International Journal of Korean History (Vol.10, Dec. 2006) 1 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade with Ming in the Last Years of the Koryŏ Dynasty Lee, Jin- Han∗ Introduction Although it was an unprecedented mega-empire, Yuan began to see signs of agitation in the mid-14th century onwards. Not only did there exist fierce strife for the imperial throne and conflict among the aristocracy but also the misgovernment of Emperor Shundi (Huizong) brought about financial difficulties and the misery of the masses, in turn leading to uprisings nationwide. Originally under the command of Guo Zixing from Haozhou, one of the most powerful forces involved in such unrest, Zhu Yuanzhang (the future Emperor Gaodi or Taizu) declared his independence as the Duke of Wu upon Guo Zixing’s death in 1355 (5th year of King Gongmin’s reign). He then proclaimed himself the King of Wu in 1364 in Nanjing, subdued rival forces such as Zhang Shicheng and Fang Guozhen in 1367, proclaimed himself as the Ming emperor in 1368, and initiated the conquest of Yuan to the north, thus capturing the capital and seizing control of China.1 With the founding of the Ming Dynasty, Koryŏ put its effort into forging diplomatic relations with Ming to be free from Yuan political interference. As for Ming, unlike Koryŏ’s intention, it sought to maintain ∗ Associate Professor, Dept. of Korean History, Korea University 2 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ the Koryŏ-Yuan diplomatic form, which had been based on suzerain-tributary relations. Consequently, as with Yuan earlier, Ming stated the types and amounts of goods that it needed and strictly controlled the number and quality of tribute despite its superficial claim that goodwill was most important to tribute. Because it was not militarily invaded by Ming, unlike in the case of Yuan, Koryŏ was able to manage diplomatic relations with the new Chinese dynasty in a more assertive manner, just as it had done with Song, Liao, and Jin during the early Koryŏ period. Because it presumed that it would gain economic profit through diplomatic relations, Ming’s attitude naturally surprised Koryŏ. In the end, Koryŏ-Ming relations surrounding the tribute problem were also a process through which Koryŏ, which sought to restore diplomatic relations to pre-Yuan conditions, and Ming, which wished to maintain diplomatic relations as established by Yuan, endeavored to establish new tribute relations through compromise. Bearing all of this in mind, the present paper will examine the development of Koryŏ-Ming diplomatic relations following their initial establishment. Koryŏ had no choice but to accept Ming’s restriction of the frequency of missions to China, prohibition of Koryŏ envoys’ use of sea routes, and continued increase in the total volume of tribute demanded because its monarchs wished to secure political legitimacy through Ming investiture and to strengthen their authority by introducing Ming institutions and goods, and its officials had much to profit from the trade that took place during the Koryŏ envoys’ visits to China. In other words, for the ruling class of Koryŏ, it was imperative that relations with Ming be amicable. In order to gain better insights into the process of conflict and reconciliation between the two nations during this period in terms of the tribute problem, emphasis will be placed on political as well as cultural exchange and trade.2 Lee, Jin-Han 3 The Development of Diplomatic Relations with Ming and the Tributary Relations at the End of the Koryŏ Period As Yuan deteriorated and Ming seized the Central Plains, Koryŏ’s diplomacy likewise had to shift its focus to Ming.3 On January 17, 1368, after the fall of Dadu (Khanbaliq; modern-day Beijing), Zhu Yuanzhang established Great Ming (Da Ming) and adopted the regnal title of Hongwu. Accordingly, Koryŏ dispatched Jang Ja-on to the King of Wu in November 1368,4 in response to which Ming dispatched an envoy in April 1369 with an imperial rescript and 40 rolls of silk gauze.5 After a month, Koryŏ dispatched Hong Sang-jae, a secretary in the Board of Rites, to Ming to congratulate the emperor’s accession and to express gratitude,6 in response to which Ming dispatched an envoy in May 1370 to invest King Gongmin as the King of Koryŏ and to bestow the Datong Calendar and 10 rolls of silk carpets.7 Diplomatic relations between the two nations were thus swiftly normalized because Ming needed Koryŏ’s cooperation in subduing Northern Yuan, which was still a threat, and Koryŏ in turn wished to free itself from Yuan pressure by hastily forging diplomatic relations with Ming.8 However, with its advance into Liaodong in 1371, Ming began to change its attitude toward Koryŏ and to become coercive. The Ming emperor’s edict brought back from China in July 1373 by chief secretary Gang In-yu conveyed Ming’s suspicion that Koryŏ was secretly in league with Northern Yuan. It accused Koryŏ of engaging in espionage under the guise of trade, exchanging envoys with the King of Wu in Liaodong, failing to present horses from Jeju Island according to Ming demands, and attacking Niujiazhuang in collusion with Naghachu.9 In addition, the imperial edict and the advice of the Central Secretariat brought back by envoy Jeong Bi in June 1374 stated that Koryŏ was to present tributes to Ming once every 3 years and to use sea routes. In addition, claiming that Koryŏ’s goodwill was more important than the amount of tributes, Ming only accepted hemp and returned the 4 The Development of Diplomatic Relations and Trade ~ remaining gold, silver, dishes, colored cushions, ramie, leopard hide, otter hide, and white ramie. Ming also refused to provide, as Koryŏ had requested, the machinery, gunpowder, sulfur, and nitrate necessary for constructing ships to fight against the marauding Japanese pirates.10 This was a flagrant refusal to accept Koryŏ’s original request that envoys from the latter be allowed to travel through the safer Liaodong and that Koryŏ be permitted to dispatch envoys several times a year for occasions such as the New Year and the birthdays of Ming emperors, empresses, and crown princes. Ming continued to maintain a strong attitude toward Koryŏ because it wished to prevent the latter from endangering Liaodong by colluding with remaining Northern Yuan forces and to control Koryŏ effectively by putting the latter in a difficult position through relentless critique of its supposed insincerity and rebelliousness.11 Amid such a situation, Koryŏ’s own political environment, too, changed. Yi In-im, who came to power after enthroning King U in the eleventh month of 1374, switched to foreign policy that would forge diplomatic relations with both Yuan and Ming at the same time. This was because King Gongmin, the head of the pro-Ming faction, had been assassinated, Ming’s hard-line policy had strengthened the pro-Yuan faction by giving rise to Koryŏ court officials’ antipathy, and Koryŏ had been placed in a compromising position through the murder of Ming envoy Cai Bin, who had arrived to demand annual tribute horses, by escort Gim Ui at the incitation of An Sa-gi, a chief secretary who belonged to the pro-Yuan faction.12 On the other hand, new literati such as Jeong Mong-ju, Bak Sang-chung, and Jeong Do-jeon argued for continued relations with Ming, which had been forged under King Gongmin’s reign as a part of the “policies of the previous monarch” and opposed the resumption of diplomatic relations with Yuan. They believed that because it was the “righteous lord of all under heaven” and equipped with “celestial troops,” Ming had the political legitimacy and military power to necessitate Koryŏ’s continued diplomatic relations in both name and practice.13 In the end, Yi In-im’s forces dispatched envoys to Ming to request a Lee, Jin-Han 5 posthumous title for King Gongmin because, in consideration of contemporary international situation, it was difficult for Koryŏ to relinquish completely diplomatic relations with an increasingly dominant Ming. In addition, though Koryŏ explained the assassination of King Gongmin and the murder of Cai Bin, Ming’s suspicions were not cleared, which even led to the imprisonment of Koryŏ envoy Choe Won. However, with Ming’s release of Choe Won in June 1378, relations between the two nations began to ease. In September of the same year, Koryŏ once again started to use the Ming regnal title of Hongwu,14 thus creating a mood for reconciliation. Nevertheless, Ming’s demand for tribute became more stringent. In March 1379, Ming envoys visited Koryŏ and demanded: Koryŏ must send 1,000 tribute horses, as King Gongmin had promised, together with envoys, half of who were to consist of state ministers; starting in the following year, Koryŏ must customarily present 100 catties of gold, 10,000 taels of silver, 100 good horses, and 10,000 rolls of fine hemp; and Koryŏ must repatriate all Ming subjects whom it had taken from Liaodong.15 In addition, Ming notified Koryŏ in August 1380 that it would pardon the latter for the murder of the Ming envoy if Koryŏ would newly send the 1,000 horses, with additions, that Ming had demanded earlier (even though a portion had been sent already) and make it a custom, starting in the following year, to send 100 catties of gold, 5,000 taels of silver, 5,000 rolls of hemp, and 100 horses.16 Invaded by Japanese pirates and devastated by the Red Turban Rebels, Koryŏ found it difficult to comply with Ming’s demand for tribute. Nevertheless, because Ming’s investiture would stabilize both royal power and the border region, it prepared the annual tribute as demanded.