The Making of China's Peace with Japan

The Making of China’s Peace with Japan Mayumi Itoh The Making of China’s Peace with Japan

What Xi Jinping Should Learn from Zhou Enlai Mayumi Itoh Princeton New Jersey, USA

ISBN 978-981-10-4007-8 ISBN 978-981-10-4008-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore In memory of Harumi Befu NOTES ON THE TEXT

Names of people and places in Chinese are in principle shown in the modern spelling of Mandarin, based on pinyin; however, some historical names of institutions and people that are known in the old spellings are shown in Wade–Giles style, as in Sun Yat-sen and Tsinghua University. For Japanese, the Hepburn style is primarily used, with macrons; however, macrons are not used for words known in English without macrons, as in Kyoto and Tokyo. Another exception is that “n” is not converted to “m” for words where it precedes “b,”“m,” and “n”; for example, “nenpu” instead of “nempu” and Saionji “Kinmochi” instead of Saionji “Kimmochi” (names for Japanese newspapers, such as Asahi Shimbun, are given “as is” because they are their official English names). Chinese and Japanese names are given with the surname first, except for those who use the reversed order in English. Honorificprefixes, such as Dr. and Mr., are not used in the text, except in direct quotations. Positions and titles, as well as ages, for individuals are as of the time for which the event is described in the particular passage of the text, unless specified otherwise. English translations of institutions and positions are based on the ones given at the official sites of each governmental organization, wherever available. All translations were made by the author, in the form of paraphrases (not as literal translations), in order for the translations to make sense in English, and in consultation with multiple native Chinese speakers for accuracy. Citation numbers for sources of information are normally given at the end of each paragraph, instead of at the end of each sentence, in order to enhance the smooth reading of the text and also to limit the number of citations. Regarding online sources, the dates of actual access are given unless the sources give the posting dates. vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Among the many people who encouraged me in writing this manuscript, I would like to thank Sara Crowley Vigneau, Rachel Crawford, and Connie Li for editorial work, Anni Chen, Sophia Ho, Jin Li, Deana Low-Beer, Jia Mi, Michael Shiue, Charlotte Sun, Edith Twanmoh, Rose Tsang, and Wei Xinyi, for valuable information, and Daniel Dalet for the loan of the map. I also thank Tsuneo Akaha, Kent Calder, Toshiko Calder, Gerald Curtis, Joshua Fogel, Ronald Hrebenar, Ellis Krauss, Mike Mochizuki, T. J. Pempel, Stephen Roddy, Gilbert Rozman, Richard Samuels, Donald Zagoria, and Quansheng Zhao, as well as Gregory Rewoldt and Megumi Itoh, for continuous encouragement and inspirations.

ix CONTENTS

1 Introduction 1

2 Chinese Diplomatic Overtures toward Japan and Zhou Enlai 7

3 Establishing Semi-Ofﬁcial Sino-Japanese Economic Relations 35

4 Cultural Revolution and Zhou Enlai 61

5 Ping-Pong Diplomacy 85

6 Secret Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization 115

7 Secret Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty 147

8 “History Issues” and Zhou Enlai 173

9 Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute 205

10 Conclusion 237

xi xii CONTENTS

Selected Bibliography 271

Index 281 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADIZ Air Defense Identiﬁcation Zone APEC Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CCCPC Central Committee of the Communist Party of China CCPIT China Council for the Promotion of International Trade CHINCOM China Committee CIA Central Intelligence Agency COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls CPAFFC Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries CPC Communist Party of China CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress CYCPE Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DPP Democratic Progressive Party DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DSP Democratic Socialist Party ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FIR Flight Information Regions GHQ General Headquarters HC House of Councillors HR House of Representatives ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICJ International Court of Justice ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IJA Imperial Japanese Army

xiii xiv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JAPIT Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade JCAET Japan–China Association on Economy and Trade JCG Japan Coast Guard JCOTLC Japan–China Overall Trade Liaison Council JCP Japanese Communist Party JCTPA Japan-China Trade Promotion Association JSP Japan Socialist Party KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) LDP Liberal Democratic Party MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA overseas development aid PLA People’s Liberation Army POW prisoner of war PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea SCAP Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers SDPJ Social Democratic Party of Japan SOFA US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement

Memorial poem stone of Zhou Enlai, ‘Arashiyama in the Rain’, originally written in Kyoto, Japan, April 1919.

xvi CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

This is the final part of a three-volume study of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (March 1898–January 1976) and Japan, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of Zhou’s visit to Japan in 1917 in order to study at a higher school in Tokyo. It reviews and updates all of the previous studies on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, by this author, by juxtaposing them with the newly published official biography of Zhou Enlai (Vol. 1 and Vol. 2) and the official Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976 (Vol.1,Vol.2andVol.3),aswellas with the previous official Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1898–1949.1 It is no exaggeration to state that a significantaspectofZhou’s life and career was the contemplation of strategies for how to deal with Japan. Zhou grew up observing Japanese expansionism in China. He was born just after the first Sino-Japanese War and grew up in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the two countries vied for spheres of influence in Manchuria (China’s northeast region). Zhou studied at an upper elementary school in Fengtian (Mukden, current Shenyang), the former capital of China’s northeast. Then, he enrolled in Nankai Middle School in Tianjin, where Western imperial powers and Japan occupied concession territories in the city. Upon graduating from Nankai Middle School, Zhou went to Japan to study at a higher school in Tokyo from 1917 to 1919. Chinese intellectuals at that time

© The Author(s) 2017 1 M. Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_1 2 1 INTRODUCTION had ambivalent feelings toward Japan: animosity toward Japanese militarism on the one hand and admiration for Japanese modernization on the other. The young Zhou absorbed a kaleidoscope of new thoughts and learned communism from the Japanese version of the “Hundred Flowers” movement. There were no Chinese translations of Karl Marx available in China at that time.2 While a student at Nankai University, Zhou was arrested and imprisoned for his part in a student protest. He was released after six months and shortly thereafter travelled to France, where he stayed, apart from a brief sojourn in the UK, for two years. Upon returning from Europe, Zhou climbed up the hierarchy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and guided the nation through the civil war with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek. Zhou subsequently formed the KMT–CPC United Front against Japan, fought in the Anti-Japanese Resistance War (the second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945), and then fought another civil war with the KMT. Subsequently, with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China” hereafter) in 1949, Zhou, as its foreign minister and premier, launched diplomatic overtures toward Japan and proactively engaged in restoring relations with Japan. From the perspective of China’s world strategy, Japan was important as a counterbalance to the United States during the Cold War era, and Zhou, a “modern Sun Tzu,” tried to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States.3 Zhou’s foreign policy initiatives toward Japan established the foundation of post-World War II Sino-Japanese relations, and this is still relevant today. The issue of Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine is a case in point. Zhou visited the Yasukuni Shrine himself while studying in Japan in 1918 and observed its annual spring festival. No other Chinese leaders, in their youth or in their maturity, have ever done this. Little did the young Zhou know then that this shrine would later become a focal point of the controversial “history issues” between China and Japan. If Japanese parliamentarians remembered how Zhou had renounced China’s (PRC’s) war reparations from Japan, they would understand why the Chinese government continued to protest Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In addition, Zhou established a mutual agreement on the territorial dispute between China and Japan involving a small island group in the East China Sea— the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. However, Chinese and Japanese government ofﬁcials appear to have forgotten about this.4 LITERATURE REVIEW 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature in Chinese The Chinese government has published a number of works on Zhou Enlai since his death in January 1976. One of the most important productions is the Official Biography of Zhou Enlai, edited by the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC) Party Literature Research Office. The original 1989 version covers the period from his birth to the establishment of the PRC (1898–1949). The revised 1998 version added a second volume, covering his premiership of the PRC until his death (1949–1976). However, the new volume concentrates on Zhou’s involvement in Chinese domestic policy and mostly presents the officially recognized views of the CPC. It includes only scant accounts of his foreign policy towards Japan, and there is not a chapter on the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.5 Another important publication is the official Chronology of Zhou Enlai. The original 1989 edition has only one volume, covering the period 1898–1949, whereas the new 1997 edition chronicles his life and premiership from the foundation of the PRC until his death (1949–1976) in three volumes. This three-volume chronology is the most detailed documenta- tion of Zhou’s day-to-day activities as Chinese premier and foreign minister, clarifying many facts that were unknown or unclear previously. In addition, the CCCPC Party Literature Research Office compiled the Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai since the Nation’s Foundation, in three volumes, in 2008.6

Literature in English Despite the crucial importance of Zhou Enlai’s foreign policy toward Japan, which constituted an integral part of Chinese foreign policy toward the United States, biographies of Zhou Enlai in English by and large ignore his relations with Japan in the post-World War II period. In turn, a plethora of books in English on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations have been published. Some of the notable works include Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach (1996), Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978 (1998), and Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (2006). Nevertheless, no book offers a comprehensive and exclusive study of Zhou’s foreign policy 4 1 INTRODUCTION making toward Japan from the foundation of the PRC until his death, as seen from his own perspective.7 In previous works, no personal views of Japan and the Japanese by Zhou Enlai loom large. As with a number of Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries who lived in Japan in exile at the turn of the twentieth century, including Sun Yat-sen (November 1866–March 1925) and Liang Qichao (February 1873–January 1929), Zhou had high hopes and deep disappointments with the Japanese. This dichotomy in the Chinese intellectuals’ perceptions of Japan reﬂects the complex historic relations between the two countries, and also is evident in Zhou’s foreign policy toward Japan. Interestingly, Zhou in his “Diary of Travel to Japan” expressed his concerns about some of his fellow Chinese students studying in Japan who denounced as “traitors” other Chinese students who were associating with the Japanese. Nevertheless, Chinese propaganda politics and its ofﬁcial party platforms toward Japan hide Zhou’s personal views of Japan and the Japanese. Also, few studies highlight Zhou’s personal views on Japan and the Japanese.8

Literature in Japanese Meanwhile, memoirs of Japan by China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General, Sun Pinghua (1917–August 1997), were published in Tokyo in 1998. Sun was born in Fengtian province (the current Liaoning province) and studied at the Tokyo Higher School of Technology (the current Tokyo Institute of Technology). After the establishment of the PRC, Sun directly assisted Zhou Enlai’s operations vis-à- vis Japan and also worked in Tokyo as China’s chief representative for Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade. Sun’s memoirs, written originally for a Japanese newspaper as a series of articles in 1997 (they were then published as a book in 1998, after his death), offer candid and uncensored views of Zhou’s foreign policy making toward Japan. A Chinese translation was also published.9 In the same year, the Asahi Shimbun reporter, Yoshida Makoto (b. 1931), who was its Beijing bureau head at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, published his record of reporting Sino-Japanese relations for 35 years. Then, in 1991, an anthology of recollections of Zhou Enlai by a number of Japanese who had been closely associated with him was published in Tokyo. This ﬁne collection offers many interesting and insightful accounts of Zhou by politicians of NOTES 5 both ruling and opposition parties, government ofﬁcials and business leaders, as well as individuals in academic, cultural and sports circles (a Chinese translation was also published). In addition, a new scholarly work on Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization came out in 2010, demonstrating continuing interest in Japan in trying to understand Zhou’s foreign policy toward Japan and contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.10

SCOPE OF THIS BOOK This book examines the existing literature on Zhou Enlai in three languages—Chinese, English, and Japanese—with special attention to the inner working of Zhou’s foreign policy making toward Japan, as well as his personal perceptions of Japan and the Japanese. In so doing, building on all of the previous works on Zhou Enlai available to this author, it presents the most accurate and comprehensive study of Zhou’s relations with Japan in the post-World War II period. It also sheds new light on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations from a longer historical perspective and thereby provides constructive insight into President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy toward Japan. As with the ﬁrst two volumes of this author’s study of Zhou Enlai and Japan, this work is indebted to the herculean efforts of scholars and writers who have investigated and tried to understand this enigmatic Chinese leader. This book is, therefore, to be understood as being a synthesis of all of the previous works on Zhou Enlai.

NOTES 1. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 2 vols., Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1898–1949 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1898–1949), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe and Renmin- chubanshe, 1989; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), 3 vols., Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997. 2. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 3. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, The Making of China’s War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 4. For details, see Itoh, The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations. 6 1 INTRODUCTION

5. Zhou Enlai zhuan 1898–1949 (Biography of Zhou Enlai 1898–1949). 6. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1898– 1949 (1989); Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (1997); Zhou Enlai, Jianguo-yilai Zhou Enlai wengao (Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai since the Nation’s Foundation), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 3 vols., Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 2008. 7. Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro–Macro Linkage Approach, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998; Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2006. 8. Zhou Enlai, “Luri-riji” (“Diary of Travel to Japan”), in Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai zaoqi wenji 1912.10–1924.6 (Early Writings of Zhou Enlai October 1912–June 1924), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi and Nankai-daxue, Tianjin: Zhonggyang wenxian-chubanshe and Nankai-daxue chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 1, 327. 9. Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai-shimbunsha, 1998; Sun Pinghua, Sun Pinghua, Wode lulishu (My Autobiography), Beijing: Shijie-zhishi chubanshe, 1998. 10. Yoshida Makoto, Nitchū-hōdō kaisō no 35-nen (Recollections of Thirty-Five Years of Reporting Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo: Ushio-shuppansha, 1998; Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991; Jinian Zhou Enlai chuban-faxing weiyuanhui, ed., Ribenren xinmuzhong de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai in the Hearts of the Japanese), trans by Liu Shouxu, Beijing: Zhonggong-zhongyang dangxiao-chubanshe, 1991; Inoue Masaya, Nitchū kokkō seijōka no seijishi (Political History of Sino- Japanese Normalization), Nagoya: Nagoya-daigaku shuppankai, 2010. CHAPTER 2

Chinese Diplomatic Overtures toward Japan and Zhou Enlai

The Chinese won their Anti-Japanese Resistance War, with the help of the US Army, Air Force, and Navy, including the American Volunteer Group (the “Flying Tigers”) led by Lieutenant General Clair Lee Chennault (September 1893–July 1958), only to resume the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1946. After three years of intense battles nationwide, the CPC army defeated the KMT army. The former won primarily because the second KMT–CPC United Front had given it much-needed respite from the earlier round of civil war (Chiang Kai-shek’s relentless “Bandit Suppression Campaign”) and positioned it to confront the KMT Army again. The CPC was no longer an insurgent group but a legal organization and an equal to the KMT that was running the Republic of China (ROC) government. Mao Zedong pointed out the paradox: “The CPC owed its victory in the revolutionary war to Japanese imperialism, because the Anti- Japanese Resistance War had united the Chinese and strengthened the party.”1 When the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China” hereafter) was established in October 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai worked out a successful division of labor. CPC chairman Mao dominated party politics and domestic policy as President of the Central People’s Government of the PRC (term of ofﬁce, September 1949–April 1954), while Zhou held the dual positions of premier and foreign minister of the government and

© The Author(s) 2017 7 M. Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_2 8 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI took charge of foreign policy. This chapter examines Zhou’s foreign policy toward Japan in the ﬁrst decade of the PRC.

ZHOU ENLAI’S “FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE” As the first foreign minister of the PRC, Zhou Enlai carefully selected the high echelon of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and appointed Wang Jiaxiang (August 1906–January 1974) as the PRC’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Wang had been one of the “28 Bolsheviks”—the CPC’s internationalist group controlled by the Third International (Comintern)—but he switched his position and allied with Mao Zedong and Zhou during the Long March. (Wang died during the Cultural Revolution.) Then, in February 1958, Zhou surrendered his position of foreign minister to vice premier and vice chairman of the National Defense Committee Chen Yi (August 1901–January 1972). This was a gesture of self-criticism on Zhou’s part, as he had taken a cautious, neutral stance when Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, considering the campaign to be hasty “adventurism.” Zhou had known Chen from his years in Europe and they had become close colleagues there. Zhou continued to oversee Chinese foreign policy as premier alongside Chen, who served in this position until his death during the Cultural Revolution.2 Zhou, meanwhile, had envisaged the fundamental framework for Chinese foreign policy and wrote the “Five Principles for Peace” in December 1953, which consist of: (1) mutual respect for others’ territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non- interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The principles were codified for the first time in April 1954 in the agreement between China and India concerning trade and traffic between China’s Tibet region and India. Subsequently, they were incorporated in the Ten Principles for Peace that were adopted at the Asian–African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, which became almost universal principles to guide relations between the non-aligned countries.3

ZHOU’S DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN No sooner had the Chinese MOFA taken off than Zhou began operations vis-à-vis Japan, as an integral part of the Chinese international propaganda strategy. As the US government supported Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR REPARATIONS ... 9 government on Taiwan (ROC or “Taiwan” hereafter) and embargoed China, the Chinese needed foreign economic aid to rebuild a nation that had been devastated by decades of war. Although the Soviet Union provided economic assistance to China, this was hardly sufﬁcient, and Zhou approached Japan. (Sino-Soviet relations were not as monolithic as outside watchers had imagined, but their ideological disparities and the Sino-Soviet rift did not become evident to the outside until the early 1960s.) Nevertheless, Japan had lost its sovereignty and was under occupation by US armed forces, led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). The General Headquarters of SCAP (SCAP-GHQ) essentially dictated the domestic and foreign policies of Japan.4 Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the former Allied Powers in September 1951, but the treaty excluded China, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union and its allies. Although Japan regained its sovereignty when this peace treaty came into force, the US–Japan Security Treaty incorporated Japan into the US camp in the postwar Cold War system. This gave Japan little leverage to formulate an independent foreign policy that could contradict the interests of the US–Japan alliance.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR REPARATIONS FROM CHIANG KAI-SHEK The Japanese government concluded the Japan–ROC (Taiwan) Peace Treaty in April 1952 on the day the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect, in which the ROC government relinquished its right to war reparations from Japan. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not voluntarily relinquish this right, as it has been generally thought, when he quoted a Chinese axiom, “To repay hatred by gratitude.” Contrary to this face- saving political gesture, Chiang had actually sought war reparations from Japan. In fact, his ROC government in its provisional capital, Chongqing, had planned to take over properties in Japan as war reparations. The Chongqing government sent its ofﬁcial representative to Japan in 1947 to investigate potential reparation properties such as the Hirohata Works of Japan Iron & Steel (currently part of Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corporation) in Himeji (west of Osaka) and the Kure Power Plant (east of Hiroshima), and to negotiate with SCAP-GHQ.5 This fact is known because the ROC government’s Economic Department senior adviser, who was sent to Tokyo as ROC representative 10 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI to Japan, wrote the account in his memoirs. Surprisingly, he was a Japanese businessman, Takasaki Tatsunosuke (February 1885–February 1964). Takasaki had worked in Manchukuo (the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria) as vice president and then as president of the Manchuria Heavy Industries Development Company, at the strong request of its founder Ayukawa Yoshisuke (generally known as Ayukawa Gisuke; November 1880–February 1967). After Japan’s surrender, Takasaki voluntarily chose to remain in Manchuria (though the Japanese government had secured his repatriation) and took a leading part in the postwar settlement in Manchuria, acting as an intermediary between the ROC, the Soviet Union, and the United States.6 In Tokyo in 1947, Takasaki visited SCAP-GHQ’s Economic & Scientiﬁc Section (ESS) and met Colonel Charles W. Ryder, who was surprised to see that the ROC government’s Economic Department senior adviser was a Japanese. Takasaki wrote a detailed report on his feasibility study of the ROC taking over the Hirohata Works of Japan Iron & Steel and the Kure Power Plant as war reparations. Having read the report, the Truman administration changed its mind and decided that the ROC would not seek war reparations from Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to follow the US decision.7

ZHOU’S “DIVIDE AND CONQUER” TACTICS In turn, Zhou Enlai’s primary objective in his dealings with Japan—to establish a connection with the Japanese government—had met strong resistance from the Japanese MOFA and the US administrations. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (terms of ofﬁce, May 1946–May 1947 and October 1948–December 1954) had initially “fought a vigorous, rear-guard action” against the Truman administration’s chief peace-treaty negotiator, John Foster Dulles (US secretary of state, January 1953–April 1959), resisting his demand to recognize the Taipei government. Dulles prevailed. Yoshida was also interested in establishing trade relations with Beijing, but the US administration objected. Yoshida thus employed double-tongued diplomacy and publicly denounced China (the PRC). However, the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration were still suspicious and closely scrutinized any Japanese contacts with China. Consequently, China and Japan became distant neighbors.8 Hemmed into these political conﬁnes, Zhou Enlai employed “divide and conquer” tactics, trying to drive a wedge between Japan and the ZHOU INVITES JAPANESE CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANS 11

United States. While publicly condemning the Yoshida cabinet that concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty, Zhou deftly courted Japanese, in various circles, who were interested, for different reasons, in reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. Zhou approached not only Japanese politicians on the left in the JapanSocialistParty(JSP)andtheJapaneseCommunistParty(JCP), but also conservative politicians in the Japan Democratic Party and the Japan Liberal Party. The two conservative parties were created by Hatoyama Ichirō, who merged them in November 1955 and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): the “Conservative Merger of 1955.” The LDP has ruled the postwar Japanese politics, for the most part, until the present day. Zhou had to forge positive relations with conservative Japanese lawmakers because they ruled Japanese politics. He thus approached conservative parliamentarians in the House of Representatives (the HR, the powerful lower house) and the House of Councillors (the HC, the nominal upper house like the House of Lords in the United Kingdom).9 MeanwhileinJapan,manyconservativepoliticians,letalonethoseon the left, saw the need to establish official relations with China (although Japan had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1952). They were not only motivated by narrow national interests (such as economic benefits) but also had a larger perspective in mind. Historically, China had been the mentor for the Japanese, and the Japanese had had relations with the Chinese for two millennia. Added to this were feelings of guilt for Japanese acts of wartime aggression in China. While recognizing ideological differences, many Japanese politicians considered it abnormal not to have diplomatic relations with their neighbor, representing as it did the great majority of the Chinese people. While acknowledging the cardinal importance of the US–Japan alliance, these politicians groped for a way to establish relations with China, and, as a first step, formed the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade. Zhou could take advantage of these “weak spots” the Japanese had for China.10

ZHOU INVITES JAPANESE CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANS In this context, Zhou Enlai proactively approached ruling conservative Japanese politicians. Among them were such inﬂuential ﬁgures in the Japan Democratic Party as Sakurauchi Yoshio (May 1912–July 2003), 12 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

Sonoda Sunao (December 1913–April 1984), and Nakasone Yasuhiro (b. May 1918). Nakasone’s most recent memoirs tell how the three HR members visited Beijing as early as September 1954, when there were no diplomatic relations between China and Japan. They had visited Stockholm, as part of the non-partisan parliamentarians’ mission, and attended the International Peace Conference there before flying to Beijing via Moscow.11 All three became leading figures in the LDP and worked towards reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. Sakurauchi, who held such positions as international trade and industry minister, foreign minister, and house speaker, promoted Sino-Japanese relations as the president of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT). Sonoda became chief cabinet secretary of the Fukuda cabinet and foreign minister, and signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. As for Nakasone who became Prime Minister in 1982, he is usually considered anti-communist, as exemplified by his friendship with President Ronald Reagan. However, he was actually one of the earliest promoters of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.12

ZHOU WELCOMES JAPANESE LEFTIST POLITICIANS Simultaneously, Zhou Enlai engaged in forging strong ties with Japanese parliamentarians from opposition parties on the left. The newly published official Chronology of Zhou Enlai records that in February 1953 Zhou invited former HC Vice President, Matsumoto Jiichirō (June 1887– November 1966), who was a leader of the “Leftist Socialist Party of Japan” (the JSP split into leftists and rightists in 1951; they merged again in 1955). Back in Tokyo, Matsumoto was elected first president of the Japan–China Friendship Association in May 1953. Zhou invited Matsumoto again in November 1956 for the 90th anniversary celebration of the birth of Sun Yat-sen.13 Zhou also invited a non-partisan parliamentarians’ mission in Beijing in the fall of 1954, which included Suzuki Mosaburō (February 1893–May 1970), chairman of the “Leftist Socialist Party of Japan” and his protégé, Sasaki Kōzō (May 1900–December 1985), who became JSP chairman (term of office, May 1965–August 1967). Then, in November 1955, Zhou received the first official delegation of the JSP, led by party chairman Katayama Tetsu (July 1887–May 1978), who was Prime Minister of a coalition cabinet (May 1947–March 1948).14 ZHOU’S RIGHT-HAND MAN FOR OPERATIONS VIS-À-VIS JAPAN 13

“PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS” China’s potential large market offered irresistible opportunities for the recovery of a Japanese economy that had been devastated by defeat in World War II, and leaders in business circles wanted to develop trade relations with China. Nevertheless, the Yoshida cabinet could not openly sanction trade with China due to US objections. In this bind, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) devised a non-linkage policy called, “the principle of separation of politics and economics (business),” in order to accommodate Japanese economic interests in China and to facilitate unofﬁcial trade arrangements with China.15 This measure of political expediency allowed Japanese business leaders, except for government ofﬁcials, to visit China without obtaining permission from the MOFA and to engage in private trade with China. Zhou initially repudiated this non-linkage policy because it was impossible for Chinese corporations to conduct bilateral trade with any foreign countries without government involvement. However, he eventually decided to condone the measure, recognizing the political constraints on the Japanese side.16

ZHOU’S RIGHT-HAND MAN FOR OPERATIONS VIS-À-VIS JAPAN Moreover, Zhou Enlai encountered obstacles from within. At home, even after the war, anti-Japanese sentiment ran so high among the Chinese officials in the CPC establishment that Zhou faced difficulties in launching his diplomatic overtures toward Japan. Zhou charged Liao Chengzhi (September 1908–June 1983) with the task of overseeing China’s operations vis-à-vis Japan. Liao was not one of the Japan specialists in the party apparatus during the war years, but there was no better person than him for this job. Liao was born and grew up in Tokyo and spoke fluent Japanese. He was the son of Liao Zhongkai (April 1877–August 1925), the right-hand man of Sun Yat-sen and the financial manager of the KMT, who had been dubbed “Sun Yat-sen’s wallet.”17 Liao Zhongkai and Sun Yat-sen fled to Tokyo and lived there each time their revolutionary attempts failed. Liao became the KMT representative at the Whampoa Military Academy at its foundation in May 1924, and it was Liao who hired Zhou as deputy director of the Academy’s political department in September 1924 upon his return home from France. Zhou had known the young Liao since 1924 because Liao’s family lived in the 14 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI compound of the academy, along with its commandant, Chiang Kai-shek. Liao Chengzhi grew up calling both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek “uncle.”18 During the civil war, Zhou Enlai had Liao Chengzhi engage in international propaganda work and appointed him president of the Red China News Agency in its formative years (Red China News Agency became today’s Xinhua News Agency—the New China News Agency). With the foundation of the PRC, Zhou appointed Liao as deputy director of the International Liaison Department, deputy director of the United Front Work Department, and vice chairman of the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs at the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC). Liao was also appointed vice minister of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs at the State Council and maintained expan- sive international networks in Hong Kong, Europe, and North America.19 The head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs bodies both in the CCCPC and in the State Council was Liao Chengzhi’s mother, He Xiangniang, who was Sun Yat-sen’s colleague and life-long friend of his widow, Song Qingling. Also, Liao’s niece, Chen Xiangmei (b. June 1925), is the widow of the Flying Tigers leader, Clair Lee Chennault. Anna Chennault (her American name) was a significant figure in Sino-US relations and Republican Party politics from the 1950s to the 1990s, holding many leadership positions, including National Republican Asian Assembly chair.20

THE FIRST POST-1949 JAPANESE DELEGATION TO BEIJING The first mission that Zhou Enlai charged Liao Chengzhi with was to invite to Beijing in May 1952 the first unofficial Japanese delegation, made up of three parliamentarians: Kōra Tomi (July 1896–January 1993), an HC member (affiliated to a group of Independents in the HC called the Ryokufū-kai); Hoashi Kei (September 1905–February 1989), a former HC member (as an Independent) and soon to be an HR member from the JSP; and Miyakoshi Kisuke (1905–1966), an HR member from the Japan Progressive Party. Kōra was vice chair of the HC Special Committee for the Repatriation of Oversea Japanese. She had studied psychology at Columbia University and had graduated from Johns Hopkins University. She became the first Japanese woman to receive a Ph.D. degree, and then taught at Japan Women’s University.21 REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE LEFT BEHIND IN CHINA 15

Hoashi Kei was representative of the Japan–China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) and Miyakoshi Kisuke was director-general of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade. The objectives of this delegation were humanitarian and economic: to initiate negotiations for the repatriation of Japanese left behind in China and to conclude a ﬁrst private (unofﬁcial) trade agreement between the two countries.22

REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE LEFT BEHIND IN CHINA Zhou Enlai first took up the humanitarian project with Japan because there were as many as 60,000 Japanese left behind in China’s northeast in 1948. They were mainly the survivors of the Japanese farmer-settlers who had settled in Manchuria as part of the Japanese government policy to create Manchukuo. When the Soviet Army invaded Manchukuo in August 1945, the Japanese Kwantung Army abandoned Japanese civilians, leaving them to be massacred and plundered by the Soviet Army. It is estimated that, out of a total of 270,000 farmer settlers, 80,000 died at the end of the war. The survivors became displaced persons. Some managed to reach cities, where Japanese local residents had already turned into refugees. Then, more Japanese died after the war had ended because the Japanese government ignored Japanese civilians left in Manchuria and did not repatriate them.23 In the absence of government help, several Japanese civilian leaders who had remained in Manchuria organized self-help organizations to facilitate the repatriation of Japanese. The representative of these voluntary groups was Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who patiently negotiated with the ROC government, the Soviet Army, and other concerned authorities. As a result, collective repatriation of the Japanese took place, and by the end of 1947 approximately 1,272,000 Japanese had been repatriated. However, more than 60,000 were still left behind in China.24 The Yoshida cabinet had ignored this issue, but Kōra Tomi was determined to repatriate the remaining Japanese in China and wanted to negotiate directly with the Chinese government. Hoashi Kei and Miyakoshi Kisuke were planning to conclude a first private (unofficial) trade agreement between China and Japan. However, it was almost impossible for the three Japanese politicians to visit China because the Yoshida cabinet had banned Japanese from visiting communist countries. They planned to go to Beijing after attending the International Economic 16 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

Conference in Moscow, but Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru (he held dual positions) denied their visa applications to Moscow, invoking the Japanese Passport Law that could deny a visa if a potential visit was deemed to hold the possibility of jeopardizing Japanese national interests and security. Hoashi later sued the Japanese government for the denial of his visa application—the Hoashi Kei Incident.25 Zhou Enlai then made an elaborate plan for them. The three first flew to Paris. Then they flew to Moscow and attended the International Economic Conference there. At the conference they met the chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the president of the People’s Bank of China, Nan Hanchen (1895– January 1967), who was Zhou’s former military intelligence agent, and Foreign Trade Vice Minister Lei Renmin (b. 1912). The two Chinese officials invited the three Japanese to visit Beijing. That was how the first Japanese delegation visited China in 1952.26 Zhou meanwhile appointed a CCCPC staff member, Sun Pinghua (1917–August 1997), who had studied at the Tokyo Higher School of Technology (currently the Tokyo Institute of Technology) from 1939 to 1943, as a secretary to the CCPIT and assigned him the task of taking care of the first post-1949 Japanese delegation to China. From this point in time, Sun became involved in Chinese foreign policy towards Japan. If Liao Chengzhi was the right-hand man for Zhou in Chinese operations vis-à-vis Japan, Sun was the right-hand man for Liao. In 1952, Zhou sent him to Beijing airport to receive the Japanese delegation. He welcomed the delegation members in Japanese, but, as Hoashi Kei smilingly confided to Sun years later, they did not understand his Japanese at all.27

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT In May 1952, the three Japanese parliamentarians met PRC’s first health minister and first president of the Red Cross Society of China (of the PRC) Li Dequan (1896–1972). Li promised Kōra Tomi that she would investigate the matter of the Japanese left behind in China. On June 1, 1952, Hoashi Kei, as the JCTPA representative, Kōra, as the International Economic Council representative, and Miyakoshi Kisuke, as director-general of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade, signed the first Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement with CCPIT chairman Nan Hanchen. The agreement was referred to as “private agreement” because there were no official diplomatic relations between the two THE BEIJING AGREEMENT OF MARCH 1953 17 countries. However, the nature of the agreement was nothing but governmental. The format was barter trade because China did not have foreign currency to pay for imports. The first Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement provided a maximum £30 million—each way—in goods to be traded before the end of 1952.28 Upon returning to Tokyo, the Yoshida cabinet reprimanded the parliamentarians for visiting Moscow and Beijing in violation of the Passport Law. Nevertheless, the cabinet not only did not repudiate the trade agreement signed in Beijing; in fact, it approved supplying China with essential items such as chemical fertilizer in exchange for coal. The Yoshida cabinet, however, did not sanction supplying China embargoed items banned by the China Committee (the CHINCOM) of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), of which the United States, West European countries, and Japan were members.29 CHINCOM had a longer embargo item list than COCOM. In the end, only about 5 percent of the total amount in the trade agreement was traded. However, this agreement sparked Japanese business circles’ interest in the Chinese market, putting the Yoshida cabinet under pressure to reexamine its trade policy towards China.30

THE BEIJING AGREEMENT OF MARCH 1953 In February–March 1953, Kōra Tomi visited Beijing again for negotiations on the repatriation of Japanese, leading a seven-member delegation including representatives of the Red Cross Society of Japan, the Japan– China Friendship Association, and the Japan Peace Liaison Council. Kōra did so despite the fact that Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo initially denied her a visa; she had already violated the Passport Law in 1952. In order to obstruct her visit, Okazaki falsely stated in a press conference that the other six members of the Japanese delegation were willing to go without Kōra, contrary to fact. In turn, the six delegation members unanimously protested to the MOFA, stating that they would not go without Kōra.31 Okazaki issued her a visa at the last minute on the day of departure. Meanwhile in Beijing, Zhou Enlai charged Liao Chengzhi with the task of receiving the Japanese delegation, as chief representative of the Red Cross Society of China. Their meeting resulted in the Agreement on the Issues Concerning Japanese Repatriation, signed by the Red Cross Society of China, the Red Cross Society of Japan, the Japan–China Friendship 18 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

Association, and the Japan Peace Liaison Council—the Beijing Agreement of March 1953. Thanks to this agreement, the collective repatriation of Japanese that had been suspended in 1948 ﬁnally resumed, and about 26,000–27,000 Japanese civilians were brought home.32

SECOND SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT Then, in October 1953, the Yoshida cabinet sent a large non-partisan delegation to China, consisting of 13 parliamentarians and 12 businessmen. This mission was led by Ikeda Masanosuke (January 1898–March 1986), an HR member in the Japan Liberal Party, who was representing the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade, and Hoashi Kei of the JSP, who had signed the first Sino- Japanese Private Trade Agreement in Beijing in May 1952. Subsequently, on October 29, CCPIT chairman Nan Hanchen and Ikeda Masanosuke signed the second Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement, with a maximum of £30 million each way in volume. In the end, about 38 percent of the agreed maximum was traded.33 In essence, the Yoshida cabinet employed a double-tongued policy and promoted Sino-Japanese economic relations, while denouncing China publicly in order to save its face with Washington. This foreign policy stance of Yoshida was referred to as “subordinate independent” diplomacy. However, given the fact that Japan had been under US occupation from 1945 to 1952, it would have been unfeasible at that time for any Japanese leaders to formulate an independent Japanese foreign policy in defiance of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Thus, Yoshida walked a fine line between accommodating domestic economic interests in China and US foreign policy towards China. Hatoyama Ichirō, and later Tanaka Kakuei in the 1970s, were two of very few Japanese Prime Ministers who pursued an outright proactive foreign policy toward China. It cost both of them their political life.34

THE TIANJIN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1956 In October–November 1954, Zhou Enlai sent a delegation of the Red Cross Society of China to Japan, led by Li Dequan and Liao Chengzhi, in order to reciprocate the Red Cross Society of Japan’s mission to China in February–March 1953, which concluded the Beijing Agreement. Then, in June 1956, representatives of the Red Cross Society of Japan, the ZHOU AND JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 19

Japan–China Friendship Association, and the Japan Peace Liaison Council visited Tianjin, and discussed once more the issue of the repatriation of the Japanese left behind in China with Li and Liao. Their negotiations resulted in the Tianjin Agreement of June 1956. This allowed Japanese women who had been married to Chinese men but had longed to return to Japan, to make temporary home visits. At the end of the war, many Japanese girls had married Chinese in exchange for help in repatriating the rest of their families to Japan. Other girls married Chinese because they saved their lives when they were attacked by the Soviet Army. Each of these Japanese young women had gone through unspeakable hardships (including gang rapes) and had remained in China in disgrace.35 The Tianjin Agreement also achieved the repatriation of 1,368 Japanese, including 1,017 unindicted Japanese war criminals. At the end of the war in 1945, the Soviet Army had taken about 760,000 Kwantung Army officers and soldiers, as well as Manchukuo government officials, to concentration camps in Khabarovsk and elsewhere in Siberia. Then, in July 1950, as many as 969 Japanese war criminals and 60 Chinese Manchukuo officials were handed over to China by the Soviet Army and were taken by the Eighth Route Army to the Fushun War Criminals Management Center in Liaoning province. The Japanese war criminals included the director-general of the Manchukuo General Affairs Agency, Takebe Rokuzō (governor of Manchukuo in effect), and Deputy Director-General, Furumi Tadayuki. Chinese Manchukuo officials included Manchukuo emperor Aixinjueluo Puyi and Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui (Chang Ching-hui).36

ZHOU AND JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS Zhou Enlai personally took charge of the administration of the Fushun War Criminals Management Center and exercised extremely lenient measures against the Japanese war criminals there, to the extent that the prison wardens objected. For instance, on August 29, 1950, Zhou instructed the CCCPC Northeast Bureau to ensure the living standards of the war criminals according to international customs and according to their ranks, and also to respect their dignity.37 One of the former Japanese inmates at the Fushun War Criminals Management Center, Tominaga Shōzō, attests to this in his memoir:

Premier Zhou instructed the wardens to treat the Japanese inmates huma- nely in respect of their customs and traditions, reminding them that the 20 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

Japanese ate rice three times a day. Zhou also instructed the wardens to release early those who behaved well, as well as the elderly and sick, and permit their family members to visit China and meet them. Zhou told the wardens, “Revenge and sanctions will not end the chain of hatred. Transforming Japanese war criminals from demons into human beings and friends of China is a challenge to the wisdom and capability of Chinese culture. It will take 20 to 30 years to assess the outcome.”38

Tominaga further states:

None of the staff members of the prison took a humiliating attitude toward us. When some of us became sick, a nurse came, even during the night, took care of us, and sent the seriously sick ones to the hospital outside the prison. We were given sorghum three times a day at ﬁrst, but soon we were given rice three times a day (at a time when Chinese soldiers were given sorghum twice a day). Before long, we came to realize our sins to have treated the Chinese people as subhuman, and were willing to receive any sentences ...More than 30 years after the release, I learned that the wardens and most of the staff members had been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution for their lenient treatment of the Japanese war prisoners during the 1950s.39

Then, in June 1956, special military tribunals were established in Shenyang in Liaoning province and Taiyuan in Shanxi province, in order to try the inmates in the Fushun War Criminals Management Center and the Taiyuan War Criminals Management Center (where 140 Japanese were detained). With Zhou Enlai’s intervention, out of the total of 1,062 prisoners, 1,017 prisoners were not indicted and were immediately released. Only 45 prisoners (36 at Fushun and 9 at Taiyuan) were indicted. Moreover, none of them received death sentences or life imprisonment, with 20-year imprisonments being the maximum sentence, and the ﬁve-year internment in the Soviet Union and six-year imprisonment in China counted as time served. In addition, those who had behaved well were released before their full term. The last three prisoners were released in April 1964, signifying that all Japanese war criminals had been repatriated.40 In doing this, Zhou personally saw to it that the former Manchukuo top ofﬁcials, Takebe Rokuzō and Furumi Tadayuki, were well taken care of. Regarding Chinese prisoners, Zhang Jinghui died in prison in November 1959, while Aixinjueluo Puyi was released in December 1959, as a model prisoner. Zhou treated Puyi and his younger brother JAPANESE ORPHANS LEFT BEHIND IN CHINA 21

Aixinjueluo Pujie with deference, and even helped Pujie’s Japanese wife, Lady Saga Hiro, and his daughters (see Chapter 4).41 This makes a stark contrast with the sentencing of the US-led International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which imposed seven death sentences and 16 life imprisonments, one 20-year imprisonment and one seven-year imprisonment for the Class-A war criminals, as well as 920 death sentences and 383 life imprisonments for the Class-B and Class- C Japanese war criminals. For that matter, the Soviet Union had kept as many as 760,000 Japanese prisoners of war in concentration camps without trial and used them as forced labor until Hatoyama Ichirō resumed Japan–Soviet diplomatic relations in 1956 and succeeded in their repatriation. Granting that the merciful treatment was part of the CPC’s conventional tactics to indoctrinate prisoners of war, Zhou really did not have to be so lenient as to upset the wardens. This not only reﬂects his personal disposition, but also his understanding of the Japanese people and their way of living that he had gained during his study years in Japan.42

JAPANESE ORPHANS LEFT BEHIND IN CHINA In December 1957, Zhou Enlai sent a delegation of the Red Cross Society of China, led by Li Dequan and Liao Chengzhi, to Japan again, in order to reciprocate the Red Cross Society of Japan’s mission to China in June 1956, which concluded the Tianjin Agreement. However, the issue of the repatriation of Japanese left behind in China was far from over. More than 30,000 Japanese “orphans,” now teenagers or even adults, whose parents had died or returned to Japan without their children at the end of the war, had been left behind in China. Their repatriation was more complex because local Chinese residents had adopted many of the Japanese orphans and the Japanese Ministry of Public Health and Welfare conveniently considered these orphans to have been naturalized in China, contrary to fact.43 Meanwhile, the orphans grew up in China, being discriminated against as “little Japanese demons.” Many of them were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and died, but the Japanese government persisted in ignoring them. Their repatriation began only in the late 1970s, after Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization, and only due to devoted Japanese volunteer works in the absence of a Japanese government initiative. The ofﬁcial repatriation sponsored by the Japanese government did not begin until the 1980s when the “orphans” were middle-aged and could not learn to speak Japanese, posing complex social issues for Japan to this day.44 22 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

FORMATION OF THE HATOYAMA CABINET Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who had taken a strong anti- China stance, at least politically, resigned and Hatoyama Ichirō formed a new cabinet in December 1954. Hatoyama advocated an “independent” foreign policy, departing from Yoshida’s “subordinate independent” diplomacy, and tried to normalize diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union. There were about 760,000 Japanese prisoners of war who had been detained in forced labor concentration camps in Siberia since the end of World War II. Their repatriation was one of the many urgent issues on which Japan had to deal with the Soviet Union. By current standards, Hatoyama’s foreign policy initiative might appear nothing extraordinary, but it was an extremely dangerous move for a Japanese political leader to take at that time.45 Hatoyama encountered not only obstruction from the Eisenhower administration but also from the Japanese MOFA. Even his own Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, sabotaged his foreign policy initiatives. Faced with intervention both at home and abroad, Hatoyama failed to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, but at least managed to normalize diplomatic relations by signing the Japan–Soviet Joint Declaration in October 1956, and succeeded in the total repatriation of the Japanese internees from Siberia. Having accomplished his “politically incorrect diplomacy,” Hatoyama resigned in December 1956.46

THE THIRD SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT In January 1955, during the ﬁrst Hatoyama cabinet, Zhou Enlai invited JAPIT ﬁrst President Murata Shōzō (September 1878–March 1957) and JCTPA Executive Director Suzuki Kazuo to Beijing. Murata was president of the maritime transportation company Osaka Shōsen-kaisha (OSK, a predecessor of the Mitsui OSK Lines), also served as posts and telecommunications minister and railroad minister and became a senior adviser to the MOFA. In Beijing, the Japanese delegation had preparatory meetings with Foreign Trade Vice Minister Lei Renmin for the conclusion of the third Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement. Lei was soon to become CCPIT vice chairman. Then, a Chinese trade mission, led by Lei and China Import & Export Company President Lu Xuzhang (soon-to-be foreign trade vice minister), visited Japan in March–May 1955, in order to conclude the third Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement.47 THE THIRD SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT 23

Sun Pinghua, who was appointed deputy secretary-general of this trade mission, states, “It was my ﬁrst visit to Japan since I left there in 1943. This trade mission had another important objective: establishing a connection with the Japanese government.”48 Washington became deeply concerned with the prospect for the third Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement, to the extent that President Dwight Eisenhower urged the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to analyze the net effect of this trade on Sino-Japanese relations. In Tokyo, the MOFA, which was dominated by the pro-US school, obstructed the Chinese trade mission. First, the Japanese Consulate-General in Hong Kong refused to issue visas to the Chinese trade mission members. Then, the Ministry of Justice in Tokyo refused them extensions of the visas until Sonoda Sunao, who had visited Beijing in September 1954 along with Nakasone Yasuhiro and Sakurai Yoshio, intervened.49 In Tokyo, the Chinese trade mission members met inﬂuential members of the Hatoyama cabinet, such as Japan Democratic Party Secretary-General Kishi Nobusuke, International Trade and Industry Minister Ishibashi Tanzan, and Economic Affairs Council Director-General Takasaki Tatsunosuke. Nevertheless, Sun Pinghua states that the Chinese delegation could not meet Prime Minister Hatoyama due to “some misunderstand- ings.” This strongly hints at intervention by MOFA.50 On May 4, 1955, after more than month-long negotiations, amidst obstructions from within and without, the trade mission head, Lei Renmin, representing CCPIT, JAPIT President, Murata Shōzō, and Ikeda Masanosuke, representing the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade, signed the third Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement in Tokyo. This hard-earned £30 million (each way) barter trade agreement provided China with much-needed fertilizer, steel, and machinery in exchange for Chinese agricultural products and minerals. Trade picked up as the Japanese government applied the “exceptions procedure” in the COCOM, which allowed Japan to export steel products to China.51 A year later in April 1956, CCPIT, JAPIT, and the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade agreed to extend the third trade agreement for another year. Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō then stated that he would approve a proposal to establish a permanent Chinese trade mission in Japan. However, the MOFA opposed the plan, arguing that it would be tantamount to recognizing China diplomatically.52 24 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

FORMATION OF THE ISHIBASHI CABINET Subsequently, the resignation of the Hatoyama cabinet in December 1956 put the LDP in turmoil. There was no obvious successor to Hatoyama Ichirō, who had accomplished the Conservative Merger of 1955. In the end, the LDP decided to hold a public election for party president (the president of the ruling party would become Prime Minister and form a cabinet). Kishi Nobusuke (November 1896–August 1987), Ishibashi Tanzan (September 1884–April 1973), and Ishii Mitsujirō (August 1889–September 1981) emerged as the primary contenders. Kishi came in ﬁrst, but lacked a majority, and a runoff election was held between Kishi and Ishibashi. Kishi lost the runoff because the Ishii faction members voted for Ishibashi.53 Thus, Ishibashi formed a cabinet in December 1956. Like Hatoyama, Ishibashi believed in the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and was determined to work on this. However, he suffered a minor stroke during the campaign for the HR general elections and ended up resigning his cabinet in February 1957.54

FORMATION OF THE KISHI CABINET Following the resignation of Ishibashi, Kishi Nobusuke became Prime Minister much sooner than expected. Kishi, who was foreign minister in the Ishibashi cabinet, retained all the members of the Ishibashi cabinet in his first cabinet because the Ishibashi cabinet had lasted only two months. Thus, Kishi was both Prime Minister and foreign minister in his first cabinet. He soon called for HR general elections and formed his second cabinet (June 1958–June 1959).55 In contrast to his mentor Hatoyama Ichirō, Prime Minister Kishi took an outright pro-Taiwan position. He declared that communist China was a threat to Japan and made his support for Taiwan unequivocal during his trips to the United States and Southeast Asia. He even visited Taipei in June 1957 to become the first postwar Japanese Prime Minister to visit Taiwan. Nonetheless, Kishi accepted Zhou Enlai’s invitation to the Japanese economic mission to Beijing in September 1957 for negotiations for the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement.56 Zhou condemned Kishi’s “separation of politics and economics (business)” stance in allowing trade with China, but not acknowledging the PRC as the legitimate government of China. For instance, Zhou made his disapproval of Kishi’s policy known to JAPIT President Yamamoto THE FOURTH SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT 25

Kumaichi (April 1889–January 1963, a retired career diplomat) during his visit to Beijing in February 1958. Zhou stated that trade with the Chinese people must proceed alongside relations with Japan, and that friendship should not be separated from trade. He then entrusted Yamamoto with his message that the Japanese people should promote Sino-Japanese peace and friendship, as well as long-term cooperation between the two countries. Yamamoto consented and stated that he would make efforts to promote friendship and peace with China.57

THE FOURTH SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT In this context, Zhou Enlai received the Japanese economic mission led by Ikeda Masanosuke, the delegation head for the Japanese mission that had concluded the second Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement in Beijing four years earlier. The nature of the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement significantly differed from that of the previous three in that it envisioned long-term trade through establishing a permanent office in each capital. Nevertheless, Kishi Nobusuke justified his dual policy by arguing that expansion of trade with China did not mean that Japan acknowledged the communist regime in Beijing as a legitimate government of China.58 The negotiations for the fourth trade agreement had actually begun in Beijing in October 1956 during the Hatoyama cabinet, but they stalemated. The negotiations resumed in Beijing in September 1957, but the Kishi cabinet decided to enforce fingerprint requirements on Chinese officials, who would be sent to the Chinese trade office in Tokyo, and also banned the flying of the Chinese flag at the Chinese trade office in Tokyo.59 In Beijing, Zhou Enlai had CCPIT officials engage in negotiations with the Japanese economic mission team, including the JAPIT, the Japan– China Importers and Exporters Association (JCIEA), and the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade. However, the negotiations stalemated again. It was not until February 1958 that the negotiations resumed. Subsequently, on March 5, 1958, CCPIT Chairman Nan Hanchen signed the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement with Ikeda Masanosuke. The fourth agreement provided for a £35 million barter deal—each way—of Japanese steel and chemical fertilizer in exchange for Chinese iron ore and coal. The accord also included the provision of the establishment of permanent liaison offices in Beijing and Tokyo, which would have diplomatic status and would fly the national 26 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

ﬂag. This was a victory for Zhou’s foreign policy initiative toward Japan, but without ﬂying colors.60 Kishi’s Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichirō (May 1897–February 1985), who was to succeed Ikeda Masnosuke as president of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade, explains:

I had the Japanese economic mission head Ikeda keep me informed of the progress of the negotiations in Beijing. Then, in consultation with Kishi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi (October 1907–November 1973), I decided that the Japanese government would accept the agreement. I realized that the Japanese government could not officially grant diplomatic immunity to the Chinese officials who would be sent to the Chinese trade office in Tokyo. Yet, I felt that the Japanese government could give them equivalent treatment. I also realized that the Japanese government could not accept the flying of the Chinese flag at the Chinese trade office in Tokyo because this would signify recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China. Thus, I instructed Ikeda in Beijing to renegotiate on the flag with the Chinese. However, Zhou Enlai could not concede on the point.61

As a compromise, Fujiyama decided that the Japanese government would acquiesce in the flying of the flag at the Chinese trade office in Tokyo, while not officially acknowledging this. Consequently, on April 9, 1958, Kishi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi surprised the Japanese economic and political circles by declaring his support and cooperation for the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement. Nevertheless, Zhou was dissatisfied with the “Aichi Statement,” because it did not officially allow the flying of the Chinese flag, and had CCPIT chairman Nan Hanchen publicly express China’s disapproval.62

THE NAGASAKI CHINESE FLAG INCIDENT Worse, the Chinese flag issue developed into a more serious diplomatic dispute. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke stated in the parliament that the Chinese flag that was to be flown at the Chinese trade office in Tokyo would not receive protection under Article 92 of the Japanese Penal Code. He also stated that damage to the Chinese flag would be treated as damage to common private property. Article 92 proscribed the damage, removal, or defiling of the national flag or emblem of a foreign state with intent to insult the foreign state. CCPIT Chairman Nan Hanchen sent a telegraph THE NAGASAKI CHINESE FLAG INCIDENT 27 to Tokyo in protest. Things turned even worse on May 2, 1958, when two Japanese men pulled down the Chinese flag that was raised at an exhibi- tion of Chinese stamps, cut paper, and brocade work at the Hamaya department store in Nagasaki. The local police arrested the two men but soon released them because the flag was undamaged.63 The lenient treatment of the incident by the Japanese authorities angered not only the Chinese government but also the Taiwanese government. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated, “The Kishi cabinet condoned the desecration of the Chinese flag. This indicates that the Kishi cabinet’s anti-China stance has reached an intolerable level.” Kishi countered by stating, “The Chinese reaction is irrational. It is politically motivated in order to influence the outcome of the forthcoming HR general elections.” In protest, Zhou Enlai rescinded the fourth Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement, which had taken so much energy and time of the negotiators on both sides. Zhou also suspended negotiations for individual contracts with Japan, including the first Sino-Japanese steel agreement, and denied the extension of visas for employees of the Japanese trading company. Taiwan, meanwhile, protested the fact that the Chinese flag was raised at the department store in Nagasaki. Kishi Nobusuke reaffirmed his commitment to Taiwan and promised that the Japanese government would not recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China.64 Consequently, the Kishi cabinet’s anti-China stance derailed Zhou’s economic diplomacy toward Japan and froze all the ties between China and Japan that had gradually been built up. Zhou’s reaction seemed irrational, considering the fact that China was in dire need of Japanese steel and chemical fertilizers. The “unofficial Japanese ambassador to China,” Saionji Kinkazu (November 1906–April 1993, see Chapter 4), knew the team of Zhou Enlai’s operations vis-à-vis Japan very well, including Liao Chengzhi, Zhang Xiangshan (1914–October 2009), Zhao Anbo (1915– December 1999), and Xiao Xiangqian (1918–October 2009). Saionji states, “Not only foreign trade vice-minister Lei Renmin, Zhang Xiangshan, Zhao Anbo, Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian but also Liao Chengzhi, who was usually a very calm person, were upset with Kishi’s pro-Taiwan stance to the extent that I feared that something terrible would happen. In this context, the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident occurred.”65 Saionji explains:

Premier Zhou Enlai could not ignore the dragging down of the Chinese ﬂag in Nagasaki, because he had just allowed in April the ﬂying of the Japanese 28 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

flag at the Japanese trade exhibitions held in Wuhan and Guangzhou. It was not an easy thing to do at that time when anti-Japanese sentiment still ran high in China. Yet, Zhou personally went out of his way to persuade skeptical Chinese officials and allowed the flying of the Japanese flag at the Japanese exhibitions. He even had People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers guard the Japanese flags there. In stark contrast, the Kishi cabinet did not punish the Japanese men who desecrated the Chinese flag in Nagasaki. Zhou could not accept this breach of confidence. The Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident became the last straw, forcing him to put principle over substance. A few days after the incident, Foreign Trade Vice Minister Lei Renmin came to see me in Guangzhou and informed me that Premier Zhou had decided to suspend all Sino-Japanese trade and that Foreign Minister Chen Yi would make this announcement on May 9. I regretted the Chinese decision, but understood how the Chinese officials felt and why they made this decision. I felt that this incident pushed the clock for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization back at least ten years. Sino-Japanese friendship had to start from scratch.66

THREE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS In the aftermath of the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident, Zhou Enlai laid out the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations,” which prescribed the principle of inseparability of politics and economics (business). This was his answer to the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident. The “three political principles” stipulate: 1) not to make policies that would be adversarial toward China; 2) not to join a conspiracy to create two Chinas; and 3) not to obstruct the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. On behalf of Premier Zhou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Liao Chengzhi declared the “three political principles” to JSP International Department Director Sata Tadataka (June 1904–April 1980, an HC member), who visited Beijing in July–August 1958. Afterward, they became the criteria for the Chinese acceptance of Japanese delegations—official and unofficial—as well as for the selection of Japanese “friendly firms” that were allowed to do business with China. The three political principles ultimately became the prerequisites for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.67

*** THREE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 29

With Kishi Nobusuke’s outright anti-China policy, Sino-Japanese relations fell into a hiatus. Only in March 1959 did Zhou Enlai receive the second ofﬁcial JSP mission, led by party Secretary-General Asanuma Inejirō (December 1898–October 1960; party chairman, March 1960–October 1960). Asanuma stated during his visit to Beijing, “American imperialism is the common enemy of the peoples of China and Japan.” This statement caused a stir in Japan to the extent that LDP Secretary-General Fukuda Takeo sent a telegram in protest. It also led to the assassination of Asanuma by a sympathizer of right-wing politicians in Tokyo.68 Saionji Kinkazu reveals a secret story:

Asanuma Inejirō’s ﬁrst draft actually read, “American imperialism and Japanese imperialism were the common enemy of ...” When I read this draft in Beijing, I advised Asanuma to remove the phrase “Japanese imperialism” so that he would not make unnecessary enemies in Japan. He concurred. Despite this precaution, Asanuma ended up being assassinated. Sadly, Asanuma became a victim of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.69

Then in September 1959, Zhou invited former Japanese Prime Minister and former LDP President Ishibashi Tanzan, who had survived a stroke, and another early advocate for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the LDP, Utsunomiya Tokuma (September 1906–July 2000), who would become Japan–China Friendship Association president, to visit to Beijing. Zhou Enlai invited these Japanese dignitaries to Beijing to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the national foundation of the PRC.70 Utsunomiya states:

It was the worst time in postwar Sino-Japanese relations, marred by the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident and the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty during the Kishi cabinet. I accompanied Ishibashi, who was determined to salvage Sino-Japanese relations through direct talks with Premier Zhou. There was no direct flight from Tokyo to Beijing at that time, so we flew to Hong Kong first. After a long journey, Ishibashi could not get out of his wheelchair upon arriving at Beijing airport. Ishibashi visited China, dragging his body along and risking his own life. I also risked my own life. That’s how determined we were.71

In October 1959, in commemoration of the ten-year anniversary of the foundation of the PRC, Zhou welcomed a large Japanese non-partisan delegation made of representatives of various circles and led by former 30 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

Japanese Prime Minister and former JSP Chairman Katayama Tetsu. Zhou also received a JCP delegation, led by party chairman Nosaka Sanzō (March 1892–November 1993).72

*** In retrospect, it seems almost miraculous that four unofﬁcial trade agreements were concluded between China and Japan in an extremely con- strained situation. This also indicates the double standards applied by the Yoshida cabinet and the Kishi cabinet, employing the “principle of separation of politics and economics (business)” and advancing Japanese economic interests with China while restraining political relations. Afterwards, Zhou Enlai groped for ways to break the impasse in Sino- Japanese relations brought about during the Kishi cabinet. Japanese promoters of Sino-Japanese relations in the ruling LDP, including Fujiyama Aiichirō, Ishibashi Tanzan, and Utsunomiya Tokuma, did their best, but Zhou had to meet another extraordinary Japanese to break the impasse.

NOTES 1. Mō Takutō ga, “Nihon no shinryaku ni kansha shiteita” (Mao Zedong “Thanked Japanese Invasion”), March 22, 2011, http://www.epoch times.jp/jp/2011/03/html/d75853.html. 2. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949– 1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian- chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 1, 1–10; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 2, 124–125. 3. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 342; “Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles for Peace,” Zhou Enlai Peace Institute, June 2013, http:// www.zhouenlaipeaceinstitute.org/en/ﬁve-principles-of-peace-2/. 4. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 1182–1183 and 2068. For details, see John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. 5. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Manshū no shūen (The End of Manchukuo), Tokyo: Jitsugyō-no-nihonsha, 1953, 332–334. 6. Ibid. For historical background of Manchukuo, see Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932, Cambridge, NOTES 31

MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2001; Haruo Iguchi, Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.–Japanese Relations, 1937–1953, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2003. 7. Ibid. 8. Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952– 1982,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No.3, 1986, 403–405. 9. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 237 and 240; Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro–Macro Linkage Approach, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 122–144. 10. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Sono ‘toshi’ de aka ni naruna” (“Don’t Become Red at ‘Your Age’”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, ed., Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū (Takasaki Tatsunosuke Collection), Vol. 2, Tokyo: Tōyō- seikan kabushiki-gaisha, 1965, 166–170. 11. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku: Rekishi-hōtei no hikoku toshite (Reflections: As Defendant at the Tribunal of History), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004, 99–100, 108–123. 12. Ibid., 131–139; Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai-shimbunsha, 1998, 86–87. 13. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 1), 518; Narasaki Yanosuke, “Matsumoto Jiichirō-sensei to-tomoni” (“Accompanying Master Matsumoto Jiichirō”), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991. 14. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 1), 518; Sun, 87–88. 15. Zhao, 135–137. 16. Sayuri Shimizu, Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan’s Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001, 56–58 and 67–68. 17. For details, see Kurt Werner Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. 18. Ibid. 19. Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan), Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007, 115–120. 20. Ibid. 21. Wu and Wang, 124–127. 22. Ibid.; “Michi o hiraita Hoashi Kei-shi” (“Mr. Hoashi Kei Opened the Way”), http://www.peoplechina.com.cn/maindoc/html/zhongri/ 200108/200108-left.htm, accessed October 18, 2014. 23. Manshūkokushi hensan-kankōkai, Manshūkokushi (History of Manchukuo), Vol. 1 (Sōron), Tokyo: Man’mō dōhō-engokai, 1970, 779–781 and 809–817. 32 2 CHINESE DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN AND ZHOU ENLAI

24. Takasaki (Manshū no shūen), 296–302. 25. Ide Magoroku, Owarinaki tabi (Endless journey), Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2004, 214–215. 26. Sun, 77–80. 27. Ibid., 76–80. 28. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 240; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 33–35. 29. Chad J. Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 1949–79: Grain, Trade and Diplomacy, London: Routledge, 2005, 5–6. 30. Ibid. 31. Ide, 218–220; Wu and Wang, 142–147. 32. Ibid. (both). 33. Soeya, 35–36; Ishikawa Tadao, Nakajima Mineo and Ikei Masaru, eds., Sengo shiryō: Nichū kankei (Postwar Documents: Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha, 1970, 69–70. 34. Shimizu, 52–58. For details, see Dower. 35. Wu and Wang, 179–184 and 200–209; Endō Mitsuo, Chūgoku zanryū-koji no kiseki (Tracks of Orphans Left Behind in China), Tokyo: San’ichi-shobō, 1992, 41. 36. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 593–594; Wu and Wang, 200–209; Endō, 41. 37. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 593–594. 38. Tominaga Shōzō, “Shū Onrai-shushō to Bujun senpan-kanrisho” (“Premier Zhou Enlai and Fushun War Criminals Management Center”), in Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 310–314. 39. Ibid., 310–314. 40. Ibid., 311. 41. Ibid., 311. 42. Ibid., 310–314. 43. Endō, 41; Asano Shin’ichi and Dong Yan, Ikoku no fubo (Fathers and Mothers in a Foreign Country), Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2006, pp. 147–153. 44. Ibid. (both). 45. “Shiberia yokuryū: Shinshiryō 76-man-nin bun hakken” (“Internment in Siberia: New Documents Found Concerning 760,000 Detainees”), Tokyo Shimbun, July 23, 2009. For details, see Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969. 46. For details, see Hellmann. 47. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 443 and 457. NOTES 33

48. Sun, 88–91. 49. Ibid., 88–91; Soeya, 36–37. 50. Sun, 88–91. 51. Ishikawa, Nakajima and Ikei, 71–72. 52. Mitcham, 15 and 18–19. 53. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Waga michi o iku” (“Going My Way”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, ed., Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū (Takasaki Tatsunosuke Collection), Vol. 1, Tokyo: Tōyō-seikan kabushiki-gaisha, 1965, 204–206. 54. Ishibashi Tanzan, “Nitchū-yūkō eno tabi” (“Trip for Sino-Japanese Friendship”), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 80–87. 55. Takasaki (1965, Vol. 1), 206–207. 56. Soeya, 38–39. 57. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 126. 58. Soeya, 38–39. 59. Sun, 97–98. 60. Ibid., 97–98; Ishikawa, Nakajima and Ikei, 246–250. 61. Fujiyama Aiichirō, Seiji waga-michi: Fujiyama Aiichirō kaisōroku (My Way in Politics: Memoirs of Fujiyama Aiichirō), Tokyo: Asahi-shimbunsha, 1976, 172–173. 62. Ibid., 173–174. 63. Sun, 95–99; Wu and Wang, 256–261. 64. Ibid. (both); Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 143. 65. Saionji Kinkazu, Saionji Kingazu kaikoroku: “Sugisarishi, Shōwa” (Memoirs of Saionji Kinkazu: “The Bygone Shōwa [Era]”), Tokyo: Aipeccu-puresu, 1991, 324–330; “Mitsugetsu kizuita moto-gaikōkan futari shikyo” (“Two [Chinese] Former Diplomats Who Built a Honeymoon [with Japan] Died”), Sankei Shimbun, October 20, 2009. 66. Saionji, 324–330. 67. Ibid., 327–330; Zhao, 135–137; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 159. 68. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 211. 69. Saionji, 329–332. 70. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 254. 71. Utsunomiya Tokuma, “Tsukisenu omoide” (“Endless Memories”), in Shinka-tsūjinsha shashinbu, ed., Shashinshū:Ryō Shōshi no shōgai (Photo Collection: Life of Liao Chengzhi), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984, 172. 72. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 262–263. CHAPTER 3

Establishing Semi-Ofﬁcial Sino-Japanese Economic Relations

With the disastrous end of the Great Leap Forward campaign (which resulted in a “great leap backward”) in 1958 and the total recall of Soviet technical assistance due to the Sino-Soviet rift, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China” hereafter) was in desperate need of foreign economic assistance from Japan. Nevertheless, Sino-Japanese relations were deadlocked due to Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s outright pro-Taiwan policy, as exemplified by the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident. Zhou Enlai took the initiative to break the impasse, which culminated in the Memorandum Concerning Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade in November 1962. This landmark agreement not only institutionalized Sino-Japanese trade that had thus farbeenlimitedtoprivateandadhoctransactions,butalsoestablished the permanent liaison offices in Beijing and Tokyo, which functioned almost in the same way as an embassy for each government in the absence of official diplomatic relations between the two countries. Zhou, however, could not accomplish this alone. Zhou had to meet an extraordinary Japanese first, for this to happen.

ZHOU ENLAI MEETS TAKASAKI TATSUNOSUKE The origin of this Sino-Japanese accord dates back to April 1955 when Zhou Enlai visited Bandung, Indonesia, and attended the historic Asian-African Conference, leading the Chinese delegation including

Vice Premier and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee Chen Yi (August 1901–January 1972; became foreign minister in February 1958), Foreign Trade Minister Ye Jizhuang (1893–June 1967), and Liao Chengzhi (September 1908–June 1983), who was in charge of international propaganda operations and Overseas Chinese affairs, as well as operations vis-à-vis Japan. Earlier in December 1954, five Asian leaders—of India, Indonesia, Ceylon (present Sri Lanka), Burma (present Myanmar), and Pakistan—hadmetanddecidedto hold an international conference to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation in Asia and Africa. China and Japan were invited, whereas the Republic of China (ROC or “Taiwan” hereafter), the two Koreas, and Israel were not.1 In the end, 29 major countries in the region, including China and Japan, participated in the conference hosted by Indonesian President Sukarno. This was a sizable number before the age of independent nations in the Third World in the 1960s, encompassing two thirds of the world population at that time. Attendees included such Third-World leaders as Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser (became President in 1956) and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. This conference became a harbinger of the Non-Aligned Movement.2 There Zhou met the Japanese representative to the conference, Takasaki Tatsunosuke (February 1885–February 1964), who was director-general of the Economic Affairs Council in the first Hatoyama cabinet. The council was renamed the Economic Planning Agency in the second Hatoyama cabinet and Takasaki became its first director-general. In Bandung, Zhou approached Takasaki with a smile and they shook hands. (During the Geneva Conference in 1954, Zhou had tried to shake hands with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but Dulles refused.) Zhou and Takasaki had instant rapport.3 Takasaki observed that Zhou walked with his right arm bent, which gave an appearance of arrogance to some people. The fact was that Zhou physically could not straighten his right arm. Zhou explained to Takasaki that his right arm was bent due to an injury he sustained when he fell from a horse in 1939. However, Zhou did not tell the whole truth: Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing, was riding a horse in front of Zhou. As she suddenly stopped her horse, Zhou’s horse was startled and he fell. This required Zhou to receive medical treatment in Moscow.4 THE AIR INDIA KASHMIR PRINCESS INCIDENT 37

Actually, Zhou and Takasaki almost did not attend the Asian–African Conference. Considering this, their meeting seems to have been fateful.

THE AIR INDIA KASHMIR PRINCESS INCIDENT There was an attempt to assassinate Zhou Enlai by bombing the airplane he was supposed to take to attend the Asian–African Conference. On April 11, 1955, the Air India aircraft Kashmir Princess (China did not have an airplane to fly to Indonesia at that time) took off from Hong Kong, carrying the first group of the Chinese delegation to the conference. Five hours later, it was exploded by a bomb planted inside and crashed into the South China Sea, killing 16 passengers, including 11 Chinese reporters and Zhou’s driver. Only three crew members were rescued. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) considered the accident a conspiracy of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) of Chiang Kai-shek and the US Central Intelligence Agency.5 It turned out that Zhou was not aboard the Kashmir Princess. Zhou departed Kunming, in Yunnan province, on April 14 aboard an Air India Skymaster aircraft with the second group of the Chinese delegation, including Vice Premier Chen Yi. The airplane landed in Rangoon. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu had invited Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai to a pre-Asian-African summit in Rangoon. Zhou and Chen also participated in the Burmese Water Splashing Festival.6 According to the Official Biography of Zhou Enlai and the Official Chronology of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese MOFA had learned of the assassination plot by KMT agents on April 9, and informed the British Consulate-General, the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch, and Chinese intelligence agents in Hong Kong. On April 10, Chinese MOFA officials met British counselor to China John Mansfield Addis (June 1914– July 1983) and asked him to warn the Hong Kong authorities and to secure a guarantee of the safety of the aircraft. Addis consented. Nevertheless, KMT agents in Hong Kong bribed a Chinese airport ground worker, Zhou Ju, and had him install a time bomb on the Kashmir Princess. Some writers speculate that Zhou avoided assassination by having an emergency appendectomy operation, which postponed his departure to April 14. However, official records of Zhou Enlai state that he had an appendectomy operation on March 12. Existing accounts on this incident are contradictory and the whole truth is unknown.7 38 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OPPOSES JAPAN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ASIAN–AFRICAN CONFERENCE In turn, for Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Japan almost did not accept the invitation to the Asian–AfricanConference.TheJapaneseMinistryof Foreign Affairs (MOFA) perceived the meeting as a communist-leaning gathering and had strong reservations about Japan’s participation in it. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (July 1887–January 1957), in the Hatoyama cabinet, was against it from the outset. In turn, Takasaki, Hatoyama’s Economic Affairs Council director-general, advised Hatoyama that Japan should participate because most of the major Asian countries were attending. Takasaki had a different perspective from career politicians because he was a businessman who became a politician by chance. He was the founder of a can manufacturer, Toyo Seikan, originally based in Osaka (the largest container manufacturer in Asia today). He was also president of the Manchuria Heavy Industries Development Company (“Manchuria Industries” hereafter, a different entity from the South Manchuria Railway Company) in Manchukuo during the war, not by choice but by a strong request from Nissan Konzern founder Ayukawa Yoshisuke (November 1880–February 1967), who created Manchuria Industries.8 In postwar years, Takasaki served as president of the Japan Electric Energy Sources Development Public Corporation (present J-POWER) in the Yoshida cabinet. Because of Takasaki’s extraordinary expertise as a corporate leader, Hatoyama Ichirō asked Takasaki to join his cabinet. He accepted the position on the condition that he would not become a lawmaker. Hatoyama consented. However, Hatoyama’s Japan Democratic Party Secretary-General (this was before the creation of the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP) Kishi Nobusuke (November 1896–August 1987; Prime Minister, February 1957–July 1960) forced Takasaki to run in the general elections for the House of Representatives (HR) in February 1955. Unexpectedly, he won with the highest number of votes in Osaka District 3 (a multi-seat district). When Takasaki became a parliamentarian, he tried to realize his belief: “Promoting long-term trade with foreign countries and establishing friendly relations with them regardless of ideological differences is the way to maintain world peace. That is the mission for Japanese politicians.”9 Prime Minister Hatoyama concurred with Takasaki’s opinion that Japan should attend the Asian–African Conference and appointed TEN-POINT DECLARATION ON PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE ... 39

Takasaki as the official Japanese representative to the conference. Takasaki then organized a non-partisan Japanese delegation, including president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry Fujiyama Aiichirō (May 1897–February 1985) as delegation adviser. Fujiyama was the heir to the Fujiyama Konzern that his father had founded and became Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry president in 1941. He then lost all his positions in business circles, of which he had many, when the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP- GHQ), stationed in Japan, enforced the sweeping Purge of Public Offices in 1946.10 The Purge of Public Offices was originally intended to apply only to officials in the military government, but was extended to include people in the business and other sectors. This measure affected more than 250,000 Japanese who had little to do with the government. Even Hatoyama Ichirō was purged despite the fact that he had left the wartime parliament in protest of Japanese militarism. Ironically, Hatoyama was purged just before he was to become Prime Minister. He had to wait almost a decade to actually become one. Takasaki, who had had confrontations with the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, was also purged. Fujiyama and Takasaki could not restore their business positions until the Purge of Public Offices was lifted in 1951.11 Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru still objected to the Japanese attendance at the Asian–African Conference and agreed only on the condition that high-ranking MOFA officials accompany the delegation as “chaperones.” Shigemitsu personally appointed his “three top aides”— MOFA senior counselor (sanyo) Tani Masayuki (February 1889–October 1962) and two MOFA senior advisers (komon) Ōta Saburō and Kase Toshikazu (January 1903–May 2004)—as well as Asakai Kōichirō (March 1906–September 1995) as delegation advisers. Shigemitsu instructed them to monitor Takasaki’s every move in Bandung.12

TEN-POINT DECLARATION ON PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION Given the predicaments both Zhou Enlai and Takasaki Tatsunosuke faced, it seems almost miraculous that they met in Bandung. The Asian–African Conference was a difﬁcult meeting for Japan. Japan could be isolated at the conference because most of the participants were communist-leaning 40 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS countries. In turn, if Japan went along with them too much, Japan’s relations with the United States would be compromised. Therefore, Takasaki proposed approving resolutions unanimously, rather than by a majority vote, in order to avoid discord among the participating countries. Takasaki also proposed adopting a resolution to pledge the non-use of military force and nuclear weapons. Zhou was the ﬁrst to endorse his proposal. Takasaki then asked Zhou about the possibility of China taking Taiwan over by force. Zhou replied, “I do not think that will be necessary. Taiwan will come back to us in time if we wait, just as Manchuria came back to us from Japan.”13 With the support of Zhou, Takasaki’s proposal was incorporated in the Ten-point Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation, in which the participating countries pledged settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means. This unanimously adopted peace resolution was referred to as the “Bandung Spirit.”14

ZHOU INVITES TAKASAKI TO VISIT CHINA Thus, Zhou Enlai and Takasaki Tatsunosuke met for the ﬁrst time at the Asian–African Conference in April 1955 and struck a chord. Zhou then invited Takasaki to visit China by saying, “Your children were destroyed by the Soviet Army, but they have recovered. Would you like to come to see your grown-up children?” Zhou was referring to Manchuria Industries, which Takasaki had managed during wartime. Takasaki accepted Zhou’s invitation. He also gave Zhou the names of two of his friends who had been detained in the Fushun War Criminals Management Center, in Liaoning province, and asked for their release. Zhou replied, “We cannot release them immediately, but we will repatriate them if they become sick. We will also allow their family members to visit China if they want to see them.”15 Takasaki’s two friends were Takebe Rokuzō (January 1893–January 1958) and Furumi Tadayuki (May 1900–August 1983). Takebe was director-general of the Manchukuo General Affairs Agency (governor of Manchukuo in effect, July 1940–August 1945) and Furumi was its deputy director-general (November 1941–August 1945). They were among the 969 Japanese war criminals who had been handed over to China by the Soviet Army in July 1950 and were transferred to the Fushun War Criminals Management Center by the Eighth Route Army (see Chapter 2). Subsequently, Takebe suffered a cerebral infarction. He was released and repatriated in July 1956. In turn, Furumi was sentenced to FIRST ZHOU–TAKASAKI MEETING 41

18-years imprisonment in June 1956 and was released in February 1963 and repatriated in March of that year. This record indicates that Zhou kept his words about Takasaki’s two friends.16

FIRST ZHOU–TAKASAKI MEETING More surprisingly, Zhou and Takasaki had a formal (but secret) meeting in Bandung. Okada Akira (b. January 1918), who accompanied Takasaki to the Asian–African Conference as his interpreter, disclosed the secret for the ﬁrst time in April 1982. Okada was a China specialist in the Japanese MOFA and his elder brother was the HR member from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and house deputy speaker Okada Haruo (June 1914– November 1991). Okada Akira writes:

Takasaki handpicked me as his interpreter. He did not know me before. The main school in the MOFA was pro-United States and, as a corollary, pro- Taiwan. Takasaki believed in restoring relations with China. He went to Bandung, being determined to talk with Premier Zhou and ﬁnd a way to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. Takasaki believed that Japan should get along with every country in the world because Japanese cannot survive without international trade. It was not rhetoric. Takasaki truly believed in this mission and devoted himself to it.17

Meanwhile, Zhou was searching for a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations and approached Takasaki at the Asian–African Conference. Okada Akira tells an inside story:

Premier Zhou came to the Savoy Homann Hotel half an hour before the opening ceremony of the conference on the morning of April 18. He met Takasaki there. They acted as if it were a chance meeting, but it had actually been arranged ...Zhou and Takasaki met in the lobby, talked brieﬂy, and agreed to have a formal meeting. Liao Chengzhi and I were charged with making arrangements for a ﬁrst postwar Sino-Japanese “summit” meeting (Takasaki was representing Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō). At 6:00 AM on April 22, Liao came to pick up Takasaki and took him to Zhou’s accommodation. There, Premier Zhou, Vice Premier Chen Yi, Foreign Trade Minister Ye Jizhuang, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu, and West Europe and Africa Bureau Director-General Huang Hua welcomed Takasaki. Then, only Zhou, Chen, Liao, and Takasaki (and myself) participated in the meeting, with the curtains tightly closed.18 42 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Okada recorded the meeting:

Premier Zhou expressed his hope to make Sino-Japanese contacts semi- official, if not official, because the matters between the two countries required negotiations between the governments. Nevertheless, Takasaki could not change the Japanese policy of the “principle of separation of politics and economics (business)” toward China and said to Zhou, “The Japanese government cannot necessarily act the way your government would like, because Japan is still more-or-less under occupation by the United States.” The occupation had actually officially ended in 1952. As Takasaki’s interpreter, I used my own discretion and stated in Chinese, “The Japanese government cannot necessarily act the way your government would like, because Japan is under the guidance of the United States.” Liao then immediately pointed out in Japanese, “You are wrong. That was not exactly what Mr. Takasaki said.” I was impressed with Liao’s command of Japanese.19

Afterward, Okada was even more impressed with Zhou. Okada states:

I sought instruction from Takasaki. He stated that the way I had translated could stay as is. Then, another surprise came to me. Neither Liao nor I translated this little exchange into Chinese. Nevertheless, Premier Zhou immediately stated, “I understand. I think that the will of the Japanese people to regain independence will affect the Japanese government and Japan will surely exit the state of semi-occupation.” It seemed as if Zhou had understood our conversation in Japanese. Moreover, he avoided the sensitive words, “under occupation by the United States,” and instead used a euphemistic expression, “the state of semi-occupation.” Zhou thereby demonstrated pre- cise judgment as well as considerateness for Japan’s situation ...Reminiscing about the days of his study period in Japan, Zhou also proposed to Takasaki to unify the simpliﬁed Chinese characters between China and Japan, in order to facilitate communication between the two countries. Takasaki concurred. At the end of the meeting, Zhou and Takasaki agreed to meet again on the morning on April 25, to talk about the Taiwan issue.20

JAPANESE MOFA SABOTAGES SECOND ZHOU–TAKASAKI MEETING After the meeting on April 22, Okada was summoned by the MOFA chaperones, Tani Masayuki, Ōta Saburō and Kase Toshikazu, who made him report the content of the Zhou–Takasaki meeting in detail. On April HIATUS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 43

24, Tani summoned Okada again. Tani instructed him to tell Takasaki to cancel the second meeting with Zhou scheduled for April 25. Then another adviser, Asakai Kōichirō, said to Tani, “We cannot entrust this important matter to Okada. I will tell Takasaki myself.” Later that day, Takasaki told Okada to inform Liao Chengzhi of the cancellation.21 Okada gathered information on the actions of the US ambassador to Indonesia, but he stopped speculating about US involvement. Thus, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu’s cohorts succeeded in sabotaging the second Zhou–Takasaki meeting. Okada regrets this missed opportunity and states, “The ﬁrst Zhou–Takasaki meeting paved the way for Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade and for the normalization of Sino- Japanese diplomatic relations. Had the second Zhou–Takasaki meeting been realized, international relations in Asia and Sino-Japanese relations would have taken a very different course.”22

HIATUS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Afterward, Zhou’s invitation to Takasaki to visit China was up in the air because, unlike his predecessors (Hatoyama Ichirō and Ishibashi Tanzan), Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke took an outright pro-Taiwan stance and the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident of May 1958 disrupted whatever unofficial relations had been built up between the two countries. Also, Zhou was not happy about the fact that Takasaki had accepted the position of international trade and industry minister in the second Kishi cabinet (June 1958–June 1959), albeit reluctantly. In order to fill the void, Kishi’s Foreign Minister, Fujiyama Aiichirō, who had accompanied Takasaki to the Asian-African Conference and met Zhou there, tried to salvage unofficial channels with China. Fujiyama ran in the general elections for the HR from the LDP in May 1958 and won. Fujiyama served as Kishi’s foreign minister in three consecutive cabinets: the “reshuffled first” Kishi cabinet, the second Kishi cabinet and the “reshuffled second” Kishi cabinet (July 1957–July 1960).23 In October 1958, Fujiyama secretly sent to Hong Kong the MOFA’s China section head Okada Akira for a meeting with the scholar Zhang Shizhao, who taught Mao Zedong classical Chinese. (Zhang’s adopted daughter Zhang Hanzhi would become the interpreter for Mao’s talks with Richard Nixon in 1972 and the wife of Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua.) Okada conveyed Fujiyama’s hope to continue communications between China and Japan, but Zhang stated that it would be very difficult given the 44 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS domestic situation in Japan. Fujiyama tried other measures to resume contact with China, but no progress was made. Fujiyama did his best in the most adverse situation, but what he could do as Kishi’s foreign minister was limited because the Chinese government totally distrusted Kishi.24

ZHOU INVITES MATSUMURA KENZŌ TO CHINA It took another advocate for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the ruling LDP to break the deadlock. This was Matsumura Kenzō (January 1883–August 1971), agriculture, forestry, and fisheries minister in the Shidehara cabinet (October 1945–January 1946) until purged by the SCAP-GHQ and education minister in the second Hatoyama cabinet (March 1955–November 1955). Upon graduating from Waseda University, Matsumura became a newspaper reporter and then became a lawmaker. Restoring Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations was one of Matsumura’s life goals as a politician. Thus, Zhou Enlai instructed Liao Chengzhi to invite Matsumura to Beijing in October 1959. Liao knew Matsumura as Liao was a student at the First Higher School of Waseda University.25 This was Matsumura’s first postwar visit to China and first meeting with Zhou. Before departure, Takasaki asked Matsumura to apologize to Zhou for him: Takasaki had promised one thing to Zhou at the Asian–African Conference, but it did not materialize because Prime Minister Kishi took a pro-Taiwan stance. Takasaki also asked Matsumura to obtain a letter of invitation to visit China from Zhou.26 In Beijing, Matsumura explained to Zhou that Takasaki was not to be blamed and that there was no better person than Takasaki to promote Sino-Japanese trade. Matsumura, however, did not receive Zhou’s invitation to Takasaki. As Matsumura was waiting at Beijing airport, Liao Chengzhi came running in and gave him a letter, saying, “I’m glad I caught you. This is a letter for Mr. Takasaki.” It was Zhou’s letter of invitation to Takasaki to visit China during the next cherry blossom season. Takasaki accepted the invitation, but decided to visit China in the fall of 1960. He was already scheduled to visit Moscow in April 1960 for the Japan–Soviet fisheries negotiations.27 Takasaki’s philosophy transcended political ideology and promoted trade with China and the Soviet Union. He believed that economic prosperity would bring the demise of communism. Takasaki visited Washington, DC before visiting China, in order to explain Tokyo’s TAKASAKI VISITS CHINA 45 position on trade with China. Takasaki met US house speaker John McCormack (Democrat from Massachusetts) and US senators such as John F. Kennedy and William F. Knowland (Republican from California). Takasaki stated, “Japan invaded China and oppressed its people for three decades, and yet Japan has not paid war reparations to China. While Japan has been recovering from the war damage owing to US aid, China is still suffering. Japan should help China in order to atone for Japan’s acts of aggression. That is my last service to the nation.” McCormack then invited Takasaki to the inaugural ceremony of President Kennedy in January 1961.28 Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was a self-claimed protégé of Matsumura Kenzō, asked Takasaki to let him go to Washington, DC with him. Takasaki consented. Nakasone was dumbfounded when Takasaki bought a postcard of Abraham Lincoln and sent it to Zhou from Washington, DC. The postcard was addressed only to “His Excellency Zhou Enlai, Beijing, China.” Takasaki said with a smile, “I wonder if Premier Zhou will receive it.”29

FORMATION OF THE IKEDA CABINET In July 1960, Prime Minister Kishi resigned over the revision of the US– Japan Security Treaty and Ikeda Hayato formed a new cabinet (July 1960– November 1964). Ikeda put Japanese economic growth as the top priority and put forth the bold “income doubling plans” for the Japanese. He was also in favor of resuming trade with China and entrusted Matsumura Kenzō with the matters of China. In turn, China was faced with a double economic crisis: the disastrous end of the Great Leap Forward and the recalling of Soviet technical assistance. It was vital for China to resume trade with Japan. Thus, as soon as the Ikeda cabinet took office, Zhou sent two of Liao Chengzhi’s right-hand men, Zhao Anbo (1915–December 1999) and Sun Pinghua (1917–August 1997) to Japan, in order to reactivate the unofficial relations between the two countries that had been halted since 1958. The time was ripe for Takasaki to visit China, and Zhou’s invitation to Takasaki made at the Asian–African Conference in April 1955 finally came true.30

TAKASAKI VISITS CHINA In October 1960, Zhou met Takasaki with an entourage of 13 business leaders from the steel, machine, and other manufacturing sectors. Takasaki was a godsend for China and Zhou gave Takasaki a rare opportunity to 46 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS visit Northeast China (former Manchuria). It was exceptional treatment for a Japanese at that time. The day Takasaki visited Shenyang fell on October 15, the same day that 13 years earlier (in 1947) Takasaki had left Shenyang aboard a repatriation train. This brought back painful memories for Takasaki. In 1945, he had witnessed the displaced Japanese farmer settlers who had survived the massacres and plunder by the Soviet Army. The Japanese Kwantung Army had abandoned them. Takasaki could have gone home at the end of the war if he wanted, but he decided to remain in Manchuria in order to help the Japanese refugees and organized associations to facilitate their repatriation.31 Takasaki returned to Japan in 1947 only because the ROC government in Chongqing sent him to Japan as its official representative. Chiang Kai-shek was planning to take over properties in Japan, as war reparations from Japan, and sent Takasaki to investigate facilities and negotiate with the SCAP-GHQ. As the civil war in China intensified, Takasaki could not return to China. Unexpectedly, this business trip to Japan became his repatriation.32 In October 1960, Takasaki toured the locales where he used to work, including Anshan, Fushun, Changchun, and already-below-freezing Harbin. Zhou also gave Takasaki permission to visit the Fushun War Criminals Management Center and meet 17 Japanese war criminals who had been detained there since 1950. One of them was his old friend Furumi Tadayuki, former deputy director-general of the Manchukuo General Affairs Agency. Furumi was sentenced to 18-years imprisonment in 1956 (he would be released and repatriated in 1963). During the tour of Northeast China, Takasaki witnessed the disasters of the Great Leap Forward everywhere. Takasaki also saw no Soviet engineers and found many projects left untouched for several years because the equipment from the Soviet Union had not arrived. Observing these, Takasaki sensed a Sino-Soviet split, which was not public knowledge at that time.33 Upon returning from the field trip, Takasaki candidly told Zhou that the pace of heavy industrialization had gone too fast and suggested a redirection to agricultural production. This suggestion hit Zhou hard because China had suffered a serious shortage of crops and was unable to repay the debt to the Soviet Union. Zhou and Takasaki also discussed Sino-Japanese relations. Zhou stated, “China cannot have diplomatic relations with Japan insofar as Japan is allied with the United States, the enemy of the Chinese people.” Takasaki replied, “China is not the one that is obstructing Sino-Japanese ZHOU SENDS CHESS MISSION TO JAPAN 47 diplomatic relations ...That Japan concluded the US–Japan Security Treaty does not mean Japan is anti-China.”34

ZHOU SENDS CHESS MISSION TO JAPAN Subsequently, in January 1962, along with Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Premier Zhou received a delegation of the JSP, led by its senior adviser Suzuki Mosaburō (former chairman of the Leftist Socialist Party of Japan). They reminisced about JSP former Chairman Asanuma Inejirō, who had visited Beijing in March 1959 and then was assassinated in Tokyo in October 1960 (see Chapter 2). Then in July 1962, Zhou sent Sun Pinghua to Tokyo on a Chinese chess mission. Sun humorously states:

I did not know how to play Chinese chess at all. I made totally wrong moves in the ﬁrst and second moves at the friendship chess tournament held in Tokyo. The Japanese players thought I had deliberately made the wrong moves and were impressed with my graciousness. When I made the third move, they burst into laughter because my move ended the game.35

This chess mission was only a front. Sun was actually charged with a secret mission: to deliver the messages of Zhou and Chen Yi to Matsumura Kenzō and Takasaki Tatsunosuke and to invite them to China. Although Sun failed in the chess match, he succeeded in this secret mission.36 Consequently, Matsumura visited China in September 1962 and discussed with Zhou, Chen Yi, and Liao Chengzhi such matters as the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations,” China’s representation at the United Nations, and Taiwan. Both sides agreed to resume trade and to normalize Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations gradually. Following this, Takasaki visited China in October 1962, with an entourage of 22 presidents of large corporations. Takasaki envisioned an annual £36 million (about $100 million) barter trade, for ﬁve years, and thereby tried to revive the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement that was aborted in 1958. Zhou concurred. Given the limited ﬁnancial capabilities of China, Takasaki considered this trade a long-term loan to China in effect. For this, he negotiated with the Bank of China in London and made it guarantee the letters of credit (L/C) for each transaction Japanese trading companies would make. This convinced the reluctant Japanese government to sanction this trade.37 48 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

SIGNING OF THE MEMORANDUM CONCERNING SINO-JAPANESE LONG-TERM COMPREHENSIVE TRADE The Zhou–Takasaki meeting resulted in the Memorandum Concerning Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade, signed by Liao and Takasaki in Beijing on November 9, 1962. Zhou and his Japanese counterpart, Ikeda Hayato, did not sign the accord because there were no official diplomatic relations between China and Japan. The trade framework established by this agreement is generally referred to as “LT Trade” after the initials of cosigners, Liao and Takasaki. On this epoch-making agreement, Sun Pinghua states, “Matsumura and Takasaki worked out a fine division of labor between themselves. Matsumura dealt with the political matters while Takasaki dealt with the economic matters.” Matsumura in turn gives credit to Takasaki by stating, “Once Takasaki came into the picture, Sino-Japanese relations became his one-man show.” In turn, Nakasone Yasuhiro comments, “Matsumura dragged Takasaki into Sino-Japanese relations and the rest is history.”38 LT Trade provided China with steel, chemical fertilizer, insecticides, and agricultural machinery, in exchange for Chinese soybeans, maize, coal, iron ore, salt, and tin in the form of barter trade. It also encompassed large-scale “industrial plant exports” (exporting industrial manufacturing facilities as a whole) and opened a window for Japanese companies that were not designated as “friendly firms” by Beijing to do business with China. More significantly, LT Trade institutionalized Sino-Japanese trade by establishing permanent offices. The Chinese government created the Liao Chengzhi Office in Beijing. The Japanese created the Japan–China Overall Trade Liaison Council (JCOTLC), a private organization in Tokyo consisting of manufacturers and consumers of goods traded under the LT Trade framework. Its headquarters was called the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office.39 Nevertheless, the actual implementation of LT Trade was still difficult because of reluctance on the part of the Japanese government. The Ikeda cabinet was under pressure from Taiwan and the United States and was unwilling to approve “industrial plant export” projects.40

ZHOU SENDS ORCHID MISSION TO JAPAN In April 1963, Matsumura Kenzō suddenly requested that Zhou send a Chinese orchid mission to Japan as soon as possible. Matsumura was president of the Japan Orchid Fanciers Association. Zhou sensed that ZHOU SENDS ORCHID MISSION TO JAPAN 49 this had to do with LT Trade and sent Sun Pinghua, who could not tell the difference between orchids and onions. Two other Japan specialists, Wang Xiaoyun and Wang Xiaoxian, as well as real orchid growers accompanied Sun. A new study in 2010 revealed that although Matsumura was not rich, he was prepared to pay the expenses for this mission out of his own pocket. During his previous visits to China, he had been received as a state guest and was treated as such. In turn, Chinese officials were not treated in kind in Japan because there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries and the Japanese government did not pay the expenses. This episode indicates Matsumura’s utmost determination to make LT Trade a success.41 In Tokyo, Sun, Wang Xiaoyun, and Wang Xiaoxian met Matsumura, Takasaki, and Utsunomia Tokuma (September 1906–July 2000), another advocate for restoration of Sino-Japanese relations in the LDP. They discussed such issues as how to make the Ikeda cabinet approve the “vinylon industrial plant export” by Kurashiki Rayon, the Export–Import Bank of Japan credits to finance this export, and the establishment of liaison offices of the Liao Chengzhi Office and the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office in each capital. Then, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) Heavy Industrial Products Export Section head Kawai Ryōichi (January 1917– November 2008) made arrangements for Sun to secretly meet MITI minister’s Chief Secretary Watanabe Yaeji.42 Matsumura had known Kawai since he was born. Kawai’s father, Kawai Ryōsei (May 1886–May 1970), the bureaucrat/politician turned Komatsu president, was Matsumura’s neighbor in his hometown in Toyama prefecture. Kawai was his deputy when Matsumura became agriculture, forestry, and fisheries minister. (His son Ryōichi would become Komatsu president in 1964 and make it Japan’s Caterpillar, and would also become Japan Orchid Fanciers Association president.) In 1963, Watanabe told Sun, “MITI supports LT Trade.”43

Watanabe Yaeji Reveals the Secret Deal A new study in 2010 revealed exactly what Watanabe Yaeji had done in endorsing LT Trade. Watanabe states:

I met Sun Pinghua for the ﬁrst time in 1963 and instinctively felt that I could trust him. What I could do for him at that time was to approve the industrial plant export in my capacity as the minister’s chief secretary. I signed a 50 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

document without consulting the minister, because I knew that the minister would not approve. I decided to resign as soon as the minister learned about it. When the minister learned about it three weeks later, he reacted as if the house was on ﬁre. However, the document had already taken effect according to international protocol. Nevertheless, the minister did not accept my resignation and showed understanding for what I had done.44

Watanabe did not disclose the name of the MITI minister. It was Fukuda Hajime, MITI minister in the “second reshuffled second” Ikeda cabinet (July 1962–July 1963). In 1963, Utsunomiya Tokuma did his part. He hosted a grand banquet for the Chinese Orchid Mission in a garden at his residence and invited MITI International Trade Section head Yashiki Hiroshi. There, Utsunomiya had Sun and Yashiki hold a secret meeting in a room on the second floor. Then, Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office Secretary-General Ōkubo Tadaharu arranged a secret meeting for Sun with MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau China Section head Hara Fujio. Sun’s meetings with these MITI and MOFA officials were the first semi-official talks that the Chinese government had with the Japanese government.45 In addition, another HR member in the LDP, Sonoda Sunao, whom Sun had known since 1955, arranged a meeting with Construction Minister Kōno Ichirō (who was a confidant of Hatoyama Ichirō and his agriculture, forestry, and fisheries minister). Kōno told Sun, “Prime Minister Ikeda understands the Chinese position and has decided to promote Sino-Japanese trade. His decision will not be discouraged by foreign pressure.” Takasaki Tatsunosuke also talked with Ikeda in person and then told Sun, “The Japanese government will approve the vinylon industrial plant export to China. Prime Minister Ikeda will keep his word.”46 True to Takasaki’s words, in August 1963, Ikeda approved the Export– Import Bank of Japan credits for the “vinylon industrial plant export” by Kurashiki Rayon (Ikeda sanctioned only one industrial plant export for 1964 in consideration for Taiwan and the United States). The Chinese “messengers of orchids” were greatly relieved. This became the first “industrial plant export” to China from a capitalist country in the world. In June 1963, the formal contract for the 7.4 billion-yen vinylon industrial plant project was signed in Beijing, which would play an important role in solving the shortage of clothes in China. LT Trade reached $100 million in 1963, just as Takasaki had envisioned.47 DEATH OF TAKASAKI TATSUNOSUKE 51

THE IKEDA CABINET’S “PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS” Takasaki meanwhile continued to work on establishing credit arrangements through private banks for financing LT Trade, as alternatives to the inflexible government-run Export–Import Bank of Japan. Takasaki then visited China again in September 1963 for negotiations for the second year of LT Trade. Negotiations for Chinese steel contracts for the 1964 LT Trade progressed to the extent that European competitors were concerned that the number of Japanese “friendly firms” was expand- ing too rapidly. Takasaki wrote, “The initial year of LT Trade ended successfully and the second year is going well. Taiwan and the United States won’t like it, but if Japan did not do it, England, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands would do it. Chinese farmers are in dire need of fertilizers. Someone must give fertilizers to help the poor farmers.”48 The trade with Japan was going well for China, owing to Takasaki’s tireless work, and Zhou stated at the CCCPC working session the day after he had met Takasaki’s trade mission on September 18, “The Japanese trade delegation is in effect a Japanese government mission. Their interest rests in trade with China.” Nevertheless, Zhou still encountered the Ikeda cabinet’s “separation of politics and economics” stance. Zhou had invited the Japan– China Friendship Association and the Japan–China Trade Promotion Association to visit China. Nevertheless, the Ikeda cabinet only approved a delegation of the latter to visit China. It refused to issue passports for a delegation of the former to visit China. On September 19, Zhou wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Wang Jiaxiang concerning this issue, stating, “Our policy is for the both delegations to be able to visit China.”49

DEATH OF TAKASAKI TATSUNOSUKE In January 1964, Zhou sent Sun Pinghua again to Tokyo on the Chinese youth Peking Opera mission. Sun was again charged with a secret assignment: to discuss the matter of establishing permanent liaison ofﬁces for Sino- Japanese trade with Matsumura and Takasaki. The idea of establishing such permanent ofﬁces had been stipulated in the fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement in 1958, but the Kishi cabinet did not approve. Sun writes:

Whenever I visited Takasaki’s residence previously, I met Takasaki in the drawing room on the ﬁrst ﬂoor. This time, however, I was guided to Takasaki’s 52 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

bedroom on the second ﬂoor. Takasaki had been suffering from stomach cancer and was convalescing at home. He appeared to be ﬁne then. I learned of his death from Wang Xiaoyun at Beijing station upon returning home. Takasaki died without witnessing all the fruits of LT Trade that he had created. LT Trade also paved the way for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Takasaki’s accomplishments in Sino-Japanese friendship will last forever. Among the many Japanese Zhou Enlai associated with, he trusted Takasaki the most. Zhou knew the best how much Takasaki had contributed to China.50

Takasaki died on February 24. Zhou lost the strongest ally for Sino- Japanese trade.

ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT LIAISON OFFICES In April 1964, Zhou invited Matsumura Kenzō and Okazaki Kaheita (April 1897–September 1989), who had succeeded Takasaki as the head of the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office, to Beijing. Okazaki, one of the executive directors of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT), was a government official during the prewar period and had served in such positions as an official of the Bank of Japan and counselor at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai. He became the second president of All Nippon Airways in 1961. For this trip, Matsumura dared to take a more direct but rough sea route at the age of 81. (He would visit China again later in 1964 and for the last time in March–April 1970.) In Beijing, Zhou and Liao Chengzhi talked with Matsumura and Okazaki for over five hours. This resulted in the 1964 Memorandum Concerning LT Trade and the Sino-Japanese Journalist Exchange Agreement.51 According to this follow-up LT Trade Agreement, the Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office and the Beijing Liaison Office of the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office were established in January 1965. Zhou appointed Sun Pinghua as chief representative to the Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office. Also, Zhou appointed officials of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and officials of the MOFA, as its representatives. In turn, Japan sent former MITI official Sōma Tsunetoshi as chief representative to the Beijing Liaison Office of the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office. Although Sōma assumed this position in a private capacity, the MITI involvement was undeniable.52 CREATION OF THE CHINA–JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION 53

These liaison offices were non-governmental only on paper. Sun states, “The Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office was a private trade representative body only nominally. Its functions were nothing but those of an embassy. The only differences were that it could not issue visas and it could not use secret codes for communications with Beijing.”53

CREATION OF THE CHINA–JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION Meanwhile, another landmark in Zhou’s operations vis-à-vis Japan was created in October 1963: the China–Japan Friendship Association, as part of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) at the State Council. Zhou appointed Liao Chengzhi as president and the intellectual leader Guo Moruo (November 1892–June 1978) as honorary president. Guo had studied at the First Higher School, the Sixth Higher School and Kyūshū Imperial University Medical School in Japan from 1914 to 1921 and also lived in Japan from 1928 to 1937. At the inaugural reception of the China–Japan Friendship Association, Guo stated, “The creation of the China–Japan Friendship Association is a milestone for the history of Sino-Japanese relations. This is a revival of the golden age for Sino-Japanese relations created by Jianzhen and Abe no Nakamaro in ancient times. I believe that the age of Jianzhen and Abe no Nakamaro will last forever.”54 Guo was referring to the Chinese grand monk Jianzhen (688–763; Japanese pronunciation, Ganjin) and Imperial Japan’s embassy to the Tang dynasty, Abe no Nakamaro (698–770; Chinese name, Zhao Heng). The year 1963 was the 1200-year anniversary of Jianzhen’s death. Jianzhen landed in Japan in 753 on his sixth attempt to sail to Japan (he lost the sight in both eyes during the voyage). In Japan, Jianzhen founded Tōshōdai Temple in the ancient capital Nara in 759, in order to propagate Buddhism, and died there. In turn, Abe was born in Nara, sailed to China in 717, served Tang-dynasty Emperor Xuanzong as governor-general, and died in Chang’an (current Xi’an). Abe wrote a poignant poem, which immortalized the sentiment of longing for one’s homeland. This poem was compiled in the First Imperial Anthology of Poems in Japan in 905, and then in the Anthology of One Poem Each of One Hundred Poets. It reads:

Looking back at the eastern sky far away, the moon rises over Mount Mikasa in Nara.55 54 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In 1963, Zhou appointed other veteran Japan specialists to the China– Japan Friendship Association: Zhao Anbo as secretary-general; Wang Xiaoyun, Sun Pinghua, and Lin Lin (1910–2011) as deputy secretaries- general. Zhao had studied at the First Higher School in Tokyo and had engaged in intelligence operations in the Eighth Route Army and also in “education” (indoctrination) of Japanese war prisoners at the Japanese Workers–Farmers School in Yan’an. He then became chairman of the Northeast People’s Government Overseas Japanese Control Committee in 1945. Wang also engaged in operations vis-à-vis Japan in Yan’an, and then in the MOFA (he would become Chinese minister to Japan). In turn, Lin studied at Waseda University in Tokyo from 1933 to 1936.56 Zhao, Wang, Sun, and another Japan specialist, Xiao Xiangqian (1918– October 2009), were the “brain trust” of Liao Chengzhi and were referred to as Liao’s Four Guardian Kings. Xiao had studied at the Tokyo Higher Normal School, had participated in negotiations with Japan since the first Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement, along with Sun, and had engaged in operations vis-à-vis Japan in the MOFA. He later became MOFA Asian Bureau director-general, Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office chief representative, and China–Japan Friendship Association vice president.57 In turn, Sun Pinghua became China–Japan Friendship Association secretary-general and vice president in 1979 and then president in 1986. Sun states, “Despite the fact that the Japanese created the Japan–China Friendship Association in Tokyo as early as 1950, the China–Japan Friendship Association was not created because the Japanese government was taking a hardline policy toward China. Then, with the successful signing of the LT Trade Memorandum in 1962, Premier Zhou decided to create the China–Japan Friendship Association in 1963.”58 The Japan–China Friendship Association was a Japanese counterpart for the China–Japan Friendship Association. It was supported by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Matsumoto Jiichirō (June 1887– November 1966), a leader of the “Leftist Socialist Party of Japan,” became its first president. In January 1956, the Japanese also created another organization to promote Sino-Japanese relations, the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association. This group was supported by the “Rightist Socialist Party of Japan,” and former Prime Minister and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman Katayama Tetsu (July 1887–May 1978) became its first president. This group is less ideologically charged than the THE TAIWAN ISSUE 55

Japan–China Friendship Association and a literature scholar, Nakajima Kenzō (1903–1976), became its director-general.59

ZHOU RECEIVES JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP MISSIONS Upon the creation of the China–Japan Friendship Association, Zhou in April 1964 sent association Vice President Nan Hanchen (1895–January 1967), who was also chairman of the CCPIT, to Japan on a China–Japan economic and friendship mission. Zhou then received a plethora of Japanese delegations. They included two inﬂuential Japanese parliamentarians in the JSP: Sasaki Kōzō (May 1900–December 1985), who would become party chairman (May 1965–August 1967); and Kuroda Hisao (April 1899–October 1986), one of the extreme leftists, who would become Japan–China Friendship Association president. Zhou then welcomed Japan–China Friendship Association President Matsumoto Jiichirō and Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō in September, as well as JSP General-Secretary Narita Tomomi (September 1912–March 1979), who would become party chairman (November 1968–September 1977) in October.60 Zhou also received Japanese cultural missions, such as the Matsuyama Ballet Company in October, which performed a ballet version of a revolutionary Peking Opera, Baimaonu (The White-Haired Girl). The company founder, Shimizu Masao, choreographed it in 1955 and made a debut tour of the ballet in China 1958. Zhou also enjoyed receiving the Shingeki (“new theater”) delegation in April 1965, led by Takizawa Osamu, as Zhou himself used to perform Shingeki plays when he was a student at Nankai Middle School.61

THE TAIWAN ISSUE Meanwhile, Japan–Taiwan relations were on the brink in October 1963. The Chinese trade mission interpreter Zhou Hongqing had defected in Tokyo. He first sought the protection of the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, but then requested that he be sent to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek demanded that Japan hand over Zhou, but Japan extradited him back to China in January 1964: the Zhou Hongqing Incident. In protest, Taiwan recalled its ambassador and chargé d’affaires from Tokyo. Prime Minister Ikeda sent former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Taipei in order to assuage Chiang’s anger. Yoshida promised Chiang that the Export–Import Bank 56 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS of Japan would not extend its credits to Japan’s “industrial plant export” to China. Yoshida then sent a letter to Chiang’s Secretary-General, Chang Chun, to endorse his promise.62 Although the Ikeda cabinet declared that the “Yoshida letter” was a private letter with no binding power, it actually treated the letter as binding. This double standard upset Zhou so that he suspended exchanges with Japan. Fujiyama Aiichirō, who became director-general of the Economic Planning Agency in the “first reshuffled second” Ikeda cabinet (July 1961–July 1962), states, “Ikeda actually promoted trade with China despite the official stance. He approved Export–Import Bank of Japan credits for the Chinese deferred payments for Japan’s industrial plant export. It was Satō who suspended the credits.”63

FORMATION OF THE SATŌ CABINET Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (November 1964–July 1972), who succeeded Ikeda, took a pro-Taiwan policy for the most part. Unlike Ikeda, Satō considered the “Yoshida letter” binding for an indeﬁnite duration. Worse, in November 1964, the Satō cabinet denied mayor of Beijing Peng Zhen a visa to attend the Ninth Congress of the JCP in Tokyo. Zhou reacted in kind and postponed the scheduled visit in December of an HR member from the Satō faction, Kuno Chūji (February 1910–October 1998, from Chita, Aichi prefecture), who would force through the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Seabed Cable Agreement in 1973, against all odds, as posts and telecommunications minister. In 1964, Satō sent Matsumura Kenzō to Beijing to explain that the denial of Peng Zhen’s visa should not be misconstrued as manifestation of the Satō cabinet’s hostility toward China, but even Matsumura could not remove Zhou’s distrust of Satō.64 Being caught between pressures from Satō and the business community, the MITI pro forma sanctioned large-scale contracts with China, including “industrial plant exports,” realizing that these contracts could go nowhere insofar as Satō refused to endorse Export–Import Bank of Japan credits for the Chinese deferred payments. Zhou was exasperated by Satō’srejection and cancelled the “vinylon industrial plant export” contract in May 1965. Zhou, in 1966, instructed Liao Chengzhi to inform Okazaki Kaheita again of the Chinese demand that Prime Minister Satō publicly disavow the “Yoshida letter” and extend the credits to China. However, Satō was under US pressure to keep Sino-Japanese trade in check.65 NOTES 57

CHANGING TIDE With Takasaki gone, Zhou lost the best Japanese spokesman for Sino- Japanese trade. Prime Minister Satō’s anti-China policy jeopardized LT Trade that Zhou and his team of Japan specialists had painstakingly established. Overall, Sino-Japanese economic relations stood on shaky ground. The Japanese political circles were divided between the pro-Taiwan mainstream and the pro-China minority, and each cabinet carefully weighed the political costs for promoting trade with China. However, at this time, domestic politics in China began to destroy everything that Zhou had accomplished. China had been caught up in the power struggle between radical dogmatists and moderate pragmatists. Consequently, the Chinese ofﬁcials in charge of operations vis-à-vis Japan had to navigate a perilous path in promoting relations with Japan. Their power struggle culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

NOTES 1. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 1149–1159. 2. Ibid., 1165–1170; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 1, 465–471. 3. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “A · A kaigi ni shishite” (“Mission to A · A Conference”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, ed., Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū (Takasaki Tatsunosuke Collection), Vol. 2, Tokyo: Tōyō- seikan kabushiki-gaisha, 1965, 101–112. 4. Ibid., Jin, 1182–1183. 5. Jin, 1159–1161; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 462–464. 6. Ibid. (both). 7. Jin, 1158–1161; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 458, 462–464 and 477–478; “Secret Behind the Explosion of the Aircraft Kashimir Princess,” December 22, 2013, http://www.chinauncensored.com/ index.php/most-censored/659-secret-behind-the-explosion-of-the-air craft-kashmir-princess. 8. Takasaki, 103–104; Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Waga michi o iku” (“Going My Way”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, ed., Takasaki Tatsunosuke- shū (Takasaki Tatsunosuke Collection), Vol. 1, Tokyo: Tōyō-seikan kabushiki-gaisha, 1965, 143–149. 58 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

9. Takasaki (“Waga michi o iku”), 177–180 and 203–204; Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Watashi no kyōsanken bōekiron” (My Discourse on Trade with the Communist Sphere), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, ed., Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū (Takasaki Tatsunosuke Collection), Vol. 2, Tokyo: Tōyō-seikan kabushiki-gaisha, 1965, 227–228. 10. Takasaki (“A · A kaigi ni shishite”), 103–104. 11. Takasaki (“Waga michi o iku”), 172–173. For details, see Hans H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1959. 12. Okada Akira, Mizutori gaikō hiwa: Aru gaikōkan no shōgen (The Secret Story of Waterfowl Diplomacy: Testimony of a Diplomat), Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1983, 45–46. Kase Toshikazu should not be confused with another career diplomat, Kase Shun’ichi (October 1897–September 1956). Their names are spelled with identical Chinese characters, but their pronunciations in Japanese differ. In order to avoid confusion, Kase Shun’ichi is referred to as “Senior Kase” and Kase Toshikazu is “Junior Kase” according to the seniority. 13. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 469–471; Takasaki (“A · A kaigi ni shishite”), 103–112. 14. Ibid. (both). 15. Jin, 1183; Takasaki (“Watashi no kyōsanken bōekiron”), 229–230. 16. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Jūsan’nen buri no Manshū” (“Revisiting Manchuria Thirteen Years Later”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, Vol. 2, 178– 183. Upon repatriation, Furumi Tadayuki wrote a memoir, Wasure-enu Manshuūkoku (Unforgettable Manchukuo), Tokyo: Keizai-ōraisha, 1978. 17. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 468–469; Okada, 45–46. 18. Okada, 46–48. 19. Ibid., 51–55. 20. Ibid., 51–55; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 469; Okada Akira, “Bandon-kaigi ni-okeru Shū-sōri” (Premier Zhou at Bandung Conference), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 54–57. 21. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 468–469; Okada (1983), 57–58 and 62. 22. Okada (1983), 57–58 and 62. 23. Takasaki (“Waga michi o iku”), 206–207; Fujiyama Aiichirō, Seiji waga- michi: Fujiyama Aiichirō kaisōroku (My Way in Politics: Memoirs of Fujiyama Aiichirō), Tokyo: Asahi-shimbunsha, 1976, 175–177. 24. Fujiyama, 175–177; Okada (1983), 66–73. 25. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949– 1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 2, 263–264; Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, NOTES 59

Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan), Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007, 293–298. 26. Matsumura Kenzō, “Hansei no tsukiai” (“Lifelong Friend”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, Vol. 2, 334–338. 27. Ibid., 334–338; Wu and Wang, 293–298. 28. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, “Sono ‘toshi’ de aka ni naruna” (“Don’t Become Red at ‘Your Age’”), in Takasaki Tatsunosuke-shū kankōkai, Vol. 2, 166–170. 29. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi-Yūjō: Nakasone Yasuhiro 50-nen no sengo-seiji o kataru (World Sentiment: Nakasone Yasuhiro Talks about 50 Years of Postwar Japanese Politics), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjū, 1996, 199. 30. Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai-shimbunsha, 1998, 102–104. 31. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 357–358; Takasaki (“Jūsan’nen buri no Manshū”), 178–183; 1953, 295–309. 32. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Manshū no shūen (The End of Manchukuo), Tokyo: Jitsugyō-no-nihonsha, 332–334. 33. Takasaki (“Jūsan’nen buri no Manshū”), 178–186. 34. Ibid., 183–186; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 360–362. 35. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 452; Sun, 104–109. 36. Sun, 104–109. 37. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 495–496 and 506; Takasaki (“Watashi no kyōsanken bōekiron”), 232–234. 38. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 510–511; Sun, 103–104; Matsumura, 334–338; Nakasone, 228–229. 39. Jin, 1183–1184; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 91–94. 40. Soeya, 91–94. 41. Sun, 111–114; “Shiru hito zo shiru, Chūnichi ‘Ran no hana gaikō’” (“The Legendary Sino-Japanese ‘Orchid Diplomacy’”), No. 1, September 7, 2010, http://jpn_cpc.people.com.cn/65014/7132666.html. 42. Sun, 111–114. 43. “Shiru hito zo shiru, Chūnichi ‘Ran no hana gaikō’” (“The Legendary Sino- Japanese ‘Orchid Diplomacy’”), No. 2, September 8, 2010, http://jpn_ cpc.people.com.cn/65014/7133994.html. 44. “Shiru hito zo shiru, Chūnichi ‘Ran no hana gaikō’” (“The Legendary Sino- Japanese ‘Orchid Diplomacy’”), No. 3, September 10, 2010, http://jpn_ cpc.people.com.cn/65014/7136332.html. 45. Sun, 114–115. 46. Ibid. 60 3 ESTABLISHING SEMI-OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

47. Ibid. 48. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 580; Takasaki (“Watashi no kyōsanken bōekiron”), 232–234; Soeya, 95–99. 49. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 580–581. In this source, the “Yoshida” [sic] cabinet is mistaken. It should read “Ikeda” cabinet. Also, the “Japan–China Trade Promotion Association Federation [sic]” should read the “Japan–China Trade Promotion Association.” 50. Sun, 118–119. 51. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 636; Sun, 119–124; Soeya, 91–94. 52. Sun, 121–127; Soeya, 91–94. 53. Sun, 121–127. 54. Sun, 116–118; Wu and Wang, 320–323. 55. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 589–590; Sun, 116–118; Joshua A. Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, 17–19. 56. Lin Liande, “Imadakara katareru watashi no tainichi bōeki” (“My Secret Story of [China’s] Trade with Japan”), March–April 2007, http://blog. explore.ne.jp/de/index.php; “Mitsugetsu kizuita moto-gaikōkan futari shikyo” (“Two [Chinese] Former Diplomats Who Had Built Honeymoon [with Japan] Died”), Sankei Shimbun, October 20, 2009. 57. Ibid. (both). 58. Sun, 118. 59. Narasaki Yanosuke, “Matsumoto Jiichirō-sensei to-tomoni” (“Accompanying Master Matsumoto Jiichirō”), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 63–68; Nakajima Kenzō, “Tenanmon ue nite” (On Top of the Tiananmen), Chūōkōron, No. 1,000, December 1970, 260–270. 60. Narasaki; Nakajima; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi (Vol. 2), 672–675. 61. Shimizu Masao and Matsuyama Mikiko, “Tō Eichō–fujin ni o-aishite nazo ga toketa Shū-sōri no idaisa” (“Greatness of Premier Zhou That We Understood from Meeting Mrs. Deng Yingchao”), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 213–221. 62. Soeya, 96–100. 63. Fujiyama, 176–183. 64. Ibid., 176–183. 65. Soeya, 99–105; Wu and Wang, 355–359. CHAPTER 4

Cultural Revolution and Zhou Enlai

While Zhou Enlai encountered a serious setback in promoting trade with Japan as Prime Minister Satō Eisaku had set the clock back to the pro- Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) stance (just as his birth brother Kishi Nobusuke had done earlier), something ominous was emerging in China. By late 1965, Chinese ofﬁcials who had been promoting Sino-Japanese economic relations, such as Foreign Trade Vice Minister Lu Xuzhang, who had concluded the third Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement in May 1955, and China–Japan Friendship Association President Liao Chengzhi, who had signed the Memorandum Concerning Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade in November 1962, felt increasing pressure from leftist members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC). They even began to sense that their careers were in danger.1 This was a premonition of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (“Cultural Revolution” hereafter). The power struggle between radical dogmatists and moderate pragmatists escalated into a brutal and relentless nationwide liquidation campaign of unprecedented dimensions, putting China into total turmoil for more than a decade. It ruined all Zhou’s efforts since 1952 in establishing economic and diplomatic relations with Japan.

***

The extreme leftists, under the guidance of Mao Zedong, launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966, denouncing capitalism and foreign inﬂuence as counterrevolutionary. They labeled such moderate leaders as Liu Shaoqi (November 1898–November 1969) and Deng Xiaoping (August 1904–February 1997) as capitalist roaders and purged them from party and government positions. The Red Guards marched in the streets, chanting from Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book, searched for the people’s enemies and arrested them. If they were not executed by the people’s courts, they disappeared from the public scene. Some were imprisoned and tortured, while others were sent to reeducation camps in remote regions and engaged in forced labor. This was Mao’s answer to his failure in the Great Leap Forward of 1958. After what turned out to be a “great leap backward,” Mao resigned from the position of president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in April 1959 and Liu replaced him. Liu and Deng then promoted an adjustment policy for the reconstruction of the Chinese economy. Afterward, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in order to take power back from the moderate revisionists.2

PERSECUTION OF ZHOU’S CLOSE COLLEAGUES As China plunged into the bloody ideological conflict, the list of victims is almost endless. To name just two in the economic sphere, first, Nan Hanchen (1895–January 1967), president of the People’s Bank of China and chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), committed suicide. Having joined the CPC in 1926, Nan had worked for Zhou Enlai as his military intelligence agent during the revolutionary war. Second, Foreign Trade Minister Ye Jizhuang (1893– June 1967) was denounced as pro-capitalist and died in 1967.3 In addition, longtime colleagues of Zhou were not immune from this sweeping purge. One of Zhou’s closest comrades since the years in France, Chen Yi (August 1901–January 1972), who was vice premier, foreign minister, and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marshal, was denounced as counterrevolutionary and died in 1972. One of Zhou’s earliest recruits in Berlin, Zhu De (December 1886–July 1976), who was PRC vice president, CPC vice chairman, and PLA marshal and commander-in- chief, lost his positions and died in 1976. Lin Biao (December 1907– September 1971) considered Chen and Zhu his rivals. The first PRC ambassador to the Soviet Union, Wang Jiaxiang (August 1906–January 1974), also fell victim.4 ZHOU ENLAI’S “PET PROJECT” 63

In literary circles, the writer and Culture Minister Mao Dun (August 1896 [July Guangxu-year 22]–March 1981), who had lived in exile in Japan during the 1920s, lost his position. The playwright and Vice Culture Minister Xia Yan (October 1900–February 1995), who had studied in Japan during the 1920s, was imprisoned for eight years. The prominent leftist writer Lao She (February 1899–August 1966, a Manchu) was publicly assaulted and committed suicide.5

THE ART OF SURVIVAL Zhou did not suffer the fate of Liu Shaoqi, who had been placed under house arrest, was subjected to inhumane treatment (he was denied proper medical treatment for his illness), and died in infamy during the Cultural Revolution. The unfortunate fate of Liu was that he had taken over the position of Mao Zedong as president of China and become the archrival of Mao. In contrast, Zhou escaped the purge because he made conscious efforts not to be perceived by Mao as such a rival. One Chinese writer speculates that Zhou was homosexual and that he escaped the purge because his homosexuality presented weakness vis-à-vis Mao. This is groundless. The writer herself admits that there is no evidence whatsoever to prove this speculation. It was Zhou’s modest and prudent disposition and his deference to Mao in important decision making that placed him below Mao. Zhou was extremely careful not to arouse the anger and jealousy of Mao. This was Zhou’s art of survival.6 Yet, when Zhou was diagnosed with bladder cancer in 1972, Mao intervened in Zhou’s medical team’s decisions and instructed the team not to give him an operation, which could have contained the cancer. Zhou continued to suffer from the illness until his death in January 1976. Mao outlived him by eight months. If Mao was feared as a “god” in China, Zhou was revered as a “saint” so that his death resulted in the ﬁrst Tiananmen Square Incident in 1976. Then, the death of a moderate leader in the second generation, Hu Yaobang, resulted in the second Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. No such popular uprising occurred when Mao died.7

ZHOU ENLAI’S “PET PROJECT” During the Cultural Revolution, Zhou tried his best in the most difficult situation to save his colleagues and protégés from persecution so that this was referred to as Zhou’s “pet project.” For instance, Zhou tried hard to 64 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI save Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who suffered from illness during the purge. The newly compiled Official Chronology of Zhou Enlai records that Zhou, in January 1971, approved the report of the 301 Military Hospital concerning the prognosis and treatment of Chen Yi’s illness. Zhou then sent Zhongnanhai Health Office principal Bian Zhijiang to the operating room during Chen’s surgery and had him report the progress of the surgery periodically.8 When Zhou found that the diagnosis for Chen was colon cancer, Zhou instructed the hospital to provide its best treatment available to cure Chen. Zhou also advised the hospital to show Chen’s wife, Zhang Qian, every cancer cell removed, as evidence. Zhou then made her keep the secret, stating, “Old Chen should not know about this.” Afterward, Zhou kept checking on the medical treatment of Chen until his death in January 1972.9 Zhou also protected Deng Xiaoping each time he become a target of a liquidation campaign by the radicals. Zhou had met Deng for the first time in Paris in the early 1920s when Deng was a poor student in the work– study program, going by the name of Deng Xixian. Zhou suggested that Deng open a tofu shop in Paris, which he did, and his tofu shop thrived. Thus, Deng became Zhou’s protégé in Paris. During the Cultural Revolution, Deng was persecuted and was sent to a labor camp in Xinjian in Nanchang, in Jiangxi province, but his party membership was kept intact, owing to Zhou. In contrast, Liu Shaoqi was stripped of his party membership and died in disgrace. Zhou also succeeded in rehabilitating Deng in April 1973 (when he made a public appearance as “first vice premier”) and continued to protect Deng until he could no longer do so in January 1976. After Zhou’s death, and in the wake of the first Tiananmen Square Incident of April 1976, Mao and the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen) launched an anti-Deng Xiaoping and anti-rightists campaign and Deng lost power again.10

ZHOU ENLAI PROTECTS THE CHILDREN OF HIS CLASSMATES In addition, Zhou protected the children of his former schoolmates at Nankai Middle School, who had studied in Japan at the same time as Zhou. They included the eldest son of Zhang Ruifeng, who was a student at Waseda University in Tokyo, and the daughter of Wang Xitian (from Jilin province, September 1896–September 1923 ofﬁcial death, actually ZHOU ADOPTS CHILDREN OF HIS COLLEAGUES 65 died in 1986), who was a Chinese student leader at the First Higher School in Tokyo. Zhang Ruifeng had an unfortunate life upon returning home from Japan, and Zhou recruited Zhang’s son into the Red Army during the revolutionary war and looked after him. In turn, Wang Xitian was presumed to have been killed by the Japanese authorities in the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake and was ofﬁcially pronounced dead: the Wang Xitian Incident.11 Wang was actually alive. Wang had been engaged in clandestine operations for the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). For instance, he already had the expertise to produce bacillus anthracis, the etiologic agent of anthrax, and this secret project led to the biological research at Unit 731 in the suburb of Harbin in Manchuria. Wang continued to live in Japan under Japanese pseudonyms until 1986/1987. Meanwhile, in China, Premier Zhou made the Chinese government recognize Wang as a revolutionary martyr so that his family in China (his daughter Wang Zhenqi wanted to become a doctor) could receive protection during the Cultural Revolution.12

ZHOU ADOPTS CHILDREN OF HIS COLLEAGUES Moreover, Zhou adopted children of his colleagues, who had become victims of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) during the civil war. Zhou and his wife Deng Yingchao (February 1904–July 1992) did not have their own children (Deng had miscarried twice). They adopted a son, Li Peng (b. October 1928) and a daughter, Sun Weishi (1921–October 1968). Li Peng’s birthfather was the early communist activist Li Shuoxun (1903–1931, executed), who was a colleague of Chen Duxiu and Zhao Shiyan (April 1901–July 1927, executed). Zhao went to France in June 1920 and became one of the leaders of the Chinese work–study students in France when Zhou lived there. Zhao and Zhou worked together to create the Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe (CYCPE). Zhao’s younger sister, Zhao Juntao, married Li Shuoxun and bore Li Peng. After Li Shuoxun was executed by the KMT, Zhou adopted Li Peng.13 In turn, Sun Weishi’s birthfather was Sun Bingwen (1885–April 1927, executed), who was a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance founded by Sun Yat-sen. Sun Bingwen met Zhu De in 1917, and together they went to Europe in September 1922 in order to study communism. They met Zhou Enlai in Berlin and became members of the CPC in 66 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

November by the good offices of Zhou. Upon returning from Moscow, Sun Bingwen joined the faculty of the Whampoa Military Academy, but was arrested by the KMT for involvement in the Zhongshan Warship Incident of March 1926: an alleged plan to capture Chiang Kai-shek, which gave him an excuse to suppress communists in the ROC government during the first KMT–CPC United Front. Sun was released with the help of Zhou, but was arrested again and was executed during the Shanghai Massacre of April 1927. Sun had five children and Zhou adopted his third child (eldest daughter), Sun Weishi.14 While Zhou protected many colleagues and their family, he could not save his own family from becoming prey to the brutal liquidation campaign. His adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, became a renowned actress and theater director. Her beauty and fame aroused the jealousy of Lin Biao’s wife, Ye Qun (1917–September 1971), because Lin was interested in Sun, as well as Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing (March 1914–May 1992), because Mao was also interested in Sun. Jiang Qing’s animosity toward Sun was particularly strong because she was also an actress, but a less popular one. It was a “no win situation” for Zhou. Mao wanted her but Jiang Qing hated her. Jiang forced Zhou to sign Sun Weishi’s arrest warrant and sentenced her without trial. Sun was subjected to brutal torture and gang rape and died in prison in October 1968.15

ZHOU PROTECTS ZHANG XUELIANG’S YOUNGER BROTHERS Further, Zhou protected the younger brothers of Zhang Xueliang (June 1901–October 2001), the culprit of the Xi’an Incident of December 1936. After the incident, Zhang was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing and was under house arrest for life. Zhang’s younger brother and the second son of Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueming (1908–April 1983), studied at the IJA Infantry Academy, worked for Zhang Xueliang’s Northeastern Army and then served in the KMT–ROC government. In 1949, Zhang Xueming met Zhou, converted to the CPC, and obtained the position of People’s Park director. Zhang was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, but Zhou helped to rehabilitate Zhang in 1973.16 In turn, another younger brother of Zhang Xueliang and the fourth son of Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xuesi (1916–May 1970), studied at the Whampoa Military Academy, joined the CPC in 1933, and was arrested by the KMT in December 1936 soon after the Xi’an Incident. Zhou managed to release him and sent him to Yan’an for safety. Zhou then ZHOU ENLAI PROTECTS PUYI AND PUJIE’S JAPANESE FAMILY 67 helped Zhang to become PLA Dalian Naval Academy vice principal and eventually Navy chief of staff (there is a photograph of Zhang Xuesi in a Navy uniform with Zhou and Deng Yingchao from June 1951). Then, as Lin Biao became national defense minister, Zhang’s career was threatened. Zhou tried to save Zhang, but he was brutally persecuted by Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution. When Zhang became gravely ill, Zhou ordered immediate hospitalization, but Lin Biao’s protégé Li Zuopeng obstructed this. Zhang died in May 1970. Zhou rehabilitated him posthumously.17

ZHOU ENLAI PROTECTS PUYI AND PUJIE’S JAPANESE FAMILY Zhou even protected the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, Aixinjueluo Puyi (February 1906–October 1967), notwithstanding the fact that he had become emperor of the Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo. Zhou oversaw the administration of the Fushun War Criminals Management Center and leniently treated the prisoners of war there, so that Puyi was pardoned as a model prisoner and released in 1959 (see Chapter 2). Zhou extended his protection to Puyi’s younger brother, Aixinjueluo Pujie (April 1907–February 1994), and his wife, Saga Hiro (March 1914– June 1987), who was a Japanese aristocrat (the Saga family, formerly the Ōgimachi-Sanjō family, originated in the twelfth century) and a distant cousin of Emperor Hirohito.18 While Pujie was taken by the Soviet Army and interned in a prison camp in Chita and then in Khabarovsk, along with Puyi and other Manchukuo ofﬁcials, Hiro and their younger daughter, Aixinjueluo Husheng (b. March 1940), became displaced persons in Manchuria and were arrested by the CPC’s Eighth Route Army and then by the KMT Army. Their elder daughter, Aixinjueluo Huisheng (February 1938–December 1957), was studying at the Gakushūin Peers Primary School in Tokyo.19 Hiro’s younger brother, Saga Kinmoto (January 1922–October 1998), who was the 31st head of the Saga family, conﬁdes in his memoir:

In 1947, Hiro and Husheng managed to escape to Japan. Hiro settled down in her parents’ home in Yokohama and raised their two daughters, while teaching Japanese calligraphy. In 1953, the elder daughter Huisheng, who had not seen her father since 1944, wrote to Premier Zhou in Chinese from Japan, saying that she wanted to meet her father. Zhou then permitted Hiro and the two daughters to correspond with Pujie. However, before Pujie was 68 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

pardoned as a model prisoner and released in 1960, Huisheng committed double suicide with her boyfriend at age of 19 [the “Double Suicide at Mount Amagi” incident]. After Pujie’s release, Zhou made arrangements for Hiro to return to China and live with Pujie in Beijing. Then, with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the Red Guards attacked their residence. Afterward, Zhou hid them in Zhongnanhai, the quarters in Beijing where the party and government ofﬁces and housing for high-ranking ofﬁcials were located.20

These are only some of the people that Zhou helped during the Cultural Revolution. A remarkable thing was that Zhou saved these people by risking his own career and life. If Zhou was homosexual, therefore giving Mao Zedong an upper hand and putting Zhou at greater risk, as the Chinese writer speculates, why did Zhou go out of his way to save many people, even including Japanese? In fact, Zhou’s wife, Deng Yingchao, told the “unofﬁcial Japanese ambassador to China,” Saionji Kinkazu (November 1906–April 1993; grandson of two-time Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi from an aristocratic family that had dominated the Japanese Imperial Court), in later years:

Zhou was actually in danger of being purged more than anyone else. The Gang of Four tried to purge Zhou even before the summer of 1973, when they launched the Criticize-Confucius Campaign, in order to actually attack Zhou.21

Zhou resisted the pressure and then managed to change the campaign to the Criticize-Lin (Biao), Criticize-Confucius Campaign. Lin died in September 1971 in an airplane crash in Mongolia. In turn, Zhou often reminisced about his study period in Japan to Saionji and told Saionji in a friendly fashion, “I could not afford to eat sukiyaki in Japan and mostly ate ﬁsh or tofu, with rice. I became good at cooking tofu dishes in Japan. Shall I cook tofu dishes for you sometime?”22

THE PURGE OF LIAO CHENGZHI The case of Zhou’s right-hand man for his operations vis-à-vis Japan, Liao Chengzhi, exempliﬁes the efforts and limitations of Zhou in helping out the victims of the Cultural Revolution. Earlier, Zhou had taken Liao under his wing after his father, Liao Zhongkai (April 1887–August THE PURGE OF LIAO CHENGZHI 69

1925, Sun Yat-sen’s right-hand man), was assassinated by the rightist faction of the KMT. In fact, Zhou saved Liao’s life on at least two occasions. In the winter of 1936 during the Long March, Zhou released Liao, who had been held as a prisoner of Red Army Fourth Front Army commander Zhang Guotao (December 1897–December 1979, one of the student leaders during the May Fourth Movement and one of the original members of the CPC) since December 1934 for having criticized Zhang’s “leftist opportunism.”23 Zhang stripped Liao of his CPC membership and had him continue the Long March in the custody of the guard. However, Zhang lost his leadership battle with Mao Zedong; he was expelled from the CPC in April 1938 and moved to Canada. Then, after World War II, in January 1946, Zhou again rescued Liao, who had been arrested by the KMT–ROC authorities in May 1942, from a prison for political prisoners attached to the ROC– US Special Technology Joint Ofﬁce in Chongqing, the capital of the ROC government at that time.24 In turn, Liao’s elder sister Liao Mengxing (February 1904–January 1988) married one of Zhou’s close aides, Li Shaoshi (1906–1945), who was assassinated in Chongqing in October 1945. There is a group photograph that shows the high degree of camaraderie between Zhou and Liao’s family. On August 20, 1946, Zhou, Deng Yingchao, and Dong Biwu (March 1886–April 1975, one of the founding members of the CPC, PRC vice president) joined Liao Chengzhi, his wife Jing Puchun, his sister Liao Mengxing, and her daughter Li Mei, and attended the 21st anniversary memorial service of Liao Zhongkai at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing.25 At the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou’s team of Japan specialists were denounced as “pro-Japanese opportunists” and “spies for Japan.” The premonition that Liao had in 1965 proved to be correct. With the presidency of the China–Japan Friendship Association and his leadership roles in international front and liaison work and in Overseas Chinese affairs, Liao’s career reached almost the pinnacle of the CCCPC apparatus in 1965. Liao kept a tight schedule until March 1966. Then his career suddenly ended. The surge of radical views and the rise of the chairman of the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Liu Ningyi, at the CCCPC eclipsed Liao. Afterward, Liao disappeared from center stage in Chinese politics for six years until 1972, while the Red Guards rampaged through the whole country. During this period, Liao “wore six or seven hats” (which counterrevolutionaries were made to wear with 70 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI stigmatic labels written on them): he was labeled as “counterrevolutionary,”“spy for Japan,”“pro-capitalist,”“rebel,”“revisionist,”“traitor,” and “Three Anti-elements” (corruption, waste, and bureaucracy).26

“UNPERSONIFICATION” OF LT TRADE In this context, the leftists changed the name of LT Trade (named after Liao and Takasaki Tatsunosuke) to Memorandum Trade in March 1968, as soon as the original five-year LT Trade Agreement had expired in November 1967. The Japanese delegation to Beijing for the negotiations of the renewal to LT Trade—consisting of Okazaki Kaheita, the head of the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office for LT Trade, Furui Yoshimi, who received “initiation” in Sino-Japanese friendship from Matsumura Kenzō after having accompanied him to China in 1959, and Tagawa Seiichi, who began his political career as secretary to Matsumura Kenzō—was obliged to agree to the name changes: Takasaki had died in February 1964 and Liao had disappeared from the public scene. Consequently, the Liao Chengzhi Office for LT Trade was renamed as the China–Japan Memorandum Trade Office and the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office for LT Trade became the Japan–China Memorandum Trade Office. The purpose of the name change was to make Liao an “unperson” and erase his accomplishments. Afterward, Sino-Japanese trade and all the previous efforts of Zhou’s team for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization eroded away.27

HOUSE ARREST OF LIAO CHENGZHI In March 1966, Liao Chengzhi was placed under house arrest and all of his work was suspended. The official Chinese view is that Liao was personally persecuted by Vice Premier and Defense Minister, Lin Biao, and Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing. Liao escaped execution because of the limited protection from Zhou. Liao’s career reached a low point when he lost his position in the CCCPC in April 1969. This coincided with the official presentation of Lin Biao as Mao’s successor. Two years later, Lin was called a traitor and counterrevolutionary because he had opposed Mao’s decision to abolish the position of president of China. Lin tried to flee to the Soviet Union, but died in an airplane crash in Mongolia in September 1971. Lin’s fall marked the beginning of rehabilitation for purged party officials, but they still encountered attacks by the Gang of HOUSE ARREST OF LIAO CHENGZHI 71

Four. The persecution continued until the death of Mao in September 1976.28 Thus, after two decades of hard work for the PRC, Liao lost his seat in the CCCPC and was forced to live a life of confinement. Liao’s best Japanese friend, Saionji Kinkazu, knew how Zhou helped Liao out during this time. Saionji first met Liao at the World People’s Peace Conference in Vienna, Austria, in December 1952 and they hit a chord. In 1957, Liao asked Saionji to become a liaison between China and Japan. Saionji agreed and he became the “unofficial Japanese ambassador to China” in the absence of official Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The CPC actually gave Saionji an official position, deputy secretary-general of the Asia- Pacific Peace Liaison Committee, for a monthly stipend of 500 yuan. This was a salary at the minister’s level and a generous one, considering that Mao Zedong’s monthly salary was 600 yuan at that time.29 Saionji lived in Beijing for nearly 13 years from January 1958 to August 1970, and, after returning home, continued to be a liaison between China and Japan as one of the executive directors of the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association. He joined the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), but was expelled from the party when it severed relations with the CPC during the Cultural Revolution. While the Japanese mass media dubbed Saionji a “red aristocrat” (because of his family background), Liao teased him by referring to him as “O-tono-sama” (“My lord”). In 1966, Saionji saw in the streets of Beijing the “wall newspapers” denouncing Liao as bourgeois for having eaten expensive meat in Paris while attending conferences in the past and Marshal Zhu De for having collected exotic orchids.30 Saionji discloses:

Premier Zhou hid Liao in Zhongnanhai. I kept contact with Liao during his purge through a messenger and met him at a secret place. Liao had a heart attack after he was purged and was hospitalized, but the doctor did not treat him. Liao’s wife, Jing Puchun, appealed to Zhou. He immediately instructed the doctor to treat Liao. This saved his life.31

In turn, Jing Puchun tells her secret story:

Premier Zhou hid Liao in a secret place in Beijing in order to protect him from the Gang of Four. I was able to visit Liao once a week. The ﬁrst thing he asked me was how his mother was doing. His mother was gravely 72 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

concerned about Liao, but I could only say to her that he was too busy with his work to come home. When Liao’s mother was hospitalized in August 1970, Zhou dispatched a taxi for Liao so that he could visit the Beijing Hospital to see his mother. His mother was very happy to see Liao after several years of separation. Zhou himself also visited the hospital to see Liao’s mother.32

LIAO’S MOTHER,HE XIANGNING Liao Chengzhi’s mother, He Xiangning (1878–September 1972) was one of the last surviving colleagues of Sun Yat-sen and a lifelong friend of Sun’s widow, Song Qingling. In addition to being president of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, she held numerous leadership positions in the PRC, including vice chair of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and vice chair of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). Zhou Enlai showed deep respect to this pioneering Chinese revolutionary and the widow of Liao Zhongkai until her death. The Ofﬁcial Chronology of Zhou Enlai records that Zhou visited He Xiangning at the Beijing Hospital on June 19, 1970. Upon her death, Zhou immediately made arrangements for her funeral in order to grant her wish that she be buried beside her husband at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing.33 Jing Puchun states:

Liao Chengzhi avoided a luxury lifestyle and led a frugal life, but he was still denounced as bourgeois. Liao exercised strict discipline over himself and his family. Liao forbade his family members from using a sedan the government provided to his mother for transportation. He did not let his children visit their relatives in Hong Kong, let along visit their relatives who lived overseas. After his mother’s death, Liao moved to a smaller house, but he was still criticized as bourgeois.34

Many Japanese politicians who visited Liao’s residence in Beijing attest to the frugal lifestyle of Liao. They were shocked to find Liao’s residence extremely small and simple, contrary to their expectations. For instance, Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians for Sino-Japanese Friendship President, Itō Masayoshi (December 1913–May 1994; foreign minister, July 1980–May 1981), observed that Liao’s bedroom–study was tiny and PURGE OF OTHER OFFICIALS IN ZHOU’S JAPAN TEAM 73 cluttered with furniture and an emergency oxygen tank (for his heart conditions). The bookshelves were full of Japanese books, including the Complete Collection of the Works of Kawakami Hajime, the pioneering Japanese scholar of Marxism.35 Liao was also attacked for nepotism. Liao was conscious of the possibility of such criticism and was extremely careful about this because of his family background (his father was the right-hand man of Sun Yat-sen and his mother was a prominent figure in both the KMT and the CPC). Nevertheless, in later years, when Liao’s son, Liao Hui (b. 1942), an engineer in the PLA Air Force, accompanied him to Japan in 1979, it fueled rumors about nepotism. Liao Hui was later appointed as one of the vice ministers of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council, the position his father had held, but this took place after his father’s death in 1983. The practice of the offspring succeeding to the parent’s position is ubiquitous in the party and in the government of the PRC to the extent that it seems to be a natural mode for succession of power there. Zhou’s adopted son, Li Peng became premier. In fact, a number of the current and recent Chinese leaders are offspring of the party elders in earlier generations: the Princelings (dazidang). President Xi Jinping (b. 1953) is one of them.36

PURGE OF OTHER OFFICIALS IN ZHOU’S JAPAN TEAM Other Japan specialists in Zhou’s foreign policy-making team did not escape the purge. They included Zhang Xiangshan (1914–October 2009), Zhao Anbo (1915–December 1999), Sun Pinghua (1917– August 1997), Xiao Xiangqian (1918–October 2009), and Wang Xiaoyun. Saionji Kinkazu knew them very well. Zhang Xiangshan had studied at the Tokyo Higher Normal School, became CCCPC International Liaison Department deputy director, and engaged in operations vis-à-vis Japan in the CCCPC. He later became vice president of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and the China–Japan Friendship Association. Xiao Xiangqian was charged with being a spy for Japan and spent several years in a labor camp until 1971. Saionji writes, “My Chinese friends, such as Zhang Xiangshan, Zhao Anbo, Xiao Xiangqian, and Lei Renmin, disappeared from Beijing one by one. Even I was being watched and a PLA soldier followed me whenever I went out.”37 74 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

PURGE OF SUN PINGHUA China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General Sun Pinghua was purged in 1967. Sun has many interesting stories to tell about his study years at the Tokyo Higher School of Technology (current Tokyo Institute of Technology) from 1939 to 1943, including an episode that the Japanese Special Police spies followed Sun everywhere he went. He had actually joined a communist group in Tokyo. Sun often visited Uchiyama-shoten, a bookstore specializing in Chinese literature. It had books on Marxism-Leninism although leftist books were actually banned in Japan. Sun grew up in Fengtian province (current Liaoning province) and could not dream of obtaining such books in China.38 Uchiyama Kanzō (1885–1959), a good friend of the Chinese writer Lu Xun, owned the bookstores in Shanghai and Tokyo. Later, in 1950, Uchiyama became the first director-general of the Japan–China Friendship Association at its inception. Uchiyama lived in Shanghai when Sun lived in Tokyo, and Uchiyama’s brother Kakichi ran the bookstore in Tokyo. Sun did not buy the books he wanted right away, but waited for a few days and bought them when there were no other custo- mers. Sun did not go straight back to his dormitory, but made detours through busy districts so that the Special Police could not find his dormitory.39 Upon returning to China, Sun joined the CPC on January 1, 1944. The CPC did not allow members to leave any record. Attesting this, Zhou Enlai told the New York Times correspondent James Reston in 1971, “None of us kept a diary and none of us want to write our memoirs.” Sun therefore deliberately chose the date of joining the party to be January 1, so that he could remember it. Sun had consistently engaged in operations vis-à-vis Japan since 1952 when the first postwar Japanese delegation visited Beijing (see Chapter 2). At the inception of the China–Japan Friendship Association in 1963, Sun became one of the three deputy secretaries-general. He was promoted to the association as secretary-general and vice president in 1979, and then as president in 1986. He was also appointed vice president of the CPAFFC in 1983.40 Sun tells of his own purge:

I returned to Beijing in April 1967 on my annual leave from my assignment as chief representative to the Tokyo Liaison Ofﬁce of the Liao Chengzhi Ofﬁce: I was required to return home for the annual renewal of my visa and ZHOU RECEIVES JAPANESE DELEGATIONS 75

an annual report of my work. At that time my wife and I did not realize the gravity of the situation and did not bring our belongings in Tokyo along. Upon arriving at Beijing train station, Red Guards were waiting for us, instead of our children. The guards accompanied us to our home and then took us to a reeducation camp in a suburb of Beijing. I saw Liao Chengzhi only once during this period. I was denounced as a spy for the Japanese and Liao’s underling. I was called the “little brain” (dianzi) of Liao and criticized the most among Liao’s brain trust.41

Sun was then sent to a reeducation camp in Shandong province and engaged in physical labor there for four years, whereas his wife was sent to a reeducation camp in Henan province. His daughter and son were sent to remote regions in Heilongjiang and Shaanxi provinces. By gleaning from newspapers, Sun realized that the Revolutionary Subcommittee had not officially removed Liao Chengzhi from the position of China–Japan Friendship Association president. The post of chief representative of the Liaison Office in Tokyo was also kept vacant after Sun’s departure. Sun states, “I was unable to return to Tokyo and my service there ended after only three years. I have never betrayed the CPC nor acted as Japan’s agent. I thought that I would be rehabilitated soon, but I was jobless for a whole five years at the most productive age in a man’s career.”42

ZHOU RECEIVES JAPANESE DELEGATIONS Meanwhile, as the Cultural Revolution jeopardized Sino-Japanese relations, contact between the two countries was reduced to a minimum, and only Japanese politicians on the left were allowed to visit China. For instance, on August 20, 1970, Zhou received a delegation of JSP members, led by Kuroda Hisao (a parliamentarian and extreme leftist in the JSP), as well as a Japanese friendship mission, led by former JSP Chairman, Sasaki Kōzō. Then, on October 12, 1970, Zhou met a delegation of the JSP, again led by Kuroda Hisao. Zhou had invited Kuroda to participate in a memorial gathering for the ten-year anniversary of the assassination of former JSP Chairman Asanuma Inejirō held in Beijing on that day (see Chapter 2). It was unusual that the Chinese held a ten-year anniversary memorial event for a Japanese leader in Beijing, even granting that he was a socialist. Although this gathering might have been staged as a political gesture, this suggests 76 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI that Zhou did not forget the Japanese leader who had earnestly tried to normalize Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and that Zhou continued to pay tribute to Asanuma.43

REHABILITATION OF LIAO CHENGZHI Things finally began to change for the better in China in 1971. On April 26, 1971, Zhou approved the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public Health regarding the convalescence of Liao Chengzhi, who had been suffering heart ailment. Zhou then advised that Liao return home and convalesce there and recommended that Liao “follow the advice of doctors and have periodic health checkups after returning home.” Zhou also stated, “My heart condition was not so good either, but I restrained my diet and my blood pressure decreased and I can live normally today. I hope that Comrade Chengzhi’s health will recover soon so that he will be able to participate in study and work at least partially.”44 Then, in August 1971, a senior Japanese conservative politician Matsumura Kenzō, who devoted himself to the restoration of Sino- Japanese relations in his later years, died. Zhou immediately sent a message of condolence to Matsumura’s family in the names of China–Japan Friendship Association Honorary President Guo Moruo and association President Liao Chengzhi. This was the first “official assignment” to Liao since he was purged in March 1966, signaling the beginning of the end of his purge. This coincided with the regaining of influence of Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yun (1905–1995) in the second half of 1971. Sun Pinghua writes, “Liao’s name began to reappear in the People’s Daily in the summer of 1971, but he was still not allowed to participate in the operations vis-à-vis Japan that year. At the strong request of the Japanese VIPs, however, he was allowed to meet them that year.”45 Liao’s meeting with the Japanese VIPs Sun refers to was the meeting on October 15, 1971 with Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō (1903–1979), Secretary-General Shirato Norio (1927–2006), and Executive Director Miyagawa Torao (1908–1984; art historian and former communist), who succeeded to Nakajima as association director-general upon his death in 1979. The Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association had remained a most ardent supporter of China in Japan, after the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) severed its relations with the CPC. Miyagawa wrote in November 1971: LIAO MAKES A PUBLIC APPEARANCE 77

Premier Zhou had invited us to celebrate the 22nd anniversary of the foundation of the PRC on October 1 ...Xiao Xiangqian and Zhou Bin of the CPAFFC then took us to the home of Liao Chengzhi on October 15, 1971. We were deeply touched to be able to see Liao after so many years. Liao, who had a great sense of humor, told us, “I had a myocardial infarction and was in critical condition. I almost went to see Karl Marx [in heaven].”46

The Official Chronology of Zhou Enlai records that Zhou received, on October 15, 1971, a delegation of the “orthodox faction” of the Japan- China Friendship Association (the association was split between pro-China and pro-Soviet groups) led by Kuroda Hisao and Miyazaki Semin (1902– 1985, a nephew of Sun Yat-sen’s patron Miyazaki Tōten), as well as a delegation of the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association led by Director-General Nakajima Kenzō and Miyagawa Torao. Thus, the dates in Miyagawa’s account and that in The Official Chronology of Zhou Enlai match. On October 15, Zhou met Nakajima, Miyagawa, and Shirato first and then sent them to Liao’s home.47

LIAO MAKES A PUBLIC APPEARANCE Then, on October 17, 1971, Liao Chengzhi attended the guest performance of the Japanese Matsuyama Ballet Company. The program was a ballet version of a revolutionary Peking Opera, Baimaonu (“White-Haired Girl”; Matsuyama Ballet Director Shimizu Masao originally choreographed it in 1955). The CPAFFC had sent Liao a ticket for the Matsuyama Ballet’s guest performance, but Liao was afraid to go because he might be persecuted even more if he attended such a bourgeois function. Liao told his wife, Jing Puchun, this was like attending the Hongmenyan (the famous banquet in 206 BC in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, in which the guest attended the banquet knowing that the host was plotting to assassinate him). In turn, Jing states, “I urged Liao to go because Premier Zhou had already told him that he would not have to go back to the place of isolated surveillance soon. I convinced Liao to go. I then followed his every step to the theater in a storm in order to make sure that he attended. I was determined to help him regain his self- conﬁdence.”48 In turn, the Xinhua News Agency staff writer was not sure how to report the attendance at the Matsuyama Ballet’s guest performance of 78 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

Liao, who had been president of this news agency in its early days. The citation in Chinese newspapers was the litmus test for the fate of a purged ofﬁcial. If the People’s Daily reported that a condemned ofﬁcial attended a cultural function or met a foreign delegation, it meant that this person was rehabilitated. The Xinhua News Agency reporter cautiously put Liao’s name at the end of the list of attendees at the ballet and showed the draft to Zhou. To the surprise of the reporter, Zhou moved Liao’s name to the front of the list and added, “China–Japan Friendship Association president Liao Chengzhi has recently recovered from a long illness and attended the ballet performance today.” Thus, with Zhou’s quick wit, Liao made headline news in the People’s Daily on October 17, 1971.49

ZHOU DEMANDS LIAO’S REHABILITATION Meanwhile, a Japanese delegation of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, led by its President Fujiyama Aiichirō (May 1897–February 1985), strongly requested a meeting with Liao Chengzhi on the eve of National Day in 1971. Fujiyama met Zhou Enlai on September 30, but his wish to meet Liao was not granted. Kuroda Hisao and Miyazaki Semin of the Japan–China Friendship Association also wanted to meet Liao, but their wish was not granted either. Then, Zhou almost lost his patience with the young and radical Revolutionary Subcommittee members and told them:

Why don’t you understand the situation. Rehabilitate Liao immediately. He is the Japan specialist! Ask him to become our advisor and solve the matter right away!50

Realizing that there was no time to waste any longer, Zhou made his attempt to rehabilitate Liao explicit this time. Zhou’s secretary then notiﬁed Liao, “You will not have to return to the place of isolated surveillance. We will let you know when.”51

ZHOU AND LIAO MEET CHAIRMAN MAO More than six months later, on April 17, 1972, when a faction leader of the ruling LDP, Miki Takeo (Prime Minister, December 1974–December 1976), visited Beijing, Zhou sent a special car for Liao Chengzhi at the Beijing REHABILITATION OF SUN PINGHUA 79

Hospital to take him to the Great Hall of the People. There, Miki met Zhou and Liao, along with China–Japan Friendship Association Honorary President Guo Moruo. As soon as Kimura Ichizō, who was executive director of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT) Kansai Headquarters (in Osaka), heard that Miki had met Liao, he hurriedly visited China to meet Liao for himself. Kimura was surprised to find that Liao’shair had turned all gray, when he had looked so dashing and gallant before. Liao had lost substantial weight and wore ill-fitting loose clothes, but received Kimura in a cheerful fashion as he used to. Kimura was deeply touched, and embraced Liao and cried aloud.52 Afterward (the exact date is undocumented), at midnight, Liao received a phone call to come to Zhou’soffice in Zhongnanhai. There Zhou said, “We are going to see Chairman Mao!” Zhou took Liao to Mao’s room, where Mao was reading a book in his bed. Zhou said, “Chairman, here is Liao!” Mao put his book down and said, “Liao, why haven’t you come to see me for a long time?” Liao replied, “I was brought down.” Then, pointing his finger at Liao, Mao asked Zhou, “Why was this treasure brought down?” This was the moment when Liao was officially rehabilitated in late April 1972. Zhou’s methodical preparations for Liao’s rehabilitation had finally materialized.53

REHABILITATION OF SUN PINGHUA Sun Pinghua also owed Zhou Enlai for his rehabilitation. Sun revealed his own secret meeting with a Japanese VIP during his purge in his memoirs. When the Japanese parliamentarian in the JSP, Okada Haruo (June 1914–November 1991; former house deputy speaker, elder brother of MOFA China section head Okada Akira), visited China in 1971, he repeatedly asked for a meeting with Sun. However, Sun was still incapacitated. Then Zhou personally accepted Okada’s request and sent for Sun at the reeducation camp. Upon meeting with Okada, Sun did not know how to explain his situation to Okada. After the meeting, Sun was sent back to the reeducation camp.54 After Liao Chengzhi was rehabilitated as China–Japan Friendship Association president in April 1972, Sun was allowed to leave the reeducation camp in May and was rehabilitated as the association deputy secretary-general. Sun realized that Zhou had asked, “Where is Sun Pinghua, who used to work for relations with Japan? What is he doing?” This ended Sun’s ﬁve-year purge. It was a divine voice for Sun. He rejoiced in resuming his work in May 1972.55 80 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

Recollecting those days, Sun wrote in 1998:

The Cultural Revolution disrupted Chinese foreign policy. Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi could not continue their work. Only Premier Zhou was able to retain his position and kept Chinese foreign policy going ...Zhou often talked to me in person before the Cultural Revolution. Zhou was considerate of his subordinates and was protective of them. He trusted his subordinates and delegated big responsibilities to them. At the same time, he was strict with the execution of their assignments and expected perfection in return. Zhou was also strict with himself. Zhou worked at his desk from the evening until the following dawn, and took a nap during the morning. He then attended meetings during the afternoon. This was his work routine. He extended himself to the limit, working day and night. As the supreme commander of Chinese operations vis-à-vis Japan, Zhou immersed his heart and soul into building Sino-Japanese friendship.56

*** In summary, the Cultural Revolution destroyed what Zhou and his team of Japan specialists had painstakingly built up to promote Sino-Japanese trade and diplomatic normalization. The foremost Japan specialists, such as Liao Chengzhi, Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoyun, were stigmatized as Japan’s spies and had to persevere for several years until the rampage of the Cultural Revolution began to subside in 1971, and even afterward. Then, at the end of January 1971 Zhou met an extraordinary Japanese, who would become a godsend for him.

NOTES 1. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 1831–1851; Chad J. Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 1949–79: Grain, Trade and Diplomacy, London: Routledge, 2005, 170–171, 184–188, and 193–195. 2. Jin, 1831–1851; Chinese expatriate, interview with author, April 7, 2015. 3. Lin Liande, “Imadakara katareru watashi no tainichi-bōeki” (My Secret Story of [China’s] Trade with Japan), March–April 2007, http://blog. explore.ne.jp/de/index.php. 4. Ibid. 5. Inoue Yasushi, “Tsubo” (Pot), Chūōkōron, No. 1,000, December 1970, 372–380. NOTES 81

6. Michael Forsythe, “New Book Reinterprets Chinese Leader,” New York Times, December 30, 2015. 7. Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, trans. by Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan, New York: PublicAffairs, 2007, 232–236 and 259–262; Chinese expatriate, interview with author, April 7, 2015. 8. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949– 1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 3, 432. 9. Ibid. 10. Jin, 2081–2112; Ogura Kazuo, Pari no Shū Onrai: Chūgoku-kakumeika no Seiō-taiken (Zhou Enlai in Paris: Chinese Revolutionary’s Experiences in Western Europe), Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1992, 146–148, 154, and 160. For detail, see Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2011. 11. Wang Yongxiang and Takahashi Tsuyoshi, eds., Riben liuxue-shiqi de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai During his Study Period in Japan), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 2001, 70–72; Yoshida Makoto, Nitchū-hōdō kaisō no 35-nen (Recollections of Thirty-Five Years of Reporting Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo: Ushio-shuppansha, 1998, 441–442. 12. Ibid (both); Ochiai Kanji, “Gyū-tansokin heiki no kigen” (Origin of Bovine Bacillus Anthracis Weapon), “Gishi” (Secret History), No. 17, July 5, 2008, http://2006530.blog69.fc2.com/category10–13.html; Ochiai Kanji, “Tansokin kenkyū hiwa” (Secret Story of Bacillus Anthracis Study), “Gishi” (Secret History), No. 18, July 6, 2008, http://2006530.blog69. fc2.com/category10–13.html. 13. Ogura, 65 and 146–147. 14. Zhang Langlang, “Story of Sun Weishi,” Writings of Zhang Langlang, http://blog.boxun.com/hero/zhangll/9_1.shtml, accessed October 23, 2014; Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956, 150–152. 15. Zhang, “Story of Sun Weishi.” 16. Jin, Vol. 2, 2103; Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Xueliang koushu-zizhuan (Oral Autobiography of Zhang Xueliang), edited by Wang Shujun, Elmhurst, NY: Xiangjiang shidai-chubanshe, 2004, 491–494 (photograph, 492). 17. “Zhang Zuolin zhi zi, Zhang Xuesi” (Zhang Zuolin’s Son, Zhang Xuesi), September 22, 2008, http://www.china.com.cn/culture/txt/2008-09/ 22/content_16514683.htm. 18. Saga Kinmoto, “Shū Onrai-sōri to Saga-ke” (Premier Zhou Enlai and Saga Family), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 209. 19. Ibid., 209. 20. Ibid., 209–212. 82 4 CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ZHOU ENLAI

21. Forsythe; Jin, 2085–2103; Saionji Kinkazu, Saionji Kingazu kaikoroku: “Sugisarishi, Shōwa” (Memoirs of Saionji Kinkazu: “The Bygone Shōwa [Era]”), Tokyo: Aipeccu-puresu, 1991, 360–362. 22. Saionji, 360–362. 23. Liao Chengzhi, “Wode leixia shengya” (My Life as a Prisoner), in Liao Chengzhi-wenji (Writings of Liao Chengzhi), Liao Chengzhi-wenji bianji- bangongshi, ed., Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Sanlian-shudian, 1990, 479–502. 24. Ibid. 25. Shinka-tsūjinsha (not tsūshinsha) shashinbu, ed., Shashinshū:Ryō Shōshi no shōgai (Photo Collection: Life of Liao Chengzhi), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984, 34–35. 26. Kurt Werner Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990, 262; Li Rongde, Liao Chengzhi, Singapore: Yongsheng-shuju, 1992, 365. 27. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 223; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 101–105. 28. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 480–486; Radtke, 6–7; Li, 346–362; “Lin Pyō-jiken o tadotte: 3” (Tracing the Lin Biao Incident: 3), Asahi Shimbun, October 22, 2014. 29. Saionji, 299–320 and 354–355; Honda Yasuharu, Gendai kakei-ron (Contemporary Genealogies), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjū, 1973, 145–169. 30. Saionji, 354–356. 31. Ibid. 32. Jing Puchun, “Shōshi to watashi” (Chengzhi and I), in Shinka-tsūjinsha (not tsūshinsha) shashinbu, ed., Shashinshū:Ryō Shōshi no shōgai (Photo Collection: Life of Liao Chengzhi), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984, 12. 33. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 374 and 548. 34. Jing, 12. 35. Itō Masayoshi, “Ryō-sensei o shinobite” (Reminiscing Master Liao), in Shinka-tsūjinsha shashinbu, ed., Shashinshū:Ryō Shōshi no shōgai (Photo Collection: Life of Liao Chengzhi), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984, 175. 36. Jing, 12; Radtke, 20 and 244; “Liao Hui Brief Vitae” Xinhua Data, March 2003, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/ ziliao/2003-03. 37. Saionji, 354–355; “Mitsugetsu kizuita moto-gaikōkan futari shikyo” (Two [Chinese] Former Diplomats Who Had Built Honeymoon [with Japan] Died), Sankei Shimbun, October 20, 2009. 38. Sun Pinghua, “Honya-gai ga natsukashii” (I Miss Bookstore Street [in Tokyo]), in Tōhō-shoten and Jinmin Chūgoku zasshisha, eds., Waga seishun no Nihon: Chūgoku chishikijin no Nihon kaisō (My Youth in Japan: NOTES 83

Recollections of Japan by Chinese Intellectuals), Tokyo: Tōhō–shoten, 1982, 198–202. 39. Ibid. 40. Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai-shimbunsha, 1998, 76–80; Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Biography, New York: Viking, 1984, 307. 41. Sun (1998), 127–133. 42. Ibid., 131–132. 43. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 386 and 400. 44. Ibid., 454. 45. Sun (1998), 133–134. 46. Li Mingtan, (title of article not given), Daxiang, December 1, 1971, in Liao Chengzhi ziliaoji (Documents on Liao Chengzhi), Hong Kong: Taozhai- shuwu, 1973, 22. 47. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 489. 48. Li Mingtan, 22; Li Rongde, 365. 49. Li Rongde, 365–366. 50. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 486; Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan), Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007, 363. 51. Wu and Wang, 363. 52. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 520; Wu and Wang, 364. 53. Wu and Wang, 364–365. 54. Sun (1998), 133–134. 55. Ibid., 133–134. 56. Ibid., 133–134 and 148–149. CHAPTER 5

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution destroyed the semiofﬁcial Sino- Japanese relations that had been built up since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China” hereafter). The Chinese Japan specialists, such as Liao Chengzhi and Sun Pinghua, were purged from their positions in the Communist Party of China (CPC) and government, and lived under house arrest or in reeducation camps for several years. With the fall and death of Lin Biao in September 1971, the most violent rampages of the Red Guards subsided and Zhou Enlai began rehabilitating his team of Japan specialists. Nevertheless, he still faced the challenge of extreme leftists, such as the Gang of Four, who then launched the Anti-Lin, Anti-Confucius Campaign in order to attack Zhou. Meanwhile, the Japanese advocates for reestablishing Sino- Japanese relations were at a loss, having heard the rumors that a number of Chinese political and intellectual leaders had disappeared or died. Sino- Japanese relations were at a standstill. A totally unexpected event broke the impasse. The 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, in March–April 1971 (“Nagoya World’s” hereafter) became the arena where Zhou Enlai deployed “Ping- Pong Diplomacy.” What followed afterwards was even more extraordinary and was more than he had hoped for. This sports event not only opened the “bamboo curtain,” but also paved the way for Sino-US rapprochement, ushering in détente in East Asia. As a corollary, it also brought Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization. The pivotal role the Nagoya World’s

© The Author(s) 2017 85 M. Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_5 86 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY played in this epoch-making diplomatic breakthrough was so signiﬁcant that mass media referred it to as “a tiny ball turned the big globe upside down.” An almost forgotten fact is that none of this would have happened as early in 1972 were it not for the Nagoya World’s. Another forgotten fact is that China might not have participated in the Nagoya World’s. Japan had no diplomatic relations with China at that time. The forgotten fact is that a Japanese who was neither a politician nor a foreign service ofﬁcial met Zhou Enlai and made the Chinese participation in the Nagoya World’s possible. Were it not for the Chinese participation in the Nagoya World’s no diplomatic breakthroughs in Sino-US relations, as well as in Sino- Japanese relations, would have occurred in 1972. This chapter examines how a Japanese civic leader and Zhou made all this possible.

*** China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s was attributable to the president of the Japan Table Tennis Association (JTTA) and of the Table Tennis Federation of Asia (TTFA), Gotō Kōji (November 1906–January 1972). Gotō was the founder of a private university, Aichi Institute of Technology (AIT), and president of AIT Meiden High School (Meiden is an acronym for Nagoya Electric) in Nagoya. His father had founded the predecessor of Meiden High School. As a passionate educator and a rank- holder of “master of kendō,” Gotō believed that sports taught students discipline and a code of conduct to become responsible citizens in society. He believed that sports helped build mental strength and nurtured rich humanity in the young heart and mind. Gotō’s devotion to sports education was such that he became a civic leader in sports—not only in table tennis but also in badminton, baseball, fencing, kendō, sumō wresting, and swimming.1 Meiden High School, meanwhile, has become one of the strongest high schools in baseball in Japan. It is the alma mater of Ichirō Suzuki (b. 1973) of the Miami Marlines, formerly of the Seattle Mariners and the New York Yankees. Gotō Kōji originally chose table tennis for his students, because it required little space and cost less compared to other sports (Japan had been destroyed with the defeat in World War II and its aftermath). After the day’s classes, Gotō gave his students table tennis training throughout the night. One of his students, Hasegawa Nobuhiko (March 1947– November 2005), was personally trained by Gotō at Meiden High SITUATION IN JAPANESE TABLE TENNIS CIRCLES 87

School and AIT. Hasegawa won the national high school championships in 1964. He then debuted in the national table tennis championships in 1965 when he was a freshman at AIT and became the youngest champion in men’s singles at the age of 18.2 Afterward, Hasegawa kept rewriting the records of Japanese table tennis history, including winning the national title six times and the Asian championships four times. He not only took the title in men’s singles but also contributed to victories in men’s team and mixed doubles in the Stockholm World’s in 1967. Hasegawa then won in men’s team and mixed doubles in the Munich World’s in 1969. Hasegawa attributed his victories to the unique training and fatherly encouragement of Gotō, who went to both Stockholm and Munich as the head of the Japan World Team.3

SITUATION IN JAPANESE TABLE TENNIS CIRCLES Gotō Kōji’s passion for table tennis crossed national boundaries and he promoted table tennis as a tool for building friendship and peace in the world. Earlier in 1953, Gotō decided to participate in the Wembley World’s, in northwest London, in 1954, in the face of other executive directors of the JTTA. They opposed the participation due to lack of money and experience in Europe. The JTTA was readmitted to the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) only in 1949. Amidst opposition and obstruction from within and without, Gotō single-hand- edly opened the way for Japan’s participation and went to Wembley as head of the Japan World Team. It was an amazing feat in itself for a Japanese team to compete in the international championships in England, where the anti-Japanese sentiment from World War II still ran high. In fact, English people displayed a visceral dislike for Japanese people to the extent that even Japanese Crown Prince Akihito’s (current emperor) visit to Buckingham Palace for the coronation of Elizabeth II in June 1953, as the Japanese ofﬁcial representative, was “fair game for abuse and ridicule.” The Japanese team competing at Wembley was “confronting the lion in his den.”4 Against all odds, Ogimura Ichirō (June 1932–December 1994) won the men’s singles. His victory stunned the world. Japan also took the world title both in men’s team and women’s team. It was an extraordinary feat for the Asian newcomer to accomplish in Europe. Ogimura states, “Mr. Gotō was a superb and unique leader. Gotō had faith in the motto, 88 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

‘friendship and peace through sports.’ Gotō had conﬁdence in the players. His teaching was holistic. He even taught us European manners, including dress codes and table manners. He also reminded us of the negative feelings English people still held toward the Japanese from the war and warned us to behave ourselves and not to forget to smile.”5 Japan became the four-time consecutive world champion in men’s singles from 1954 to 1957, as well as the ﬁve-time consecutive world champion in men’s team from 1954 to 1959 (the championships became biannual events in 1957). With these international accomplishments, Gotō was elected president of the TTFA in August 1967 and then president of the JTTA in April 1968.6

THE SITUATION IN CHINESE TABLE TENNIS CIRCLES The Chinese government promoted table tennis for the same reasons as Gotō Kōji: easy accessibility and low costs. China caught up with Japan and defeated Japan in men’s singles in 1959. China defeated Japan in men’s team in 1961. China won in both men’s singles and men’s team in 1963, and then won ﬁve world titles in 1965. Then, the Cultural Revolution wiped out everything. The Revolutionary Subcommittee created by the extreme leftists not only banned all sports teams at every school, but also persecuted sports instructors and players, labeling them bourgeois. It also banned players from competing internationally in order to eradicate foreign inﬂuences. The Beijing National Stadium sat empty. The Cultural Revolution hit table tennis hardest because China was world champion. World-class players were sent to reeducation camps or were executed while coaches were imprisoned or committed suicide. Consequently, China did not participate in the world championships in 1967 and 1969.7 The situation in Chinese table tennis circles began to change in 1970. People’s Daily reporter Qian Jiang (b. 1954), states that he played table tennis at school until it was banned in 1966 and spent his banished life in a desert in the northwestern region of China from 1971 to 1977. Qian writes:

As the brutal initial phase of the Cultural Revolution took a heavy toll on the domestic front as well as on external relations, Zhou Enlai began to reeval- uate the impacts of this liquidation campaign. Only Premier Zhou had the power and will to salvage the disaster in the table tennis community in IMPEDIMENT TO CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN NAGOYA WORLD’S 89

China. Upon realizing the tragedy inflicted upon the players, Zhou had the surviving first-class players live in the National Sports Committee building until it became safe to return them home and instructed them to resume training as early as October 1969. Zhou was already looking to the future and contemplated the reentry of China’s table tennis team to the world scene at a time when the ultraleftists were rampaging in the country. In June 1970, China sent its table tennis team to Kathmandu, Nepal, for tournaments to commemorate its king’s 50th birthday. This was the Chinese team’s first foreign tour since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. China also participated in the Scandinavia Tournaments in November 1970. Thus, Zhou’s plans for China’s comeback in world table tennis took off at full swing.8

The Ofﬁcial Chronology of Zhou Enlai endorses Qian’s view, as it records, “On August 16, 1970, Premier Zhou gave a talk to the National Sports Committee Military Administration ofﬁcials and table tennis team members ...For 17 years after the foundation of the PRC, our nation’s sports have been guided not by the revisionist policy, but by Mao Zedong’s revolutionary policy. However, some people engagedinextremeleftistthoughtandconfusedpeopleforacertain period.”9

IMPEDIMENT TO CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN NAGOYA WORLD’S In turn, Gotō Kōji, president of JTTA and TTFA, became the chair of the organizing committee for the Nagoya World’s to be held in March–April 1971. He believed that world table tennis championships without China, the three-time champion from 1961 to 1965, would not be real world championships. Japan won many world titles in 1967 and 1969 only because China did not participate in them. Gotō wanted to make the Nagoya World’s true to its name. Gotō also wanted to make peace with China. He was conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in August 1937, as a corporal, and his unit was stationed in Shanxi province in China until December 1939. Former members of his unit, including Itō Seiji, attested that Gotō was personally against the war with China. Gotō did not hesitate to argue that the higher echelon of the IJA launched the war with China for the sake of achieving its own glory and promotions at a cost to the rest of the Japanese (and the Chinese). It took enormous courage for a Japanese to say such a thing at that time. Gotō 90 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY stated this at a time when any remarks critical of the military and political establishments were considered an act of treason, which war- ranted imprisonment.10 Moreover, Gotō organized table tennis training at the warfront as a way to maintain the morale of his men, as well as giving them a pastime (he had his wife send table tennis equipment from Japan). Astonishingly, he let local Chinese ping-pong enthusiasts join in and gave them training in person. As some Chinese became stronger than the Japanese, Gotō even hosted Sino-Japanese friendship tournaments in 1939 at the warfront and gave winners prizes. From these wartime experiences, Gotō ﬁrmly believed that sports should transcend ideological and political boundaries. In fact, many sports organizations in the world, including the Japan Sports Association, employed the “principle of separation of politics and sports,” in order to promote international sports events. Nevertheless, there was an insurmountable political impediment to China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s: the “two Chinas” issue.11

THE “TWO CHINAS” ISSUE AND INTERNATIONAL TABLE TENNIS CIRCLES The “two Chinas” issue became a formidable impediment not only in international politics but also in international sports. The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) admitted China as “PRC, China” in 1952. ITTF President Ivor Montagu (from England, 1904–1984; first ITTF president, 1926–1967) accepted China because he was a progressive and a member of the left-leaning World Peace Council. China also joined the TTFA at its foundation in 1952. Nevertheless, when the first Asian Table Tennis Championships were held in Singapore in November 1952, Singapore—then part of Malaysia—opposed China’s entry there. Then, the TTFA admitted Taiwan, as “ROC, China,” and Taiwan participated in the second Asian Table Tennis Championships in Tokyo in September 1953. In protest, China withdrew from the TTFA in 1953, but remained in the ITTF.12 In 1957, Taiwan applied for admission to the ITTF, as “ROC, China.” Then, both China and Taiwan claimed that they alone represented the legitimate China Table Tennis Association (CTTA). However, Taiwan’s application was rejected because China had applied first and had been a member since 1952. The ITTF was willing to admit Taiwan as “Taiwan,” GOTŌ INVITES CHINA TO NAGOYA WORLD’S 91 but not as “ROC, China.” Taiwan made applications repeatedly afterward, as “ROC, China,” but they were rejected each time. Thus, an anomalous situation existed in the international table tennis circles regarding China: China was a member of the ITTF, but not the TTFA. Taiwan was a member of the TTFA, but not the ITTF. China continued to participate in world championships, whereas Taiwan continued to participate in Asian championships.13 Gotō Kōji inherited this anomalous situation when he was elected as president of the TTFA in 1967. One of the first major tasks that Gotō undertook as TTFA president was to host the tenth Asian Championships in Nagoya, scheduled for April 1970, and he invited Taiwan to the championships. It was “natural” for Gotō to invite Taiwan to the Asian championships because Taiwan was a member of the TTFA, whereas China was not. China had withdrawn from the TTFA in 1953. Nevertheless, the Xinhua News Agency condemned Gotō as “reactionary.” Then, at a general meeting of the TTFA in Nagoya in February 1968, Gotō approved the resolution of the TTFA to recommend that Taiwan become a member of the ITTF as “ROC, China.” Again, Gotō’s decision was in accordance with the previous practices of the TTFA and he simply followed them. Nevertheless, China strongly denounced Gotō for “Japan having joined the conspiracy to create two Chinas.” Later in 1968, the ITTF advisory committee added a new provision to its constitution, stipulating that only members of the ITTF could join its subordinate regional table tennis federations and participate in respective regional tournaments.14

GOTŌ INVITES CHINA TO NAGOYA WORLD’S In this complex situation, Gotō Kōji and ITTF President H. Roy Evans (1909–1998; second ITTF president, 1967–1987) entrusted a message for China’s National Sports General Assembly to the former world champion and then ITTF Executive Vice President Ogimura Ichirō (ITTF third president, 1987–1994), when he visited China in April 1970 to attend the Guangzhou Trade Convention. Their message expressed their hope that China would participate in the Nagoya World’s. Their invitation was based on the facts that China was a member of the ITTF and that it was a world champion before it had stopped participating in the championships in 1967. Ogimura, however, brought back the negative report that China was still extremely bitter about the TTFA’s decision to recommend 92 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

Taiwan’s admission to the ITTF. China would not participate in the Nagoya World’s unless the JTTA unequivocally took the position of “one China”: the PRC being the sole legitimate government of China. Thus, although China was interested in participating in the Nagoya World’s, it put forth its demand for its one-China policy as the prerequisite for participation. This placed Gotō, as president of both the TTFA (where Taiwan was a member) and the JTTA, as well as the organizing committee chair for the Nagoya World’s, in a bind. Being caught in the “two Chinas” issue, Gotō shied away from making clear comments on China’s participation.15

JAPAN–CHINA CULTURAL EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION AND GOTŌ China had a reliable ally in Japan. The Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association (see Chapter 3) promoted China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s. The “unofﬁcial Japanese ambassador to China” Saionji Kinkazu, who had become one of the executive directors of the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association upon returning home, sent a “bomb letter” on the Chinese participation in the Nagoya World’s from Beijing. In June 1970, Saionji wrote to Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō, stating, “The JTTA is promoting Taiwan’s admission to the ITTF. This move is undermining China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s. If the JTTA wants China’s participation, President Gotō Kōji should clarify his position.”16 Then, on August 25, 1970, Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Deputy Secretary-General Muraoka Kyūbei went to Nakano Gymnasium in Tokyo to see Gotō. Gotō was there to preside over the ﬁrst Japan National Middle School Table Tennis Championships. Muraoka writes:

Mr. Gotō told me off before I had ﬁnished greeting him, saying, “It’s no use trying to persuade me about China.” That was how our conversation began. Despite this shaky start, the “Gotō–Muraoka team” was born from this initial encounter.17

In turn, the People’s Daily reporter Qian writes:

When Muraoka asked if Gotō was planning to invite China to the Nagoya World’s, Gotō said, “I have not decided yet. The Xinhua News Agency ITTF’S POSITION 93

condemned me as ‘reactionary’ when I invited Taiwan to the tenth Asian Championships.” Then, Muraoka told Gotō, “That’s not a big deal. If you only contact China, all the problems will be gone.” Gotō just smiled back at Muraoka quietly.18

Nevertheless, things were not as simple as Muraoka had suggested. Gotō had not made a ﬁnal decision to invite China to the Nagoya World’s. There was so much opposition to fend off. There were so many obstacles to overcome. He had little money to host the world championship, but the foremost and most formidable obstacle was the “two Chinas” issue.19

CHINA’S POSITION China’s position on its participation in the Nagoya World’s was clear and irrevocable. The Chinese government declared that it would not participate in the Nagoya World’s unless the JTTA, the ofﬁcial host of the championships, acknowledged that China (the PRC) was the sole legitimate government of China. That was its absolute prerequisite. There was no room for the Chinese government to compromise on this condition. As far as China was concerned, there could not be “two Chinas” in the international table tennis circles. Strangely, China insisted on this condition despite the fact that Taiwan was actually not invited to the Nagoya World’s. Taiwan was not a member of the ITTF and therefore was not eligible to participate in the world championships. Nevertheless, the Chinese government insisted that Gotō Kōji must “abandon” Taiwan in order for China to participate in the Nagoya World’s. This meant that he must expel Taiwan from the TTFA.20

ITTF’S POSITION ITTF President H. Roy Evans recommended that the TTFA follow the new ITTF rule adopted in its constitution in 1968: only members of the ITTF could join its subordinate regional organizations and participate in their tournaments. ITTF Honorary Secretary-General A. K. Vint (from India) also recommended that the TTFA expel Taiwan, as it constituted a violation of the new ITTF Constitution. However, removing Taiwan from the TTFA was not an easy task. A majority of the TTFA members were pro-Taiwan, including Japan and Singapore. To forcibly expel Taiwan from the TTFA would cause a furor among the members. The 94 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY conventional “principle of separation of politics and sports” that had been employed by many international organizations could no longer offer a solution to this problem. Gotō Kōji, as president of both the JTTA and the TTFA, must make a difﬁcult decision, based on his views beyond the table tennis circles and insight into international politics.21

GOTŌ MAKES HIS DECISION One of the executive directors and the captain of the women’steamof the JTTA, Mori Takeshi (he was deputy head of the JTTA Sino- Japanese Exchange Section and had visited Beijing as captain of the Japanese team for the first Sino-Japanese Friendship Tournaments in 1962), states that Gotō Kōji was a bold, decisive person, but he was also prudent and meticulous. Confronted with the most difficult decision he had yet to make, Gotō consulted with many officials on the Taiwan issue. He asked for the cooperation of ITTF President H. Roy Evans and ITTF Executive Vice President Ogimura Ichirō.Aswith Evans and A. K. Vint, Ogimura was also in favor of inviting China to the Nagoya World’s.22 In his own account, Ogimura visited Gotō’s home twice in Nagoya in April 1970, when Taiwan was participating in the tenth Asian Championships in Nagoya. Gotō finally agreed to see Ogimura on his second visit to Gotō’s residence. Ogimura tried to talk Gotō into inviting China. After listening to Ogimura, Gotō in the end told him, “I understand. You can tell them (ITTF top officials) that I am also hoping for China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s.” Ogimura states, “That morning was the moment that Gotō made up his mind.”23 Gotō also consulted with Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association officials, including Muraoka Kyūbei and Saionji Kinkazu. Saionji had met Gotō in Beijing in the summer of 1966 when Gotō visited Beijing for the first time in the postwar period as the head of the Japanese team for the Sino-Japanese Friendship Tournaments. When Saionji returned home in August 1970, he brought with him an important message to Gotō from Chinese officials:

China wants to participate in the Nagoya World’s, but on the condition that the JTTA accepts China’s position on the “two Chinas” issue. China will not be present where there is a Taiwan presence.24 GOTŌ MAKES HIS DECISION 95

Saionji writes:

I talked the matter over with Mr. Gotō repeatedly, but he did not give me a definite answer. Mr. Gotō was deliberating the issue prudently and working out feasible plans for realization. There were too many issues to be solved— not only political but also logistical (he did not have money to convene an ad hoc general meeting of the TTFA in order to expel Taiwan, just to mention one)—before he could make a final decision. It was not until toward the end of December that Mr. Gotō told his decision to me. He called me up to have a drink during his visit to Tokyo. He then told me, “You showed me your gyotaku [a traditional Japanese art of fish printing by rubbing on rice paper] at your house in Beijing. The fish was huge. We cannot have world championships without China. Let’s invite China.”25

Thus, the collaboration between the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association and Gotō began in earnest. Gotō wanted to make the Nagoya World’s true world championships. He also hoped to resume the Sino-Japanese Friendship Tournaments that were cancelled in 1967. For this, Gotō assumed an enormous risk (in fact it would cost him the presidency of the TTFA). In turn, his decision was a godsend for Zhou Enlai who was contemplating a comeback for Chinese table tennis on the world scene. Gotō’s decision meant that he accepted the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations” stipulated by China. They consisted of (1) not to make policy that would be adversarial toward China; (2) not to join a conspiracy to create two Chinas; and (3) not to obstruct normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.26 Zhou had originally laid out these “three political principles” in July 1958 in the wake of the Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident. After that, they became the criteria for the Chinese acceptance of Japanese delegations—official and unofficial—and ultimately became the prerequisites for their diplomatic normalization. This time, China made them a condition for China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s, and Gotō finally decided to accept them.27 In retrospect, Gotō’s decision seems reasonable. China was a member of ITTF, was qualified to participate in world championships, and was therefore invited to the Nagoya World’s. In turn, Taiwan was not a member of the ITTF and was therefore not invited. Nevertheless, the Chinese insistence on removing Taiwan from the TTFA as the prerequisite for China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s put Gotō in a bind. The complex political situation at that time made Gotō’s decision nearly 96 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY inconceivable or at least politically incorrect. The enormity of the difficulty Gotō faced is almost beyond comprehension, measured against the current standing of China and Taiwan.28

GOTŌ MAKES HIS DECISION PUBLIC Gotō Kōji made his decision public on December 19, 1970. He told reporters:

I personally hope that China will participate in the Nagoya World’s. I was impressed with the vitality of the Chinese people when I visited China in 1966. It has made a quantum leap from the time I was stationed in China during the war. In addition to resumption of exchanges in table tennis between the two countries, I believe that normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, which has a vast land area, rich natural resources, and a quarter of the world population, is necessary. I will work with ofﬁcials at the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association in order to realize China’s participation. I am prepared to resign the presidency of the TTFA, as well as that of the JTTA, at any time, so long as the Nagoya World’s succeed.29

Gotō really meant it. He was willing to sacrifice his positions for the sake of Chinese participation. Gotō chose the larger cause (China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s) over his personal interests (his positions). Gotō also stated to the reporters, “I would be happy to become suteishi [a sacrifice move in Japanese chess] if my visit to China would contribute in any way to cultural and sports exchanges between China and Japan, and eventually even in the slightest way to restoration of Sino-Japanese relations.”30 The Mainichi Shimbun summed this up by reporting, “JTTA president Gotō Kōji, who had hesitated to clarify his position on the issue of inviting China to the Nagoya World’s in consideration for Taiwan, which was a member of the TTFA, made up his mind. Gotō decided to expel Taiwan from the TTFA, in accordance with the [new] ITTF Constitution, and invite China to the Nagoya World’s. Gotō will seek cooperation from Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō and other officials for China’s participation. Thus, Gotō opened a way for China, which was No. 1 in reality, to participate in the world championships after six years’ absence.”31 OPPOSITION FROM JAPANESE RIGHT-WING GROUPS 97

REPERCUSSIONS OF GOTŌ’S DECISION With Gotō Kōji’s acceptance of the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations,” the JTTA’s invitation to China for the Nagoya World’s was no longer a mere matter in sports circles, but became a political issue. It was no longer possible to take a neutral stand on the “two Chinas” issue. There are only two options: either pro-China or pro- Taiwan. This meant that the JTTA would face vehement opposition from Taiwan and its allies regarding its membership in the TTFA. Consequently, Gotō’s decision met with strong opposition from various groups, not only in sports but also in non-sports circles.32

OPPOSITION FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT The Satō cabinet (November 1964–July 1972) was cold at best. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku took in the latter half of his administration a strong anti-China position because his ultimate goal was the “reversion of Okinawa” from the United States. For this Satō made the utmost effort to support US policy toward Taiwan and repeatedly refused the entry of Chinese officials to Japan. In this context, some officials in the Satō cabinet, such as those in the Ministry of Education, whose jurisdiction included overseeing all the amateur sports organizations in Japan, expressed opposition to Gotō Kōji’s decision. They stated that it was inappropriate for the host country to seek the participation of a specific country. They also mentioned that it was inappropriate for a sports organization (the JTTA) to negotiate with China through a politically-minded organization (the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association) because this would be misconstrued as violating the “principle of separation of politics and sports.”33

OPPOSITION FROM JAPANESE RIGHT-WING GROUPS In addition, Japanese right-wing organizations strongly opposed Gotō Kōji’s decision. These organizations had a history of violence. In October 1960, a 17-year-old right-wing sympathizer stabbed to death Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman Asanuma Inejirō in Tokyo during a public debate by the heads of three political parties—the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the JSP, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)—for the forthcoming general elections for the House of Representatives (HR). Also, 98 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY in September 1971, another right-wing sympathizer stabbed the Buddhist- based middle-of-the road political party, Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party) Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu (b. 1926), causing him a three-month convalescence. These sporadic bouts of violence stirred up public fear of the far right, which became deeply etched into the national psyche. The activists’ loud rallies, slanders, intimidating phone calls, and veiled threats of violence scared citizens at large, causing them to shun associating with those on the left, even the moderate ones.34 This time their target was Gotō.TheybombardedGotō with threatening phone calls and mail at his home and ofﬁces—at AIT and Meiden High School. They said that Gotō woukld lose his life if he did something they did not like. They threw stones at his house. The Aichi-prefecture police took the matter seriously and provided a plain-clothes police ofﬁcer for Gotō as his bodyguard. His frail wife, Suzuko, became sick and almost had a nervous breakdown. His grandchildren were scared of going outside. Nevertheless, Gotō did not succumb to these intimidations and threats. He was determined to make the Nagoya World’s genuine world championships.35

OPPOSITION FROM SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS A few officials of the Japan Sports Association expressed their support for Gotō Kōji’s decision. For instance, world-record swimmer and Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) Executive Director, Furuhashi Hironoshin (1928–2009; JOC president 1990–1999), stated that it was natural for Japan to promote sports exchanges with China, Japan’s giant neighbor with a quarter of the world population. He stated that it would also be beneficial to learn techniques from the Chinese. However, Furuhashi was in the minority. Other officials at the Japan Sports Association expressed reservations, citing the same reasons as those of the Japanese government. The Asahi Shimbun reporter, Watanabe Kunio, states, “Officials in the sports circles, who should have been supporting Gotō, were actually sabotaging his efforts.” In fact, there was even opposition from within the JTTA and some executive directors opposed Gotō’s decision.36

OPPOSITION FROM ABROAD Not surprisingly, Taiwan strongly opposed Gotō Kōji’s decision. South Korea feared the admission of North Korea into the TTFA and so followed suit. Even some ofﬁcials at the ITTF opposed it, stating that China’s non- GOTŌ PREPARES FOR HIS TRIP TO BEIJING 99 participation in the Nagoya World’s should not affect the championships. Thus, Gotō faced opposition at home and abroad. He was confronted with thick walls of impediments and obstructions. Nevertheless, nothing would deter him once he made up his mind. It might have appeared that Gotō had succumbed to the pressures of China and the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association, but that was not the case. Gotō was not the type of person who could be pressured into doing something against his will. He would prove this during his negotiations with the Chinese ofﬁcials in Beijing.37

GOTŌ PREPARES FOR HIS TRIP TO BEIJING Toward the end of December 1970, Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Deputy Secretary-General Muraoka Kyūbei obtained the information that China was considering participation in the Nagoya World’s, and was hoping to talk with Gotō Kōji. Muraoka immediately went to Nagoya on December 29, 1970, to inform Gotō of this news in person. There, Muraoka urged Gotō to visit Beijing and negotiate directly with the Chinese ofﬁcials. Gotō concurred. Then, Gotō and Muraoka wrote a draft for the agreement between the CTTA and the JTTA that would be on the table for the meeting in Beijing. Gotō was ready to leave for Beijing as soon as the association received a telegram from China to invite him.38 Nonetheless, China delayed sending the formal invitation to Gotō, despite the fast-approaching February 5 deadline for the application for the Nagoya World’s. Finally, the association received a telegram from China on January 15, 1971, which stated that Premier Zhou would like to spend the Chinese New Year (January 27) with Gotō. As soon as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ permission to visit China came through, Gotō left Nagoya with his Secretary Oda Yūsuke on the morning of January 24 in order to join Muraoka and Mori Takeshi of the JTTA in Tokyo.39 Gotō wore a Hunting cap, glasses, and a mask, in order to disguise himself from right-wing groups. Then, the group headed to Haneda airport in the afternoon. There, Gotō instructed JTTA Secretary- General Yotoe Ikuji, who came to the airport to see them off, to contact Singapore (where the secretariat of the TTFA was located) and call for an ad hoc general meeting of the TTFA. Thus, they embarked on the uncharted trip to China in order to settle the terms 100 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY for China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s. This became one of the toughest negotiations Gotō had ever engaged in, and he negotiated many.40

CHINA PREPARES FOR GOTŌ’S VISIT TO BEIJING As of January 27, 1971, China had not applied for entry in the Nagoya World’s. They had yet to work out the terms for participation. That was the purpose of Gotō Kōji’s visit. The opening of the Nagoya World’s was March 28. China had only ten days left to apply. China’s National Sports General Assembly Secretary-General Song Zhong was appointed as acting president of the CTTA in late January 1971 in order to prepare for the meeting with Gotō. Song was suddenly charged with a new task that he was not familiar with. The only consolation he had was that one of the directors of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), Wang Xiaoyun, was also charged with the task of negotiating with Gotō.41 Wang was a specialist on Japan. He was one of the deputy Secretaries- General of the China–Japan Friendship Association and one-time head of the Beijing Ofﬁce of Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade. Wang had many Japanese acquaintances (see Chapter 3). In turn, Song had known Wang since wartime. They had fought against the IJA together.42

GOTŌ ARRIVES IN BEIJING Meanwhile, Gotō Kōji and his company arrived at Beijing airport on the night of January 25. CPAFFC Executive Director Wu Xiaoda and CTTA Acting President Song Zhong welcomed them at Beijing airport. It took more than two days to get from Tokyo to Beijing via Hong Kong, whereas it currently takes only a three-hour ﬂight. It was an arduous trip for the 64- year-old Gotō, who used a cane to walk. Upon arriving at the Peking Hotel, Gotō handed over to Song the Japanese draft of the “Outline of the Meeting concerning Friendship Exchanges of the Table Tennis Circles between China and Japan” (the “Outline” hereafter).43 The Chinese side immediately translated the draft into Chinese. The draft of the Outline had four points:

1. the JTTA shall invite the Chinese national table tennis team to the Nagoya World’s; MEETINGS BETWEEN CTTA AND JTTA 101

2. the JTTA shall promote exchanges between Chinese and Japanese table tennis circles in adherence to the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations”; 3. the Chinese team shall tour Japan after the Nagoya World’s and the Japanese team shall tour China at a later time; and 4. the JTTA shall not admit Taiwan’s team to the Nagoya World’s and shall “straighten out” the TTFA. (To “straighten out” the TTFA meant expelling the Taiwan Table Tennis Association from the TTFA.)44

MEETINGS BETWEEN CTTA AND JTTA

First Meeting: January 27 The first meeting between the Chinese officials and the Japanese delegation took place at the Peking Hotel on January 27, 1971. The four Japanese— Gotō Kōji, Muraoka Kyūbei, Mori Takeshi, and Oda Yūsuke—met six Chinese officials, including CTTA Acting President Song Zhong and CPAFFC Director Wang Xiaoyun. At the meeting, Gotō stated:

When I became president of the TTFA, the anomalous situation regarding Taiwan had existed for 14 years. Taiwan had been a member of the TTFA since 1953. China withdrew from the TTFA in that year. The TTFA therefore allowed Taiwan to participate in the Asian championships. It was not until 1968 that the ITTF added a new provision to its constitution, stipulating that only members of the ITTF could join its subordinate regional federations and participate in their tournaments ...It was difﬁcult for the JTTA to alter its long-time practice because the Japanese government had recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. The JTTA received funding from the Japanese government and it could not go against government policy ...China however should participate in the Nagoya World’s. In order to make this happen, I would do my best to correct the anomaly and “straighten out” the TTFA.45

In return, Wang Xiaoyun thanked Gotō for visiting Beijing, risking his life. However, Wang stressed that the political issue must be overcome ﬁrst and that the “three political principles” must be adhered to before China made a decision to participate in the Nagoya World’s. The ﬁrst meeting appeared to have proceeded smoothly. Gotō had already accepted the most critical 102 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY condition for China in the Outline: to acknowledge the “three political principles.” Gotō also pledged that he would remove Taiwan from the TTFA. Nevertheless, their subsequent meetings stumbled.46

Second Meeting: January 28 Given that both sides had agreed on the general principles, the purpose of the second meeting on January 28 was to work out the specific wording of their agreement. However, the Chinese officials presented Gotō Kōji with their counter-draft, which had the “three political principles” as the first paragraph of the Outline, instead of the second paragraph. The Chinese draft also had in the first paragraph the statements that Taiwan was an integral part of China and that it was a province of China. The Chinese side did so despite the fact that the Japanese draft of the Outline had already clearly stated the adherence to the “three political principles” in the second paragraph, which actually defied the Japanese government policy on China. Gotō had already made a “politically incorrect” decision to go against the Japanese government and agree to the Chinese demand.47 This was the utmost conciliatory gesture on Gotō’s part in order to facilitate China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s. Gotō did something no other Japanese could have done at that time. Nevertheless, the Chinese officials insisted that the “three political principles” must be stated in the first paragraph of the Outline and that the reference to Taiwan must also be added in the first paragraph. They were preoccupied with dogmatism and formality.48 Gotō saw neither the need for the “three political principles” to be placed in the first paragraph nor for the reference to Taiwan in the Outline. Gotō believed that the politics should not become the forefront of the agreement. He wanted to tone down the political references in the Outline. After all, this was an agreement on a sports event. Gotō was not a politician or a diplomat, representing the Japanese government. He came to China to discuss a table tennis event, not politics or diplomatic relations. Yet, the Chinese officials insisted on imposing their dogmatic principles and formality. Gotō’s patience and tolerance with the Chinese officials reached a limit.49

Third Meeting: January 29 On January 29, Gotō Kōji called in sick, stayed in his hotel room, and refused to see the Chinese ofﬁcials. Consequently, their negotiations had ZHOU ENLAI INTERVENES 103 deadlocked. Mori Takeshi writes that he personally felt that the second paragraph of the Outline had already fully met the Chinese conditions. Mori also feared that if Gotō accepted all the unreasonable Chinese demands, he would be forced to resign his positions— both at the JTTA and the TTFA—after the trip; then, everything they had worked for thus far would be ruined. Therefore, in order to save Gotō from such a predicament, Mori volunteered to become a “hos- tage,” by remaining in Beijing alone after the Japanese delegation left Beijing and until Gotō expelled Taiwan from the TTFA. Mori suggested this idea to Muraoka Kyūbei, who conveyed this proposal to the Chinese side.50

ZHOU ENLAI INTERVENES On the afternoon of January 29, Zhou Enlai summoned the Chinese ofﬁcials in charge of negotiating with Gotō Kōji to the conference room of the State Council, China’s supreme executive branch of government. Zhou had heard about the stalemate in the negotiations and called for a meeting. Zhou told the Chinese ofﬁcials:

You must support Mr. Gotō because he is a true friend of China. You must put yourselves in his shoes. He came to China at the age of 64, endangering himself. He promised that he would submit a motion to “straighten out” the TTFA. No ordinary person could have done such things.51

Then, Zhou asked Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asia Bureau Director- General Liu Chun how many countries were in Asia. Liu answered, “The Asia Bureau is in charge of 22 Asian countries and the West Asia Bureau is in charge of the rest of the countries in Asia.” Zhou said, “My question was how many countries were in Asia in total.” Liu could not answer that. Zhou then said, “Even if Mr. Gotō proposed to remove Taiwan from the TTFA at the ad hoc general meeting, his motion would be rejected. Mr. Gotō therefore would have to create a new table tennis organization for Asia.” Counting on his ﬁngers, Zhou said, “18 countries and regions would support establishing a new organization, whereas at most 16 would oppose it. Therefore, it is possible to create a new organization.”52 104 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

Zhou was already thinking about creating a new table tennis organization for Asia, to replace the TTFA. Zhou was also searching for a change in China’s foreign policy and said to the ofﬁcials:

Mr. Gotō’s draft outline is well written. I understand that he has been hoping to visit Beijing for a long time. Yet, you are imposing unreasonable conditions on him. Don’t be too “left.” You guys always want to be more “left” than me. You should look at the substance and drop the formality. Mr. Gotō is not a representative of the Japanese government. Don’t give him a hard time. The three political principles can remain in the second paragraph, as stipulated in the Japanese draft. There is no need to move them to the ﬁrst paragraph ...Mr. Gotō had already put the three political principles in the Outline. He promised to straighten out the TTFA. He also declared that Taiwan did not represent China. That’s enough.53

Zhou then told the Chinese officials to go and talk with Gotō immediately. Zhou also told them that he would meet Gotō that night, after they worked out the specific wording of the Outline with Gotō. Song Zhong and Wu Xiaoda went to the Peking Hotel and told Gotō’s Secretary Oda Yūsuke that they brought good news. Then, Gotō came out of his room. They told Gotō that they would accept his draft. They also told Gotō, “Premier Zhou Enlai will meet you at the Great Hall of the People tonight. We will come to pick you up later.” Thus, the meeting was resumed that afternoon and the wording of the Outline was resolved. With Zhou’s intervention, the CTTA just made the deadline of February 5 for the entry application for the Nagoya World’s.54 In retrospect, Gotō accomplished something no other Japanese could have at that time. No other Japanese visitor in Beijing could have acted the way Gotō did. Other people would have been pressured into the Chinese demands and changed the draft Outline for the sake of China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s. On the contrary, Gotō stood his ground firmly in the face of the Chinese officials. He believed that the Japanese draft was fair. In fact, it was more than fair. It had already incorporated all of the critical Chinese conditions. Gotō was a man of conviction. He did not abase himself to the Chinese authorities. Zhou understood that Gotō had already made the maximum concessions to the Chinese demands. Zhou was also impressed with Gotō’s fortitude and straightforwardness. Therefore, Zhou decided to goaheadwithGotō’s draft. Thus, Gotō’spassionfortheNagoyaWorld’sand Zhou’s plan for China’s comeback on the world scene converged. SIGNING OF THE OUTLINE 105

GOTŌ MEETS PREMIER ZHOU Gotō Kōji and the three other Japanese visitors were invited to the Great Hall of the People on the night of January 29 and met Zhou Enlai. The renowned poet/writer and China–Japan Friendship Association Honorary President, Guo Moruo, was also there (the association President Liao Chengzhi was still under house arrest). They talked for an hour and a half until 11:00 PM. During their conversations, Zhou reminisced about his years of studying in Japan during his youthful period. Zhou also thanked Gotō for his devotion to resuming the table tennis exchanges between China and Japan. Zhou stated, “The Chinese people supported your initiative at the TTFA.” Gotō asked, “Does this mean that seven hundred million people support me?” Zhou replied, “Yes, they do.”55

SIGNING OF THE OUTLINE On February 1, 1971, Gotō Kōji (representing the JTTA), Muraoka Kyūbei (the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association), Song Zhong (the CTTA), and Wu Xiaoda (the CPAFFC), signed the Outline of the Meeting concerning Friendship Exchanges of the Table Tennis Circles between China and Japan. It stipulated:

1. The JTTA shall promote the development of international table tennis in adherence to the ITTF Constitution and straighten out the TTFA in accordance with the ITTF Constitution; 2. The JTTA shall promote friendship exchanges between the Chinese and Japanese table tennis circles based on the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations.” The CTTA expressed its respect and support for this; 3. The JTTA shall invite the Chinese national team to the Nagoya World’s to be held March 28–April 7, 1971, in accordance with the principles stipulated above. The CTTA shall accept the invitation and send its team to Nagoya; 4. The Chinese team shall extend its stay in Japan after the Nagoya World’s and tour Japan to engage in friendship tournaments. The Japanese team shall reciprocate this by visiting China later this year; and 5. The CTTA and the CPAFFC thank the JTTA, the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association, and other Japanese friends of China 106 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

for their efforts to develop and promote friendship and solidarity between the Chinese and Japanese table tennis circles, as well as between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.56

AFTERMATH The Japanese mass media responded immediately. Japanese TV stations repeatedly broadcast this news on the night of February 1, 1971. Major TV stations also contacted the JTTA ofﬁce in order to obtain the right to broadcast the Nagoya World’s. The Asahi Shimbun reported, “The Japanese acceptance of the ‘three political principles’ opened the way for Sino-Japanese table tennis exchanges. This ‘table- tennis formula’ will become a norm for opening other exchanges between China and Japan in various circles, not only in sports but also in culture, economics, and others. In this sense, the JTTA set the precedent for Sino-Japanese exchanges after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.”57 Zheng Yueqing, who was once a Chinese national table tennis team member, writes:

Mr. Gotō Kōji recognized the “three political principles” as the foundation for promoting Sino-Japanese relations before the Japanese government did. Using the “unofﬁcial serve,” Gotō won great “points” in achieving a quantum leap in Sino-Japanese relations as well as in Sino- US relations.58

Concluding the tough negotiations with China successfully and securing China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s the way Gotō did was an accomplishment in itself. Nevertheless, it was only the “end of the beginning.” For an immediate task among many, he first had to “straighten out” the TTFA: to expel Taiwan from the organization. Another arduous trip and negotiations, even more difficult ones, lay ahead for Gotō. At that time, nobody, including Gotō himself, could have predicted the ramifica- tions of his visit to Beijing. Only time would reveal the impact that Gotō’s initiative had on the world table tennis circles and beyond. What was known at that time was that Gotō wanted to make the Nagoya World’s genuine world championships and that he had succeeded in inviting China to the Nagoya World’s.59 TTFA REJECTS GOTŌ’S MOTION TO EXPEL TAIWAN 107

TTFA REJECTS GOTŌ’S MOTION TO EXPEL TAIWAN As soon as the Outline was signed on February 1, 1971, Gotō Kōji directly headed for Singapore, convened the ad hoc general meeting of the TTFA there, and submitted a motion to remove Taiwan from the TTFA, at the cost of his presidency of the federation. After three hours of shouting back and forth, Gotō’s motion went to a vote. It failed. Only Japan voted in favor, whereas ten were opposed and one (Singapore) abstained. Gotō resigned just as he had promised earlier that he would resign should his motion fail. One would be hard pressed to imagine the difﬁculties of the non-English speaking president of the TTFA, who was also Japanese representative, when he was isolated in its general meeting and was grilled by the rest of the representatives. Having failed to remove Taiwan from the TTFA, it appeared that Gotō had lost in the battle over the “two Chinas” issue.60 Nevertheless, history proved otherwise. As the Japanese reporter Ōno Seizō states, “Mr. Gotō’s decision and determination sowed the seeds of China’s participation in the Nagoya World’s, which bore the fruit of the Sino-US rapprochement and the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Mr. Gotō won the battle in the end.”61

*** Zhou Enlai’s wish came true and China participated in the Nagoya World’s, owing to the extraordinary efforts on the part of Gotō Kōji. Being a generous host, Gotō also organized for the participants in the championship an excursion trip to the Ise-Shima National Park in Mie prefecture, where the Mikimoto Pearl Island of Mikimoto Kōkichi (March 1858–September 1954) is located with live performances of female pearl divers. Most of the Chinese team members joined the tour on April 2, including the three-time world champion in men’s singles, Zhuang Zedong (August 1940–February 2013). They enjoyed the breathtaking scenery and the impeccably crafted pearl necklaces. Zhuang was a star at the Mikimoto Pearl Island. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhuang had spent his life in conﬁnement until Zhou Enlai intervened in 1970.62 On April 4, 1971, the Chinese players had a chance meeting with the 19-year-old US No. 3 men’s player, Glenn Cowan (August 1952–April 2004; then a student at Santa Monica College near Los Angeles). He missed the microbus assigned to the American team to go to the Aichi- prefecture Gymnasium from one of the training centers and accidentally 108 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY got on the microbus for the Chinese team. There, Zhuang Zedong approached Cowan and talked with him, against the Chinese government rule that the Chinese team members not have any contact with US team members at the Nagoya World’s. Then, ignoring the warning of the Chinese delegation head Zhao Zhenghong, who was also on the bus, Zhuang took from his bag a large piece of brocade of the famous Huangshan landscape and gave it to Cowan. Upon arriving at the gymnasium, the reporters did not miss them. The news, “Cowan got on the Chinese bus at the training center,” immediately reached the press center at the gymnasium.63 Later that day, Cowan went to the underground shopping mall in downtown Nagoya to buy something symbolic of the United States for Zhuang. There, he saw a teenager wearing a tricolored T-shirt (in blue, red, and white) with a print, “Nature Calls Me.” He asked the boy to sell the T-shirt for six dollars. The boy did not know what to do. Then, his parent pulled his hand, and they disappeared into the crowd. Cowan soon found T-shirts with the same design at a nearby store. He bought two; one for Zhuang and another for himself. The next day, he saw Zhuang at the gymnasium. TV reporters caught the scene of Cowan giving the T-shirt to Zhuang. Cowan also took the brocade Zhuang had given him from his bag and showed it to the reporters. The scene became the newspaper headline of the day.64 In Beijing, instead of reprimanding Zhuang for breaking the rule, Zhou Enlai took this opportunity and made a surprising decision, with the consent of Mao Zedong. On April 7, Zhou invited the American World Table Tennis Team, along with the Canadian, Columbian, English, and Nigerian teams, to Beijing on its way back to the United States from Nagoya. The rest is history.65 As for Zhuang Zedong, he was promoted to chairman of the National Sports Committee (equivalent of a sports minister of a national government), in 1974; however, he lost his position with the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976. He was close to Jiang Qing and was imprisoned for four years until 1980. His wife left him. In 1987 he married a Japanese, Sasaki Atsuko, who had met Zhuang in 1971 when she worked as an interpreter at the Nagoya World’s. In February 2015, on the two-year anniversary of Zhuang’s death, a Japanese TV broadcasting station produced a documentary about Sasaki Atsuko entitled, “A Hero’s Wife: Atsuko.” The program chronicled a turbulent life of the Japanese woman, who was born in Manchuria and was repatriated to Japan at the end of World TTFA REJECTS GOTŌ’S MOTION TO EXPEL TAIWAN 109

War II. Atsuko then met Zhuang in Nagoya in 1971 and again in Beijing in 1985. However, the Chinese government did not allow Atsuko to marry Zhuang, because she was a Japanese citizen. She abandoned her Japanese citizenship in order to marry Zhuang.66

*** The Ping-Pong Diplomacy Zhou Enlai deployed at the Nagoya World’sbrokethe“bamboo curtain” and China replaced Taiwan at the United Nations in October 1971. It also paved the way for the Sino-US rapprochement and détente in East Asia. President Richard Nixon ﬂew to Beijing on February 21, 1972 and met Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou at the Great Hall of the People. However, one VIP who was to be present at the historic occasion was missing from the scene. Gotō Kōji died of a ruptured aortic aneurysm on January 22, 1972, at the age of 65.67 Gotō had been consumed with working on the creation of a new table tennis organization for Asia: the Asian Table Tennis Union (ATTU). Owing to Gotō’s groundwork, the ATTU was established in Beijing in May 1972. The ITTF executive meeting held at the Sarajevo World’s in April 1973 decided to expel the TTFA, de facto acknowledging the ATTU as its legitimate subordinate organization representing Asia. The ITTF made this decision ofﬁcial at its biennial general meeting held at the Calcutta World’s in April 1975. The ATTU has prospered to this day.68 In retrospect, Zheng Yueqing concludes that, were it not for Gotō’s initiative to go to Beijing and negotiate in person the terms of the Chinese participation in the Nagoya World’s, China could not have participated in the world championships and Zhou Enlai could not have launched Ping-Pong Diplomacy there. As a corollary, without Gotō’s decision, Nixon could not have visited China in 1972. It was Gotō’s conviction and determination that made the unthinkable diplomatic breakthrough possible in 1972. For this reason, Gotō is referred to as the “father of Ping-Pong Diplomacy.” To quote a Japanese saying, watari ni fune (lit., “a ferry at the river crossing”), Gotō was the ferry- man at the river. Zhou and Nixon got on the ferry and reached the shore of an open China. Zhou referred to Gotō as a “well-digger for China,” following the old Chinese proverb, “He shall not forget those who dug thewellwhenhedrinksthewater.” Zhou knew best how much he owed to Gotō.69 110 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

NOTES 1. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 2049–2050; Hashimoto Shigezō, “Supōtsu no ōgi ha mugen” (Endless Secrets of Sports), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, ed., Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku (Recollections of Gotō Kōji), Nagoya: Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō- iinkai, 1975, 152–154. 2. Hasegawa Nobuhiko, “Nobu, gambare-yo” (Fight, Nobu!), in Gotō Kōji- sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 318–321. 3. Ibid., 318–321. 4. Ogimura Ichirō, “Jinsei iki ni kanzu” (A Life of Determination), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 221–223; “Ichiro Ogimura, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Grassroots Sports Development in Nigeria,” The Nation (publication of Nigeria), http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/ 5031/1/Ichiro-Ogimura-Premier-Zhou-EnLai-and-grassroots-sports- development-in-Nigeria/Page1.html, accessed May 30, 2009. 5. Ogimura, 223–224. 6. “Nenpu” (Chronology), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 545–456. 7. Jin, 2050–2051; Qian Jiang, Beichū gaikō hiroku: Pinpon gaikō shimatsuki (Secret Record of Sino-US Diplomacy: An Account of Ping-Pong Diplomacy), Kanzaki Isao (trans.), Tokyo: Tōhō-shoten, 1988, 9 and 11. 8. Jin, 2050–2051; Qian i-ii, 9–10, and 209. 9. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949– 1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 3, 386. 10. Itō Seiji, “Gotō bunken-taichō-dono” (Dear Platoon Sergeant Gotō), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 3–8. 11. Ibid., 6–7. 12. Zheng Yueqing, “‘Pinpon-gaikō’ to Gotō Kōji” (“Ping-Pong Diplomacy” and Gotō Kōji), Aichi-Shukutoku University Gendai-shakai kenkyū-ka kenkyū-hōkoku, No. 2, June 30, 2007, 36. 13. Ibid.; Mori Takeshi, “Pinpon-gaikō: 71-nen Nagoya sekai-taikai o chūshin ni” (Ping-Pong Diplomacy: Focusing on the 1971 Nagoya World’s), Waseda University Shakai-kagaku-tōkyū, Vol. 35, No. 102, 1989, 215/ 645–216/646. Zheng’s article (p. 36) states that China joined the ITTF in 1952, whereas Mori’s article (p. 215/645) states that it was in 1953. The year 1952 ﬁts the other facts better. 14. Mori, 215/645; “Rainen no Sekai-takkyū-senshuken: Chūgoku sanka e doryoku” ([JTTA] Will Try to Have China Participate in Next Year’s Nagoya World’s), Asahi Shimbun, May 27, 1970. NOTES 111

15. “Rainen no Sekai-takkyū-senshuken ...”; “Roy Evans, 88, Architect of Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Dies,” New York Times, May 27, 1998; “The Table Tennis Collector,” No. 46, Fall 2007, http://www.ittf.com/ museum/TTC46c.pdf. 16. Mori, 215/645; Muraoka Kyūbei, “Shin-dankai no Nitchū-yūkō undō” (New Stage in Sino-Japanese Friendship Movement), Mail Magazine, Alter, No. 8, http://www.alter-magazine.jp/backno/backno_8_2.htm, April 10, 2008; “Tsuyomaru Chūgoku sanka yōsei” (Intensifying Voices for China’s Participation [in Nagoya World’s]), Asahi Shimbun, July 30, 1970. 17. Muraoka Kyūbei, “Ketsudan to jikkō no hito” (Man of Decisions and Actions), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 173. 18. Qian, iii-iv and 13. 19. Zheng, 38. 20. Zheng, 37; Mori, 216/646. 21. Zheng, 40; Mori, 216/646–217/647. 22. Mori, 216/646–217/647. 23. Ogimura, 226. 24. Saionji Kinkazu, “Pinpon-gaikō no umi-no-oya” (Father of Ping-Pong Diplomacy), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 99–100; “Gotō- kaichō ga hochū ketsui” (President Gotō Decides to Visit China), Asahi Shimbun, January 12, 1971. 25. Saionji, 99–100. 26. Zheng, 35–36 and 38; Mori, 217/647. 27. Ibid. (both). 28. Saionji, 100. 29. “Nanmon kakaeru Nittakkyō” (JTTA Beset with Difﬁcult Problems), Asahi Shimbun, December 20, 1970. 30. “Taiwan nozoki Chūgoku maneku: Nagoya de hiraku Sekai-takkyū Gotō- kaichō ga ketsui” (President Gotō Decides to Remove Taiwan and Invite China to Nagoya World’s), Mainichi Shimbun, December 31, 1970. 31. Ibid. 32. Zheng, 39. 33. Armin H, Meyer, Assignment Tokyo: An Ambassador’s Journal, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, 25–62; “Sekai-takkyū sanka e Chūgoku iyoku shimesu” (China Expresses its Willingness to Participate in Nagoya World’s), Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1971. 34. Waki Yasumitsu, Sōzō to ningensei: Nagoya-denki-gakuen 90-nen no ayumi (Creativity and Humanity: 90-year History of Meiden Academy), Nagoya: Meiden Academy, 2002, 245–246; Martin Fackler, “New Dissent in Japan is Loudly Anti-Foreign,” New York Times, August 29, 2010. 35. Waki, 246–248; Gotō Haruko and Gotō Yoshiki, Author interview, August 3, 2010. 112 5 PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

36. “Sekai-takkyū: Sanpi uzumaku Chūgoku sanka” (World Table Tennis Championships Embroiled with Support and Opposition), Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 1971; Watanabe Kunio, “Yowane mo haita wanman kaichō” (Even President Gotō Showed the White Feather), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 363–366; Zheng, 39. 37. Waki, 245–246; Gotō-kaichō to tairitsu” (Confronting President Gotō), Asahi Shimbun, December 26, 1970. 38. Mori 217/647–218/648; Qian, 13–14. 39. Zheng, 37; “Gotō Nittaku-kaichō:Chūgoku e shuppatsu” (JTTA President Gotō Departs for China), Asahi Shimbun, January 25, 1971. 40. Zheng, 39. 41. Qian, 11–12. 42. Ibid. 43. Zheng, 39–40; “Gotō Nittakkyū-kaichō ra no Pekin-iri” (JTTA President Gotō and Others Enter Beijing), Asahi Shimbun, January 27, 1971. 44. Zheng, 39–40; Qian, 183. 45. Zheng, 40–41; Mori, 218/648; Qian, 17–19; “Nitchū-takkyū-kaidan: Nagoya-taikai ni sanka yōsei” (CTTA–JTTA Meeting Requests Participating in Nagoya World’s), Asahi Shimbun, evening edition, January 28, 1971. Zheng’s article (p. 40) and the Asahi Shimbun state that the ﬁrst meeting took place on January 27. In turn, Mori’s article (p. 218/648) states that it was on January 26, whereas Qian’s book does not specify the date. Zheng’s information is based on Mori’s journal of this trip that Zheng obtained from Mori personally, which states that the meeting began on January 27. January 27 also ﬁts the other facts better. 46. Zheng, 40–42. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., 42; Qian, 20. 49. Zheng, 42, Qian, 20–21. 50. Mori, 218/648–219/649. 51. Jin, 2049–2050; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 431. 52. Ibid. (both). 53. Ibid. (both); Qian, 23–25. 54. Qian, 25–27; Zheng, 43. 55. Qian, 30; Zheng, 43–44; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 431; “Shū-shushō to kaiken: Gotō Kōji Nihon takkyū-kyōkai-kaichō” (JTTA President Gotō Kōji Meets Premier Zhou), Asahi Shimbun, January 31, 1971. 56. Jin, 2050; Mori, 221/651–222/652. 57. Qian, 28–29; “Sekai-takkyū: Sanpi uzumaku Chūgoku sanka.” 58. Zheng, 44–45. 59. Zheng, 43. NOTES 113

60. Mori, 219/649; “Ajia-takkyū-renmei-sōkai: Taiwan jomei-an tōrazu” (TTFA General Meeting Rejects Motion to Expel Taiwan), Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 1971; “Taiwan mondai deno kaichō jinin” (President Resigns over Taiwan Issue), Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 1971. 61. Ōno Seizō, “Ajia-takkyū-sōkai deno sensei” (Gotō at TTFA General Meeting), in Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, ed., Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku (Recollections of Gotō Kōji), Nagoya: Gotō Kōji-sensei tsuisōroku kankō-iinkai, 1975, 233. 62. Qian, 108; “Genten no shima gaikō no butai ni” (The Island of Origin [of Mikimoto] Became Stage for Diplomacy), Chūnichi Shimbun (also circulated as Tokyo Shimbun), August 14, 2013. 63. Qian, 113–117. 64. Qian, 118–133. 65. Jin, 2052–2053; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 449–450. 66. “Shō Sokutō-shi, shikyo” (Mr. Zhuang Zedong Dies), Chūnichi Shimbun, February 11, 2013; “Dokumentarī, ‘Eiyū no tsuma: Atsuko’” (Documentary, “A Hero’s Wife: Atsuko”), Chūnichi Shimbun, February 10, 2015. 67. Jin, 2053–2063; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 513–514. 68. “ATTU,” http://www.attu.org/news_about.php, January 17, 2011; “Ajia-takkyū-renmei o tsuihō” ([ITTF] Expels TTFA), Asahi Shimbun, April 5, 1973. 69. Zheng, 35–36 and 49–50. CHAPTER 6

Secret Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization

The most brutal stage of the Cultural Revolution began to subside in the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China” hereafter) in the fall of 1971, with the death of Lin Biao in September. After ﬁve years of the sweeping liquidation campaign against “pro-capitalists” and “foreign elements,” the extreme radicals realized the enormous damage that the xenophobic isola- tionist policy had caused to its economy and world standing. With the arrival of the much awaited changing tide, Zhou Enlai wasted no time in resuming his diplomatic initiative toward Japan and tried to make up for the lost years. Nevertheless, Zhou realized that diplomatic normalization with Japan was a totally different game from promoting trade with Japan. In Japan, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (term of ofﬁce, November 1964–July 1972) supported the US policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or “Taiwan” hereafter) and took an outright pro-Taiwan stance during the latter part of his administration, as if to revive the anti-China policy of his birth brother Kishi Nobusuke. The underpinning “principle” for Japan’s China policy was that Japan could not normalize diplomatic relations with China unless and until the United States changed its stance toward China. Japanese leaders knew too well the political cost of violating this cardinal rule.1

ZHOU’S “PEOPLE’S DIPLOMACY” TOWARD JAPAN China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General Sun Pinghua, who was purged from April 1967 to May 1972, states, “Chinese foreign policy made a quantum leap in the latter half of 1971. With the

© The Author(s) 2017 115 M. Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_6 116 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION relative relaxation of the situation in China, Premier Zhou received Japanese lawmakers and businessmen, who had been wondering what had been going on in China in these years. Subsequently, the Revolutionary Subcommittee, consisting of young, extreme leftists, decided to reactivate the Chinese operations vis-à-vis Japan and rehabilitated Wang Xiaoyun, who was one of the directors of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and one of the Deputy Secretaries-General of the China–Japan Friendship Association.” This took place when China–Japan Friendship Association President Liao Chengzhi and Sun were still under purge. They were not available to Zhou when he needed them the most.2 The first post-rehabilitation assignment for Wang Xiaoyun was to go to Nagoya, as deputy delegation head of the Chinese World Team to the 31st World Table Tennis Championships (“Nagoya World’s” hereafter) in March–April 1971 (see Chapter 5). For a month, Wang actively engaged in groundwork to improve Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-US relations with close communication with Beijing under the direction of Zhou: Ping-Pong Diplomacy. During his stay in Japan, Wang secretly met anti- Satō Eisaku faction leaders within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), such as Miki Takeo (foreign minister, 1966–1968; Prime Minister, 1974–1976) and Ōhira Masayoshi (March 1910–June 1980; who was confidant of Ikeda Hayato), as well as opposition party leaders and business leaders. Wang’s delegation received an enthusiastic welcome from the Japanese so that Zhou’s “people’s diplomacy” caused the “first Wang whirlwind (‘fever’)” in Japan.3 Then, in August 1971, when the “old friend of China” Matsumura Kenzō, who was one of the earliest advocates for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the ruling LDP, died, Zhou had China–Japan Friendship Association Honorary President Guo Moruo and association President Liao Chengzhi send a telegraph with a joint message of condolence to his family. This was Liao’s first “official assignment” since March 1966. Then, Zhou in person instructed Wang Guoquan, who was CPAFFC head and China–Japan Friendship Association Vice President, and two other officials to attend the funeral service of Matsumura: Funeral Diplomacy. During a one-week stay, Wang met Japanese leaders in various circles and succeeded in turning those who had close personal ties with Prime Minister Satō to pro-China. This included Nippon Steel Corporation President Nagano Shigeo, who was also president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Zhou’s “people’sdiplomacy” caused the “second Wang whirlwind” in Japan.4 ZHOU GRABS MOMENTUM 117

THE ISSUE OF CHINA’S REPRESENTATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS Simultaneously, as the Nagoya World’s in March–April 1971 had set the precedent for the “two Chinas” issue by recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China and inviting the PRC team to the Nagoya World’s, it unleashed momentum for the PRC to solve the China representation issue at the United Nations (UN) in its favor. For this, Zhou Enlai had the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) actively engage in “people’s diplomacy” in the world. The PRC succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy, ushering in a “China rush” in the international community. Consequently, in October 1971 the UN General Assembly passed an Albania-sponsored draft resolution, by which it recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN and expelled the ROC (Taiwan), which was a permanent member of the Security Council. This became Resolution 2758.5 The United States and Japan co-sponsored an alternative draft resolution, which accepted China’s admission to the UN, but rejected Taiwan’s expulsion: a dual representation formula. However, with the passage of Resolution 2758, the alternative draft resolution did not even go to a vote.6

ZHOU GRABS MOMENTUM The relaxation of Chinese policy toward Japan also brought about the rehabilitation, in April 1972, of China–Japan Friendship Association President Liao Chengzhi, who had been purged in March 1966 (see Chapter 4). Zhou Enlai appointed Liao as an advisor to the MOFA so that he could directly assist Zhou at a critical time for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. There was no better person than Liao for this role; he grew up in Tokyo and could speak the Tokyo dialect of Japanese fluently, even better than many of the Japanese. Zhou immediately had Liao make a report on the state of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations at an MOFA conference. MOFA officials warmly welcomed “Liao-gong” (Lord Liao), whom they had not seen for a long time. A month later, Liao’s right-hand man Sun Pinghua was also rehabilitated.7 Zhou had no time to waste and grabbed the momentum for Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization, triggered by the resignation of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in July 1972. No sooner than Tanaka Kakuei formed a new cabinet on July 7, stating that he would promote “peace diplomacy” 118 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION and realize diplomatic normalization with China, did Zhou make a statement welcoming Tanaka’s inaugural statement on July 9. Also, previously, on July 3, just before the LDP presidential election, Zhou had raised the rank of the chief representative to the China–Japan Memorandum Trade Office (formerly the Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office) from second secretary to minister and appointed the veteran Japan specialist in the MOFA Xiao Xiangqian (who was rehabilitated in 1971) as a new chief representative. Thus began the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in earnest. Nobody had anticipated at that time that the normalization would be realized so quickly; it took less than three months.8

SHANGHAI BALLET MISSION TO JAPAN Further, on July 11, Zhou Enlai sent former chief representative to the Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Chengzhi Office, Sun Pinghua, to Japan as head of the 200-member Shanghai Ballet Mission to Japan. Three delegation officials—Sun, Tang Jiaxuan (foreign minister, 1998–2003), and Jiang Peizhu—had no association with the ballet. As with the Chess Mission in 1962 and the Orchid Mission in 1963, Sun was charged with a secret mission: to deliver Zhou’sofficial invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to visit China, as well as Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei’s (1972–1974) invitation to his Japanese counterpart, Ōhira Masayoshi, to visit China. Sun states, “The Japanese were surprised to see me after five years’ absence and reporters followed me everywhere I went.”9 This six-week long visit caused the “Sun whirlwind” and heightened “China fever” in Japan just when Tanaka Kakuei had replaced Satō Eisaku. Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō (1960–1962) arranged a meeting of Tang Jiaxuan with his Japanese counterpart, MOFA China Section head Hashimoto Hiroshi (April 1926–April 2014; ambassador to China, 1989–1992). This was the first official meeting between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Then, in mid-August, Sun succeeded in deliver- ing in person Zhou’sofficial invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka to visit China, as well as Foreign Minister Ji’s invitation to Foreign Minister Ōhira.10 It is interesting to note that negotiations for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization took the form of informal diplomacy through third-party channels and under the guise of cultural missions. Nevertheless, as Quansheng Zhao pointed out, China’s diplomacy was anything but informal in substance because the government made all the decisions. Chinese officials employed their version of “divide and conquer” toward Japan, JAPAN’S RESPONSE TO ZHOU’S DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES 119 taking advantage of divisions in Japanese political circles—pro-China factions within the ruling LDP, as well as the rivalry between the LDP and the leftist parties—and also approached the business community. Zhou tactfully laid out the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations” and demanded adherence to the principles by each visiting Japanese delegation as the prerequisite for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Zhou also deployed “smile diplomacy” toward the United States in the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in Nagoya in 1971, which paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing and Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972.11

JAPAN’S RESPONSE TO ZHOU’S DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES Meanwhile, the major players for the Japanese unofficial diplomacy toward China had changed. With the death of Takasaki Tatsunosuke in February 1964, Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT) Executive Director Okazaki Kaheita succeeded the Takasaki Tatsunosuke Office. Okazaki visited Beijing in April 1964 and signed the Memorandum Concerning LT Trade (see Chapter 3). For political matters, Fujiyama Aiichirō (May 1897–February 1985), who was foreign minister in the Kishi cabinet and Economic Planning Agency director-general in the Ikeda cabinet, filled the void. Like Takasaki, Fujiyama was a businessman- turned-politician and had held countless leadership positions in economic circles, including president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, to mention just three.12 Fujiyama tells a secret story. After returning from a trip to China in April 1964 to conclude the follow-up LT Trade Agreement, the LDP elder statesman, Matsumura Kenzō, told Fujiyama, who was Economic Planning Agency director-general in the Satō cabinet at that time, “Premier Zhou has asked about you.” Zhou remembered Fujiyama who had accompanied Takasaki to the Asian–African Conference in Bandung in 1955. Matsumura then told Fujiyama, “Resign the ministerial position and let’s go to China together.” Fujiyama was concerned whether Zhou would accept him kindly because he was foreign minister in the Kishi cabinet and handled the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty. Then, Matsumura told Fujiyama, “Premier Zhou mentioned you along with Takasaki, whom he respected. Just as Zhou trusted Takasaki, he will trust you.”13 120 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

ZHOU ENLAI AND FUJIYAMA AIICHIRŌ Fujiyama took the advice of Matsumura and resigned the post of Economic Planning Agency director-general in the Satō cabinet in December 1966. Then in March–April 1970, Fujiyama accompanied Matsumura to China; Matsumura was 87 years old and in a wheelchair. This was the ﬁrst post-1949 visit to China for Fujiyama, while it became the last visit for Matsumura. During the meeting with the Japanese delegation, Zhou criticized the Satō cabinet because Satō had signed the Nixon–Satō Joint Statement of November 1969. The statement included the “Taiwan clause,” which stipulated that the peace and security of Taiwan was an important matter to Japan. The meeting with Zhou made Fujiyama realize that this was not a time to only promote trade with China. Upon returning to Tokyo, he reorganized the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino- Japanese Trade into the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and became president in December 1970. This was a nonpartisan group and included members of the LDP as well as of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).14

SECOND ZHOU–FUJIYAMA MEETING Subsequently, Zhou invited Fujiyama to visit China in February–March 1971, when the Japanese Memorandum Trade mission was scheduled to visit China. Thus, Fujiyama’s parliamentarian delegation and the Memorandum Trade mission led by Okazaki Kaheita went to China together, but the Chinese received the two groups separately. While Chinese Memorandum Trade Ofﬁce head Liu Xiwen received the Okazaki mission, CPAFFC head and China–Japan Friendship Association Vice President Wang Guoquan received the Fujiyama delegation. Fujiyama writes:

This was the ﬁrst time that Wang Guoquan appeared in relations with Japan. This suggests the importance China gave to my delegation. I talked with Wang ﬁve times and Premier Zhou twice during this visit. They criticized Satō cabinet’s “two Chinas” position. Premier Zhou also gave me a cryptic message hinting at the possibility of Sino-US rapprochement.15

On this, the Ofﬁcial Chronology of Zhou Enlai records, “Along with Guo Moruo, Zhou Enlai met Fujiwara Aiichirō and his entourage, including Tagawa Seiichi, on February 23. Zhou met representatives in the Japanese trade circles, such as JAPIT Kansai Headquarters (in Osaka) THE NIXON ANNOUNCEMENT SHAKES THE WORLD 121

General Affairs Director Kimura Ichizō and executive director Tanaka Shūjirō,onFebruary24.”16

THE NIXON ANNOUNCEMENT SHAKES THE WORLD Meanwhile, US President Richard Nixon was groping for a way toward Sino-US rapprochement through different diplomatic channels, without success, and grabbed the opportunity opened up by the Ping-Pong Diplomacy at the Nagoya World’s in March–April 1971. Nixon secretly sent his national security advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing in July. Then, on July 15, Nixon made the surprising announcement that he would visit China by May 1972: the “first Nixon shock” to the Japanese. The Satō cabinet was not informed of the secret deal and was stunned by the “over- the-head” diplomacy of President Nixon. Even his ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer (1914–2006; term of office, July 1969–March 1972) was not informed and doubted his ears when he heard it for the first time.17 Meyer states:

I heard Nixon’s announcement in Tokyo over the US Armed Forces Radio, locally known as the Far Eastern Network (FEN), while getting a haircut. I ﬁrst thought that it was a “slip of the tongue” by Nixon when I heard that “President Nixon had sent Kissinger to Beijing ...” I thought that Nixon had meant to say “Vietnam,” not Beijing. Immediately grasping the gravity of the statement, I then thought, “Oh, my god, I’ve got to run and warn the Japanese government ...” But when I called up the State Department in Washington, I was told, “No one is to make any comment whatsoever.” I insisted, “We’ve got to tell them, they’ve been following us dutifully ...”18

This was a huge shock to the Japanese MOFA that was faithfully following US policy toward Asia to the extent that it was ridiculed as the “Far Eastern Division of the US Department of State.” Yet, Nixon did not tell Prime Minister Satō about his plan to visit Beijing. The newly released diplomatic archives by the Japanese MOFA in July 2014 reveal that Nixon’s “betrayal” derived from his anger toward Satō over textile negotiations. Nixon wanted more concessions from Satō on the textile issue. Comprehensive restrictions of Japanese textile exports to the United States was a core campaign promise for Nixon’s reelection in 1972. Satō in November 1969 had made a secret deal with Nixon and agreed to make concessions on the textile issue in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa, on which Satō had staked his political life. The Japanese ofﬁcials, however, were unaware of the secret deal between Satō and Nixon and rejected US 122 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION demands in the textile negotiations. Satō failed to reach an agreement with Nixon on the textile issue in October 1970 and again in March 1971. Then came Nixon’s surprise announcement of July 15, 1971. Nixon’s anger toward Satō also complicated the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa and affected the current territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands between China and Japan (see Chapter 9).19

THIRD ZHOU–FUJIYAMA MEETING In August 1971 Matsumura Kenzō died without achieving his life goal of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Fujiyama succeeded to Matsumura’s mission and volunteered to become the unofﬁcial Japanese chief negotiator for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Then Zhou Enlai invited Fujiyama in September–October 1971, as the delegation head of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations. After meeting with Zhou, Fujiyama issued a joint communiqué with the China–Japan Friendship Association in Beijing. The statement articulated four fundamental principles (similar to the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations”) and also declared that the Japan–Taiwan (ROC) Peace Treaty was not in effect.20 Upon returning to Tokyo, Fujiyama was accused by his fellow parliamentarian in the LDP of having violated LDP policy on China. The LDP Disciplinary Committee found Fujiyama to have violated party bylaws and suspended his executive position in the party, with probation, in January 1972. This took place despite the fact that in October 1971 the UN General Assembly had approved China (PRC) as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN and expelled Taiwan (ROC).21

FOURTH ZHOU–FUJIYAMA MEETING In February 1972 President Nixon made a historic visit to China. In turn, Prime Minister Satō was unable to deal with relations with China in the drastically changed situation. Then Zhou invited Fujiyama back to China again in March 1972. A right-wing sympathizer tried to spill sulfuric acid on Fujiyama, who was departing from Haneda Tokyo airport, and was arrested (this person would also attack Prime Minister Miki Takeo in June 1975 when he attended the funeral service for Prime Minister Satō). In Beijing on March 24, Wang Guoquan held a welcome banquet for Fujiyama. The second day, Fujiyama had talks with Wang, Xiao FOURTH ZHOU–FUJIYAMA MEETING 123

Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoyun. On the third day, Fujiyama was taken to the Yiheyuan, the former Summer Palace of Empress Dowager Cixi. There, Liao Chengzhi and his wife, Jing Puchun, waited for him.22 Fujiyama writes:

This was the ﬁrst time that I saw Liao Chengzhi since we met at the Asian– African Conference in 1955. Liao told me that he had been sick and joked that his wife was watching his diet. I was impressed with his profound knowledge of Japan. He was undoubtedly the number-one Japan specialist in China. From this meeting with Liao, I sensed that China was going to make important diplomatic overtures toward Japan.23

This Fujiyama–Liao meeting took place just before Liao’s rehabilitation in April 1972. Fujiyama’s account also clariﬁes that he did not meet Liao when he had visited Beijing in September–October 1971. This in turn conﬁrms that the Japanese delegation that had met Liao in September– October 1971 was the one led by Nakajima Kenzō (see Chapter 4). Fujiyama then recounted his secret meeting with Zhou:

I met Premier Zhou on the ﬁfth day of my visit, on March 28. Only Liao, Wang Guoquan, and a Chinese interpreter participated in this meeting. Even my secretary was asked to leave. Zhou wanted to know who would succeed Satō. Zhou was concerned that Fukuda Takeo, who was close to Satō, would become Prime Minister. I told Zhou that this would not happen. I also said that either Miki Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, or Tanaka Kakuei would be ﬁne and that all three would promote normalization with China. I assured Zhou that Tanaka, who belonged to the Satō faction, would not follow Satō’s anti-China policy. I believe that this meeting pushed the button for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.24

Then, on April 17, 1972, Zhou received Miki Takeo and had a long discussion with him, along with China–Japan Friendship Association Honorary President Guo Moruo and President Liao Chengzhi. Back in Japan, Miki, Ōhira, and Tanaka formed an anti-Fukuda alliance in the presidential election for the LDP. As Fujiyama had predicted, Fukuda lost in the election and Tanaka became Prime Minister in July 1972. On this, another promotor for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the ruling LDP, Nakasone Yasuhiro, tells his story:

Tanaka Kakuei was not actually enthusiastic about Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization as has generally been thought. When China replaced Taiwan 124 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

at the United Nations in 1971, I knew that the time was ripe for Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization. I felt that Fukuda would not promote Sino-Japanese normalization on one hand, because he was Satō’s protégé. I, on the other hand, sensed that Tanaka would promote it if certain conditions were met. I then told Tanaka, “I will not run in the LDP presidential election. I want you to carry out Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. I will not vote for you unless you do it.” Tanaka said reluctantly, “I understand.” That’s how Tanaka changed his mind. However, he was unwilling to proceed with the diplomatic normalization until Tagawa Seiichi [in the LDP] and Takeiri Yoshikatsu in the Kōmeitō had visited China and obtained verbal commitment from Zhou Enlai. As I decided not to run in the LDP presidential election, the Fukuda faction [erroneously] condemned Tanaka as having been bribed by me.25

GROUNDWORK FOR TANAKA’S VISIT TO CHINA In addition to Fujiyama Aiichirō, who succeeded to the mission of Matsumura Kenzō and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, and Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was a self-claimed protégé of Matsumura, other lawmakers in the ruling LDP also engaged in the groundwork for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. They included Furui Yoshimi (January 1903–February 1995), who had received “initiation” in Sino-Japanese friendship from Matsumura after having accompanied him to China in 1959, Tagawa Seiichi (June 1918– August 2009), who had begun his political career as Matsumura’s secretary. Zhou, for instance, had secret talks with Furui about the diplomatic normalization in May 1972. This was his eleventh visit to China.26 Further, leaders in the opposition parties also played an important part in the secret negotiations in the absence of the ofﬁcial communication channels between the two countries. For instance, Zhou and Guo Moruo received a delegation of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), led by chairman Kasuga Ikkō (March 1910–May 1989), in April 1972. Kasuga presented Zhou with a list of goals common to the Chinese people and the Japanese people, which became a foundation for drawing up a draft Sino- Japanese joint communiqué. Then, in May, Zhou received the second mission of the Kōmeitō (a political party backed by the New Buddhist group Sōka Gakkai), led by vice chairman Ninomiya Bunzō (January 1920–January 2006), and had a lengthy discussion of the matter of Sino-Japanese relations.27 “TAKEIRI NOTES” 125

On July 16, Zhou and Liao Chengzhi met JSP former chairman Sasaki Kōzō (May 1900–December 1985), who brought a secret message from Prime Minister Tanaka to Zhou. In response, Zhou told Sasaki that he would welcome Tanaka for talks on normalization. Zhou was enthusiastic enough to offer Tanaka a direct ﬂight to Beijing, instead of having to go via Hong Kong. The trip between Beijing and Tokyo took three and a half days via Hong Kong, whereas a direct ﬂight only took a few hours. Zhou also did not forget to show his consideration to the JSP by telling Sasaki:

Since the JSP has no diplomatic rights, I would normalize diplomatic relations with Prime Minister Tanaka, but this is accomplished by the long and tireless efforts of the Japanese people. Please convey my appreciation to the Japanese people for their efforts. I would like to discuss forward-looking matters [at the summit meeting], leaving the past aside. The Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization is to realize perpetual peace and friendship between 750 million Chinese people and 110 million Japanese people.28

“TAKEIRI NOTES” Subsequently, Zhou and Liao Chengzhi received Kōmeitō chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu on July 25. Zhou unusually gave Takeiri three meetings and a banquet during his stay in Beijing. Zhou told Takeiri about the Chinese idea for the draft Sino-Japanese joint communiqué and Takeiri took notes as Zhou spoke, word by word. The eight proposals Zhou indicated to Takeiri included: the US-Japan Security Treaty would not jeopardize the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization; the “Taiwan clause” at the Nixon– Satō summit would not be an impediment to the normalization; the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands would not be an obstacle; and Zhou would be willing to relinquish China’s claims to war reparations from Japan for the sake of future Sino-Japanese friendship.29 Upon returning to Tokyo on August 3, Takeiri showed his notes to Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi. Reading the notes, Tanaka said, “Premier Zhou is a smart person. We could realize the diplomatic normalization with him.” In turn, Ōhira, who was not generally known as a gracious person, thanked Takeiri repeatedly and then dashed to the MOFA. The “Takeiri Notes” made Tanaka convinced that Zhou was serious about the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization and he decided to proceed with this risky business in the face of opposition at home and abroad.30 126 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

On August 7, Zhou and Liao received a delegation of the JSP, led by Kuroda Hisao (a leader of the Japan–China Friendship Association), and reiterated the terms of the diplomatic normalization to him. Then on August 12, upon the official notification from Foreign Minister Ōhira that Prime Minister Tanaka had decided to realize Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, Zhou had Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei declare, “Premier Zhou enthusiastically welcomes Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to China and will discuss the matter of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.” Later in August, Zhou and Liao received a Japanese youth mission led by the HR member in the LDP, Kawasaki Hideji (September 1911–February 1978) and a Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association mission led by its Director-General Nakajima Kenzō, as well as an economic mission of the Mitsubishi Corporation Group and another mission led by Japan–China Association on Economy and Trade (JCAET) President Inayama Yoshihiro (Nippon Steel president, 1973–1981; Japan Business Federation president, 1980–1986).31 Meanwhile, the dominant pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP (Tanaka himself had belonged to the Satō faction) and the Nixon administration was concerned with the fast pace of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. (Although Nixon had visited China in February 1972 and realized the Sino-US rapprochement, he stated that this was not diplomatic normalization in the conventional sense. The US government did not establish diplomatic relations with China until January 1979.) In order to assuage US concerns, Tanaka had summit talks with President Nixon in Honolulu, Hawaii, in August–September, prior to his visit to Beijing, and assured Nixon that Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization would not jeopardize US–Japan relations and that Japan would faithfully and fully impellent the US–Japan Security Treaty.32 Then, on September 12, Zhou and Liao met Furui Yoshimi, Tagawa Seiichi, and MOFA advisor and former HR member, Matsumoto Shun’ichi (June 1897–January 1987, first postwar Japanese ambassador to England). They flew to Beijing aboard the first non-stop flight to Beijing from Tokyo, as a test flight for Tanaka’s visit to China. When this special flight landed at Beijing airport, the Japanese delegation solemnly descended the airstair carrying portrait photographs of the late Matsumura Kenzō and Takasaki Tatsunosuke. It was a memorable moment for the delegation members. Through this symbolic gesture they paid tribute to the two Japanese pioneers of Sino-Japanese relations, who had longed for the day of the diplomatic normalization to come.33 TANAKA KAKUEI VISITS CHINA 127

Zhou also did his part in acknowledging their contributions. Zhou sent a telegraph on September 12, requesting Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade Japanese head, Okazaki Kaheita, to visit Beijing immediately. Zhou met Okazaki on September 23 and gave thanks for the immeasurable efforts of the Japanese pioneers for the diplomatic normalization, such as Matsumura, Takasaki, Ishibashi Tanzan, and JAPIT first President Murata Shōzō (1878–1957), by quoting the old Chinese proverb, “He shall not forget those who dug the well when he drinks the water.”34 Meanwhile, on September 18 and 19, Zhou met the first official LDP parliamentarians’ mission to China led by former Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō, who was president of the LDP Council on Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization. Then on September 20, Zhou met with Furui Yoshimi, alone this time, with whom Foreign Minister Ōhira had secretly entrusted the Japanese draft joint communiqué proposal, written on the basis of the “Takeiri Notes.” Thus, the die was cast for Tanaka’s visit.35

TANAKA KAKUEI VISITS CHINA On September 25, 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei made an epoch- making trip to China, accompanied by his Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidō Susumu (October 1909–February 2000, who famously said, “My hobby is Tanaka Kakuei.”) and Foreign Minister Ōhira. On the day of departure, Tanaka woke up at 5:00 AM and visited the Kodaira cemetery in the suburb of Tokyo, where the grave of Takasaki Tatsunosuke stood. Before the historic visit, Tanaka went out of his way to pay tribute to this pioneer of Sino-Japanese relations, who had established the semi-ofﬁcial Sino-Japanese relations in a most adverse situation. Just as Takasaki had been threatened with death by rightwing groups (he was almost assassinated), Tanaka’s delegation members “literally risked their own lives” by going to China.36 One of the secretaries of Tanaka, Asaka Akira, recalls:

Tanaka’s fellow lawmakers in the LDP vehemently attacked him, and chaos prevailed in LDP General Council meetings. A rightwing sound truck parked in front of Tanaka’sofﬁce and kept shouting, “Tanaka is a traitor.” The tension was such that anything could happen.37

Foreign Minister Ōhira also received threatening letters at home. He told one of the reporters who accompanied his local trip for the election campaign of his colleague, “This might be the last time I travel with 128 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION you ...I could be assassinated at any time ...” Ōhira wrote a will before leaving for China, detailing the reasons for his decision to carry out the diplomatic normalization with China. Ōhira also entrusted domestic matters to one of his secretaries should he be unable to return.38 In turn, realizing the determination of the Japanese delegation, Zhou made elaborate preparations to receive the delegation and had his team of Japan specialists research Tanaka’s favorite things in order to provide the utmost hospitality during his stay in Beijing. One of Tanaka’s secretaries, Hayasaka Shigezō (June 1930–June 2004), stated, “The host provided anpan (round bun with red bean paste filling) and other food at the guest house where we were staying. Anpan was Tanaka’sfavoritesweet.The Chinese side had contacted me earlier and asked about Tanaka’sfavorite things in detail.” The delegation members were most pleasantly surprised to find that a traditional Japanese breakfast was served on their first morning in Beijing after the lavish Chinese banquet at the Great Hall of the People on the previous night, during which the Chinese orchestra had played sado okesa, the traditional folkdance song of Tanaka’s hometown. The orchestra also played Kagoshima oharabushi (folkdance song of Nikaidō’shometown) and Konpira funebune (folkdance song of Ōhira’s hometown), impressing the foreign minister. In turn, Tanaka was impressed by the fact that the specific miso of his hometown was used for the miso soup.39 On this, Chinese MOFA Asia Bureau Japan Section deputy head, Ding Min, tells an inside story:

Premier Zhou had mobilized a huge number of staff members in preparation for President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. Among them were a couple of the MOFA ofﬁcials in charge of Japan. They were secretly made part of the team to welcome the US delegation so that they could learn the preparation process and apply their experience to a Japanese leader’s visit to Japan. Zhou had anticipated this would take place in the near future. Therefore, we were well prepared for Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit in September 1972.”40

Sun Pinghua also tells his story:

Premier Zhou was a night owl. He worked at night because he was too busy with meetings and receiving visitors during the day. He ﬁnally had time to sit at his desk in the evening and worked from evening until dawn. Then he took a nap during the morning. This was his work routine, but when he THE “MEIWAKU” INCIDENT 129

heard that Prime Minister Tanaka was a morning person, he changed his work schedule and ended his work at midnight so that he could meet Tanaka in the best conditions. I prepared necessary reports around the clock so that Zhou could read them before he went to bed and also after he woke up. Zhou made meticulous preparations in order to realize the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.”41

THE “MEIWAKU” INCIDENT Nevertheless, the actual summit talks to work out the text of the Sino- Japanese Joint Communiqué in Beijing were not as sweet as anpan.Inan opening address at the welcoming banquet in the Great Hall of the People on September 25, the host Zhou stated that the Chinese people had been subjected to extreme misfortunes by the Japanese military invasion for half a century. In response, Tanaka stated in Japanese that he deeply regretted that Japan had caused tremendous “meiwaku” (“trouble”) to the Chinese people in the past. However, the Chinese interpreter mistranslated the word “meiwaku” with a much lighter meaning (the same Chinese characters for the Japanese word “meiwaku” are pronounced “mihuo” in Chinese, which means “to perplex” or “nuisance”). While the Chinese officials applauded Tanaka’s speech the end of every phrase, they stopped applauding when they heard the word “mihuo.” Next day, Zhou pointed out to Tanaka that the word “mihuo” in his speech was too light as an apology. Tanaka countered by saying that the Japanese used the word for expressing a sincere apology for causing serious trouble.42 According to a new interview with the Gakushūin University President, Inoue Toshikazu, published in January 2015, Zhou’s complaint stunned the Japanese officials because they had given the text of Tanaka’s speech to the Chinese officials in advance. They did not hear any objection from the Chinese side about the wording of the text at that time. Moreover, Tanaka, who usually did not like to speak reading from a text, was careful enough to read the text written by foreign affairs bureaucrats literally word for word in this speech, without adding ad libs. Inoue states, “Notwithstanding these facts, Zhou expressed his displeasure on purpose.”43 In turn, another scholar, Yabuki Susumu, thinks that understanding the word “meiwaku” correctly was beyond the capacity of Chinese interpreters. Yabuki speculates that Mao Zedong summoned Liao Chengzhi, 130 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION who explained to Mao that Tanaka had used the word “meiwaku” to mean his sincere apology for causing big trouble. Mao was satisfied with Liao’s explanation. Thus, the misunderstanding between Zhou and Tanaka was resolved. Yabuki has a good reason to believe his speculation: On September 27, Mao suddenly invited Tanaka and Ōhira to his private residence in Zhongnanhai. Ōhira requested that Tanaka’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaidō Susumu accompany Tanaka, which was accepted. Chinese participants were Zhou, Liao, and Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei.44 According to Nikaidō, Mao first asked Tanaka, “Is your quarrel over? You must quarrel.” Tanaka replied, “I talked with Premier Zhou amic- ably.” Then, pointing his finger at Liao, Mao said to Tanaka, “True friendship is born out of quarrels. Take him with you when you go home because he was born in Japan.” Tanaka replied, “Mr. Liao is famous in Japan. He would win a seat in the Japanese House of Councillors if he ran in the elections.” Mao’s reference to Liao was out of context. Yabuki thinks, “By joking about Liao, Mao indicated to Tanaka that it was Liao who had explained Tanaka’s sincere apology to him.”45 At the end of the talk, Mao gave Tanaka a six-volume annotated anthology of the classic verses during the Warring States Period, Chu-ci (Songs of Chu). It is generally thought that Mao gave this book to Tanaka because it was one of Mao’s favorite readings and he wanted to liken Tanaka’s patriotism for building Sino-Japanese friendship to that of Qu Yuan, the politician-hero whose poems appear in Chu-ci. However, in 2001, Yabuki found that the word “mihuo” was used in Chu-ci with the same meaning that Tanaka had used it. Yabuki therefore thinks that the real intention of Mao in 1972 was to tell Tanaka that he was right. Yabuki laments that Mao’s true intention is still not understood to this day and states that the “meiwaku” incident symbolizes the “distant neighborly” relations between the two countries.46 While the Chinese government officials were deft at sending subtle signals through symbolic gestures, they do not mean much unless the Japanese understand the hidden meanings. In this case, assuming that Yabuki’s speculation was correct, Mao’s intention was too subtle for the Japanese to understand. Tanaka would never have guessed it. It is beyond the realm of ordinary Japanese to know the text of Chu-ci. Mao’s two interpreters at the Mao–Tanaka talk, Wang Xiaoxian and Lin Liyun, did not know the “true” connection between the word “meiwaku” (“mihuo”) and Chu-ci when they were asked about it three decades later (Yabuki also did not notice it until 2001). Moreover, if Mao had known the word TANAKA–ZHOU SUMMIT TALKS 131

“mihuo” was used in Chu-ci in the same way that Tanaka had used it and therefore gave a collection of Chu-ci to Tanaka, Mao probably would not have summoned Liao to have him explain the meaning of the word “meiwaku,” as Yabuki speculated.47 In addition, it is a cynical view to suggest that Zhou gave his handwritten calligraphy of a famous quotation from the chapter of Zilu (Zhong You, one of the ten disciples of Confucius) in the Analects to Tanaka in order to hint at Tanaka’s ignorance and Chinese people’s cleverness. The quotation begins as, “Always be true in words and resolute in deeds.” This is followed by, “It is a necessary quality for a man of aspirations, but if he has nothing else, he is small as a person.” Zhou only wrote the ﬁrst part of the quotation for Tanaka, and Tanaka was happy to receive Zhou’s calligraphy, apparently without knowing the second part. In reality, few Japanese (except for those versed in Chinese classic literature) know the second part of the quotation and therefore the ridicule would not work for a Japanese. It seems unlikely that Zhou meant to insinuate Tanaka’s ignorance (he graduated only from an upper-elementary school) by giving the quotation from the Analects. Instead, Zhou gave this calligraphy to the Japanese delegation at the end of the summit meeting on September 28, in order to express his high expectations for Tanaka and Ōhira in keeping their words and acting accordingly.48 In fact, the phrase “Always be true in words and resolute in deeds” was one of Zhou’s favorite quotations so that he included it in his “Five Words (Mottos)” that he always cited to the Japanese during the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization and for the peace and friendship treaty. The “Five Words” were: (1) Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future; (2) Leave aside minor differences for the sake of the common good; (3) Always be true in words and resolute in deeds; (4) Friendship for many generations to come between the Chinese people and the Japanese people, and (5) Oppose hegemony. Zhou left these words as his “will” because he died before the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty.49

TANAKA–ZHOU SUMMIT TALKS After resolving the misunderstanding of the word “meiwaku,” the negotiations focused on the actual wording of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. It required highly skilled expertise to work out the differences between the Chinese and Japanese drafts regarding the expression of 132 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION the “two Chinas” issue, as well as of Japan’s apology. Former MOFA China Section Head Hashimoto Hiroshi recalled in 2014:

We felt overwhelmed with the difficulty of the negotiations with tough and unyielding Chinese officials. Then, Tanaka said, “Don’t worry. I will assume all the responsibilities. College graduates are no good when it comes to a hellish situation.” His sense of humor cheered us up and we were able to work out the final wording of the joint communiqué.50

An ofﬁcial biography of Ōhira Masayoshi endorses Hashimoto’s recollections. The negotiations deadlocked as early as the second day (September 26). Ōhira reported to Tanaka who had waited at the Diaoyutai National Guesthouse:

Ōhira: “What should we do? ...We won’t be able to go home without resolving the deadlock.” Takana: “College-graduate intellectuals are no good in a deadlock.” Ōhira: “Then what should we do?” Tanaka: “You, college-graduate intellectuals, should come up with ideas.”

Everyone burst into laughter.

Tanaka: “There is no need to make too many concessions at this point. If our negotiations do not work, then we can go home. Just think that we came to China for sightseeing. I will assume all the responsibilities. Continue to do your best.”51

The “two Chinas” issue was the most essential prerequisite for China so that there was no room for compromise and the Japanese side agreed to recognize China (the PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China and also Taiwan as an inalienable part of China. This was more than Richard Nixon was willing to acknowledge seven months earlier. The Nixon administration only acknowledged in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972 that it would not object to China’s claim to be the sole legitimate government of China and to Taiwan being part of it: a “one China, but not now” formula devised by Morton Abramowitz (b. January 1933), the special assistant in the Ofﬁce of the Under Secretary of State. Zhou Enlai was surprised by this tactfully calibrated wording designed to avoid giving a clear ZHOU ENLAI AND THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR 133 commitment to China’s claim, but also to save face for both China and Taiwan. Zhou stated in later years that he could not have possibly come up with such an idea.52 In addition, the wording of Japan’s apology was controversial, especially after the “meiwaku incident” on September 25. During the foreign ministers’ meeting on September 28, Foreign Minister Ōhira proposed to his counterpart Ji Pengfei the wording “Japan’s strong awareness of its war responsibility and its deep apology.” When the wording was ﬁnally settled to be “Japan is keenly aware of its responsibility for the serious damage that it caused to the Chinese people through war ...” it was 4:30 AM on September 29.53

ZHOU ENLAI AND THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR Subsequently, Zhou showed a remarkably conciliatory stance regarding the wording of the termination of the state of war between the two countries. In establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, the Japanese government refused to accept the form of a peace treaty because Japan had already concluded a peace treaty with the ROC (Taiwan) in 1952, which was still in effect. Japanese MOFA officials considered that concluding a new peace treaty with the PRC would negate the Japanese postwar foreign policy toward China. Therefore, the Japanese government took the position that the matter of the termination of the state of war between China and Japan had already been settled by the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty and that it would violate international law for Japan to conclude another peace treaty with the PRC.54 The Chinese officials, on the other hand, considered that a new Sino- Japanese joint communiqué would terminate the state of war between the PRC and Japan. Zhou in person made it clear to Furui Yoshimi, who had visited Beijing earlier in September in order to discuss a Japanese draft proposal. Zhou also said to Furui during their second meeting, “Don’t worry. I have a good idea.” This suggests that Zhou already had a solution in mind at that time.55 According the official biography of Ōhira Masayoshi and Asahi Shimbun Research Office head Furukawa Mantarō, during the first round of official negotiations on September 25, Zhou denounced MOFA Treaties Bureau Director-General Takashima Masuo, as “fafei” (lit., law bandits), who stated that the matter had already been settled by the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty and that Japan was not in the position to refer to the matter. Afterward, however, Zhou suggested not to use the 134 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION phrase, “the state of war,” and instead to use the wording, “the two governments terminate the abnormal state of affairs between the two countries.” This idea satisfied the Japanese. Tanaka was impressed with Zhou as being a tough but conciliatory negotiator and referred to him as having “a body as flexible as a willow and a heart as strong as a rock.”56 Inoue Toshikazu has a different story to tell. According to Inoue’s interview in January 2015, Japanese MOFA China Section head Hashimoto Hiroshi initially suggested the idea to use the phrase “the abnormal state of affairs.” Foreign Minister Ōhira agreed with the idea and presented it to the Chinese officials. The Chinese side showed an understanding to this proposal and the issue of the wording of the termination of state of war was resolved.57

ZHOU ENLAI RENOUNCES CHINA’S WAR REPARATIONS Moreover, Zhou surprisingly renounced any claims toward Japan for war reparations from the second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese ofﬁcials again considered that the matter of war reparations between China and Japan had already been settled by the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty. Zhou already had a solution in mind on this issue and had indicated this to the Kōmeitō chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu in August 1972 by stating:

China not only was subjected to Japanese invasion for half a century but also suffered enormous pain due to the imposition of heavy war reparations [from the ﬁrst Sino-Japanese War]. Considering this, I cannot bear the thought of subjecting the Japanese people go through the same pain. On behalf of the Chinese people and the government, I therefore declare that China relinquishes its claims toward Japan for war reparations.58

Zhou made this political decision, which would seem hardly acceptable to the Chinese people on the mainland, for the sake of the realization of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. A former ambassador to China (1984–1987), Nakae Yōsuke (December 1922–March 2014), who directly handled the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization as an ofﬁcial in the MOFA Asia Bureau (bureau director-general, 1975– 1978), tells an inside story:

Prime Minister Tanaka took the position that Japan could not normalize relations with China should China request war reparations from Japan. ZHOU SHELVES SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE 135

From the Japanese standpoint, the war reparation issue between China and Japan had already been settled in the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty of 1952, in which the ROC (Taiwan) under Chiang Kai-shek relinquished war reparations from Japan (see Chapter Two).59

Zhou agreed to relinquish Chinese (PRC’s) war reparation claims towards Japan in order to reestablish peace and friendship between the two countries for generations. This was not an easy thing to do and was a huge concession on Zhou’s part. Some watchers argue that this concession was only pro forma because Zhou managed to obtain sizable economic aid from Tanaka in lieu of war reparations, which began the practice of Japan’s massive overseas development aid (ODA) to China. Nevertheless, it was still a signiﬁcant concession diplomatically and symbolically. Nakae explains that Zhou needed to justify his decision to the Chinese people, who had suffered tremendous damage and pain by the Japanese acts of aggression. For this, Zhou devised a rationale of distinguishing the Japanese people at large from the Japanese militarism:

Zhou reasoned that the war responsibility rests with a handful of Japanese militarists and the Japanese general public were also their victims. The Chinese government therefore should not demand war reparations from the Japanese.60

Zhou identiﬁed the “handful of militarists” as the Class-A war criminals indicted at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. This distinction would have serious implications for the issue of the Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (see Chapter 8).61

ZHOU SHELVES SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE Furthermore, Zhou decided to shelve the territorial dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. These islands had been under the effective control of the Japanese government since 1895. Neither China nor Taiwan claimed sovereignty over the islands until 1971, after the discovery that oil reserves might lay in the continental shelf of the East China Sea in October–November 1968 (see Chapter 9). This territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands could easily have been an impediment to the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, 136 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION but Zhou deterred it. Zhou ﬁrst discussed the issue with the Kōmeitō chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu in Beijing on July 28, 1972.62 The transcription of the handwritten “Takeiri Notes,” made in the ofﬁce of Tanaka Akihiko at Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, read:

There is no need to refer to the issue of the Senkaku Islands [in the Sino- Japanese Joint Communiqué]. I assume that Mr. Takeiri has not been interested in the issue. Neither have I. [Chinese] historians made an issue of the islands because of oil. In Japan, Professor Inoue Kiyoshi is enthusiastic about this issue. There is no need to take up this issue seriously. This is not an issue in comparison to realizing the diplomatic normalization based on the Five Principles for Peace.63

Inoue Kiyoshi (December 1913–November 2001), a Japanese communist and scholar of Japanese history, wrote an article and a book on the Senkaku Islands in 1972, in which he argues that the islands historically belonged to China, not to the Ryūkyū Kingdom, and that the Japanese claim over the islands was therefore untenable. Some analysts think that Zhou might have implied the Chinese claim to the islands by referring to Inoue Kiyoshi. Nevertheless, Inoue’s work on the Senkaku Islands is not well founded. Inoue himself stated that he had not studied Chinese history, let alone Chinese geographical history, and that he wrote this work in a little over a month with the help of his colleagues. Inoue had supported the Cultural Revolution and was expelled from the Japanese Communist Party in 1967, which severed relations with the Communist Party of China (CPC). In turn, the Five Principles for Peace refer to the principles written by Zhou in December 1953, which became the fundamental guide in establishing diplomatic relations between China and other countries (see Chapter 2).64 In comparison, a Chinese study on this dispute states, “Premier Zhou proposed to shelve the matter for the ﬁrst time at the Zhou–Takeiri meeting in July 1972, as a realistic solution to the dispute,” and cites a paragraph in the “Takeiri Notes” that was not included in the transcription made by the ofﬁce of Tanaka Akihiko at Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia. The paragraph reads:

When I [Takeiri] stated, “The Senkaku Islands are inalienable territories of Japan historically and also from the documented records,” Mr. Zhou just CONVERSATION BETWEEN TANAKA AND ZHOU 137

smiled. He then said, “The Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territories since long ago and I cannot change the view on this. We would only disagree endlessly [if we talk about the issue], let’s shelve it and leave it to wise generations in the future.65

CONVERSATION BETWEEN TANAKA AND ZHOU Then, in September 1972, Zhou discussed the Senkaku Islands issue with Prime Minister Tanaka. The diplomatic archives from the Japanese MOFA—which were declassiﬁed in September 2012—include records of the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization over the span of almost two decades from 1955 to 1973. An account in the records reads:

On September 27, 1972, the third day of the summit negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization between Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in Beijing, Tanaka ﬁrst brought up the Senkaku Islands issue to Zhou by asking, “What do you think about the Senkaku Islands?” Zhou then told Tanaka, “I do not want to talk about the Senkaku Islands issue at this time. It is not good to talk about it now. This became the issue because of oil there. Were it not for oil, neither Taiwan nor the United States would make an issue of the islands.” Then, the two moved on to a different subject.66

This short account appears in the transcription of the conversation between Tanaka and Zhou for four days of the negotiations, made by the Japanese MOFA in September 1988 from the original document. The MOFA did not disclose the original document at the time. The MOFA says that the original document does not exist and its whereabouts are unknown. Commenting on the declassiﬁed account, Chūō University professor Hattori Ryūji states:

The account appears to be a contrived and truncated version of the actual conversation between Tanaka and Zhou. The original document might have included a more detailed account of their conversation. If the original document cannot be found in the near future, this calls into question the management of classiﬁed documents on the part of the MOFA ...It was amateurish of Tanaka to have brought up the Senkaku Islands issue when Japan had effective control of the islands, but Zhou 138 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

did not take advantage of this and instead eschewed discussing the issue further. Zhou made the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with Japan a top priority, because China was confronted with the Soviet threat at that time, and judged that it had better not touch the issue of Senkaku Islands. However, the fact that Zhou did not take up the Senkaku Islands issue at the summit meeting for the negotiation of the diplomatic normalization can only be considered as China’s abandon- ment of its claim to the islands. In international law, a country cannot later claim a territory that it did not claim at the time of establishing diplomatic relations with another country.67

Hattori is right in casting doubt on the Japanese MOFA account. Actually, one of the foremost Japan specialists and then Chinese MOFA senior advisor, Zhang Xiangshan (1914–October 2009), who attended all four summit talks between Tanaka and Zhou, as well as three foreign ministers’ talks in Beijing, recorded more detailed minutes of the conversation between Tanaka and Zhou on September 27. Zhang’s minutes read:

Toward the end of the meeting, Tanaka brought up the issue by stating, “I would like to hear your position on the Senkaku Islands on this occasion.” Zhou replied, “I do not want to talk about it at this time. It is no good to talk about it now.” Tanaka: “I would be in trouble if I went home without mentioning this matter to you insofar as I came to Beijing. Since we just addressed this matter, I can report this back to Japan. I fulﬁlled a certain responsibility for this.”

Zhou: “Taiwan is making a big issue out of this because oil reserves were discovered. The United States is also intent on doing something about it.” Tanaka: “This is ﬁne. There is no need to talk about it further. Let’s leave it to the future.” Zhou: “Let’s leave it to the future. We should settle the big issue of diplomatic normalization ﬁrst at this time. This is the most urgent matter. Other issues can wait.” Tanaka: “We can solve them upon the realization of diplomatic normalization.”68

In essence, Zhou did not want the territorial dispute to become an obstacle to the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Tanaka concurred and both agreed to shelve the issue. Consequently, no reference SIGNING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ 139 to the dispute was made in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 1972 (see Chapter 9 for later developments on this dispute).

SIGNING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ On the ﬁfth day of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Beijing on September 29, 1972, Premier Zhou, Prime Minister Tanaka, and Foreign Ministers Ji and Ōhira signed the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué, by which the two countries normalized their diplomatic relations. The joint communiqué was made up of a preamble and the text with nine paragraphs, an excerpt of which read:

The two countries aspire to realize the termination of the state of war and the normalization of their relations. Japan is keenly aware of its responsibility for the serious damage that it caused to the Chinese people through war and acknowledges the “three principles concerning the restoration of relations” put forth by the Chinese government.

1) The two governments terminate the abnormal state of affairs between the two countries; 2) Japan recognizes China as the sole legitimate government of China; 3) Japan respects the Chinese position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of China; 4) The two governments have decided to establish diplomatic relations as of September 29, 1972, and have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment; 5) China renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people; 6) The two governments agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual beneﬁt, and peaceful coexistence; 7) Normalization of relations between the two countries is not directed against any third country. Neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Paciﬁc region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. 8) The two governments have agreed that they will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship; and 140 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

9) The two governments have agreed that they will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and ﬁsheries.69

The wording of the text reﬂects Zhou’s willingness to forgive and forget the past so that two countries could move on to a new stage of their relations. Chinese MOFA Japanese Section deputy head Ding Min states:

It was Premier Zhou Enlai who insisted on adding the phrase, “for many generations to come,” to “peace and friendship between the two countries” in the joint communiqué. This was not mere rhetoric. Premier Zhou really meant it. He genuinely wished for peace and friendship with Japan.70

Ding was actually referring to one of Zhou’s “Five Words (Mottos)” used during the negotiations for the diplomatic normalization and for the peace and friendship treaty: “friendship for many generations to come between the Chinese people and the Japanese people.” Endorsing Ding, an Asahi Shimbun correspondent in Beijing, Yoshida Makoto, also notes that China had never used such expressions as “friendship for many generations to come” in establishing relations with other countries. This demonstrated the unusually strong wish for peace and friendship between China and Japan on Zhou’s part. This motto is reﬂected in the expression—“to establish relations of perpetual peace between the two countries”—in the joint communiqué, as well as in the expression—“China and Japan shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship”—in the Sino- Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty to be concluded in 1978.71

ABROGATION OF THE JAPAN–ROC PEACE TREATY On September 29, at the press conference held after the signing of the Sino- Japanese Joint Communiqué, Foreign Minister Ōhira stated that, “the termination of the abnormal relations between China and Japan will significantly contribute to peace in Asia and in the world ...The Japanese government takes the view that as a result of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty has lost its raison d’être, and the treaty is thereby considered to have lost its effect ...” This was one of the points that the Japanese government had refused to include in the text of the joint communiqué. Zhou conceded that the Japanese government would make only a verbal declaration of this point unilaterally. Zhou even ABROGATION OF THE JAPAN–ROC PEACE TREATY 141 acquiesced to Japan and Taiwan continuing private relations, including economic and cultural exchanges. Zhou therefore was pressing the Japanese side as to when it would make this verbal declaration.72 In this context, Ōhira did so at the press conference after the signing of the joint communiqué, just as he had indicated the previous day. Zhou was impressed with Ōhira’s fortitude and stated, “Ōhira is sincere and honest. He might not be facile with words but he is intelligent and knowledgeable. He wholeheartedly assisted Tanaka. The Sino-Japanese diplomatic restoration was made possible only by his selfless support of Tanaka.” Accordingly, the Japanese government abrogated the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty in Tokyo on September 29, 1972 and both governments recalled their embassy and consulate general reciprocally. However, private relations between Japan and Taiwan continued, as Zhou had acquiesced to them.73 Later that day, Zhou flew to Shanghai, accompanying Tanaka and his entourage, and saw them off the following day. Subsequently, Fujiyama Aiichirō received an invitation from Zhou to attend the celebration of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in Beijing. He declined (because he had already visited China several times recently and his mission was accomplished). However, China–Japan Memorandum Trade Office chief representative Xiao Xiangqian, in Tokyo, came to see Fujiyama in person and told him that Zhou wanted Fujiyama to come. Thus, Fujiyama visited China again in October 1972. There, Liao Chengzhi hosted a reception to celebrate the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization at the Great Hall of the People. It was a huge banquet with 800 guests, including Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō and Japan–China Memorandum Trade Office chief representative Okazaki Kaheita.74 Fujiyama writes, “I was impressed with the heartfelt reception by the Chinese. I could not help but think of Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Matsumura Kenzō,aswellasMurataShōzō who taught me about China in my businessman days. I knew how much the three had longed for this day to come for so long. I wished that the three pioneers of Sino-Japanese relations were alive and I could celebrate this historic moment with them.”75

*** Zhou realized a major diplomatic breakthrough by restoring diplomatic relations with Japan 23 years after the foundation of the PRC. It was truly an epoch-making event, liquidating the Japanese acts of aggression and establishing new Sino-Japanese relations, as a basis for building peace in Asia. However, this was only an end of the beginning. Concluding a peace 142 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION and friendship treaty with Japan, in order to formally terminate the state of war between the two countries and build a permanent peace and friendship relationship, as stipulated in the joint communiqué, was not an easy task. A series of obstacles confronted the conclusion of the treaty and new rounds of arduous negotiations awaited Zhou.

NOTES 1. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 2068–2070. 2. Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai-shimbunsha, 1998, 133. 3. Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 140. 4. Ibid.; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 3, 476–477. 5. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 491; John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations, New York: Rowan & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 1997, 10–11; “Resolution 2758,” United Nations General Assembly, http://daccess- dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/ NR032774.pdf?OpenElement, accessed March 17, 2015. 6. Holdridge, 10–11. 7. Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan), Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007, 364–365. 8. Jin, 2070–2072; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 534–535; Sun, 133–136. 9. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 535–536; Sun, 136–144. 10. Ibid. (both). 11. Zhao, 122–124 and 137–144. 12. Fujiyama Aiichirō, Seiji waga-michi: Fujiyama Aiichirō kaisōroku (My Way in Politics: Memoirs of Fujiyama Aiichirō), Tokyo: Asahi-shimbunsha, 1976, 179–182. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 197–198 and 203. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 363. 15. Fujiyama, 198–201. 16. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 438. 17. Armin H, Meyer, Assignment Tokyo: An Ambassador’s Journal, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, 111–123; Robert A. Wampler, “Armin Meyer NOTES 143

Oral History Interview,” January 17, 1996, http://www.gwu.edu/~ nsarchiv/japan/meyerohinterview.htm. 18. Ibid. (both). 19. “60–70 nendai gaikō bunsho kōkai” (Diplomatic Archives of the 1960s and 1970s Released to the Public), Chūnichi Shimbun (also ciculated as Tokyo Shimbun), July 25, 2014. 20. Ibid. 21. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 486; Fujiyama, 203–204, 209– 215, and 309–310. 22. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 513–517; Fujiyama, 211–213. 23. Fujiyama, 211–213. 24. Fujiyama, 213–215; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 517. 25. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 520; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku: Rekishi-hōtei no hikoku toshite (Reﬂections: As Defendant at the Tribunal of History), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004, 99–100. 26. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 527; Sun, 153–154 and 159; Furui Yoshimi, “Korekarawa keizai o oyarinasai” (Promote Economic Relations From Now on), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 163–166. 27. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 519–520 and 525–526; Zhao, 141–142. 28. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 536–537; Sasaki Kōzō, “Sorenara Tanaka-shushō ni kite-moraimashōka” (Then, Why Don’tWeInvidePrime Minister Tanaka to Beijing?), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 171–175. 29. Jin, 2072–2073; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 539–540; Takeiri Yoshikatsu, “Nitchū no ‘kin-no-hashi’ rekishi no haguruma o ugo- gasu” (“Golden Bridge” between China and Japan Moved the History), in Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 162. 30. Takeiri, 162; Furukawa Mantarō, “Shū Onrai to tainichi gensoku: Kokkō- seijōka ni miru seiji-shuwan” (Zhou Enlai and his Principles toward Japan: Political Skills for Diplomatic Normalization), in Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 401–405. 31. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 543–547. 32. “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai: Nitchū ni hashi o kakeru” (Ōhira Masayoshi and Zhou Enlai: To Build a Bridge between Japan and China), in Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 376–379. 33. Furukawa, 403–405; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 370 and 379. 34. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 550–552. 144 6 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

35. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 551. 36. Jin, 2074–2075; Yoshida Makoto, Nitchū-hōdō kaisō no 35-nen (Recollections of 35 Years of Reporting Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo: Ushio-shuppansha, 1998, 146–147. 37. “Tanaka Kakuei, ima-taikō, horonigai anpan” (Bittersweet Anpan Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei Ate [in Beijing]), Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 2014. 38. “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 380–381. 39. Ibid., 387; Yoshida, 147–148; “Tanaka Kakuei, ima-taikō, horonigai anpan.” 40. “Tei Min tono ichimon ittō” (Interview with Ding Min), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 22, 2002. 41. Sun, 151–152. 42. Jin, 2075; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 552–554; Yoshida, 147–148. 43. Inoue Toshikazu, “Gaimu-kanryō o miryō shita Tanaka Kakuei” (Tanaka Kakuei Who Fascinated Foreign Affairs Ofﬁcials), Bungei-shunjū, Vol. 93, No 1, January 2015, 285–287. 44. Yabuki Susumu, “Ryō Shōshi tsūyaku no yakuwari” (Role of Liao Chengzhi as Interpreter), October 21, 2003, http://www25.big.jp/~yabuki/2003/ cd031021.htm; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 554; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 384–385; Yoshida, 149–150. 45. Ibid. (all). 46. Yoshida, 150; Yabuki Susumu, “Meiwaku no ni-moji: Sanjū-nen hetemo tsutawaranai Mō Takutō no shin’i” (Two Characters, Mei-waku: True Intention of Mao Zedong That is Not Understood after Thirty-Years), September 17, 2002, http://www18.big.jp/~yabukis/doc11/cd020917. htm; Yoshida, 149–150. 47. Yabuki (2002). 48. Jin, 2077; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 554; Yoshida, 151 and 434–435; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 385. 49. Yoshida, 434–435. 50. “Tanaka Kakuei, ima-taikō, horonigai anpan.” 51. “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 383. 52. Holdridge, 263–267. 53. “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 385–386. 54. Jin, 2076–2077; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 550; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 380–385; Furukawa, 402–405. 55. Ibid. (all). 56. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 552–553; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 380–385; Furukawa, 402–405. 57. Inoue, 285–287. 58. Jin, 2075–2076; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 553–554; Furukawa, 402–403. NOTES 145

59. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 553–554; Nakae Yōsuke, “Chūgoku wa naze Yasukuni sanpai ni kodawarunoka” (Why Does China Oppose the Yasukuni Visit?), Chūnichi Shimbun, July 16, 2001. 60. Nakae. 61. Ibid. 62. “Dai-nikai Takeiri Yoshikatsu Shū Onrai kaidan kiroku” (Minutes of the Second Takeiri Yoshikatsu–Zhou Enlai Talk), ofﬁce of Tanaka Akihiko, Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo. ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720728.O2J.html, accessed September 28, 2012. 63. Ibid. 64. Inoue Kiyoshi, “Senkaku”-rettō:Chōgyo-shotō no shiteki kaimei (“Senkaku” Islands: Historical Analysis of Diaoyu Islands), Tokyo: Gendai-hyōronsha, 1972; Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, 390 and 408–409; “Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles for Peace,” Zhou Enlai Peace Institute, http://www. zhouenlaipeaceinstitute.org/en/ﬁve-principles-of-peace-2/, June 2013. 65. “Kenshō:Chōgyo-tō ryōyūken mondai ni kansuru Chūnichi-kan no ‘tanaage gōi’” (Assessment: Sino-Japanese “Agreement to Shelve” for Issue of Sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands), January 15, 2013, http://j.people.com. cn/94474/8093454.html. 66. “Nitchū-gaikō wa kōshite hajimatta” (This is How the Sino-Japanese Diplomacy Began), September 30, 2012, http://matome.naver.jp/odai/ 2134917025274577601. 67. Ibid. 68. “Kenshō.” 69. Jin, 2077; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 555; “Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” September 29, 1972, http://www.mofa.go. jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html. 70. “Tei Min tono ichimon ittō.” 71. Ibid.; Yoshida, 434–435. 72. Jin, 2077–2078; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 384–386; Yoshida, 152–153. 73. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 554; “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai,” 384–386. 74. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 555; Fujiyama, 219–220. 75. Fujiyama, 219–220. CHAPTER 7

Secret Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty

No sooner had the People’s Republic of China (the PRC or “China” hereafter) established diplomatic relations with Japan by signing the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué in September 1972 than Zhou Enlai engaged in the ultimate task of fully normalizing Sino-Japanese relations: to conclude a peace treaty with Japan in order to formally end the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Japan had only concluded a peace treaty with the Republic of China (ROC or “Taiwan” hereafter) in 1952 and the state of war between China and Japan had not been legally terminated. This became Zhou’s last operation vis-à- vis Japan, as he was diagnosed with bladder cancer in February 1972. He put his remaining energy into this mission while domestically dealing with the aftermath of the Lin Biao Incident and the Gang of Four. The negotiations for the peace treaty stalemated despite the fact that the Chinese terms for the peace treaty were basically the same as those stipulated in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. This chapter examines the real causes for the impediments to the peace treaty from the accounts of those who were actually engaged in the behind-the- scenes negotiations.

ZHOU’S MEETING WITH NAKASONE YASUHIRO In January 1973, Zhou received two Japanese parliamentarians from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) consecutively: Kimura Takeo

(August 1902–November 1983), former construction minister in the first Tanaka cabinet, and Nakasone Yasuhiro (b. May 1918; Prime Minister, November 1982–November 1987), international trade and industry minister in the first and second Tanaka cabinet. Nakasone’s trip marked the first visit to China by a Japanese incumbent state minister after the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in September 1972. Nakasone, who had met Zhou for the first time in Beijing in September 1954 (see Chapter 2), had a long discussion with Zhou in January 1973. Nakasone states:

Premier Zhou showed special interest in Japan’s national defense policy because I had been director-general of Japan’s Defense Agency. We ended up discussing the security issues in East Asia, although I was international trade and industry ministeratthattime.Ourmeetingwas extended from the originally scheduled one session to three sessions over two days. Our discussions lasted for eight hours in total. Zhou also told me that he had lived in Kyoto for a while during his years in Japan, but that he had returned home soon ...He asked me if I knew Kawakami Hajime. I replied that I had read Kawakami’s Binbō monogatari (Tale of Poverty).1

Nakasone further states:

I was impressed with the way Zhou Enlai saw me off after our meeting ﬁnished past 1:00 AM. He escorted me down to the entrance stairs of the Great Hall of the People, personally put my coat on me, and saw me off. It was freezing outside. It was not conventional for a premier to do this for a mere state minister of another country. I learned a lot from the considerate and gracious manner with which Zhou treated me. I did not have a chance to see him again because he died in 1976. The next time I visited China was during the time of Hua Guofeng [premier, 1976–1980]. I visited China again in March 1984, this time as Japan’s Prime Minister. During this visit, Zhou’s widow Deng Yingchao told me that his relics, including his journal, were displayed at the National History Museum [current National Museum of China] in front of the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square. Then she told me that Zhou had written in his journal about his meeting with me in 1973. She also told me that Zhou had told her about his meeting with me and said, “Nakasone will become Japan’s Prime Minister some day.”2 CHINA–JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION MISSION TO JAPAN 149

CHINA–JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION MISSION TO JAPAN In April–May 1973, Zhou sent a large China–Japan Friendship Association mission to Japan, with association President Liao Chengzhi as delegation head leading 55 members. This was the first official Chinese mission to Japan after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 1972. Before the departure, Zhou met Liao and his entourage twice and instructed them, “not to forget old friends and to make new friends there.” Zhou then had Deng Xiaoping see the delegation off. Liao was born in Tokyo, spoke fluent Japanese, and had an amiable personality with a great sense of humor. For example, he drew a painting of a giant panda in ink-brush on the spot, as his self-portrait, and gave it to a Japanese parliamentarian Hamano Seigo. Liao’s energetic visit to different parts of Japan during a month-long stay caused the “Liao whirlwind.” During a meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, Liao handed him an unlikely present. It was the leaves of a cherry tree. The leaves were from the cherry tree that Tanaka had planted himself in Beijing in September 1972, as a gift to China in commemoration of the diplomatic normalization. Liao presented the leaves in order to show Tanaka that his cherry tree was growing well.3 Sun Pinghua, who accompanied Liao as deputy head and secretary- general of the Chinese delegation, states:

Before the departure of the delegation, Premier Zhou had summoned all the members of the delegation for a brieﬁng. There he asked how Prime Minister Tanaka’s cherry tree was doing. Two delegation members hurried to Tiantan (Temple of Heaven) Park and saw that the tree had rooted and was growing well. They took some leaves and delivered them to Zhou. Zhou then asked Liao to deliver them to Tanaka in person ...This episode exempliﬁes how Zhou tended every small detail of diplomatic protocol and how he had the utmost considerateness for political leaders in other countries he was dealing with at any given time.4

Liao then met with members of the second Tanaka cabinet (December 1972–November 1973), including Vice Prime Minister and Environmental Agency Director-General Miki Takeo, Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio, International Trade and Industry Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Posts and Telecommunications Minister Kuno Chūji, who succeeded in concluding the Sino-Japanese Seabed Cable Agreement in 1973 in a 150 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ... most adverse situation. Liao also met other members of the LDP, including Fujiyama Aiichirō (May 1897–February 1985), Furui Yoshimi (January 1903–February 1995), and Utsunomiya Tokuma (September 1906–July 2000). They were among the strongest advocates for Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization in the LDP.5 Liao then visited the residence of former Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan (September 1884–April 1973) on his deathbed. Ishibashi had visited China with Utsunomiya in September 1959, as the first Japanese former Prime Minister in the LDP to do so, and also in September– October 1963. At Ishibashi’s house, his son whispered to him and informed him that he had visitors from China. He then moved his mouth slightly, as if to acknowledge that he understood this. He passed away several days later.6 Liao also met opposition party leaders, such as Kōmeitō (backed by the New Buddhist group Sōka Gakkai) Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) Chairman Kasuga Ikkō, both of whom had played a role in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, as well as economic leaders, including Japan–China Association on Economy and Trade (JCAET) President Inayama Yoshihiro (Nippon Steel president, 1973–1981; Japan Business Federation president, 1980–1986). In addition, following the Chinese saying, “he shall not forget those who dug the well when he drinks the water,” Liao visited the graves in Tokyo of Matsumura Kenzō, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, and Asanuma Inejirō, the assassinated Japan Socialist Party (JSP) chairman. Liao and his wife, Jing Puchun, then traveled to western Japan, with Saionji Kinkazu, who had become one of the executive directors of the Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association. They visited Nagoya, Kyoto, Nara, and Kobe. Through accompanying the Chinese delegation on these local trips, Saionji felt that peace had finally returned between China and Japan.7 Meanwhile, other members of the Chinese delegation traveled as far as Hokkaidō to the north and Okinawa to the south and energetically promoted friendship with local cities all over Japan. They made sister city arrangements with them, such as between Kobe and Tianjin and between Yokohama and Shanghai, and thereby strengthened China’s ties with Overseas Chinese in Japan, who had enormous influence on Taiwan. Taiwan countered the Chinese operations vis-à-vis Overseas Chinese in Japan by sending its intelligence agents to Japan, but they were eclipsed by the Liao whirlwind. According to the Asahi Shimbun opinion poll in May 1973, taken during Liao’s local trips in Japan, China became the most FALL OF PRIME MINISTER TANAKA KAKUEI 151 popular country with which the Japanese would like to be friends (34 percent), whereas the United States came second (21 percent). A Japanese journal sums Liao’s trip as “a total encapsulation of postwar Sino-Japanese relations that had been built up” and “a milestone for building permanent friendship between the peoples of China and Japan.”8

FALL OF PRIME MINISTER TANAKA KAKUEI Nevertheless, the tension between the two governments was smoldering behind the China fever in Japan. Pro-Taiwan lobbies in the former Satō cabinet tried to remove Tanaka’s power. Tanaka was implicated in domestic money scandals, and the support rate for Tanaka plummeted to 27 percent in May 1973 from 62 percent in April 1973, during Liao’s stay in Japan. Tanaka resigned in December 1974. In retrospect, Tanaka tried to rebuild Sino-Japanese relations in haste and antagonized the Nixon administration by unequivocally recognizing China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China, before the Nixon administration did. In turn, the ROC (Taiwan) government conﬁscated Japanese corporate assets in Taiwan in retaliation against Tanaka’s unilateral abrogation of the Japan–ROC Peace Treaty. Tanaka also began the practice of Japan’s sizable overseas development aid (ODA) to China. A Japanese political scientist, Kataoka Tetsuya, argues:

The Nixon administration took Tanaka’s commitment to China as a de facto Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact, making Nixon and Kissinger distrust Tanaka. Thus, Zhou Enlai succeeded in creating a crevice in the US–Japan Security Treaty. Subsequently, US–Japan relations actually deteriorated.9

Tanaka also promoted Japan–Soviet relations and visited Moscow in October 1973, only the second Japanese Prime Minister to do so after Hatoyama Ichirō in 1956. Then, with the outbreak of the ﬁrst Oil Crisis in October 1973, Tanaka switched Japan’s pro-Israel position to a pro-Arab position, which upset the Nixon administration and the international oil cartel. After Tanaka resigned in December 1974, he was indicted in the Lockheed bribery scandals and was arrested in July 1976, becoming the second former Japanese Prime Minister to be arrested. This scandal is shrouded in mystery. Many Japanese think that it was a conspiracy by a US oil industry cartel, the US administration, and the mainstream in the Japanese MOFA that resented Tanaka for damaging US–Japan relations. 152 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was international trade and industry minister in four Tanaka cabinets, states:

The origin of the Lockheed bribery scandals was Tanaka’s oil policy ...Henry Kissinger, who continued to serve as secretary of state in the Ford administration, knew more about it than you would think.10

In turn, the Chinese continued to revere Tanaka, and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Tanaka’s residence (the “Mejiro palace”) in Tokyo during his visit to Japan in October 1978. Then, in August 1992, Deng invited Tanaka and his daughter Tanaka Makiko, who had accompanied her father to Beijing 20 years earlier, to visit China. Makiko succeeded to her father’s district and won a seat in the HR in July 1993, ﬁve months before his death. Makiko then became foreign minister in the ﬁrst Koizumi cabinet in April 2001, only to be dismissed in January 2002. Kataoka states, “The fact that the MOFA launched an anti-Makiko campaign suggests the MOFA’s deep animosity towards Tanaka Kakuei and its collaboration in the Lockheed bribery scandals.” Makiko left the LDP in 2003 and transferred to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2008, where Tanaka’s protégé, Ozawa Ichirō, had moved in 2002.11

SINO-JAPANESE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT Meanwhile, in 1973, negotiations for bilateral agreements in specific matters such as trade, aviation, navigation, and fisheries that were supposed to be made within a year of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué did not progress as expected. Specifically, the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese civil aviation agreement stumbled over the Taiwan issue. On September 9, 1973, Zhou summoned the Japanese ambassador to China, Ogawa Heishirō, and strongly pointed out that the Taiwan issue constituted an impediment to building Sino-Japanese relations.12 To complicate the matter, China (the PRC) was not a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and was not a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at that time, whereas the ROC was a member. Zhou pressed for the PRC’s admission to the ICAO, and it came through in February 1974. Meanwhile, Japan had ratified the convention and was admitted to the ICAO in 1953. But even after Japan had established diplomatic relations with China in September 1972 and abrogated the Japan–ROC (Taiwan) Peace Treaty SINO-JAPANESE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT 153 of 1952, Japan and Taiwan still maintained direct flights between Taipei and Tokyo. The Japanese flag carrier, Japan Airlines (JAL), regularly flew to Taipei. The Taiwanese flag carrier, China Airlines (CAL), flew to Haneda–Tokyo airport. China considered this a violation of the “three political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations,” which the Japanese government had agreed to in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué.13 Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations President Fujiyama Aiichirō was frustrated with the slow progress in the bilateral agreements. Being a former (the first) president of JAL and incumbent president of the Japan Aeronautic Association (JAA), he decided to lay the groundwork for the aviation agreement himself. Fujiyama tells a secret story about how he did this:

I ﬁrst talked to Foreign Minister Ōhira toward the end of 1973 and convinced him to go to Beijing and negotiate the terms for the aviation agreement in person. When Ōhira visited China in January 1974 in order to sign a Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement, Ōhira discussed the matter of civil aviation with Premier Zhou and worked out a draft for a six-point “one-package” aviation agreement (The “one-package” meant that none of the provisions in the draft agreement shall be excluded). This draft stipulated that ﬂight routes between Japan and Taiwan would be dealt with by a private agreement and that the Japanese national carrier JAL would not be used for routes between Japan and Taiwan ...Should the content of the draft agreement be leaked in advance, the Taiwanese government and pro-Taiwan Japanese parliamentarians would lobby to kill the aviation bill before it was presented at the Japanese parliament. I immediately gathered my colleagues and mobilized them for the groundwork for the passage of the aviation bill in parliament.14

Fujiyama continues his secret story: “Foreign Minister Ōhira pledged to me that he would resign his post if he failed in the negotiations for the aviation agreement. He engaged in the difficult task of dealing with opposition both within the LDP and without. One slip of the tongue by Ōhira would have ruined the agreement, but he managed to keep it to himself until the LDP Policy Research Council meeting.” In turn, Zhou also knew that he could trust Ōhira from the way he had handled the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué in Beijing in September 1972 (see Chapter 6). In addition, Ōhira’s sworn friend and colleague, Itō Masayoshi (foreign minister, July 1980–May 1981) 154 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ... collaborated with Fujiyama, and the Sino-Japanese Civil Aviation Agreement was finally signed in Beijing on April 20, 1974. In protest, Taiwan suspended all of its air routes to Japan; however, they were resumed in September 1975.15 Subsequently, on April 22, 1974, Zhou received former member of the House of Representatives (HR) in the LDP, Kawasaki Hideji, who was leading a mission of the World Youth Exchange Association (he had created it in 1965 and became president in 1969). They discussed matters such as Sino-Japanese navigation and international trade at length. When Kawasaki expressed his hope that Zhou would visit Japan, Zhou stated: “It is very difficult for me to answer your question, because I ‘owe’ too much. Therefore, I have to say, ‘I cannot go.’” Then, on September 29, 1974, the first official direct non-stop flight between Tokyo and Beijing flew on the second anniversary day of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. Former Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō led this commemorative Japanese friendship mission, which included many friends of China, such as Saionji Kinkazu.16

“HEGEMONY CLAUSE” More seriously, the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, the ultimate objective set forth by the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 1972, stumbled over the “hegemony clause” issue. The “hegemony clause” refers to Paragraph Seven of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué, which stipulates, “Normalization of relations between the two countries is not directed against any third country. Neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Paciﬁc region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” Zhou felt that the Sino- Japanese peace and friendship treaty should include the “hegemony clause,” just as the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué had provided it. The Japanese government had signed the joint communiqué and therefore should not have any problems with having the same clause in the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty. Nevertheless, the Japanese MOFA ofﬁcials objected to including the “hegemony clause” in the treaty. They were concerned about the Soviet claim that Paragraph Seven was adversarial to the Soviet Union and that the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué constituted an anti-Soviet military alliance in effect.17 “HEGEMONY CLAUSE” 155

Prime Minister Miki Takeo (term of ofﬁce, December 1974–December 1976), who had succeeded Tanaka Kakuei, stated at his inaugural address in January 1975 that he would conclude the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty before the end of 1975. However, Miki, a small faction leader in the LDP, kept changing his position on the “hegemony clause.” Miki’s position changed from “not to include the hegemony clause in the treaty,” to “include the clause in the preamble of the treaty” (interpreting that the preamble has no binding effect), then to “to adhere to the principles of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué,” and to “consider the hegemony clause a universal principle.” Sun Pinghua states:

When I visited Japan in September 1975, Prime Minister Miki whispered to me, “I perfectly understand the Chinese position. Rest assured that I will solve the issue.” Despite his assurance, he failed to keep his word.18

In turn, Fujiyama Aiichirō writes:

Miki’s indecisive attitude made China’s Japan specialists, even including the usually congenial Liao Chengzhi, distrust the Japanese government. It was contradictory for the Japanese government to refuse the hegemony clause that it had acknowledged in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. Since the war reparations and territorial dispute had already been settled in the joint communiqué, the main purpose of the treaty was to pledge to each other to promote peace and friendship between the two countries. There was nothing wrong with stipulating the hegemony clause in the treaty. Yet, Japanese MOFA ofﬁcials argued that the nature of the peace treaty was different from that of the joint communiqué and that the term hegemony did not suit the peace treaty. They were sabotaging the treaty by using petty technicalities as an excuse.19

It appears that the Japanese MOFA officials were concerned with a balance between Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-US relations. The US administration had proceeded in its relations with China cautiously due to the presence of the strong Taiwan lobby at home. Despite the Sino-US rapprochement in February 1972, the Nixon administration did not establish official diplomatic relations with China. The Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972 did not recognize China as the sole legitimate government of China or Taiwan as an integral part of China. Instead, the communiqué stipulates: “The United States acknowledges all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and 156 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ... that Taiwan is part of China. The US government does not challenge that position.” This ambiguous position was devised to save face for both China and Taiwan. Then the Nixon administration established the US Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing in March 1973 and appointed David K. E. Bruce as its first chief (1973–1974), who was succeeded by George H. W. Bush (1974–1975). The US government did not establish diplomatic relations with China until January 1979 during the Carter administration.20

ZHOU’S FAILING HEALTH During this period, ofﬁcial diplomatic contacts between China and Japan were few and Sino-Japanese relations were mainly limited to economic engagements. Concurrently, Zhou’s health was rapidly declining and he received fewer Japanese visitors. One of those visitors was Ikeda Daisaku (b. January 1928), third president of the New Buddhist group Sōka Gakkai (the backbone of the Kōmeitō). Ikeda states:

I visited China for the ﬁrst time in May 1974 and met Vice Premier Li Xiannian. I visited China again in December 1974 and met Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping at noon on December 5. That night, I met Premier Zhou at Beijing 305 Hospital ...I was deeply touched by his generosity to have invited a mere private foreign visitor against the strong objections of his medical team. He was 76 years old and I was only 46. He told me, “I consider you important because you are young,” as if to entrust the future to younger generations. His words motivated me to begin the new activities for the promotion of peace and friendship of the youth of the world.21

Inspired by Zhou, Ikeda founded Sōka Gakkai International (SGI) in 1975, and is still its president in 2017. Ikeda also accepted six students from the PRC to Sōka University in April 1975, which became the ﬁrst university in Japan to ofﬁcially accept students from the PRC. Ikeda has often been referred to as the last Japanese Zhou met before his death, but this is not the case. In January 1975, Zhou received a Japan–China Association on Economy and Trade (JCAET) mission, led by its President Inayama Yoshihiro, and a delegation of HR members in the LDP, which included Hori Shigeru (September 1901–March 1979; Satō Eisaku’s chief cabinet secretary, known for the “Hori Letter,” by which Satō had Hori unsuccessfully tried to contact Zhou in 1971), Tsubokawa ZHOU’S LAST MEETING WITH A JAPANESE 157

Shinzō (November 1901–November 1977, Satō’s construction minister), and Tagawa Seiichi (Matsumura Kenzō’s protégé).22 During the meeting with the Japanese parliamentarians, Zhou reminisced about the cherry blossom he had seen in Arashiyama, Kyoto, 56 years before. The Japanese visitors expressed their hope that he would visit Japan at the time of cherry blossom again and see the cherry blossom again. Zhou stated, “I wish I could, but I do not have the strength to follow my heart. I am afraid that it would be difﬁcult.” Then, in June 1975, Zhou received a Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT) mission led by its President Fujiyama Aiichirō, who was also Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians for Sino- Japanese Friendship president. This became Zhou’s last meeting with the Japanese.23

ZHOU’S LAST MEETING WITH A JAPANESE The international situation in East Asia changed drastically with the Fall of Saigon in April 1975. Fujiyama felt that he had no time to lose for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Out of a sense of urgency, Fujiyama sought a meeting with Zhou. Fujiyama states:

I refrained from meeting Premier Zhou on my previous two visits to China because he had been sick for some time and was conducting his administrative work at the hospital. In June 1975, however, I sought a meeting with Zhou when I visited China on trade business as JAPIT president, along with its Vice President Kawase Ikkan. Upon arriving in Beijing, I asked Liao Chengzhi for a meeting with Zhou. Liao consented. On June 12, I was then taken to a hospital, which looked like a nursing home. Zhou’s secretary told me to limit the meeting to 15 to 20 minutes due to his condition. Zhou looked frail and thin, but once he began talking, he regained his usual assertive and eloquent manner. The meeting began before 8:00 PM and ended after 9:00 PM, making Zhou’s secretary and myself worry. Zhou pushed himself and extended the meeting time because he wanted to clarify his position on the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty to Prime Minister Miki.24

Fujiyama revealed the content of his secret meeting with Zhou:

As Premier Zhou articulated his opinions to me, I wrote down his words, with permission. Zhou states: 1) the most important objective of the 158 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty is to establish forward-looking relations for the future; 2) China has no intention of bringing up the war reparation issue and the Taiwan issue in the treaty; 3) the principle of peaceful coexistence (Paragraph Six of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué) and the hegemony clause (Paragraph Seven of the joint communiqué) are important to China; and 4) China only wants Japan to stipulate in the treaty the hegemony clause that Japan has already acknowledged in the joint communiqué.25

Zhou also told Fujiyama that he did not understand why the Japanese government insisted that it had not received his reply to Prime Minister Miki’s letter to him: Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua had received Miki’s letter to Zhou through the Japanese ambassador to China, Ogawa Heishirō. Zhou then gave his reply to Miki to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong, who in turn gave it to Ambassador Ogawa in Beijing. Nevertheless, the Japanese MOFA claimed that it had not received Zhou’s reply. It even claimed that this was causing the delay in the negotiations for the treaty. Fujiyama writes:

Premier Zhou told me in a clear manner that that was simply not true. He asked me to convey his message to Miki and stated, “I would like the Japanese people to respond to my sincerity in kind, with sincerity.” Little did I know at the time, this became my last meeting with Zhou. In fact, I became the last Japanese Zhou met before his death. This message of Zhou became his “will” to the Japanese people.26

Asahi Shimbun correspondent Yoshida Makoto, who was stationed in Beijing, interviewed Fujiyama right after the Zhou–Fujiyama meeting. Yoshida felt that Zhou’s last message to the Japanese from his sickbed showed his utmost resolve to conclude the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Zhou’s message touched Yoshida so much that it compelled him to rush to the public residence of Ambassador Ogawa Heishirō at midnight with his crew. There, Yoshida confronted Ogawa and asked whether it was true that the Japanese MOFA had not received Zhou’s reply to Miki’s letter to Zhou. There, Yoshida realized that the Japanese MOFA was sabotaging the conclusion of the treaty. Yoshida writes:

Meanwhile in Tokyo, Prime Minister Miki was caught in a bind between China and the Soviet Union, as well as among the factions within the LDP, DEATH OF ZHOU ENLAI 159

and failed to take a decisive position on the hegemonic clause. Consequently, the Chinese ofﬁcials came to consider Miki “insincere.” The clumsy way the Miki cabinet handled the issue ...ended up in making the hegemony clause the “principle” (prerequisite) for the treaty, because it was Zhou’s “will” to the Japanese people.27

DEATH OF ZHOU ENLAI Upon returning to Tokyo, Fujiyama Aiichirō met Prime Minister Miki in person, in the presence of Chief Cabinet Secretary Ide Ichitarō, and conveyed Zhou’s message. Fujiyama told Miki that the “hegemony clause” issue could not be settled at the bureaucratic level (the MOFA) and strongly suggested that top political decision makers, such as Miki or Ide, should visit China in order to settle the matter. However, Miki did not listen to Fujiyama’s advice. Then, on January 8, 1976, at the age of 77, Zhou died of bladder cancer after a long ﬁght with the illness. Zhou was not given proper treatment when he was diagnosed with cancer in 1972; he was hospitalized in 1974, but he continued to work at the hospital (see Chapter 4). Fujiyama heard about the death from a newspaper reporter at dawn on January 9.28 Fujiyama states:

It was Premier Zhou who initiated and promoted Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. There was no other Chinese top leader who knew and understood Japan better. Thinking how deeply the Chinese people must be saddened by his death, my heart sank to the bottom of the abyss. I deeply regretted that Zhou, who had longed for the conclusion of the Sino- Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in order to ensure lasting friendship between the two countries, died without seeing that happen. After his death, I renewed my resolve to settle the hegemony clause issue and to realize the conclusion of the treaty, as a tribute to Zhou.29

Fujiyama had many memories of Zhou, whom he had met about ten times over the span of two decades, and stated:

I met Premier Zhou for the ﬁrst time in 1955 at the Asian–African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, with Takasaki Tatsunosuke. My ﬁrst impression of Zhou was that he was a cool and sharp person with piercing eyes which seemed to see through people. As I had more meetings with 160 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

Zhou, I found his warm aspects. He looked like a man of steel in public, but he did not impose his opinions on others in private. He was courteous and gracious toward people, but once a discussion concerned a critical issue, he did not budge. Yet, he was a realist and tried to ﬁnd solutions to difﬁcult issues by working from larger perspectives and making compromises. For this, some people called him Machiavellian, but I think that he was a great politician.30

Fujiyama adds:

When I mentioned to Zhou an episode I had heard that he had narrowly escaped execution after being caught by the Nationalist (KMT) Army in Shanghai, Zhou told me that this was not true. Zhou had actually left Shanghai before the Shanghai Massacre of April 1927. All of my ten meetings with Zhou took place at night. His tight work schedule allowed him to sit down to talk with visitors only late at night. A Chinese ofﬁcial once explained to me that Zhou had become a night owl from the life in the caves in Yan’an during the Long March, but my meetings with other Chinese revolutionary leaders took place during the day. I even saw some Chinese ofﬁcials, who were present at my meetings with Zhou, falling asleep and nodding.31

FIRST JAPANESE WHO SAW ZHOU ENLAI AFTER HIS DEATH There was another Japanese politician who had sought a meeting with Zhou on his deathbed. China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy General-Secretary Sun Pinghua tells an inside story. In January 1976, the former posts and telecommunications minister in the second Tanaka cabinet, Kuno Chūji (February 1910–October 1998), who had forced through the Sino-Japanese Seabed Cable Agreement in 1973, wanted to meet Zhou. However, Zhou was not allowed to meet foreign visitors at that time. Instead, Vice Premier Li Xiannian agreed to meet Kuno at 10:00 AM on January 8. Right before 10:00 AM, Li abruptly postponed the meeting to the afternoon. Zhou passed away at 9:57 AM. Kuno was in shock.32 The following day, on January 9, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), as well as the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the State Council, and other major organizations in the Chinese government jointly announced Zhou’s AFTERMATH OF THE DEATH OF ZHOU ENLAI 161 death publicly. Then, Sun Pinghua escorted Kuno Chūji to the Beijing Hospital to “meet” Zhou. Afterward, Sun was charged with handling messages of condolence for Zhou, sent from home and abroad. Sun writes:

Telegrams of condolences from Japan were the most in number among foreign countries. The Chinese people and the Japanese people mourned Premier Zhou’s death most deeply. Premier Zhou wanted peace with Japan all the more because he himself had fought the war with Japan. Chinese ofﬁcials who had studied or lived in exile in Japan during the prewar period felt the same way. This sentiment was also shared by the Japanese people who had worked in China in the prewar period. Premier Zhou exerted all of his energy and faculties for building Sino-Japanese friendship, as well as defending world peace in the post-1949 era. A giant star had fallen.33

AFTERMATH OF THE DEATH OF ZHOU ENLAI The death of Zhou Enlai resulted in a decline in influence of the moderates in China. In 1973, Mao Zedong had allowed the Gang of Four— Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen—to launch the Criticize Confucius campaign in order to attack Zhou, but Zhou tactfully changed the campaign to the Criticize Lin (Biao) and Criticize Confucius campaign. Zhou resisted the pressure as much as possible and did his best to salvage China’s domestic and foreign policies from the damages of the Cultural Revolution, but succumbed to illness. That Mao was conspicuously absent from Zhou’s funeral foreboded ill for the moderates in the CCCPC, such as Deng Xiaoping.34 In turn, on Qingming Day (Tomb Sweeping Day) on April 4, 1976, the Chinese general public gathered at Tiananmen Square and held memorial meetings to mourn the death of Zhou. As the crowd held rallies to criticize the Gang of Four, the Beijing-city authorities removed the offer- ings of flowers and flower wreathes and tried to stop the meetings, but the crowd protested. The next day, the police forces attacked the protesters and arrested them: the first Tiananmen Square Incident of April 5, 1976. Deng Xiaoping was blamed as the culprit for the first Tiananmen Square Incident, and the Gang of Four launched an anti-Deng Xiaoping and anti- rightists campaign and Deng lost power again.35 Sino-Japanese relations remained strained until Deng was rehabilitated and regained his previous positions in the party and the government in July 1977. This took place after the death of Mao Zedong in September 162 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

1976 and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976. History repeated itself with the demonstrations of students and the general public at Tiananmen Square in order to mourn the death of CCCPC General-Secretary Hu Yaobang (November 1915–April 1989), who had promoted relations with Japan. Their call for democracy resulted in the second Tiananmen Square Incident of June 4, 1989.36

RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY Meanwhile, in Japan, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (term of office, December 1976–December 1978), succeeded Miki Takeo in December 1976. Fukuda was a confidant of Satō Eisaku and maintained an indifferent attitude toward China. Meanwhile, Hamano Seigo (April 1898–June 1990, the justice minister in the “second reshuffled second” Tanaka cabinet) had succeeded Fujiyama Aiichirō as Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians for Sino-Japanese Friendship president in September 1975 as Fujiyama decided to retire from politics. Hamano became frustrated with Fukuda and warned him in public by stating that he would launch an action to overthrow the Fukuda cabinet unless Fukuda concluded the peace treaty with China; however, Fukuda still remained cautious.37 Then, as moderates began to gain power in China, the Sino-Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement was signed in Beijing in February 1978 and negotiations for the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty resumed in July 1978. Japan then proposed to add a qualifying statement to the “hegemony clause,” which read: “This treaty is not directed against any specific third country” (the “third country clause”). China rejected the Japanese proposal as being too accommodating to the Soviet Union and presented its counterproposal: “This treaty is not directed against any third country that does not seek hegemony.” Japan rejected this counterproposal. In the end, China agreed to the revised Japanese proposal: “This treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries” (the new “third countries clause”).38

SIGNING OF THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY On August 12, 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao (December 1913– April 1984), who was one of the earliest pro-China parliamentarians in the SIGNING OF THE SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY 163

LDP, flew to Beijing and signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty with Foreign Minister Huang Hua (January 1913–November 2010). It had taken almost six years after the signing of the Sino- Japanese Joint Communiqué. Acknowledging the significance of the treaty, Prime Minister Fukuda later stated, “The bridge built between China and Japan by the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué was made of wood, but the bridge built by the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was made of steel.”39 The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was made up of a preamble and five articles, an excerpt of which reads: China and Japan confirm that the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 1972 constitutes the basis for the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that they shall strictly observe the principles enunciated in the joint communiqué.

1. China and Japan shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The two countries shall settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force. 2. The two governments declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; 3. The two governments shall endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations and promote exchanges between the people of the two countries; 4. The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries; and 5. The present treaty shall be ratifiedandshallenterintoforceon the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Tokyo. The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force ...Either contracting party may terminate the present treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter, by giving one year’s written notice to the other contracting party.40 164 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty remains the second most important peace treaty that Japan has concluded in the post-World War II period, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.

DENG XIAOPING VISITS JAPAN As soon as the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified by the respective legislatures of the two countries, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and China–Japan Friendship Association President Liao Chengzhi visited Japan in October 1978, in order to exchange the officially ratified copies of the treaty with Prime Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Sonoda. Accordingly, the treaty entered into force on October 23, 1978. China and Japan thereby made peace legally and fully normalized their diplomatic relations. While in Tokyo, Deng and Liao also met former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and former Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, called on house speaker Hori Shigeru (of the “Hori Letter”), and visited the residence of Japan–China Cultural Exchange Association Director-General Nakajima Kenzō, who was bed-ridden. He died in June 1979.41

DENG XIAOPING AND THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS Meanwhile, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea had become more serious than it was when Zhou negotiated the Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 (see Chapter 9 for details). However, Deng Xiaoping followed the stance Zhou had taken and decided to shelve the territorial dispute for the sake of the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. In Tokyo in October 1978, Deng stated at the Japan Press Club, in response to a question regarding the territorial dispute:

The Chinese call the Senkaku Islands the Diaoyu Islands. Even the name is different to begin with. It is true that there are differences of opinion between the two countries on the sovereignty issue over the Senkaku Islands, but the two countries agreed not to refer to them at the time of the diplomatic normalization. Likewise, we also agreed not to refer to the issue during the negotiations for the peace and friendship treaty. In light of the wisdom of the Chinese people, I cannot think of any other way; if we CREATION OF A MEMORIAL STONE ... 165

take up the issue, we cannot discuss things clearly. We had better shelve the issue to future generations, who will be wiser than us, to ﬁnd a solution that will be acceptable to everyone.42

DENG XIAOPING MEETS EMPEROR HIROHITO It is signiﬁcant to note that Deng Xiaoping also met Emperor Hirohito at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. Hirohito personally had been wishing to visit China in order to apologize to the Chinese people in person for the Japanese acts of aggression during the second Sino-Japanese War, but the Imperial Household Agency had deterred his wish. According to the diary of Imperial Household Agency grand chamberlain Irie Sukemasa (September 1969–September 1985), Hirohito told Deng Xiaoping in October 1978, “I am sorry for causing [China] trouble over a long period.” Deng replied, “I am touched by your words.”43 Nevertheless, the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” (Shōwa is the reign name for Hirohito) that was complied by the Imperial Household Agency and was released in September 2014, does not quote this statement of Hirohito. Instead, it describes the Hirohito–Deng meeting as: “[Hirohito] stated that unfortunate things happened in the past between the two countries and he wished for promotion of goodwill relations from now on.” Similarly, the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” also does not quote Hirohito’s statement of July 1982 that was recorded in the Diary of Irie: “[Japan] did really terrible things to Korea ...” It appears that, contrary to its name, the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” tried to suppress Hirohito’s true voice of apology toward the victims of the war and thereby to obscure his war responsibility (see Chapter 8).44

CREATION OF A MEMORIAL STONE OF ZHOU’S POEM, “ARASHIYAMA IN THE RAIN” In October 1978, Deng and Liao traveled west and visited Nagoya, which was establishing a sister-city relationship with Nanjing in December 1978. (As an update, Nanjing suspended its sister-city relationship with Nagoya in February 2012, after the latter’s mayor, Kawamura Takashi, expressed doubts to the visiting delegation of Chinese ofﬁcials from Nanjing that the Nanjing Massacre had actually taken place in 1937.) While in Nagoya, they also paid a courtesy call on the family of Gotō Kōji 166 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

(November 1906–January 1972), who had opened the way for the Chinese participation in the World Table Tennis Championships in 1971 by accepting the PRC’s position on the “two Chinas” issue and trying to expel Taiwan from the Table Tennis Federation of Asia (TTFA). Then they headed to Kyoto and dropped by at the popular tourist spot Arashiyama.45 This was the place Zhou had written a poem, “Arashiyama in the Rain,” on April 5, 1919. In 1978, JAPIT Kyoto General Ofﬁce President Yoshimura Magosaburō decided to erect a memorial stone with the inscription of Zhou’s poem in commemoration of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. The 95-year-old Yoshimura organized a committee for this project with the cooperation of the Kyoto- prefecture government, Koyo-city, and the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce and Industry. On October 27, 1978, Yoshimura asked Liao to handwrite Zhou’s poem in order to make an inscription of the poem on a stone. A month later, the Chinese Science Academy laser nuclear fusion mission to Japan delivered Liao’s handwriting of Zhou’s poem to Yoshimura. Then, Zhou’s poem was inscribed on a Kurama-stone and the memorial poem stone was erected at Kameyama Park in Arashiyama on April 16, 1979, exactly 60 years after Zhou wrote the poem (see Photograph 1).46 Meanwhile, Deng and Liao had traveled to the older ancient capital of Japan, Nara, and visited the Tōshōdai Temple, which was founded by the Chinese grand monk Jianzhen (Ganjin, 688–June 763) in 759. Shortly after the death of Jianzhen, one of his disciples constructed his statue, made of dry lacquer and linen clothing, most likely originally worn by Jianzhen (both hands were made of wood). This statute is considered the oldest portrait statute in Japan and is designated as a National Treasure of Japan. In April 1980, the statue traveled to China through a Sino-Japanese cultural exchange project. Thus, Jianzhen (in the form of statue) made a homecoming to Yangzhou, Jiangsu province, after more than 1,200 years.47

ZHOU’S WIDOW,DENG YINGCHAO,VISITS JAPAN In April 1979, Zhou Enlai’s widow, NPC Standing Committee vice chair Deng Yingchao (February 1904–July 1992), visited Japan at the invitation of the presidents of both houses of the Japanese parliament (the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors). Deng visited Japan in order to fulﬁll Zhou’s longtime dream of revisiting Japan during the DENG YINGCHAO MEETS MATSUMOTO KAMEJIRŌ’S “GRANDSONS” 167 time of the cherry blossoms upon the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General Sun Pinghua accompanied Deng to Japan, as delegation secretary-general. They toured from east to west and visited Tokyo, Hakone, Lake Biwa, Kyoto, and Osaka. The cherry blossoms had already passed their peak in Tokyo, but were in full bloom in the mountains in Hakone.48 In Kyoto, they attended the opening ceremony for the memorial poem stone “Arashiyama in the Rain” on April 16. It was raining in Arashiyama, just as on the day when Zhou wrote the poem 60 years before. When Deng commenced the ceremony by cutting the tape, it stopped raining and a spring sunbeam pierced through the clouds, just as Zhou had described in the poem. Deng stated in the opening address, “The sun just emerged and the sunbeam is shining on us. This symbolizes the bright future of friendship between the peoples of China and Japan.” In turn, Sun Pinghua wrote:

The scene was exactly what Premier Zhou described in the poem. I felt as if he brought the rain and the sunbeam from heaven. His wish ﬁnally came true. I felt as if he were with us right there. It was his strong wish to revisit Japan during the time of the cherry blossoms upon the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. I deeply regret that Premier Zhou could not see this day.”49

Since then, whenever Chinese missions to Japan toured the western part of Japan, they made sure to drop by Kameyama Park in Arashiyama, to pay tribute to the memorial poem stone. The park also became a popular tourist spot for Chinese tourists, and their number exceeded that of the indigenous tourists who visited the park.50

DENG YINGCHAO MEETS MATSUMOTO KAMEJIRŌ’S “GRANDSONS” While in Tokyo, Deng Yingchao fulﬁlled another longtime wish of Zhou. That was to meet the “grandsons” of Matsumoto Kamejirō (April 1866– September 1945), president of the Nikka-dōjin East Asian Higher Preparatory School. Matsumoto dedicated himself to teaching Japanese to Chinese students in Tokyo, including the renowned writer Lu Xun (Zhou Shuren, September 1881–October 1936) and the legendary female revolutionary Qiu Jin (November 1875–July 1907), as well as Zhou. 168 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

Matsumoto also went out of his way to protect many Chinese students who were subjected to various forms of discrimination in Japan. In his later years, Zhou had asked Deng to visit Japan and meet Matsumoto’s descendants on his behalf. Zhou said to Deng:

Little Chao, Japanese acts of aggression had caused tremendous damage to China. But there were also people like Master Matsumoto Kamejirō in Japan. I wish I could visit Japan again around the time of the cherry blossom and visit his grave, but I cannot. I would like you to visit Japan and meet the family of Master Matsumoto for me.51

When Deng visited Japan in April 1979, she duly fulfilled Zhou’s wish and met Matsumoto’s “grandsons,” who were actually his adopted heir Matsumoto Yōichirō (son of his niece-in-law) and his younger brother Kamiya Hideo, at the Hotel New Otani in Tokyo. They in turn dutifully reported this touching meeting at Matsumoto’s grave in his hometown, Kakegawa, Shizuoka prefecture. Thus, through Deng Yingchao, Zhou finally fulfilled his unfinished business with his Japanese mentor, who had volunteered to give him private Japanese lessons and encouraged him to study harder. Under the tutelage of Matsumoto, Zhou not only learned the Japanese language but also the hearts of the Japanese people.52

*** Zhou exerted his energy for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty right to the last minute of his life, ﬁghting with his terminal illness as well as dealing with the Gang of Four. However, his effort was obstructed by the Soviet Union (the “hegemony clause” issue) and by the wishy-washy Miki Takeo, who had promised to conclude the treaty before the end of 1975. Had Miki kept his word, the treaty would have been concluded while Zhou was still alive. Unfortunately, Zhou died without seeing the conclusion of the treaty, but his philosophy and spirit that constitute the backbone of the treaty live forever.

NOTES 1. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949– 1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997, Vol. 3, 574; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi-Yūjō (commonly pronounced as “Ujō): Nakasone Yasuhiro 50-nen no sengo-seiji o NOTES 169

kataru (World Sentiment: Nakasone Yasuhiro Talks about 50 Years of Postwar Japanese Politics), Tokyo: Bungei-shunjū, 1996, 276–277 and 283. 2. Nakasone, 276–277. 3. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 587; Wu Xuewen and Wang Junyan, Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan), Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007, 403–411. 4. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 587; Sun Pinghua, Watashi no rirekisho: Chūgoku to Nihon ni hashi o kaketa otoko (My Autobiography: The Man Who Built a Bridge Between China and Japan), Tokyo: Nihon keizai- shimbunsha, 1998, 155–156. 5. Sun, 155–157; Wu and Wang, 403–411. 6. Ibid. (both). 7. Wu and Wang, 408–414; Saionji Kinkazu, Saionji Kingazu kaikoroku: “Sugisarishi, Shōwa” (Memoirs of Saionji Kinkazu: “The Bygone Shōwa [Era]”), Tokyo: Aipeccu-puresu, 1991, 370. 8. “Ryō Shōshi hōichi no ashiato” (Tracks of Liao Chengzhi’s Visit to Japan), Sekai, No. 332, July 1973, 186–187. 9. Sekai, 188–189; Kataoka Tetsuya, “Nihon yo, dōmei o kyozetsu surunoka” (Japan! Are you abandoning the [US–Japan] alliance?), Voice, September 2003, 88–98. 10. Nakasone, 271–276 and 471–474; Tahara Sōichirō, “Amerika no tora-no-o o funda Tanaka Kakuei” (Tanaka Kakuei Stepped on the Tail of the American Tiger), Chūōkōron, July 1976, 160–196. 11. Kataoka Tetsuya, “Daijin no shoku o jishinasai!” (Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, Resign the Minister’s Post), Shokun, July 2001, 62–71; Tahara Sōichirō, Nihon no seiji: Tanaka Kakuei Kakuei-igo (Japanese Politics: Tanaka Kakuei and Post-Kakuei), Tokyo: Kōdanshia, 2002, 16–27. 12. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 619; Sun, 158–159. 13. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 609 and 666; Sun, 158–159; “Status of China with regard to ICAO,” February 15, 2015, http://www. icao.int/secretariat/legal/Status%20of%20individual%20States/china_en.pdf. 14. Fujiyama Aiichirō, Seiji waga-michi: Fujiyama Aiichirō kaisōroku (My Way in Politics: Memoirs of Fujiyama Aiichirō), Tokyo: Asahi-shimbunsha, 1976, 220 and 229–230; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 642. 15. Fujiyama, 229–230; Furukawa Mantarō, “Shū Onrai to tainichi gensoku: Kokkō-seijōka ni miru seiji-shuwan” (Zhou Enlai and his Principles toward Japan: Political Skills for Diplomatic Normalization), in Shū Onrai kinen- shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 406. 16. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 665–666; Fujiyama, 229–230. 17. Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes, Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University 170 7 SECRET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SINO-JAPANESE PEACE ...

of California, 1988, 82–84; Yoshida Makoto, Nitchū-hōdō kaisō no 35-nen (Recollections of 35 Years of Reporting Sino-Japanese Relations), Tokyo: Ushio-shuppansha, 1998, 211–220. 18. Yoshida, 211–220; Sun, 163–164. 19. Fujiyama, 221–224. 20. John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations, New York: Rowan & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 1997, 111–121, 155–159, 165–177, and 269–275. 21. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 684; Wang Yongxiang and Takahashi Tsuyoshi, eds., Shū Onrai to Nihon: Kunō kara hishō eno seishun (Zhou Enlai and Japan: Youth from Anguish to Flight), translated by Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao Study Society, Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2002, preface 1–3. 22. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 692–693 and 712; Sun, 158–159. 23. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 712; Wang and Takahashi, preface 1–3. 24. Ibid.; Fujiyama, 224–225 and 312. 25. Fujiyama, 225–226. 26. Ibid., 225–226 and 312. 27. Yoshida, 219–220. 28. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 726; Fujiyama, 223 and 226. 29. Fujiyama, 226. 30. Ibid., 2226–228. 31. Ibid., 227–228. 32. Jin Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 2, 2151; Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, 727; Sun, 159–160. 33. Jin, 2151–2152; Sun, 160–162. 34. Jin, 2152–2155. 35. Ibid. For detail, see Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2011. 36. For detail, see Vogel. 37. Fujiyama, 312. 38. Ogata, 85–92; Sun, 163–164. 39. Sun, 164. 40. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China,” August 12, 1978, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ china/treaty78.html. 41. Sun, 167–168; Wu and Wang, 428–433. NOTES 171

42. “Tō Shōhei Nihon kisha-kurabu de kaiken” (Deng Xiaoping Speaks at Japan Press Club), Asahi Shimun, Ocotober 25, 1978. 43. “Ten’nō Jitsuroku: Hyōgen yokusei ‘seishi’ no genkai” (Real Record of Emperor: Suppressed Expression [Suggests] Limits to “Correct History”), Chūnichi Shimbun (also ciculated as Tokyo Shimbun), September 9, 2014. 44. Ibid. 45. Wu and Wang, 433–437. 46. Ibid.; “Shū onlai-sōri kinen-shihi konryū-iinkai” (Committee to Erect Commemorative Poem Stone of Premier Zhou Enlai), November 29, 2011, http://www.japitkyoto.jp/zhouenlai.html. 47. Wu and Wang, 437–439. 48. Sun, 165–166. 49. Ibid.; “Shū onlai-sōri kinen-shihi konryū-iinkai.” 50. Ibid.; “Shū onlai-sōri kinen-shihi konryū-iinkai.” 51. “Rojin, Shūkin, Shū Onrai no nihongo kyōshi, Matsumoto Kamejirō” (Japanese Teacher of Lu Xun, Qiu Jin, and Zhou Enlai: Matsumoto Kamejirō), Hekiyōkai: Tokyo Gakugei-daigaku zenkoku-dōsōkai, October 24, 2010, http://www.u.gakugei.ac.jp/~dousou/1/contents/kaichou/ 17.html. 52. Ibid. CHAPTER 8

“History Issues” and Zhou Enlai

In September 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (b. October 1953) made an address at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York and stated, “Next year is the 70-year anniversary of the victory of the anti-fascism war and of the anti-Japanese resistance war of the Chinese people ...History cannot be revised and distortion of truth cannot be permitted.” His statement refers to the wartime history issues between China and Japan, which include the revision of Japanese history textbooks to obscure Japan’s acts of aggression during the war (such as the Nanking Massacre) and the “comfort women” issue, as well as the Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.1 Why do the wartime history issues still constitute impediments to Sino- Japanese relations seven decades after the war ended? Why does the Chinese government protest each time a Japanese political leader visits the Yasukuni Shrine? This issue actually signiﬁcantly concerns the decision Zhou Enlai made for the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972, which became a legacy of Zhou’s policy toward Japan for the Chinese. Wang Yi’s father-in-law, Qian Jiadong (b. 1924) was Zhou’s foreign affairs secretary. In turn, the Japanese government considers the Chinese protests against Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine as violations of the principle of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs. This chapter reexamines the issue concerning visits of Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine (the “Yasukuni Shrine visit issue” hereafter), which has become one of the focal points of the “history

© The Author(s) 2017 173 M. Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_8 174 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI issues” between China and Japan, in the light of Zhou Enlai’s foreign policy toward Japan.2

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE The most controversial case of the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue in recent years occurred when Koizumi Jun’ichirō (b. January 1942; term of office, April 2001–September 2006) visited the Yasukuni Shrine annually for six consecutive years during his tenure as Prime Minister. The dates of his visits to the shrine were August 13, 2001, April 21, 2002 (during the Annual Spring Festival of the shrine), January 14, 2003, January 1, 2004, October 17, 2005 (during the Annual Autumn Festival), and August 15, 2006 (the anniversary day of the end of the Asia-Pacific War, 1937–1945). During the presidential election campaign for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Koizumi courted the conservatives by pledging that he would visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, the war-end memorial anniversary day, regardless of the criticism from the liberals this might draw. He won the election and became Prime Minister in April 2001.3 The Yasukuni Shrine enshrines the “souls” of military personnel who died in action and who died due to their post of duty in all of the wars the Japanese had fought since the 1860s. Over the course of time, the shrine became the spiritual symbol for Japanese soldiers so that their farewell words to each other before going to the battlefields was “See you at Yasukuni!” This meant that their “souls” would meet at the Yasukuni Shrine after their deaths, because they were most likely going to die in action.4 A Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 is similar to the custom for a US president to visit the Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day and lay a wreath in front of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier for remembrance of the American war dead. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Koizumi’s proclaimed plan to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day drew strong protest from the Chinese government, as well as from the South Korean government (Republic of Korea, ROK). This was because the shrine in October 1978 had enshrined the “souls” of 14 out of the 28 total Class-A war criminals, who were charged at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1945.5 “JOINT ENSHRINEMENT OF THE 14 CLASS-A WAR CRIMINALS” 175

“JOINT ENSHRINEMENT OF THE 14 CLASS-A WAR CRIMINALS” The 14 consisted of seven who were executed in December 1948 (including Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki), four who died while serving life imprisonment, two who died before the sentence was handed down (Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke died of tuberculosis in June 1946), and one who died during parole. The Japanese parliament in the 1953 revised the law and determined that the 14 Class-A war criminals were not criminals in the Japanese Penal Code but had died on duty so that the government could provide bereaved families with military pensions. Consequently, in 1972, the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare considered the 14 Class- A war criminals qualified to be enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine—some Class-B and Class-C war criminals were already enshrined there—and sent the list of their names to the shrine.6 The Yasukuni Shrine is constitutionally an independent entity from the Japanese government (similar to the separation of church and state) and the shrine’s chief priest Tsukuba Fujimaro (February 1905–March 1978; term of office, January 1946–March 1978) took a prudent stance on politically sensitive matters. Tsukuba was a member of the Imperial Family (his father was Prince Yamashina Kikumaro) until 1947 when the US occupation forces removed 11 branches of the Imperial Family, including the Yamashina family, from Imperial Family status. Tsukuba did not enshrine the 14 Class-A war criminals despite the recommendation of the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare to do so.7 However, upon Tsukuba’s death, his successor Matsudaira Nagayoshi (March 1915–July 2005; term of office, July 1978–March 1992) decided to enshrine the 14 Class-A war criminals as “Shōwa-era martyrs” in October 1978. This is referred to as the “joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals” as they were enshrined “jointly” along with the previous war dead.8 Because of this joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals, the Chinese government regards Japanese political leaders’ visits to the shrine as Japanese government acts honoring the Class-A war criminals. Earlier, a number of Japanese Prime Ministers had customarily visited the shrine, but their visits did not draw criticism from China. In 1975 it caused domestic controversy when Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited the shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day (August 15) for the first time as an incumbent Prime Minister. But Miki stated that it was done in his capacity as a private person (not in his official capacity 176 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI as Prime Minister) and he paid the cash offering from his own pocket. China did not protest this. Even after the joint enshrinement of the 14 Class-A war criminals became public knowledge in April 1979, three Prime Ministers visited the shrine, but their visits did not draw the criticism of the Chinese government. Ōhira Masayoshi visited three times, Suzuki Zenkō, nine times, and Nakasone Yasuhiro, nine times, before August 1985.9

PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE’S VISITS TO YASUKUNI SHRINE Nevertheless, the Chinese government criticized Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s (term of tenure, November 1982–November 1987) visit to the shrine on August 15, 1985 (this was his tenth visit) because it was the ﬁrst time a Prime Minister visited the shrine in the capacity of a public person (as Prime Minister), not as a private person, on the war-end memorial anniversary day. He paid the cash offering from his ofﬁce expense account. A real reason for the Chinese protest might have been the unequivocally rightward stance of Nakasone, who had put forth a sweeping platform of “total reassessment of postwar politics,” including the revision of the postwar history education and the removal of the “1 percent limit of GNP” (gross national product) on the national defense budget. Nakasone also built strong personal relations with US President Ronald Reagan and likened the Japanese archipelago to an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”10

CHINESE INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE However, there was another important reason for the Chinese protest. It was the Chinese internal power struggle. The Yasukuni Shrine visit issue was embroiled in the Chinese leadership split between Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Advisory Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping (August 1904–February 1997) and Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC) Secretary-General Hu Yaobang (November 1915–April 1989). Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was used as a pretext to oust Hu. Hu promoted more pro-reform policies than Deng and other senior members in the CPC Politburo could condone, such as liberal- ization in Tibet.11 CHINESE INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE ... 177

Hu also promoted relations with Japan and visited Tokyo in November 1983. During his stay in Tokyo, Hu made a speech at the national parliament, as the ﬁrstChinesepoliticiantodoso,andalso signed, with Prime Minister Nakasone, the “four principles concerning Sino-Japanese friendship,” consisting of peace and friendship, equality and mutual beneﬁt, mutual trust, and long-term stability. The original political principles concerning Sino-Japanese relations had only three principles, but when Nakasone proposed to Hu to add “mutual trust,” Hu readily concurred. Hu in turn proposed to invite 3,000 Japanese youths to China in order to promote mutual trust, and actually carried this out.12 Hu’s pro-Japanese stance was later attacked by the conservatives in the CPC and the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue escalated along with the anti-Hu campaign within the CPC. Hu lost power in January 1987 and died in April 1989. The student demonstrations to mourn the death of Hu and to call for democracy resulted in the second Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989, which was suppressed by Deng Xiaoping. In this context, after the visit in 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. His Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotōda Masaharu stated in August 1986, “Prime Minister Nakasone has decided not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in a public capacity given that the visit last year drew criticism that such action might have honored the Class-A war criminals who were responsible for the considerable sufferings and damage to the people in the neighboring countries. Also, such actions might cause misunderstanding and even mistrust about Japan’s repeatedly expressed repentance for the war and its determination for peace and friendship based on the repentance.”13 Nakasone himself states:

Hu Yaobang was like a brother to me ...He was a rare Chinese politician who was convinced of the necessity for the introduction of democracy and a free market system in China. He therefore promoted relations with Japan ...I decided not to visit the shrine after a careful assessment of the situation at home and abroad. Earlier, I had sent Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō to Beijing for consultation with his Chinese counterpart Wu Xueqian and also asked [Japan Business Federation president and Nippon Steel former president] Inayama Yoshihiro to talk with other high-ranking ofﬁcials. I made this decision also because I sensed the danger that Hu Yaobang might be accused because of my visit to the shrine and lose 178 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

power ...The Chinese conservatives were trying to consolidate power and Hu Yaobang became their target.14

Overall, Nakasone was not anti-China as his otherwise conservative stance might suggest, in fact he was one of the early advocates for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the LDP (see Chapter 2). Also, in June 1987, Nakasone as Prime Minister apologized to the Chinese government when a Japanese rightwing group defaced the memorial poem stone of Zhou Enlai in Kameyama Park in Kyoto (Zhou had originally written a poem, “Arashiyama in the Rain,” there in April 1919). Nakasone’s successors followed suit and refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Thus, between 1986 and 2001, no Japanese Prime Ministers visited the Yasukuni Shrine, with only one exception, so much so that an extreme rightwing group in 1988 threatened to kill former Prime Minister Nakasone and incumbent Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru for not visiting the shrine.15 The only Prime Minister who visited the Yasukuni Shrine after Nakasone’s and before Koizumi’s was Hashimoto Ryūtarō (term of ofﬁce, January 1996–July 1998). He did so because he was president of the Japanese Bereaved Association. Still, Hashimoto visited the shrine on his birthday, July 29, 1996, not on the war-end memorial anniversary day. Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi also visited the shrine during his term of ofﬁce (November 1991–August 1993), but this visit is not recorded at the shrine.16

PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE CAMPAIGN Despite the self-restraint on the part of a few Japanese Prime Ministers, conservative LDP politicians kept visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and each time Japanese cabinet members (state ministers) visited the shrine, the Chinese government strongly protested and the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue became a focal point of the history issues between China and Japan. This coincided with the assumption of power in China of the third-generation leader President Jiang Zemin (b. August 1926; term of ofﬁce, March 1993–March 2003). Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were the ﬁrst generation, while Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang were the second generation. To the dismay of the Japanese, Jiang launched an outright anti-Japanese movement. By promoting anti-Japanese patriotic education for the Chinese people, Jiang tried to consolidate the power of the CPC in the aftermath of the PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN VISITS JAPAN 179 economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries after the second Tiananmen Incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union.17 President Jiang also had a personal reason to hate Japan. His uncle was killed by local bandits in 1939 during the second Sino-Japanese War and he was adopted into the family of his uncle (who did not have his own heir) posthumously in order to maintain this branch family of the Jiang clan. It is considered that this adoption was made in order to conceal the fact that Jiang was the son of a traitor; his birthfather had worked for Wang Jingwei as propaganda deputy director.18

PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN VISITS JAPAN President Jiang visited Japan in November 1998. This was the first visit to Japan by a Chinese head of state in the long history between the two countries. A year earlier, Jiang had stopped over in Hawaii on his way to Washington, DC, laid a wreath at the USS Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor, and criticized the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This is a prime example of the way in which Chinese officials use foreign state visits to convey symbolic messages. Then, during the state visit to Japan in November 1998, Jiang condemned insufficient wartime history education in Japan. He mentioned it even during the official banquet at the Imperial Palace hosted by Emperor Akihito, and demanded an apology from the emperor for Japan’s wartime acts of aggression. Such behavior constituted a violation of diplomatic protocol.19 Moreover, although the two governments issued the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development in Tokyo, Jiang and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō failed to sign the document because Jiang demanded that the word “apology” be added in the declaration. The Japanese government felt it unnecessary because Japan had already expressed its apology in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972 and other official statements. Jiang also gave a public speech at Waseda University (the school had accepted many Chinese students since the early stage of the Chinese studying in Japan). However, he refused an honorary doctorate degree conferred by the university, apparently because the school founder Ōkuma Shigenobu had, as Prime Minister, made the Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shikai in 1915.20 In contrast, China–Japan Friendship Association President Liao Chengzhi had graciously accepted the same degree in October 1982. 180 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

Although Jiang traveled to Sendai in northeastern Japan, where the Chinese writer Lu Xun had studied, overall Jiang’s visit to Japan is remembered as one characterized by disrespect to the host nation.21

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI VISITS YASUKUNI SHRINE Then in August 2001, notwithstanding the strong protest from the Chinese government, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō visited the Yasukuni Shrine two days before the war-end memorial anniversary day. It was incomprehensible for a pro-reform Prime Minister to attach himself to a traditionally rightwing agenda. Chūnichi Shimbun (also circulated as Tokyo Shimbun) reporter Shimizu Yoshikazu (1953–April 2012) argues that Koizumi’s public pledge to visit the shrine was not really based on his beliefs, as he had claimed. Rather, Koizumi made the public pledge to visit the shrine because he needed the votes of the Japan Bereaved Association in order to win the LDP presidential election in April 2001. This was his second run, after the loss in the ﬁrst run in 1998, and he had a strong stake in winning this election.22 Koizumi’s rival in the LDP presidential election was former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō. Hashimoto was expected to obtain a majority vote of the LDP members in the national parliament. Koizumi therefore needed to obtain votes from local conservative assemblymen. For this, he appeased the Japan Bereaved Association, a strong lobby for the LDP (Hashimoto was president of the association), and pledged to visit the Yasukuni Shrine upon winning the election. His tactics worked. Koizumi, a pro-reform presidential candidate, obtained votes from members of the local prefectural federations of the LDP and won.23 With Koizumi’s victory, former LDP Secretary-General Nonaka Tsutomu, representing the so-called “resistance power” (old guard), in turn launched a campaign to split the pro-reform group by appeasing Japanese liberals. Although the majority of Japanese (including moderate conservatives and liberals) were pro-reform, liberals were opposed to Koizumi’s pledge to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Taking advantage of this disparity, Nonaka tried to abort Koizumi’s plan to visit the shrine and even visited China in August 2001. Trapped in Nonaka’s scheme, Koizumi failed to keep his public pledge to visit the shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day, August 15, and was obliged to visit the shrine on August 13, as a compromise. (August 13 still fell during the bon memorial week when the Japanese pay tribute to their dead ancestors.) This visit still drew PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S SECOND VISIT TO YASUKUNI SHRINE 181 strong protest from the Chinese and South Korean governments. For them, the date of the visit did not matter so much as the fact that a Japanese Prime Minister visited the shrine.24 Koizumi justiﬁed his visit by stating that it did not diminish his sincere apology for the Japanese acts of aggression during the war. However, Koizumi was obliged to visit China in October 2001, in order to prove his sincerity. It was a one-day “apology visit” to patch up Sino-Japanese relations soured by his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August. Koizumi visited the Anti-Japanese Resistance War Memorial Hall in a suburb of Beijing (the site of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937), where he stated that he saw the exhibits with sincere apologies and condolences. The Chinese people interpreted his statement as his pledge not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine again. In 2004, the Fukuoka District Court determined that Koizumi’s visit to the shrine in 2001 was unconstitutional, in violation of Article 20 (equivalent of the principal of “separation of church and state”), primarily because he had signed the visitor’s book “Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’inichō.”25

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S SECOND VISIT TO YASUKUNI SHRINE Nevertheless, Koizumi caught the world off guard by suddenly visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on April 21, 2002 during its Annual Spring Festival. Shimizu Yoshikazu tells an inside story: two days before this visit to the shrine, Koizumi had met former LDP Secretary-General Koga Makoto (in the Hashimoto faction), who was also president of the Japan Bereaved Association, succeeding to the post from former Prime Minister Hashimoto. Koga told Koizumi that South Korea’s opposition to his visit to the shrine had remained strong and suggested that he might visit the shrine during the Annual Spring Festival, instead of on the war-end memorial anniversary day. Two days later, Koizumi made the surprise visit.26 Koga was the boss of the so-called “road tribe” (a lobby for the road construction and maintenance interest groups), a linchpin of the “resistance power,” and therefore was a political enemy of Koizumi who was trying to disband the “Road Public Corporation.” However, Koga helped Koizumi on the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue because Koizumi’s popularity was declining at that time due to failing structural reforms, and the LDP needed to maintain a certain support rate of the general public. Koizumi 182 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI thus used the shrine visit to regain his support rate amidst the increasing anti-Chinese sentiment among the Japanese.27 Shimizu considered it deplorable for the Japanese political leader to keep manipulating the constituents’ sentiment to retain his power, while Chinese President Jiang Zemin had learned a lesson from his mistake of using the same strategy toward the Chinese people in the late 1990s and began to modify policy towards Japan. The Chinese government felt betrayed by Koizumi’s second visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and not only canceled Vice Premier Wen Jiabao’s (term of ofﬁce, March 1998–March 2003) visit to Japan, but also canceled Japan’s Crown Prince Naruhito’s scheduled visit to China in the fall of 2002 in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.28

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S THIRD VISIT TO YASUKUNI SHRINE Then, Koizumi made another surprise visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on January 14, 2003. He had apparently hoped that if he visited the shrine early in the year and got over with that year’s visit to the shrine, it would be forgotten by the time of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 2003. Few of his close aides were informed of this visit in advance. Yet, the cooling-off time period between January and August did not diminish the anger of the Chinese, so that his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda Yasuo, flew to Beijing in August 2003, instead of Koizumi, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the treaty.29 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (term of office, March 2003–March 2013) told Fukuda in Beijing that both countries should look upon “history as a jian (mirror)” for promoting wholesome Sino-Japanese relations and that it was problematic that a Japanese political leader had visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Had it not been for Koizumi’s visit to the shrine, Koizumi himself would have visited Beijing, while the new Chinese President Hu Jintao would have visited Tokyo, making the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Peace and Friendship Treaty more commemorative and significant.30 In August 2003, as reciprocal protocol for Fukuda’s visit to Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Tokyo and met with Prime Minister Koizumi. At the meeting, Koizumi stated to Li that he had dealt THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE AND ZHOU ENLAI 183 with his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine with due consideration, referring to the fact that he had avoided visiting the shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day (August 15). However, the dates did not really matter to the Chinese. While in Tokyo, Li also met Japanese opposition political party leaders, such as Kan Naoto of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Doi Takako of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). In these meetings, Li stated that the Chinese people could understand why the Japanese people wanted to visit the Yasukuni Shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day in order to pay tribute to the war dead; however, they could not accept Japanese political leaders’ visits to the shrine because it enshrined the Class-A war criminals. It was the first time that a Chinese leader expressed a view in public to distinguish the Japanese people’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from those of Japanese political leaders.31

THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE AND ZHOU ENLAI This Chinese view to distinguish the Japanese people’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from those of Japanese political leaders derives from the decision that Zhou Enlai had made in 1972 during the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Nakae Yōsuke (December 1922–March 2014; ambassador to China, 1984–1987), explains that this distinction is directly linked with the war reparation issue between China and Japan. Given the fact that the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek had already relinquished China’s war reparations towards Japan in 1952, Zhou agreed with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to relinquish China’s (PRC’s) war reparation claims towards Japan in 1972 (see Chapter 6).32 Zhou, however, needed to justify his decision to the Chinese people on the mainland, who had undergone tremendous damage and suffering from the Japanese acts of aggression. For this, Zhou devised the logic of distinguishing the Japanese people at large from the Japanese militarism: “The war responsibility rests with the handful of Japanese militarists and the Japanese general public were also their victims. The Chinese government therefore should not demand war reparations from Japan.” Zhou identiﬁed the “handful of militarists” as the Class-A war criminals indicted at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.33 Accordingly, Nakae states, “A Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine that enshrines the Class-A war criminals obscures their war responsibilities and rubs against the grain of the Chinese people who 184 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI relinquished their war reparations toward Japan. Therefore, the Chinese government could not accept it. Prime Minister Nakasone made the right decision not to visit the shrine after the one visit in 1985. Future Japanese Prime Ministers should recognize that their visits to the shrine would have a grave impact on Sino-Japanese relations because the issue involves the very foundation of the way Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization was accomplished, and they should act accordingly.” This answers Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated question as to why the Chinese government so adamantly opposed his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine just because the Class-A war criminals were jointly enshrined there.34

ZHOU ENLAI VISITED YASUKUNI SHRINE It is interesting to note that Zhou Enlai had actually visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 1918, long before the Class-A war criminals were enshrined there. On April 30, 1918, Zhou wrote in his diary: “Went to Kudan to see the Annual Spring Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine in the evening, but the rain cancelled it ...” The Annual Spring Festival was held on April 29– May 1 in 1918. Zhou went to the Yasukuni Shrine again on May 1 and recorded: “While strolling in Kudan in the evening, I saw the Annual Spring Festival at the Yasukuni Shrine. I was deeply touched by watching the festival.”35 Despite the casual appearance of this account, Zhou did not see the Annual Spring Festival by accident. He went to see the ritual the day earlier, but missed it, and went to the shrine again in order to observe it. In fact, Zhou was so impressed with the ceremony that he visited the shrine again on June 2 and toured its war memorial museum, Yūshūkan, which at that time housed mementoes of the Japanese war dead of the first Sino- Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and other wars. It is significant that Zhou visited the Yasukuni Shrine at least three times during his youthful period in Japan. He must have read one of the tourist guides to Tokyo for Chinese students, which describes how the Yasukuni Shrine honors the “souls” of those who lost their lives for the country. CPC cofounder Li Dazhao also visited the Yasukuni Shrine and Yūshūkan while he was a student at Waseda University.36 Zhou was impressed with the Annual Spring Festival all the more because there was no such practice in China. In China, only the highest- ranking government and military officials were honored at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing, whereas bereaved families were not EMPEROR HIROHITO AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE 185 even informed of war deaths, let alone honored by the government or entitled to government compensation. In contrast, the Japanese government provided a variety of military pensions for bereaved families, including parents and widows. Being deeply touched by the Annual Spring Festival at the Yasukuni Shrine and the exhibits at Yūshūkan, young Zhou understood the essence of the Japanese tradition of honoring the “souls” of the war dead. Little did he know then that this shrine would become a focal point of controversial history issues between China and Japan in the 1980s and up to the present.37

EMPEROR HIROHITO AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE It is also important to note that even Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine because of the joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in October 1978. Hirohito had visited the shrine eight times in the postwar era between 1945 and 1975, but he stopped visiting the shrine after the Class-A war criminals were enshrined there. He visited the shrine on November 21, 1975 and never visited the shrine afterward for the rest of his life. (After his death in January 1989, this practice has been observed by his heir, Emperor Akihito.) A journal entry written by Imperial Household Agency grand steward Tomita Tomohiko (July 1920–November 2003; term of ofﬁce, May 1978–June 1988), which was disclosed by the Japanese daily Nihon Keizai Shimbun on July 20, 2006, endorses this. Tomita had meticulously recorded personal statements of Emperor Hirohito and his conversations with Tomita in a total of 27 volumes of diaries and journals. These entries are collectively referred to as the “Tomina Notes.”38 According to the journal entry dated April 28, 1988, which was actually a note handwritten by Tomita on a piece of paper that he had pasted into his journal, Hirohito told Tomita:

The Class-A [war criminals] were jointly enshrined, even including Matsuoka and Shiratori. I heard that Tsukuba had taken a cautious stance, but what did the current chief priest, the son of Matsudaira, think about it? [He did it] so easily. I think that Matsudaira had a strong resolve for peace, but the son did not understand the father’s heart ...That’s why I have not visited the shrine ever since. This is my heart.39

Matsuoka refers to former Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke (March 1880–June 1946) and Shiratori refers to former Japanese ambassador to 186 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

Italy Shiratori Toshio (June 1887–June 1949), both of whom were Class- A war criminals indicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. It is known that Hirohito disliked Matsuoka and Shiratori, who did not listen to him. In turn, Tsukuba refers to Yasukuni Shrine chief priest Tsukuba Fujimaro, who did not enshrine the Class-A war criminals despite the recommendation from the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare. Matsudaira refers to Imperial Household Agency ﬁrst grand steward Matsudaira Yoshitami (March 1882–July 1948). His son refers to Yasukuni Shrine chief priest Matsudaira Nagayoshi, who went ahead with the joint enshrinement of the A-Class war criminals. This statement of Hirohito clearly suggests that he was personally displeased with the joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in the Yasukuni Shrine and that he therefore decided not to visit the shrine afterward.40

IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AGENCY CONCEALS HIROHITO’S TRUE “HEART” The Imperial Household Agency concealed the “Tomita Notes” until July 2006, which exactly corresponded with the one-year anniversary of the death of Matsudaira Nagayoshi in July 2005. The diary of another chamberlain of Hirohito, Urabe Ryōgo, also recorded Hirohito’s statements that indicated his displeasure with the joint enshrinement. Nevertheless, those on the right and leaning right refute the “Tomita Notes” by arguing that the joint enshrinement of Class-A war criminals was not the reason for Hirohito’s decision to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. They argue that Hirohito did not specifically state that he was “displeased with” the joint enshrinement. They also argue that Hirohito still sent a messenger to the shrine on his behalf and that Imperial Family members have continued to visit the shrine. These arguments distort Hirohito’s “heart.”41 That Hirohito’s “heart” was displeased with the joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals is clear from his statement. A visit to the shrine by Hirohito’s messenger or those of the Imperial Family members does not carry the same significance as his own visit. This fact actually endorses Hirohito’s “displeasure.” The point is that Hirohito had decided not to visit the shrine after the joint enshrinement of Class-A war criminals and he actually stopped visiting. Yet, some people even doubt the authenticity of the “Tomita Notes” on the ground that the paragraph in question was pasted into the journal. However, the fact that Tomita added his BEREAVED FAMILIES OF CLASS-A WAR CRIMINALS ... 187 handwritten note to his pocket-size journal does not diminish the authenticity.42 Moreover, some on the right and leaning right argue that Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine after Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s visit on August 15, 1975, which had created a controversy over the difference between a visit as a “private person” and as a “public person,” making a visit to the shrine in an official capacity difficult. Nevertheless, this argu- ment is untenable: Hirohito did visit the shrine on November 21, 1975, after this controversy.43 In turn, the newly released “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” simply states, “Hirohito told Imperial Household Agency Grand Steward Tomita Tomohiko in April 1988 about the joint enshrinement of Class-A war criminals in the Yasukuni Shrine and his visit.” As in the case of the Hirohito–Deng Xiaoping meeting in Tokyo in 1978 (see Chapter 7), the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” does not quote Hirohito’s actual words and thereby obscures his views on politically sensitive matters. Overall, it appears that there is a consistent effort on the part of the Imperial Household Agency in compiling the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” to suppress Hirohito’s true voice with regard to his war responsibility. As several Japanese historians pointed out, the “Real Record of the Shōwa Emperor” ended up being a record compiled by the bureaucrats, contemplated from the standpoint of the government, and written in defense of the government.44

BEREAVED FAMILIES OF CLASS-A WAR CRIMINALS AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE Further, it is important to note that the bereaved families of the Class-A war criminals themselves had never asked for the joint enshrinement in the Yasukuni Shrine, and that they even proposed a separate enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in order to solve the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue. Kimura Tarō, the eldest son of former Army General Kimura Heitarō (December 1888–December 1948), one of the seven Class-A war criminals who were sentenced to death by hanging at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, conﬁded his thoughts about his father for the ﬁrst time in January 2015.45 Kimura Tarō states:

The bereaved families of the Class-A war criminals never requested or wished for the joint enshrinement. We graciously accepted it because 188 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

chief priest Matsudaira Nagayoshi, who had served in the Navy, decided to make the joint enshrinement ...However, my family has been concerned that the joint enshrinement has made the emperor stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. It also made the Prime Ministers’ visits to the shrine diplomatic issues. In order to resolve the issue, we [his mother was White Chrysanthemum Bereaved Families Association president, a group for the war criminals’ families] have proposed to the Yasukuni Shrine a separate enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals. However, the shrine rejected our proposal. They feared that accepting our request would set a precedent for other requests for separate enshrinement, such as of the Christian war dead and the Korean war dead.46

In addition, Hirota Kōtarō, the grandson of the career diplomat and former Prime Minister Hirota Kōki (February 1878–December 1948; term of ofﬁce, March 1936–February 1937), the sole civilian who was executed by hanging, despite the fact that he had confronted the military establishment in order to end the war, states:

After the execution and cremation of the seven Class-A war criminals, the ashes of my grandfather were mixed with those of the other six and were dumped in the garbage site at the crematorium. The SCAP-GHQ did this in order to prevent the ashes from being used for a cult of militarism. However, one of the defense lawyers secretly collected the ashes at night and kept them. After the occupation had ended, the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare informed us of this. However, my father declined to accept the ashes, because the identities of the ashes were mixed up and unrecognizable.47

Hirota Kōtarō continues:

Then we were very surprised when we learned that my grandfather had been jointly enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine. This was done unilaterally. We were never consulted about it. Had we been consulted, we would have declined politely. The Yasukuni Shrine is for soldiers who lost their lives in action ...I do not want my grandfather enshrined there along with the generals who had involved my father in the war. If possible, I would like to have my grandfather removed from the joint enshrinement there. This is my candid feeling.48 PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S FOURTH VISIT ... 189

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S FOURTH VISIT TO THE YASUKUNI SHRINE AND MASSIVE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIONS IN CHINA Unlike former Prime Minister Nakasone, Prime Minister Koizumi did not listen to the advice of Nakae Yōsuke and visited the Yasukuni Shrine again on January 1, 2004. This was Koizumi’s fourth visit as Prime Minister. Just as Nakae had warned, Koizumi’s repeated visits to the shrine, coupled with the “history textbook issue” and Japan’s bid for non-permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, ignited Chinese anger and resulted in massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in various cities in China in March–April 2005. First, local citizens in Guangdong and Shenzhen collected anti-Japanese signatures and held rallies, while locals in Chengdu held a protest meeting and some of the protesters broke windows of the store of the large Japanese supermarket chain, Itō-Yōkadō.49 Elsewhere, students held a massive rally in Beijing and some of the demonstrators threw stones at the Japanese embassy and the Japanese ambassador’s public residence. Meanwhile, students in Shanghai held a protest meeting in front of the Japanese consulate-general and the mob threw stones at the consulate-general and attacked Japanese restaurants (although they were run by Chinese) and Japanese cars (although the passengers were Chinese).50 Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka visited Beijing in April in order to consult on the matter with his counterpart Li Zhaoxing and other Chinese ofﬁcials, but Premier Wen Jiabao refused to meet Machimura. Machimura demanded that the Chinese government apologize and pay compensation for the damage incurred to the Japanese government facilities and for the losses to Japanese business operations in China, but the Chinese government rejected this. Despite the series of violent episodes, the Chinese government condoned anti-Japanese protests as “patriotic protests” and the Chinese police acquiesced to them. Many observers note that the Chinese government employ a double standard in controlling demonstrations and only suppresses those that are against the Chinese government itself.51 The massive anti-Japanese demonstration in Beijing for instance proceeded in collaboration with the local police, and the demonstrators and the police ofﬁcers even sang the Chinese national anthem together at the 190 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI end of the rally. From a historical perspective, the size of the protest was such that it was reminiscent of the Chinese student movements in the early 20th century, such as the one in protest of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Zhou Enlai, who personally witnessed the student movement to reject the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements in May 1918, as well as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, would have felt that “history repeats itself” had he seen the protests in 2005.52

PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S FIFTH AND SIXTH VISITS TO YASUKUNI SHRINE Notwithstanding the massive demonstrations and riots in China in March–April 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine again on October 17, 2005, during the Annual Autumn Festival, and again on August 15, 2006. Thus, in his last year of tenure, Koizumi, who had avoided visiting the shrine on the war-end memorial anniversary day for five years, finally fulfilled his campaign pledge in 2001 to visit the shrine on August 15. He did so despite the fact that even the Japan Bereaved Association (Koga Makoto of the LDP was president at that time) issued a statement in June 2005, “While we appreciate Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, it is also necessary to consider the feelings of neighboring countries.”53

PRESIDENT HU JINTAO AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE Soon after Hu Jintao (b. December 1942) became the new Chinese president in March 2003, he met Koizumi in St. Petersburg, Russia, in May, prior to attending the Group of Eight Advanced Nations’ Summit Meeting in Evian, France (Hu was the first Chinese leader to attend such a meeting). In this brief meeting with Koizumi, Hu refrained from referring to the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue and simply stated that both nations should promote wholesome relations based on “history as a mirror” and on long-term and future-oriented perspectives. Many China watchers interpreted Hu’s measured statement as a sign of the “end of history” in Sino-Japanese relations. They thought that the fourth-generation Chinese leadership had departed from the anti-Japanese education of Jiang Zemin and decided to put the history issues with Japan behind them. It was PRESIDENT HU JINTAO AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE 191 reasoned that the Chinese government wanted Japan’s further cooperation in transforming its economy to state capitalism. It was also reasoned that the fourth-generation Chinese leaders were not as affected by wartime history as the third-generation leaders. Their prognosis turned out to be optimistic.54 President Hu Jintao actually had reasons to hate Japan. Chinese scholar Yang Zhongmei, who taught politics at Hōsei University and at Yokohama City University, argues that it is wrong to assume that new Chinese leaders do not adhere to the history issues as much as Jiang Zemin just because they are a postwar generation who do not have negative baggage with Japan as did the older generations. Yang points out that President Hu is in the 46th generation of a reputable family in Anhui province that goes back 1,600 years in China’s history. The first generation was a general of the Jin dynasty that emerged after the Three Kingdoms period in 280 AD. The Hu family also produced two state ministers, a minister at-large and a defense minister, during the Ming dynasty. The Hu family prospered as a wealthy merchant (tea dealer) family during the Ming and Qing dynasties, employing several English interpreters. The family’s prosperity ended with the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 due to the huge increase in tea tax to pay for war expenses and war reparations. Then the second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 forced Hu’s father to close his main office in Anhui province and move to Shanghai.55 As the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) occupied Shanghai, Hu’s father was obliged to dismiss all his employees and his mother fell ill due to overwork. The young Hu was sent to live with his relatives in Tai in Jiangsu province in 1946. In 1949, when Hu was six years old, his mother died. The decline of the Hu family and his mother’s death deeply hurt the young Hu, the only male heir of the Hu family. Yang argues, “Having witnessed the family’s decline, Hu’s hatred of Japan grew immeasurable, but this does not mean that Hu will adhere to the history issues just because he hates Japan deeply. Hu is a rational leader and he will not formulate foreign policy simply based on his personal sentiments.”56 Yang, however, notes that President Hu had another reason to distrust Japan. His mentor, former CCCPC Secretary-General Hu Yaobang (no direct relation with Hu Jintao), lost power partly because of his pro- Japanese foreign policy. Hu Yaobang visited Japan in November 1983 in order to discuss plans for Emperor Hirohito’s visit to China with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Then, Nakasone visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August 1985. The Japanese Ministry of Education also censored junior 192 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI high school textbooks and removed the word “aggression” in reference to Japan’s acts of aggression during the Asia-Pacific War: the revival of the “history textbook issue.” These Japanese actions triggered a storm of Chinese protest and Emperor Hirohito’s visit to China ended up being “pie in the sky” (Hirohito’s son, Emperor Akihito, visited China in October 1992).57 From Hu Yaobang’s perspective, it seemed as if anti-Chinese groups in Japan contemplated these actions in order to forestall Hirohito’s visit to China and Hu felt betrayed by the Japanese. Hu was then criticized as being pro-Japanese by his senior colleagues and lost power in 1987. Yang argues that the fate of Hu Yaobang was firmly imprinted in the mind of his protégé Hu Jintao, who had also encountered a crisis in his own political life. Hu had cracked down on Tibet in order to prove himself to senior members in the CPC Politburo, including the supreme leader Deng Xiaoping.58

HU JINTAO’S VISITS TO JAPAN Even if President Hu Jintao had refrained from reference to the Yasukuni Shrine with Prime Minister Koizumi in their en route meeting in May 2003 and might have wanted to put the history issues behind him, relations could not improve as long as Koizumi kept visiting the shrine annually. Although Hu and Koizumi met briefly in third countries during international conferences (in Santiago, Chile, in November 2004 and in Jakarta, Indonesia, in April 2005), the Chinese government refused to have official summit meetings during Koizumi’s tenure. The Chinese officials had to wait for a leadership change in Japan in order to change their stance toward Japan (examined below). Earlier in 1985, Hu Jintao had visited Japan for the first time as delegation head of a Chinese Youth Mission. Then, Hu visited Japan in April 1998, as China’s vice president, in order to prepare for President Jiang’s state visit to Japan in November that year. Vice President Hu then visited the United States in April 2002. On this trip, he made sure to stop over in Honolulu and laid a wreath at Pearl Harbor, as a symbolic gesture, just as President Jiang had done in 1997.59 Overall, President Hu took a more measured policy toward Japan than Jiang, especially after Koizumi’s tenure ended in September 2006. President Hu visited Japan in May 2008 and had a summit meeting with Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo. There, Hu and Fukuda issued the Sino- PLAN FOR ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL MEMORIAL FACILITY FOR THE WAR DEAD 193

Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” Hu decided to eliminate from the joint statement the reference to the history issues that had always been included in previous Sino-Japanese joint statements since the 1980s. Hu also indicated to Fukuda Chinese support for Japan’s bid for becoming one of the non-permanent members at the UN Security Council. This was the first time a Chinese leader expressed a positive stance on this matter. Hu also gave a public speech at Waseda University and played table tennis with the Japanese female champion player Fukuhara Ai, who was a student there. Hu introduced himself to Fukuhara, “You might not know me, but I know you.”60 President Hu’s itinerary in Japan included a visit to the Yokohama- Yamate Chinese Academy (originally called the Yokohama-Daidō School) in Yokohama. The Chinese officials had seldom failed to use a foreign state visit to convey cryptic messages to the host nation and its people. Their diplomatic overtures were characterized by symbolic gestures. President Hu’s visit to the Yokohama-Yamate Academy was no exception. The Daidō School officially opened in February 1898, based on the proposal of Sun Yat-sen in October 1895. Xu Qin, who was a student of the Chinese scholar/reformer Kang Youwei, became its first principal and the Japanese patron Inukai Tsuyoshi (assassinated Prime Minister; June 1855–May 1932) became honorary principal. The school taught in Cantonese and became a world pioneer in Overseas Chinese education. Sun Yat-sen visited the school in March 1913.61 President Hu’s visit in 2008 evoked the memory of this school, which is associated with many prominent Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, including Liang Qichao and Zhang Binglin (Zhang Taiyan). The Chinese officials choreographed Hu’s visit with subtle symbols representing complex historic and cultural ties in Sino-Japanese relations.62

PLAN FOR ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL MEMORIAL FACILITY FOR THE WAR DEAD Meanwhile, after Prime Minister Koizumi’s first controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, the conservative LDP and Japan’slargest opposition party, the more liberal DPJ, had discussed a compromise plan to create a non-denominational national memorial facility for the war dead that would not have any ties with the Yasukuni Shrine. However, the plan met opposition from more conservative members 194 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI of the LDP. Then, the advisory council for Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, which was specifically established to address this issue, reported that the council considered it premature to create a new national memorial facility for the war dead.63 Koizumi also decided, in August 2003, not to appropriate the budget for such a facility in the next fiscal year, in consideration of the LDP’s presidential election in September 2003. Although the LDP and the DPJ agreed in October 2005 to set up a cross-party group to promote the creation of a secular national memorial facility dedicated only to ordinary soldiers, little progress has been made on the creation of such a facility to this day.64

PRIME MINISTER ABE SHINZŌ AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE Meanwhile in Japan, seven leadership changes took place during the ten- year tenure of President Hu Jintao between March 2003 and March 2013. First, Abe Shinzō (term of tenure, September 2006–September 2007) succeeded Koizumi Jun’ichirō. Abe is a maternal grandson of former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who was arrested and incarcer- ated at Sugamo Prison with a charge of Class-A war crimes, but was not indicted and released. The frozen Sino-Japanese relations by visiting China immediately after he took office. Abe met President Hu in BeijinginOctober2006andagreedtopromote“a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.” This agreement resulted in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” of 2008. Abe’s visit was well received by the Chinese government as an “ice breaking trip.”65 Abe also refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine during his first tenure as Prime Minister, but sent an offering of a sacred masakaki tree during the Annual Spring Festival of the shrine in 2007. Abe had visited the shrine earlier in 2004, 2005, and 2006 when he was LDP secretary- general, LDP acting secretary-general, and chief cabinet secretary of the Koizumi cabinet, respectively. Fundamentally, however, Abe’s policy toward China remained pro-Taiwan, just as those of his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke and his birthfather, Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō, were. In fact, Abe was president of the East Asia Friendship Association PRIME MINISTER ABE AND THE “COMFORT WOMEN” ISSUE 195 that promotes exchange between Japan and Taiwan (and other countries in East Asia), but resigned the post when he became Prime Minister.66 Abe simultaneously promoted a rightward national policy with platforms of “exit from the postwar regime” and “creation of a beautiful nation.” The “exit from the postwar regime” slogan suggested that Japan should end the “shameful apology diplomacy” toward its neighboring countries, revise the war-renouncing constitution “imposed by” the United States, and grow out of its dependence on the United States. In turn, the “creation of a beautiful nation” slogan implied evoking a nos- talgic yearning for wartime patriotism and even beautifying the past militarism. Abe succeeded in legislating much of his cardinal policy agenda, including revision of the Basic Law of Education (mandating the teaching of patriotism to schoolchildren), upgrading the status of the Self-Defense Agency to the Ministry of Self-Defense, and the Law concerning the Procedure for Revising the Japanese Constitution (as a first step to revising the constitution).67

PRIME MINISTER ABE AND THE “COMFORT WOMEN” ISSUE Prime Minister Abe also betrayed himself on another wartime history issue: the “comfort women” issue. Abe denied that the IJA had forced comfort women to serve the army on the grounds that they were recruited by brokers and were paid. He stated that there might have been coercion in a broader sense of the word, but there was not coercion in the strict sense of the word. Abe also denied the responsibility of the IJA for the “comfort facilities” established at its overseas posts on the ground that these facilities were created and managed by private businesses. His argu- ment seems to claim that a parent organization is not responsible for its outsourced operations overseas because they are nominally separate enti- ties. Abe’s unapologetic stance on the comfort women issue was such that a Japanese–American US House of Representatives member Michael Honda introduced a resolution before the US Congress to condemn Abe in January 2007. In response, Abe stated that the US resolution contradicted objective facts and that he would not apologize even if the resolution were passed.68 The US House of Representatives passed an amendment to the resolution in July 2007, which demanded that the Japanese government formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility for the IJA’s coercion of young women into sexual slavery during the colonial and 196 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI wartime occupation of Asia and Paciﬁc islands. Several parliaments in Europe, including the European Parliament, also passed similar resolutions. Then, Abe abruptly resigned in September 2007, after just one year in ofﬁce, due to fatigue and stress-related illness.69

PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA YASUO AND THE YASUKUNI SHRINE VISIT ISSUE Then, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo (September 2007–September 2008), the eldest son of Fukuda Takeo, tried to formulate a more balanced foreign policy toward Asia, following in the footsteps of his father who had built stronger relations with Southeast Asian countries. As with Abe, Fukuda Yasuo also tried to placate China by pledging that he would not make an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. He also formally apologized to the “Japanese orphans left behind in China,” who had been ignored by the Japanese government for decades since the end of World War II. In May 2008 in Tokyo, Fukuda and Hu Jintao issued the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.”70 However, the Fukuda cabinet suffered from the “nejire (contorted)” parliament, in which the ruling LDP did not have a majority in the House of Councillors (HC), the nominal upper house of the Japanese parliament. In June 2008 the HC, ruled by the opposition DPJ, passed a non-binding motion to censure Fukuda. This was the HC’s equivalent of a House of Representatives (HR) non-confidence vote for the cabinet. This was the first case in which such a motion against an incumbent Prime Minister was actually passed under the postwar Japanese constitution. Fukuda then resigned unexpectedly in September, having served just shy of one year in office.71

PRIME MINISTER ASŌ TARŌ AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Prime Minister Asō Tarō (September 2008–September 2009), a maternal grandson of Yoshida Shigeru, also refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. However, Asō had earlier stated in an interview with the former Economist editor, Bill Emmott, when he was foreign minister in the Abe cabinet, “Ah, I don’t know why you Westerners are so surprised by all this tension between China and Japan. After all, China and Japan have hated PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA YUKIO AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 197 each other for a thousand years. Why should it be any different now?” Asō’s statement reﬂected “historical amnesia” syndrome. As with the case of Fukuda Yasuo, the HC passed a motion to censure Asō in July 2009. Asō also resigned after less than one year in ofﬁce, in September 2009.72

PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA YUKIO AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS After three short LDP administrations, the relatively new DPJ won a landslide victory over the LDP in the HR general elections in August 2009, and Hatoyama Yukio, a grandson of Hatoyama Ichirō,formedthefirst cabinet of the DPJ in September 2009. Japanese constituents had grown tired of the government of the LDP and voted for the hodgepodge DPJ, consisting of members ranging from conservatives to social democrats. The victory for the DPJ owed not so much to constituents’ expectations for the party as to their disappointment in the LDP. Being a neo-liberal leader, Hatoyama Yukio did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine and was sympathetic with China and South Korea on the history issues, including the “comfort women” issue and the history textbook issue. Also, Hatoyama had a summit talk with President Hu Jintao at the UN General Assembly and proposed the creation of an East Asian community, modeled after the European Union, for the sake of the integration of East Asia. Through his foreign policy initiatives, Hatoyama sought “a new path for Japan.”73 For this, Hatoyama simultaneously tried to establish “more” equal relations with the United States and cancelled the US–Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative that began in 1993 between Bill Clinton and Miyazawa Kiichi. Through this program, the US government had presented an annual reform request list to Japan, which Sekioka Hideyuki referred to as the “list of interferences in internal affairs that Japan cannot reject.” Sekioka argued that the privatization of Japan’s postal system, the hallmark of the Koizumi reforms, was the prime product of the annual reform request list, as the reform involved high stakes for American financial and insurance companies. The Obama administration strongly objected to Hatoyama’s decision.74 The two sides also failed to reach an agreement on the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, a lingering issue of US–Japan relations, complicated by changes between conservative and liberal leadership in the Okinawa-prefecture government and the local municipalities concerned. Hatoyama was involved in political contribution 198 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI scandals and resigned in June 2010, ending his tenure in less than nine months. By unequivocally distinguishing Japanese national interests from US national interests, Hatoyama repeated the legacy of his grandfather, Hatoyama Ichirō.75 Hatoyama Yukio’s successors as head of the DPJ and Japanese Prime Minister, Kan Naoto (June 2010– September 2011) and Noda Yoshihiko (September 2011–December 2012), also refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, but they encountered another problem with China: the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (see Chapter 9). They were also challenged by difficult domestic issues, such as the rescue and recovery projects in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 and the resultant Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster, as well as the legislation to raise the consumer tax (equivalent to a sales tax), and their cabinets were short-lived.76

FORMATION OF THE SECOND ABE CABINET In December 2012, the LDP took power back from the DPJ in the HR general elections and Abe Shinzō formed his second cabinet. This was the eighth (counting Abe twice) Japanese Prime Minister that Hu Jintao dealt with during his tenure as Chinese president. During his second bid for the LDP presidency in September 2012, Abe expressed his “limitlessly extreme regret” for not being able to visit the Yasukuni Shrine during his ﬁrst tenure as Prime Minister and vowed to do so in his second tenure if he was reelected. Earlier, on August 15, 2008, the ﬁrst war-end memorial anniversary day after resigning from the post of Prime Minister in September 2007, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine. In 2012, Abe visited the shrine on August 15, but visited the shrine again in October 2012 during its Annual Autumn Festival. He did so as president of the LDP before the HR general elections in December.77 Then after the formation of his second cabinet, Abe sent an offering of a sacred masakaki tree for the shrine’s Annual Spring Festival in 2013, which three of his cabinet ministers attended. Another cabinet minister visited the shrine on April 28, one day before the birthday of former emperor Hirohito. In total, as many as 168 parliamentarians, the largest number thus far, emboldened by the return to power of the LDP, visited the shrine in April 2013. Abe then made a money offering on August 15, out of his own pocket. Three of his cabinet ministers visited the shrine on that day. Abe sent another offering of a sacred masakaki tree in October PRIME MINISTER ABE VISITS YASUKUNI SHRINE 199

2013 for the shrine’s Annual Autumn Festival, which two of his ministers attended.78

PRIME MINISTER ABE VISITS YASUKUNI SHRINE Then, suddenly on December 26, 2013, the one-year anniversary of the formation of his second cabinet, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine and thereby finally realized his campaign promise. This was the first Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the shrine in more than seven years since Koizumi’s on August 15, 2006. Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide, stated, “In accordance with the custom of Prime Minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the past, Prime Minister Abe visited the shrine in the capacity of a ‘private person.’ He made the money offering out of his own pocket, but he signed in the visitor’s book as ‘Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.’” It should be recalled that the Fukuoka District Court determined in 2004 that Koizumi’s visit to the shrine in the same manner in 2001 was unconstitutional.79 Abe’s visit not only received criticism from China and South Korea, but also from European countries, Russia, and the United States. On behalf of the Obama administration, the US embassy in Tokyo issued a statement that “the United States was disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.” The word “disappointed” is a stronger term than the US government had used in expressing its regret over Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the past.80 It was thought that Abe had learned a lesson in his first term when the US Congress (as well as the European Parliament) passed the resolution to censure Abe’s stance on the “comfort women” issue, another “history issue” that besets Japan’s relations with countries in East Asia. Nevertheless, Abe was not only unapologetic about his visit to the shrine but was proud of it. Abe’s supporters on the right criticized any conciliatory stance on the history issues on the part of the Japanese leaders as “weak-kneed” and even unpatriotic. Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine was also important to Abe’s push for “exit from the postwar regime” and his vision for “creation of a beautiful nation.”81 Abe repeatedly stated, “I visited the Yasukuni Shrine in order to pay respect for the war dead and to pray for world peace. I have no intention of neglecting the feelings of the people in China and South Korea. I will continue to explain my true intensions for visiting the shrine in order to 200 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI obtain understanding of the people in China and South Korea.” However, despite his intentions, China and South Korea perceived Abe’s visit as promoting “kenkagoshi” (confrontational) diplomacy toward its neighbors regarding the “history issues” in his second tenure. Abe refrained from visiting the shrine in 2014, but sent another offering of a masakaki tree for the Annual Autumn Festival on October 17, 2014. Three female ministers visited the shrine the following day. Thus, the controversy on the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue continues (see Chapter 10 for updates). Meanwhile, Abe had to deal with another issue with China: the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands.82

NOTES 1. “‘Rekishi’ wa kaizan dekinai” (“History” Cannot be Revised), Chūnichi Shimbun (also circulated as Tokyo Shimbun), September 28, 2014. 2. Ibid. 3. “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki” (Major Developements concerning Yasukuni Shrine), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 27, 2013. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. “Seikyō-bunri mondai mo okizari” (Ignoring the Issue of Separation of Church and State), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 27, 2013. 8. Ibid. 9. “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” 10. Ibid.; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku: Rekishi-hōtei no hikoku toshite (Reﬂections: As Defendant at the Tribunal of History), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2004, 135–137. 11. Ibid. (both). 12. Nakasone, 135–137. 13. Ibid.; “Hon’nen 8-gatsu 15-nichi no naikaku sōri-daijin sonota no kokumu- daijin ni-yoru Yasukuni-jinja kōshiki-sanpai ni-tsuite” (Regarding Ofﬁcial Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister and Other State Ministers on August 15, 1986), August 14, 1986, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ tuitou/dai2/siryo1_9.html. 14. Nakasone, 135–139. 15. “Shū Onrai-shushō no shihi, kizutsukeru” (Defacing the Memorial Poem Stone of Premier Zhou Enlai), Chūnichi Shimbun, June 26, 1987; “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” 16. “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” NOTES 201

17. Yang Zhongmei, Kokintō: Nijūisseiki Chūgoku no shihaisha, (Hu Jintao: Chinese Ruler of the Twenty-ﬁrst Century), Tokyo: Nippon-hōsō-kyōkai, 2003, 252–265. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid.; “Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development between Japan and the People’s Republic of China,” November 26, 1998, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html. 21. Yang, 265. 22. Shimizu Yoshikazu, Chūgoku ha naze “han’nichi” ni nattaka (Why China Becane “Anti-Japan”), Tokyo: Bunshun-shinsho, 2003, 215–217. 23. Ibid. 24. Kataoka Tetsuya, “Nonaka Hiromu-shi no taichū kankan-gaikō okyūdan- suru” (To Condemn Mr. Nonaka Hiromu’s Traitorous Diplomacy towards China), Seiron, July 2002, 82–89. 25. Ibid.; “Seikyō-bunri mondai mo okizari.” 26. Shimizu, 215–216. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. “On-shushō Fukuda-kanbōchōkan to kaiken” (Premier Wen Talks with Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda), Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2003. 30. Ibid. 31. “Li-gaishō Koizumi-shushō to kaidan” (Foreign Minister Li Talks with Prime Minister Koizumi), Asahi Shimbun, August 12, 2003. 32. Nakae Yōsuke, “Chūgoku wa naze Yasukuni-sanpai ni kodawarunoka” (Why Does China Oppose Yasukuni Visit?), Chunichi Shimbun, July 16, 2001. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Zhou Enlai, “Luri-riji” (Diary of Travel to Japan), in Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai zaoqi wenji 1912.10–1924.6 (Early Writings of Zhou Enlai 1912.10–1924.6), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi and Nankai-daxue, Tianjin: Zhonggyang wenxian-chubanshe and Nankai- daxue chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 1, 357–358. 36. Ibid., 374; Mizuma Masanori, Imakoso Nihonjin ga shitteokubeki “rōyodo mondai” no shinjitsu (Truth about the “Territorial Issues” that Japanese Must Know Now), e-book, Tokyo: PHP kenkyūjo, February 8, 2011, 82–85. 37. Mizuma, 82–85. 38. “Rekishi o kaeta bunsho” (Documents that Changed History), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 20, 2014. 39. Ibid. 202 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

40. “Shōwa Ten’nō Jitsuroku: Yasukuni mondai” (Real Record of Shōwa Emperor: Yasukuni Issue), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 9, 2014. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” 44. “Ten’nō Jitsuroku: Hyōgen yokusei ‘seishi’ no genkai” (Real Record of Emperor: Suppressed Expression [Shows] Limits to “Correct History”), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 9, 2014. 45. “A-kyū senpan no chichi o ushinatta kazoku no sengo” (Postwar [Life] of a Family that Lost its Father, Who was a Class-A War Criminal), Bungei- shunjū, Vol. 93, No 1, January 2015, 241–245. 46. Ibid. 47. “Sofu, Hirota Kōki gōshi eno iwakan” (Reservations about the Joint Enshrinement of my Grandfather, Hirota Kōki), Bungei-shunjū, Vol. 93, No 1, January 2015, 306–308. 48. “Sofu, Hirota Kōki gōshi eno iwakan” (Reservations about the Joint Enshrinement of my Grandfather, Hirota Kōki), Bungei-shunjū, Vol. 93, No 1, January 2015, 306–308. 49. “Chūgoku ni-okeru Nihon-kanren kōgi-katsudō” (Anti-Japanese Protest Activities in China), April 12, 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ area/china/j_kogi01.html. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid.; “Japan-China Talks Fail to Ease Tensions,” Washington Post, April 18, 2005. 52. Ibid. (both). 53. “Nihon-izokukai no kenkai” (Statemment of the Japan Bereaved Association), Asahi Shimbun, June 11, 2005. 54. “Chūgoku, Nihon, shunō-kaidan” (China-Japan Summit Talk), Chūnichi Shimbun, June 1, 2003. 55. Yang, 252–256. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., 263–275. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. “Nitchū gokei-kankei o suishin” (Promoting Sino-Japanese Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship), Asahi Shimbun, May 7 2008; “Ko Kintō Waseda de kōen” (Hu Jintao Gave Speech at Waseda), Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 2008; “Joint Statement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship Based on NOTES 203

Common Strategic Interests,” May 7, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html. 61. “Yokohama-Yamate Chūka-gakuen” (Yokohama-Yamate Chinese Academy), March 30, 2015, http://www.yokohamayamate-chinese school.ed.jp//chn/school/history.html. 62. Ibid. 63. “Report: Tsuitō heiwa-kinen no-tameno kinenhi-tō shitetsu no arikata o kangaeru kondankai” (Report: the Advisory Council to Consider Memorial Facilities for the War Dead and for Peace, December 24, 2002, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tuitou/kettei/021224houkoku.html. 64. “Koizumi-shushō, kokuritsu senbotsusha tsuitō shisetsu kensetsu no yosan, rainendo-kaikei ni morikomazu” (Prime Minister Koizumi Did Not Appropriate Budget for Creating a National Memorial Facility for the War Dead in the Next Fiscal Year), Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 2003. 65. Terashima Jitsurō, “Abe-gaikō sekai to zure” (Abe Foreign Policy Diverges from the World), Chūnichi Shimbun, February 8, 2014. 66. Ibid.; “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” 67. Terashima. 68. “Bei-kain ianfu-ketsugian katetsu” (US House Passed Resolution on Comfort Women), Asahi Shimbun, July 31, 2007. 69. Ibid. 70. Terashima; “Joint Statement between Japan and China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” 71. “Fukuda-shushō monseki-ketsugian, San’in kaketsu” (House of Councillors Passed Motion to Censure Prime Minister Fukuda), Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2008. 72. “Bill Emmott: The Rise of Asia is Not a Simple Matter of East versus West,” October 30, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commenta tors/bill-emmott-the-rise-of-asia-is-not-a-simple-matter-of-east-versus- west-978471.html;Asō-shushō monseki-ketsugian, San’in kaketsu” (House of Councillers Passed Motion to Censure Prime Minister Asō), Asahi Shimbun, July 15, 2009. 73. Hatoyama Yukio, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 27, 2009. 74. “Minshutō wa nenji-kaikaku yōbosho haishi ni hanpatsushita Amerika ni tsubusareta!? (Was the DPJ Destroyed by the United States that Objected to the Cancellation of Annual Reform Request List!?), October 26, 2012, http://biz-journal.jp/2012/10/post_907.html. 75. Ibid.; Martin Fackler, “Ties to U.S. Played Role in Downfall of Japanese Leader,” New York Times, June 3, 2010. 204 8 “HISTORY ISSUES” AND ZHOU ENLAI

76. “Senkaku-shotō de Chūgoku-gyosen ga Kaijō-hoanchō junshisen ni shōtotsu” (Chinese Fishing Vessel Clashed with Japan Coast Guard Patrol Boats near the Senkaku Islands), Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2010. 77. “Yasukuni-jinja o-meguru omona ugoki.” 78. Ibid. 79. “Abe-shushō Yasukuni sanpai” (Prime Minister Abe Visits Yasukuni Shrine), Asahi Shimbun, December 26, 2013. 80. “Shushō Yasukuni-sanpai ni ‘shitsubō’ seimei” (Statements of “Disappointment” with Prime Minister [Abe]’s Visit to Yasukuni Shrine), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 29, 2013. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid.; “Abe-shushō Yasukuni-jinja shūki-reitaisai ni masakaki hōnō” (Prime Minister Abe Made Offering of Masakaki for Yasukuni Shrine Annual Autumn Festival), Asahi Shimbun, October 17, 2014. CHAPTER 9

Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute

In addition to the wartime history issues, another controversy that has beset contemporary Sino-Japanese relations is the territorial dispute over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Geographically, the Senkaku Islands are part of the chain of islands called the Ryūkyū Islands, which include the Okinawa Islands (Okinawa Island is the main island of the group) and the Sakishima Islands (Ishigaki Island is the main island). Administratively, the Senkaku Islands are under the jurisdiction of Ishigaki city, Okinawa prefecture, Japan. The Senkaku Islands—a Japanese translation for the Pinnacle Islands that were cited in the record of water- ways of the British Navy—refer to the whole archipelago, and there is no individual island called Senkaku Island. This archipelago consists of—in size order—Uotsuri Island (Chinese name, Diaoyu-dao; about 1.39 square miles), Kuba Island (US name, Kōbi-shō; 0.34 square miles; under exclusive control of US armed forces stationed in Japan), Minami- kojima (lit., “south islet”; 0.12 square miles), Kita-kojima (“north islet”; 0.10 square miles), Taishō Island (US name, Sekibi-shō; 0.02 square miles; under exclusive control of US armed forces stationed in Japan), and several rocks.1 Given that a thorough study of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands requires a book-length volume or more, this chapter does not go into details of the history of this issue and examines the subject in light of the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The early history of the Senkaku Islands is not clearly established because of sporadic records, but geographically the islands are part of the Sakishima Islands (which are part of the Ryūkyū Islands). Since theSakishimaIslandswerepartoftheRyūkyū Kingdom at its zenith, the Senkaku Islands could be historically considered as part of the Ryūkyū Kingdom. At least, the existence of the Senkaku Islands was known by the people of the Ryūkyū Kingdom, who used the islands as navigation markers for their route to China. The Ryūkyū Kingdom was a tributary state of China, which also proves that the former was an independent entity, not part of China. The origin of the official relations between Japan and the Ryūkyū Kingdom dates back to the early seventeenth century when the Tokugawa shogunate government authorized its retainer in the southwestern province, Shimazu Tadatsune (Iehisa) of Satsuma province (current Kagoshima prefecture), to dispatch a military expedition to the Ryūkyū Kingdom in 1609. King Shōnei surrendered to Shimazu, and the Ryūkyū Kingdom became a vassal state of Satsuma, while retaining nominal independence.2 With the restoration of the power of Emperor Mutsuhito in 1868, theJapaneseMeijigovernmentdesignatedtheRyūkyū province as Okinawa prefecture in 1879. Afterwards, the government conducted land surveys on the Senkaku Islands in 1885 and confirmed that there were neither inhabitants on the islands nor any trace of Chinese control over the islands. Then in January 1895 (just before the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Treaty of April 1895 that ended the first Sino- Japanese War), the Meiji government made a cabinet decision to incorporate the Senkaku Islands into Okinawa prefecture and to erect alandmarkerthere.3 Although the Meiji government did not declare this decision publicly, the Japanese government considers that Japanese sovereignty over the island was officially established at that time in recourse to the international law of terra nullius (“land belonging to no one”). Accordingly, the Shimonoseki Treaty did not stipulate the Senkaku Islands as part of the area China (the Qing dynasty) ceded to Japan. In turn, China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan in the treaty. This suggests that China acknowledged at that time that the Senkaku Islands were part of Japan’s territory.4 JAPANESE SETTLEMENT ON THE SENKAKU ISLANDS 207

JAPANESE SETTLEMENT ON THE SENKAKU ISLANDS On September 1896, the Meiji government leased four of the Senkaku Islands—Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, Kita-kojima, and Minami-kojima—to a private citizen, Koga Tatsushirō, free of charge for the first 30 years and then with a rent afterward. As the pioneer of the islands, Koga built a fish processing plant to make dried skipjack tuna (bonito), an essential ingredient for Japanese cuisine. In 1909, as many as 248 Japanese (99 households) lived on the Senkaku Islands. Then, Koga died in 1918. In 1932, the Japanese government sold the four islands to Koga’s son, Koga Zenji. When Koga closed the factory in 1940, the Japanese settlers left the islands, leaving the islands uninhabited again.5 With the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War in August 1945, Japan was occupied by US armed forces and lost sovereignty over its territories proper. Japan regained its sovereignty over its territories proper in April 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force and officially relinquished Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. The Senkaku Islands were not stipulated in the peace treaty as relinquished areas by Japan because they were recognized as part of Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. Neither the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China” hereafter) nor the Republic of China (ROC or “Taiwan” hereafter) claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands at that time.6 To complicate the matter, the United States did not return Okinawa prefecture to Japan when the latter regained its sovereignty in April 1952, but continued to exercise the right to administer the “territory” as a major base for the US armed forces through the US–Japan Security Treaty and the US–Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The “territory” included the Ryūkyū Islands and the Daitō Islands. Then, the United States established its Government of the Ryūkyū Islands, whose administration area included the Senkaku Islands. The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that the US Air Force established in the area also included the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, the US Navy began to use two of the Senkaku Islands— Kuba Island (Kōbi-shō)andTaishō Island (Sekibi-shō)—as its bombing and gunnery range in March 1956. The US government actually paid an annual rent of US$11,000 for Kuba Island to the landowner Koga Zenji, whereas the Japanese government directly leased Taishō Island to the US Navy.7 208 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE The territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands began in the early 1970s when an oceanographic survey of the East China Sea in October– November 1968, conducted by the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), found that oil reserves might lay in the continental shelf. Following this, the ROC (Taiwan) in May 1969 gave the right to drill for oil to American Gulf Oil in the waters surrounding Tiaoyutai Island (the Taiwanese name for Uotsuri Island). In addition, a Taiwanese vessel landed on Tiaoyutai Island and raised the ROC’s national flag there, but the United States, which administered the Government of the Ryūkyū Islands, had the flag removed.8 The Government of the Ryūkyū Islands then erected land markers on five islands: Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima, Minami-kojima, Kuba Island, and Taishō Island. However, Taiwanese students in the United States launched an anti-Japanese demonstration in January–February 1971, claiming that these islands were part of the inalienable territory of Taiwan. The ROC (Taiwan) made official its claim of sovereignty over the islands in June 1971.9

SIGNING OF THE “OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT” This occurred just several days before the signing of the Agreement between Japan and the United States concerning the Ryūkyū Islands and the Daitō Islands on June 17, 1971, by which the United States handed over “administration” of the area to Japan. This is generally known as the “Okinawa Reversion Agreement” (and hereafter). US Secretary of State William P. Rogers, on behalf of President Richard Nixon, and Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi, on behalf of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, signed this agreement simultaneously in Washington, DC and Tokyo. Because of Taiwan’s abrupt claim over the Senkaku Islands, President Nixon before signing the agreement had conﬁrmed with his national security adviser Henry Kissinger that the “residual sovereignty” that the United States considered Japan possessed over Okinawa during the period of the US administration covered the Senkaku Islands. Kissinger concurred and stated, “these islands had stayed with Okinawa when Japan returned Taiwan to the ROC government in 1945.”10 Accordingly, the Senkaku Islands were included in the geographical area for which “the United States shall hand over administration to SIGNING OF THE “OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT” 209

Japan,” defined in longitude and latitude in the “Agreed Minutes” attached to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. The Satō cabinet wanted to have the exact locations and the specific names of the islands to be handed over identified in the text of the agreement, but the Nixon administration refused.11 The timing of ROC’s claim suggests that it was in a state of brinkmanship as the China representation issue at the UN had reached a climactic point. According to the newly released (July 2014) classified diplomatic archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi had a secret talk with an official of the ROC in May 1971 and proposed Japan’s support for the ROC on the China representation issue at the UN as a quid pro quo for ROC’s self-restraint on its territorial claim over the Senkaku Islands and on public opinion. The ROC official responded by stating, “We will make an effort for this.”12 Foreign Minister Aiichi also met the US ambassador to the ROC on May 7. Aichi stated that he would closely cooperate with the US government for retaining ROC’s seat at the UN and requested that the US government be quiet about the Senkaku Islands so as not to stir up the issue. The US ambassador thanked him for the Japanese support of the ROC at the UN and stated on the Senkaku Islands, “We will make an effort to cool off the issue.” The declassified document did not give the name of the US ambassador, but the US ambassador to the ROC at that time was a career diplomat, Walter Patrick McConaughy, Jr. (1908–2000; term of office, June 1966–April 1974).13 Despite this secret deal, the ROC made an official claim of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in June 1971. In turn, Japan, along with the United States and their allies, voted against the Albanian draft resolution to expel the ROC from the UN at the UN General Assembly and also submitted an alternative “dual representation” draft resolution, which would accept the admission of the PRC but reject the expulsion of the ROC. The China representation issue at the UN was settled in October 1971 when the General Assembly passed the Albanian draft resolution (Resolution 2758), accepting the admission of the PRC as the legitimate representative of China to the UN and the expulsion of the ROC from the UN. Then, after the admission in the UN, the PRC also claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in December 1971, and the Chinese MOFA declared that the Diaoyu Islands (the Chinese name for the islands) had been covered in the maritime defense zone of China as early as the Ming dynasty.14 210 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

ACTUAL OKINAWA REVERSION The Okinawa Reversion Agreement between Japan and the United States took effect in May 1972; however, per agreement, the US armed forces continued to be stationed in Okinawa prefecture. Simultaneously, two islands of the Senkaku Islands—Kuba Island and Taishō Island—were designated as facilities and areas for the US armed forces: FAC 6084 Kōbi-shō Range and FAC 6085 Sekibi-shō Range, respectively. Thus, the whole area of the two islands became bombing and gunnery ranges of the US Navy. At the time of the Okinawa Reversion, the Japanese government contracted a lease of Kuba Island from the Japanese landowner, Koga Zenji, and made it available for the US Navy. Upon Koga’s death in 1978, the title of the island was transferred from Koga to his wife, Koga Hanako; then she sold the title to Kurihara Kunioki. Actually, earlier in 1972, Kurihara had bought the title of Minami-kojima and Kita-kojima from Koga Zenji, and then bought the title of Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island after his death.15 In turn, the Japanese government continued to directly lease Taishō Island to the US Navy. Actual exercises on the two islands have not been conducted since 1979. There was no concrete plan for the use of the land afterwards, but the islands have been under the continuous exclusive control of the US armed forces and have remained off-limits to the Japanese to this day.16

NIXON OBSCURES US COMMITMENT TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS Despite these facts, when the signed Okinawa Reversion Agreement was presented to the US Senate for ratiﬁcation in October 1971, the Nixon administration changed its earlier position that Japan had “residual sovereignty” over the Senkaku Islands to a substantially more reserved one. Being aware of the claim over the Senkaku Islands by the ROC and having a visit to Beijing and Sino-US rapprochement in mind, President Nixon decided not to unequivocally acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over the islands. As a result, Robert Starr, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser to Secretary of State William P. Rogers, made a convoluted explanation to the US Congress. To put is simply, the new stance of the Nixon administration was the following:

The United States had no claim to the islands; it did not take an ofﬁcial position on who owned the islands; and any conﬂicting claims to the islands were a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.17 ZHOU ENLAI AND THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 211

This became the ofﬁcial position of the United States concerning the territorial disputes over sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, to this day. Every US administration since then has carefully eschewed acknowledging Japanese sovereignty over the islands.18 The Nixon administration also stopped short of making an unequivocal commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands, regarding whether it was within the purview of Article Five of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan of 1960 (which replaced the original US–Japan Security Treaty of 1951). Article Five of the treaty read:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.19

Nevertheless, Nixon’s Defense Secretary, David Packard, stated that Japan would assume “primary responsibility” for the defense of the treaty area but that the Security Treaty was applicable. The interpretation of the US commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands in recourse to Article Five of the Security Treaty has changed over the course of time (examined below).20

ZHOU ENLAI AND THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE Zhou Enlai considered the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands a negligible matter for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Zhou thus proposed to shelve the issue in September 1972 when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei brought up the matter during the summit negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. The two governments agreed to maintain the status quo of the dispute and shelve the issue. The detailed minutes recorded by a longtime specialist in charge of China’s operations vis-à-vis Japan and then Chinese MOFA senior advisor, Zhang Xiangshan (1914–October 2009), indicates that Zhou and Tanaka agreed to shelve the issue. In contrast, the Japanese record of their conversation—given in 212 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE diplomatic archives declassified in September 2012 by the Japanese MOFA—appears to be a truncated version of the original minutes (the ministry says that the original minutes were lost) and does not tell the whole truth (see Chapter 6).21 The fact is that no reference to the dispute was made in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 1972. The bottom line is that “maintaining the status quo of the dispute and shelving the issue” became the mutually-agreed foundation for the territorial issue. While Zhou’s stance might have reflected China’s economic and military powers vis-à-vis Japan’s at that time, it is still significant that he did not claim China’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands at the time of the diplomatic normalization, just as he relinquished China’s war reparation claims towards Japan (see Chapter 6).22

DENG XIAOPING AND THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE Then, in April 1978, more than 100 armed Chinese fishing vessels crossed the territorial water boundary and repeatedly operated in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands, despite the warnings of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG, the new English name since 2000 for the Maritime Safety Agency). The JCG is in charge of maintaining the security and safety of Japan’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and deals with foreign fishing vessels and other non-military vessels. It is a separate organization from Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force that deals with military action. In response to the Chinese actions, a Japanese rightwing group landed on the Senkaku Islands in May and raised the Japanese national flag there, ignoring the JCG’s order for them to stop. This was the first time the Japanese landed on the islands in the post-World War II period. In August 1978, another Japanese rightwing group landed on the islands and built a lighthouse on Uotsuri Island.23 The Fukuda Takeo cabinet officially protested the Chinese fishing operations in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands to the Chinese government, but the latter explained that they were merely accidental. Then, just before the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in Beijing in August 1978, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping stated that such accidents would not happen again. Deng followed the stance Zhou Enlai had taken at the time of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 and decided to shelve the territorial dispute for the sake of the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty. After exchanging the ratified copies of the peace treaty in Tokyo in October 1978, Deng ESCALATING TENSION 213 proposed at a press conference on October 25 to shelve the issue to “future generations, who will be wiser than us, to find a solution that will be acceptable to everyone” (see Chapter 7).24

THE AGE OF NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA Then, the world entered a new age of the law of the sea and the drastic changes in the law of the sea affected the Senkaku Islands dispute. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was codified through the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1973 on and was finally adopted in December 1982. The convention came into force in November 1994, after 60 countries had signed and ratified the treaty. The new Law of the Sea is characterized by the establishment of 12-nautical-mile territorial waters (as opposed to the traditional 3-nautical-mile territorial waters) and a 12- nautical-mile contiguous zone (measured from the outer line of the territorial waters, in which the coastal state can exert limited administrative control of foreign vessels including customs regulations), as well as a 200- nautical-mile EEZ (measured from the baseline for the territorial waters).25 With this background, the Chinese government, in February 1992, established its Law of Territorial Waters and stipulated that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory. Some scholars considered this to be Chinese relinquishment of its agreement with Japan to maintain the status quo of the territorial dispute and to shelve the issue to future generations.26 Then, in July 1996, after the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea had come into force in 1994, the Japanese government designated its 200- nautical-mile EEZ. Afterward, Chinese and Taiwanese protests against Japanese control of the Senkaku Islands intensified. For instance, in September 1996, activists from Hong Kong entered the territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and jumped into the water, which resulted in one person being drowned. In October, activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan in a flotilla of 14 boats entered the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and four people landed on Uotsuri Island. Similar cases continued through 1997.27

ESCALATING TENSION Things became worse at the turn of the new century. In April 2002 the Japanese government of Koizumi Jun’ichirō contracted a lease, with a rent of about ¥24,500,000 (US$183,500), for three of the Senkaku 214 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

Islands—Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima, and Minami-kojima—from the landowner Kurihara Kunioki for the purpose of peaceful and stable maintenance and management of the islands. Kurihara had given title to Kita- kojima and Minami-kojima to his younger brother Kurihara Hiroyuki in 1991, but Hiroyuki gave the title back to Kurihara Kunioki at this time so that the government could lease the three islands together.28 Then, in September and October 2002, Lee Teng-hui, ﬁrst native president of the ROC in Taiwan, and of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), stated:

The Senkaku Islands belong to Okinawa and therefore to Japan. When the Qing dynasty relinquished Taiwan to Japan [in 1895], the Senkaku Islands were not included in it. This is also clear from the map at that time. The Senkaku Islands had originally belonged to the Ryūkyū Kingdom and the Ryūkyū Kingdom was not part of the Ming dynasty. Ryūkyū is currently a prefecture of Japan, and it is clear who has the sovereignty ...the ROC (Taiwan) only has ﬁshing rights there.29

Nevertheless, the ROC government of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officially registered the Tiaoyutai Islands (their name for the Senkaku Islands) on its land registration in January 2004. Subsequently, in March 2004, seven Chinese (the PRC) activists landed on Uotsuri Island. They were arrested by the Okinawa-prefecture police. This was the first time that Chinese citizens were arrested on the Senkaku Islands. However, they were not indicted and were deported. Then, in December 2008, two Chinese (the PRC) oceanographic research ships entered the Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time that Chinese government vessels entered the area. The Chinese State Oceanic Administration stated that the Chinese government had to demonstrate its presence in the waters under its jurisdiction and to exercise effective jurisdiction over the waters.30 In turn, ROC’s KMT President Wu Po-hsiung (b. June 1939) during his official visit to Japan in December 2008 expressed his concerns over the Chinese (the PRC) oceanographic research activities in the area and stated, “Although we [Japan and the ROC] differ in our positions on the territorial dispute over the Tiaoyutai Islands, we could shelve the issue of sovereignty and cooperate with each other in the joint development of resources and fishing rights in the area surrounding the islands.”31 SENKAKU BOAT COLLISION INCIDENT 215

SENKAKU BOAT COLLISION INCIDENT On September 7, 2010, a Chinese trawler operating in the waters northwest of the Senkaku Islands collided with two patrol boats of the JCG. Since the area was within Japanese territorial waters and was outside the agreed area for Chinese ﬁshing, the JCG repeatedly requested the captain of the trawler to leave the area, but he did not comply and rammed into the patrol boats and damaged them. The JCG arrested the captain and crew on a charge of obstruction of justice and handed them over to the Ishigaki-city police of Okinawa prefecture. The local police soon released the crew members but detained the captain.32 The Chinese government strongly protested the detention and immediately took sanctions against Japan, including the cancellation of high- level government meetings and an embargo of the rare earth minerals that are essential for manufacturing batteries, light emitting diodes (LED), and magnets used in electronic products. Also, more than 20 exchange projects were cancelled, such as Japanese students’ trip to the Shanghai Expo and a concert by a popular Japanese singing group, SMAP, at Shanghai Stadium scheduled for October.33 This incident was blown out of proportion in China and triggered explosions of anti-Japanese sentiment, coupled with the lingering animosity of the Chinese people toward Japan deriving from the wartime history issues. Consequently, large-scale demonstrations erupted in four cities in China on September 18—the day when the Manchurian Incident took place in 1931, which is designated as a “National Humiliation Day” of China—and a Japanese department store was attacked in Chengdu in October. In the end, the Okinawa local authorities decided not to indict the captain on September 24 and released him the following day, “in consideration of diplomatic relations,” and the captain ﬂew home to Fujian province on a Chinese chartered airplane.34 Although the Kan Naoto cabinet (June 2010–September 2011) of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had taken power from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September 2009, insisted that the decision was solely made by the local authorities, it is speculated that Prime Minister Kan Naoto and Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji were at least aware of the decision in advance and might have had something to do with the decision. The Kan cabinet also did not publicize the videotape of the Chinese trawler crashing into the JCG patrol boats, taken by the JCG crew, “in consideration of diplomatic relations” (the tape was leaked on the internet in November). 216 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

Japanese on the right demanded the prosecution of the Chinese captain and criticized the lenient measures of the Kan cabinet as weak-kneed.35 In turn, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed understanding of the way the Japanese government handled the Senkaku Boat Collision Incident of September 2010 to Foreign Minister Maehara. She also stated that the Senkaku Islands were subject to Article Five of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, which authorized the United States to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack in the territories under the administration of Japan. She then reiterated this US position to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Hawaii in October 2010.36

DEFACEMENT OF ZHOU ENLAI’S POEM STONE IN ARASHIYAMA,KYOTO Meanwhile, in September 2010, someone poured yellow paint on the memorial poem stone of Zhou Enlai in Arashiyama, Kyoto, apparently in protest of the release of the captain of the Chinese trawler by the Japanese authorities. The poem stone was a transcription of the poem “Arashiyama in the Rain” that Zhou had written in April 1919 and was erected in 1979 in commemoration of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. However, the local committee that had erected the memorial poem stone decided not to report the damage to the police, so as not to cause further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations.37 Actually, a similar incident of defacement occurred in June 1987, when China and Japan were embroiled in “history issues” (see Chapter 8). The culprits of these heedless conducts did not understand the “heart” of Zhou Enlai. They were ignorant of the fact that Zhou had not wanted to make the territorial dispute an impediment to establishing Sino- Japanese peace and friendship and had shelved the issue. They were ignorant of the fact that Zhou also decided to forgive and forget the acts of Japanese aggression during the second Sino-Japanese War and to move on to a new stage of their relations (see Chapter 6).38

JAPANESE POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE Although the DPJ is a more liberal party than the conservative LDP, the Kan cabinet followed the LDP’sstancethat“the Senkaku Islands are inalienable territories of Japan. Japan has no territorial dispute over CHINESE POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 217 sovereignty in the East China Sea.” Referring to Deng Xiaoping’s statement in Tokyo in October 1978 to shelve the territorial dispute to future generations, the Kan cabinet in October 2010 declared that “there exists no agreement between China and Japan to shelve the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands,” and made this position ofﬁcial by making it a “cabinet decision.” Afterward, Chinese government ﬁshery patrol boats frequently entered the Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands throughout the remainder of the year 2010.39

CHINESE POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE In turn, the Chinese government was most upset with the denial of the existence of the territorial dispute on the part of the Japanese government. In this context, Chinese scholars have argued that there exists an (at least tacit) agreement between China and Japan to shelve the territorial dispute and that the agreement was made at the time of the diplomatic normalization in 1972. Tsinghua University professor Liu Jiangyong argues, “It was the Japanese government that first changed its position by proposing to settle the Senkaku Islands dispute after the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Then, Japan changed its position again when Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko (Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s son-in-law) stated that Japan had no territorial dispute over sovereignty in the East China Sea.”40 It is unclear what Liu Jiangyong, who has access to classified documents in China, was referring to as “the Japanese government proposal to settle the Senkaku Islands dispute after the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.” (The Japanese government made a proposal for a joint development of oil in the area surrounding the islands in 1979, but it seems unlikely that Liu was referring to this.) There is no public record on this in Japan. The diplomatic archives declassified in September 2012 by the Japanese MOFA include only the record of the negotiations for the Sino- Japanese diplomatic normalization up to 1973.41 It is also unclear exactly when the Japanese government for the first time decided to make its official position: “Japan has no territorial dispute over sovereignty in the East China Sea.” If Liu is correct, this was most likely during January 1996–September 1997 because Ikeda Yukihiko served as foreign minister in the first and second Hashimoto cabinets during that time.42 218 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

As an update, in September 2013, Zhu Jianrong, a Chinese professor at Tōyō Gakuen University in Tokyo, obtained in Beijing a classiﬁed document from 1972, which states that the two governments agreed to shelve the dispute at the time of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Zhu obtained the document from a Chinese scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and sent it to the Japanese concerned, but Zhu ended up being arrested by the Chinese authorities on charges of espionage activities.43

ADECLASSIFIED DOCUMENT ON THE DISPUTE Further, a document in the National Archives of the United Kingdom that was declassiﬁed in December 2014 reveals that Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō (July 1980–November 1982) mentioned the existence of an agreement between China and Japan to maintain the status quo of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the summit meeting in London in September 1982. Suzuki told Thatcher:

Deng Xiaoping stated in Tokyo in October 1978 that the Chinese and Japanese governments had agreed not to refer to the territorial dispute during the negotiations for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 and for the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. Deng then proposed to shelve the issue. Suzuki and Deng also agreed in their summit meeting to maintain the status quo of the territorial dispute and shelved it to future generations so that both countries would cooperate with each other for larger mutual interests and set aside smaller differences. Afterward, China stopped referring to the Senkaku Islands.44

Suzuki’s conversation with Thatcher strongly suggests the existence of a “tacit agreement” between China and Japan to shelve the dispute (if not a written agreement), which scholars have noted. In response to this dis- closure, a Japanese ofﬁcial stated in December 2014, “There exists no such fact that the Japanese government agreed to maintain the status quo of the Senkaku Islands and to shelve the territorial dispute. No such tacit agreement exists. The Senkaku Islands are inalienable territory of Japan, historically and by international law.”45 TOKYO GOVERNOR ISHIHARA’S MOVE TO PURCHASE THE SENKAKU ISLANDS 219

TOKYO GOVERNOR ISHIHARA’S MOVE TO PURCHASE THE SENKAKU ISLANDS Meanwhile, in 2011, the Chinese government further increased its activities in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. For instance, a Chinese fishery patrol boat sailed on the waters near the islands nine times, a maritime patrol aircraft of the Chinese Navy flew over the area of the islands several times, and a Chinese oceanographic research vessel sailed in the Japanese EEZ near the islands several times. At least there were no collision incidents between China and Japan in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in 2011, but the situation drastically changed in 2012. In April 2012, the novelist-turned-politician, Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō (served four terms, April 1999–October 2012;), decided to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands—Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima, and Minami-kojima, leased to the Japanese government since April 2002— from the landowner Kurihara Kunioki. Ishihara is a former member of both the House of Representatives (HR) and the House of Councillors (HC) and denies the Massacre of Nanking as Chinese propaganda.46 Kurihara Kunioki no longer wished to own the islands because of the recurrent territorial dispute with the PRC (China) and the ROC (Taiwan). Although the islands are located far away from Tokyo and have no direct connections with it, Ishihara made the decision to purchase the islands in order to strengthen the effective control of the islands, and began fun- draising for this project. He stated that the Japanese government should be doing this, but that he decided to do this because the Japanese government was not doing it. The Tokyo government received contributions totaling ¥1,473,266,085 (about US$18.9 million) as of September 13, 2012.47 The way in which Governor Ishihara made this announcement was also unusual. In April 2012, Ishihara made the announcement at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, not in Tokyo. Sasa Atsuyuki (Defense Facilities Administration Agency director-general, July 1984–June 1986; Cabinet Secretariat Cabinet Security Office director, July 1986–June 1989), who worked as Election Strategy Headquarters head for Ishihara in his third run for the governor’soffice, explains the reason:

Ishihara deliberately chose Washington, DC to make this announcement in order to appeal for correct understanding of the Senkaku Islands issue to the American citizens. Earlier in 1996 when Ishihara talked with US ambassador 220 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

to Japan, Walter F. Mondale (September 1993–December 1996), Ishihara was shocked to ﬁnd that the former US vice president did not have the correct understanding that the Senkaku Islands were under the purview of Article Five of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960.48

Sasa was referring to Ambassador Mondale’s statement in 1995, which indicated that seizure of the Senkaku Islands would not automatically invoke the US–Japan Security Treaty and force American military intervention. Mondale later corrected his position and stated:

[T]he Senkakus were a part of the administrated area [of the United States] ...we have a treaty in which we pledge to defend Japan that refers to “administrative areas,” areas that we administered after World War II as part of our occupation ...49

NATIONALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS In response to Tokyo Governor Ishihara’s move, during a meeting with former Japanese HC President Eda Satsuki in Beijing in May 2012, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) International Department Director Wang Jiarui referred to the Diaoyu Islands, as constituting “a core interest of China.” This was the ﬁrst time that a Chinese high-ranking referred to the islands as such to a Japanese counterpart. The word “core interest of China” had been thus far used only for Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Uyghur. Vice President Xi Jinping also stated the same thing to Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians for Sino-Japanese Friendship President Kōmura Masahiko (former foreign minister) in May 2012.50 In turn, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko (September 2011–December 2012) of the DPJ, who had succeeded Kan Naoto, wanted to avoid further escalation of the territorial dispute triggered by Governor Ishihara’s abrupt move to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands—Uotsuri Island, Kita-kojima, and Minami-kojima. However, instead of making Governor Ishihara cancel the project, the Noda cabinet decided to nationalize the three islands and purchased them from the owner, Kurihara Kunioki, on September 11, 2012, at the price of ¥2,050 million (about US$26.2 million). The Japanese government had continued to lease Kuba Island with a rent from Kurihara and renewed the contract on May 15, 2012, because the island had been used by the US Navy.51 ESCALATION OF CHINESE “OFFENSIVE” 221

Prime Minister Noda explained that there was no change in the status quo in substance because this was simply a matter of the transfer of ownership on paper of the islands that the government had been leasing from the private landlord since 2012. Noda reasoned that the Japanese government could control the islands more peacefully so as not to escalate tension with the PRC (China) and the ROC (Taiwan), whereas Japanese rightwing groups would launch nationalist moves on the islands and build facilities there if Governor Ishihara purchased them.52 Contrary to the intensions of the Noda cabinet, the nationalization of the islands backﬁred and reignited the anger of the Chinese against Japan, resulting in massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in more than 50 cities in China in September 2012. Many of the demonstrations turned into riots and the Japanese embassy and consulates-general, as well as Japanese factories, car dealers, stores, and restaurants, became targets of looting and arson. This was reminiscent of the massive anti-Japanese rallies mobilized in major cities in China in March–April 2005 during the tenure of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, but the size of the 2012 demonstrations exceeded those of 2005 and became the largest anti-Japanese demonstration in China since the diplomatic normalization of 1972. That September 18 was “National Humiliation Day” of China (the day the Manchurian Incident broke out in 1931) also worsened the situation.53 In addition, on September 18, three Chinese maritime surveillance vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. In protest, two Japanese activists landed on Uotsuri Island. Further, it was reported in December 2014 that a beer with the brand name, “Diaoyudao Beer” (Diaoyu Island Beer) had been sold in southern Chia since 2012. On the label, it says, “Diaoyu Island belongs to China.”54

ESCALATION OF CHINESE “OFFENSIVE” Since 2012, Chinese government vessels—fishery patrol boats and oceanographic research vessels—have habitually entered the contiguous zone and even the territorial waters of Japan surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, in December 2012, a patrol boat of the JCG spotted an aircraft of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration flying over Uotsuri Island. The JCG requested that the aircraft leave Japanese territorial 222 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE airspace and reported this to the Japanese Ministry of Defense. This was the first case where a JCG patrol boat made such a request to a foreign aircraft in the area. Also, a Chinese Air Force airplane crossed over the median line between China and Japan.55 Then, in November 2013, the Chinese Department of Defense suddenly declared that it had established the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” It stated that all aircraft entering the zone must file a flight plan and submit radio frequency information in advance and that it would take necessary defensive emergency measures against aircraft that did not abide by its regulations and instructions. This new zone is beyond the existing Chinese ADIZ and overlaps with the Japanese ADIZ in some areas, including the Senkaku Islands. This unilateral enforcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” caused much confusion for international commercial airlines. For instance, two of the Japanese commercial airlines had initially complied with the Chinese notification and reported their flight plans to China until the Japanese government told them not to.56 Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who had taken power in the HR for the LDP back from the DPJ in December 2012, denounced China’s unilateral declaration as a dangerous attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea by coercion, and demanded its retraction. In March 2014, the Japanese and US governments made an official inquiry about whether the “East China Sea ADIZ” violated any existing international rules to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the UN, which regulates international air navigation and dele- gates “flight information regions” (FIR) over territorial and open airspace to each country. FIRs do not necessary correspond with territorial airspace but are determined by geographic factors. For instance, the airspace over the Senkaku Islands, located between east longitude 123 degrees and east longitude 125 degrees, is under jurisdiction of two FIRs: the FIR Fukuoka (RJJJ) of Japan for the area east of east longitude 124 degrees and the FIR Taipei (RCAA) of the ROC (Taiwan) for the area west of east longitude 124 degrees.57 In November 2014, the ICAO gave its answer to the inquiry of the Japanese and US governments that “it does not accept a country directly controlling the aircraft that are flying in an existing FIR under the jurisdiction of another country. Therefore, the PRC cannot control aircraft flying in the airspace over the Senkaku Islands, which are controlled by the FIR Fukuoka and the FIR Taipei.” Subsequently, it was reported in December CHINESE CORAL POACHING IN OGASAWARA ISLANDS 223

2014 that the Chinese Ministry of Defense had lifted the provision of the warning that it would take necessary defensive emergency measures against aircraft that did not abide by its instructions and regulations. It appeared that the Chinese authorities had realized that the unilateral imposition of the “East China Sea ADIZ” had caused too much confusion to international commercial airlines and that its enforcement was unfeasible.58

US RESPONSE The increasing activities of Chinese government aircraft and vessels in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in 2012 and 2013 caused serious concerns to the United States, as well as to Japan. Consequently, although the US government has been shy of unequivocally acknowledging Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, its high-ranking officials went as far as stating that Japan maintained effective administrative control over the islands and that the islands fell within the purview of Article Five of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960.59 In November 2012, the US Senate passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2013, which recon- firmed the US commitment to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands based on the US–Japan Security Treaty. President Barack Obama signed the Act in January 2013. He also stated, in April 2014 during his visit to Tokyo, that the Senkaku Islands were within the purview of Article Five of the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960. This was the first time that an American president had unequivocally declared a US commitment to the Senkaku Islands in recourse to this treaty.60

CHINESE CORAL POACHING IN OGASAWARA ISLANDS As if trying to further escalate tension between China and Japan, the issue of coral poaching by the Chinese in Japanese territorial waters surfaced in early November 2014. It was reported that an increasing number of Chinese fishing boats had illegally harvested coral in the waters in the Izu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands, in the Pacific Ocean south of Tokyo, which are administered by the Tokyo government. Red coral is highly prized by the Chinese as jewelry (red is an auspicious color in Chinese culture), and coral reefs are under stress and many of the species are threatened due to overharvesting and environmental destruction. The Chinese government had banned coral harvesting in its waters, while 224 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE demand for red coral increased in the fall in preparation for the festivity of the Chinese New Year.61 With the rise in the number of Chinese fishingboatsoperatinginthe Ogasawara Islands, the Japanese government urged the Chinese government to control Chinese illegal operations in Japanese territorial water. The JCG meanwhile chased Chinese fishing vessels operating in the Ogasawara Islands out of Japanese territorial waters. However, the number of Chinese illegal operations kept rising and the JCG decided to take concrete measures and began arresting the captains of these vessels. In fact, the JCG arrested nine captains of Chinese fishing boats for suspicion of coral poaching in November 2014. Nevertheless, the JCG released them after they paid fines. The problem was that after having paid fines and been released, the captains resumed their operations in the same area. They would rather pay fines and continue to harvest coral because the profitfarexceedsthefine.62 In sharp contrast, when Japanese fishermen operated in the “disputed” Japanese territorial waters in the Northern Territories, consisting of four island groups northeast of Hokkaidō, captains and crew members were arrested and some were injured or shot to death by Soviet authorities (currently, the Coastal Force of Russia). The Northern Territories have been occupied by the Soviet Union/Russia since the end of World War II. The Japanese fishing boats were seized and confiscated, or heavily fined. The crew members, including minors, went missing. The whereabouts of the detained Japanese fishermen were kept undisclosed.63 Coincidentally, the issue of Chinese coral poaching in Japanese territorial waters surfaced just after the revelation that traffickers in elephant tusks used a Chinese presidential aircraft for shipping the ivory to China from Africa. A London-based non-governmental organization, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), reported that members of the delegation of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Tanzania had smuggled ivory on the president’s airplane in March 2013. The elephant tusks were put in diplomatic bags (with diplomatic immunity) and were shipped on the presidents airplane. A similar case occurred during former President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Tanzania in 2009.64

INCREASING CHINESE MARITIME PATROL Many suspect that the Chinese government might be behind the Chinese operations in the Ogasawara Islands and that the coral poaching was a mere front for the Chinese government’s oceanographic survey of the INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON THE DISPUTE 225 area. For one thing, flotillas of 200 appear too big for private poaching. Also, the activities of the Chinese vessels in the area appeared to be coordinated by the Chinese government. In fact, it was reported in December 2014 that the Chinese government had created a new organization called the CCCPC Small Group to Lead Oceanic Interest Maintenance Operations in September 2012, immediately after the Japanese government decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands. Chinese President-to-be Xi Jinping became head of this new group, which was mandated to deal with the territorial dispute in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. This group directly gives instructions to the Chinese military fleets and patrol vessels and coordinates their activities with Chinese foreign policy toward Japan.65 For instance, when as many as 168 Japanese parliamentarians visited the Yasukuni Shrine in April 2013, the largest number thus far, eight Chinese oceanographic patrol vessels entered the Japanese territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands. In turn, when President Xi held a meeting to improve relations with neighboring countries in October 2013, the number of intrusions of Chinese vessels decreased and the vessels sailed only in the contiguous waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Also, Chinese boats in the area suddenly disappeared during the Sino-Japanese summit meeting in Beijing in November 2014 and reappeared after the meeting. Then, in December 2014, Chinese military fleets, which have been stationed 125 miles north of the islands since August 2014, approached to within 17 miles of the contiguous waters of Japan surrounding the Senkaku Islands (41 miles from the coastal line).66

INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON THE DISPUTE As an update, despite the escalating tensions in the East China Sea as reported by the mass media, the Japanese government seemed to consider the situation under control as of mid-2015. Iijima Isao (b. 1945), the former executive secretary to Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō and incumbent special advisor to the Abe Shinzō cabinet, made a surprising revelation on a political TV show in Osaka on June 7, 2015. Iijima is a “political ﬁxer” (dubbed “Japan’s Karl Rove”) and laid the groundwork for historic Koizumi’s two historic visits to North Korea in 2002 and 2004. Iijima in June 2015 disclosed that there has existed an informal agreement since just before Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2014 between China and Japan not to escalate tensions.67 226 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

Iijima stated:

From July 13, 2013 to November 2014, I engaged in negotiations with Chinese officials who worked directly with President Xi Jinping and reached an agreement with them. Prime Minister Abe had earlier made two public campaign promises regarding China for his second cabinet: 1) to visit Yasukuni Shrine, which he had failed to do during his first cabinet and 2) not to recognize the existence of the territorial dispute between China and Japan. Accordingly, I negotiated with the Chinese officials on the condition that Japan must promote positive relations with China on the “principle of inseparability of politics and economics.”68

Iijima continues:

I proposed two conditions for promoting positive relations with China: 1) not to cause anti-Japanese riots in protest of a Japanese political leader’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine (in the past, about a four-month-long period of riots occurred each time a Japanese political leader visited the shrine) and 2) not to dispatch more than three Chinese government maritime patrol boats to the surrounding sea of the Senkaku Islands at any given time (in the past, more than ten Chinese government maritime patrol boats had entered the area). In return, I made a concession that the seven Politburo Standing Committee members, with the exception of President Xi Jinping, could publicly protest the Japanese stance regarding the territorial dispute. The Chinese side agreed with my proposal. Therefore, no riot occurred when Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2014. Also, President Xi did not make any statement that could be construed as intervention in the internal affairs of Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands. Chinese ofﬁcials agreed to my proposal because China needs Japanese technology for infrastructure projects (currently 11 such projects have been suspended) and also for environment projects.69

CHINESE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW MILITARY FACILITIES AND GLOBAL MARITIME STRATEGY Nevertheless, despite the existence of the informal agreement between the two governments on the Senkaku Islands dispute, many watchers think that the surge in the operations of Chinese fishing boats near the Ogasawara Islands reflects Chinese global maritime strategy to control ASSESSMENT 227 the western Pacific Ocean. They also think that this might be a Chinese strategy to divert the attention of the JCG from the Senkaku Islands and weaken its patrol capabilities in the area. In fact, it was reported in December 2014 that the Chinese Army had begun the construction of a military base in the Nanxi Islands, in Zhejiang province, located 188 miles northwest of the Senkaku Islands. The Nanxi Islands are about 63 miles closer to the Senkaku Islands than is Okinawa Island, where US armed forces and Japanese Self-Defense Forces are stationed. Military analysts think that this base is aimed at strengthening the surveillance of the ADIZ, which China established in the East China Sea in November 2013, in preparation for a military confrontation with the United States and Japan.70 The construction of a new military base also seems to be consistent with the recent Chinese military buildup in the South China Sea, such as the construction of a radar site on Subi Reef and of an airport on Fiery Cross Reef; both are part of the Spratly Islands and China took both by force from Vietnam in 1988. China also constructed a building on Mischief Reef in 1995, which is also part of the Spratly Islands and in the EEZ of the Philippines. The ROC (Taiwan) also completed the construction of a military airport on Itu Aba Island, the largest island in the Spratly Islands, in January 2008. In March 2010, Chinese government officials told US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg that the Chinese government considered the South China Sea an “area of core interest concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.”71 Subsequently, China established a new city, Sansha, on Woody Island (Yongxing Island), in July 2012, as part of Hainan province, in order to administer the Paracel Islands, which the ROC (Taiwan) and Vietnam also claim are under their sovereignty. Also, in August 2014, the Filipino Army released aerial photographs of what appeared to be military facilities that China was building on reclamation land on several reefs in the Spratly Islands, including Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and the Gaven Reefs. Meanwhile, construction of artificial islands at Mischief Reef continued in April 2015.72

ASSESSMENT Overall, the tug-of-war over the Senkaku Islands has become a proxy for a much larger battle over the shifting power balance between China and Japan, but Japanese governments, both of the LDP and of the DPJ, have 228 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE failed to take effective measures over the islands. They wanted to avoid a further escalation of tension between China and Japan and dissuaded the local government from engaging in activities on the islands. For instance, in October 2010, the Kan Naoto cabinet of the DPJ denied the petition of the Ishigaki mayor and city assemblymen to land on the Senkaku Islands for an environmental survey. Then, it was reported in December 2014 that the second Abe Shinzō cabinet of the LDP had requested from the Ishigaki mayor a voluntarily restriction on flights over the islands for aerial environmental surveys. The mayor complied.73 Nevertheless, these “considerations” of the Japanese government did not work insofar as they kept denying the existence of the dispute in itself. The Japanese government has maintained that it has consistently taken the position that “there exists no territorial dispute over sovereignty between China and Japan in the East China Sea.” However, this stance seems to contradict the fact that Prime Minister Tanaka brought up the matter with Zhou in September 1972. The conversation between Tanaka and Zhou clearly indicates that the Japanese government recognized the existence of the dispute. The two then agreed to shelve the issue. The recent revelation of Prime Minister Suzuki’s conversations with Prime Minister Thatcher also strongly suggests the existence of the agreement. Intrinsically, it seems strange to deny the existence of the issue when the issue actually exits. The refusal to acknowledge the existence of the territorial dispute also seems counterproductive and even disadvantageous for Japan. Moreover, denying the existence of the territorial dispute gives China a pretext to intensify its claims to the islands and its military buildup. As a matter of fact, referring to the Chinese military fleets approaching the contiguous waters of Japan surrounding the Senkaku Islands in December 2014, a Chinese military official stated that China would keep creating a tense situation until Japan acknowledges the existence of the dispute. In addition, China’s State Oceanic Administration created a new internet site on December 30, specifically designed to proclaim Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The informal agreement between China and Japan worked out by Iijima Isao in 2014 was broken in 2016. In August, as many as 230 Chinese fishing vessels operated in the contiguous waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and a total of 27 Chinese government ships, such as patrol boats of the China Coast Guard, entered Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Islands.74 In this situation, it seems unwise for Japan to keep giving China a convenient excuse to launch anti-Japanese campaigns and to accelerate TOWARD A SOLUTION 229 its military buildup in the East China Sea. This is detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security of the region. Also, unless the Japanese government acknowledges the existence of the dispute, it cannot file the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which could also strengthen the solidarity among other countries in East Asia that have their own territorial disputes with China over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, such as Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, as well as the ROC (Taiwan).

TOWARD A SOLUTION In the final analysis, it is best for Japan to acknowledge the existence of the dispute so that the two governments can stand on the mutually-agreed foundation for the dispute that was established by Zhou and Tanaka in September 1972. Japan has much to gain by acknowledging the existence of the dispute. While Japan actually will lose nothing by making this “compromise,” China will lose its pretext to engage in patrol activities in the area and military buildup. Prime Minister Abe could also explain to President Xi Jinping that the LDP was not responsible for the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands because the Noda cabinet of the DPJ made the decision. Then neither government will lose face, they can stand on common ground and begin constructive consultations on the dispute. This will reduce tension in the area, which is one of the primary concerns for Japan and the United States. In order to prevent the escalation of tension between China and Japan, both governments must collaborate and devise innovative measures for the peaceful resolution of the dispute from the perspective of long-term security and prosperity of East Asia. In this juncture, one cannot help but wonder what Zhou and Tanaka think of the recurrence of the dispute. Would they consider it to be like a childish fight over a robot or a toy sword? Would they think that it is anachronistic to fight over small islands in the age of borderless societies? Here, the idea of “joint control,” or “condominium,” is worth considering. The concept of “condominium” in international law refers to a territory in which two or more sovereign powers share a territory equally and exercise their rights equally without defining the national borders in the territory. Several cases have existed. For instance, Japan and Russia shared Sakhalin Island through the Treaty of Shimoda of 1855. This lasted until 1875 when the two countries signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg in which Russia made Japan relinquish its claim to Sakhalin Island in exchange for giving Japan sole jurisdiction over the 230 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

“Kuril Islands.” The four island group, located at the southernmost tip of the Kuril Islands chain, were demarcated as inalienable territories of Japan in 1855 and are legally separate from the “Kuril Islands” that Japan acquired through the Treaty of St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the Soviet Army occupied them at the end of World War II, in addition to the Kuril Islands. This is the origin of the dispute over Japan’s Northern Territories. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to one of the four islands, Kunashiri Island, in November 2010 stunned the Japanese. With the Russian economic recession since 2014, President Vladimir Putin appears to be slightly willing to negotiate the territorial dispute. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that he would return the islands to Japan.75 In turn, China and Japan could reactivate the Sino-Japanese Agreement on Joint Development in the East China Sea of June 2008, so that they could share the rich fishing grounds and potentially rich deposits of oil and natural gas on the continental shelf.76 As noted above, ROC’s KMT President Wu Po-hsiung also proposed in December 2008 to shelve the territorial dispute and collaborate on the fishing rights issue and in the joint development of natural resources in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Promoting projects based on the concept of condominium in the area would set a precedent for the Northern Territories and Takeshima Islands (Dokdo Islands, Korean name, or Liancourt Rocks). This approach would also serve as a model for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) for the countries that have territorial disputes in the South China Sea. If mankind is to make progress, governments and peoples in the region should embrace an idea of condominium and find ways to collaborate among themselves in order to ensure the sustainable management of natural resources in the region, as well as peace and security.

CONCLUSION In conclusion, the basic foundation for the territorial issue over the Senkaku Islands between China and Japan of maintaining the status quo and shelving the issue was established at the time of the signing of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization of 1972 at the suggestion of Zhou Enali. Zhou was willing to shelve the territorial issue for the sake of a larger cause. Deng Xiaoping followed suit at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978. Given the recurrence and escalation of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, it seems best for both governments to revert to the mutually agreed foundation of the issue so that NOTES 231 they can stand on common ground and begin new consultations for joint development of the natural resources and joint management of the security in the region. This will fulﬁll the goals stipulated in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, as well as the goals of the “mutually beneﬁcial relationship based on common strategic interests” set forth in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of 2008. This will also meet the ultimate goal of the region; to promote peace and prosperity of East Asia.

NOTES 1. “Senkaku Islands,” March 6, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/ c_m1/senkaku/page1w_000015.html. 2. “Shimazu-shi no Ryūkyū shinkō” (Shimazu’sRyūkyū Expedition), http://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/publication/2014/03/post-168. html, March 31, 2014. There are conﬂicting views on the early history. See Nicholas D. Kristof/Han-yi Shaw, “The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, New York Times, September 19, 2012; Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C. and Japan, Baltimore, MD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1999. 3. Kristof/Shaw; Nakauchi Yasuo, “Senkaku-shotō o meguru mondai to Nitchū-kankei: Nihon no ryōdo hen’nyū kara kon’nichi made no keika to kongo no kadai” (Issues concerning Senkaku Islands and Sino-Japanese Relations: Details of Japanese Incorporation and Future Issues), Rippō to chōsa, No. 334, November 2012, 70–71 and 73–74. 4. Nakauchi, 70–71 and 73–74. 5. Ibid. Taishō Island was nationalized in July 1921. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 71–72; “Okinawa no Beigun-kichi” (US Military Bases in Okinawa), 328–329, July 1, 2003, http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/kititaisaku/DP-07- 01-03.pdf; Kerry Dumbaugh (coordinator), “China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, November 12, 2001, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=446508,20–21. Koga “Zenji” is misspelled in Dumbaugh. 8. “Senkaku Islands”; Nakauchi, 72. 9. Nakauchi, 72. 10. Dumbaugh, 21–22; “60–70 nendai gaikō bunsho kōkai” (Diplomatic Archives of the 1960s and 1970s Released to the Public), Chūnichi Shimbun (also circulated as Tokyo Shimbun), July 25, 2014. 11. Ibid. (both). 12. “60–70 nendai gaikō bunsho kōkai.” 232 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

13. Ibid.; “Ofﬁce of the Historian,” US Department of State, http://history. state.gov/departmenthistory/people/mcconaughy-walter-patrick, accessed March 17, 2015. 14. “60–70 nendai gaikō bunsho kōkai”; Nakauchi, 72–73. 15. “Okinawa no Beigun-kichi”; Nakauchi, 71–72. 16. Ibid. (both). 17. Dumbaugh, 22. For details, see Robert D. Eldridge, The Origin of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa’s Reversion and the Senkaku Islands, London: Routledge, 2013. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid., 22–25; “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/q&a/ref/1.html, accessed May 3, 2015. 20. Ibid. For details, see Mark Manyin, “Senkaku (Diayu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations,” Congressional Research Service, 7, January 2013. 21. “Nitchū-gaikō wa kōshite hajimatta” (This is How the Sino-Japanese Diplomacy Began), September 30, 2012, http://matome.naver.jp/odai/ 2134917025274577601; “Kenshō:Chōgyo-tō ryōyūken mondai ni kansuru Chūnichi-kan no ‘tanaage gōi’” (Assessment: Sino-Japanese “Agreement to Shelve” for Issue of Sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands), January 15, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/94474/8093454.html. 22. “Kenshō.” 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Nakauchi, 75; “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src= TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, accessed March 13, 2015. 26. Nakauchi, 75. 27. Ibid., 76. 28. Ibid., 71–72 and 76. 29. “Senkaku-shotō wa Nihon ryōdo” (Senkaku Islands Are Japanese Territories), Okinawa Times, September 24, 2002. 30. Nakauchi, 76. 31. “Kokumintō-shuseki Gō Hakuyū kōshiki hōnichi” (KMT President Wu Po- hsiung Made Ofﬁcial Visit to Japan), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 12, 2008. 32. “Senkaku-shotō de Chūgoku-gyosen ga Kaijō-hoanchō junshisen ni shōtotsu” (Chinese Trawler Crashed into Japan Coast Guard Patrol Boats near the Senkaku Islands), Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2010. NOTES 233

33. “Nitchū-kōryū-jigyō chūshi nado 20-ken-chō” (More Than 20 Sino- Japanese Exchange Projects Cancelled), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 23, 2010. 34. “Chūgoku 3-toshi de sūsen-nin no han’nichi-demo” (Three Cities in China Held Anti-Japanese Demonstration), Asahi Shimbun, October 17, 2010. 35. Ibid. 36. “‘Senkaku wa Nichibei-anpo tekiyō taishō’ Kurinton-chōkan, meigen” (Secretary Clinton Declares “Senkakus Are Under Purview of US–Japan Security Treaty”), Asahi Shimbun, September 24, 2010; “Kurinton- chōkan, Chūgoku gaishō to kaidan” (Secretary Clinton Meets Chinese Foreign Minister), Chūnichi Shimbun, October 31, 2010. 37. “Shū Onrai moto-shushō no shihi, kiiro penki kakerareru” (Yellow Paint Poured on the Memorial Poem Stone of Former Premier Zhou Enlai), Chūnichi Shimbun October 1, 2010. 38. Ibid. 39. Nakauchi, 73n17. 40. “Seika-daigaku-kyōju ga kataru Chūgoku no tachiba” (Tsinghua University Professor Explains China’s Position), Chūnichi Shimbun, October 1, 2010. 41. “Kenshō”; “Senkaku ‘tanaage’ de dōchō” (Agreed to “Shelve” the Senkaku [Issue]), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 21, 2012. 42. Ibid. (both). 43. “Senkaku ‘hikōkai no bunsho’ sōfu, Shū-kyōju, tōkyoku mondaishi-ka” (Authorities Consider Professor Zhu’s Sending of “Classiﬁed Document” on Senkakus Problematic), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 26, 2013. 44. “Senkaku ‘genjō-iji’ no gōi akasu” ([Suzuki] Disclosed the Agreement on “Maintaining the Status Quo” of Senkakus), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 31, 2014. 45. “Senkaku ‘genjō-iji’ de gōi” (Agreement on “Maintaining the Status Quo” of Senkakus), Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 2015. 46. Nakauchi, 77 and 77n28. 47. Ibid.; “Tokyo-to Senkaku-shotō kifukin uketsuke jōkyō” (Contributions to Tokyo Government for Senkaku Islands), September 13, 2012, http:// megalodon.jp/2012-0914-1401-42/www.chijihon.metro.tokyo.jp/sen kaku_kifu.htm. 48. Sasa Atsuyuki, “Ishihara-tochiji ga naze Amerika de Senkaku o kau to itta shinsō” (True Reason Why Governor Ishihara Announced Purchase of Senkakus in the United States), May 2, 2012, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=FWmDt0kXy_E. 49. Nicolas D. Kristof, “Would You Fight for These Islands?,” New York Times, October 20, 1996; “The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Ambassador Walter F. Mondale,” April 27, 2004, http://www.adst.org/OHTOCs/Mondale, Walter F.toc.pdf. 234 9 SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS DISPUTE

50. “Shū Kinpei-shi, ‘kakushin-teki rieki’ to hatsugen” (Mr. Xi Jinping Refers to [Senkakus] as “Core Interest”), May 3, 2012, http://www.47news.jp/ CN/201205/CN2012050301001691.html. 51. Nakauchi, 72n12 and 77n30. 52. Ibid., 78. 53. “China Marks ‘National Humiliation Day’ with Anti-Japanese Protests,” Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 2012. 54. Ibid.; “Chūgoku de ‘Chōgyo-tō bīru’” (“Diaoyu Island Beer” Sold in China), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 26, 2014. 55. “Chūgokuki ni yoru ryōkū shinpan ni tsuite” (On the Intrusion into Territorial Airspace by Chinese Aircraft), December 13, 2012, http:// www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2012/12/13b.html. 56. Chūgoku no bōkūken tekkai motomeru” ([Abe] Demanded Retraction of Air Defense Zone), Asahi Shimbun, November 25, 2013. 57. Ibid.; “ICAO FIR WORLD,” http://gis.icao.int/ﬂexviewer/, accessed January 1, 2015. 58. “Chūgoku, bōkū-shikibetsuken no ‘keikoku’ sakujo” (China Removed “Warning” for the Air Defense Identiﬁcation Zone), Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2014. 59. Dumbaugh, 22–25. 60. Ibid.; “Obama-daitōryō ‘Senkaku wa Anpo taishō’ meigen” (President Obama Declares “Senkakus Are Under Purview of Security Treaty”), Asahi Shimbun, April 24, 2014. 61. “Sango mitsuryō no utagai, Chūgokujin senchō taiho” (Chinese Captain Arrested for Suspicion of Coral Poaching, Chūnichi Shimbun, November 23, 2014. 62. Ibid. 63. “‘Hoppō-ryōdo’ shūhen de Rosia-gawa no gyosen daho konzetsu sezu” (Russia Continues to Seize Japanese Fishing Boats in “Northern Territories”), Sankei Shimun, February 7, 2013. 64. “Chinese President’s Delegation Tied to Illegal Ivory Purchases During Africa Visit,” New York Times, November 5, 2014. 65. “Chūgoku gunkan no Senkaku sekkin, Shū-shushū no ikōka” (President Xi Might be Directing Chinese Military Fleets to Approach Senkakus), Asahi Shimbun, December 30, 2014. 66. Ibid. 67. “Sokomadeitte-iinkai” (TV political talk show), June 7, 2015, http://www. dailymotion.com/video/x2t0tha_Sokomadeitteiinkai-150607-1_news. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. “Chūgoku, Senkaku kinkai ni gunji-kyoten seibi” (China Built a Military Base Near Senkakus), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 22, 2014. NOTES 235

71. “Chūgoku no gunji-shisetsu ka Nansa-shotō ni tsugitsugi kensetsu” (What Appeared to be Chinese Military Facilities Are Being Built in the Spratly Islands One after Another), Asahi Shimbun, August 29, 2014. 72. Ibid.; David E. Sanger and Ric Gladstone, “Piling Sand in a Disputed Sea, China Literally Gains Ground,” New York Times, April 9, 2015. 73. Martin Fackler, “In a Test of Wills, Japanese Fighter Pilots Confront Chinese,” New York Times, March 9, 2015; “Senkaku jōkū no hikō-chōsa jishuku yōsei” ([Government] Requested Voluntary Restriction on Aerial Survey over the Senkaku Islands), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 24, 2014. 74. “Chūgoku gunkai 2-seki ga Senkaku ni sai-sekkin” (Two Chinese Military Fleets Approached Closest to Senkakus), Asahi Shimbun, December 30, 2014; “Chūgoku-kokka-kaiyōkyoku, Senkaku-shotō ryōyūken no apīru saito tachiage” (China’s State Oceanic Administration Created Internet Site to Proclaim Sovereignty over Senkakus), Asahi Shimbun, December 31, 2014. 75. Warera no hoppō-ryōdo (Japan’s Northern Territories), Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 6; “Medovedevu-daitōryō Kunashiri-tō hōmon (President Medvedev Visits Kunashiri Island), Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 2010; “Nichi-ro heiwa-jōyaku teiketsu mondai ni ‘kon’nan’ Rosia-kōkan” (Russian High-Ranking Ofﬁcial States that the Matter of Conclusion of a Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty Would be “Difﬁcult”), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 13, 2016. 76. “Higashi-Shinakai niokeru Nitchū-kan no kyōryoku nitsuite” (On Cooperation between China and Japan in the East China Sea), http:// www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/higashi_shina/press.html, June 18, 2008. CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

When Sino-Japanese relations became “politically frozen, economically cool,” primarily due to history issues and the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō met President Xi Jinping in Beijing during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit conference in November 2014. This was the first official meeting between Prime Minister Abe, who had taken power back for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the more liberal Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in December 2013 and formed his second cabinet, and President Xi in the fifth generation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership, who had succeeded the rational technocrat-type Hu Jingtao in March 2013. This was the first official Sino-Japanese summit talk since the one between Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko of the DPJ and President Hu in December 2011.1 Many things were unusual about the Abe–Xi summit meeting. The Abe–Xi summit talk lasted for only 25 minutes, whereas the meeting between Xi and US President Barack Obama lasted nine hours. Chinese government officials are deft at sending subtle signals through symbolic gestures and the Abe–Xi meeting was no exception. According to diplomatic protocol, President Xi as the host of the APEC conference was supposed to wait for the arrival of each foreign leader and undertake a photo shoot session with each. Nevertheless, Xi arrived after Abe had arrived in the room. When Abe approached Xi, saying, “I am very pleased to meet you officially,” Xi did not respond and only shook hands with Abe without smiling. It was an awkward moment, to put it mildly.2

Actually, the way leaders shake hands carries significant weight in diplomacy. Former Japanese ambassador to France, Ogura Kazuo (who wrote a book entitled “Zhou Enlai in Paris”), highlighted how Zhou Enlai welcomed US President Richard Nixon at Beijing airport in February 1972, Zhou received him in a dignified manner, not overly enthusiastic but not cold either. His manner was neither obsequious nor condescending. His measured welcome was based on a rational calculation of the best way to receive this anti-communist US president. In turn, Nixon approached Zhou first and put his hand out first to Zhou. Ogura notes that the more forward manner of Nixon reflected the fact that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had refused to shake hands with Zhou when he extended his hand to Dulles at the Geneva Conference in April 1954. Being aware of this episode, Nixon showed more enthusiasm in his handshake with Zhou in 1972 in response to Dulles’ earlier snub. In 2014, Xi Jinping’s measured handshake with Abe reflected the state of Sino-Japanese relations.3 The Chinese government also sent a less subtle and unmistaken message during the photo shoot in 2014. While the photo shoots of Xi with other APEC leaders had the national flags of China and the country of each leader displayed in the background, the display of the national flags of China and Japan was conspicuously missing at the photo shoot of Xi and Abe. The disparity in the way the Chinese government treated the Japanese leader was a violation of diplomatic protocol. This behavior on the part of the Chinese government was insulting and almost childish, but Abe took it in stride.4

ABE–XI SUMMIT MEETING Many think that President Xi’s ungracious reception of Prime Minister Abe was intended for domestic consumption. Xi could not be seen to be on friendly terms with Abe because of the strong antipathy among the Chinese people toward Japan. It was estimated that 87 percent of Chinese had an unfavorable view of Japan in 2014, whereas 83.1 percent of Japanese had unfavorable feelings toward China and 84.5 percent of Japanese did not think that Sino-Japanese relations were good. This was the worst survey result of Japanese concerning China since the opinion polls by the Japanese government began in 1978. As the Chinese government has been challenged by anti-government demonstrations and unrest at home (such as those in Hong Kong and Tibet), the Chinese leadership ABE–XI SUMMIT MEETING 239 still employ anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people as glue to unite the people.5 On the other hand, China would lose face internationally if Xi, as the host of the APEC meeting, refused to meet the Japanese leader during the meeting. Also, as the Chinese economy began to slow down, China wanted more investment from Japan so that Xi saw a need to meet Abe. Japanese investment decreased by more than 46 percent in the first half of 2014 from the same period in the previous year. Another reason for Xi’sdecisiontomeetAbemighthavecon- cerned the triangular relations among China, Japan, and Russia. As Russian President Vladimir Putin had agreed to meet Abe during the APECmeeting,XifeltcompelledtodothesamesothatXiwouldnot lose China’s relative diplomatic leverage toward Japan vis-à-vis Russia. Thus, as a compromise, Xi decided to meet Abe, but to receive him less than enthusiastically.6 The way the Abe–Xi meeting was arranged was also unusual. The negotiations for the realization of the summit meeting had secretly begun in May 2014 when LDP Vice President Kōmura Masahiko, who was also Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians for Sino-Japanese Friendship president, visited Beijing and met Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Zhang Dejiang, who was third in the CPC hierarchy. Kōmura conveyed to Zhang Abe’s message that he would like to meet President Xi at the APEC meeting in Beijing in November. Then, in July, former Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo visited Beijing and secretly met President Xi Jinping. Fukuda conveyed to Xi Abe’s message about having a summit meeting. After this initial groundwork by the “big shots,” the foreign ministers of the two countries, Wang Yi and Kishida Fumio, had an official talk in Myanmar in August 2014 during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The foreign ministers’ meetings between China and Japan had been halted for two years.7 Wang and Kishida met again in September during the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and laid further groundwork for the Abe–Xi summit meeting. Then, the final groundwork on security issues were completed in November between China’s state councilor (at the rank of vice premier) and Foreign Affairs Leading Group secretary-general, Yang Jiechi (former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States), and Japan’s National Security Council Secretariat Secretary-General and Abe’s Special Advisor, Yachi Shōtarō, who was disclosed to have accompanied 240 10 CONCLUSION

Fukuda Yasuo to Beijing in July. Foreign Ministers Kishida and Wang made the ﬁnal adjustments for the Abe–Xi summit meeting.8

“FOUR ITEMS OF COMMON GROUND” The most unusual thing about the Abe–Xi summit meeting was that the two governments issued, on November 7, three days before the summit meeting, a joint statement which stipulated “Four Items of Common Ground between China and Japan.” The four items consisted of:

1. Both sides confirmed that they would observe the principles and spirit of the “four basic documents between China and Japan” and that they would continue to develop a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests; 2. Both sides shared some recognition that, following the spirit of squarely facing history and advancing toward the future, they would overcome political difficulties that affect their bilateral relations; 3. Both sides recognized that they have different views as to the emergence of “tense situations” in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism, and avoid the rise of unforeseen circumstances; and 4. Both sides shared the view that, by utilizing various multilateral and bilateral channels, they would gradually resume dialogue in the political, diplomatic, and security fields and make an effort to build a political relationship of mutual trust.9

The “four basic documents between China and Japan” refer to the Sino- Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development of 1998, and the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” of 2008. Despite the announcement of the Four Items of Common Ground, the actual interpretations of the text differed between China and Japan (examined below). This “agreement” THE ACTUAL ABE–XI SUMMIT MEETING 241 was a product of the compromise on the preconditions for the Abe–Xi summit meeting demanded by the Chinese government. The Chinese had specifically demanded: 1) Japan shall recognize the existence of a dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and 2) Japan shall pledge not to allow its political leaders to visit the Yasukuni Shrine.10 In turn, Prime Minister Abe flatly refused these demands. The Japanese government (both by the LDP and by the DPJ) has taken the position that “there exists no territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The Senkaku Islands are inalienable territory of Japan and Japan’s sovereignty over the islands is indisputable.” Regarding the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue, on November 4, 2014, five days before Abe left for the APEC summit meeting in Beijing, the Abe cabinet made a decision concerning the issue. This rare “cabinet decision” stipulates that “there exists no such agreement between the Chinese and Japanese governments that a Japanese Prime Minister, foreign minister, and cabinet chief secretary shall voluntarily refrain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.” Thereby, Abe made his stance on the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue unequivocal before meeting President Xi in Beijing.11

THE ACTUAL ABE–XI SUMMIT MEETING On November 10, 2014, the Abe–Xi summit meeting took place in awkward circumstances and lasted only 25 minutes. Abe and Xi agreed only two major points in the Four Items of Common Ground that were announced three days earlier: 1) to begin consultation for establishing a bilateral maritime liaison mechanism, including a hotline, in order to avoid collision of vessels in the East China Sea in the future and 2) to establish new cooperative relations based on the “starting point” of Sino-Japanese relations. Abe explained to the Japanese press that the “starting point” referred to the “promotion of a mutually beneﬁcial relationship based on common strategic interests” that China and Japan had agreed to in October 2006 during his visit to Beijing. This agreement was then stipulated in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” in May 2008 during the summit meeting of Hu Jintao and Fukuda Yasuo in Tokyo (see Chapter 8).12 On the other points, they only agreed to disagree. In fact, there are subtle but important differences between the Chinese version and the Japanese version of the joint statement. There are also two different 242 10 CONCLUSION

English translations. The Japanese did not accept the English translation prepared by the Chinese, and made its own English translation. Each version was carefully calibrated so as to fit with one party’s positions and to not give the impression that the party had made compromises with the other.13 For instance, regarding the “tense situations” in the waters of the East China Sea—this refers to the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands but the joint statement used this euphemism because the Japanese government refused to recognize the existence of the dispute—the Chinese version states that both sides recognized that they had different “positions” on what has caused the “tense situations” in the East China Sea in recent years. In turn, the Japanese version used the more general word “views” instead of “positions.” The Japanese interpretation is that the sovereignty issue was not covered in the joint statement and that the “tense situations” refer to China’s aggressive patrolling in the waters and skies in the area and its unilateral establishment of an air defense zone over the Senkaku Islands in 2013.14 Regarding the history issues, the Chinese version states both sides “reached some agreement” that they would overcome “political obstacles” to their bilateral relations. In contrast, the Japanese version states both sides “shared some recognition” that they would overcome “political difficulties” to their bilateral relations. After the Abe–Xi summit meeting, the disparities in their interpretations caused immediate reactions. When a Chinese official issued a statement that both sides had “reached some agreement,” a Japanese official quickly responded and stated that there was no such agreement.15

CHINA WATCHERS’ VIEWS Japanese political analysts on the right and leaning right argue that Japan gained leverage over China as a result of the Abe–Xi summit meeting and commend Abe for not giving in to any of the Chinese demands. They think that, since Xi’s meeting with Abe went against Chinese policy toward Japan, Xi would lose face at home if he fails to improve relations with Japan on China’s terms in the near future. They also think that, if Abe visited the Yasukuhi Shrine again, Xi would be in big trouble. (Chinese leaders had not forgotten how CCCPC Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, who had proactively promoted relations with Japan, lost power in 1987.) CHINA WATCHERS’ VIEWS 243

However, their view seems narrow-minded and appears to anticipate further deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations.16 In turn, Tama University President Terashima Jitsurō (former fellow at the Brookings Institution) considers it deplorable that the Yasukuni Shrine issue still gets in the way of Sino-Japanese relations. Terashima states:

The United States and European countries also made clear their disappointment in Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. Yet, Abe is still promoting kenkagoshi (adversarial) diplomacy toward Japan’s neighbors concerning the history issues in his second tenure. Abe should understand the perceptions overseas that Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine suggest honoring Class-A war criminals. It is a narrow-minded stance for Japanese political leaders to justify their shrine visits just because it is a natural thing for the Japanese to do.17

Terashima continues:

Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine also suggest an anti- US stance because it implies the denial of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and even the denial of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which Japan accepted the judgment of the international tribunal in exchange for Japan’s regaining sovereignty. Although Prime Minister Abe is trying to confront China’s military threat by strengthening the US–Japan alliance, his policy agenda for “exit from the postwar regime” contains elements of an anti-US stance.18

In fact, conservative Japanese argue that the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was a one-sided victor’s court without Japanese representation. They also argue that the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were violations of the Hague Convention and crimes against humanity, but the issue of US war crimes has never been brought to trial. Concurring with Terashima’s view, journalist Takano Hajime states that “the ultimate goal of Prime Minister Abe is to create a strong Japan and to become independent from the United States. Abe’s utmost policy agenda is to revise the war- renouncing constitution ‘imposed by’ the United States. Emboldened by the LDP’s victory in the House of Representatives (HR) general elections, Abe is determined to realize this ultimate goal in his second tenure. Along 244 10 CONCLUSION this line, the Abe cabinet had already made the cabinet decision in July 2014 that Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense.”19 Thus far, “exercising the right to collective self-defense” had been considered unconstitutional, whereas “exercising the right to individual self-defense” had been considered constitutional. Takano notes that Abe is essentially following in the footsteps of his maternal grandfather, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (November 1896–August 1987), who as commerce and industry minister in the Tōjō cabinet was arrested with a charge of Class-A war crimes but was not indicted. Kishi then concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960. Takano states, “What Kishi and Abe have in common is a desire to achieve Japan’s independence from the Unites States, while pretending to be pro-US.”20

LEGACY OF ZHOU ENLAI AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Sino-Japanese relations have been marred by the wartime history issues and the territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands for more than four decades. The recurrence of the history issues has become a perennial sore point for Japanese foreign policy, while that of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands has reached boiling point. Given the impasse, it is high time to revisit the origins of postwar Sino- Japanese relations and reexamine the legacy of Zhou Enlai. Zhou established the foundations of postwar Sino-Japanese relations and Zhou’s decisions in 1972 contain clues to the solution to the history issues and the territorial dispute. Zhou made a bold political decision with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei during the negotiations for the diplomatic normalization in 1972 and relinquished China’s(PRC’s) war reparations from Japan. This decision was hard to swallow for the Chinese people, who had suffered tremendous damage and suffering from the Japanese acts of aggression during the war. Zhou nonetheless decided to forgive the Japanese people at large and held only the Class-A war criminals responsible for the Japanese acts of aggression. This was how Zhou decided to forgive and forget the wartime history between China and Japan for the sake of establishing perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries. This is the foundation of the postwar Sino-Japanese relations established by Zhou and Tanaka in 1972 (see Chapter 6). ZHOU ENLAI’S LENIENCY TOWARD THE JAPANESE 245

Zhou also shelved the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands during the negotiations with Tanaka for Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Tanaka concurred. Tanaka did not object to Zhou’s suggestion and did not claim Japanese sovereignty over the islands. Therefore, no reference to the territorial dispute was made in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972. This clearly suggests that there was at least a tacit agreement to maintain the status quo regarding the islands and to shelve the issue in 1972; however, the Japanese government denies the existence of such an agreement (see Chapter 9).

After Zhou’s death, his protégé Deng Xiaoping followed suit with Zhou’s stance and shelved the issue during the negotiations with Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo for the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in 1978. Fukuda concurred. Fukuda did not object to Deng’s position and did not claim Japanese sovereignty over the islands. Fukuda did not insist on stipulating a clear demarcation of the islands as Japan’s territory in the peace treaty, whose primary purposes included the demarcation of territory. Therefore, neither a reference to the territorial dispute nor a demarcation of the islands was made in the Sino- Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978. This is the mutually agreed ground of the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (see Chapter 7).

Thus, the way Zhou handled the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization established the foundation for the history issues and the territorial dispute. It also gives their solution. The “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” that Prime Minister Abe had identified as the “starting point” for a new Sino-Japanese relation was declared as the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” in 2008 between Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and President Hu Jintao. This joint statement provided that the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, and the Sino- Japanese Joint Declaration of 1998 are the political foundations for advancing Sino-Japanese relations (see Chapter 8).

ZHOU ENLAI’S LENIENCY TOWARD THE JAPANESE From the larger perspective of world politics, the international political environment undoubtedly was a decisive factor for Zhou Enlai’s foreign policy toward Japan. This is exemplified by his diplomatic initiatives 246 10 CONCLUSION toward Japan when the Sino-Soviet rift became irreversible, which neces- sitated China reconciling with the United States. However, this international structural factor alone does not account for his foreign policy toward Japan. For instance, he did not have to be so lenient with the Japanese war prisoners detained at the Fushun War Criminals Management Center. Even if he had an “ulterior motive” of indoctrinat- ing the Japanese war prisoners, his leniency more than offset such a purpose to the extent that it upset the Chinese wardens there. He issued specific directives to treat the Japanese war prisoners with deference according to their ranks. In fact, ironically, his generous treatment was such that the Chinese wardens ended up being persecuted during the Cultural Revolution for their generous treatment of the Japanese war prisoners (see Chapter 2). In addition, Zhou did not have to save Puyi’s younger brother Pujie and his Japanese wife, Lady Saga Hiro, who was related to Japanese emperor Hirohito, during the Cultural Revolution. Notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese and those who were labeled as pro-Japanese were persecuted and executed, Zhou went out of his way to help Saga and her daughters while Pujie was detained at Fushun. The Japanese find bene- volence and humanity in these actions by Zhou (see Chapter 4).

TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE “HISTORY ISSUES” Understanding Zhou’s legacy makes it clear that Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine rub against the grain of the Chinese because they violate the foundations of the postwar Sino-Japanese relations established by Zhou and Tanaka in 1972. The current Japanese political leaders should understand the spirit behind Zhou’s generous decision and liqui- date the wartime history issues with China once and for all. Prime Minister Abe can easily solve the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue simply by refraining from visiting the shrine in the future and having his cabinet members do the same. Another solution is to create a non-denominational national memorial facility for the war dead, about which discussion has been deadlocked (see Chapter 8). Instead, Abe’s answer is to continue to seek understanding of the Japanese position from the Chinese and other countries concerned. He seems to believe that there is nothing wrong with Japanese political leaders’ visits to the shrine in order to pay tribute to the war dead who sacriﬁced their lives for Japan, despite the fact that the Class-A war criminals were also TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE “HISTORY ISSUES” 247 enshrined there. Japanese political leaders’ visits to the shrine are also political gestures intended for their lobbyists and supporters (see Chapter 8). The problem is that the Japanese stance is not accepted in China and other countries in East Asia, nor by European countries, Russia, and the United States. Visiting the shrine with full awareness that it goes against the sentiments of people in neighboring countries appears not only unreasonable but also jeopardizes Japan’s national interests. If Japanese leaders would really like to pay tribute to the “souls” of the war dead and pray for peace, they could do so anywhere—at other sacred places or in front of an altar at home—because it is a matter that concerns the “heart” of each individual (see Chapter 8). Even Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine after the joint enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals because it was a matter of his “heart.” If the Japanese political leaders and lawmakers truly revere the emperor, they should understand the true heart of the emperor who decided not to visit the shrine, and follow his example. Moreover, the bereaved families of the Class-A war criminals did not ask for the joint enshrinement, and even proposed removing the joint enshrinement of Class-A war criminals in order to resolve the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue (see Chapter 8). Japanese political leaders might calculate that refraining from visiting the shrine would make no difference because Sino-Japanese relations would remain strained anyway. This is a wrong way of thinking. Prime Minister Koizumi stated that Sino-Japanese economic relations would keep going strong even if he visited the Yasukuni Shrine. His prognosis turned out to be wrong and Japanese business with China suffered because of his visit to the shrine. Japanese political leaders’ visits to the shrine also send a message that the Japanese government is not conciliatory, and is even adversarial towards it neighbors in East Asia. The visits only jeopardize Japanese national interests in the region and in the world (see Chapter 8). In this regard, a former Japanese diplomat Kiuchi Akitane (b. 1928; father of parliamentarian Kiuchi Takatane), who worked for Tanaka Kakuei as an ofﬁcial secretary to the Prime Minister, deplores the state of Sino-Japanese relations as of January 2014. He states:

Had Mr. Tanaka been in ofﬁce now, this situation would not have been brought about. Contemporary politicians have become small-scaled. They are acting self-indulgently and safely, only to protect and promote their own interests.21 248 10 CONCLUSION

PRIME MINISTER ABE AND “HISTORY ISSUES” In December 2014, Prime Minister Abe secured four more years of his tenure with a landslide victory in the general elections for the House of Representatives (HR), and his position in the ruling LDP is stronger than ever. With this solid standing, it appeared that he would not have to cave in to his right-leaning supporters and could work on the creation of a truly “beautiful nation” for Japan that is respectable and respected in the world. However, on April 21, 2015, Abe sent another offering of a masakaki tree for the Annual Spring Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine. Although it was paid for out of his own pocket, the offering was done in the name of “Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.” Also, his special advisor Etō Seiichi (an HR member) paid a visit to the shrine on that day on his behalf.22 In March 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, during her visit to Japan, stated that Japan should squarely confront its wartime past. In turn, Prime Minister Abe visited Washington, DC in April 2015 and made a speech at a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives of the US Congress, as the first Japanese political leader to do so. Fifty-eight years earlier, his maternal grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, made a speech at the House of Representatives. The focal point of Abe’s speech was how he would address the Japanese acts of aggression during World War II. Abe had repeatedly stated that there was no need for him to apologize because he supported the views of history held by previous Japanese Prime Ministers.23 Abe was referring to the “Murayama Statement” (1995), the “Koizumi Statement” (2005), and others, in which Japanese political leaders had expressed “heartfelt apology” in reference to “colonial rule and aggression.” In Washington, DC, it turned out that Abe only referred to “deep remorse” over the war, but did not express his apology. The distinction between “remorse” and “apology” is that the former is made to oneself, whereas the latter is made to the victims. The South Korean government (Republic of Korea, ROK) made public its displeasure with Abe’s consistent refusal to apologize.24 Two days earlier, Abe also spoke at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. When he was asked about the “comfort women” issue during the question-and-answer session, he stated, “As with previous Prime Ministers, I am disheartened thinking of the victims of the human trafficking, who went through indescribable sufferings,” but he stopped short of acknowledging the Japanese government involvement in it. Some ONGOING “COMFORT WOMEN” ISSUE 249 students demonstrated on the streets, demanding that Abe acknowledge the involvement of the Japanese government in the issue. Then, in August 2015, on the 70-year anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, Abe simply mentioned that previous Japanese Prime Ministers have expressed “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” over the war, but stopped short of expressing his own apology. Thus Abe adhered to his stance that there was no need for him to apologize and reaffirmed his determination to end Japan’s “apology diplomacy” once and for all.25

ONGOING “COMFORT WOMEN” ISSUE Meanwhile, in August 2014, the liberal Asahi Shimbun announced that the series of articles, published from 1982 to 1992, based on the testimony of Yoshida Seiji (October 1913–July 2000) that stated that Korean “comfort women” had been forcibly recruited by the local police (Korea was Japan’s territory at that time) were a fabrication and retracted all the articles. Those on the right were quick to take advantage of this revelation and launched an anti-Asashi Shimbun campaign. They also demanded the retraction of the “Kōno Statement” of August 1993, on the ground that it was based on the false “Yoshida Testimony.” The Kōno Statement refers to the statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei in the reshufﬂed Miyazawa cabinet (December 1992–August 1993), in which he acknowledged the coercion in the recruitment of the Korean “comfort women” by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and publicly apologized.26 The conservatives argue that these women were not forced to serve the IJA, but that they were “ordinary” prostitutes who were paid to do the service. They also argue that such a practice was not unique to the IJA, but was common practice among armies around the world. However, even if there was “no coercion on the part of the IJA in the strict sense of the word,” to use Prime Minister Abe’s explanation, this does not negate the fact that these women worked as “comfort women” for the IJA and suffered emotional and physical pain.27 The more the Japanese political leaders try to justify the issue, the worse the international reputation of Japan becomes, affecting Japan’s relations with its allies and jeopardizing Japan’s national interests in the long run. The European Parliament and the US Congress had already censured Abe on this issue during his ﬁrst term. In this context, several communities in the United States with a concentration of Korean-American residents built memorial monuments dedicated to the “comfort women.” For instance, a 250 10 CONCLUSION brass memorial plaque was installed in Palisades Park in New Jersey in October 2010. Then, a bronze statue of a young woman was unveiled in Glendale, California in August 2013. This is a replica of the “Statue of a Young Woman” (who represents “comfort women”) erected in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.28 Other communities, including ones in New York and Georgia, were building new memorials, and the number was rising. In response, Japanese lawmakers have launched a protest campaign and petitioned to demand the removal of these memorials. Had the Japanese political leaders shown sin- cerer apologies earlier, none of these memorials would have been erected.29

JAPAN–SOUTH KOREAN ACCORD ON THE “COMFORT WOMEN” ISSUE As an update, the Japanese and South Korean governments reached an accord on the comfort women issue in December 2015. A landmark agreement stipulated that the Japanese government provide a one-time contribution of about ¥1 billion (about US$8,950,000 as of April 28, 2016) to a foundation for supporting former comfort women to be established by the South Korean government. At the press conference, both sides confirmed that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.” It appeared at that time that Prime Minister Abe had finally grappled with the reality and decided to put an end to this history issue with South Korea.30 Nevertheless, the issue was far from over. The problem was that there was no written document; the accord was only a verbal agreement. Not unexpectedly, controversy soon erupted regarding the removal of the “Statue of a Young Woman” in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The Japanese government demanded that the South Korean government remove the statue first, as a precondition for the provision of the fund. In contrast, the South Korean government argued that there was no such quid pro quo in the accord. As of April 2016, the two governments agreed to disagree, and thus the “history issues” between Japan and South Korea go on.31

“DENIAL OF HISTORY” Meanwhile, the voice of the vocal minority in Japan that denies the country’s wartime history has become more conspicuous in recent years. The case in point is the denial of the Nanking (Nanjing) Massacre. “DENIAL OF HISTORY” 251

The novelist-turned-politician and former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō is one of the prominent ﬁgures that deny the “Rape of Nanking.” As recently as February 2014, a popular writer Hyakuta Naoki, who was appointed by Prime Minister Abe as a member of the executive board of the public broadcasting station, NHK, denied the Nanking Massacre during his speech in support of the election campaign for the Tokyo governorship by former Air Self-Defense Force chief of staff Tamogami Toshio (he lost in the election).32 An excerpt of Hyakuta’s speech reads:

The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers implanted masochistic history views in the Japanese through the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The tribunal covered up the massacres by the United States, such as the series of massive air raids of Tokyo and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which was a biological warfare experiment on a massive scale. The US Air Force deliberately did not drop regular bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to see the net effects of the atomic bombing on human beings. In this context, the Nanking Massacre reappeared like a ghost at the tribunal. Originally, it was Chiang Kai-shek’s propaganda, and the world did not pay attention to it because it did not happen. It reappeared after the war in order to offset US crimes against the Japanese ...33

In this regard, it is significant that US ambassador to Japan John Roos (August 2009–August 2013) attended on August 6, 2010 the annual peace memorial ceremony to honor the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to become the first US ambassador to do so. It was a politically sensitive decision given the American sentiment at home that might interpret such attendance as an act of contrition or “unspoken apology.” Ambassador Roos stated in August 2014, “President Barack Obama wholeheartedly supported my visit,” but he also suggested that there was some objection even in the Obama administration. Yet, he decided to visit because, “I felt it important to do everything possible in order to assuage the hatred concerning the history issues ...Japan and United States share the same goal of nuclear disarmament.”34 Ambassador Roos also visited Nagasaki for the annual memorial ceremony on August 9, 2012 to become the first US envoy to do so. Actually, President Obama, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, had considered visiting Hiroshima during his stay in Japan to attend the 252 10 CONCLUSION

APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Yokohama in November 2010. However, the Japanese MOFA dissuaded him, reasoning that it would be premature for a US president to do so. Six years later in May 2016, President Obama made a historic visit to Hiroshima. Although he did not offer an apology for the US atomic bombing at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, the surviving victims considered his visit to Hiroshima in itself signiﬁcant.35

Misguided Patriotism Although those who deny the wartime history of the Japanese acts of aggression are a vocal minority in Japan and the silent majority does not share such extreme views, the vocal minority stands out because its views are sensational. Advocates on the right and leaning right also appeal to the sentiment of patriotism in denying the negative wartime history. In general, it is easier to evoke the sentiment of patriotism than to suppress it, because most citizens in every country have a certain sense of patriotism. Even less politically oriented people embrace patriotism in the broad sense of the word as displayed during the Olympic Games or other world competitions. Further, the mass media also plays a part in popularizing sensational views because sensationalism sells. In this regard, Japanese who express concerns about the denial of Japanese wartime history and try to promote sound Sino-Japanese relations are accused of being “anti-Japan Japanese” and even “traitors.” However, genuine patriots are those who have the courage to recommend policies that lead to Japan becoming a responsible and respected nation in the world.36

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NANKING MASSACRE In turn, the Chinese government might be exaggerating the number of victims in the Nanking Massacre. The Chinese government argues that more than 300,000 Chinese were killed in the Nanking Massacre. This number is based on the propaganda of Chiang Kai-shek, who abandoned Nanking and ﬂed the city on December 7, 1937, a week before the Nanking Massacre. In contrast, the actual population of Nanking at the time of the Fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937 was estimated to be about 200,000. In addition, IJA general Matsui Iwane (July 1878– December 1948) wrote in his diary in Nanking on December 20, 1937 that “more than 120,000 Chinese were transferred to the safety zone.” THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NANKING MASSACRE 253

This would make the number of Chinese victims about 80,000, at most, assuming that all the remaining Chinese residents in Nanking were killed at that time.37 Earlier, on November 19, 1937, the JIA Tenth Army began attacking Nanking without a directive from General Matsui. He tried to stop the attack, but it was too late, because the IJA General Staff Office in Tokyo had sanctioned the action without informing Matsui of its decision. General Matsui was considered pro-Chinese by the IJA General Staff Office. Nanking fell on December 13. Four days later, on December 17, General Matsui entered the city and was dismissed from duty. Nevertheless, ironically, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sentenced Matsui to death by hanging for his role in the Nanking Massacre. He was hung despite the fact that he had not ordered the Fall of Nanking. Matsui in fact testified that he had learned of the Nanking Massacre after the war from a US Army broadcast. Judging from the entries in his diary, Matsui seems to have told the truth at the tribunal. His testimony also suggests that the Nanking Massacre may have been blown out of proportion in later years by the Chinese government.38 The bottom line is that the “exaggeration” of the number of victims of the Nanking Massacre by the Chinese authorities—the Japanese on the right call it “fabrication”—does not negate the fact of brutal acts by the IJA in China. Denying history is counterproductive and only fuels the Chinese people’s anger. The more the Japanese deny history, the worse becomes the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese, which invites counteractions by the Chinese government, worsening the vicious cycle. As a matter of fact, the Chinese government, in February 2014, designated December 13, the day the Nanjing Massacre occurred in 1937, as a new “National Memorial Day.”39 The memorial ceremony for the Nanjing Massacre had been conducted annually in the past, but Chinese supreme leaders had rarely attended it. However, on December 13, 2014, President Xi Jinping attended the memorial ceremony at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in Jiangsu province, in order to commemorate the first ceremony after that date had been designated as the National Memorial Day. The side of the Memorial Hall has large inscriptions, “300,000 Victims,” in ten languages, including English and Russian. There, President Xi stated that “the evidence for the Nanjing Massacre was sound and unchangeable.”40 In addition to this National Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre, the Chinese government upgraded another memorial anniversary day 254 10 CONCLUSION concerning the second Sino-Japanese War to a National Memorial Day: September 3 or Victory over Japan Day (VJ Day). This was the day in 1945 when Japan signed the instrument of surrender to the Allied Powers aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. China has another memorial anniversary day concerning the second Sino-Japanese War: July 7, the day the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in 1937.41 President Xi attended all three memorial ceremonies in 2014—July 7, September 3, and December 13—and made a speech stating that China would not accept denial and distortion of the history of aggression. President Xi’s new move seems like a revival of the anti-Japanese patriotic education during the reign of Jiang Zemin. The establishment of the new National Memorial Days was added to the already existing National Humiliation Days concerning Japan, which include: May 7 and May 9, the day the Japanese government gave an ultimatum on the Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shikai and the day he accepted them in 1915; and September 18, the day the Manchurian Incident broke out in 1931. (In the modern history of China, there are many national humiliation days regarding imperial powers, including Japan.) The Chinese government has organized massive rallies on these anniversary days in order for the people to remember the humiliations.42

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF “HISTORY ISSUES” In an overall assessment of the issues concerning recognition of wartime history, although history issues are not fundamental constraints to Sino- Japanese relations, they have become serious but unnecessary impediments to the relations. As history issues have kept recurring, they have blurred fundamental issues between China and Japan and have preempted opportunities for improving their relations. In this regard, Chinese scholar Yang Zhongmei, who teaches in Japan, notes that Chinese leaders interpret the history issues as a Japanese diplomatic strategy to keep Sino- Japanese relations strained, using them as a pretext to keep some distance from China for the sake of the US–Japan alliance.43 In summary, the rationale for settling the history issues with China includes:

– China relinquished its war reparation claim on Japan in exchange for condemnation of the Class-A war criminals at the time of establishing the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972. This is the TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE 255

foundation of Sino-Japanese relations devised by Zhou Enlai. Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine jeopardize this foundation of the relations. – The history issues are counterproductive and fuel unnecessary antipathy on both sides. They have created a vicious cycle of escalation of controversies over the denial of history and the exaggeration of history, intensifying animosity among the people of both countries against each other. – The history issues have given China the upper hand vis-à-vis Japan and a pretext for China’s demand for Japan’s zange gaikō (apology diplomacy). It is unwise for Japan to keep giving China a convenient tool for political leverage. – The history issues have spilled over to business and trade activities and affected Sino-Japanese economic relations. The history issues have damaged Japan’s economic interest in China, which could further weaken Japan’s economic standing in the world. – It is an anachronistic strategy to manipulate nationalistic sentiment and use it in foreign policy. Liquidation of the history issues is the real departure from the postwar regime. The “end of history” does not mean that all the issues between the two countries would dis- appear, but it will enable both sides to see the real issues—economic, military, or political—and work together for their solution.

TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE The territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands has been ongoing for more than four decades, but the latest round began with Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō’s move to purchase the islands from the Japanese landowner in April 2012, in order to make the Japanese presence on the islands more visible and active. This prompted the Japanese government, ruled by the liberal DPJ, to purchase the islands from the landowner in September, in order to control the activities of Japanese rightists on the islands. This “nationalization” is not actually as unusual as it appears because the government had originally owned the islands. It had leased four of the ﬁve islands to a private citizen, the family then bought them from the government, and then sold them to a family friend. Then, since April 256 10 CONCLUSION

2002, the Japanese government has leased three of the islands from the new landowner with a rent.44 In turn, the Chinese government considered the “nationalization” of the Senkaku Islands as a violation of the bilateral agreement to maintain the status quo and shelve the dispute. The Chinese government responded by frequently intruding in Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and airspace over them in order to demonstrate that it had effective control of the islands (see Chapter 9). Moreover, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration created a new internet site in December 2014 in order to widely proclaim Chinese sovereignty over the islands. The agency was also planning to create the site in many foreign languages, ranging from Arabic to Russian.45 In retrospect, this escalation of the territorial dispute would not have happened had Tokyo governor Ishihara not decided to purchase the islands. However, a more fundamental problem is the denial of the existence of the territorial dispute in itself on the part of the Japanese government since the late 1990s. This stance counters the agreement on the dispute that was established in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization and the conclusion of the peace treaty. The newly declassiﬁed document also conﬁrms the existence of an at least tacit agreement. With the Japanese refusal to acknowledge the existence of the dispute, China has escalated its actions to claim the islands (see Chapter 9).

CHINA’S MILITARY BUILDUP IN EAST ASIA Simultaneously, President Xi Jinping is engaged in a rapid military build up in the East China Sea and the South China Sea based on a far-reaching global strategy. As the world’s second largest economy, China appears to be intent on carving up the Pacific Ocean with the United States and on extending its spheres of interest to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. The construction of new military facilities in the Nanxi Islands (part of Zhejiang province) in the East China Sea and on several reefs in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, such as Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, which are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries, suggests the nature of this Chinese move. The recent rise in the number of Chinese fishing boats and government patrol vessels entering the Japanese territorial waters around the Izu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands located directly south of Tokyo, in addition to the Senkaku Islands, also appears to be a new move in this direction.46 CHINA’S MILITARY BUILDUP IN EAST ASIA 257

Further, China has been increasingly engaged in activities in the airspace over the East China Sea, such as the cases of Chinese government aircraft crossing over the median line and into Japanese territorial airspace. Then, in November 2013, China unilaterally established the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), in the area beyond the existing Chinese ADIZ and overlapping with the Japanese AIDZ in some areas, including the Senkaku Islands. All of these moves point to a new Chinese military strategy in East Asia, causing serious concern to countries in the region, as well as to the United States. The fundamental problem with the Senkaku Islands issue is that the Japanese refusal to acknowledge the existence of the dispute is giving China a pretext to escalate its activities surrounding the islands as a part of its global strategy.47 Had the two governments reached some kind of agreement on the islands, the Chinese military activities in the area could have been contained. What the Chinese government wants from the Japanese government regarding this territorial dispute is an acknowledgment of the existence of the dispute so that the two governments can stand on the same ground on this issue. It appears unreasonable for the Japanese government not to acknowledge the dispute. There is nothing to lose for Japan in acknowledging the dispute, which actually exists. On the other hand, persistently refusing to acknowledge the existence of the dispute will only escalate the tensions in the region. It seems best for Japan to acknowledge the existence of the dispute and then agree to shelve the issue so that the two governments can stand on the same foundation for the issue, as established by Zhou Enlai.48 Diplomacy is made of compromise and quid pro quo, based on a realistic assessment of a given situation. An uncompromising stance, such as adhering to a country’s own national interests without giving consideration to those of the other party, does not achieve diplomatic outcomes. The purpose of diplomacy is to find mutually agreeable common ground. Diplomatic compromise is often perceived as “weak-kneed” by the conservatives at home, but it is often a wiser approach in settling a dispute. Back in the 1920s, the military establishment condemned the non-interventionist policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō, who tried to work out peaceful coexistence with China, as “weak-kneed” diplomacy. This led to the Manchurian Incident, and then to the second Sino- Japanese War and to the Asia-Pacific War. Japanese paid a high price for the wars in the end. 258 10 CONCLUSION

In conﬂict resolution, a small concession could be the key to the peaceful settlement of a dispute. In the world of nature, narwhals, med- ium-sized whales with a long tusk, seem to know how to avoid collisions. When two pods of narwhal swim through a narrow passage from different directions in the Arctic Ocean to feed, an observer would expect a head-on collision. However, it is documented that one pod turns back, and a collision is avoided. Mankind can learn something from the narwals’ behavior.49

TOWARD COLLABORATIONS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS Sino-Japanese relations do not have to be a zero sum game, but can be mutually beneficial. President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe agreed in November 2014 to promote a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” between China and Japan. There are many areas in which the two countries can cooperate with one another. For instance, they could collaborate in the joint development of natural energy sources in the East China Sea and in the creation of a consortium (see Chapter 9). As Terashima Jitsurō proposed, they could also work out a monetary exchange agreement in order to preempt a financial crisis in Asia. The two governments should also continue bilateral talks in order to reduce military tension in the East China Sea. Establishing a bilateral maritime liaison mechanism, including a hotline, in order to avoid collisions of vessels in the East China Sea, as agreed in the Abe–Xi summit meeting, is a step forward in this direction. For this, Japan should also make a concerted effort with the US administration, which made unequivocal its defense responsibilities for the Senkaku Islands under the US–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Japan could also collaborate with countries that have territorial disputes with China, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.50 Japan should also reactivate the Six-Party Talks concerning nuclear weapons development in North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), which involve North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. As a non-nuclear country, Japan could also propose a creation of a non-nuclear zone in Asia, which would encompass parts of China, North Korea, and Russia. This is not an FINAL ASSESSMENT OF ZHOU ENLAI 259 unrealistic proposal. In essence, China and Japan should work together for the sake of peace and prosperity in East Asia. This is the ultimate goal of the “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” between the two countries.51 China and Japan should also promote non-governmental exchanges between the two countries. The governments should encourage student exchange programs (including credit exchange programs to allow credit exchanges among universities) so that the younger generations in both countries can develop mutual understanding. Civic level exchanges could play an important role in foreign policy, as exemplified by the Ping-Pong Diplomacy at the 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya in 1971. Miyazaki Tenshō (age 46), a third-generation Japanese orphan left behind in Manchuria, who had settled in Nagoya with his parents and become an owner-chef of a Chinese restaurant there, was inspired by the Ping-Pong Diplomacy and created a Chūbu (central region of Japan) Japan–China Table Tennis Association in order to promote grassroots exchanges between Chinese and Japanese groups.52 ***

FINAL ASSESSMENT OF ZHOU ENLAI In summary, Zhou Enlai was a unique Chinese revolutionary and political leader, who did not seek a top position in the party and the government. Although Zhou reached a pinnacle of power in the CPC, as the supreme military leader, at the Zunyi Conference of January 1935 during the Long March, Mao Zedong soon took over that position. Zhou was not a domineering leader, whereas Mao was a formidable leader. Zhou’s family background as shiye (a private clerk working for the government), as well as his personal attributes (being modest and prudent), equipped him to be in the number two position. If one takes an analogy from the Chinese classic story, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Zhou could be likened to Zhuge Liang (181–234; courtesy name, Zhuge Kongming), the chancellor and strategist for the state of Shu Han. Zhuge did not have the ambition to become supreme leader and remained in the number two position. After the establishment of the PRC, Zhou assumed a dual position in the government as premier and foreign minister, while Mao became the 260 10 CONCLUSION supreme leader of China. However, this does not diminish the significance of Zhou as a superb political leader of China. His intelligence, sharp insights, and refined manners impressed western officials, including United Nations second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (July 1905–September 1961) and US national security advisor Henry Kissinger. Zhou formulated Chinese foreign policy, but he made sure that Mao made the final decisions for it. It was the necessary art of survival for the high-ranking officials in the CPC Politburo (see Chapter 4). In this regard, one cannot help but ask whether Zhou in his later years, after the trials and tribulation of many disastrous campaigns of the CPC, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, wondered if nation-building based on Marxism-Leninism was a mistake. He might have considered these misguided campaigns unfortunate byproducts of the power struggles within the party, rather than as fundamental flaws in the ideology itself. He decided to become a communist in his youth, subscribed to the ideology and followed through with it. The introduction of an open market system had to wait for his protégé Deng Xiaoping. While Mao was feared as a “god” in China, Zhou was revered as a “saint” so that his death resulted in the first Tiananmen Square Incident in 1976. Then, the death of another moderate leader (in the second generation), Hu Yaobang, resulted in the second Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. No such popular uprising occurred after Mao’s death.53

PERSONAL LIFE OF ZHOU ENLAI Before closing, it is necessary to examine the personal life of Zhou Enlai, because a new book speculates that he was gay without presenting any evidence. The Chinese writer admits that she has no evidence and that she only has “clues.” Yet, the sources the writer used for her clues do not substantiate her speculation. The rumors about Zhou’s sexual orientations are not new. In fact, the former chief editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Dick Wilson, mentioned them in his biography of Zhou in 1984, and flatly denied such rumors.54 Specifically, the Diary of Zhou Enlai in Japan (1918), from which the writer gets her clues, provides neither clues nor evidence that Zhou had sexual yearnings toward Li Fujing, one of Zhou’s classmates at Nankai Middle School. Li’s courtesy name was Xinhui, and Zhou referred to him as “Little Brother Hui.” Their relationship was purely brotherly. Zhou actually had numerous friends at Nankai with whom he developed a very DIARY OF ZHOU ENLAI IN JAPAN 261 strong bond. In attending an all-male school, there is nothing unusual in male students developing strong friendships with each other. For instance, Zhou and Wu Hantao (courtesy name, Diqian) recruited six “blood brothers” at Nankai, all of whom went to Japan for college educations. Li Fujing was not one of them. Zhou followed the six to Tokyo, but Li did not follow Zhou to Tokyo.55 Zhou was also very close to Wu Guozhen (known as K.C. Wu in the west), who served as mayor of Chongqing under Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan, and then to the United States, and died in Savannah, Georgia. There is a photograph of the young Zhou and Wu. In fact, Zhou, Wu, and Li prepared for a swearing-in ceremony for brotherhood in the manner of the heroes in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, but their pledge was not carried through due to the objections of the superstitious father of Li.56

DIARY OF ZHOU ENLAI IN JAPAN Zhou conﬁded his innermost thoughts to his diary in Japan and he occasionally mentioned love in it. He did so because he was contemplating the differences between love and arranged marriage, not because he was gay. He was opposed to arranged marriage because it was not based on pure love. Chinese men were forced to marry at a young age and the majority of Zhou’s blood brothers, including Wu Hantao and Wang Pushan (whom Zhou referred to as “Big Brother Shan”), were already married. Zhou was observing their married lives in Japan. There is nothing in Zhou’s references to love in his diary that could even be remotely interpreted as a clue to gay sexual orientation. Similarly, to consider Zhou’s crossing out of a line, in his reference to love in his diary entry of January 1, 1918, to be a clue to his sexual orientation, as the writer does, is a stretch. In fact, the word, “baby” is legible in the crossed-out line. Judging from his references to love in other passages, it seems most likely that Zhou was referring to pure love as a baby.57 Interestingly, Zhou also disclosed in his diary in Japan who his best friends were, and Li Fujing was only one of many. Zhou socialized with all of his blood brothers in Japan, but the bond between Zhou and his blood brothers was genuinely brotherly. Zhou meticulously recorded in his diary his day-to-day activities in Japan, including when he visited his friends, where they went, what they talked about, and when he came home. The diary entry that the writer cites as a clue to Zhou’s “yearnings” for Li Fujing was the entry Zhou wrote on October 25, 1918. This was actually 262 10 CONCLUSION written on the page for August 27 that still had about two-thirds blank space left. Zhou wrote there:

I have written nothing until today. The pains in my heart have lasted for two months. Whenever I saw the moon in the evening, the breeze in the early morning ...I thought of my family and reminisced about my Little Brother Hui. This was unbearable!58

There is nothing in this entry that could be construed as “a clue to his yearnings” for homosexual desires, nor in the entire diary, for that matter. Having spent a wonderful time in Tianjin during his summer homecoming visit, Zhou missed his family and Li Fujing. Zhou’s family and Li’s family were very close and Zhou often visited Li’s house during homecoming. Zhou and Li were like real brothers. Having returned to Tokyo alone in September, Zhou was deeply homesick. Zhou was also depressed because he was unsure about what to do for his studies in Japan and about his future. Moreover, he was also suffering financially and was in dire need of financial assistance. His unstable financial situation and unstable state of mind in Japan made him miss his family and his friend in China all the more strongly. It is not unusual for a foreign student in this condition to miss his family and his friend back home and write an emotional entry in his diary.59

ZHOU’S YEARS IN EUROPE After Zhou Enlai, Li Fujing, and many of their friends had sailed to Europe together in November 1920, Li’s father sent money from Nankai University founder Yan Xiu to Zhou, as well as his own money to his son. These elders knew that Zhou and Li were like true brothers. Regarding Zhou’s years in Europe, it is also unlikely that Zhou received a stipend from the Third International (Comintern), as the writer states. Zhou did not have strong ties with Moscow at that time. Unlike Deng Xiaoping who was a “work–study” student in France, Zhou and Li were “frugal study” students, who held “certiﬁcates of frugal study” and did not work in factories. Zhou received scholarships from Yan and others. Zhou also worked as a special correspondent in Europe for a local Catholic newspaper Tianjin Yishibao.60 In addition, Zhou and Li did not live together “alone” in London, as the writer suggests. Upon arriving in France in December 1920, Li soon ZHOU DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 263 left Paris in order to enroll at the University of Manchester in England, whereas Zhou was obliged to stay in Paris for a few weeks to recover from sickness. Then, Zhou visited London in January 1921 and stayed with one of his best friends from Nankai, Chang Ceou (Xingya), who was studying at the London School of Economics. Chang was married and lived with his wife. Li also stayed at Chang’s place in London until he left for Manchester. Thus, the writer’s speculation that Zhou lived with Li in London, and therefore that Zhou was gay, is unfounded.61 Moreover, Zhou had a “girlfriend” whosailedtoFrancewithhim.Zhang Ruoming (1902–1958) was Zhou’s fellow member in the Awakening Society in Tianjin, and also his fellow inmate in a jail in Tianjin. When Zhou lived in Blois in central France, Zhou fell in love with Zhang, but their relationship ended in France due to growing ideological differences between them. Zhou was not attached to Deng Yingchao at that time. Zhou wasalsointerestedinLiFujing’s sister, Li Fumin, and sent her a postcard from Paris on May 14, 1921, while also writing to Deng.62 After Zhou married Deng Yingchao in August 1925, Zhou secretly met Zhang Ruoming. A Chinese source states that Zhou visited Zhang in Lyon in the summer of 1928 after attending the Sixth National Party Congress of the CPC in Moscow (convening the meeting in China was dangerous because of Chiang Kai-shek’s suppression of communists). It is known that Zhou went to Moscow with Deng Yingchao by train via Siberia in 1928, but it appears that Zhou returned home alone via Marseille. Then, in the spring of 1930, Zhou secretly met Zhang again in the suburbs of Lyon on his way to Moscow, via Marseille, to attend the Comintern meeting in disguise with a fake passport. He took the land route, via Siberia, on his way back to China from Moscow. Zhang meanwhile received a doctoral degree in literature from the University of Lyon, with a dissertation on André Gide, and thereby became the ﬁrst Chinese female doctor of philosophy. Upon returning home, she taught at the Sino-French University in Beijing and at YunNan University. She then joined the liberal China Democratic League and refused to conform during Mao Zedong’s Anti-Rightist Movement. She committed suicide in 1958.63

ZHOU DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION In turn, Zhou forged a lasting relationship with Mao Zedong because of Zhou’s conciliatory and prudent disposition, not because of his sexual orientation. Unlike Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, Zhou consciously positioned 264 10 CONCLUSION himself to be second in the party hierarchy. Nonetheless, Zhou often risked his own life during the Cultural Revolution to save his long-time colleagues from persecution, such as China’s Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, as well as Zhou’s junior officers, such as Liao Chengzhi. Zhou even helped the Japanese aristocrat, Lady Saga Hiro, who was married to the last emperor of the Qing dynasty Puyi’s younger brother, Pujie. If Zhou was in a weak position against Mao because of his sexual orientation, as the writer argues, why did Zhou go out of his way to help so many people during the Cultural Revolution, risking his own life (see Chapter 4)? The bottom line is that there is nothing in the sources used by the writer that could even be remotely interpreted as a clue that Zhou was gay. The Diary of Zhou Enlai in Japan, in which he spelled out his inner conflicts in a most candid manner, neither reveals nor suggests anything about his sexual orientation. His feeling for Li Fujing was one of genuine brotherhood. As with Sidney Rittenberg, another American journalist, Edgar Snow, who spent a good amount of time with Zhou in his hideout in Shaanxi province, did not write anything that insinuated Zhou’s sexual orientation. Dick Wilson also denied such rumors. Strictly speaking, in the absence of definite evidence and witnesses, it is now impossible to either prove or disprove that Zhou was gay. However, one thing is clear. Insofar as there are no definite proofs, one should not write a book that suggests that Zhou was gay, based only on speculations. As Rebecca Karl stated in the article, “this kind of speculation” would only “provoke needless controversy about Zhou” and, worse yet, lend itself to the exaltation of sensationalism in place of genuine and honest scholarship.64

ZHOU ENLAI AND JAPAN Zhou Enlai was an exceptional Chinese political leader who truly understood Japan and the Japanese. Following in the footsteps of early Chinese intellectual leaders and revolutionaries, including Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen, Zhou went to Japan and absorbed a kaleidoscope of new ideas. The Chinese learned from Japan not only modernization and militariza- tion, but also communism and socialism to the extent that the Chinese “imported” Japanese translations from German and Russian for terminol- ogy of the new ideologies.65 Having grown up in a destitute intellectual family, Zhou had strong compassion for the farmer class and identified with the cause of rural ZHOU ENLAI AND JAPAN 265 revolution, advocated by Mao Zedong, as opposed to the urban revolution expounded by the CPC cofounder Li Dazhao. Zhou’s empathy for the poverty-stricken farmers was not a utopian notion, but a very real one. In fact, the “Diary of Zhou Enlai in Japan,” which Zhou wrote in Tokyo in 1918 at age 19 and 20, clearly indicates that he was taken by the Russian Revolution so that he combed through the articles in Japanese about the subject. Zhou’s diary also indicates that he was deeply disappointed in both the Chinese government reforms, such as those by Liang Qichao, and the series of revolutions led by Sun Yat-sen. Zhou found in peasant and popular revolution the answer to his search for a third way to save China from self-destruction.66 After World War II, Zhou genuinely wished for peace and friendship with Japan, not only in terms of Chinese world strategy, but also for the sake of reconciliation. Having fought the second Sino-Japanese War himself, he wanted peace with the Japanese. He had studied in Japan from 1917 to 1919, and intently observed its people and society. Zhou received the personal tutelage of Nikka-dōjin East Asian Higher Preparatory School President Matsumoto Kamejirō, who had also taught Lu Xun and Qiu Jin. Zhou’s respect for Matsumoto remained for the rest of his life. Zhou also revered the Japanese Marxist scholar, Kawakami Hajime, and the liberal intellectual, Yoshino Sakuzō.67 These hands-on experiences in Japan distinguish Zhou from Mao Zedong and make Zhou’s hope for perpetual peace and friendship between China and Japan compelling. He achieved his ultimate goal with Japan in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 and became the architect of Sino-Japanese peace and friendship, although the actual conclusion of the peace treaty took place in 1978 after his death (see Chapter 7). As with Chinese foreign policy toward the United States, Zhou adhered to Chinese principles toward Japan, but he was simultaneously conciliatory and flexible. Zhou earned the respect of Japanese negotiators because he was considerate of Japanese positions and paid meticulous attention to their needs. He was even lenient toward Japan, as exemplified by his treatment of the Japanese war criminals and his decision to relinquish Chinese war reparation claims (see Chapters 2 and 6). Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was one of the Japanese political leaders who was impressed with Zhou, and referred to him as having “a body as flexible as a willow and a heart as strong as a rock.”68 In turn, Suzuki Kazuo, who devoted himself to Sino-Japanese trade as an executive director of the Japan Association for the Promotion of 266 10 CONCLUSION

International Trade (JAPIT), referred to Zhou as “persuasive and toler- ant.” Suzuki stated, “The magnificence and humility of Premier Zhou awed even Japanese from different political and social spectrums and made them respect and like him.” With these personal attributes and political clout, Zhou was able to reach agreements with the Japanese negotiators without bending his core principles. For this, he is revered not only by politicians on the left, but also by conservative politicians and business leaders alike in Japan. No other Chinese leader has earned the respect from the Japanese that Zhou has to this day.69 *** In conclusion, Zhou Enlai was a quintessential Chinese leader and devoted his postwar career to preserving and promoting Chinese national interests until his death, while making compromises on Japanese national interests wherever possible. Given the growing economic interdependence and intertwining regional security interests in East Asia, China and Japan should further promote non-governmental exchanges, as well as governmental collaborations, for the ultimate goal of peace and prosperity in East Asia. In so doing, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of Zhou’svisittoJapanin1917inorderto study at a higher school in Tokyo, it is appropriate to reflect on Zhou’s genuine wish for “Sino-Japanese peace and friendship for many generations to come” and to learn from his wisdom that put priority on reconciliation over confrontation with Japan. This is a first step to start new Sino-Japanese relations. After the 70-year anniversary of the end of World War II, it is high time to realize this. If mankind is to make progress in a borderless age, political leaders in the world should overcome narrower interests as defined by the territorial boundaries of nation-states and cooperate with one another for resolving regional conflicts in the world. This is a test for mankind.

NOTES 1. Nitchū shunō kaidan” (Sino-Japanese Summit Meeting), Chūnichi Shimbun (also circulated as Tokyo Shimbun), November 11, 2014. 2. Ibid. 3. “Chūnichi shunjū” (Chūnichi Column), Chūnichi Shimbun, November 11, 2014. 4. “Nitchū shunō-kaidan.” NOTES 267

5. “Takajin no sokomadeitte-iinkai” (TV political talk show), November 16, 2014, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2abfju_ Takajinnosokomadeitteiinkai-141116-2_news?from_related=related.page. ext.behavior-only.59dc35c3baa170276beebe10923aaeff141629307 “Gaikō nikansuru seron-chōsa” (Opinion Poll on Diplomacy), http://sur vey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-gaiko/2-1.html, December 22, 2014. 6. “Takajin no sokomadeitte-iinkai.” 7. “2-nen-buri gaishō-kaidan” (Foreign Ministers’ Meeting After Two Year’s Absence), Chūnichi Shimbun, August 12, 2014; “Japan–China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page3e_ 000262.html, November 8, 2014. 8. “Japan–China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”; “Nitchū shunō-kaidan e zentei toshite gōi bunsho happyō” (Announcement of Agreement as Precondition for Sino-Japanese Summit Meeting), Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 2014. 9. “Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000150.html, November 7, 2014. 10. “Nitchū shunō-kaidan.” 11. “Takajin no sokomadeitte-iinkai.” 12. “Japan-China Summit Meeting,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/ cn/page4e_000151.html, November 10, 2014. 13. Ibid. 14. “Who Gave Ground?: China, Japan Tweak Translations to Claim Victory,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2014. 15. Ibid. 16. “Takajin no sokomadeitte-iinkai.” 17. Terashima Jitsurō, “Abe gaikō sekai to zure” (Abe Foreign Policy Diverges from the World), Chūnichi Shimbun, February 8, 2014. 18. “Taibei jiritsu tsuyoku shikō” (Strong Orientation for Independence from the United States), Chūnichi Shimbun, March 15, 2014. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. “Tanaka Kakuei, ima-taikō, horonigai anpan” (Bittersweet Anpan for Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei), Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 2014. 22. “Abe-shushō, Yasukuni-jinsha ni sonaemono shunki-reitaisai” (Prime Minister Abe Made an Offering to the Annual Spring Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine), Chūnichi Shimbun, April 21, 2015. 23. “Visiting Merkel Reminds Japan to Face Wartime Past,” Reuters, March 9, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/09/us-japan-germany- idUSKBN0M509220150309; “Shushō Bei-gōdō gikai de enzetsu” (Prime Minister Made a Speech at the Joint US Congress), Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 2015. 268 10 CONCLUSION

24. “Shushō Bei-gōdō gikai de enzetsu.” 25. “Abe-shushō, ianfu-mondai ni genkyū, ‘jinshin baibai no gisei’” (Prime Minister Abe Referred to the Comfort Women Issue as “Victims of Human Trafﬁcking”), Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 2015; “Abe-shushō, shūsen-kinenbi no danwa” (Prime Minister Abe’s Speech for the End-of- the-War Anniversary, Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 2015. 26. “Ianfu mondai o kangaeru” (To Think About Comfort Women Issue), Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 2014. 27. “Kenshō: Asahi ‘Ianfu’ hōdō” (To Verify Asahi’s “Comfort Women” Reports), Yomiuri Shimbun, August 28, 2014. 28. “In New Jersey, Memorial for ‘Comfort Women’ Deepens Old Animosity,” New York Times, May 18, 2012; “California City Unveils ‘Comfort Women’ Statue,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2013. 29. Ibid. (both). 30. “Nikkan gaishō kaidan” (Japan–ROK Foreign Minister’s Meeting), December 28, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/na/kr/page4_ 001667.html; “Kishi-gaishō ianfu-mondai ni ‘shūshifu’” (Prime Minister Kishida Stated, “Put an End” to the Comfort Women Issue), Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2015. 31. “‘Shōjo-zō tekkyo no genkyū nai’ Kankoku-daitōryō” (South Korean President States “No Reference to Removal of the Girl Statue”), Chūnichi Shimbun, April 27, 2016. 32. “Nankin daigyakusatsu nakatta” (“Nanking Massacre Did Not Happen”), Asahi Shimbun, February 5, 2014. 33. Ibid. 34. “Genbaku tōka 69-nen-go no Beikoku” (The United States, 69 Years After Dropping of Atomic Bombs), Chūnichi Shimbun, August 7, 2014. 35. Ibid.; “Presidnet Obama Visits Hiroshima,” New York Times, May 27, 2016. 36. “Han’nichi Nihonjin” (Anti-Japan Japanese), https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7rxtbjtEYns, June 14, 2013. 37. “1937-nen 12-gatsu 13-nichi, Nankin kanraku-ji no jinkō wa?” (What was the Population of Nanking at the Fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937?), http://history.gr.jp/nanking/reason01.html, accessed April 28, 2016. 38. “‘Gyakusatsu wa shūsen-go, Beigun-hōsō de shitta’ kōshukei no Matsui Iwane-taishō” (General Matsui Iwane Who was Executed by Hanging, “Learned of the [Nanking] Massacre after the War from the US Army Broadcasting”), February 18, 2015, http://www.sankei.com/life/news/ 150218/lif1502180008-n3.html. 39. “Nankin-jiken de Chūgoku hatsu no ‘kokka tsuitō-bi’ Shū-shuseki shikiten ni sanka” (President Xu Attended the Memorial Service for the First “National Memorial Day” for the Nanking Incident), Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 2014. NOTES 269

40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Yang Zhongmei, Kokintō: Nijūisseiki Chūgoku no shihaisha, (Hu Jintao: Chinese Ruler for Twenty-ﬁrst Century), Tokyo: Nippon-hōsō-kyōkai, 2003, 267–268. 44. “Chūgoku koka-kaiyōkyoku, Senkaku ryōyūken no apīru saito tachiage” (China’s State Oceanic Administration Created Internet Site to Proclaim Sovereignty over Senkakus), Asahi Shimbun, December 31, 2014. 45. Ibid. 46. “Chūgoku, Senkaku kinkai ni gunji-kyoten seibi” (China Built a Military Base Near Senkakus), Chūnichi Shimbun, December 22, 2014; David E. Sanger and Ric Gladstone, “Piling Sand in a Disputed Sea, China Literally Gains Ground,” New York Times, April 9, 2015. 47. “Chūgoku no bōkūken tekkai motomeru” ([Abe] Demanded Retraction of Air Defense Zone), Asahi Shimbun, November 25, 2013. 48. Ibid. 49. “Frozen Planet: Spring,” Nature, BBC, December 1, 2011. 50. Terashima. 51. Ibid. 52. “Pinpon-gaikō no kioku o otte” (Tracing Memories of Ping-Pong Diplomacy), Chūnichi Shimbun, September 6, 2014. 53. Chinese expatriate, interview with author, April 7, 2015. 54. Michael Forsythe, “New Book Reinterprets Chinese Leader,” New York Times, December 30, 2015. This author’s email inquiry to Forsythe has not been returned. For details, see Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Biography, New York: Viking, 1984. 55. Zhou Enlai, “Luri-riji” (Diary of Travel to Japan), in Zhou Enlai, Zhou Enlai zaoqi wenji 1912.10–1924.6 (Early Writings of Zhou Enlai 1912.10– 1924.6), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi and Nankai- daxue, Tianjin: Zhonggyang wenxian-chubanshe and Nankai-daxue chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 1. For details, see Wilson. 56. Ibid. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, The Origins of Contemporary Sino- Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 57. Ibid.; Forsythe. For details, see Itoh. 58. Ibid., 398; Forsythe. 59. Zhou. For details, see Itoh. 60. Forsythe. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, The Making of China’s War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 61. Ibid. 270 10 CONCLUSION

62. Jin, Chongji, ed. (principal editor), Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai), edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1998, Vol. 1, 95–97; Ogura Kazuo, Pari no Shū Onrai: Chūgoku-kakumeika no Seiō-taiken (Zhou Enlai in Paris: A Chinese Revolutionary’s Experiences in Western Europe), Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1992, 82–85. 63. Ibid. (both); “Zhang Ruoming,” http://baike.baidu.com/view/1543905. htm, accessed June 3, 2014. 64. Forsythe. 65. For details, see Itoh, The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations. 66. Zhou, 354–356. 67. Ibid., 362–265 and 378–383. 68. Furukawa Mantarō, “Shū Onrai to tainichi gensoku: Kokkō-seijōka ni miru seiji-shuwan” (Zhou Enlai and his Principles toward Japan: Political Skills for Diplomatic Normalization), in Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 402–405. 69. Morikawa Kazuyo, “Shū Onrai-shushō to Suzuki Kazuo-shi” (Premier Zhou Enlai and Mr. Suzuki Kazuo), in Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 39–43. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Wang, Yongxiang and Takahashi, Tsuyoshi. eds. Riben liuxue-shiqi de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai During his Study Period in Japan). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian- chubanshe, 2001. Wu, Xuewen. Fengyu yinqing: Wosuo jingli de Zhongri guanxi (Wind, Rain, Cloud, Sun: My Autobiography and Sino-Japanese Relations). Beijing: Shijie-zhishi chubanshe, 2002. Wu, Xuewen, Lin, Liande, and Xu, Zhixian. Dangdai Zhongri guanxi, 1945–1994 (Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945–1994). Beijing: Shishi-chubanshe, 1995. Wu, Xuewen and Wang, Junyan. Liao Chengzhi yu Riben (Liao Chengzhi and Japan). Beijing: Zhonggongdangshi-chubanshe, 2007. Xu, Jieyu. Zhou Enlai-zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai). Hong Kong: Mingbao youxian-gongsi chubanbu, 1976. Xu, Zhixian. ed. Zhongri guanxi sanshi-nian (Thirty-Years of Sino-Japanese Relations). Beijing: Shishi-chubanshe, 2002. Zhang, Zuoliang. Zhou Enlai de zuihou shinian: Yiwei baojian-yisheng de huiyi (Last Ten Years of Zhou Enlai: Recollections by His First Medical Doctor). Shanghai: Shanghai-renmin chubanshe, 1997. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi. ed. Zhou Enlai nianpu 1898–1949 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1898–1949). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe and Renmin-chubanshe, 1989. Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi. ed. Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976). 3 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 1997. Zhou, Enlai. Zhou Enlai zaoqi wenji 1912.10–1924.6 (Early Writings of Zhou Enlai 1912.10–1924.6). Edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang rwenxian-yanjiushi and Nankai-daxue. 2 vols. Tianjin: Zhonggyang wenxian-chubanshe and Nankai-daxue chubanshe, 1998. Zhou, Enlai. Jianguo-yilai Zhou Enlai wengao (Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai since Nation’s Foundation). Edited by Zhonggong-zhongyang wenxian-yanjiushi. 3 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian-chubanshe, 2008.

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Bo, Zhiyue. China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2010. Calder, Kent E. and Ye, Min. The Making of Northeast Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. Calder, Kent E. Singapore: Smart City, Smart State. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016. Curtis, Gerald, Kokubun, Ryosei and Wang, Jisi. Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. Dower, John W. Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dreyer, June Teufel. Middle Kingdon and Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Fogel, Joshua A. ed. The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Fogel, Joshua A. ed. Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Gao, Wenqian. Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary. Trans. by Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007. Goodby, James E., Ivanov, Vladimir I., and Shimotomai, Nobuo. eds. “Northern Territories” and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Han, Suyin. Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898–1976. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1994. Hellmann, Donald C. Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969. Holdridge, John H. Crossing the Divide: An Insider’s Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations. New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. Hoppens, Robert. The China Problem in Postwar Japan: Japanese National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Hrebenar, Ronald J. and Nakamura, Akira. eds. Party Politics in Japan: Political Chaos and Stalemate in the Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge, 2015. Hsu, Kai-yu. Chou En-lai: China’s Gray Eminence. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968. Iriye, Akira. China and Japan in the Global Setting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Itoh, Mayumi. The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Itoh, Mayumi. The Making of China’s War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 274 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jansen, Marius B. Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894–1972. Chicago: Rand-McNally College Publishing, 1975. Johnson, Chalmers A. Revolutionary Change. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982. Kissinger, Henry. On China. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. Krauss, Ellis S. and Pekkanen, Robert J. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. Lam, Peng, Er, ed. Japan Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power. New York: Routledge, 2006. Lamb, Malcolm. Directory of Ofﬁcials and Organizations in China, 1968–1983 Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983. Lee, Chae-Jin. China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1984. Li, Tien-min. Chou En-lai. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1970. MacFarquhar, Roderick. ed. Politics of China: Sixty Years of the People’s Republic of China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 3rd. ed. 2011. Mitcham, Chad J. China’s Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 1949–79: Grain, Trade and Diplomacy. London: Routledge, 2005. Nathan, Andrew J. and Ross, Robert S. Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Ogata, Sadako. Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988. Pempel, T. J. ed. Remapping Asia: The Construction of a Region. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. Radtke, Kurt Werner. China’s Relations with Japan, 1945–1983: The Role of Liao Chengzhi. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990. Rozman, Gilbert. Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Samuels, Richard J. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. Segal, George. Normalizing Sino-Japanese Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. Shimizu, Sayuri. Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan’s Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001. Shin, Gi-Wook, and Sneider, Daniel C. eds. Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia. Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia- Paciﬁc Research Center, Stanford University and Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2007. Soeya, Yoshihide. Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 275

Sumiya, Mikio. ed. A History of Japanese Trade and Industry Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Sutter, Robert G. China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership on Asia. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2006 d Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University/Belknap Press, 2001. Vogel, Ezra F., Yuan, Ming, and Tanaka, Akihiko. eds. The Golden Age of the U.S.- China-Japan Triangle, 1972–1989. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002. Wan, Ming. Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Whiting, Allen S. China Eyes Japan. Berkeley, CA: University California Press, 1989. Wilson, Dick. Zhou Enlai: A Biography. New York: Viking, 1984. Yang, Alexander Ching-an. The Policy-Making Process in Japan’s Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Zagoria, Donald S. Sino–Soviet Conﬂict, 1956–1962. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. Zagoria, Donald S. ed. Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Zhao, Quansheng. Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics: Informal Mechanisms and the Making of China Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Zhao, Quansheng. Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Zhao, Quansheng and Liu, Guoli. eds. Managing the China Challenge: Global Perspectives. London: Routledge, 2009. Zhao, Suisheng. ed. China and the United States, Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Zhao, Ziyang. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

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Book Chapters and Journal Articles Arai, Akira. “Takubatsu na ōtai” (Outstanding Hospitality). In Shū Onrai kinen- shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihon-jin no naka no Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 251–255. Furukawa, Mantarō. “Shū Onrai to tainichi gensoku: Kokkō-seijōka ni miru seiji- shuwan” (Zhou Enlai and his Principles toward Japan: Political Skills for Diplomatic Normalization). In Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 389–413. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 279

Kokubun Ryōsei. “1972-nen taisei o koeta Nitchū-kankei o motomete” (To Seek Sino-Japanese Relations Beyond the 1972 System). Gaikō fōramu, October 2002, 16–23. Nakauchi, Yasuo. “Senkaku-shotō o meguru mondai to Nitchū-kankei: Nihon no ryōdo hen’nyū kara kon’nichi made no keika to kongo no kadai” (Issues concerning Senkaku Islands and Sino-Japanese Relations: Details of Japanese Incorporation and Future Issues). Rippō to chōsa. No. 334, November 2012, 69–84. Ni, Zhimin. “Tanaka-naikaku ni okeru Chūnichi kokkō-seijōka to Ōhira Masayoshi (sono 4)” (Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations and Ohira Masayoshi in the Tanaka Cabinet, part 4). Ryūkoku-daigaku keizaigaku ronshū, Vol. 48, No. 3 & 4 (March 2009), 63–96. Ni, Zhimin. “Chōgo-tō (Senkaku-shotō)ryōyū-mondai ni kansuru Chūnichi no ‘tana’age-gōi’ no shiteki keii: Nihon-gawa no shiryō ochūshin ni” (Historical Process of the “Agreement to Shelve” regarding the Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) between China and Japan: Based on Japanese Historical Documents). Ryūkoku-daigaku shakai-kagaku kenkyūjo nenpō, No. 43 (May 2013), 83–94. Ōhira Masayoshi kinen-zaidan. “Ōhira Masayoshi to Shū Onrai: Nitchū ni hashi o kakeru” (Ōhira Masayoshi and Zhou Enlai: To Build a Bridge between Japan and China). In Shū Onrai kinen-shuppan kankō-iinkai, ed., Nihonjin no nakano Shū Onrai (Zhou Enlai among the Japanese), Tokyo: Ribun-shuppan, 1991, 369–388. Sekai Editorial Ofﬁce. “Ryō Shōshi hōichi no ashiato” (Japan’s Current 4: Tracks of Liao Chengzhi’s Visit to Japan). Sekai. No. 332, July 1973, 186–189. Takasaki, Tatsunosuke. “Watashi no rirekisho: Takasaki Tatsunosuke,” (My Autobiography: Takasaki Tatsunosuke). In Nihon keizai shimbunsha, ed., Watashi no rirekisho, (My Autobiography), Vol. 1, Tokyo: Nihon keizai- shimbunsha, 1980, 423–454. INDEX

A American World Table Tennis Abe cabinet, 196, 241 Team, 108 Abe no Nakamaro, 53 Analects, 131 Abe Shintarō, 177, 194–196, 198, Anna Chennault, 14 199, 222, 225, 226, 229, Annual Autumn Festival, 2, 174, 181, 237–239, 241–246, 248–251, 184, 185, 190, 194, 198–200, 258 248 Abe-Xi summit meeting, 237, 239, Anti-Japanese resistance war, 2, 7, 173 240–242, 258 Anti-Japanese Resistance War Addis, John Mansﬁeld, 37 Memorial Hall, 181 ADIZ, 227 Anti-Lin, Anti-Confucius Agreement on the Issues Concerning Campaign, 85 Japanese Repatriation Among the APEC, 237–239, 241, 252 Red Cross Society of China, the APEC meeting, 239 Red Cross Society of Japan, the Arashiyama, 157, 166, 167, 216 Japan-China Friendship “Arashiyama in the Rain”, 166, 167, Association, and the Japan Peace 178, 216 Liaison Council, 17–18 Arlington National Cemetery, 174 Aichi Institute of Technology Asaka Akira, 127 (AIT), 86, 87, 98 Asakai Kōichirō, 39, 43 Aichi Kiichi, 26, 208, 209 Asanuma Inejirō, 29, 47, 75, 76, 97, Aichi-prefecture Gymnasium, 107 150 Air Defense Identiﬁcation Zone Asia Bureau, 103 (ADIZ), 207 Asian-African Conference, 8, 35, AIT Meiden High School, 86 37–41, 43–45, 119, 122, 159 Aixinjueluo Huisheng, 19–21, 67 Asian championships, 91, 101 Akihito, 87, 179, 185, 192 Asian Table Tennis Union Allied Powers, 9, 254 (ATTU), 109

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Brunei, 229 (APEC), 230, 237 Bush, George H. W., 156 Asia-Pacific Peace Liaison Committee, 71 fi Asia-Paci c War, 174, 192, 207, C 249, 257 Cabinet decision, 241 ō ō As Tar , 196 Calcutta World’s, 109 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Carter administration, 156 (ASEAN), 239 CCCPC International Liaison Atsuko, 109 Department, 73 ATTU, 109 CCCPC Party Literature Research Awakening Society, 263 Office, 3 Ayukawa Yoshisuke, 10, 38 CCCPC Small Group to Lead Oceanic Interest Maintenance Operations, 225 B CCPIT, 16, 18, 23, 25, 26, 55 Baimaonu (The White-Haired Central Advisory Commission, 176 Girl), 55, 77 Central Committee of the Bandit Suppression Campaign, 7 Communist Party of China Bandung, 8, 35, 36, 39, (CCCPC), 3, 14, 16, 19, 51, 61, 41, 119, 159 69–71, 73, 160–162, 176, 191, Bandung Spirit, 40 220 Basic Law of Education, 195 Central Committee of the Beijing, 12, 14–18, 22–25, 28, 29, Revolutionary Committee of the 44, 48, 50, 52, 56, 68, 71, 74, KMT, 72 75, 78, 94, 99, 100, 101, 103, Central Intelligence Agency, 23 104, 106, 108, 109, 116, 122, Chairman Mao, 7 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, Chang Ceou, 263 138, 141, 149, 153, 154, 156, Chang Chun, 56 158, 162, 163, 177, 181, 182, Chen Duxiu, 65 194, 210, 212, 218, 220, Chengzhi, liao, 116, 123 237–241 Chennault, Clair Lee, 14 Beijing Agreement, 18 Chen Xiangmei, 14 Beijing Liaison Office of the Chen Yi, 8, 27, 28, 36, 37, 41, 47, 62, Takasaki Tatsunosuke 64, 80, 264 Office, 52 Chen Yun, 76 Beijing National Stadium, 88 Chess Mission, 118 Beijing Office of Sino-Japanese Chiang Kai-shek, 2, 7–10, 14, 37, 46, Memorandum Trade, 100 55, 66, 135, 183, 251, 252, 261, Berlin, 62, 65 263 Bill Clinton, 197 China Committee (the Bruce, David K. E., 156 CHINCOM), 17 INDEX 283

China Council for the Promotion of Chinese People’s Association for International Trade (CCPIT), 16, Friendship with Foreign 52, 62 Countries (CPAFFC), 53, 73, 74, China–Japan Friendship 77, 100, 101, 105, 115 Association, 4, 53–55, 61, 69, Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, 65 73–76, 79, 100, 105, 115–117, Chinese State Oceanic 120, 122, 123, 149, 160, 164, Administration, 214, 221, 256 167, 179 Chinese World Team, 116 China–Japan Memorandum Trade Chinese Youth Communist Party in Ofﬁce, 70, 117, 141 Europe (CYCPE), 65 China (the PRC), 9, 10, 91, Chongqing, 9, 46, 69 93–99, 100–102, 104, 107, Chongqing government, 9 109, 123, 124, 133, 135, 158, Chu-ci (Songs of Chu), 130, 131 207, 258 Civil war, 2, 14, 46, 65 China representation issue at the Cixi, 123 United Nations (UN), 117 Class-B and Class-C war criminals, 21, China representation at the United 175 Nations, 47, 209 Class-A war crimes, 194, 244 China’s National Sports General Class-A war criminals, 21, 135, 174, Assembly, 91 175, 177, 183–188, 243, 244, China Table Tennis Association 246, 254 (CTTA), 91 Clinton, Hillary, 216 China and the U.S. foreign policy COCOM, 17, 23 toward China Hatoyama Cold War, 2 Ichirō, 18 Comfort women, 249 CHINCOM, 17 Comfort women issue, 173, 195, 197, Chinese Academy of Social 199, 248 Sciences, 218 Comintern, 263 Chinese ADIZ, 222, 257 Committee of Overseas Chinese Chinese chess mission, 47 Affairs, 14 Chinese Department of Defense, 222 Communist Party of China (CPC), 2, Chinese Memorandum Trade 7, 85, 136, 176, 237 Ofﬁce, 120 Condominium, 229, 230 Chinese Ministry of Defense, 223 Confucius, 131 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Conservative Merger of 1955, 11, 24 (MOFA), 8, 37, 117, 138, 140, Contiguous waters, 225, 228 209, 211 Contiguous zone, 213 Chinese MOFA Asia Bureau, 128 Convention on International Civil Chinese Nationalist Party Aviation, 152 (Kuomintang, KMT), 2, 7, 37, Coordinating Committee for 65, 214 Multilateral Export Controls Chinese orchid mission, 48, 50 (COCOM), 17 284 INDEX

Coral poaching, 223, 224 The Diary of Zhou Enlai in Japan, 4, Cowan, Glenn, 107, 108 260, 264, 265 CPC, 3, 7, 8, 13, 65, 66, 69, 71, Ding Min, 128, 140 74–76, 177, 178, 184, 239, Diplomatic normalization, 217 259, 260 Doi Takako, 183 CPC Army, 7 Dokdo Islands, 230 CPC Politburo, 192, 260 Dong Biwu, 69 Criticize Confucius campaign, 68, 161 DPJ, 193, 194, 196–198, Criticize Lin (Biao) and Criticize 216, 220, 222, 227–229, Confucius campaign, 68, 161 237, 241 CTTA, 99, 100, Dulles, John Foster, 10, 36, 238 101, 104, 105 Dwight Eisenhower, 23 Cuarteron Reef, 227 Cultural Revolution, 8, 20, 21, – 61 69, 71, 75, 80, 88, 89, E 106, 107, 115, 136, 161, East Asia Friendship Association, 194 246, 260, 264 East China Sea, 135, 164, 205, 208, 217, 222, 225, 227, 228, 240–242, 256–258 D East China Sea Air Defense Daitō Islands, 207, 208 Identiﬁcation Zone (ADIZ), 222, Democratic Party, 11 223, 257 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 152, Economic Affairs Council, 23, 36, 38 183, 215, 237 Economic Commission for Asia and Democratic People’s Republic of the Far East (ECAFE), 208 Korea, DPRK, 258 Economic Planning Agency, 36, 119 Democratic Progressive Party Eda Satsuki, 220 (DPP), 214 EEZ, 213, 219, 227 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 97, Eighth Route Army, 19, 40, 54, 67 124, 150 Eisenhower administration, 10, 18, 22 Deng Xiaoping, 62, 64, 149, 152, Enkaku Islands, 226, 248 156, 161, 164, 165, 166, 176, Etō Seiichi, 248 177, 178, 192, 212, 217, 218, European Union, 197 230, 245, 260, 262 Evans, H. Roy, 91, 93, 94 Deng Xixian, 64 Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 212 Deng Yingchao, 65, 67–69, 148, Export-Import Bank of Japan, 49–51, 166–168, 263 55–56 Détente, 85, 109 Diaoyu Island, 135, 137, 164, 205, 209, 213, 220, 221, 228 F Diaoyutai National Guesthouse, 132 FAC 6084 Kōbi-shō Range, 210 Diary of Irie, 165 Fall of Saigon, 157 INDEX 285

Federation of Japanese Paramentarians Fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade to Promote Restoration of Agreement, 24–27, 47, 51 Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Friendly ﬁrms, 48, 51 Relations, 78, 120, 122, 153 Frugal study students, 262 Federation of Japanese Paramentarians Fujiyama Aiichirō, 26, 30, 39, 43, 56, to Promote Sino-Japanese 78, 119, 120, 122–124, 141, Trade, 11, 15, 16, 18, 23, 150, 153, 155, 157–160, 162 25, 26, 72, 120, 157, 162, Fukuda cabinet, 12, 162, 196 220 Fukuda faction, 124 Fengtian (Mukden, current Fukuda Hajime, 50 Shenyang), 1 Fukuda Takeo, 29, 123, 124, 162, Fengtian province, 4, 74 163, 182, 196, 245 Fiery Cross Reef, 227 Fukuda Takeo cabinet, 212 FIR, 222 Fukuda Yasuo, 182, 192–194, 196, FIR Fukuoka (RJJJ), 222 197, 239–241, 245 First Asian Table Tennis Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Championships, 90 Plant Disaster, 198 First Hatoyama cabinet, 22, 36 Furuhashi Hironoshin, 98 First Kishi cabinet, 24 Furui Yoshimi, 70, 124, 126, 127, First KMT–CPC United Front, 66 133, 150 First Koizumi cabinet, 152 Furukawa Mantarō, 133 First Oil Crisis, 151 Furumi Tadayuki, 19, 20, 40, 46 First and second Hashimoto Fushun, 20, 246 cabinets, 217 The Fushun War Criminals First Sino-Japanese Friendship Management Center, 19, 20, 40, Tournaments, 94 46, 67, 246 First Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement, 16–18, 54 The ﬁrst Sino-Japanese War, 1, 134, G 184, 191, 206 Gang of Four, 64, 68, 70–71, 85, 108, First Tanaka cabinet, 148 147, 161, 162, 168 First Tiananmen Square Incident, 63, Gaven Reefs, 227 64, 161, 260 General Assembly, 209 First Wang whirlwind (‘fever’), 116 General Headquarters of the Supreme First Zhou–Takasaki, 43 Commander of the Allied Powers FIR Taipei (RCAA), 222 (SCAP-GHQ), 9, 39 Five Principles for Peace, 8, 136 Geneva Conference, 36, 238 Five Words (Mottos), 131, 140 Gotōda Masaharu, 177 Flight information regions (FIR), 222 Gotō Kōji, 86–107, 109, 165 Flying Tigers, 7, 14 Government, 7 Foreign Affairs Leading Government of the Ryūkyū Group, 239–241 Islands, 207, 208 286 INDEX

Great East Japan Earthquake, 198 Hirota Kōtarō, 188 Great Hall of the People, 8, 35, 45, History issue(s), 2, 173–174, 193, 46, 62, 79, 104, 105, 109, 128, 199, 200, 237, 242, 250 129, 141, 148, 260 History textbook issue, 189, 192, 197 Great Proletarian Cultural Hoashi Kei Incident, 14–16, 18 Revolution, 57, 61, 85 Hokkaidō, 224 Guangzhou, 28 Honda, Michael, 195 Guo Moruo, 53, 76, 79, 105, 116, Hong Kong, 14, 29, 37, 100, 125, 120, 123, 124 213, 238 Hongmenyan, 77 H Hori Letter, 156, 164 Hague Convention, 243 Hori Shigeru, 156, 164 Hamano Seigo, 149, 162 House of Councillors (HC), 11, 130, Hammarskjöld, Dag, 260 166, 196, 219 Han Nianlong, 158 House of Representatives (HR), 11, Hara Fujio, 50 14, 18, 38, 41, 43, 50, 56, 97, Hasegawa Nobuhiko, 86, 87 126, 152, 154, 156, 166, 219, Hashimoto Hiroshi, 118, 132, 134, 222, 243, 248 178, 180, 181 HR general elections, 197, 198 Hatoyama cabinet, 23–25, 38, 39, 44 Hua Guofeng, 148 Hatoyama Ichirō, 11, 21–24, 38, 39, Huang Hua, 41, 163 41, 43, 50, 151, 197, 198 Huisheng, 67 Hatoyama Yukio, 197, 198 Hu Jingtao, 182, 190–194, 196–198, Hattori Ryūji, 137, 138 224, 237, 241, 245 Hayasaka Shigezō, 128 Husheng, 67 HC, 14, 197, 220 Hu Yaobang, 63, 162, 176–178, 191, HC Special Committee for the 192, 242, 260 Repatriation of Oversea Hyakuta Naoki, 251 Japanese, 14 Hegemonic clause, 154, 155, 158, 159, 162 I Hegemony clause issue, 154, 155, ICAO, 222 159, 162, 168 Ide Ichitarō, 159 He Xiangniang, 14, 72 Iijima Isao, 225, 226 Hiro, 67 IJA, 100, 195, 249, 252, 253 Hirohata Works of Japan Iron & IJA General Staff Ofﬁce, 253 Steel, 9, 10 IJA Infantry Academy, 66 Hirohito, 67, 165, 185–187, 191, Ikeda cabinet, 48–51, 55, 56, 119 192, 198, 246, 247 Ikeda Daisaku, 156 Hirohito-Deng meeting, 165 Ikeda Hayato, 45, 48, 116, 217 Hiroshima, 243, 251, 252 Ikeda Masanosuke, 18, 23, 25, 26 Hirota Kōki, 188 Ikeda Yukihiko, 217 INDEX 287

Imperial Family, 175 Japan Aeronautic Association Imperial Household Agency, 165, (JAA), 153 185–187 Japan Association for the Promotion of Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), 65, 89, International Trade (JAPIT), 12, 191, 249 52, 79, 119, 157, 265–266 Imperial Palace, 126, 150, 156, 177, Japan Association of Corporate 179 Executives, 119 Industrial plant export, 48–50, 56 Japan Bereaved Association, 180, 181, Inoue Kiyoshi, 136 190 Inoue Toshikazu, 134 Japan Business Federation, 126, 150 International Civil Aviation Japan Chamber of Commerce and Organization (ICAO), 152, 222 Industry, 39, 116, 119 International Court of Justice Japan-China Association on Economy (ICJ), 229 and Trade (JCAET), 126, 150, International Economic 156 Conference, 15–16 Japan-China Cultural Exchange International Economic Council, 16 Association), 54, 55, 71, 76, 77, International Military Tribunal for the 92, 94–97, 99, 105, 126, 141, Far East, 21, 135, 174, 183, 186, 150, 164 187, 243, 251, 253 Japan-China Friendship International Peace Conference, 12 Association, 12, 17, 19, 29, 51, International Table Tennis Federation 54, 55, 74, 77, 78, 126 (ITTF), 87, 90 Japan-China Importers and Exporters Inukai Tsuyoshi, 193 Association, 25 Irie Sukemasa, 165 Japan-China Memorandum Trade Ishibashi cabinet, 24 Ofﬁce, 70, 141 Ishibashi Tanzan, 23, 24, 29, 30, 43, Japan-China Overall Trade Liaison 127, 150 Council (JCOTLC), 48 Ishigaki, 205, 215, 228 Japan-China Trade Promotion Ishihara Shintarō, 219–221, 251, 255, Association, 15, 51 256 Japan Coast Guard (JCG, 212 Ishii Mitsujirō, 24 Japan Democratic Party, 11, 23, 38 Itō Masayoshi, 72, 153 Japanese ADIZ, 222, 257 ITTF, 90–95, 98, 101, 109 Japanese Bereaved Association, 178 ITTF Constitution, 94, 96, 105 Japanese Communist Party (JCP), 11, Itu Aba Island, 227 54, 71, 76, 120, 136 Izu Islands, 223, 256 Japanese Consulate-General in Hong Kong, 23 Japanese Memorandum Trade J mission, 120 James Steinberg, 227 Japanese Ministry of Defense, 191, Japan, 258 222 288 INDEX

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs The joint enshrinement of Class-A war (MOFA), 10, 38, 41, 99, criminals, 175, 185–187 121, 133, 134, 137, 138, 151, Joint Statement on Comprehensive 154, 155, 158, 209, 212, 217, Promotion of a “Mutually 252 Beneﬁcial Relationship Based on Japanese Olympic Committee Common Strategic Interests, 245 (JOC), 98 JSP, 12, 18, 28–30, 47, 55, 75, 79, Japanese orphans left behind in 125, 126 China, 196 JTTA, 87–89, 92–94, 96–100, 101, Japanese Passport Law, 16, 17 103, 105, 106 Japanese Self-Defense Forces, 227 Japan Liberal Party, 11, 18 Japan Peace Liaison Council, 17, 19 K Japan Progressive Party, 14 Kameyama Park, 166, 167, 178 Japan-ROC (Taiwan) Peace Treaty, 9, Kamiya Hideo, 168 – 11, 122, 133 135, 140, 141, Kan cabinet, 215, 216, 217 151, 152 Kang Youwei, 193 ’ Japan s Defense Agency, 148 Kan Naoto, 183, 198, 220 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 11, 41, 54, Kan Naoto cabinet, 215, 228 97 Kase Toshikazu, 39, 42 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, 22 Kashmir Princess of Air India, 37 Japan Sports Association, 90, 98 Kasuga Ikkō, 124, 150 Japan Table Tennis Association Katayama Tetsu, 12, 30, 54 (JTTA), 86 Kathmandu, 89 Japan-Taiwan relations, 55 Kawai Ryōichi, 49 Japan World Team, 87 Kawai Ryōsei, 49 JAPI, 23 Kawakami Hajime, 73, 148, 265 – JAPIT, 22 25, 127, 157, 166 Kawamura Takashi, 165 Jawaharlal Nehru, 36, 37 Kawasaki Hideji, 126, 154 JCG, 30, 56, 212, 215, 221, Kawase Ikkan, 157 222, 224, 227 Kennedy, John F., 45 JCTPA, 16, 22 Khabarovsk, 19, 67 JIA, 253 Kimura Heitarō, 187 Jiang Peizhu, 118 Kimura Ichizō, 79, 120 Jiang Qing, 36, 64, 66, 70, 108, 161 Kimura Takeo, 147 – Jiang Zemin, 178 180, 182, 190, Kimura Tarō, 187 191, 192, 254 Kishi cabinet, 25, 27–30, 51, 119 Jianzhen (Ganjin), 53, 166 Kishida Fumio, 239, 240 Jing Puchun, 69, 71, 72, 77, 123, 150 Kishi Nobusuke, 23–27, 29, 35, 38, Ji Pengfei, 118, 126, 130, 133, 139 43–45, 61, 115, 194, 244, 248 Johnson South Reef, 227 Kissinger, Henry, 121, 151, 152, 208, Joint enshrinement, 187, 188 260 INDEX 289

Kita-kojima, 205, 207, 208, 210, 214, L 219, 220 Lao She, 63 Kiuchi Akitane, 247 Law concerning the Procedure for Kiuchi Takatane, 247 Revising the Japanese KMT, 2, 7, 13, 37, 65, 66, 69, 214, Constitution, 195 230 Law of Territorial Waters, 213 KMT Army, 7, 67 LDP Council on Sino-Japanese KMT–CPC United Front against Diplomatic Normalization, 127 Japan, 2 LDP General Council, 127 Knowland, William F., 45 LDP Policy Research Council, 153 Kobe, 150 Lee Teng-hui, 214 Kōbi-shō, 205 Leftist Socialist Party of Japan, 12, 54 Koga Hanako, 210 Lei Renmin, 16, 22, 23, 27, 28, 73 Koga Makoto, 181, 190 Liancourt Rocks, 230 Koga Tatsushirō, 181, 207, 210 Liang Qichao, 4, 193, 264, 265 Koga Zenji, 207, 210 Liao Chengzhi, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, Koizumi cabinet, 194 27, 28, 36, 41, 42–45, 47, 52–54, Koizumi Jun’ichirō, 174, 180–182, 56, 61, 68–70, 72, 75–80, 85, 189, 190, 192–194, 197, 199, 105, 116, 117, 125, 126, 213, 221, 225 129–131, 141, 149, 150, 155, Koizumi Statement, 248 157, 164–166, 179, 264 Kōmeitō (Clean Government Liao Chengzhi Ofﬁce, 48, 49 Party), 98, 124, 125, 134, 136, Liao Chengzhi Ofﬁce for LT Trade, 70 150, 156 Liao Hui, 73 Kōmura Masahiko, 220, 239 Liao Mengxing, 69 Kōno Ichirō, 50 Liao whirlwind, 149, 151 Kōno Statement, 249 Liao Zhongkai, 13, 68, 69, 72 Kōno Yōhei, 249 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 11, Kōra Tomi, 14–17 12, 24, 29, 30, 43, 44, 49, 50, 78, Kosaka Zentarō, 118, 127, 154 97, 116–119, 122–124, 126, 127, Kuba Island (Kōbi-shō), 205, 207, 147, 150, 152–156, 158, 163, 208, 210, 220 174, 178, 180, 181, 193, 194, Kunashiri Island, 230 196–198, 215, 216, 222, Kuno Chūji, 56, 149, 160, 161 227–229, 237, 239, 241, 243, 248 Kure Power Plant, 9, 10 Li Dazhao, 184, 265 Kurihara Hiroyuki, 214, 220 Li Dequan, 16, 18, 21 Kurihara Kunioki, 210, 214, Li Fujing, 260–264 219, 220 Li Mei, 69 Kuril Islands, 230 Lin Biao, 62, 66, 67, 70, 85, 263 Kuroda Hisao, 55, 75, 77, 78, 126 Lin Biao Incident, 147 Kwantung Army, 15, 19, 39, 46 Lin Lin, 54 Kyoto, 148, 150, 157, 166, 216 Lin Liyun, 130 290 INDEX

Li Peng, 65, 73 Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book, 62 Li Shaoshi, 69 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 181, 254 Li Shuoxun, 65 Maritime Safety Agency, 212 Liu Chun, 103 Maritime Self-Defense Force, 212 Liu Jiangyong, 217 Marx, Karl, 2, 77 Liu Ningyi, 69 Marxism-Leninism, 260 Liu Shaoqi, 51, 62–64, 263 Massacre of Nanking, 219 Liu Xiwen, 120 Matsudaira Nagayoshi, 175, 185, 186, Li Xiannian, 156, 160 188 Li Zhaoxing, 182, 189 Matsui Iwane, 252, 253 Li Zuopeng, 67 Matsumoto Jiichirō, 12, 54, 55 Lockheed bribery scandals, 151, 152 Matsumoto Kamejirō, 167, 168, 265 Long March, 8, 69, 160, 259 Matsumoto Shun’ichi, 126 LT Trade, 48–52, 57, 70 Matsumoto Yōichirō, 168 LT Trade Agreement, 52, 70, 119 Matsumura Kenzō, 44, 45, 47–49, 51, LT Trade Memorandum, 54 52, 56, 70, 76, 116, 119, 122, Lu Xun, 74, 167, 180, 265 124, 126, 127, 141, 150 Lu Xuzhang, 22, 61 Matsuoka Yōsuke, 175, 185 Matsuyama Ballet, 77 Matsuyama Ballet Company, 55, 77 M May Fourth Movement, 69, 190 MacArthur, Douglas, 9 McConaughy, Walter Patrick, Jr., 209 Machimura Nobutaka, 189 McCormack, John, 44, 45 Maehara Seiji, 215 Medvedev, Dmitry, 230 Malaysia, 229 Meiden High School, 86, 87, 98 Manchukuo, 10, 15, 19, 20, Meiji government, 206, 207 38–40, 67 Meiwaku, 129–131 Manchukuo General Affairs Meiwaku incident, 130, 133 Agency, 19, 40, 46 Memorandum Concerning Manchuria, 1, 10, 15, 46, 67, Sino-Japanese Long-Term 108, 259 Comprehensive Trade, 35, 48, Manchuria Heavy Industries 61, 119 Development Company, 10, 38 Memorandum Trade, 70 Manchuria Industries, 38, 40 Merkel, Angela, 248 Manchurian Incident, 215, 221, Meyer, Armin H., 121 254, 257 Mihuo, 129, 130, 131 Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai, 3 Miki cabinet, 159 Mao Dun, 63 Mikimoto Kōkichi, 107 Mao Zedong, 7, 8, 36, 43, 51, 62, 63, Mikimoto Pearl Island, 107 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 79, 89, 108, Miki Takeo, 78, 116, 122, 123, 149, 109, 129, 130, 161, 178, 259, 155, 157, 158, 159, 162, 168, 260, 263, 265 175, 187 INDEX 291

Minami-kojima, 205, 207, 208, 210, Nagoya World, 85, 86, 89–102, 214, 219, 220 104–109, 116–118, 121, 150, Ming Wan, 3 165, 259 Ministry of Education, 97 Nakae Yōsuke, 134, 135, 183, 189 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asia Nakajima Kenzō, 55, 76, 77, 92, 96, Bureau, 103 123, 126, 141, 164 Ministry of International Nakasone Yasuhiro, 12, 23, 45, 48, Trade and Industry (MITI), 123, 124, 148, 149, 152, 176, 13, 49 177, 178, 184, 189, 191 Ministry of Justice, 23 Nan Hanchen, 16, 18, 25, 26, 55, 62 Ministry of Public Health and Nanjing, 66, 69, 72, 165 Welfare, 21, 175, 186, 188 Nankai Middle School, 1, 55, 64, 260 Ministry of Self-Defense, 195 Nankai University, 262 Mischief Reef, 227 Nanking (Nanjing) Massacre, 173, MITI, 49, 50, 52, 56 250–253 Miyagawa Torao, 76, 77 Nanxi Islands, 227, 256 Miyakoshi Kisuke, 14, 15, 16 Nara, 150, 166 Miyazaki Semin, 77, 78 Narita Tomomi, 55 Miyazaki Tōten, 77 Naruhito, 182 Miyazawa Kiichi, 178, 197 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 36, 37 MOFA Asia Bureau, 23, 39, 41, 42, National Archives of the United 50, 54, 125, 126, 132, 133, 134, Kingdom, 218 137, 152, 159 National Committee of the Chinese Mondale, Walter F., 220 People’s Political Consultative Montagu, Ivor, 90 Conference (CPPCC), 72 Mori Takeshi, 94, 99, 101, 103 National Defense Authorization Morton Abramowitz, 132 Act, 223 Moscow, 12, 16, 17, 66, 151, 262, National Defense Committee, 8 263 National History Museum, 148 Munich World’s, 87 National Humiliation Day of Muraoka Kyūbei, 92, 93, 99, 101, China, 215, 221, 254 103, 105 Nationalist (KMT) Army, 160 Murata Shōzō, 22, 23, 127, 141 National Memorial Day, 253, 254 Murayama Statement, 248 The National People’s Congress Mutsuhito, 206 (NPC), 160, 239 National Security Council Secretariat, 239 N National Sports Committee, 89, 108 Nagano Shigeo, 116 National Sports Committee Military Nagasaki, 27, 28, 243, 251 Administration, 89 Nagasaki Chinese Flag Incident, 27, National Sports General 28, 29, 35, 43, 95 Assembly, 100 292 INDEX

Nikaidō Susumu, 127, 128, 130 Ōhira Masayoshi, 116, 118, 123, Nikka-dōjin East Asian Higher 125–128, 130–134, 139, 140, Preparatory School, 167, 265 141, 149, 153, 164, 176 1964 Memorandum Concerning LT Okada Akira, 41, 42, 43, 79 Trade, 52 Okazaki Kaheita, 52, 56, 70, 119, 120, Ninomiya Bunzō, 124 127, 141 Nixon, Richard, 109, 119, 122, Okazaki Katsuo, 17 126, 128, 132, 151, 208, Okinawa, 197, 208, 214 210, 238 Okinawa Island, 205, 227 Nixon administration, 126, 132, 151, Okinawa prefecture, 205–207, 210, 155, 209–211 215 Nixon–Satō Joint Statement, 120 Okinawa Reversion Nixon–Satō summit, 125 Agreement, 208–210 Noda cabinet, 221, 229 Ōkubo Tadaharu, 50 Noda Yoshihiko, 198, 220, 221, 237 Ōkuma Shigenobu, 179 Nonaka Tsutomu, 180 Ōno Seizō, 107 Non-Aligned Movement, 36 Orchid Mission, 118 Normalization of Sino-Japanese Ōta Saburō, 39, 42 diplomatic relations, 43 Outline of the Meeting concerning Northeast China (former Friendship Exchanges of the Manchuria), 46 Table Tennis Circles between Northeastern Army, 66 China and Japan, 100, 102–105, Northern Territories, 224, 230 107 North Korea, 98, 225, 258 Overseas development aid Nosaka Sanzō, 30 (ODA), 135, 151 NPC, 166 Ozawa Ichirō, 152

O P Obama administration, 197, 199 Packard, David, 211 Obama, Barack, 223, 237, 251, 252 Paracel Islands, 227, 229 Obuchi Keizō, 179 Paragraph Seven, 154, 158 Oda Yūsuke, 99, 101, 104 The peace and friendship treaty, 131 Ofﬁce of Overseas Chinese Pearl Harbor, 179, 192 Affairs, 14, 73 Peking Hotel, 101, 104 Ofﬁcial Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1, 3, Peking Opera, 51, 55, 77 12, 37, 64, 72, 77, 89, 120 Peng Zhen, 56 Ogasawara Islands, 223, 224, 226, People Republic of China (PRC or 256 “China”), 115, 116, 122 Ogawa Heishirō, 152, 158 People’s Bank of China, 16, 62 Ogimura Ichirō, 87, 91, 94 People’s Dail, 76, 78, 88, 92 Ogura Kazuo, 238 People’s diplomacy, 116, 117 INDEX 293

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 28, Qingming Day (Tomb Sweeping 62 Day), 161 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 2, Qiu Jin, 167, 265 7, 35, 62, 85, 147, 207 Quansheng Zhao, 3, 118 Pescadores Islands, 206, 207 Qu Yuan, 130 The Philippines, 227, 229, 256, 258 Ping-Pong Diplomacy, 85, 109, 116, R 259 Rape of Nanking, 251 PLA, 67, 73 Real Record of the Shōwa Politburo, 176 Emperor, 165, 187 Politburo Standing Committee, 226 Red Army, 65 Political principles concerning Red Army Fourth Front Army, 69 Sino-Japanese relations, 177 Red China News Agency, 14 PRC, 3, 4, 7, 8, 24, 29, 73, 89, 90, 92, Red Cross Society of China, 16, 17, 93, 132, 133, 141, 151, 152, 18, 21 156, 183, 209, 214, 219, 221, Red Guards, 62, 68, 69, 75, 85 222, 259 Reeducation camp, 75, 79, 88 Princelings, 73 Republic of China (ROC or Principle of inseparability of politics “Taiwan”), 7, 36, 115, 147, and economics (business), 28, 30, 183, 207 42, 226 Republic of Korea, 174, 248 Principle of separation of politics and Reshufﬂed Miyazawa cabinet, 249 economics (business), 13 Residual sovereignty, 208, 210 Principle of separation of politics and Resolution 2758, 117, 209 sports, 90, 94, 97 Reversion of Okinawa, 97, 121 Prisoners of war, 21, 67 Revisions of Japanese history Pro-Taiwan, 43, 194 textbooks, 173 Pro-Taiwan faction, 126 Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pro-Taiwan policy, 56 Treaty, 45 Pro-Taiwan stance, 44 Revolutionary Subcommittee, 75, 78, Pujie, 67, 246, 264 88, 115 ﬁ Purge of Public Of ces, 39 Rightist Socialist Party of Japan, 54 Putin, Vladimir, 230, 239 ROC government, 8–9, 10, 15, 46, Puyi, 67, 246, 264 66, 69, 214 ROC (Taiwan), 10, 90, 91, 133, 151, 208–210, 214, 219, 221, 222, Q 227, 229, 230 Qian Jiadong, 173 Rogers, William P., 208, 210 Qian Jiang, 88, 92 Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 77, Qiao Guanhua, 158 259, 261 Qing dynasty, 67, 206 Ronald Reagan, 12, 176 294 INDEX

Roos, John, 251 Second KMT–CPC United Front, 7 Russia, 224, 258 Second Sino-Japanese Private Trade Russian Revolution, 265 Agreement, 18, 25 Russo-Japanese War, 1, 184 The second Sino-Japanese War, 2, Ryder, Charles W., 10 134, 147, 165, 179, 191, 216, Ryokufū-kai, 14 254, 257, 265 Ryūkyū Island, 205, 206, 207, 208 Second Tanaka cabinet, 148, 149, 160 Ryūkyū Kingdom, 136, 206, 214 Second Tiananmen Square Ryūkyū province, 206 Incident, 63, 162, 177, 179, 260 Second Wang whirlwind, 116 Second Zhou–Takasaki meeting, 43 S Security Council, 117 Saga Hiro, 21, 67, 246, 264 Security Council of the United Saga Kinmoto, 67, 246 Nations, 211 ō Saionji Kinkazu, 68, 71, 73, 92, 94, Sekibi-sh , 205 95, 150, 154 Sekioka Hideyuki, 197 Sakhalin Island, 229 Self-Defense Agency, 195 Sakishima Islands, 205, 206 Senkaku Boat Collision Incident, 216 Sakurai Yoshio, 11, 12, 23, 149 Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 2, 121, – – San Francisco Peace Treaty, 9, 11, 125, 135 138, 164, 205 223, – 164, 207, 243 225 230, 240, 241, 242, 245, – Sansha, 227 256 258 Sarajevo World’s, 109 Senkaku Islands dispute, 213, 217, Sasa Atsuyuki, 219, 220 226 Sasaki Atsuko, 108 Senkaku Islands issue, 137, 138, 219, Sasaki Kōzō, 12, 55, 75, 125 257 Sata Tadataka, 28 Separation of politics and economics Satō cabinet, 56, 97, 119, 120, 123, (business), 24, 51 209 Shanghai Ballet Mission, 118 Satō Eisaku, 56, 61, 97, 115, 116, Shanghai Communiqué, 132, 155 117, 122, 156, 162, 208 Shanghai Massacre, 66, 74, 141, 160 Satō faction, 56, 57, 123, 124, 126 Shenyang, 20, 46 Satsuma province, 206 Shidehara cabinet, 44 ū ō Scandinavia Tournaments, 89 Shidehara Kij r , 257 SCAP–GHQ, 9, 44, 46, 188 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 22, 38, 39, 43 SCAP-GHQ’s Economic & Scientiﬁc Shimazu Tadatsune (Iehisa), 206 Section (ESS), 10 Shimizu Masao, 55, 77 Second Abe Shinzō cabinet, 228 Shimizu Yoshikazu, 180, 181, 182 Second Asian Table Tennis Shimonoseki Treaty, 206 Championships, 90 Shingeki, 55 Second Hatoyama cabinet, 36 Shirato Norio, 76, 77 Second Kishi cabinet, 43 Shiratori Toshio, 185, 186 INDEX 295

Shōnei, 206 Sino-Japanese Military Siberia, 19, 22 Agreements, 190 Sidney Rittenberg, 264 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Singapore, 99, 107 Treaty, 5, 12, 140, 154, 155, Sino-Japanese Agreement on Joint 157, 158, 163, 164, 166–168, Development in the East China 182, 212, 216, 218, 230, 231, Sea, 230 240, 245 Sino-Japanese Civil Aviation Sino-Japanese relations, 237 Agreement, 152, 154 Sino-Japanese Seabed Cable Sino-Japanese diplomatic Agreement, 56, 149, 160 normalization, 5, 85, 122, 123, Sino-Soviet rift, 35, 46, 246 124–126, 129, 131, 134, 135, Sino-U.S. rapprochement, 85, 109, 137, 138, 140, 141, 150, 159, 119, 126, 155, 210 164, 178, 182, 183, 184, 211, Six-Party Talks, 258 212, 217, 218, 230, 245, 256, Sixth National Party Congress of the 265 CPC, 263 Sino-Japanese diplomatic Snow, Edgar, 264 relations, 254 Social Democratic Party of Japan Sino-Japanese Friendship (SDPJ), 183 Tournaments, 94, 95 Sōka Gakkai, 124, 150, 156 Sino-Japanese joint Sōka Gakkai International, 156 communiqué, 124, 125, 129, Sōka University, 156 131, 133, 139, 140, 147, 149, Sōma Tsunetoshi, 52 152–155, 158, 163, 173, 179, Song Qingling, 14, 72 212, 240, 245 Song Zhong, 100, 101, 104 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration on Sonoda Sunao, 12, 23, 50, 162, 164 Building a Partnership of South China Sea, 225, 227, 230, 256 Friendship and Cooperation for South Korea, 98, 199, 250, 258 Peace and Development, 179, South Korean government, 174, 248, 240, 245 250 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on Soviet Army, 15, 19, 40, 46, 67, 230 Comprehensive Promotion of a Soviet Union, 8–10, 21, 22, 44, 46, “Mutually Beneﬁcial Relationship 154, 158, 168, 179, 224 Based on Common Strategic Spratly Islands, 227, 229, 256 Interests, 192–194, 196, 231, Standing Committee of the National 240, 241 People’s Congress (NPC), 72 Sino-Japanese Journalist Exchange Starr, Robert, 210 Agreement, 52 State Council, 14, 53, 73, 103, 160 Sino-Japanese Long-Term State Oceanic Administration, 228 Comprehensive Trade, 5, 43, 162 Statue of a Young Woman, 250 Sino-Japanese Memorandum Stockholm World’s, 87 Trade, 127 Subi Reef, 227 296 INDEX

Sugamo Prison, 194 Takano Hajime, 243 Suga Yoshihide, 199 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 10, 15, 23, 36, Sukarno, 36 38–48, 47, 49, 50–52, 57, 119, Sun Bingwen, 65, 66 124, 126, 127, 141, 150, 159 Sun Pinghua, 4, 16, 23, 27, 45, 47–54, Takasaki Tatsunosuke Ofﬁce for LT 73–76, 79, 80, 85, 115, 117, 118, Trade, 70 128, 149, 155, 160, 161, 167 Takasaki Tatsunosuke Ofﬁce, 48–50, Sun Tzu, 2 52, 119 Sun Weishi, 65, 66 Takashima Masuo, 133 Sun whirlwind, 118 Takebe Rokuzō, 19, 20, 40 Sun Yat-sen, 4, 12–14, 65, 69, 72, 77, Takeiri Notes, 125, 127, 136 193, 264, 265 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 98, 124, 125, 134, Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, 69, 72 136, 150 Supreme Commander of the Allied Takeshima Islands, 230 Powers, 9 Takeshita Noboru, 178 Suzuki Kazuo, 22, 265 Tamogami Toshio, 251 Suzuki Mosaburō, 12, 47 Tanaka Akihiko, 136 Suzuki Zenkō, 176, 218, 228 Tanaka cabinet, 152 Tanaka Kakuei, 18, 117, 118, 123–132, 134, 135, 137–139, T 141, 149, 151, 152, 155, 164, Table Tennis Federation of Asia 183, 211, 228, 229, 244–247, (TTFA), 86, 166 265 Tagawa Seiichi, 70, 120, 124, 126, Tanaka Makiko, 152 157 Tanaka Shūjirō, 120 Taipei, 24, 153 Tang Jiaxuan, 118 Taipei government, 10 Tani Masayuki, 39, 42 Taishō Island (Sekibi-shō), 205, 207, Ten-point Declaration on Promotion 208, 210 of World Peace and Taiwan clause, 120, 125 Cooperation, 40 Taiwanese government, 27 Ten Principles for Peace, 8 Taiwan issue, 42, 94, 152, 158 Tenth Asian Championships, 91, 93, 94 Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC), 9, Terashima Jitsurō, 243, 258 11, 24, 27, 40, 47, 48, 55, 61, Termination of the state of war, 133, 90–98, 101–104, 106, 107, 109, 139 117, 123, 124, 132, 133, 135, Territorial dispute over the Senkaku 137, 138, 139, 141, 147, 150, (Diaoyu) Islands, 198, 200, 237, 154, 166, 195, 206, 207, 208, 244, 245, 255 214, 220, 261 Territorial waters, 212, 213 Taiyuan, 20 Thatcher, Margaret, 218, 228 Taiyuan War Criminals Management Third International (Comintern), 8, Center, 20 262 INDEX 297

Third Sino-Japanese Private Trade U Agreement, 22, 23, 61 Uchiyama Kanzō, 74 Thirty-first World Table Tennis UN Conference on the Law of the Championships (“Nagoya Sea, 213 World’s”), 85, 116, 259 United Nations (UN), 109, 208, 260 Three political principles concerning United Nations (UN) General Sino-Japanese relations, 28, 47, Assembly, 117, 122, 173, 197, 95, 97, 101, 102, 104–106, 118, 209, 239 122, 153 United Nations (UN) Security Tiananmen Square, 148, 161, 162 Council, 189, 193 Tianjin, 1, 19, 150, 262, 263 The United States, 10, 251, 256–258, Tianjin Agreement, 19, 21 265 Tiaoyutai Island, 208, 214 U Nu, 37 Tibet, 176, 192, 220, 238 Uotsuri Island, 205, 207, 208, 210, Tōjō cabinet, 244 212–214, 219–221 Tōjō Hideki, 175 Urabe Ryōgo, 186 Tokugawa shogunate government, 206 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 37 Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and U.S. House of Representatives, 195 Industry, 119 U.S.-Japan alliance, 9, 11 Tokyo Higher School of U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Technology, 4 Competition Policy Tokyo Liaison Office of the Liao Initiative, 197 Chengzhi Office, 52–54, 74, 117, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 9, 29, 47, 118 119, 125, 126, 151, 207, 211 Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 174 U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Tominaga Shōzō, 19 Agreement (SOFA), 207 Tomita Note, 185, 186 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Tomita Tomohiko, 185, 187 Cooperation and Security, 216, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 220, 223, 258 Security between the United U.S. Liaison Office (USLO), 156 States and Japan, 211, 244 U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Treaty of Shimoda, 229–230 Futenma, 197 Truman administration, 10, 18 Utsunomiya Tokuma, 29, 30, 49, 50, Tsinghua University, 217 150 Tsubokawa Shinzō, 156 Tsukuba Fujimaro, 175, 185, 186 – – TTFA, 88 99, 101 107, 109 V 28 Bolsheviks, 8 Victory over Japan Day, 254 Twenty-One Demands, 179, 190, 254 Vietnam, 227, 229, 256, 258 Two Chinas, 92 Vint, A. K., 93, 94 Two Chinas issue, 90, 93, 94, 97, 107, Vinylon industrial plant export, 49, 50, 116, 132, 166 56 298 INDEX

W Wu Po-hsiung, 214, 230 Wall newspapers, 71 Wu Xiaoda, 100, 104, 105 Wang Guoquan, 116, 122, 123 Wu Xueqian, 177 Wang Hongwen, 64, 161 Wang Jiarui, 220 Wang Jiaxiang, 8, 51, 62 X Wang Jingwei, 179 Xi’an Incident, 66 Wang Pushan, 261 Xiao Xiangqian, 27, 54, 73, 77, 80, Wang Xiaoxian, 49, 130 118, 122, 141 Wang Xiaoyun, 52, 54, 73, 80, 100, Xia Yan, 63 101, 115, 122 Xi Jinping, 5, 73, 220, 224–226, 229, Wang Xitian, 64, 65 237–239, 241, 242, 253, 254, The Wang Xitian Incident, 65 256, 258 Wang Yi, 173, 239, 240 Xinhua News Agency, 14, 37, 77, 78, Wang Zhenqi, 65 91, 92 – War criminals, 19 21, 40 Xinjiang Uyghur, 220 War prisoners, 22, 54, 246 Xu Qin, 193 War reparation issue, 135, 158, 183 War reparations, 2, 9, 10, 45, 55, 125, 134, 135, 139, 183, 184, 191, 244 Y Wartime history issues, 244, 246 Yabuki Susumu, 129, 130 Waseda University, 44, 54, 64, 179, Yachi Shōtarō, 239 184, 193 Yamamoto Kumaichi, 24–25 Watanabe Kunio, 98 Yamashina Kikumaro, 175 Watanabe Yaeji, 49, 50 Yan’an, 54, 66, 160 Wembley World’s, 87 Yang Jiechi, 216, 239 Wen Jiabao, 18, 189 Yang Zhongmei, 191, 254 Whampoa Military Academy, 13, 66 Yan Xiu, 262 White Chrysanthemum Bereaved Yao Wenyuan, 64, 161 Families Association, 188 Yashiki Hiroshi, 50 Wilson, Dick, 260, 264 Yasukuni Shrine, 2, 135, 173–178, Woody Island (Yongxing Island), 227 180–193, 194, 196–199, 225, Work–study student, 262 226, 241–243, 246, 248, 255 World Peace Council, 90 Yasukuni Shrine issue, 243 World Table Tennis Yasukuni Shrine visit issue, 173, 174, Championships, 166 176–178, 181, 187, 190, 200, World War II, 13, 22, 87, 196, 224, 241, 246 230, 248, 266 Ye Jizhuang, 36, 41, 62 Wu Guozhen, 261 Ye Qun, 66 Wuhan, 28 Yiheyuan, 123 Wu Hantao, 261 Yokohama, 150 INDEX 299

Yokohama-Daidō School, 193 Zhang Zuolin, 66 Yokohama-Yamate Chinese Zhao Anbo, 27, 45, 54, 73 Academy, 193 Zhao Juntao, 65 Yoshida cabinet, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, Zhao Shiyan, 65 30, 38 Zhao Zhenghong, 108 Yoshida letter, 56 Zheng Yueqing, 106, 109 Yoshida Makoto, 5, 140, 158 Zhongnanhai, 68, 71, 79, 130 Yoshida Seiji, 249 Zhongshan Warship Incident, 66 Yoshida Shigeru, 10, 16, 22, 55, 196 Zhong You, 131 Yoshida Testimony, 249 Zhou Bin, 77 Yoshihide Soeya, 3 Zhou Enlai, 1, 3–5, 7, 8, 10–22, Yoshimura Magosaburō, 166 24–30, 35, 37, 39, 40–48, 51–57, Yoshino Sakuzō, 265 61–72, 74, 76–80, 85, 86, 88, 89, Yotoe Ikuji, 99 95, 99, 103–105, 107–109, 110, Yuan Shikai, 179, 254 115–120, 122–142, 147–149, Yūshūkan, 184, 185 151–154, 156–161, 166–168, 173, 174, 178, 183, 184, 190, 211, 212, 216, 228–230, 238, Z 244–246, 255, 257, 259–265, Zhang Binglin (Zhang Taiyan), 193 266 Zhang Chunqiao, 64, 161 Zhou Hongqing Incident, 55 Zhang Dejiang, 239 Zhou Ju, 37 Zhang Guotao, 69 Zhou–Takasaki meeting, 42 Zhang Hanfu, 41 Zhou–Takeiri meeting, 136 Zhang Jinghui, 19, 20 Zhuang Zedong, 107–109 Zhang Qian, 64 Zhu De, 62, 65, 71 Zhang Ruifeng, 64, 65 Zhuge Kongming, 259 Zhang Ruoming, 263 Zhuge Liang, 259 Zhang Shizhao, 43 Zhu Jianrong, 218 Zhang Xiangshan, 27, 73, 138, 211 Zilu, 131 Zhang Xueliang, 66 Zunyi Conference, 259 Zhang Xuesi, 66