International Journal of Korean History (Vol.10, Dec. 2006) 1

The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty

Lee, Jin- Han∗

Introduction

Although it was an unprecedented mega-empire, Yuan began to see signs of agitation in the mid-14th century onwards. Not only did there exist fierce strife for the imperial throne and conflict among the aristocracy but also the misgovernment of Emperor Shundi (Huizong) brought about financial difficulties and the misery of the masses, in turn leading to uprisings nationwide. Originally under the command of Guo Zixing from Haozhou, one of the most powerful forces involved in such unrest, Zhu Yuanzhang (the future Emperor Gaodi or Taizu) declared his independence as the Duke of Wu upon Guo Zixing’s death in 1355 (5th year of King Gongmin’s reign). He then proclaimed himself the King of Wu in 1364 in Nanjing, subdued rival forces such as Zhang Shicheng and Fang Guozhen in 1367, proclaimed himself as the Ming emperor in 1368, and initiated the conquest of Yuan to the north, thus capturing the capital and seizing control of China.1 With the founding of the Ming Dynasty, Koryŏ put its effort into forging diplomatic relations with Ming to be free from Yuan political interference. As for Ming, unlike Koryŏ’s intention, it sought to maintain

∗ Associate Professor, Dept. of Korean History, Korea University 2 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ the Koryŏ-Yuan diplomatic form, which had been based on suzerain-tributary relations. Consequently, as with Yuan earlier, Ming stated the types and amounts of goods that it needed and strictly controlled the number and quality of tribute despite its superficial claim that goodwill was most important to tribute. Because it was not militarily invaded by Ming, unlike in the case of Yuan, Koryŏ was able to manage diplomatic relations with the new Chinese dynasty in a more assertive manner, just as it had done with Song, Liao, and Jin during the early Koryŏ period. Because it presumed that it would gain economic profit through diplomatic relations, Ming’s attitude naturally surprised Koryŏ. In the end, Koryŏ-Ming relations surrounding the tribute problem were also a process through which Koryŏ, which sought to restore diplomatic relations to pre-Yuan conditions, and Ming, which wished to maintain diplomatic relations as established by Yuan, endeavored to establish new tribute relations through compromise. Bearing all of this in mind, the present paper will examine the development of Koryŏ-Ming diplomatic relations following their initial establishment. Koryŏ had no choice but to accept Ming’s restriction of the frequency of missions to China, prohibition of Koryŏ envoys’ use of sea routes, and continued increase in the total volume of tribute demanded because its monarchs wished to secure political legitimacy through Ming investiture and to strengthen their authority by introducing Ming institutions and goods, and its officials had much to profit from the trade that took place during the Koryŏ envoys’ visits to China. In other words, for the ruling class of Koryŏ, it was imperative that relations with Ming be amicable. In order to gain better insights into the process of conflict and reconciliation between the two nations during this period in terms of the tribute problem, emphasis will be placed on political as well as cultural exchange and trade.2

Lee, Jin-Han 3

The Development of Diplomatic Relations with Ming and the Tributary Relations at the End of the Koryŏ Period

As Yuan deteriorated and Ming seized the Central Plains, Koryŏ’s diplomacy likewise had to shift its focus to Ming.3 On January 17, 1368, after the fall of Dadu (Khanbaliq; modern-day Beijing), Zhu Yuanzhang established Great Ming (Da Ming) and adopted the regnal title of Hongwu. Accordingly, Koryŏ dispatched Jang Ja-on to the King of Wu in November 1368,4 in response to which Ming dispatched an envoy in April 1369 with an imperial rescript and 40 rolls of silk gauze.5 After a month, Koryŏ dispatched Hong Sang-jae, a secretary in the Board of Rites, to Ming to congratulate the emperor’s accession and to express gratitude,6 in response to which Ming dispatched an envoy in May 1370 to invest King Gongmin as the King of Koryŏ and to bestow the Datong Calendar and 10 rolls of silk carpets.7 Diplomatic relations between the two nations were thus swiftly normalized because Ming needed Koryŏ’s cooperation in subduing Northern Yuan, which was still a threat, and Koryŏ in turn wished to free itself from Yuan pressure by hastily forging diplomatic relations with Ming.8 However, with its advance into Liaodong in 1371, Ming began to change its attitude toward Koryŏ and to become coercive. The Ming emperor’s edict brought back from China in July 1373 by chief secretary Gang In-yu conveyed Ming’s suspicion that Koryŏ was secretly in league with Northern Yuan. It accused Koryŏ of engaging in espionage under the guise of trade, exchanging envoys with the King of Wu in Liaodong, failing to present horses from Jeju Island according to Ming demands, and attacking Niujiazhuang in collusion with Naghachu.9 In addition, the imperial edict and the advice of the Central Secretariat brought back by envoy Jeong Bi in June 1374 stated that Koryŏ was to present tributes to Ming once every 3 years and to use sea routes. In addition, claiming that Koryŏ’s goodwill was more important than the amount of tributes, Ming only accepted hemp and returned the 4 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ remaining gold, silver, dishes, colored cushions, ramie, leopard hide, otter hide, and white ramie. Ming also refused to provide, as Koryŏ had requested, the machinery, gunpowder, sulfur, and nitrate necessary for constructing ships to fight against the marauding Japanese pirates.10 This was a flagrant refusal to accept Koryŏ’s original request that envoys from the latter be allowed to travel through the safer Liaodong and that Koryŏ be permitted to dispatch envoys several times a year for occasions such as the New Year and the birthdays of Ming emperors, empresses, and crown princes. Ming continued to maintain a strong attitude toward Koryŏ because it wished to prevent the latter from endangering Liaodong by colluding with remaining Northern Yuan forces and to control Koryŏ effectively by putting the latter in a difficult position through relentless critique of its supposed insincerity and rebelliousness.11 Amid such a situation, Koryŏ’s own political environment, too, changed. Yi In-im, who came to power after enthroning King U in the eleventh month of 1374, switched to foreign policy that would forge diplomatic relations with both Yuan and Ming at the same time. This was because King Gongmin, the head of the pro-Ming faction, had been assassinated, Ming’s hard-line policy had strengthened the pro-Yuan faction by giving rise to Koryŏ court officials’ antipathy, and Koryŏ had been placed in a compromising position through the murder of Ming envoy Cai Bin, who had arrived to demand annual tribute horses, by escort Gim Ui at the incitation of An Sa-gi, a chief secretary who belonged to the pro-Yuan faction.12 On the other hand, new literati such as Jeong Mong-ju, Bak Sang-chung, and Jeong Do-jeon argued for continued relations with Ming, which had been forged under King Gongmin’s reign as a part of the “policies of the previous monarch” and opposed the resumption of diplomatic relations with Yuan. They believed that because it was the “righteous lord of all under heaven” and equipped with “celestial troops,” Ming had the political legitimacy and military power to necessitate Koryŏ’s continued diplomatic relations in both name and practice.13 In the end, Yi In-im’s forces dispatched envoys to Ming to request a Lee, Jin-Han 5 posthumous title for King Gongmin because, in consideration of contemporary international situation, it was difficult for Koryŏ to relinquish completely diplomatic relations with an increasingly dominant Ming. In addition, though Koryŏ explained the assassination of King Gongmin and the murder of Cai Bin, Ming’s suspicions were not cleared, which even led to the imprisonment of Koryŏ envoy Choe Won. However, with Ming’s release of Choe Won in June 1378, relations between the two nations began to ease. In September of the same year, Koryŏ once again started to use the Ming regnal title of Hongwu,14 thus creating a mood for reconciliation. Nevertheless, Ming’s demand for tribute became more stringent. In March 1379, Ming envoys visited Koryŏ and demanded: Koryŏ must send 1,000 tribute horses, as King Gongmin had promised, together with envoys, half of who were to consist of state ministers; starting in the following year, Koryŏ must customarily present 100 catties of gold, 10,000 taels of silver, 100 good horses, and 10,000 rolls of fine hemp; and Koryŏ must repatriate all Ming subjects whom it had taken from Liaodong.15 In addition, Ming notified Koryŏ in August 1380 that it would pardon the latter for the murder of the Ming envoy if Koryŏ would newly send the 1,000 horses, with additions, that Ming had demanded earlier (even though a portion had been sent already) and make it a custom, starting in the following year, to send 100 catties of gold, 5,000 taels of silver, 5,000 rolls of hemp, and 100 horses.16 Invaded by Japanese pirates and devastated by the Red Turban Rebels, Koryŏ found it difficult to comply with Ming’s demand for tribute. Nevertheless, because Ming’s investiture would stabilize both royal power and the border region, it prepared the annual tribute as demanded. In December 1380, Gwon Jung-hwa, chief secretary of the Chancellery for State Affairs, and others were dispatched to Ming China to present 300 taels of gold, 1,000 taels of silver, and 450 horses and to request King Gongmin’s posthumous title and succession.17 In April 1382, Gim Yu, chief secretary of the Chancellery for State Affairs, and others once again presented the annual tribute of 100 catties of gold, 10,000 taels of silver, 6 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~

10,000 rolls of hemp, and 1,000 horses to Ming authorities.18 Although Koryŏ had prepared a large volume of tributes despite difficulty, Ming, dissatisfied, became even more coercive. In November 1383, Ming imprisoned Gim Yu and Yi Ja-yong, who had been dispatched to congratulate a celebratory occasion in the Chinese imperial household, for their failure to arrive on time. In addition, it threatened Koryŏ by claiming that the latter would not be attacked only if it fully demonstrated its goodwill by sending at once 5,000 annual tribute horses, 500 catties of gold, and 50,000 taels of silver, which Koryŏ had not sent in the past 5 years.19 In response, Koryŏ’s high-ranking officials discussed the annual tribute in December 1383. As the consensus was to comply with Ming demands, Koryŏ established a temporary agency for preparing the annual tribute.20 It then sent the 2,000 annual tribute horses thus prepared to China together with official Jang Bang-pyeong in June 1384 (10th year of King U’s reign).21 In July of that year, Ming finally allowed Koryŏ envoys once again to enter China, stating that Koryŏ had sent enough tribute horses. In addition, in response to the plea that Koryŏ did not possess enough gold and silver to present, Ming allowed Koryŏ to substitute horses for the rate of 300 taels of silver per horse and 50 taels of gold per horse.22 Despite severe financial difficulties, Koryŏ prepared the annual tribute according to Ming’s new standards. In October (leap month) 1384, it sent 98 catties and 14 taels of gold out of the 500 catties, the total amount for a 5-year annual tribute. The remaining 403 catties and 2 taels were substituted by 129 horses. Koryŏ also sent 19,000 taels of silver out of the originally demanded 50,000 taels. The remaining 31,000 taels were substituted by 104 horses. In addition, Koryŏ sent 4,300 rolls of white ramie, 24,100 rolls of black hemp, and 21,300 rolls of white hemp out of the originally demanded 50,000 rolls of hemp, and 1,000 horses in addition to the 4,000 that had already been sent as a part of the originally demanded 5,000 horses.23 In other words, within only 3 months, Koryŏ sent, as the annual tribute, exactly 100 catties of gold, 10,000 taels of silver, 10,000 rolls of hemp, and 1,000 horses according to Ming’s Lee, Jin-Han 7 conversion standards. Consequently, recognizing Koryŏ’s goodwill in complying with all of Ming demand for the annual tribute, Ming dispatched envoys to invest King U and to bestow on King Gongmin a posthumous title. Overjoyed, King U bestowed on Gwak Hae-ryong, the Koryŏ interpreter, with a silver belt and a horse.24 Furthermore, when the same Ming envoys were returning to China in November 1385, King U even personally sent them off, traveling all the way to the West Office for Relief and Social Works, and was moved to tears that his decade-long succession to the throne had finally been legitimated and that King Gongmin had been bestowed with a posthumous title. He bestowed on the Ming envoys clothing, saddled horses, platinum, and ramie as traveling expenses.25 Considering the political power of court officials such as Yi In-im and Im Gyeon-mi and the consequent weakening of royal power in this period, Ming’s official investiture in King U would have contributed considerably to strengthening royal power. This is why King U was so moved and showed his appreciation in various ways. Later, in the second month of 1386, Koryŏ dispatched envoys to Ming China to request ordinary attire and official uniforms for both kings and officials. In addition, through a memorial, it requested the Ming emperor for a gracious reduction in the annual tribute because, though Koryŏ hitherto had unfailingly prepared the annual tribute according to Ming demand, gold and silver were not native to Koryŏ and horses and hemp were most likely to drop in quantity.26 Koryŏ requested Ming for official and unofficial attire so that King U, by wearing clothes bestowed by the Ming emperor, could demonstrate his authority as a monarch invested by China27 and distinguish himself from his officials. It requested a reduction in the annual tribute because previous annual tribute had aggravated Koryŏ’s finance considerably. In response to Koryŏ’s request for reduced annual tribute, Ming abolished the annual tribute, and instead orederd dispatch of envoys once every 3 years, accompanied by 50 good horses only. However, this decision was not made in consideration of Koryŏ’s situation. In fact, 8 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ taking Koryŏ’s request as a case of insolence, Ming began to find fault in new ways, claiming: “In the days of Han and Tang, the people of Koryŏ came to China to engage in espionage under the guise of trade and took skilled artisans by bribery. Recent years has seen clandestine trade on their part, for which they will be imprisoned and denied pardon. Furthermore, Koryŏ must not prohibit the people of Ming from visiting Tamna [Jeju Island] to purchase horses with hemp, silk, and satin. We shall permit trade and the use of sea and land routes alike if the people of Koryŏ bring official documents to China. Nor shall we forbid the people of Koryŏ from traveling directly from Liaoyang, Shandong, Jincheng, and Taicang to Shanxi and Sichuan to engage in trade.”28 This meant that Ming would, instead of demanding annual tribute, directly purchase goods that it wanted, and, according to the principle of mutual benefit, allow the people of Koryŏ to engage in trade in China as long as they had the necessary documents. Because, on the surface, Ming was accepting Koryŏ’s demands, considerably reducing the volume of annual tribute, and directly purchasing goods from Koryŏ, all of this may seem like great generosity on Ming’s part. However, this in fact was an expression of great displeasure with Koryŏ, and Ming’s intention of restricting Koryŏ’s trade was undoubtedly diplomatic retaliation. In the eleventh month of the same year, Ming expressed its wish to trade 5,000 horses, inquired about Koryŏ’s intentions, and prepared 10,000 rolls of satin and 40,000 rolls of cotton as the price. It would pay 2 rolls of satin and 4 rolls of cotton for each minister’s horse and 1 roll of satin and 2 rolls of cotton for each official’s or commoner’s horse.29 Surprised by the Ming intention of directly purchasing horses in Koryŏ, Koryŏ replied that, due to the paucity and smallness of its horses, it could not accept payment but that it would still prepare the horses that Ming needed.30 This, however, was in fact a refusal of Ming’s demands.31 The Ming expressed its displeasure that Koryŏ not only failed to show adequate goodwill in presenting annual tribute using an excuse of its weakness and paucity of goods but also stating that it would not dare accept compensation. As Koryŏ offered to present only 5,000 horses, the Lee, Jin-Han 9

Ming stated that it would engage in direct trade with the people of Koryŏ at a rate of 8 rolls of hemp and 2 rolls of satin per horse, as it had originally demanded.32 Although Ming’s superficial intention was to purchase the horses for a price, this actually was demand for tribute horses.33 Despite the difficulty of preparing 5,000 horses due to the nation’s situation, Koryŏ proved its goodwill by sending the horses to Liaodong in five shipments in 1387. When the first shipment arrived in Liaodong, Ming authorities inspected them, returning all old, sick, and small horses. Koryŏ was in a highly compromised state because Ming refused to accept a total of 1,000 horses out of the five shipments. After such trouble, the horses sent by Koryŏ were classified into three grades: high-grade horses were each counted as 2 rolls of satin, 8 rolls of hemp; medium-grade horses were each counted as 1 roll of satin and 6 rolls of hemp; and low-grade horses were counted as 1 roll of satin and 4 rolls of hemp. In the end, the horses were exchanged with 2,670 rolls of satin and 30,168 rolls of hemp provided by Ming China.34 Ming then threatened Koryŏ by expressing its intention of refusing the latter’s tribute, which would mean the termination of diplomatic relations between the two nations,35 and imprisoned chief secretary Jang Ja-on, who traveled to China in June (leap month) 1387 to express gratitude for Ming’s permission for Koryŏ to change its official uniforms, on the pretext that the tribute horses were inferior.36 In February 1388, Ming also dispatched envoys to find fault: “Stallions from Koryŏ are useless and the horses that we have purchased from Koryŏ likewise were inferior.” In addition, it claimed, “Although we have given permission for trade with Koryŏ, the subjects of Koryŏ prefer to engage in trade in China without from notifying our authorities and have committed illegal acts such as infiltrating into Taicang to spy on the Ming troops and the construction of ships. We therefore shall prohibit the entry of Koryŏ envoys and incorporate the territory north of Cheollyeong into the Ming Liaodong, which had been under the control of the Mongol Yuan.”37 Ming’s intention was to prohibit the entry of Koryŏ envoys on the 10 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ pretext that the latter engaged in military espionage and that tribute horses from Koryŏ were below par, and to seize the territory north of Cheollyeong, which had belonged to Koryŏ but had been temporarily conquered by Yuan. While they previously had mainly concerned annual tribute, diplomatic agenda between Koryŏ and Ming now spilled over into the prohibition of Koryŏ envoys from entering China and even territorial conflict sparked off by the installation of the Cheollyeong Commandery, thus becoming quite complicated. Ming’s closure of Liaodong, however, was but a preliminary measure for the conquest of Naghachu,38 and the nonsensical demands for Koryŏ territory made with the closure of Liaodong, notwithstanding the fact that some envoy did fraudulently switch good tribute horses with inferior ones during transportation to China,39 were all caused by the subservient diplomacy of the ruling class including King U. This was aggravated by Ming’s foreign policy, which strengthened its attacks by taking advantage of the corruption of Koryŏ’s ruling class.40 At any rate, the Ming demand for the territory north of Cheollyeong aggravated Koryŏ’s sentiments. Although Choe Yeong and others took advantage of the circumstance to proceed with the conquest of Liaodong, this project was frustrated by Yi Seong-gye’s retreat from Wihwa Island. After coming to power, Yi Seong-gye’s pro-Ming faction dispatched Bak Ui-jung to China to request the repeal of the installation of the Cheollyeong Commandery and explained the situation in Koryŏ, to which Ming expressed its intention of granting Yi Seong-gye’s wish.41 Afterwards, major issues in Koryŏ-Ming relations such as the depositions of Kings U and Chang, enthronement of King Gong’yang, and false accusations by Yun I and Yi Cho were all political.42 However, the Ming attitude gradually relaxed, finally to demand in 1391 10,000 horses and eunuchs,43 to which Koryŏ sent 1,500 horses, explaining that this was the best that it could do.44 This seems to have restored Koryŏ-Ming relations to their state before the installation of the Cheollyeong Commandery and Yi Seong-gye’s retreat from Wihwa Island. Tribute horses continued to be sent to China, so that, in August of Lee, Jin-Han 11 the same year, 2,500 horses were additionally sent,45 and, in May 1392, 2,000 more are supposed46 to have been sent.47 In other words, begun in the last years of King Gongmin’s reign, the diplomatic conflict between Koryŏ and Ming was resolved with the instatement of a pro-Ming government following the retreat from Wihwa Island. In this respect, Ming’s diplomatic attacks on Koryŏ can be seen as political actions aimed at establishing new tribute-investiture relations. Nevertheless, the fact that, in the process, Ming pressured Koryŏ by attempting to increase the amount of tribute demanded of Koryŏ and presenting conditions such as the closure of national borders and prohibition on trade in Liaodong requires examination from different perspectives.

Diplomatic Relations and Trade with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty

Starting in 1370, Koryŏ faced Ming’s endless demands for tribute—especially horses—and the process through which it overcame the attendant problems is directly related to changes in Koryŏ-Ming diplomatic relations. Consequently, events that occurred during this period such as Choe Yeong’s conquest of Tamna, murder of a Ming envoy, problem of the Cheollyeong Commandery, and the retreat from Wihwa Island were caused by and resolved through horses.48 Indeed, tribute horses were important enough to take up the bulk of Koryŏ-Ming relations and, when seen from a different perspective, were also related to trade. Although Ming made unreasonable demands on many occasions, Koryŏ consistently succumbed without responding appropriately, which in turn led to further demands from Ming authorities, as has been pointed out above. While it desisted from direct attacks and political interference, Ming still sought to establish and to maintain tribute relations with Koryŏ based on the Koryŏ-Yuan patterns. Even though it said that Koryŏ’s 12 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ tributes needed only to show goodwill, Ming actually made strict demands that Koryŏ had to satisfy. At times, Koryŏ did not at all raise objections even when Ming, contrary to its purported intention, did not pay for the horses that Koryŏ had sent, which betrays Koryŏ’s attitude that such omissions were a natural part of paying tribute to China. Admittedly, Ming’s considerable demands for tribute horses caused many problems including reduced battle readiness, loss in agricultural production due to a decrease in the number of horses, and the people’s hardship in transporting horses to China. Nevertheless, Koryŏ willingly endured such problems to promote stability in domestic politics, to obtain the legitimacy of its government, and mitigate military tension along its national border.49 When the respective positions of Ming and Koryŏ are compared in terms of both diplomacy and trade, it is clear that Koryŏ was more urgent. Ming demanded as tribute such items as gold, silver, hemp, and horses,50 which differed somewhat from earlier China dynasties’ tendency to flaunt its domination over wide regions by demonstrating the emperor’s possession of rare tribute objects.51 On the other hand, Koryŏ adopted the new institutions and customs of Ming China to a considerable degree. First, as for music, musical instruments for court music were introduced into Koryŏ in May 1370, envoys were dispatched in the same year to request Ming China to send talented and knowledgeable musicians so as to train their counterparts in Koryŏ (permission subsequently granted), Koryŏ envoys were ordered to purchase musical instruments in Ming China in March 1372, and Koryŏ musicians began to practice ceremonial music for the Royal Ancestral Shrines in September of that year.52 Koryŏ thus actively adopted Ming court music and sought to reform its own institutions to strengthen the monarch’s authority with this new type of music. Second, Koryŏ reformed its official uniforms as well as equipments and insignias used in state ceremonies based on Ming models. The official uniforms for the king, queen, and court officials of Koryŏ that Ming sent Ming sent in 1369 (18th year of King Gongmin’s reign)53 were Lee, Jin-Han 13 worn during the Koryŏ monarch’s audience to officials upon national occasions for celebration.54 However, it was only in 1388 (14th year of King U’s reign) that the Yuan style official uniforms were abolished and replaced with those based on the Ming system,55 and equipments and insignias used in state ceremonies related to the Koryŏ monarch’s morning audience of his officials were legislated according to Ming models in January 1390.56 Such changes to official uniforms as well as equipments and insignias used in state ceremonies according to Ming patterns seem to have been brought about by the ruling class of the Koryŏ: even with the unresolved problem of tribute horses, Koryŏ envoys were visiting Ming China in 1386 and presenting the Ming government with memorials requesting official uniforms and unofficial attire for kings and officials alike. As with its reforms in music, Koryŏ’s reform of official uniforms as well as equipments and insignias used in state ceremonies was intended to strengthen the king’s authority and the ruling system. For this to happen, Koryŏ had to restore amicable relations with Ming above all. Although Ming made unreasonable demands as it raised the amount of tributes, Koryŏ seems to have had no choice but to accept. Well aware of such circumstances, Ming placed pressure on Koryŏ by devising strict regulations. In this period, Ming stipulated Koryŏ’s mandatory tribute amounts per year.57 As the Ming demands were difficult to fulfill, the Ming threatened through diplomatic and military channels. When Koryŏ requested a decrease in the burdensome amount of tribute demanded, Ming would rebuke such pleas as insolent. In addition, the Ming authorities would place Koryŏ in an awkward position by proposing a number of horses that Koryŏ could not supply and suggesting that they would directly purchase the horses instead of receiving them as tribute. Of course, the social class most afflicted by Ming’s demands for tribute horses obviously was the commoners of Koryŏ. In the process, Ming added demands that were difficult for Koryŏ to accept such as forcing Koryŏ envoys to travel by sea, reducing the frequency of missions from Koryŏ, and prohibiting the entry of people 14 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ from Koryŏ into Liaodong. In fact, the Ming authorities were well aware of just how dangerous sea routes were, as ships crossing the Yellow Sea often capsized.58 The reduction of the number of missions to China meant reducing opportunities for official trade to Koryŏ, which depended on diplomatic trade. Such measures were a considerable blow to high-ranking Koryŏ officials and the trade merchants who lived on them, for whom it was customary to use the mission to Ming China as an opportunity for trade. To understand this fully, it is necessary to examine the reality of tribute trade. During King Gongmin’s reign, envoys to Ming China took gold, silver, and other products of Koryŏ and purchased dyed silk and light currency. Goods personally purchased upon request from the rich and powerful amounted to nine-tenth of the entire goods brought back to Koryŏ even for more conscientious members of the mission, which led the Chinese to remark, “Those from Koryŏ only come to trade on the pretext of paying tribute.”59 On the other hand, Bak Ui-jung, an academician in Koryŏ’s Royal Secretariat who traveled to China in February 1388 to request the Ming government to repeal the installation of the Cheollyeong Commandery,60 did not take with him any goods for trade. When asked for hemp by a Chinese official in charge of escorting the Koryŏ envoys once they had entered Liaoxi, Bak Ui-jung showed that his pockets were empty and took off and handed over the ramie clothing that he was wearing. Moved by the man’s moral uprightness, the Chinese official reported this to the Board of Rites, and the Ming emperor summoned and honored Bak Ui-jung.61 However, it was public knowledge that Koryŏ envoys and their retinue would engage in trade in China. In September 1391, King Gong’yang thus made a request, during royal lectures, to An Ro-saeng, a member of the Chancellery for State Affairs appointed secretary to the crown prince, who was about to visit China for an audience with the Ming emperor: “As an undersecretary, thou shalt monitor the mission. While the statutes are strict, because the mission includes a large retinue, some unfailingly will Lee, Jin-Han 15 desire profit and engage in trade, thus subjecting themselves to mockery in China. Such acts must be strictly prohibited.”62 Clearly, the king himself knew about and endeavored to correct Koryŏ envoys’ participation in and considerable profit from trade in Ming China, which had become excessive and was criticized by the Chinese. At the same time, however, King Gong’yang himself attempted to trade sheep in Beiping by dispatching merchants such as Gim In-yong. This led Heo Ung, a censor, to suggest, “Because this most likely does not stem from the commendable desire to honor His Majesty’s frugality and the Chinese will in the future consider the Crown Prince’s visit a pretext for trade, Gim In-yong, who seeks to trade sheep in China, must be excluded from the mission.”63 In other words, while ordering that trade by other members of the mission be monitored, the king himself was participating in trade by taking advantage of the fact that the crown prince was going to Ming China. The powerful including the monarch himself thus participated actively in the dispatch of envoy because it was an opportunity for official and legal trade. It was therefore inevitable for Bak Ui-jung’s case to become an anecdote of exemplary conduct. The Ming critique of Koryŏ envoys was similar to Su Dongpo’s critique that the envoys came to Song China mainly for trade profit. Indeed, many Koryŏ envoys participated in tribute trade for private profit, thus leading to historical criticism of the rich and powerful for their avarice. At the same time, however, it was natural and inevitable for the people Koryŏ to be eager for tribute trade because movement between nations was restricted. Because, for them, it was more foolish to relinquish a rare opportunity to exchange advanced Chinese goods, the people of Koryŏ strove to trade as many goods as possible regardless of Chinese ridicule and accusation of avarice. Amid such a situation, for Koryŏ, it was a considerable blow indeed for the number of tributary missions to China to decrease due to strained relations with Ming. In addition, the closure of Liaodong could considerably affect Koryŏ’s trade. While this period saw an increase in the number of Koryŏ 16 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ merchants clandestinely trading cows, horses, gold, silver, ramie, and hemp in Liaoyang and Shenyang,64 the government was unable clearly to restrict such illicit trade despite its purported intention. Indeed, due to lax controls in the border region, there was no end of merchants in the streets. It was only in May 1391 that the Koryŏ government finally prohibited private trade with Ming.65 Thus taking advantage of confusion in China and Koryŏ’s weakened controls, private trade between the two nations thrived.66 Indeed, trade with China was so active that the country was left only with slow and dull donkeys and mules because Koryŏ merchants in groups of five or ten were daily taking horses, cows, gold, and silver abroad for trade and the people were purchasing foreign merchandise and indulging in luxury goods regardless of their social classes.67 It was even noted68 that the use of Chinese goods had become universal among the people.69 Amid such a situation, the restriction on private trade in Liaodong was a phenomenon brought about by a return to the tribute trade system, prohibition of private trade, and placement of certain limitations on existing trade methods since the rise of Ming.70 Ming’s closure of Liaodong must have been a considerable blow to the merchants and their patrons who had hitherto led private trade with China. In other words, Ming threatened to terminate diplomatic relations altogether or to restrict Koryŏ merchants’ entry into China unless the Koryŏ government complied with its demands regarding annual tribute to place economic pressure on the royal household and powerful families who were profiting from trade by limiting Koryŏ’s trade with Ming. Indeed, Ming linked diplomatic agenda with private or tribute trade because it was well aware that the ruling class of Koryŏ would respond to such measures. In other words, diplomatic relations with Ming in the last years of the Koryŏ Dynasty were closely related to trade. Lee, Jin-Han 17

Conclusion

Although they were similar to relations with Song, Liao, and Jin because they involved little interference in domestic politics, Koryŏ’s diplomatic relations with Ming were more similar to those with Yuan because tribute was not seen merely as a token expression of goodwill but involved concrete demands for amounts needed. Consequently, Koryŏ could not apply to its relations with Ming the method by which it had made considerable profit in trade as a part of its diplomatic relations with Song, Liao, and Jin. In addition, the development of Koryŏ-Ming relations regarding annual tribute horses reveals the limitations of Koryŏ, which passively sought to satisfy Chinese demands instead of responding more independently. The weakness of King U political legitimacy required the approval of Ming, the new ruler of China, and the ruling class was profiting from trade. Consequently, the government and the ruling class of Koryŏ feared that their profit would decrease if diplomatic relations with Ming were terminated and national borders were closed. For such reasons, Koryŏ reformed its music, official uniforms, and equipments and insignias used in state ceremonies based on Ming models. Koryŏ requested Ming for these new institutions to strengthen the authority of its monarchs. This is why, from the king’s standpoint, the normalization of diplomatic relations with Ming was urgently needed. At any rate, Koryŏ’s diplomatic relations and trade with Ming differed from those with Song, Liao, and Jin and Yuan alike. Though improved in political independence in comparison with those with Yuan, Koryŏ’s relations with the Ming were more restrictive as compared with its relations with with the Song. In addition, the volume of tribute trade was smaller than that with Song but greater than that with Yuan. As for private trade, while Koryŏ had, in its early years, made considerable profit from active trade with the Five Dynasties and Song. From King Seongjong’s reign onwards, it only saw trade from and to the port of 18 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~

Yeseong led by the merchants of Gaeseong. While Yuan had opened its national borders, thus activating private trade between the two states, Ming closed its national borders. The last years of Koryŏ thus saw drastic changes in both diplomatic relations and trade with China, which continued until the downfall of the dynasty. Moreover, the diplomatic and trade patterns forged through conflict between the two states would provide the framework for the new Joseon dynasty.

Keywords : Koryŏ, Yuan Dynasty, Ming Dynasty, Diplomatic Relations and Trade, Horse

Notes :

1 For detailed discussion of trade and diplomacy between Koryŏ and Ming during this period, see Donald N. Clark “Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Tributary Politics: Sino-Korean Relations in the Fall of Koryo and the Founding of the Yi,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University (1978) “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations under the Ming,” The Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2, edited by Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 2 Bak Yong-un, 1987, Koryŏ Sidaesa [A History of the Koryŏ Period], vol. 2, Ilchisa, 609-12. 3 As for Koryŏ’s relations with Ming in the last years of the dynasty, the works below were referred to: Hiroshi Ikeuchi[池內宏], 1917, “Kōrai matsu ni okeru Ming oyobi Hokugen tono Kankei(The relations with Ming and the Northern Yuan in late Koryŏ era)”, Shigaku Zasshi[史學雜誌]29-1~4; 1963, Mansenshi Kenkyu(Chusei Hen[滿鮮史硏究(中世編)[middle age part]), Yoshikawa Koubunkan, Yasukazu Suematsu[末松保和], 1941, “Raimatsu Chōshō-no Daimyō Kankei” [麗末朝初の對明關係: Relations with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and Early Years of the Joseon Dynasty], Shigaku Ronsō [史學論叢: Historical Monographs] 2: 367; 1965, Shōku Shisō [靑丘史草: Historical Monographs on Korea] 1, Kasai Shuppansha. Lee, Jin-Han 19

Gim Yang-gi, 1975, Sinpyeon Koryŏ Sidaesa [A New History of the Koryŏ Period], Seoul National University Press. Gim Seong-jun, 1974, “Koryŏ-wa Won, Myeong-eui Gwan’gye” [The Relations among Koryŏ, Yuan, and Ming], Han’guksa [A History of Korea], National Institute of Korean History. Go Seog-won, 1977, “Yeomal Seoncho Daemyeong Oegyo” [Diplomatic Relations with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and Early Years of the Joseon Dynasty], Baeksan Hakbo [Baeksan Journal] 23. Bak Yong-un, 1987, Koryŏ Sidaesa, vol. 2, Ilchisa, 609-18. Gim Seong-jun, 1994, “Koryŏ Mar-eui Jeongguk-gwa Won, Myeong Gwan’gye” [The Political Situation and Relations with Yuan and Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty], Han’guksa 20, National Institute of Korean History. Gim Sun-ja, 1995, “Koryŏ Mal Daejungguk Gwan’gye-eui Byeonhwa-wa Sinheung Yusin-eui Sadaeron” [Changes in Relations with China in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and the New Confucian Literati’s Theory of Tribute], Yeoksa-wa Hyeonsil [History and Reality] 15. Gim Don, 1997, “Koryŏ Mal Dae’oe Gwan’gye-eui Byeonhwa-wa Jeongchi Seryeog-eui Dae’eung” [Changes in Foreign Relations in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and Political Factions’ Responses], Han’guk Godae, Jungse-eui Jibae Cheje-wa Nongmin: Gim Yong-seop Gyosu Jeongnyeon Ginyeom Han’guk Sahak Nonchong [The Ruling System of Ancient and Medieval Korea and the Peasantry: A Festschrift for Professor Gim Yong-seop] 2, Jisik Saneopsa. 4 Recent studies have confirmed that this “King of Wu” here was none other than Zhu Yuanzhang himself (Bak Won-ho, 2005, “Koryŏ-wa Ju Won-jang-eui Cheot Gyoseob-e Gwanhan Sogo” [Notes on the First Negotiations between Koryŏ and Zhu Yuanzhang], Bukbangsa Nonchong [Monographs on Northern History] 3, Koguryo Research Foundation). 5 Koryŏsa [History of the Koryŏ Dynasty], vol. 41, “Sega” [Illustrious Families], Jiashen, April, 18th year of King Gongmin’s reign. 6 Koryŏsa, vol. 41, “Sega,” Jiachen, May, 18th year of King Gongmin’s reign. 7 Koryŏsa, vol. 42, “Sega,” Jiayin, May, 19th year of King Gongmin’s reign. 8 Gim Seong-jun, 1974, “Koryŏ-wa Won, Myeong-eui Gwan’gye,” Han’guksa 20, National Institute of Korean History, 356. Gim Seong-jun, 1994, “Koryŏ Mar-eui Jeongguk-gwa Won, Myeong 20 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~

Gwan’gye,” Han’guksa 20, National Institute of Korean History, 356. 9 Koryŏsa, vol. 44, “Sega,” Renzi, July, 22nd year of King Gongmin’s reign. 10 Koryŏsa, vol. 44, “Sega,” Renzi, June, 23rd year of King Gongmin’s reign. 11 Gim Seong-jun, op. cit., 367-68. 12 Hiroshi Ikeuchi[池內宏], 1917, “Kourai matsu ni okeru Ming oyobi Hokugen tono Kankei(The relations with Ming and the Northern Yuan in late Koryŏ era)”, Shigaku Zasshi[史學雜 誌]29-1~4; 1963, Mansenshi Kenkyu(Chusei Hen[滿鮮史硏究(中世編)[middle age part]), Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 276-79. Bak Yong-un, op. cit., 614-15. 13 Gim Don, op. cit., 345. 14 Gim Seong-jun, op. cit., 375. 15 Koryŏsa, vol. 134, March, 5th year of King U’s reign. 16 Koryŏsa, vol. 134, Yichou, August, 6th year of King U’s reign. 17 Koryŏsa, vol. 134, December, 6th year of King U’s reign. 18 Koryŏsa, vol. 134, April, 8th year of King U’s reign. 19 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, Wushen, November, 9th year of King U’s reign. 20 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, Jiaxu, February, 9th year of King U’s reign. 21 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, Gengwu, June, 10th year of King U’s reign. 22 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, Yichou, July, 10th year of King U’s reign. 23 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, October (leap month), 10th year of King U’s reign. 24 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, September, 11th year of King U’s reign. 25 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, October, 11th year of King U’s reign. 26 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, February, 12th year of King U’s reign. 27 It was probably for the same reason that, in 1386, King U requested Ming for physicians (Koryŏsa, vol. 136, Bingwu, August, 12th year of King U’s reign). 28 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, July, 12th year of King U’s reign. 29 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, Dingmao, November, 12th year of King U’s reign. 30 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, Dingyou, December, 12th year of King U’s reign. 31 Gang Sang-un, 1959, “Yeowang Gukje Gwan’gye Yeon’gu” [A Study of the International Relations between Koryŏ and China], Jung’angdae Nonmunjip [Chung-ang University Monographs] 4, 259-60. 32 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, February, 13th year of King U’s reign. 33 Because monetary compensation was rendered for them, unlike other tributes presented to China as a part of tributary diplomacy, tribute horses in the last years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and early years of the Joseon Dynasty differed from and constituted proper trade. In addition, the sheer volume of the tribute Lee, Jin-Han 21

horses presented exceeded that of any period before the modern era (Gim Sun-ja, 2000, “Yeomal Seoncho Daemyeong Mamuyeok” [Horse Trade with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and the Early Years of the Joseon Dynasty], Han’guksa-eui Gujo-wa Jeon’gae: Ha Hyeon-gang Gyosu Jeongnyeon Ginyeom Nonchong [The Structure and Development of Korean History: A Festschrift for Professor Ha Hyeon-gang], 529). 34 Gim Seong-jun, op. cit., 378-79. It was China that determined the price of horses in trade with Korea in the last years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and the early years of the Joseon Dynasty. However, when the actual payments are examined, Koreans turn out to have paid amounts corresponding to mid- to low-range prices, unlike the prices originally quoted by Ming authorities (Gim Sun-ja, op. cit., 531-32). 35 Gim Sun-ja, op. cit., 545. 36 Koryŏsa, vol. 136, June (leap month), 13th year of King U’s reign. 37 Koryŏsa, vol. 137, Gengshen, February, 14th year of King U’s reign. 38 Suematsu Yasukazu [末松保和], 1941, “Raimatsu Chōshō-no Daimyō Kankei” [麗末朝初の對明關係: Relations with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty and Early Years of the Joseon Dynasty], Shigaku Ronsō [史學論叢: Historical Monographs] 2: 367; 1965, Shōku Shisō [靑丘史草: Historical Monographs on Korea] 1, Kasai Shuppansha. 39 Powerful court officials would determine the subsequent posts of King U’s envoys upon the latter’s return from China according to the amount of bribes and slander them if the bribes were inadequate. Consequently, to avoid misfortune, the envoys had no choice but to resort to bribery (Koryŏsa, vol. 136, June, 12th year of King U’s reign). This in turn means that being an envoy was in itself profitable, which is corroborated by Ming edicts’ comments that envoys from Koryŏ switched good horses with small, inferior ones. 40 Gim Seong-jun, op. cit., 380-81. 41 Koryŏsa, vol. 137, “ Chang wang chong seo,” 42 Gim Yang-gi, 1985, Sinpyeon Koryŏ Sidaesa, Seoul National University Press, 668-71. 43 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” Renwu, April, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 44 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” June, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 45 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” Guiyou, August, 3rd year of King Gongmin’s reign. 46 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, Renyin, May, 4th year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 22 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~

47 From March of the 21st year of King Gongmin’s reign to May of the 4th year of King Gong’yang’s reign, 25,605 horses were sent in 35 shipments. In particular, Koryŏ sent the largest number of horses, 8,000, in the 1-year period from June, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign, to May of the 4th year of the same monarch’s reign following the retreat from Wihwa Island, which was due to the wish of the newly enthroned Yi Seong-gye and his faction to be acknowledged by Ming China (Nam Do-yeong, 1996, Koryŏ Sidae-eui Majeongsa [A History of Equine Administration in the Koryŏ Period], Korea Racing Association Equine Museum, 158-62). 48 Nam Do-yeong, op. cit., 158. 49 Gim Sun-ja, op. cit., 546-47. This is especially clear from the stance of the Yi Seong-gye government, which sent no fewer than 8,000 horses to Ming China between 1391 and 1392 (Nam Do-yeong, op. cit., 162). 50 Gim Sun-ja, 1995, “Koryŏ Mal Daejungguk Gwan’gye-eui Byeonhwa-wa Sinheung Yusin-eui Sadaeron,” Yeoksa-wa Hyeonsil 15: 126-28. 51 Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present, trans. Bak Gwang-sik, 2003, Simsan, 42. 52 Koryŏsa, vol. 70, “Akji” [Records on Music] 1, court music, diagram of the arrangement of musicians for state ceremonies, July, 19th year of King Gongmin’s year; March, 20th year of the same monarch’s reign; May, 20th year of the same monarch’s reign; and September, 21st year of the same monarch’s reign. 53 Koryŏsa, vol. 41, “Sega,” Jiayin, August, 18th year of King Gongmin’s reign. 54 Koryŏsa, vol. 72, “Yeobokji” [Records on Chariots and Attire], official uniforms, ancient attire. 55 Koryŏsa, vol. 72, “Yeobokji,” official uniforms, controls on official uniforms, June, 13th year of King U’s reign. 56 Koryŏsa, vol. 72, “Yeobokji,” honor guards’ equipments and insignias for morning audiences, January, 2nd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 57 Koryŏsa, vol. 135, November, 9th year of King U’s reign. 58 Consequently, Koryŏ continued, whenever possible, to urge Ming to repeal its order that only sea routes be used, as in the request made in February 1374 that land routes were preferable because Koryŏ envoy had frequently been shipwrecked (Koryŏsa, vol. 44, “Sega,” Jiazi, February, 23rd year of King Lee, Jin-Han 23

Gongmin’s reign). 59 Koryŏsa, vol. 112, “Bak Ui-jung-jeon” [Life of Bak Ui-jung]. 60 Koryŏsa, vol. 137, Gengshen, February, 14th year of King U’s reign. 61 Koryŏsa, vol. 112 “Bak Ui-jung-jeon.” 62 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” Bingxu, September, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 63 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” Jiachen, September, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 64 Because Jeong Yo-wi wished to engage in trade across the Yalu in accordance with the emperor’s orders, only trade in Uiju was allowed, with prohibition on the use of gold, silver, horses, and cows (Koryŏsa, vol. 135, Guiyou, October, 10th year of King U’s reign). As is apparent from this data, private merchants actively engaged in trade in the frontier. 65 Koryŏsa, vol. 46, “Sega,” Jiyou, May, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign. 66 Hong Hui-yu, 1989, “Koryŏ Sigi Sang’eop’-gwa Hwapye Yutong-eui Jangseong” [The Growth of Commerce and Currency Circulation in the Koryŏ Period], Joseon Sang’eopsa: Godae, Jungse [The Commercial History of Korea: The Ancient and Middle Ages], Gwahak Baekgwa Sajeon Chulpansa, 118. 67 Koryŏsa, vol. 85, “Hyeongpopji” [Records on Criminal Law] 2, Geumnyeong [Prohibitions], March, 3rd year of King Gong’yang’s reign, military officer Bang Sa-ryang’s memorial 68 Gim Yang-gi, 1975, Sinpyeon Koryŏ Sidaesa, Seoul National University Press, 672-73. 69 This is very similar to the description, scale, and behavior of Koryŏ traders traveling to China in Nogeoldae [The Old Cathayan] (Wi Eun-suk, 1997, “Won Ganseopgi Daewon Muyeok: Nogeoldae-reul Jungsim-euro” [Trade with Yuan in the Period of Yuan’s Interference: With a Focus on Nogeoldae], Jiyeok-gwa Yeoksa [Area and History] 4: 87-88). 70 Wi Eun-suk, op. cit., 92. 24 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~

<국문초록>

고려후기 대명외교와 무역

이 진 한 (고려대학교)

고려와 명과의 외교 관계는 정치적으로 내정간섭이 적었다는 점에서 송 · 요 · 금과의 관계와 유사했지만, 조공을 단순한 외교상 필요한 의식으로 여겨 성의를 중시 하는 것이 아니라 필요한 액수를 구체적으로 요구하였던 것은 고려- 원과의 형식에 더 닮은 것이었다. 그러므로 고려가 송 · 요 · 금을 상대로 외교를 전개하 면서 상당한 무역상의 이익을 얻었던 그런 방식은 명에게는 적용될 수 없었다. 아울러 명과 세공마를 둘러싼 양국간의 외교의 전개 과정을 보면 주체적으 로 대응하지 못하고 그들의 요구에 순응하려고 했던 고려의 한계를 확인할 수도 있다. 우왕의 등장 이후 정권의 취약성은 중국의 새로운 지배국인 명의 승인을 필요로 했으며, 지배 계층은 무역을 통해 이익을 얻고 있었기 때문에 명과의 외교가 단절되고 국경이 폐쇄되면 자신들의 이익이 줄어들 것이라고 생각하였다. 이런 이유로 고려의 국왕과 지배 계층은 명과의 외교 관계를 유 지하려고 했던 것이다. 그리고 고려는 음악 · 관복 및 의장 등을 명의 제도로 개혁하였는데, 고려에서 명에 요청하여 새로운 제도를 받아들였던 것은 국왕 의 권위를 높이려는 뜻이 담겨있었다. 그것이 국왕의 입장에서 대명외교의 정 상화가 절실했던 또 다른 이유였다. 고려말은 외교 관계가 변화하는 만큼이나 대중국 무역의 양상도 급격하게 변화하는 과정이었으며, 그것은 고려의 멸망 때까지 계속되었다. 그리고 이 시기에 양국간의 갈등을 겪으면서 만들어낸 외교와 무역의 형식은 새로운 왕 조의 전형이 되어갔다.

주제어: 고려시대, 원, 명, 무역, 조공, 말