From Confidence Tricks to Confidence Building: Resolving Conflict in the OSCE Area

MAY 2011

This meeting note was prepared by On April 3, 2011, the International Peace Institute (IPI) convened in its Vienna Walter Kemp, Director for Europe office a meeting to discuss confidence-building measures in the OSCE area. The and Central Asia, with assistance meeting's participants included representatives of the OSCE’s participating from Ian Hrovatin and David states, executive structures, and Parliamentary Assembly, as well as interna - Muckenhuber, all of IPI Vienna. tional experts. Discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule of It is based on written and oral nonattribution. contributions made by participants at a workshop on confidence- Background building measures in the OSCE area. It reflects the rapporteur's interpre - The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was a tation of the discussions and does pioneer in introducing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). not necessarily represent the views For example, it did so in the 1986 and 1994 Vienna Documents, which have of all other participants. since been updated. These measures are designed to improve transparency Sharpening its international profile and predictability in achieving disarmament, and to build trust between and broadening its reach to Europe parties, in order to reduce tensions and avoid the use of force. CSBMs have and beyond, IPI announced the been instrumental in reducing tensions in, for example, Southeastern Europe establishment of its new Vienna office in September 2010. and the South Caucasus. IPI has had a forty-one-year partner - However, the nature of conflict has changed. Inter-ethnic disputes, ship with Austria, manifested by the intrastate conflicts, and low-level, multicausal conflicts (e.g., concerning annual Vienna Seminar that brings language, education, use of symbols, and power-sharing) are replacing the together policymakers, academics, more traditional interstate conflicts, which were previously the domain of and military experts to discuss highly centralized political and military commands. Economic issues and pressing issues of peace and transnational threats are also having an increasing impact on stability. security, and to explore ways of improving the global system of As the causes and types of conflicts change, so too must the responses. There conflict prevention and risk manage - may be occasions when nonmilitary confidence-building measures (CBMs) ment. can play a key role in reducing tensions. Examples include people-to-people An independent, international, not- contacts; joint solutions to humanitarian problems; cultural, educational, and for-profit think tank, IPI was sports exchanges; and joint economic projects. Such measures should be founded in 1970 in New York and considered as part of a cumulative process to increase confidence and build since its inception has occupied understanding between communities. This is vital for preventing conflict and offices across from United Nations fostering postconflict rehabilitation. headquarters. The Vienna office is During the Corfu process (initiated in 2009 to strengthen the effectiveness the first that IPI has created outside of the OSCE), OSCE participating states on several occasions discussed the of New York. need to strengthen confidence-building measures. For example, in the context IPI owes a debt of thanks to its many of enhancing the role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention, and generous donors, particularly resolution, there was a call for the organization to pay more attention to CBMs Austria, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, and the United States, whose among affected communities. CBMs were also discussed in the context of 1 support made this publication further developing the OSCE’s cross-dimensional approach to security. possible. 1 See OSCE, Interim Report Summarizing Proposals Put Forward Within the Corfu Process , OSCE Doc. CIO.GAL/117/10, July 2, 2010. 2 MEETING NOTE

In the Astana Commemorative Declaration of Confidence building is inherently about creating December 2, 2010, OSCE participating states the right context for peace processes to be reaffirmed their commitment “to strengthen successful. By changing relations and behavior, one security, trust and good-neighborly relations can create a new context for resolving a conflict. among our States and peoples.” They also Following this logic, CBMs are about steps that can recognized that the OSCE “continues to provide a give your opponent confidence in you as a reliable, unique forum” for “promoting open dialogue, accountable, and trustworthy interlocutor. preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual The underlying premise is that small steps are a understanding and fostering co-operation.” necessary means to foster an improved political Furthermore, they acknowledged “the climate and lead to further steps, agreements, and, Organization’s significant role in establishing ultimately, cooperative relations. However, CBMs effective confidence- and security-building are not about package resolutions to conflicts, but 2 measures.” about measures to change the climate in which What are CBMs? How are they different from, these more complex and fundamental issues can be and complementary to, CSBMs? How can they be negotiated. more effectively applied in the OSCE area? This was It was observed that communication is an the focus of a workshop hosted by IPI on April 3, indispensible, but not sufficient, component of 2011. The meeting was held on the eve of the “5+2” building trust and confidence. Other essential negotiations—involving Moldova, Transdniestria, ingredients are political will and interlocutors who the three mediators (Russia, Ukraine, and the demonstrate integrity, act with predictability, and OSCE), and two observers (the United States and remain consistent in their policies. the European Union)—which are designed to CBMs should come from the bottom up as well as promote the settlement of the Moldovan- the top down. Indeed, the former can stimulate the Transdniestrian conflict. This meeting report latter. Several years after a conflict, people on either reflects the discussions during the workshop. side of the divide may no longer know each other. What are CBMs? Cooperation in the spheres of education, trade, culture, sport, or tourism can bring people back The first panel looked at CBMs in general, together, and create new bonds that overcome old including lessons learned and examples from misunderstandings. Joint research and study tours international experience. can also open up new channels of thinking and ways of communicating. Civil society can be the The first speaker characterized CBMs as “an vanguard for stimulating such people-to-people essential element of repairing any distorted contacts. relationships by de-demonizing the other.” He underlined the challenge of changing the historical Such contacts are most beneficial when they perception and narrative of each party to the address real daily needs; for example, cooperation conflict. among fire departments, police, and people dealing with humanitarian issues or natural disasters. In Another speaker said that effective confidence this way, small, practical steps at the community building is about demonstrating a commitment to level can create a public climate conducive to seeing the other side receive a dividend. In doing higher-level political cooperation. so, the credibility of the demonstrator is enhanced and there is greater confidence that current and Events can trigger CBMs, even unintentionally. future commitments will be fulfilled, thereby Examples include sports diplomacy (like the recent creating a positive or beneficial spiral in relations. India-Pakistan cricket match during the World Thus, confidence building is about honoring Cup and the Armenia-Turkey football match) and agreements, so that deeds and not just words can be natural-disaster diplomacy, leading to support taken seriously in order to reshape relationships. programs in situations after earthquakes or

2 Astana Commemorative Declaration , 2010, available at http://summit2010.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/444.pdf . 3

tsunamis, as was the case between Turkey and A participant explained how the purpose of Greece and between Indonesia and Aceh. CBMs changes over time. In the short term, they In some cases, a political gesture may create the aim to arrest an escalating crisis before the outbreak opening for reconciliation. As one speaker pointed of major violence or to stabilize an immediate post- out, gestures of political will that signal positive ceasefire situation. In the medium term, CBMs are intent can be a significant contribution to meant to increase contact and trust between conflict confidence building. He stressed that one should parties and socialize them into a new approach to not underestimate the power of symbolism to shift addressing their dispute. In the long term, they can perceptions and change the way opponents see one play a crucial role in paving the way to, and another, because symbolic acts can demonstrate sustaining, a meaningful conflict settlement. that a party is prepared to take seriously the The case of Northern Ireland was cited: for interests, concerns, and grievances of its current or example, a joint declaration in 1993 by the British erstwhile opponent. and Irish prime ministers gave essential commit - One example is Willy Brandt in 1970 kneeling at ments to the conflict parties in Northern Ireland the monument to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto about both the principal parameters of a settlement Uprising, a gesture that contributed to a context in and assured them that no solution would be which West Germany and Poland were able to sign imposed without their consent. It required a a peace treaty and a border agreement (a policy of cessation of violence in exchange for inclusive “change through rapprochement”). Other unilat - talks. This quasi-unilateral declaration by the two eral steps aimed at building confidence include governments thus offered a concrete inducement, Anwar Sadat’s November 1977 trip to Jerusalem essentially to Sinn Féin and the IRA to end their and address to the Knesset, which eventually paved campaign of violence and enter a meaningful the way to the Camp David Accords of 1978; negotiation process. Over the next five years, a Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech before the United negotiation process took place which eventually led Nations in 1988, which signaled the end of the Cold to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The War; and, more recently—and perhaps as yet Northern Ireland example illustrates the need for unfulfilled in all their aspirations—Barack Obama’s reciprocity in order to achieve progress and the June 2009 Cairo speech pledging a new beginning need for credibility in order to ensure that offers between the US and Muslims around the world and are seen as genuine and are followed up on. his earlier initiative to “reset” relations with Russia. While concessions or symbolic gestures are It was pointed out that there is no blueprint for important, success is more likely if they are part of CBMs. Parties—or interested local groups—need an orchestrated process that enables the action to be to identify opportunities and issues, and have the followed up on, and ideally, to be reciprocated. The courage to reach out to the other side. Over time, 1955 Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations , for example, such actions can build trust among adversaries, and were coordinated, simultaneous unilateral declara - lead to joint processes and shared objectives. tions by the West German and Danish governments on the treatment of each other’s national minorities. Another speaker defined confidence-building They were almost immediately followed by relevant measures as having the objective to prevent, changes in the legal and policy frameworks for the manage, and resolve crises that are likely to escalate treatment of the German minority in Denmark and into violent conflicts between states or between the Danish minority in Germany, thus bringing to states and nonstate actors. CBMs can be unilateral, an end a long-standing disagreement between the bilateral, or multilateral depending on the nature of two states and removing an important obstacle to the conflict. They are often facilitated and West Germany’s NATO membership. supported by third parties, including regional and international governmental and nongovernmental Another speaker pointed out how the opening of organizations. CBMs can be military, diplomatic, borders, ports, and transit corridors can build political, or cultural in their nature, and they can be confidence. For example, starting in 1974 the Green applied equally in conflicts between, across, and Line partitioned Cyprus and acted as a de facto within states. border administered by the United Nations. In 4 MEETING NOTE

April 2003, in support of UN-sponsored negotia - dimension to domestic legal and constitutional tions, Turkish Cypriots opened crossing points on guarantees. An example of “pre-negotiation” the Green Line. Similarly, Israel has regularly closed confidence building is the 1994 Framework its borders to Palestinians because of security Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating concerns. In 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Process in Guatemala in which the parties agreed Authority negotiated an Agreement on Movement on a range of parameters and subjected their and Access , which opened a series of Israeli-run commitments to verification by the UN. The 2001 checkpoints to Palestinians and Palestinian goods. Ohrid Framework Agreement included specific The 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt amendments to the constitution of the former guaranteed Israeli ships and ships travelling to and Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as from Israel the right of free passage through the specifics on individual laws to be changed. Suez Canal. In this situation, the confidence- Of equal significance for lasting confidence is a building measures of regular transit service between joint commitment by the parties concerning Israel and Egypt served to help reinforce and dispute-resolution mechanisms in case of disagree - consolidate the 1979 peace treaty. ments over the implementation or subsequent Once substantive political negotiations interpretation of such a law. This frequently takes commence, confidence building remains essential the form of references to special domestic or mixed if momentum toward a sustainable settlement is to domestic-international dispute-resolution bodies be maintained. Here, regional and international (such as the Joint Council established under the organizations play an important role, especially in 2002 Aceh Ceasefire Agreement or the National relation to security issues, and it is at this stage that Human Rights Commission foreseen in the 2006 confidence building often requires and allows a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Nepal) or the more bilateral approach—that is, the parties are constitutional court or equivalent judicial bodies able to agree to joint measures and initiatives rather (such as provided for in the 2001 Bougainville than relying on unilateral, albeit reciprocal, steps. Peace Agreement ). Dispute-resolution mechanisms For example, in the 1997 Protocol on Military can also be international in nature, such as those Issues to end the civil war in Tajikistan, the conflict established by the 2003 Comprehensive Peace parties requested that the United Nations through Agreement for Liberia and its reference to dispute its observer mission monitor the process of settlement through ECOWAS-led mediation in implementation of agreements. Agreeing to collaboration with the African Union and UN, or appoint an impartial third party to monitor and the 1994 Quadripartite Agreement on Abkhazia , verify implementation of the various negotiated which gave a specific role in dispute settlement to agreements increased both sides’ confidence in the Russian Federation and the UN High each other’s willingness to uphold their commit - Commissioner for Refugees. ments. In the 1996 Sierra Leone peace agreement, More generally, international or regional organi - the parties established an international Neutral zations can enable such confidence-building Monitoring Group responsible for monitoring and measures by providing monitoring and verification investigating breaches of the ceasefire. The 2006 “services.” These have a specific and often narrow Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Nepal mandate (including limited duration), and limited confined Maoist rebel troops to cantonments enforcement powers, as, for example, illustrated by under UN supervision. the EU Observer Mission in Georgia, the Confidence building is also important when EU/ASEAN Aceh Monitoring Mission, and the UN parties move into formal, substantive negotiations Verification Mission in Guatemala. Beyond their and reach an agreement. Here the main issue is role to verify and monitor ceasefires, disarmament, about achieving mutual confidence in the and demobilization, such international missions durability of an agreement. In other words, parties are used frequently in relation to human rights need to commit to guarantees for their final provisions in conflict settlements (such as in the conflict-settlement agreements and third parties 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Nepal) can be helpful in adding an international legal and more broadly in the monitoring of agreement 5

implementation (such as in the 1999 Lomé Peace Another speaker summarized the optimal Agreement for Sierra Leone). characteristics of CBMs, as follows: Another speaker pointed out that while third- • Initiatives must promote a sense of security and party monitoring is important, over the long term confidence in a party, not endanger or expose CBMs are about transforming relationships and risk. should therefore operate through self-regulation, • Measures must be feasible—otherwise they serve which itself contributes to the transformed to damage relations and undermine confidence. behavior and attitudes. • Adaptation is possible—there are not set models. The relationship between military confidence- • CBMs should be separated from final outcomes: and security-building measures and CBMs was process, not product. If a CBM is designed to explored. The question was asked, Can you have promote a desired outcome for one party then it one without the other? The feeling was that they are will be perceived as prejudicing the interest of the two complementary pillars. other party and this latter party will be less It was stressed that CBMs need to be regarded as inclined to engage. initiatives that can bridge divides not just between • It is important to engage in an honest and self- military protagonists or civilian leaders but critical assessment of the needs and fears of the between societies as well. The degree of permissive - other side, to stand in the shoes of the other, and ness that exists for societal involvement, often to not make the mistake of self-deception, framed as civil-society engagement, says much expecting the other side to jettison its bottom about the political elite’s willingness (including the line. government and opposition) to see more open societal relations postconflict. Parliamentarians • CBMs should not be confused with concessions can play a crucial role: for example, by finding or pressuring a party to give up something common ground between elite interests and public important. opinion, and by engaging in public policy that can • It is necessary to promote the CBMs both within generate the wide support needed for a paradigm one’s own community and with interlocutors shift in relations with a former adversary. across the divide, neither of which is monolithic. Indeed, one of the biggest challenges of CBMs is not only to change perceptions of the former Experiences in the OSCE adversary, but to change attitudes at home that Area create the possibility of engaging with the other side. This requires significant internal dialogue to The second panel examined experience with CBMs prepare the way. As one speaker put it, confidence in the OSCE area. CBMs have been used in a building is not about external actors delivering you number of cases, for example in Southeastern something on a plate, and it is not about demanding Europe and the South Caucasus, and frequently in something from the other side. Rather, it is about the work of the OSCE High Commissioner on demanding something from yourself and your own National Minorities as a way of reducing tensions community. He paraphrased John F. Kennedy: between ethnic groups. “think not of what your opponent can do for you, The specific case of Georgia was cited, particu - but of what you can do for your opponent.” larly the Economic Rehabilitation Programme, It was noted that CBMs are sometimes used in launched in 2005, that was designed to encourage isolation, as if they could be brought out of cold the peaceful resolution of the Georgian and South storage when politically or tactically expedient, and Ossetian conflict through investments of human then put away again. As one speaker put it, and financial resources in infrastructure rehabilita - “without a strategic commitment to confidence tion and economic development in the Zone of building as a sustained policy to change relations Conflict. In a joint needs assessment, Georgian and and behavior, the CBM is a catch phrase, used as a South Ossetian experts identified joint projects to means to curry favor with internationals but not to improve the livelihoods of both sides under the alter one’s own behavior.” auspices of a control commission and a steering 6 MEETING NOTE committee. There was an evident willingness to One practitioner cautioned that while there may cooperate at the grass-roots level on a range of be a formal mutual agreement to promote CBMs, practical initiatives. The speaker observed that even some key elements required in theory are most of after the August 2008 events, there was still a the time either missing or ignored in practice due willingness to work together, although this did to the promotion of selfish agendas. Insistence that become more difficult. In the discussion that only one’s own position contains rational elements followed, it was observed that this case and a reluctance to accept the validity of arguments demonstrates how economic confidence-building put forward by the other side too often prevent measures cannot be divorced from political CBMs consensus from being reached on the implementa - and CSBMs. tion of otherwise reasonable ideas related to CBMs. One speaker pointed to the fact that armed To implement specific CBMs, one needs well- hostilities in the Southern Caucasus in August 2008 entrenched confidence and trust at the political revealed the real danger of “unfreezing” and level. Without the political will of the highest escalating conflicts. The ability of the OSCE to decision-making bodies to engage seriously in handle the early warning and prevention of such conflict-settlement processes, any noble intentions crises was questioned. of mediators, however eloquent they may be, will not materialize in practical measures, he said. He pointed out that contradictions among the OSCE participating states seriously complicate, and That said, some positive examples were given, sometimes block, the possibility of an expedient use including the Incident Prevention and Response of all existing instruments. This was evident when Mechanisms (IPRM) both in the South Ossetia and trying to reach consensus on the OSCE Action Plan the Abkhaz contexts. The resumption of the at the Astana Summit in December 2010. Ergnety-Dvani IPRM in 2010, after several months of disruption, was cited as a positive example that Based on his experience of dealing with conflicts consistent efforts of persuasion can turn into in the OSCE area, one speaker underlined the something tangible. importance of having adequate channels for normal, regular communication between the According to the panelist, to build confidence it parties to the conflict. He cautioned that mediators is essential that the tendency to divide issues into alone cannot achieve much if the conflicting sides categories of greater and lesser significance is are still in the process of trying to intimidate, resisted. If one manages to establish a decent level blackmail, insult, and threaten each other. He of trust among conflicting parties while working on stressed that the time for CBMs comes when heads humanitarian problems—like clarifying the fate of are cool, emotions are set aside, and the intention missing persons or facilitating farmers’ access to to arrange normal conditions for survival and pastures and vineyards—then appropriate goodwill peaceful coexistence under changed circumstances for dealing with the political issues surrounding the becomes the leading motivation for accepting non-use of force and security guarantees can be mediation services of outside well-wishers. gradually established, improving the chances for regular functioning CBMs. He said that this was the In theory, the promotion of CBMs involves the case in the area of the Transdniestria settlement. collective efforts of all the direct and indirect participants, mediators, and observers to He stressed that a rather effective way to determine major alternative variants of action; convince the parties to think and to act in a assess the advantages and disadvantages resulting constructive manner is to provide them with a map from the implementation of each of the existing of problems in the realm of freedom of movement options; separate the probable from the possible; of people, goods, and services. Accompanied by convince the other side to respect the arguments of relevant recommendations for next steps, such a the former adversary; resist the temptation to map can serve as a basis for practical measures on demand immediate results or set artificial and the ground, in a way becoming an agreed roadmap unrealistic deadlines; and adopt, as a matter of for the implementation of the CBMs. principle, flexibility as opposed to rigidness as the “While we may never entirely agree on the past, way to move the process forward. what counts is that we agree on the way forward, 7

foremost in the realm of CBMs,” he concluded. past twenty years. In that period, the peoples on Among the issues raised in the discussion session both sides of the Dniestr River have drifted apart. was how mediators could encourage the parties to This is why confidence-building measures are so take the “leap of faith” often necessary to overcome important. a crisis. The relationship between CSBMs and Indeed, while CBMs were seen as a low priority CBMs was also discussed. Other points raised in the past, 4 there is a growing understanding that included CBMs concerning national minorities, the measures to promote economic, social, and cultural danger of politicizing CBMs, and the problem of integration are the cornerstone of the settlement mainstreaming CBMs into the wider settlement process itself. It was pointed out that CBMs and the process. It was stressed that confidence building is political settlement (or status talks) should be a process, and efforts to predetermine the outcome pursued on two parallel tracks. Ideally the two could be counterproductive insofar as one party processes should be simultaneous and mutually would feel that a solution was being imposed. reinforcing; however, absence or lack of political negotiations should not be used as an excuse to halt CBMs in Moldova 3 the CBMs. The third panel of the workshop looked at the past One participant suggested that restoration of a and present experience of implementing single economic space encompassing Moldova and confidence-building measures in Moldova, as well Transdniestria is the best way to work toward as prospects for the future. political unification. In the initial phase, this The long record of attempts to implement CBMs process should focus primarily on dismantling in Moldova was recalled. It was noted that such artificial barriers to trade, investments, transport, measures are essential since the major blockage to and the movement of people. resolving the conflict is lack of trust over political A number of specific measures were proposed for control (and its implications) rather than any deep- building confidence across the Dniestr River. It was seated ethnic or religious problem, or territorial suggested that Chisinau could do the following: dispute. 1. Enable direct exports by railways. Much can be It was explained that the settlement of the done to solve the issue of direct exports from Transdniestrian conflict has two main components. the Transdniestrian region. According to the Firstly, at a political level, a settlement is being Moldovan Customs Code, all exports have to be discussed in the “5+2 format.” Secondly, a more conducted through the Moldovan customs technical process is being carried out at the level of check points. This leads to unjustifiable experts in the framework of the “Working Groups” transport costs. EU experts have recommended in order to build confidence between the two sides direct exports by railways. This arrangement, if and to find common solutions to problems facing realized, should in no way contradict the the population due to the unresolved conflict. existing customs regime between Moldova and It was noted that there have been numerous Ukraine on the basis of the so called Tarlev- meetings to hammer out agreements. The problem Yachanurov Declaration of December 30, 2005. has been implementing these agreements without 2. Improve the import system, especially that for the parties defecting. raw materials to the Transdniestrian region. The The general view was that the situation in European Union Border Assistance Mission Moldova is no longer a conflict, and the issues at (EUBAM) long ago presented proposals on the stake are quite tractable. As one participant put it, scheme of direct imports on the basis of pre- “the resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict is arrival information exchange between the one of the lowest hanging fruits in the OSCE area.” customs services of Moldova and Ukraine. And yet a solution has not been possible for the 3. Resume railway traffic. This is crucial, not only

3 For more on confidence-building measures in Moldova, see Walter Kemp, “Bridge over the Dniestr: Confidence-Building Measures in Moldova,” New York: International Peace Institute, March 2011. 4 The point was raised that numerous agreements have been made between the parties in the past twenty years: over 170 by one estimate. Some contain CBMs. But few have been followed up, and a systematic revision should be carried out. 8 MEETING NOTE

for Transdniestria, but also since the Odessa- ordinary people on both sides of the Dniestr River. Tiraspol-Chisinau railway line is part of the But what will it take to implement such ninth European transport corridor, linked to measures? And why hasn’t there been progress thus the Baltics and Northern Europe via the far? “Viking” line. One observer suggested that some influential 4. Open corresponding accounts by Trans - parties were actually quite comfortable with the dniestrian banks at Moldovan banks. status quo. He suggested that there is in fact a great 5. Share international cargo permits. deal of confidence between certain influential 6. Cancel the environmental fee for Trans - parties on both sides of the river. However, this dniestrian companies. kind of confidence serves private interests over the public good. “Personalities often making nasty 7. Register the Transdniestrian Chamber of references to one another in public appear to have Commerce and Industry in Chisinau. great mutual interest in secretly collaborating on 8. Cancel the ban on exports of grain. making piles of money off the current stalemate,” 9. Enable the import to the Transdniestrian remarked one observer. He said that “looking at the region of radioactive materials needed for the incidents undermining the process through a treatment of cancer. cynical lens one may suppose collusion between 10. Find a solution to the use of Transdniestrian hard-liners on both sides to ensure that talks are licence-plate numbers, possibly on the basis of sabotaged.” In such a climate, bottom-up, people- EUBAM proposals. to-people contacts take on added significance. 11. Dismantle all non-peacekeeping posts on the It was pointed out that the word “confidence” has internal boundary between the two river banks. several uses in English, among them not only those Internal customs checkpoints should be implying faith and reliability, but also the opposite, replaced by mobile customs units. as in “confidence scheme,” or “confidence man.” Bearing that in mind, the challenge in Moldova 12. Cancel criminal cases against a number of (and elsewhere) is to get from confidence tricks to Transdniestrian politicians and officials. confidence building; from a situation in which For its part, Tiraspol could build confidence by people profit from the failure to resolve the conflict • dismantling non-peacekeeping check points; to one in which there is an incentive to solve the problems it causes. • cancelling 100 percent of customs duty for goods brought from the right bank of Moldova; It was noted that the beginning of a new breakdown in trust coincided with the failure of the • implementing tax reform by introducing a Kozak Memorandum in late 2003, after which the value-added tax, which would facilitate trade sides took increasingly aggressive actions against between the two banks of the Dniestr River; one another, locking the region in a vicious circle of • opening the Gura Bicolui bridge built by EU tit-for-tat. funds; It was also noted, however, that the situation may • guaranteeing access by the Moldovan customs in some respects be improving. In September 2009, officers for inspections carried out in relation a new alliance came into power in Moldova and to the issuance of Moldovan certificates of Prime Minister Vlad Filat backed efforts to engage origin of goods; with the Transdniestrians and build up confidence • cancelling all possible restrictions on freedom by solving problems. of travel by members of the Moldovan The “confidence-building working groups,” Parliament and the government; and initially proposed by the Moldovan side in 2007, • resolving issues related to Moldovan Latin- represent one such attempt to strengthen coopera - script schools in Transdniestria. tion. During 2010, twelve meetings of the working This list is by no means exhaustive. But it groups were held to build confidence in health and illustrates how a few small steps—at no cost—could social protection; humanitarian assistance; road improve the general atmosphere and the lives of and rail infrastructure development; agriculture 9

and environment; economy and trade; and crime and other ethnicities on both sides—mostly control. A working group on telecommunications Orthodox Christians, united through deep histor - was set up. Other areas being explored are customs ical roots, kinships, mixed marriages, common administration, civil registration, and education. culture and traditions—are compatible and capable At the beginning of 2011, the working group on of living together in the same state in peace and the economy and the one on transport infrastruc - understanding. They all share the common desire ture held their meetings, discussing a wide range of to finally get rid of the daily obstacles that hinder issues related to confidence-building measures. them from having a normal and better life, he said. The working group on the economy has agreed to In the view of the Moldovan government, despite continue discussions on improving the existing different perspectives and views over the nature of framework of cooperation between financial the Transdniestrian conflict, the absolute majority institutions from both banks of the Dniestr River. of the population and political forces on both banks Chisinau has also provided a short overview of the of the Dniestr River are deeply interested in current stage of negotiations with the European overcoming the problems created by this conflict. Union on the association agreement and the deep “Its settlement would undoubtedly contribute to and comprehensive free trade agreement. solving the numerous problems affecting common It was pointed out, though, that there has been people on both banks of the river and open new little progress through these working groups, either perspectives to speed-up economic development, due to lack of preparation by one or another of the build a modern, democratic, and prosperous state parties, lack of agreement, or lack of follow up. In and satisfy its European aspirations,” he said. 2010, a 5+2 meeting suggested that an agreement It was pointed out that, for the country’s entire between the sides on a set of regulations for the existence, every Moldovan government has consid - CBMs working groups would be helpful. Chisinau ered Transdniestria part of Moldova. With the and Tiraspol are apparently in the final stage of advent into power of the new government, there drafting this regulation and in the coming months has been an increasing readiness to resolve it should be ready for signing by political represen - practical problems on a technical level, while tatives of both parties. waiting for the possibility to reach a comprehensive The point was made that ultimately the working political solution to the conflict. “We are trying to groups cannot function in isolation; they need to be help solve the Transdniestrian problem also by part of an integrated negotiation mechanism that helping to improve the lives of Transdniestrian includes the 5+2, and the 1+1 format that opens a people,” said a senior Moldovan official. meaningful channel of communication between The European Union has become more active in the leaders of the two sides. the settlement process, and in promoting CBMs. One discussant said that in this light, when it For example, the EU and the United Nations comes to producing confidence, the best thing the Development Programme are contributing more international community can do is “prime the than €13 million to CBMs in Moldova over the next pump”—that is, help the sides find the minimal three years. This assistance will be used for capacity level of understanding without which confidence- building and the implementation of concrete building measures cannot operate. An important projects on the ground. actor in this regard is the OSCE Mission to It was stressed that CBMs should be depoliticized Moldova. But as an international civil servant and status-neutral, with tangible effects for the pointed out, “ultimately, we can only help: it is the people concerned. This could contribute to an sides themselves who have to build confidence.” overall improvement of the political climate, as well It was therefore interesting to hear from the as help to address everyday concerns. parties. The Moldovan representative explained A participant noted that one benefit of CBMs is that in spite of some differences in mentality and that they enable both parties to have a voice and to the negative impact of the violent war in 1992, be heard and understood by a broader audience. people living on both banks of the Dniestr do not He stressed that CBMs should be placed within a hate each other. Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, predictable framework since complications can 10 MEETING NOTE arise when unilateral moves undermine the In the discussion that followed a number of equilibrium of established processes. Similarly, to considerations were raised, including the role of be effective, CBMs must respect some criteria: the women in building confidence; the analysis of parties’ expectations should be acknowledged; no reasons for lack of trust; and the question of one should lose sight of the origins of the conflict; whether confidence was a prerequisite for starting and each side must have the equal right to partici - CBMs, or if CBMs in fact raise confidence. pate in the process, bearing the same privileges and It was concluded that CBMs have an important prerogatives. Furthermore, it was emphasized that role to play in the settlement of the conflict in agreements made in the past should be respected, Moldova and that they can contribute to easing and that the process should not be prejudiced by tensions and building trust in a number of one side’s preconceived notion of the outcome. situations across the OSCE area. 11

Participants

Veronika Bard-Bringeus Elena Raluca Neculaescu Head, Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Romania OSCE to the OSCE

Donatas Butkus Andreas Nothelle Third Secretary, Permanent Mission of Lithuania Special Representative, OSCE Parliamentary to the OSCE Assembly

Eugin Carpov Bolat Nurgaliyev Deputy Prime Minister, Moldova Former Special Representative of the OSCE CiO for Protracted Conflicts Giedrius Cekuolis Personal Representative of the CiO of the OSCE for Patrick O’Reilly Protracted Conflicts First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE Jonathan Cohen Director of Programmes, Conciliation Resources Onur Özceri Acting Deputy Head, Permanent Mission of Turkey Paul Fritch to the OSCE Director, Office of the OSCE Secretary-General Andrea Pfanzelter Paata Garindashvili Director, Vienna Office, IPI Head, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the OSCE Vasyl Pokotylo Mahur Gasimov Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Third Secretary, Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan Mission of Ukraine to the OSCE to the OSCE Julie Raschka Sergey Gubarev Political Specialist, US Mission to the OSCE Ambassador-at-Large, Russian Federation Philip Remler Gottfried Hanne Head, OSCE Mission to Moldova Deputy Director for Operations Services, OSCE Vitalie Rusu Conflict Prevention Centre Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of William Hill Moldova to the OSCE Professor of National Security, National War Michael Schmunk College (Washington, DC) Deputy Head, Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE Ashot Hovakimian Head, Delegation of Armenia to the OSCE Stefan Wolff Professor of International Security, University of Mindaugus Kacerauskis Birmingham Counsellor, Lithuanian MFA Vladimir Yastrebchak Walter Kemp Chief Negotiator for Transdniestria Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Peace Institute (IPI) Andrei Zagorski Leading Researcher, Center for War and Peace Christine Moser Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Head, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE Relations (MGIMO) The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

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