SUPREME COURT of the STATE of NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION : FOURTH JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT DECISIONS FILED JULY 6, 2012 HON. HENRY J. SCUDDER, PRESIDING JUSTICE HON. NANCY E. SMITH HON. JOHN V. CENTRA HON. EUGENE M. FAHEY HON. ERIN M. PERADOTTO HON. EDWARD D. CARNI HON. STEPHEN K. LINDLEY HON. ROSE H. SCONIERS HON. SALVATORE R. MARTOCHE, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES FRANCES E. CAFARELL, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department 29 KA 11-01908 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DONALD C. FILER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. DAVID R. ADDELMAN P.C., BUFFALO (DAVID R. ADDELMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. MICHAEL J. VIOLANTE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Richard C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.), rendered August 7, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, predatory sexual assault against a child, and sexual abuse in the first degree. It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal sexual act in the first degree under count two of the indictment and dismissing that count of the indictment without prejudice to the People to re-present any appropriate charges under that count of the indictment to another grand jury and as modified the judgment is affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75 [1] [a]), criminal sexual act in the first degree (§ 130.50 [3]), predatory sexual assault against a child (§ 130.96), and sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [3]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was deprived of his right to a public trial when County Court ordered his friend to leave the courtroom (see People v Hamilton, 45 AD3d 1396, lv denied 10 NY3d 765). In any event, that contention is without merit inasmuch as the record establishes that the court acted within its discretion in order to “preserve order and decorum in the courtroom” (People v Colon, 71 NY2d 410, 416, cert denied 487 US 1239). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention that counts one, four and five of the indictment are facially -2- 29 KA 11-01908 duplicitous (see People v Becoats, 71 AD3d 1578, 1579, affd 17 NY3d 643, cert denied ___ US ___ [Apr. 23, 2012]; People v Sponburgh, 61 AD3d 1415, 1416, lv denied 12 NY3d 929). We decline to exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Although count two is not duplicitous on its face inasmuch as it alleges a single act (see CPL 200.50 [3] - [7]; People v Keindl, 68 NY2d 410, 417-418), we agree with defendant that it was rendered duplicitous by the testimony of the victim tending to establish the commission of multiple criminal acts during the period of time specified therein (see People v McNab, 167 AD2d 858). “Because defendant’s right to be tried and convicted of only those crimes charged in the indictment is fundamental and nonwaivable,” defendant’s contention regarding count two does not require preservation (id.). We therefore modify the judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal sexual act in the first degree under count two of the indictment and dismissing that count without prejudice to the People to re-present any appropriate charges under that count to another grand jury (see People v Bracewell, 34 AD3d 1197, 1198-1199). Contrary to defendant’s contention, he was not entitled to his own copy of the videotape of the victim’s testimony presented to the grand jury, which defense counsel had an opportunity to view (see People v Smith, 289 AD2d 1056, 1058, lv denied 98 NY2d 641). We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in allowing the People to present the testimony of an expert witness concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Expert testimony concerning CSAAS is admissible to assist the jury in understanding the unusual conduct of victims of child sexual abuse where, as here, the testimony is general in nature and does “not attempt to impermissibly prove that the charged crimes occurred” (People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375, 387; see People v Bassett, 55 AD3d 1434, 1436-1437, lv denied 11 NY3d 922; see also People v Gillard, 7 AD3d 540, 541, lv denied 3 NY3d 659). We also reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in permitting the People’s forensic pediatrician to testify that the absence of physical injuries was not inconsistent with sexual abuse of a child (see generally People v Shelton, 307 AD2d 370, 371, affd 1 NY3d 614). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions that he was denied his rights to due process and equal protection when the People prosecuted him for predatory sexual assault against a child rather than criminal sexual act in the first degree, and that the People also thereby violated the separation of powers clause of the United States Constitution (see generally People v Jackson, 71 AD3d 1457, 1458, lv denied 14 NY3d 888; People v Schaurer, 32 AD3d 1241). In any event, those contentions are without merit (see People v Lawrence, 81 AD3d 1326, 1326-1327, lv denied 17 NY3d 797). Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Entered: July 6, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department 222 KA 09-00307 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, FAHEY, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER STEFAN E. LEWIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. STEFAN E. LEWIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (GEOFFREY KAEUPER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Frank P. Geraci, Jr., J.), rendered August 27, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree. It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3] [felony murder]). Contrary to the People’s contention, defendant did not forfeit his right to appeal by pleading guilty after County Court issued an oral suppression ruling but before a written order thereon had been issued; “an appeal does lie from an oral ‘order’ ” (People v Elmer, ___ NY3d ___, ___ [June 27, 2012]). Defendant contended at the suppression hearing that the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive because the store clerk who made the identification did not see the robbers’ faces, which were covered. Thus, defendant failed to preserve for our review his present contentions that the court erred in failing to suppress the showup identification on the grounds that the People failed to demonstrate that the showup identification procedure was conducted in temporal proximity to the crime and that the showup identification procedure was unnecessary because the police already had probable cause to arrest him in connection with an earlier robbery (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, we conclude that defendant’s present contentions lack merit. Although showup identification procedures are generally disfavored (see People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537), such procedures are permitted “where [they are] reasonable under the circumstances—that -2- 222 KA 09-00307 is, when conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime—and the procedure used was not unduly suggestive” (People v Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 597; see Ortiz, 90 NY2d at 537; People v Jackson, 78 AD3d 1685, 1685-1686, lv denied 16 NY3d 743). Here, the showup identification procedure was reasonable because it was conducted at the scene of the crime, within 95 minutes of the commission of the crime and in the course of a “continuous, ongoing investigation” (Brisco, 99 NY2d at 597; see People v Santiago, 83 AD3d 1471, lv denied 17 NY3d 800; People v Boyd, 272 AD2d 898, 899, lv denied 95 NY2d 850). Further, a showup identification procedure is not improper “merely because the police already have probable cause to detain a suspect” (People v Davis, 232 AD2d 154, 154, lv denied 89 NY2d 941, rearg denied 89 NY2d 1091). Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney also represented defendant’s two accomplices and thus had an inherent conflict of interest. We reject that contention. The successive or joint representation of multiple defendants is “not per se violative of one’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel” (People v Macerola, 47 NY2d 257, 262; see People v Gonzalez, 30 NY2d 28, 34, cert denied 409 US 859). While we agree with defendant that both defense counsel and the prosecutor had a duty to recognize a potential conflict of interest, defendant was required to show “that the conduct of his defense was in fact affected by the operation of the conflict of interest, or that the conflict operated on defense counsel’s representation” (People v Weeks, 15 AD3d 845, 847, lv denied 4 NY3d 892 [internal quotation marks omitted]).