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CEES Center for Eastern European Studies CEES Working Paper No. 2 Theopolitics on the Grand Chessboard: September 2019 Ukraine between the Church Canons and the Canons of War By Alexander Ponomariov, Passau CEES Working Paper No. 2 Abstract In January 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul three pillars of his 2019 re-election campaign (“Army, issued a document of independence for the newly Language, and Faith”). In December 2018, he even created Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Playing on an imposed martial law in the country in order to convene imagined Byzantine past, the document asserted the the required church council and amend the Ukrainian Patriarchate’s cultural leadership of the Orthodox com- Constitution’s provisions on future NATO membership. monwealth. This was possible because of what could be The leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate view such called the Constantinopolitan Consensus, according to events as “combat actions” (военные действия) and are which the Orthodox churches recognize the Patriarchate ready to resist, both parties instrumentalizing the church in Istanbul as primus inter pares based on interpreta- canons as the canons of war. As such, the decision to tions of antique canon law, which remains terra incognita form an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine has for researchers of international politics. Ukrainian pres- resulted in new tensions, both within Ukraine and ident Poroshenko made church autocephaly one of the between Ukraine and Russia. Content Theopolitics on the Grand Chessboard: Ukraine between the Church Canons and the Canons of War Ukrainian Autocephaly … in Ancient Greek 3 A Crafty Agreement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate 3 The Constantinopolitan Consensus Delendus est 5 Ecclesia Vivit Lege Romana: Roman Law in Canon Law 5 Multiple Orthodoxies 7 Theopolitical Synergies 8 Between the Church Canons and the Canons of War 9 A Theopolitical Challenge on the Grand Chessboard 11 Notes 12 Bibliography 16 Center of Eastern European Studies CEES Working Paper No. 2 Theopolitics on the Grand Chessboard: Ukraine between the Church Canons and the Canons of War By Alexander Ponomariov, Passau territories in the East of Ukraine from polling; the sepa- Ukrainian Autocephaly … in rate poll category called “simply Orthodox” (21 percent) Ancient Greek further diminishes the reported presence of the On 6 January 2019, on the Orthodox feast of Epiphany, Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.4 When Crimea and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, otherwise the rebel provinces are included in the survey, the fig- known as the Phanar, issued a document of independ- ures rise to 39.4 percent of parishioners for the Moscow ence to the newly created Orthodox Church of Ukraine Patriarchate, while the Kiev Patriarchate has 25.3 per- (OCU), which was made up of two Ukrainian Orthodox cent.5 The latter breakdown is closer to reality given the communities, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the official number of active parishes, monasteries, and Kiev Patriarchate (UOC KP) and the Ukrainian Auto- clergy. As per the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, on cephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), both of which 1 January 2019 the UOC MP had 12,122 active parishes had been outlawed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate until versus 5,994 (4,946 plus 1,048) of the UOC KP and the late 2018. Patriarch Bartholomew solemnly handed the UAOC; 215 active monasteries versus seventy-seven Declaration (Tomos) of Ukrainian church independence (sixty-three plus fourteen); and 10,419 clergymen versus to Metropolitan Epiphany of the OCU and to the presi- 4,438 (3,732 plus 706).6 However, these statistics do not dent of Ukraine, who was even mentioned by name: include the UOC MP dioceses in Crimea. It is also “This Patriarchal and Synodal Tome is […] delivered unclear if they include the rebel territories in Donbass. […] to His Excellency the President of Ukraine, Nevertheless, these official figures speak in favor of the Mr. Petro Poroshenko.”1 It is no coincidence that the assumption that over twelve thousand active parishes feast of Epiphany and the name of the newly elected and ten thousand clergymen of the UOC MP can hardly OCU metropolitan share the same origin, epiphany have fewer parishioners than the two opponent churches implying a manifestation of a divine being or nature to taken together. the people. Poroshenko’s stake in the electoral effect of church Mentioning a modern politician in a religious docu- autocephaly has sown the seeds for a new conflict in ment is extraordinary in and of itself. Yet by perpetuat- Ukraine for years to come. The UOC MP considered the ing the name of the incumbent Ukrainian president in actions of the Phanar as an intervention in its canonical the Tomos at the start of Ukraine’s 2019 presidential territory and broke the communion with it.7 The world’s race, the Phanar also did Poroshenko a favor since he Orthodox churches were taken aback by the actions of had made church autocephaly one of the three pillars of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine. The situation his re-election campaign (“Army, Language, and Faith”). thus raises the question of the Phanar’s motivation with In December 2018, for the first time in Ukrainian his- regard to Ukraine. My answers and analysis are pro- tory, Poroshenko imposed martial law in ten regions of vided in the following sections. the country in order to convene the required church council by cutting off the pro-Russian southeastern regions along the Russian border and the border with A Crafty Agreement with the Transnistria before amending the Constitution’s provi- Ecumenical Patriarchate sions on future NATO membership.2 The creation of the On 3 November 2018, President Poroshenko and new church is to be introduced to the school program in Patriarch Bartholomew signed an agreement between Ukrainian history in September 2019.3 the secular Ukrainian state and the Ecumenical Patriar- The statistical data on the exact share of each Ortho- chate based in Istanbul, Turkey, regarding the then- dox community in Ukraine remains subject to manipu- planned and now-implemented autocephaly of the lation. Some polls show a decrease in membership of Ukrainian Church. “The Agreement on Cooperation the largest church in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox and Collaboration between Ukraine and the Ecumenical Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) (only Patriarchate of Constantinople,” composed in both 15 percent), and an increase for the UOC KP (25 percent), Ukrainian and English, blatantly violated article 35 of a result achieved by excluding Crimea and the rebel the Ukrainian Constitution on the separation of church www.cees.uzh.ch 3 CEES Working Paper No. 2 and state.8 The agreement was only divulged in the the canon law and concede the right of the Phanar to Ukrainian language on 12 March 2019, on the eve of the lead, there remains the requirement to consult with all, first round of the presidential election.9 which was not the case in the unilateral actions of the This document exemplifies the post-secular practice Ecumenical Patriarchate in connection with the Tomos whereby state and church enter into an agreement with for Ukraine. each other as partners and refer to both church canons Canon 38 of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, also and secular law as a basis for their collaboration. It was known as the Council in Trullo (692 CE), speaks about agreed that the Phanar would establish its representa- the compliance of the church with the administrative tion in Ukraine, which includes a title to real estate division of the Byzantine Empire: “If a city was inno- (§3.1). It is also noteworthy that Ukraine, as a secular vated or should be innovated by royal authority, the state, “recognizes and respects the status of the order of ecclesial affairs shall follow the civic and public ecumenical patriarch as the first in honor among the patterns” (Εἴ τις ἐκ βασιλικῆς ἐξουσίας ἐκαινίσθη πόλις Orthodox patriarchs” (визнає та поважає статус ἢ αὖθις καινισθείη, τοῖς πολιτικοῖς καὶ δημοσίοις Вселенського Патріарха як першого за честю серед τύποις καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραγμάτων ἡ τάξις Православних Патріархів). However, what is even more ἀκολουθείτω).12 stunning is that Ukraine agrees that the Ecumenical However, if the text of apostolic canon 34 could Patriarchate has the right to issue declarations of church be manipulated in order to hoodwink the reader independence in accordance with canon 34 of the Holy who is not versed in Orthodox canon law, how does Apostles, canon 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, this particular regulation relate to the professed right and canon 38 of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (§3.2). of the Phanar to grant autocephaly? The argument These references to ancient Orthodox canon law require sounds far-fetched even in terms of a very broad inter- further analysis. In particular, canon 34 of the Holy pretation according to which “city” is reinterpreted Apostles was referred to in the agreement as evidence as “nation-state” and “royal authority” as “national for the Phanar’s right to grant autocephaly in the Ortho- government” or a kind of vox populi representing dox community. However, the original ancient Greek supreme power realized through elections in modern text reads: “The bishops of every ethnos should be aware democracies. of [who is] the first of them, acknowledge him as a head, Canon 17 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council in and do nothing without his opinion. Each of them Chalcedon is the only one referred to in the agreement should do only what pertains to his diocese and its dis- that can provide some basis for the ecumenical claims. tricts” (Τοὺς ἐπισκόπους ἑκάστου ἔθνους, εἰδέναι χρὴ The rule of the Council in Trullo quoted above was a τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρῶτον, καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς κεφαλήν, paraphrase of this original canon.