ON SOME CATEGORIES for DESCRIBING the SEMOLEXEMIC STRUCTURE by Yoshihiko Ikegami

ON SOME CATEGORIES FOR DESCRIBING THE SEMOLEXEMIC STRUCTURE by Yoshihiko Ikegami 1. A lexeme is the minimum unit that carries meaning. Thus a lexeme can be a "word" as well as an affix (i.e., something smaller than a word) or an idiom (i.e,, something larger than a word). 2. A sememe is a unit of meaning that can be realized as a single lexeme. It is defined as a structure constituted by those features having distinctive functions (i.e., serving to distinguish the sememe in question from other semernes that contrast with it).' A question that arises at this point is whether or not one lexeme always corresponds to just one serneme and no more. Three theoretical positions are foreseeable: (I) one which holds that one lexeme always corresponds to just one sememe and no more, (2) one which holds that one lexeme corresponds to an indefinitely large number of sememes, and (3) one which holds that one lexeme corresponds to a certain limited number of sememes. These three positions wiIl be referred to as (1) the "Grundbedeutung" theory, (2) the "use" theory, and (3) the "polysemy" theory, respectively. The Grundbedeutung theory, however attractive in itself, is to be rejected as unrealistic. Suppose a preliminary analysis has revealed that a lexeme seems to be used sometimes in an "abstract" sense and sometimes in a "concrete" sense. In order to posit a Grundbedeutung under such circumstances, it is to be assumed that there is a still higher level at which "abstract" and "concrete" are neutralized-this is certainly a theoretical possibility, but it seems highly unlikely and unrealistic from a psychological point of view. Jakobson's study of the meanings of the Russian cases, which is a classical example of the application of the Grundbedeutung approach, will be worth discussing in this connection.' According to Jakobson (1936), the meaning (i.e., Grundbedeutung") of the genitive case, for example, is said to be that "der Umfang der Teilnahme des Gegenstandes am Sachverhalte der Aussage Yoshihiko lkegami is Associate Professor of English at the University of Tokyo. 60 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES geringer als sein gesamtes Umfang ist." The definition can be proved inade- quate by pointing out either that a case other than the genitive can be used in a way that fits the definition or that the genitive can be used in a way that does not fit the definition. Compare, on the one hand, the two expressions, John's arrival and John arrives. Since John's role in the event referred to is the same in both cases, Jakobson's definition intended for the genitive also applies to (at least certain uses of) the nominative. Compare, on the other hand, expressions like tinre's river and the city of Rome (here assuming that the ofphrase is functionally equivalent to the genitive). If, as is often said, these are really examples of "apposition," Jakobson's definition does not logically apply here.' The use theory, which in its extreme form claims that a lexeme is used in a new sense every time it is used in a new context (thus implying that there is no such thing as "~ememe"),~is to be rejected on empirical grounds, If this claim were true, the speaker would be unable to guess the meaning of an already familiar lexeme used in a context he encounters for the first time-which is not really the case, Similarly, if the number of the meanings of any lexeme were infinite, no speaker would ever be able to master a language to a satis- factory degree-which is again not really the case. If both the Grundbedeutung theory and the use theory are to be rejected, the polysemy theory will seem to offer the most realistic solution. The polysemy theory, however, must be able to show just how many sememes can most reasonably be posited as correlated with the lexeme in question. In other words, given a preliminary analysis in which a certain number of senses are tentatively posited for a lexeme, the theory must explain on what criteria certain senses are to be collapsed (as one generic sense, or more technically speaking, as representing one sememe) and certain others are to be kept separate (as polysemous senses, or as representing different sememes). The judgment can be made in the following way: Suppose a preliminary analysis has tentatively posited three senses (i.e., three possible sememes), SI, s?,and ST,for the lexeme in question. Check whether there is a set of common semantic features for sl, SI, and si. If there is not, SI,sz, and STare polysemous senses (i.e., separate sememes). If there is, then check further whether SI, Sz, and s, mutually contrast with regard to this set of common features and jointly exhaust all the possible cases in which they are relevant to the same set of common features. If they do not, SI,s?, and si are polysemous senses (i.e., separate sememes). If they do, they can be collapsed into a single generic sense (i.e., they constitute one sememe). The whole procedure can be summar- ized as follows: No --------------------------------polysemy Common feature(s)? No ---polysemy -€ Yes - Exhaustive coverage? Yes - - -generic sense SEMOLEXEMlC STRUCTURE CATEGORIES 61 Suppose, for example, that the lexeme child is tentatively analyzed as having two senses, 'male young human'and 'female young h~man.'~There is a set of common semantic features, 'young human.' 'Male' and 'female' constitute a neatly contrasting pair with regard to the set of features, 'young human'; they also jointly exhaust all the possible cases in which they are relevant to the same set of common features tie., children are either male or female). The two senses are therefore to be collapsed into 'young human'; in other words, child represents a case of generic sense. Suppose next that the 1exeme.father is tentatively assigned three senses, 'male parent,"progenitor,'and 'Catholic priest.' A common feature for them would be 'human.' But 'being male,' 'being a progenitor,' and 'being a Catholic priest' do not well contrast with regard to the feature 'human,'much less jointly exhaust all the possible ways of human existence. The three senses, therefore, represent a case of polysemy. Suppose, third, that the lexeme character. is assigned two senses, 'a written symbol' and 'a distinctive quality,'among others. It would not seem possible to define a set of features common to those two senses and the two senses must be kept separate, i.e., they are polysemous senses. It will be noticed that there are two stages at which tentatively defined senses are judged to be polysemous. These two stages represent the different degrees to which the tentatively defined senses differ from each other. Those judged to be polysemous at the first stage (e.g., character) represent a clearer case of polysemy (i.e., there is agreatersemantic distance between them) than those judged to be polysemous at the second stage (e.g., father). The latter are closer to a case of generic sense. The degree of certainty with which a judgment about mutual contrastiveness and exhaustive coverage can be made may of course differ delicately from one case to another. This, however, simply reflects the inherent indeterminacy of the semantic system of human language. 3. Suppose the number of sememes that correspond to a given lexeme is defined in this way. We will then find the following types of correspondence (Lamb 1964):' (I) Simple realization: one lexeme-one sememe, e.g., hydrogen. Typical examples are found among technical terms. (2) Neutralization: one lexeme-more than one sememe, e.g., man- 'human being,' 'male human,' 'husband,' 'servant,' etc. This is a case of polysemy. (3) Diversification: more than one lexeme-one sememe, e.g., oculist and eye-doctor (apart from different stylistic values). This is a case of synonymy. (4) Empty realization: one lexeme-no sememe, e.g., there as in there is a book.8 (5) Zero realization: no lexeme-one sememe, e.g., the sememe of'goal'as in creep under a bed (cf. creep from under a bed). Obviously, the notion of zero realization cannot be employed indiscrimi- 62 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES nately. If one should decide, for example, that there is zero realization of the sememe 'come' after the preposition to in you may come ifyou want to, one would have to posit zero realization for any verb that could occur in place of come in the above sentence (e.g., you may stay ifyou want to, you may stand ij you want to, etc.). This would be a highly undesirable consequence. It is obvious that cases like this had better be described as deletion transformation rather than reali~ation.~ 4. Componentially, sememes do not exclude each other. In other words, a sememe (or more precisely, a semantic unit that constitutes a sememe) can be a component part of another sememe. (Consider the taxonomical structure that characterizes many parts of the lexicon of any language. Thus a semantic unit constituting a sememe realized as child is part of the semantic unit constituting a sememe realized as boy or of the one constituting a sememe realized as girl.) This overlapping in structure is characteristic of the semantic system and contrasts it in acharacteristic way with the phonological system of language. Consider the following hypothetical parallelism. Suppose that a certain language had a set of three phonemes whose compositions are as follows: /p/: 'closed' + 'labial' + 'unvoiced' / b/: 'closed' + 'labial' + 'voiced' / P/: klosed' + 'labial' Structurally, this is parallel to the following set of sememes: BOY: 'human' + 'young' + 'male' GIRL: 'human' + 'young' + 'female' CHILD: 'human' + 'young' It has already been noted that a structure like this is not at all uncommon in the semantic system of language.

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