the plan as well as the objectives of the project was pre-decided and once that
was what the NGO could offer, the beneficiaries had no choice than to accept the offer. It
may also be the case that beneficiaries have not recognized their ownership role for the
sustainability of the project.
The data gathered from the communities revealed that beneficiaries of NGO-led
interventions are not aware of their right to hold the NGO accountable. The beneficiaries
added that even if they were aware of their right, they would have hesitated because of the
fears that any attempt to hold the NGO accountable could lead to the exit of the NGO from
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the community. These responses confirm Agyemang et al., (2009) and Tagarirofa &
Chazovachii (2013) assertion that in the midst of acute poverty and resultant deprivation and
vulnerability, the community members are disempowered, weak, subservient, and would not
criticize NGOs. Thus, the NGO used threat of exit to win cooperation from communities
that appeared not cooperative. The resultant effect of the hostile posture of NGOs towards
community members could be the massive corruption that characterizes the activities of the
NGOs (Trivunovic, 2011).
However, The rights-based (RB) theorists assert that practitioners in the field should factor
into the development process the rights of the beneficiaries in projects delivery, ensure
active and proactive participation of community members in planning and implementation,
as well as empowering citizens or beneficiaries to be able to hold their agents accountable,
protect the disadvantaged groups from discriminations, and generally allow the poor to be
the main directors of their development (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 2004; O‟Dwyer &
Unerman, 2010; Kindornay & Capenter, 2012 ).
The application of participatory approaches to the findings at the evaluation stage reveals
„informing‟ (Arnstein, 1969) and „contractual‟ and „consultative‟ (Vernooy, 2005) levels of
participation. After the completion of the project in the various communities, post-
construction meetings (in the form of commissioning ceremonies or durbars) were organized
and beneficiaries were informed about the achievement of the set objectives. However, the
evaluation of the success of the project was exclusively done by the NGO.
The table six (6) below shows a modified framework (to include characteristics of project
phases) after the presentation, analysis, and the discussion of data gathered from the field.
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Table 6: Author‟s modified Framework (combination of Arnstein, Vernooy, and White approaches of participation) Project Elements of Characteristics of project Phases Project phases phases Arnstein Vernooy White Author’s (1969) ( 2005) ( 1996) classification Needs Interventions of the NGO are Placation analysis. demand-driven. Consultation Contractual Sham ritual Planning Preparation of The NGO set rules for needs Informing Stage action plan. analysis. Manipulation Consultative Legitimation Tokenism Disclosure of Beneficiaries were not part of information the formulation of action plan. Colouring Meetings and Goals and objectives were feedbacks. pre-determined. Legitimate Committees. But objectives and cost of the Garnishing project were disclosed to Rhetorical beneficiaries. Meetings were organized. The NGO used threats of „exit‟ to win cooperation from beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were careful not to criticize the NGO. Rubberstamped committees.
Materials. Beneficiaries were not Tokenism, Impl. Physical involved in the procurement Contractual Stage labor. of materials. Consultative Instrumental Exploitative Welfare But materials were kept under participation services. the watch of community Finance. members.
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The contractor was not formally introduced to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries contributed physical labor. Beneficiaries provided accommodation and food for workers at the site, and other donations. Beneficiaries contributed money to prove their capacity to be able to manage the project.
Participatory Participatory reviews were not Evaluation reviews. held. Informing Contractual Tokenism Stage Monitoring Beneficiaries were not part of Consultative and evaluation the official project monitoring team. and evaluation team. Rhetorical Management Management activities were „Feel good‟ activities instituted.
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4.4 CONCLUSION
The foundation of this framework was based on three participatory approaches: Arnstein
(1969), Vernooy (2005), and White (1969). In order to ascertain the extent to which
beneficiaries were involved in NGO-led interventions, key participatory activities or
elements were identified at each stage of the project phase. The analyses of the data
revealed significant characteristics of the various stages of the project, and that called for the
modification of the initial framework as shown in the table six (6) above.
The exclusion of beneficiaries from decision making process at the planning stage has
derailed the effective downward accountability of the NGO. As a result, participation at the
planning stage became rhetorical and tokenistic as it revealed the manipulation, informing,
consultation, and placation rungs of Arnstein‟s (1969) framework of participation. The
application of Vernooy‟s (2005) framework revealed contractual and consultative stages as
the NGO maintained sole decision making power. This further revealed a „feel good‟
(legitimation) attitude articulated by White (1996) as the NGO was determined to meet
donor requirement and not for active beneficiaries‟ involvement.
According to Vernooy (2005) participation becomes contractual and consultative when one
stakeholder has sole decision making power over others. The contractive and consultative
levels were evident across the three phases (planning, implementation, and evaluation) as
the NGO maintained sole decision making power and set rules for behaviour. However, the
active involvement of beneficiaries in the provision of labor at the implementation stage was
found to be „instrumental‟ as articulated by White (1996) as the NGO used beneficiaries‟
labor to achieve project cost-effectiveness. As a result, participation becomes rather
„exploitative‟ instead of purposeful engagement of beneficiaries. At the evaluation phase,
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participatory review meetings were not held to rigorously assess the success of the project.
The participation at this stage was merely „informing‟ as the NGO held „durbars‟ to
commission the various projects. Really, the NGO maintained sole decision making power.
Consequently, participation becomes merely tokenistic, rhetorical and ritual sham as
beneficiaries were not empowered to be the main drivers of their own development as
indicated in the author‟s classification column. Thus, the participation has not reach a stage
where beneficiaries work as partners to gain control and ownership over the project
(Arnstein, 1969), collaborate and collegiate with the NGO in terms of decision making
(Vernooy, 2005). In effect, beneficiaries were not empowered through effective capacity
building for transformative decision making and that subsequently fostered dependency and
jeopardized the sustainability of the project in the various communities (White, 1996).
For the precise analysis of downward accountability of the NGO based on the data gathered,
the author‟s own description (as reflected in the author‟s categorization column of the table
6 above) of the involvement of beneficiaries across the three stages was necessary. The
analysis at the planning stage revealed that the involvement of beneficiaries in the
mechanized water project was rather rhetorical, sham ritual, and a mere colouring. Thus, the
fact that the NGO got to the communities with pre-decided project‟s goals and objectives,
and set general rules for behaviour has frustrated the entire process of downward
accountability effort. The beneficiaries were further put in rubberstamped committees to
authenticate the pre-decided objectives. As a result, downward accountability of the NGO at
the planning stage becomes legitimate garnishing rather than purposeful engagement of
beneficiaries as the NGO minimally engaged beneficiaries to legitimize their (NGO) actions
and to meet donor requirement of beneficiary involvement.
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It was evident at the implementation stage that the NGO used beneficiaries‟ labor to achieve
project‟s cost-effectiveness thereby making the participation rather „exploitative‟. Thus,
beneficiaries cleared the site, dug trenches, and fetched water (free of charge) to aid in the
achievement of pre-decided objectives.
At the evaluation stage, durbars were held to officially commission the projects. The
beneficiaries were informed about the achievement of the pre-decided objectives in the
commissioning ceremonies. The durbars were just to let beneficiaries „feel good‟ about the
NGO and their interventions. However, the beneficiaries were not given the opportunity to
rigorously evaluate the success of the project.
Hence, any study intends to investigate downward accountability of NGOs through
participatory approaches should recognize that goals and objectives of projects are
determined long before NGOs get to beneficiary communities. As a result, the depth of
downward accountability is limited to the above levels of Arnstein, Vernooy, and White
frameworks of participation. In this case, beneficiaries are not empowered to have sole
determination of the services that affect them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 Introduction
This chapter covers the summary of the major findings of the thesis, conclusions and
recommendations based on the data collected.
5.1 Summary
The study examined downward accountability of World Vision Ghana in Saboba District. A
point is made that downward accountability of NGOs emphasizes the use of participatory
approaches in service delivery. The study specifically looked at the extent to which the NGO
involves beneficiaries in the three phases of the project‟s life cycle.
5.1.1 Participatory Accountability at planning stage
The rational for Community-Driven Development (CDD) is that engagement of beneficiary
communities in decision making towards local level development ensures judicious use of
resources and meets the very needs of the people (Wong, 2012).
The data gathered through interviews as well as focus group discussions largely agreed that
interventions of the NGO are demand-driven. Thus, the beneficiaries identified water as a
need and made a demand for consideration after other requirements were met. It is important
to note that due to strict project requirements, beneficiaries could not have settled on any
other need rather than the one the NGO was ready to provide. This limited the engagement
process during the needs analysis.
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Decision making in an organization is the mandate of its governing body. Interviews with
the respondents and the analysis of the governing body of the NGO in the district revealed
no beneficiary representation. The net effect is that the action plan as well as the goals and
objectives of the project were determined long before the NGO got into the communities.
This was further compounded by the choice of the technology of the water project as the
respondents intimated during interview sessions that neither the staffs of the NGO nor the
beneficiaries have control over the choice of technology for the project. Hence, the
involvement of community members in the formulation of project‟s goals and objectives
was nonexistent.
Additionally, community participation in the determination of the sites for the project was
done on a low profile. Though the NGO made effort to engage the communities as regards
the siting of the facility, the wishes of the beneficiaries were thrown into the air as the pre-
drilling activities found points of water contrary to their (community members) desire. This
notwithstanding, community members were able to point to their sacred places (shrine,
ancestral gods, cemetery etc.) where they thought any attempt at those places may receive
the anger of the gods.
Disclosure of relevant information forms an important ingredient of downward
accountability of
the NGO. It was discovered that project‟s objectives were made known to the community
members. It was further revealed that financial issues (such as the cost of the project and
sources of funding) were made known to the beneficiaries. The rationale for the financial
disclosure was to let the beneficiaries appreciate the full cost of the project and in turn
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complement the effort of the NGO by keeping a cleaned environment as well as providing
communal support whenever they were called to do so.
The platforms for the disclosure of relevant information to the beneficiaries were meetings,
public hearings, workshops and the likes. The findings suggest that regular planning
meetings were held with the community members and during which issues about the
implementation of the project were discussed. Opportunity was provided during the
meetings to encourage freer discussions and cross fertilization of ideas. However, there was
no evidence of beneficiaries‟ disagreement of the NGO‟s pre-determined objectives. As a
result of powerlessness, poverty and resultant vulnerability, beneficiaries admitted that their
views were factored into the implementation of the project. For instance, whilst some
community respondents pointed to the entire project as their own idea (thus, communities
demanded for the water project), others referred to aspects of the project which they thought
were borne through their contributions at the meetings.
Community members were allowed to constitute a ten (10) member committees in their
various communities. The women constituted forty (50) percent of all committee members.
Interviews with the community members revealed that committees were not entrusted with
any supervisory role. It could however be deduced that committees were merely constituted
to mobilize members for communal work and to assist the workers at the site. The
committees were not entrusted with oversight responsibility.
Generally, officials of the NGO recognized that downward accountability was the surest
way to ensure sustainability of NGO-led projects. However, strict project requirement from
the donors coupled with powerlessness, illiteracy, and poverty on the part of beneficiaries
potentially limited the effectiveness of downward accountability at the planning stage.
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5.1.2 Participatory Accountability at implementation stage
Project implementation phase witnessed the active as well as the highest involvement of
beneficiaries in project related activities compared to the other two phases. An analysis of
the field data revealed that through communal labor the beneficiaries contributed physical
labor towards the implementation of the project. Thus, whilst men dug trenches and cleared
the site, women fetched water and sand to aid the implementation of the project.
The beneficiaries were made to contribute a minimum amount of money in aid of the
project. The rationale for the financial contributions was not to supplement the cost of the
project but to prove that community members were capable of managing the facility even if
the NGO finally closed operations from the district.
In the quest of the NGO to be transparent and accountable to her beneficiaries, the materials
meant for the project were kept under the watch of either the chief, assembly member or the
chairperson of the water committees (the decision was depended on the community). It was
however discovered that beneficiaries were not involved in the procurement of the materials
meant for the project. Also, the contractor was not formally introduced to the community
members.
Voluntarily, the beneficiaries offered accommodation and food for the workers at the site.
Community members also presented gifts to the staffs of the NGO. These welfare services
have two main implications for the downward accountability of the NGO: (a) it could be
seen as beneficiaries‟ contributions in aid of the project, and (b) it shows powerlessness and
resultant vulnerability of beneficiaries in the face of the NGO. As a result, beneficiaries
shunned from criticizing the NGO because they were grateful for the God sent NGO.
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Notwithstanding, the engagement of community members at the implementation stage of the
project was found to be generally high compared to the planning and evaluation stages.
5.1.3 Participatory Accountability at Evaluation stage
Participatory accountability in Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach enables
communities to identify and specify key performance indicators during planning stage of
the new development project, and then to comment on the achievements of these
performance indicators during the participatory review process at the evaluation stage
(Agyemang et al., 2009).
The data revealed that participatory monitoring and evaluation of the project was
nonexistent. The staffs of the NGO did indicate that evaluation of the project was done by
consultants who have in-depth knowledge in the installation of the facility. As a result, no
formal participatory review meetings were held to rigorously review the success of the
project against the set standards. However, post construction meetings were held and during
which management activities were discussed. Official „durbar‟ was held in each of the
communities and represented by key stakeholders for the commissioning of the projects.
The findings at the evaluation stage revealed no evident of beneficiaries‟ criticisms of the
NGO‟s actions at post construction meetings. A further probe revealed that beneficiaries
view the NGO as „God sent‟ people and must not be criticized or disturbed in the discharge
of their duties. The NGO uses threat as a mechanism to win cooperation of community
members. As a result, the communities fear that the NGO may exit if they make any attempt
to hold them accountable for breach of trust.
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The study found that the beneficiaries were likely to report to the district assembly if it was
evident that the NGO indulges in corruption, non-performance, and discrimination in the
delivery of interventions. The officer in charge of district water and sanitation disclosed in
an interview that the NGO would be barred from operating in the district if it misconducts
itself and breach the MOU signed with the district. However, the district officer was
skeptical as to whether that drastic measure would be taken against an NGO on the reason
that the district goes to solicit for NGOs. The findings further suggested that no NGO was
ever sanctioned in the district for breach of trust.
The study discovered that as part of the management activities geared towards the
sustainability of the project, capacities of some community members were built as to how to
fix the system in case of minor breakdown. The beneficiaries received skills training in the
areas of greasing, tightening nuts and bolts, minor repairs after breakdown, and required
tools and spare parts. Besides, the partner organization (thus, organization contracted for the
installation of the facility) was invited and introduced to the beneficiaries so that they
(beneficiaries) could consult them in case of major system breakdown.
The data revealed that whilst some community members refused entirely to pay for the
usage of the facility, others pay very low tariffs. This posture on the part of beneficiaries
has adversely affected the sustainability of the project. For instance, at the time of the data
collection, the project in two communities (Kpalba and Sanguli) have been closed down
with others experiencing varied problems such as overhead tanks leakage, faulty solar
system and others. It could be deduced that the project was likely not to be within the
economic means of the beneficiaries to manage (McCommon, Warner & Tohalem, 1990 as
cited in Tesfaye, 2012:20).
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5.2 CONCLUSION
The downward accountability of NGOs emphasizes the use of participatory approaches in
the service delivery. As a result, the general objective of the study sought to investigate the
extent to which NGOs involve their beneficiaries in the entire project life cycle in some
selected communities in Saboba District. The study was guided by a conceptual framework
that explains the variables necessary for the NGO involvement of her beneficiaries in project
planning, implementation, and evaluation.
The study revealed that the interventions of the NGO are demand-driven. The beneficiaries
identified their own need and made a demand. Subsequently, the involvement of the
beneficiaries in the needs analysis and the formulation of the action plan (including goals
and objectives) as indicators at the planning stage were found out to be very low as these
were decided long before the NGO got into the communities. The NGO disclosed
information as regards the objectives and the cost of the project as well as the funding
sources to the beneficiaries and feedbacks were provided. Though committees were formed
in the various communities, they were not entrusted with the oversight responsibility.
Generally, the involvement of beneficiaries at the planning stage was at the low profile.
The implementation stage witnessed the most active and highly participated phase in the
project‟s life cycle. The community members contributed physical labor, finance, and
welfare services to aid the implementation of the project.
At the evaluation stage, participatory review meetings that were supposed to review the
success of the project against the set standards were nonexistent. At best, post construction
meetings were held and during which the project was officially commissioned in the various
communities and the management activities were also discussed.
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The findings suggest that the NGO has taken steps to achieving greater downward
accountability. However, more can be done to engender effective engagements and
strengthen accountability mechanisms that would further integrate into the principles and
operations of the NGO.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
To ensure effective downward accountability of the NGO to its beneficiaries, the study
recommends the following:
Though the NGO uses a community-driven approach as a strategy in the delivery of its
interventions, the economic capacity of the beneficiary communities should be properly
assessed to ensure that the interventions are within the means of the people to manage.
It is recommended that beneficiaries of NGO-led interventions should be represented at the
governing body or executive committee of NGOs as it forms the focal point for decision
making. By so doing, decisions made are likely to reflect the aspirations of the people, and
propel for proper needs assessment.
The beneficiary communities must be actively involved in the formulation of the action
plan. Thus, a participatory approach in the formulation of the project‟s goals and objections
is much recommended as this would engender a sense of ownership and support for NGO-
led interventions.
Since it is impossible for the NGO to meet the entire community members in a meeting, the
use of committee system is highly recommended. However, the committees should be given
an oversight responsibility to enable them perform supervisory role over NGO-led projects.
The beneficiaries should be part of the project implementation team.
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The beneficiaries should be involved in the purchase of materials meant for the project.
Additionally, the control measures should be such that the communities should be given a
way bill signed by all parties involved as these would curb the sale of materials to some
community members by the workers at the site. Effort should be made to win the trust of the
people to divulge vital information to the NGO.
It is also recommended that participatory review meetings should be held at the evaluation
stage. This would enable beneficiaries to measure the success of the project against the key
performance indicators set at the planning stage. This could be made effective by making
community members part of the project monitoring and evaluation team. The District
Assembly should provide support to NGO-led interventions in various communities. This
would ensure the sustainability of the interventions in the beneficiary communities.
The donors should make NGOs‟ accountability to beneficiaries a requirement in the award
of aid. This would inject efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and ensure that
projects and programmes meet the needs of beneficiaries. It would further help check
corrupt activities associated with NGOs in aid delivery chain.
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APPENDICES
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY RESPONDENTS
RESEARCH RESEARCH QUESTIONS INTERVIEW GUIDE
OBJECTIVES
1) To investigate the extent To what extent do Were you consulted to which NGOs involve NGOs involve during the planning stage beneficiaries in project beneficiaries in project of the project? planning. planning? Were you part of the planning team?
How often do NGOs visit your community? How often do they meet chiefs and elders, youth leaders, women leaders, Assembly member (s) etc. How was project objectives explained to community leaders How were your views expressed in the meetings? How do NGOs assess the needs of the community? Which aspect of the project can you say came from the community?
2) To investigate the extent How do NGOs engage How were you engaged in to which NGOs engage their beneficiaries in project implementation by community members in projects NGOs? project implementation. implementation? Can you tell the cost of
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the project? Did you know the contractor? Can you tell where the materials were kept? Can you tell the number of workers at the site? Were you part of the procurement of materials? Was there a local team for implementing the project How often the monitoring team did visit the project site? Have you contributed something in the form of labor, food, finances etc towards the implementation of the project? If your answer to 8 is YES, how was it done? How do you get information about the progress of work?
4) To investigate how How do NGOs engage Were you part of the beneficiaries are their beneficiaries in the project monitoring and involved in the evaluation of projects? evaluation team? evaluation of NGO-led Can you tell whether or development project. not materials were all used up for the intended project? If NO, what may be the cause Were you provided information about the achievement of objectives of the project? If YES to 3, how did you know that the objectives of the project were achieved? Are you aware of
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instances where materials were secretly sold by workers at project site? Are you aware of any incidence of corruption, non-performance or discrimination in the operations of NGOs in your community? Give specific examples. What will you do if it is evident that NGO is corrupt? Do you think community or the district could have executed the project at a lower cost? Would you say that beneficiaries of NGO interventions are poor or helpless and cannot hold NGOs accountable? Do you think you have the right in holding NGOs accountable? Dou you think NGOs are doing beneficiaries a favour and should not be disturbed with accountability issues?
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APPENDIX B
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONDENTS ( NGO & DISTRICT ASSEMBLY) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES RESEARCH QUESTIONS INTERVIEW GUIDE 1) To investigate the extent To what extent do How do you involve at which NGOs involve NGOs involve communities in the needs beneficiaries in project beneficiaries in project analysis? planning. planning? Probe for real involvement such as number of meeting held with communities, their contributions, prioritization of the needs, why and how one is chosen over others. How to you engage beneficiaries in the formulation of action plan? Probe for real engagement in the entire project life cycle such as project planning meetings, whether or not community members are part of project planners, contributions of community members, and whether or not their decisions are considered in the planning process Which information is/are discussed in planning meetings? Probe for quality of information discussed such as the communication of projects‟ objectives, cost of the projects, communities‟ views on the site of the project etc What structural reforms put in place to ensure accountability to
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beneficiaries? Example Actionaid launched ALPS programme. 2) To investigate the extent How do NGOs engage Probe for real at which NGOs engage their beneficiaries in involvement during community members in projects project implementation project implementation. implementation? such as where contractor and workers sleep, where materials are kept and under whose watch, total number of materials, community contributions such as physical labor, food for workers, supply of water, money etc. Did you engage the community members in the monitoring of the project at site during the implementation stage? Why or why not. Were the beneficiaries parts of the implementation team?
3) To investigate how How do NGOs engage What role did beneficiaries are involved in their beneficiaries played in the the evaluation of NGO-led beneficiaries in the monitoring and evaluation development project. evaluation of projects? of the project? Probe for real engagement such as participatory review meetings, how the meetings made provision for the expression of ideas, how did they manage criticisms from community members if there are any, how often were the review meetings held, how does the contribution of beneficiaries contributed to the improvement of the project ( seek specific examples). Were there any
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maintenance activities discussed with the communities for the sustainability of the projects? Probe for specific examples.
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