Letlhogonolo Mpho Letshele

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How to cite this thesis

Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RECURRENCE OF COUPS IN THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO – 1970-2014

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Department of Politics and International Relations

of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Johannesburg

by Letlhogonolo Mpho Letshele

201417806

October 2019

In Fulfilment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Johannesburg, South Africa

Supervisor: Prof Annie Barbara Chikwanha Co-Supervisor: Prof Chris Landsberg

ABSTRACT

Since its independence, the Kingdom of Lesotho has experienced the recurrence of coups (1970-2014). A process of re-democratisation was attempted in the country in 1993 but another coup succeeded the elections. The next elections in 1998 were marked by the worst political violence in the history of Lesotho. Electoral reforms were then introduced in 2002. Still, the reforms did not prevent the coup attempt in 2014. Understanding the factors causing these coups, and other related problems of political instability, is important for solving Lesotho’s general social and economic challenges. This study attempts to provide an explanation for recurrent coups in Lesotho by critically assessing the sociopolitical factors that nurture this practice; and examines particular patterns of events that could present the likelihood of the occurrence of these coups. By using a historical analysis of the trajectory of these coups, the study endeavours to identify the triggers of the coups and relate these to national political developments. The study makes use of a qualitative research design, and uses mostly secondary sources of data. The results are analysed via content analysis to identify the trigger similarities and differences, and correlations among the coups.

Keywords: Coups; Election-Related Conflict; Military Intervention; Lesotho Highlands Water Project; South Africa; Civil-Military Relations; Military-Police Relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Annie Barbara Chikwanha for all her hard work and commitment in the writing of my thesis. I would also like to extend my deepest gratitude to my co-supervisor Professor Chris Landsberg for his never- ending support and guidance in my academic journey.

I would like to thank the National University of Lesotho (NUL). I would like to extend a special thanks to both Professor Motlamelle Kapa and Dr Tlohang Letsie for their time and teachings during my stay at NUL. I would also like to thank the staff and scholars at the library at the National University of Lesotho. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the staff at the Morija Museum and Archives in Roma for their patience and guidance in my search for literature for the study. I would also like to thank Professor John Aerni-Flessner for sharing his invaluable historical knowledge of Lesotho. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Ralph Mathekga for his continued support in the writing of my thesis.

I would like to thank the SARChI Chair on African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy and the Department of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Johannesburg for providing an encouraging environment to complete my research. I would like acknowledge Ellen Joubert for her excellent work in the editing of the thesis.

I am eternally grateful to my family, and to my mother, for her never-ending moral support in the writing of my thesis.

Table of Contents Page Number AFFIDAVIT 2 ABSTRACT 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 8

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 9

CHAPTER ONE: A CRITICAL NARRATIVE OF THE LESOTHO COUPS 11

1.1 Introduction 11

1.2 Problem Statement 14

1.3 Study Objectives 19

1.4 Methodology 20

1.5 Research Ethics 21

1.6 Structure of the Study 21

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 23

CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LESOTHO COUPS 37

3.1 Introduction 37

3.2 Embroynic Democracy, 1965-1970 39

3.3 Authoritarian Rule, 1970-86 41

3.4 Military Rule, 1986-93 44

3.5 Fragile Democracy, 1993-2014 48

3.6 Conclusion 52

5 CHAPTER FOUR: UNRAVELLING THE RECURRENCE OF COUPS 61

4.1 Introduction 61

4.2 An Overview of the Root Causes of the Coups 62

4.2.1 Formation of Political Parties and the role of the Church 62

4.2.2 Relationship between Chief Leabua Jonathan and King

Moshoeshoe II 63

4.2.3 Significance of the 1965 pre-independence General Elections 65

4.2 Explaining the Recurrence of Lesotho’s Coups 67

4.3 The 2014 Attempted Coup and the role of ‘Coalition Politics’ 76

4.4 Conclusion 82

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S

INTERVENTIONS IN LESOTHO 87

5.1 Introduction 87

5.2 An Overview of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho 89

5.2.1 The 1986 Military Coup Case 89

5.2.2 The 1994 Military Crisis Case 91

5.2.3 The 1998 Constitutional Crisis Case 92

5.2.4 The 2014 Attempted Coup Case 94

5.3 An Analysis of the role of South Africa in Lesotho’s Politics and the Coups 96

5.4 Conclusion 100

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 106

6.1 Conclusion 6.1.1 Introduction 106

6 6.1.2 The Evolution of the Coups 106 6.1.3 What has been the response to these Coups? 112 6.1.4 The Objective of the Study and Research Methodology 112 6.1.5 The Meaning of Coup (s) 112 6.1.6 Summary of Research Findings 113

6.2 Recommendations 116 6.2.1 The National Government 116 6.2.2 The South African Government 117 6.2.3 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 117 REFERENCE LIST 118

APPENDICES 124

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: The 1970 General Election for the National Assembly Table 2: The 1993 General Election for the National Assembly Table 3: The 1998 General Election for the National Assembly Table 4: Types of Coups in Lesotho Table 5: The 2012 National Assembly Seat Allocation

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABC- All Basotho Convention Party ANC- African National Congress AU- African Union BAC- Basutoland African Congress Party BCP- Basutoland Congress Party BDF- Botswana Defence Force BNP- Basotho National Party CAR- Central African Republic CDP- Christian Democratic Party DC- Democratic Congress DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States FPTP- First Past the Post IEC- Independent Electoral Commission IMF- International Monetary Fund IPA- Interim Political Authority KBP- Kopanang Basotho Party LAC- Lesotho Agricultural College LCD- Lesotho Congress for Democracy LCN- Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations LDF- Lesotho Defence Force LEC- Lesotho Evangelical Church LHWP- Lesotho Highlands Water Project

9 LLA- Lesotho Liberation Army LMPS- Lesotho Mounted Police Service LPF- Lesotho Paramilitary Force MCO- Ministerial Committee of the Organ MFP- Marematlou Freedom Party MMP- Mixed-Member Proportional MSA- Maseru Security Accord NIP- National Independence Party NUL- National University of Lesotho OTAM- Organ Troika Assessment Mission PAC- Pan-Africanist Congress PEMS- Paris Evangelical Missionary Society PFD- Popular Front for Democracy PMU- Police Mobile Unit PR- Proportional Representation RCC- Roman Catholic Church SACP- South African Communist Party SACU- Southern African Customs Union SADC- Southern African Development Community SANDF- South African National Defence Force UDP- United Democratic Party UNDP United Nations Development Programme USA- United States of America

CHAPTER ONE A CRITICAL NARRATIVE OF THE LESOTHO COUPS

1.1 Introduction

This thesis analyzes the history and causes of coups in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Understanding the transition from colonial to independent rule in Lesotho gives important clarity in the post-colonial context and gives understanding into the recurrence of the coups. The chapter first provides a short historical overview, the problem statement; followed by the research questions and study objectives, the research methodology and the structure of the study. Lesotho is a very small landlocked country consisting of a population of 2 203 821 (2018), spread across approximately 30 000 square kilometers. The country is surrounded by South Africa on which it depends economically and primarily for access to the outside world.

The Kingdom of Lesotho is classified as a Constitutional Monarchy, wherein the Prime Minister is the head of the government and the King is the head of the state (Matlosa & Shale, 2006:3). The King shares power with a constitutionally structured government (Ibid, 2006). The elected parliament makes and passes legislation. As such, Lesotho embodies a governance regime that mixes contemporary democratic systems with traditional governance. As a former protectorate of Great Britain, Lesotho inherited the British Westminster model of government that embraces parliamentary democracy. The National Assembly is made up of 120 seats, in which 80 members are elected according to the constituency basis and the other 40 members by proportional representation (Matlosa, 2002). Until the 1998 general

11 elections, Lesotho used the constituency-based First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral model, which was changed to the Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) in 2002 (Ibid, 2002).

The first coup in Lesotho took place in 1970. The coup was preceded by the first post-independent elections in the same year. The Basutoland African Congress Party (BCP) won the elections, however, Chief Jonathan Leabua, Prime Minister at the time, refused to give up power to the victorious BCP. Chief Jonathan Leabua subsequently dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution. Some members of the opposition were arrested, and the King exiled to the Netherlands. Lesotho would be turned into a one-party dictatorship.

The second coup took place when the military in Lesotho deposed Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime from power in 1986. Lesotho had been under economic sanctions by apartheid South Africa. South Africa used economic sanctions together with military attacks by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to force Lesotho to exile ANC liberation fighters. As such, the military intervened to stop South Africa from attacking Lesotho and moreover, to stop the economic sanctions that led to serious hardships under Chief Jonathan Leabua’s foreign policy with South Africa.

Another coup took place five years later, in 1991. The coup had in fact been preceded by an army mutiny in 1990, which had resulted from factions and power struggles forming within the military-monarch alliance. The intra-military power struggles led to general discontentment with the military regime in Lesotho. Also, there was mounting pressure to return multiparty democracy to the country. As a result of these developments, junior soldiers staged a coup. This coup would remove Major General Metsing Lekhanya from the position of commander of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF).

When the country returned to democratic rule in 1993, a royal coup took place, in the next year in 1994. The monarchy (King Letsie III) removed the elected BCP government and suspended parliament. The King had reacted in response to opposition party demands to dissolve parliament after the Basutoland National Party

12 (BNP), and other opposition parties called for its collapse when they argued that the BCP had rigged the elections. The elections were marked by post- election violence which led to the military crisis. The military crisis was only quelled by a Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention that encouraged negotiation between the conflicting parties.

The political instability being experienced in Lesotho can be traced to the 2012 general elections. To date, causes of political instability in Lesotho have been around the formation and functioning of coalition governments which have become a permanent feature of Lesotho politics since 2012. Contested electoral outcomes which arose during the new re-democratisation era in Lesotho have remained a stain on the country’s democratic practices. A lack of accountable, public institutions has also played a significant role in undermining Lesotho’s political instability. The political environment has thus always been unstable and anarchic, with sporadic political violence.

The recurrence of coups in Lesotho have had a harmful effect on the economy of the country, loss of lives, a damaged international image, and intensified political tensions with harmful costs on the country’s social structures (Gebrenmichael, Feyissa & Kidane, 2019). “SADC has made efforts to decrease the recurrence of coups in Lesotho through interventions and more recently a peace facilitation process following the 2014 coup against Prime Minister Thomas Thabane” (Ibid, 2019: 12). SADC recommended criminal investigations into the killing, dismissal of Kamoli, and the reforms of the constitution, public sector and security sector.

SADC first intervened in the political conflict in Lesotho after the military crisis in 1994. Since then, the regional organisation has intervened in all Lesotho’s political conflicts. SADC intervened in Lesotho’s political instability three more times since its first intervention, however, the country still experiences recurrent coups. The organisation has failed to stop the conflicts. Despite extreme efforts by SADC and the holding of two snap elections in 2015 and 2017, security and political stability in Lesotho has yet to be achieved (Gebrenmichael et. al, 2019). Thus, what has been the effectiveness of the external mediation? Even though Lesotho has made great strides towards becoming a stable democracy, there has been insufficient progress

13 made in recognising, advancing respect for, constitutionalism, rule of law and access to justice. There are certain laws and policies that continue to infringe on the rule of law. What is the potential position, and the missed opportunities of not including appropriately South Africa and SADC in the peacebuilding? How has the monarchy, and the army impacted democracy in the country? Thus, has the peace process been sensitive to these military-monarch relations? Moreover, the assassinations of two army chiefs of staff and several senior police officers in 2015 and 2017, as well as numerous clashes between elements in the army and police loyal to political factions, is a cause of concern and frustration to the efforts invested so far in the peace process (Ibid, 2019). Another major factor influencing the political instability in Lesotho is the country’s socio-economic problems. Lesotho has experienced various challenges that have prevented the country from achieving political stability and economic growth. Lesotho is ranked among the most impoverished countries in Africa with high levels of inequality and poverty and has one of the highest rates of unemployment on the continent (Gebrenmichael, Feyissa & Kidane, 2019). About 57% of the country’s citizens live in extreme poverty. The rate of unemployment in Lesotho is estimated at 25% among the youth. The country is also ranked among the countries with the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the region (Gebrenmichael, et al., 2019).

Zondi (2014) argues that the colonisation of Lesotho by the British resulted in the creation of the Moshoeshoe dynasty. This colonial dynasty would replace the federal system of government that existed in Lesotho before the chieftainship. As such, this angered other kingdoms, which were isolated in the process of the colonisation. These historical developments in the early colonisation of Lesotho still remain a causal factor of the political instability experienced in Lesotho’s politics today. The colonial system was successful in creating what Mamdani (1996) terms the 'bifurcated state'. The colonial administration created a decentralised tyranny, a situation still found in Lesotho's problems today. During this period, chiefs were restrained and betrayed their own by becoming local informers and guardians for the colonial state. However, Machobane and Karschay (1990) argue that Lesotho was governed under “Parallel Rule”. As a result, Lesotho does not fit well into overarching characterisations of colonialism in Africa because of this. Mamdani (1996) is seemingly speaking mostly about “indirect rule” in this context. Nevertheless, this

14 protraction of a native society along tribal lines would be named ethnicity, which would cause some of the major conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Basotho spent the past 50 years trying to establish an independent, sovereign state of Lesotho. They contended with the difficulties of decolonising the state handed to them. It would have been much easier to rename it, give an important role to their monarchy, establish new schools and hospitals, establish a party-based democracy and become an active member of the community of nations, than to get rid of the curse of fragility, limited sovereignty and other colonial legacies that haunt post- independence Lesotho.

The existence of coups in Lesotho is historically derived from the creation of the post-colonial state Lesotho inherited. Like most African states, Lesotho is a creation of the British colonial empire, which established Basutoland in the 19th century. The colonial state was formed out of concerns and interests arising outside Basotho as a people and outside Southern Africa in general. “It is a state shaped by the distortion of indigenous state, society and economy in order to serve as a subservient source of resources and cheap labour for the colonial economy in Southern Africa and the imperial economy” (Zondi, 2014:2). Lesotho’s socio-economic problems, marked by poverty, unemployment and inequality have turned the contestation over state power into a warfare among the political elites. These political infightings have undermined attempts to tackle socio-economic challenges. Therefore, consequently, socio- economics have resulted in the lack of consolidation of democracy in Lesotho.

Lesotho inherited a state designed to facilitate the exploitation of the population for the benefit of the regional colonial economy built on mining and agriculture in modern day South Africa, and for the good of global imperialism with comparatively negligible benefits for the local bourgeoisie (Zondi, 2014) The modernisation of the people and the land of Basotho through a civilising mission, was not an innocent and interest-free pursuit of progress, but rather to become a guerilla movement engaged in running battles with apartheid South Africa.

As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Lesotho adopted a constitutional monarchy. According to this political system, the King shares power with a constitutionally organised government and the capacity to make and pass legislation

15 with a chosen Parliament. As a result, Lesotho’s constitution debilitates the King as it prohibits him any political engagement. Along these lines, the debilitating of the King by means of the constitution places him in the situation of an insignificant observer, with the military and the government being the main institutions with political power.

Given that the monarchy is restricted by the constitution, Monyane (2009: 16) posits that this transition shifted the power from the traditional institution. With the King’s role in Lesotho’s politics restricted by the constitution, the monarchy would be seen mainly as nothing but a puppet of the regime in power at any given time. Over time, the monarchy attempted to proclaim its power but was unsuccessful. On the one hand, the emasculation of the monarchy prompted the King into forming alliances with the army so he could have access to the control over political activities in Lesotho. On the other hand, the military became aware that while it was vying for greater acceptance in the society, it needed a credible partner such as the King who was viewed as a symbol of unity (Gill, 1993). “The monarchy, a subject of intense controversy was drawn to the arena of politics to provide legitimacy the military seizure of power” (Mahao, 1997: 2). The monarchy increasingly became perceived as a political contestant. According to Weisfelder (1997) and Machobane (2001) the restoration of the monarchy is one explanation for the political crisis. Similarly, King Letsie III attempted to seize political power through the royal coup in 1994. On account of the 1998 constitutional crisis, the King assumed a central role in opposition parties’ protests. I concur therefore with Monyane (2009: 16) that the monarchy makes up an important aspect of the anatomy of persistent political instability in Lesotho.

The existence of coups and related problems of political control is directly connected to Lesotho’s problematic elections. Lesotho’s post-independence elections until 1998 resulted in violent disputes over the outcome of the election. The key issue was the use of the FPTP electoral model. The FPTP allocated seats disproportionately from the overall percentage of party votes (Dyer, 2003) and ensured that the winning party becomes the sole representative of the government (Grimwood, 2017). Thus, this system excluded minority party votes from being represented in parliament (Mahao 1997; Matlosa, 2008).

16 However, Sekatle (1997) challenges the notion that the FPTP electoral model was a contributing cause in the democracy breakdown. She contends that the electoral model does not deliberately exclude the minorities and losing parties’ participation. The point of reference is the 1965 and 1970 elections. Hence, she argues that the outcome of “one-party parliament” that emerged from the 1993 and 1998 elections was in fact the historical anomaly synonymous with the BNP’s rule. Notwithstanding the explanation provided by Sekatle, Lesotho’s electoral process resulted in serious political instability to the extent of inducing the coups in 1970 and 1994, as well as causing the political crisis in 1998, which was quelled by a SADC intervention. In order to fully examine the political consequence of a country’s electoral model, Croissant (2015) states “three functional demands can be discerned i.e. representation, integration and decision”. He defines each of the three terms below:

Firstly, elections should speak to the individuals, for example the political will of the electorate. In this way, it is important that the electoral system is adequately relative to accomplish a wide transformation of the wide scope of pluralistic social interest into political mandates. Secondly, elections should incorporate the electorate. An election system that is aimed at achieving successful integration should ideally complement formation of cohesive political parties. This in turn leads to greater integration in parliament without individual or isolated representatives. Thirdly, elections must produce representative majorities large enough to ensure the stability of government and its capacity to administer.

Lesotho’s coups have been caused, in part, by regional power’s influence over Lesotho’s internal environment. Luttwak (2016) argues that “if the state is substantially dependent on a foreign nation for its national security, coup plotters will need to gain the support for the coup from the foreign power” (Luttwak, 2016: 43).

In fact, the bilateral relations between the two neighbours took a bad turn when the South African government assassinated African National Congress (ANC) exiles in Lesotho in 1982. Subsequently, Chief Leabua Jonathan reacted by threat to halt talks of the transfer of water from Lesotho to South Africa in 1983. The foreign policy relations soured even further when the apartheid government threatened to invade

17 Lesotho militarily and impose economic sanctions on Lesotho to force the country to stick to its end of the deal. South Africa then imposed border controls. This led to food shortages in Lesotho.

Essentially, South Africa managed to successfully force Lesotho into acting in favour of its own interests by imposing economic sanctions on the country. Within a period of three days of the sanctions, Lesotho was in serious need of petrol. This marked increased suffering of people under Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime. The military was, therefore forced to take over to save the people from hunger and suffering because of the economic sanctions by the apartheid government in South Africa as the result of its own interests.

Luttwak’s (2016:43) theory therefore underpins some of the interpretations of the 1986 military coup. Scholars suggest that the coup was successful because of the support provided by the apartheid government in South Africa.

Therefore, the level of assistance received by a dependent (economic) country from a foreign power affects the probability of a coup attempt in the dependent country. Once the military assumed power, relations between the two countries stabilised and, in the same year, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) Treaty was signed. Lesotho needed to balance its independence and interdependence with its neighbour in order to maintain economic stability.

“This kind of dependence on South Africa makes Lesotho vulnerable to the politics of a powerful neighbour” (Monyane, 2009: 1). As lower middle-income country and landlocked, Lesotho is subject to domestic pressures, easily vulnerable to any economic and political upheaval that South Africa experiences. Such political interdependence ultimately affects the economic performance of Lesotho.

1.2 Problem Statement

The main purpose of this study is to understand the nature of the recurrent conflicts in Lesotho through an analysis of the recurrence of coups. The main research question being posited in this thesis is why a homogeneous (used in this context to

18 explain the general similarity in the language and culture) nation is susceptible to the recurrence of coups and breakdown of democracy. As Lesotho is a coup prone country, what are the sociopolitical factors that nurture the likelihood of this practice? Is there a clearly identifiable pattern of events that could help predict when coups are likely to occur? By analysing the historical trajectory of the coups, the study aims to determine the causes of the coups and link them to national political events.

Lesotho has experienced coups since the country gained independence. Coups have hindered the consolidation of democracy in the country resulting in further problems of political instability. Coups have characterised the civil-military and military-police relations in the country reducing these institutions to political actors in the struggle for political power. Coups have negatively affected the process of elections in Lesotho. Elections have been disrupted because of the execution of a coup, this has once led to a period of authoritarianism in the country. The existence of coups in Lesotho has led to the multiple interventions by South Africa and SADC. The recurrence of coups in Lesotho has led to the loss of lives and destabilisation of the economy. Therefore, a critical analysis of these coups essentially, helps the government in Lesotho to be better prepared for the probability of a coup d’ état and to be in a better position to prevent its occurrence or even limit its impact on human lives and the political stability in Lesotho. The study adds to broader knowledge of peace and conflict, conflict prevention in Lesotho, and peace and security in the SADC region.

1.3 Study Objectives

The study attempts to provide explanations for the existence of coups – military and non-military – in Lesotho, and for why Lesotho has remained susceptible to these coups. This is achieved mainly through investigating the causes of the perennial coups through a case study of their occurrence in Lesotho. The study aims to demonstrate that though there is a plethora of factors, that is, political and economic contributing to the existence of coups in Lesotho, there are some of these factors

19 that in fact result in the recurrence of the coups, which is the main aim of the thesis. These are the factors that the study aims to identify in order to determine the explanations for recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The study intends to unravel the trajectory of these coups, by doing so, the study attempts to determine the common factors found in the coups. A clear understanding of the pattern of political and/or economic events that led to the coups helps to determine from a historical perspective, when coups are more likely to occur in Lesotho. This also helps to identify the triggers of these coups in national political developments. The objective of the study is to analyse critically the history and causes of the coups in order to identify the triggers and patterns that could help predict when coups are likely to occur in Lesotho.

The study therefore focuses on the study objectives and research questions stated below:

The study aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What is the relationship between political developments and the recurrence of coups in the Kingdom – what is it that the country fails to do right? Why do political agreements not hold? 2. Do civilian-military relations play a role in the recurrence of these coups – what is the role of the military in these coups? Were the military coups intended to restore the monarchy, and change the electoral system?

3. What is the role of the Church in Lesotho’s politics– does its role in history contribute to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in the Kingdom?

4. What is the role of the monarchy in Lesotho’s politics– does its role in history contribute to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in the Kingdom?

1.4 Methodology

20 This section provides an outline of the methods used to conduct this qualitative study. The section is divided into subsections that include; research design, methodology, qualitative data and ethical considerations. A qualitative research design is the preferred method used to question about experience, meaning and perspectives and was regarded as the most suitable to respond to the complex research questions and achieve the study objectives of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The qualitative approach was selected for this study because of its diversity in data collection methods which increased the scope of the sources used to inform the study.

The study utilised the case study approach. The case study approach is generally the best method to employ when ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are being hypothesised (Ragin, 1992: 6) such as in this study. Therefore, the study employed the case study method to determine the political and economic factors that led to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho (1970-2014). The factors were analysed to determine the similarities, differences, and correlations between the coups and relate them to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho (Vrooma, 2007:12). Therefore, the study is both investigative and explanatory research, as it aims to define the how and why aspects of a problem (Shonhe, 2011: 40). The study used secondary data in the area of investigation. Secondary sources included books, journals, articles, published as well as unpublished research dissertations and the media (e.g. newspapers). The study relied on analysis of past and current literature on coups (Pallaver, 2011:23).

I visited the National University of Lesotho (NUL) and Morija Museum and Archives to gather secondary information from the local library. Casual conversations with locals in Lesotho led to specific sources of information and often supported my observations. These included random and unstructured conversations with the objective of gaining understanding of the Lesotho conflict setting and the citizens’ ways of seeing it. The discussions were simply guided by the conversations that ensued when searching for data. The conversations helped in discovering and establishing the sequence of events that were further backed by secondary literature. Relevant literature was used to interpret all the data.

1.5 Research Ethics

The study remains limited to desktop study. However, upon visiting Lesotho for collection of secondary data I had some casual conversations with some individuals that revealed important caveats for the study. These conversations pointed to key data sources and events deemed essential for inclusion in the study.

1.6 Structure of the Study

In an attempt to answer the outlined research questions, and achieve the study objectives, the study proceeds in six main chapters. Chapter one consists of the introduction to the study, the research questions and study objectives and methodology. Chapter two consists of the literature review and the theoretical framework. Chapter three presents the historical overview of coups in Lesotho. Chapter four analyses the events surrounding each coup in an attempt to explain the recurrence of the phenomenon in Lesotho. Chapter five discusses the role of South Africa in Lesotho’s politics and the coup(s). Chapter six provides concluding remarks and recommendations for future studies.

22 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides a review of some of the most important literature on coups in order to establish a solid methodological framework to answer the stated research questions and study objectives. An examination into relevant literature helps to determine the occurrence of coups from a historical perspective. Although there is vast literature on coups, it is my assertion that it is incomplete in explaining the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. As Lesotho is a coup prone country, what are the sociopolitical factors that nurture this unconstitutional practice, and are there any clearly identifiable patterns of events that could help predict when coups are likely to occur? The greed and grievance theory, liberal democratic theory, political development theory, economic theory of conflict and the coloniality/decolonial theory offer theoretical literature of this study, since the Lesotho conflict centres on all the issues that these theories deal with. Huntington (1998) argues in his book Political Order in Changing Societies that political and economic reasons provide powerful motives for the execution of a coup. Similarly, Finer in Men on Horseback (1975), argues that coups take place in states lacking institutionalised political cultures and that experience economic problems. While they acknowledge the economic aspect, their work focuses specifically on political factors.

The study on the recurrence of coups in Lesotho borrows heavily from the theoretical framework of the scholar Jonathan M Powell (2012) who researched in the field of international relations and comparative politics in dynamics related to conflict and democratisation with a focus on the role civil-military relations play in these processes. The recurrence of coups and the role of the military in the political affairs of a state have contributed immensely to the political turmoil that most African countries encounter today. Jonathan Powell’s research is therefore relevant for this study because it will help answer the research questions. Jonathan Powell’s findings are also underpinned by McGowan and Johnson’s three-type classification of coups, borrowed from African Military Coups d’états and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis (1984). The classification is based on the intention stated by the coup makers at the time of the takeover, that is, before they have been influenced by

23 the actual possession of power. Second, the classification depends on the coup maker's own announcements concerning the takeover or on the activities of the new rulers during the first days after the takeover. The classification helps to summarise the coups that have taken place in Lesotho.

Classification of Coups

The first classification is political coups; these coups are aimed at broad political change in a country. It might be an endeavour to advance a dynamic and radical policy, for example, Ghana in 1960; or it might be to make a previous approach progressively radical, as in the case of Somalia or in the Sudan in 1969. Albeit a military coup in time may prompt a radical political course, such a change has not generally been the immediate interest at the time of the coup. An example in Lesotho is the military coup in 1986 that deposed Chief Jonathan Leabua’s dictatorial regime.

The second, arbitrator coups, take place when the military intervenes in a political power struggle in support of one side over the other. This coup acts as a form of arbitration between various political interests. An example in Lesotho is the military intervention during the 1994 political crisis wherein the army intervened against the BCP government. Another example of such an intervention is the 1958 coup in Sudan. And, another example is Sierra Leone in 1967, when the army intervened on behalf of one party. The third category, politically limited coups, lacks political ambition. There is no struggle between different parties or factions, and the takeover does not bring about any extensive political changes. Such coups are inspired by military interest in an isolated issue. An example in Lesotho is 1990, and 1991 when the military staged a mutiny. The military may also intervene when political tension in a country becomes extreme to the extent that the regime can no longer assert its authority. An example is the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1966. Another example is Togo in 1963. The coups of 1975 in Nigeria and of 1978 in Ghana are also examples of internal power struggles in the ruling military regime (Wiking, 1983: 75).

Democratic Peace Theory

Coups are the most likely way that most democratic states revert back to authoritarianism. In some cases, the deposed regime was dictatorial and constrained the democratic space impeding a democratic transfer of power. According to Wobig (2013: 67), coups are therefore one of the most common ways by which all political regimes have experienced unconstitutional transfers of power. While coups have been a major feature of dictatorships because they are regarded to be the best way to deal with dictators, in recent years, democracies are becoming threatened by coups. The military in Lesotho staged a coup although the authority of the government in 1994 and 2014 respectively emanated from a democratic election. Therefore, understanding what motives contribute to the likelihood of coups, whether as enhancers or deterrents, is important to the greater understanding of what factors shape the modern democracies that have emerged.

Coups are not always provoked by bad governance as the liberal democratic peace theory suggests, but by the opportunistic greed of the army. The coup that deposed President Dawda Jawaera in Gambia emanated from soldiers demanding higher pay. The 1991 military coup in Lesotho emanated from members of the army demanding more wages and better working conditions. Mothibe (1999) argues that this made them willing accomplices in the execution of the coup. “Army officers may actually be responsible for executing the coups as demonstrated by the willingness to support the various factions in Lesotho’s politics including the monarchy” (Ibid, 1999).

Coups are often the result of the military’s intervention in politics. Similarly, Huntington (1957), argues that “the major contributing factors for the military’s intervention in politics are not military but political” (Huntington, 1957:7). According to Huntington, coups are as such a measure of how much legitimacy a civilian regime enjoys in the eyes of the people (Ibid, 1957). Therefore, “when soldiers intervene, they perceive themselves as saviors, whose actions are solely motivated by a desire

25 to rescue the state from the ineptitude or malfeasance of the civilians they overthrow” (Loum, 2000:8).

Greed Theory

The greed argument considers conflict in society as emanating from the greed of humans and their desire to profit from conflict that drives them to go into want to go into war (Collier, 2006). Collier (2006) mentions a rebel group, as an example, which uses ‘grievances’ as a reason to go into war in order to achieve economic gains. When democratic governments attempt to adopt policies that are likely to depart from the military’s preference, the military has the motivation to intervene (Cook & Savun, 2016; 53). Needler (1987: 59) argues the military intervenes in politics from a convergence of motives in which defence of the military itself predominates. In contrast, Janowitz (1977) argues that soldiers can “intervene out of patriotism, discipline, professionalism and cohesion” (Ibid, 1977). Elsewhere, soldiers claim legitimacy, efficiency, stability, unity and developments opposed to the above (Liebenow, 1986). However, in Lesotho’s case, military interventions have been “about the preservation of power for institutions that had to make way for popular power” (Monyane, 2009: 17). Huntington, in The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics and Politics and Civil Military Relations (1957), thus, argues that in actual fact the most important explanations of military intervention in politics are not military but political.

Grievance Theory

On the other hand, the grievance theory argues that conflict in society does not only emanate from human greed but from a plethora of economic, social and even historical factors (Collier, 2006). Collier (2006) further contends that

While factors such as geography, history and religion may contribute to conflict; however, largely, it is the lack of economic opportunities and underdevelopment that in fact is more likely to cause conflict in a society. As a result, economic differences within a society make up the major factors that propel people to go into war. According to Berdal and Malone (2000); this is likely, though there are many other

26 factors involved. This is evidenced in the fact that when the economic needs of an individual or a group of people within a society are not adequately met, this may result in economic and political problems (Faleti, 2006). Therefore, the grievance theory sees the existence of military coups in particular to the case in Lesotho, as emanating from the government’s disregard for the military’s grievances (Mothibe, 1999: 49). In essence, the army in Lesotho represents an aggrieved group within a society, and as such may likely respond with violence to resolve its grievances. Berdal and Malone (2000) and Faleti (2006) therefore contend that competition for control of access to economic assets, resources and systems; make up the underlying factors of conflict in society. Notably, the grievance hypothesis (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) demonstrates how the victims manage their grievances and most importantly how the perpetrators of inequality, political oppression, ethnic and religious divisions, respond to grievances.

Relative Depravation Theory

Closely tied to the grievance argument, the relative depravation theory sees conflict as emanating from depravation of the satisfaction of the human need. Contrary to the grievance theory, the relative depravation hypothesis assesses the needs of two individuals or groups relative to one another. Naturally, human beings have a lot of needs they seek to fulfil, although these needs can sometimes be limited to certain individuals, cultures or groups, there are some basic needs that will be common to all human beings. As such, depravation of these needs by other groups within society like the army, or another individual, can result in conflict (Rosati, 1990). This is because these needs are non-negotiable and as such cannot be replaced; therefore, any deterrence to the fulfillment of these needs by one group will provoke strong resistance to that group, usually through violence (Burton, 1990). For example, needs such as freedom, security and participation are fundamental to all human beings and as such, are some of the needs that cannot be compromised or even replaced. Therefore, giving access to one group and denying access to another is similar to complete denial and could result in people wanting to go into to war (Faleti, 2006).

Liberal Democratic Theory

27 The liberal democratic theory argues that the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is a sign of a lack of a consolidated democracy. Since independence in 1966, Lesotho has struggled with the institutionalisation of democracy. Moremoholo (2005) argues that the democratic transition did not involve institutional reform. This weakened key state institution namely; the military, police, judiciary, and the electoral system. Similarly, Huntington in The Crisis of Democracy (1975) argues that coups have a high probability of taking place in states lacking institutionalised political culture. The political development theory strengthens the liberal democratic position that political institutional building has failed to keep pace with economic development. This resulted in the upsurge in social mobilisation and political participation (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990: 862). Social mobilisation and political participation increase political demands and post-colonial states in Africa have not effectively responded to these demands.

Neo-patrimonialism Theory

As post-colonial states, they inherited patrimonial and clientelist administrations. They inherited a weak military professionalism which encourages interventions. Moreover, most post-colonial states adopted constitutional systems that created factionalised multiparty regimes which created political stalemates and unresponsive governments (Jenkins et. al., 1980: 862). When these governments failed to respond to rising popular demands, the military intervened an “instituted exclusionary or participation measures that provoked further and political instabilities” (Ibid, 1980: 862).

The recurrence of coups in Lesotho likely emanates from the notion of neo- patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism can be understood as a hybrid regime made up of, on one side, an exterior rational state-like apparatus (the neo) and on the other side, is made up of a network of elites that gather political support through using their position to distribute jobs, rent-seeking opportunities and resources as personal favours (Bratton and Van de Walle, in deGrassi, 2008: 1). African states are classified as being patrimonial as these states coexist with modern bureaucracy officeholders systematically appropriating public resources for their own use and political authority, largely based on clientelist practices, including patronage, various

28 forms of rent-seeking, and prebendalism (Van de Walle, 2001: 52). Kabemba (2003) argues that Lesotho, like the post-colonial state in Africa is trapped in the problem of patrimonialism. The capture of state power in Lesotho is translated into economic power through accumulation; the state becomes inextricably entangled, resulting in a rent-seeking state with rent-seeking elite connecting themselves to the state, turning the state monopoly to their personal benefit and to that of their families, friends, and clients (Matlosa, 1997).

Under these circumstances winning elections becomes more than just capturing state power. The stakes become high and losers at the elections hardly come to terms with the loss. This is because the loss of elections does not imply only the loss of parliamentary seats, it also implies loss of employment opportunity, and all related financial gains. The losers resort to desperate measures that in most cases lead to eruption or intensification in conflict. The importance attached to winning elections is evident in Lesotho. Because of a weak economy and a lack of a viable private sector, the state in Lesotho has become the second largest employer after the volatile and poorly paying textile industry (Kapa, 2006).

The implication of this is that patronage is used by those who hold state power to provide the scarce employment opportunities to those who are in one way or another aligned to the political elite of the ruling party. On the other hand, centrality of the state in economy implies that government tenders are usually given to the traders and firms that have links to the ruling party. This state of affairs renders elections in Lesotho a zero-sum game, hence all the struggles over elections. While it is true that competition for the spoils of office occurs even in liberal-democratic systems, it is in illiberal democracies such as Lesotho where 54 neo-patrimonial tendencies are most common. This emanates from weak institutions which cannot adequately deal with corrupt officials.

Election-related Conflict Theory

Many scholars concur that there is a direct relationship between the type of elections held and conflict (Goodwin, 2006). They argue that whenever elections are not free and fair, there is a high probability of conflict and vice versa (Letsie, 2009: 48). This

29 is generally because, free and fair elections engender stability. Though complex in nature, free and fair elections ideally must be grounded on the following guidelines; voting rights, political/candidature party rights and electoral management (Goodwin, 2006; Letsie, 2009: 48). These guidelines are based on the democratic theory and have been employed in the study as barometer to understand election-related conflicts as it manifests itself in Lesotho (Letsie, 2009: 47).

Lesotho’s problems of political instability are the result of all these issues mentioned above. One of the most important triggers in the electoral process was the electoral model. According to Dyer, (2003: 143) electoral models “act as variables in the distribution of political power”. Therefore, the use of good and legitimate electoral models may reduce or eliminate election-related conflicts (Letsie, 2009). However, it is not easy to say which among such models, is the best as none has proven to be immune to criticism. For the purpose of this study, two electoral models have been analysed, namely FPTP and MMP. These are the models that form part of Lesotho’s electoral process. FPTP is credited for producing “one party majority governments which are mostly stable than coalition governments” (Dyer, 2003). It also ensures accountability as “it makes it easier for votes to get rid of the party they do not like from the government, replacing it with the new; the feat that is not very easy in coalition governments” (Blais and Massicote, 1996: 73).

The system is, however, criticised for allocating seats disproportionately from the overall percentage of party votes (Dyer, 2003). The system is further weak as it excludes minority party votes from being represented in parliament (Mahao 1997; Matlosa, 2008). In the case of the MMP system, the major advantage of the model is that it combines advantages of both the FPTP and Proportional Representation systems, particularly concerning broadening parliamentary representation. Like all other models, MMP has not been able to avoid criticism. It is accused among others for affording smaller parties a platform in parliament and in government through the formation of coalition governments which are mostly unstable (Dyer, 2003; Also see Motsamai, 2018).

Civil-Military Relations Theory

30 Civil-military relations offer a different way of analysing causes of coups. The term refers to the interaction between the military and the rest of society (Ngoma, 2004). Huntington and Janowitz’s analysis of the military and its relation to the country is the notion of professionalism. The key consequence of this professionalism-orientated model is, according to Huntington, that it provides a way to weaken the military politically while at the same time allowing it to be a strong military, thereby ensuring both civilian control and military effectiveness (Huntington, 1957). On one hand, at the heart of Huntington’s analysis is the argument for a strict separation between the values of the military profession and those of liberal civil society. Any imposition or infusion of liberal values into the military would undermine its military effectiveness (Ibid, 1957). And, on the other hand, Janowitz’s (1960) analysis is driven by the argument that the military is increasingly becoming ‘constabulary forces’ rather than traditional warfighters (Baker, 2007:117). However, both concurred that the membership of the society of military professionals must be restricted to those who belong to the officer corps.

The scope of the military is increasingly not limited to the high-end spectra of violence but also extends to the middle (protests, crowd and riot control etc.) and even low end (ie theft and violence by individuals). This subsequently leads to the military’s tasks converging with those of the police. When the police want to fight a war against terrorism and organised crime, and simultaneously deal with middle-end violence, it therefore has to adjust its methods and means. In order to deal with these threats; the police have to train and equip officers to operate at the high end of police violence. These changes will inevitably lead to a militarisation of the police.

Military Relations Theory The overarching functions of the military makes the military increasingly suitable to perform generally regarded domestic security tasks. Also, on the other hand, the functions of the police are increasing as they are increasingly using military strategies organisational concepts and equipment to work effectively in violent conditions.” “What is happening in fact is that the two security organisations are increasingly overlapping and are becoming competitors in the same security market” (Working Group ‘Military and Police Relations’). As such, do we want the police to militarise or should the armed forces have a more distinct role in national domestic

31 security? Should the military's involvement in national security prevent a further militarisation of the police or should a further militarisation of the police stop an increasing military interest in public security? In the case of Lesotho, experiments with military, police, and civilian authority, human security remains the weakest and most vulnerable aspect of every administration since Lesotho’s return to multiparty politics in 1993.

Decolonial Theory Banyera (2017:65) posits that the recurrence of coups is in part, a result of “the continued existence of colonial matrices of power long after the official end of colonization”. Banyera (2017)) argues that coloniality is the residue of the obscure power structure that sustains the colonial relations of exploitations and domination long after the end of direct colonialism and this interplay is visible in the civil-military relation conundrum.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided some of the important theoretical literature on the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. A review of the existing literature on the recurrence of coups was important for establishing a methodological framework to answer the research questions and study objectives. The literature review helped to determine the recurrence of coups in Lesotho from a historical perspective. The literature review also helped to explain the sociopolitical factors that nurture these coups, which is one of the study objectives. On the other hand, the theoretical framework helped to explain the recurrence of coups in Lesotho from a theoretical perspective. The recurrence of coups in Lesotho is caused by a plethora of political and economic factors, as such, this chapter demonstrated the relationship between the main argument of the study and the selected theoretical literature.

The theoretical literature showed that the major causes of coups in Lesotho are political and economic. However, Huntington (1957) argued that political factors provide the most powerful motives for the initiation of a coup. This has been the case in Lesotho. All of the coups in Lesotho have been triggered by political events either

32 directly or indirectly. This therefore strengthened the argument that political factors provide motives for the coups.

Similarly, the liberal democratic peace theory argues that coups occur in states lacking institutionalised political culture. Since independence, Lesotho has struggled with institutionalisation of democracy which has subsequently led to the coups. The democratic transition did not involve institutional reform. This weakened key state institution namely; the military, police, judiciary, and the electoral system. All of the election results since independence have been disputed by the opposition and even once by the ruling party in 1970. This has led to election violence and the coups. Therefore, the literature supports Finer’s (1975) argument that states lacking institutionalised political culture and suffer economic hardships are more likely to experience coups.

The theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the role of the military in Lesotho’s politics and the coups. The role of the military in the political affairs of the state has contributed to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. In fact, the military features in the existence of coups in Lesotho in multiple ways through the military itself; civil-military relations and military-police relations. Still, a thorough analysis of the theoretical literature on the role of the military in the coups shows that ultimately its role is driven by political motives rather than military, which again relates to the argument made by Huntington (1957) on the causes of coups.

The theoretical literature shows that the coups in Lesotho have been provoked by the opportunistic greed of the army. The greed theory sees the coups as emanating from greed and desire of the army to benefit from coups that propels it to execute them. In Lesotho, the military coups and even army mutinies emanated from members of the army putting their interests first above those of the civilians. This has made them willing accomplices in the execution of the coups. Therefore, the military may actually be responsible for executing the coups as demonstrated by its willingness to support the various factions in Lesotho’s politics including the monarchy. Huntington’s (1957) theory therefore supports the greed argument that when the military intervenes, they perceive themselves as saviours, thus ultimately intervening for their own interests. When democratic governments attempt to adopt

33 policies that depart from the military’s preference, the military has an incentive to intervene. As such, the military intervenes in politics from a combination of motives in which defence of the institutional interests of the military itself predominates.

Some of the literature on the role of the military and the coups shows that the military intervenes in a country’s politics out of patriotism. A more thorough exploration into the military coups indicates how the army in Lesotho possibly intervened to save the country from economic crisis and at some stage from the military rule itself to return the country to democratic rule. The military intervention supports Janowitz’ argument that the military intervenes out of patriotism and cohesion. Elsewhere the military has intervened to reclaim legitimacy and to restore law and order. However, the military coups further entrenched the military into Lesotho’s politics, a situation the country has not been able to reverse even after years into multiparty democracy.

Lesotho’s return to multiparty democracy in 1993 witnessed the emergence of one of the most important political factors that continue to contribute to Lesotho’s recurrent coups – military-police relations. The theoretical literature shows that military-police relations underpin the coups in Lesotho. In essence, the nature and the role of both civil-military and military-police relations are important because they make up the political events that triggered the palace coup in 1994 and the 2014 attempted coup which is covered in more detail in chapter four. The discussion on the role of the military in Lesotho’s coups supports the theory that the most important explanations of military intervention in politics are not military but political.

Lesotho, like most post-colonial states in Africa is engulfed by politics of patrimonialism. The capture of state power in Lesotho is translated into economic power through accumulation; the state becomes inextricably entangled, resulting in a rent-seeking state with rent-seeking elite connecting themselves to the state, turning the state monopoly to their personal benefit and to that of their families, friends, and clients.

Given these circumstances winning elections becomes more than just capturing state power. The stakes become high and losers at the elections hardly come to terms with the loss. This is because the loss of elections does not imply only the loss

34 of parliamentary seats, it also implies loss of employment opportunity, and all related financial gains. The implication of this is that patronage is used by those who hold state power to provide the scarce employment opportunities to those who are in one way or another aligned to the political elite of the ruling party.

There is a direct relationship between the type of elections held and conflict. The recurrence of coups in Lesotho is greatly related to the electoral process in the country. Since its first post-independence elections in 1970, all elections in Lesotho have been disputed by the political parties involved. This has led to waves of political instability in the country. Furthermore, the bone of contention has been around the electoral model used, which was the FPTP. The 1970 and 1993 elections in Lesotho are significant to the theory of election-related conflict as both elections subsequently led to coups.

However, noting the above theoretical literature review that attempts to explain the recurrence of coups in Lesotho, the existence of coups in Lesotho is also theoretically underpinned by the theory of decoloniality or the coloniality theory. According to this theory, the coups occur as a result of the continued existence of colonial power long after the official end of colonisation. In essence, this theory explains the role of the King in the history and recurrence of coups in Lesotho. Because of his life during the colonial era, the King would disrupt the political system in pursuit of political powers. As such, the colonial system was effective in creating the ‘bifurcated state’. The colonial government created and decentralised despotism, a phenomenon synonymous with Lesotho’s problems today. Therefore, coloniality remains the power structure that sustains the colonial relations of exploitations and domination long after the end of direct colonialism and this interplay is visible in the civil-military relation conundrum.

The discussion above provides an overview of the theoretical literature underpinning the study on the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The main argument of the chapter is that the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is caused by political factors. There is a plethora of factors that lead to coups in Lesotho, as such, the literature and theoretical framework on the coup phenomena has attempted to answer the research questions and study objectives. A review of the theoretical literature helps

35 to determine the common factors that lead to the recurrence of coups. An assessment of these factors helps to establish whether the causes of the coups in Lesotho are indeed political. As such, some of the theoretical literature reviewed speaks to the hypothesis that coups in Lesotho are provoked by political motives. A thorough analysis of each of the theories relates to the political motive discovered in each and every coup case study. Therefore, this theoretical literature successfully underpins the study of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The overview of the theoretical literature was selected for this study based on its relevance to the phenomenon as it occurs in Lesotho. Therefore, the theoretical literature review of the study suffers limitations in terms of scope.

36 CHAPTER THREE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COUPS IN LESOTHO

3.1 Introduction This chapter provides a discussion on Lesotho’s transition from colonial to independent rule and provides a historical overview of the political system since independence. The aim of the chapter is to present Lesotho’s post-independence political history and to demonstrate the trajectory of Lesotho’s coups from a historical perspective. Monyane (2005) establishes four broad phases into which the historical/political developments may be classified. The study borrows from his historical framework of Lesotho’s history in order to arrange Lesotho’s history for the study. This helps to place the coups into a particular epoch, as such, the political events leading to the coup are chronologically arranged to inform a better understanding of the events that led to the coup. These periods are (1) embryonic democracy (1965-1970), (2) authoritarian rule (1970-1986), (3) military rule (1986- 1993), and fragile democracy (1993-2014).

These historical periods also provide a brief outline of the consequences of the elections associated with each phase. The chapter does not, however, provide significant details of the coups, which extend from 1970-2014, as these are covered in much more detail in the fourth chapter. Notably, in each of these four phases, the result of each election was disputed by the losing parties, and even once by the ruling party in 1970. Some of the election-related violence that happened as a result of these disputed elections have led to the coups in Lesotho. The main argument of the study is that Lesotho’s coups are motivated by political factors. As such, the elections in these phases are important in laying the groundwork for the political factors that contributed to the coups. The study is particularly interested in the recurrence of coups; therefore, the recurrence of the disputed elections provides a political motive to be looked into in terms of its relationship to the coups in Lesotho. The chapter is important as it provides historical literature on Lesotho’s politics and the coups; however, it is even more important as it provides the historical and political context in which the coups have occurred. Thus, the chapter attempts to answer the research questions on “What is the relationship between political

37 developments and the recurrence of coups in the Kingdom? What is it that the country fails to do right? Why do political agreements not hold?”

During the 19th century, the territory of Lesotho (formerly known as Basutoland) played an important role in the colonial history of southern Africa. The Basotho nation came into being in the first half of the 19th century. Moshoeshoe the Great (1785-1870) was proclaimed the builder, the founder and the father of the Basotho nation (Pherudi, 2004:1). Historically, the Basotho nation emerged out of the demographic warfare of Difaqane in the 1820s. From its inception, the Basotho nation was a political rather than an ethnic entity founded on a common desire for security, protection and economic benefit, which a Kingdom provided. During the first half of the 1800s, the Basotho also lost much of their land suitable for farming to the Boer farmers in what is referred to today as the Free State Province of South Africa, as the Boers annexed territory. Despite having managed to preserve his independence against the Voortrekkers, Moshoeshoe acknowledged that the future of Basotho sovereignty lay in a close association with the British. In 1868, Moshoeshoe saw it befitting that Lesotho be made a British Protectorate (Weisfelder & Sanders, 2011; Grimwood, 2017: 13) subsequently triggering Lesotho’s dependence on South Africa, a dependent position which persists until today. As a result, of these developments, Lesotho’s economy consequently took a negative nose dive during the 1920s and 1930s. From this period onwards, the Basotho would become migrant workers in South Africa in order to pay the new local taxes imposed by the British.

From the 1930s, a decrease in the rainfall in South Africa prompted an interest in Lesotho's water. Studies brought about the first project in 1956, called the Oxbow Scheme, a bilateral project result of dams that would move water from the Orange- Senqu River to gold-mining businesses in Gauteng, and structure some portion of a hydroelectric plan, to serve Lesotho and offer power to South Africa. The establishment of the Oxbow Hydroelectric Scheme intensified sensitivities between the two countries, with Lesotho serving as strategic importance for the economic growth of South Africa because of the water. Essentially, these developments would form the backbone of the relations between Lesotho and South Africa that still persists even today. South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho have largely been

38 centred around this project. South Africa has intervened in the political conflict in Lesotho to safeguard the interest of the LHWP.

3.2 Embroynic Democracy, 1965-1970

Lesotho gained independence from colonial rule on October, 4 1966. There had been repeated calls for representative government by political parties in Lesotho in the 1950s and 1960s (Grimwood, 2017: 15). Consequently, Lesotho held its pre- independence elections in 1965. The BCP, BNP and the MFP were the main political parties in the 1965 election (Monyane, 2009). The expected victor BCP lost the election and the BNP narrowly won the election, and Chief Leabua Jonathan became the second Prime Minister. The FPTP electoral model ensured that the BNP became the exclusive representatives of the government (Grimwood, 2017). The BNP did not only win with a slim majority in parliament but also won with a 42% minority vote (Letsie, 2009). The two losing political parties the BCP and the MFP rejected the outcome of the victory of the BNP citing that the elections were rigged. Historically, political parties in Lesotho were set up in relation to the monarchy, and this could be attributed to the monarchy’s proximity to political power. Therefore, the monarchy is important particularly in relation to what would be its powers under the new constitution, and more especially in the context of its powers over the military. The new constitution restricted the King to a constitutional monarch with no powers (Letsie, 2009). As a result, serious tensions built over the role of the monarchy. These political events will be discussed in the study.

The King worked in concert with the two losing parties to stage a series of well- attended public gatherings across the country where he campaigned for enhanced constitutional powers, this happened between 1965 and 1970 (Gill, 2010: 217). The government accused the King and the BCP of secretly planning a coup against the BNP government. Chief Jonathan Leabua coerced the King to support his regime positively or choose exile (Ibid, 2010: 217).

As Britain was preparing to grant independence to Lesotho, the critical instability- inducing circumstances that had made colonisation and annexation necessary in the 1860s, had not changed (Thabane, 2017:17). Border controls between South Africa

39 and Lesotho had been introduced in 1963 as a result of South Africa leaving the Commonwealth. Hence, even after Lesotho’s independence, Chief Leabua Jonathan emphasised the significance of having good relations with apartheid South Africa “as a bread-and–butter matter” (Grimwood, 2017). Still, Chief Leabua Jonathan respected neighbourly relations with South Africa as a practical matter for survival for continued migrant labour as well as trade, in spite of South Africa being a politically- sanctioned state he was ethically in dispute with (Ibid, 2017). Chief Leabua Jonathan referenced the foundation of the Oxbow Hydroelectric Scheme (later alluded to as the LHWP), which speaks to what would be the sensitivity of South Africa and that Lesotho had a crucial asset for the economic development of South Africa, to be specific: water (Grimwood, 2017).There had been negotiations that began in late 1966 between the two governments, but the talks faltered in the early 1970s as a result of Chief Jonathan Leabua souring the close relationship with South Africa because no foreign aid was forthcoming from the apartheid regime.

When the British government granted independence to Lesotho, British interaction concerning Lesotho's development was additionally decreased to aid. Grimwood (2017) contends that once Lesotho gained autonomy from the British colonial administration, the level of reliance on South Africa expanded. South Africa clearly practised unilateral application of its prevalent military, economic and administrative capabilities. Lesotho turned out to be an “economic hostage” (Grimwood, 2017: 16) to South Africa after independence. Other than the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Lesotho's reliance on migrant work in South Africa, South Africa additionally provided electoral assistance to Basutoland in the run-up to the 1965 elections; that is, Lesotho’s first independent elections, also, South Africa provided military assistance from 1967 to 1973, to help Lesotho and Chief Jonathan Leabua to build the Police Mobile Unit (PMU). As such, these factors constrained Lesotho to forge neighbourly relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa. Therefore, as apartheid’s hostility increased, Lesotho’s independence was controlled indirectly through coercive measures to drive Lesotho into further compliance.

Chief Jonathan Leabua and Lesotho had no options post-independence because of the South African dominance. While that was probably true for many Basotho migrants, Aerni-Flessner (2014) argues that the government of Lesotho did have

40 some leverage in the situation. The Lesotho government were not merely pawns and puppets of the South African regime. Their choices were constrained, but so also were those of the South African government.

3.3 Authoritarian Rule, 1970-86

The second round of elections, described as highly competitive, were held in 1970 (Pherudi, 2016: 35). Given its political trajectory, the BNP government believed fully that it would win the elections (Gill, 1993). Early results showed that ‘it was a neck- to-neck fight’ because all contesting parties were eager to win. This continued until results stood at a tie Khaketla (1970: 211), then it had become clear that BCP had won the election, the results at the time, were BCP 35, BNP 23, MFP, 1. The BCP won the elections by a clear majority (Khaketla, 1970). Regardless, the ruling BNP refused to give up power to the opposition

Faced with this fact, Chief Leabua Jonathan was prepared to hand over government to the BCP (Khaketla, 1970). However, a few of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s Cabinet Ministers refused to hand over the government to Mokhehle (BCP), whom they alleged, was a communist, and had rigged the elections. Khaketla (1970: 211), argues that Chief Leabua Jonathan was inclined initially to submit however, ‘his Ministers would not hear of it’ (Ibid, 1970). As a result, Chief Leabua Jonathan suspended the Constitution and declared a State of Emergency on 30 January 1970, Khaketla (1970: 208)

Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan went to the extent of nullifying the election, suspending the constitution, Parliament had already been dissolved a democratically elected parliament. King Moshoeshoe II was detained under house arrest and later exiled to the Netherlands. Sejanamane (2016: 309) summed up these developments “Chief Leabua Jonathan’s actions constituted a coup, as the constitution was clear on the processes of the dissolution of parliament and government. And, therefore, his unilateral actions fell outside these procedures” (Ibid, 2016). Following the coup, Lesotho became a one-party de facto state under Chief Leabua Jonathan.

41 After the announcement of the state of emergency, police acted swiftly. Ntsu Mokhehle and all the members of the national executive of the party including most of the people who had contested the elections under the BCP, regardless of whether they had won or lost seats, were arrested. The King had already been fetched from Matsieng where he had been during the period of election. The police, in terms of the Emergency Regulations, announced the operation of a curfew in the town of Maseru.

The refusal by Chief Leabua Jonathan to transfer power to the BCP after the 1970 elections plunged Lesotho into a series of serious political crises. During this period, the PMU became highly politicised and acted as an extension of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s de facto regime (Monyane, 2009). Notably, the military had never been fully involved in Lesotho’s politics before 1970. It was only after the coup that the military began to play a more active role in Lesotho’s politics signaling the entry of a new actor in Lesotho’s politics. To consolidate its own power, the BNP exercised strict control over the recruitment into the military during this period. The emphasis was on guarding “not only against external threats but, most critically, against internal opposition” (Mphanya, 2004: 71).

This radical transformation of Lesotho’s military by the BNP affected the role and size of the military (Moremoholo, 2005), and also increased the power of the military to protect the BNP government. This politicisation of the military compromised the apolitical nature of the military establishment (Ibid, 2005), resulting in serious political stability problems that continue to plague Lesotho today. The BNP government banned all political activities, ending completely multiparty democracy in Lesotho. One of the reasons that the BNP advanced for its new stance on multiparty politics was that it (the BNP government) was trying to save the country from the onslaught of communism. The BCP was perceived to be highly communist in its political ideology, which was seen to be in direct contrast to the nationalist inclination of the ruling BNP. The two main political parties drifted apart over their political ideology differences. In response to the political oppression, the BCP organised violent uprisings around the country in attempts to destabilise Chief Leabua Jonathan’s government. However, “due to the BNP’s executive power over all organs of the state and the politicization of the key organs of the state, the uprisings were often crushed with ease” (Machobane, 2001: 33). Other than some scattered sporadic

42 violence from January-April 1970, there was little to no political violence in Lesotho until the 1974 failed coup that was executed by the King together with the BCP and other opposition parties. Following the attempted coup, Chief Leabua Jonathan’s government reacted by forcing the coup plotters into exile, with the BCP forced into exile in South Africa and the King exiled to the Netherlands.

Ntsu Mokhehle’s period in exile saw the formation of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), an armed wing of the BCP. The LLA would launch sporadic attacks on the BNP government to force it to unban political parties and return the country to multiparty democracy. Interestingly, the LLA’s stay in South Africa also saw it establishing relations with the apartheid regime. In actual fact, these newly formed relations were South Africa’s strategic counter to the BNP’s newly established relations with the ANC. South Africa would then provide the LLA with logistical assistance and access to the border (Grimwood, 2017). Given the above context, the political activities and intentions of the LLA were not only to destabilise the government, but to also depose it (Machobane, 2001: 32).

Lesotho-South Africa relations would be further complicated by the assassination of ANC exiles in Maseru, Lesotho by the apartheid government in 1982. As a result of the above, in 1983, Chief Jonathan Leabua reacted by threatening to halt completely any potential water transfer negotiations. In this foreign policy warfare between Lesotho and South Africa, South Africa threatened to invade militarily, and placed economic pressure on Lesotho. As such, South Africa imposed economic sanctions on Lesotho to force the country to comply with their bilateral agreements over the LHWP. More border controls were enforced, resulting in food shortages in Lesotho. Therefore, South Africa was able to successfully economically coerce Lesotho into acting in the benefit of South Africa’s own interests.

With the internal and external pressure to return the country to democracy, the BNP government made the decision to settle the legitimacy crisis and called for general elections in 1985. Chief Leabua Jonathan expected an easy victory because opposition parties boycotted election registration largely because of: insufficient time allocated to them; lack of consultation on the electoral process; non-release of the voters’ rolls; existence of a political banning order; and non-approval of the elections

43 by Moshoeshoe II. Realising the reluctance of opposition parties to participate, the BNP became victorious on the nomination day, only its nominees were presented to the electoral authorities. They were thus declared winners (unopposed) in line with electoral laws (Monyane, 2009). Chief Jonathan Leabua’s overwhelming victory was because the majority of the opposition leaders were in exile and the BCP had disintegrated into several groups (Pherudi, 2016: 38). Also, during the 1985 election, gerrymandering of the political constituencies turned into a basic instrument that was used to disadvantage other opposition parties in the electoral race.

3.4 Military Rule, 1986-93

The military in Lesotho intervened in the politics probably to save the country from an economic crisis induced by a powerful regional neighbour, South Africa, which intended to force it to expel ANC liberation fighters. As a result, the military eventually deposed Chief Leabua Jonathan from power in 1986 and assumed full control of the country’s governance. The Basotho welcomed the coup with triumph. They strongly believed that the military rule eroded the chapter of authoritarianism, pain and suffering which lasted throughout Chief Jonathan Leabua and the BNP’s dictatorship. The military would rule Lesotho from 1986 to 1993 until they returned the country to democratic rule through elections in 1993.

Thus, in order to reform the country, the military regime introduced military reforms. Order No.1 of 1986 was introduced, according to the Order, all the executive and legislative powers in Lesotho would now be vested in King Moshoeshoe II. And to neutralise his powers, a six men Military Council headed by the Major General Metsing Lekhanya would advise him (Moremoholo, 2005:50). The Council of Ministers was also appointed to assist in the general governance of the country (Ibid, 2005: 50). While taking over power, the King and the military promised that by doing so they would reverse all the problems caused by the BNP government, and subsequently return the country to civilian rule. As such, these promises were spelled out through the media and statements made during public rallies by the military. The hope of the Basotho was further shattered by the adoption of Order No. 4 of 1986. This Order banned multiparty politics in Lesotho “until such time as the goal of national reconciliation had been achieved” (Moremoholo, 2005). Although the

44 military identified the political parties as sources of political instability and poverty in Lesotho, it was inefficient, corrupt and prone to power struggles (Ibid, 2005).

During the period of military rule, corruption and nepotism became the order of the day. Members of the military junta and senior government officials accumulated wealth in a relatively short space of time. This retarded economic growth, which prompted demonstrations and strikes by the public who felt marginalised (Moremoholo, 2005). These included; teachers, the banking institutions and the nurses, among others. Innocent people were killed, and former ministers of the BNP and their wives were brutally murdered during the protests (Ibid, 2005). This demonstrated that political brutality, corruption and inefficiency continued to reign even during the military rule in Lesotho. The civilian dictatorship was replaced by a military dictatorship. The military administration was inefficient, corrupt and prone to power struggles (Moremoholo, 2005).

The King played a key role in the decision-making process; this led the uncertainty around the politically-motivated interpretation of this arrangement brought about by an ambiguity concerning whether the actual power rested with the King or the Military Council. “Was it a case of the King using the military or the military using the King?” (Monyane, 2009:119). The marriage of convenience between the King and the military collapsed when the King criticised the military government regarding corruption, the violation of human rights and undemocratic practices during the military rule (Machobane, 2001:57; Monyane, 2009:120). This led to a confrontation with the Chairman of the Military Council, Council of Ministers and Major Metsing Lekhanya (Monyane, 2009:120). Furthermore, this resulted in factions developing within the military leaving the monarchy as a weakened, but isolated institution in the state (Machobane, 2001: 57)

The monarchy-military alliance crumbled soon after the fatal shooting of a male student at the Lesotho Agricultural College (LAC) by Major General Metsing Lekhanya in 1990. Many attempts by the King and the opposing faction within the army to force Major General Metsing Lekhanya to resign had been futile (King Moshoeshoe II Letter to the Chairman of the Military Council and the Council of Ministers, 22 February 1990; Monyane, 2009:120). The King was deeply entrenched

45 in the military; as such, he had members in the army whom he felt would be better positioned to lead the army. Therefore, the killing of the student by Major General Metsing Lekhanya provided motives to further alienate him from the institution. However, these events did not contribute to democratic rule, except that they probably weakened both the institutions involved.

Faction fighting formed within the military because of these power struggles between the King and the Chairman of the Council (Machobane, 2001: 57). The outcome of this internal struggle was a mutiny in February 1990. The mutiny saw the dismissal and prosecution of the King’s confidant Colonel Sekhobe Letsie in February 1990. The divisions in the alliance culminated in the passing of Order No. 2 of 1990 (Monyane, 2005: 26). The monarchy lost executive and legislative powers and most importantly, the military removed King Moshoeshoe II from the throne, forcing him into exile in Britain. The negotiations between the military government and the King to arrange for his return to Lesotho were futile, since the King insisted on having executive powers.

The monarchy subsequently demanded the resignation of the military regime and the formation of a government of national unity in Lesotho (Gill, 1993: 243). The King also demanded the suspension of the 1966 constitution and the lifting of Lesotho Order No. 2 of 1990. The military regime responded by replacing the deposed King with his son, Prince Mohato Bereng Seeiso, who became King Letsie III in November 1990 (Monyane, 2005: 26). Major General Metsing Lekhanya argued that the emasculated King was delaying the process of re-democratisation (Matlosa & Pule, 2001: 47).

With the intention of appeasing what would become the potential opposition in Lesotho, the Chairman of the Military Council and Head of Government set up a Constituent Assembly entrusted with the obligation of drafting a constitution that would be considered by the Military Council. The Assembly, constituted of board candidates of the military government and incorporating the senior leaders, fighters, policemen and pioneers of the restricted ideological groups, was to utilise the 1966 constitution as a working archive.

The pioneers of the principal ideological groups, the BNP, the BCP, UDP, and CPL were hesitant to join the Constituent Assembly since it was simply a warning body. They accepted that the nearness of the military and police staff in the assembly would prevent them an opportunity for claiming articulation. They were likewise reluctant to fill in as deputies and not as chosen individuals in the assembly (Monyane, 2005: 27). General Metsing Lekhanya disappointed and deferred the way towards giving control to the non-military personnel organisation.

The military violated the rule of law, abused basic human rights including acting as a hindrance to the process of democratisation in Lesotho. Moreover, corruption also became widespread (Monyane, 2009). Increasing discontent emerged within civil society groups such as teachers and civil servants. This was brought about by popular anger at the proposed sale of state assets and increasing corruption in the military administration. Due to discontent within the military administration including oppressive policies and pressure to return the country to democratic rule, the junior officers staged another internal coup that removed Major General Metsing Lekhanya from power on 30 April 1991.

The Chairmanship of the two Councils was now under the command of Colonel Phisoana Ramaema (later promoted to the position of Major General). Significantly, General Ramaema's assumption of power saw the unbanning of the controversial Suspension of Political Activities Order No. 4 of 1986. This signaled the first step on the road towards the return of multiparty democracy in Lesotho. Notably this (Monyane, 2009: 122) also signaled the role of the military in Lesotho’s democracy. When he came into power in 1991, Major General Phisoana Ramaema was adamant that Lesotho needed to return to the multiparty democracy that existed before Chief Jonathan seized power through a coup sending Lesotho to a one-party authoritarian regime, having to be deposed by the military regime which also had overstayed its welcome.

General Phisoana Ramaema's administration was faced with the enormous task of deciding how to tackle the issue of the ousted King Moshoeshoe II. Also, there was growing pressure from the Commonwealth Secretariat, royalist supporters and 19 of

47 the 22 Principal Chiefs that King Moshoeshoe ought to be reinstated to the throne. His son Prince Mohato Seeiso, who was put in his father’s position as King Letsie III, also exerted pressure on the military administration (Monyane, 2009: 122).

The conclusions that could be drawn from the military government are that upon its assumption of power in 1986, it was convinced that Lesotho needed a new constitution relevant to the modern political developments of the 20th century. The military had previously served as the guarantors of civil dictatorship under the BNP government, controlled state power and was now heading the process of transition to democracy. However, it was inculcated in the political culture and legacy developed by the BNP government (Machobane, 2001: 133). The military attempted to eliminate political opposition and form a no-party state. King Moshoeshoe II exercised executive powers in its early phases, a situation he had previously desired and preferred since the attainment of independence 1966. The problem emerged on the ‘balancing’ and monarchical interests that resulted in the King being exiled and dethroned in 1990. The military government, which was often confronted with the problems of indiscipline among junior ranks, was hostile to criticism and opposition (Machobane, 2001).

3.5 Fragile Democracy, 1993-2014

The purpose of this section is to present Lesotho’s political developments in the aftermath of the 1993 elections. Lesotho returned to democratic rule in 1993, however, the return to democratic rule precipitated the country into a deeper crisis. The political crisis showed that a number of political issues remained unresolved in the process of transition from the previous military government to the new multiparty- democratic dispensation. The 1993 elections did not signal a change in the way Lesotho was governed. The emergence of the new democratic dispensation failed to restrain the culture of political intolerance. Lesotho’s long-awaited democratic election took place on 27 March 1993 after a lengthy period in ‘constitutional limbo’ (Monyane, 2009). There were 12 registered political parties that contested the election. These were the BCP, BNP, Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP), Lesotho Education Party (LEP), Marematiou Freedom Party (MFP), National Independent Party (NIP), Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), and UDP (Monyane, 2005:62). The

48 BCP gained an overwhelming victory, capturing all 65 parliamentary seats plus 74% of the total number of votes cast by the electorate (Pherudi, 2016: 40).

The 1993 elections marked Lesotho’s return to multiparty democracy. The BCP won the elections by a clear majority. Though the election was declared free and fair by internal and international observers, the BNP refused to accept the election outcome, alleging that the election was rigged (Monyane, 2005). Following the humiliating loss to its bitter rival the BCP, consequently, the BNP engaged in protests that eventually threatened the country’s political stability and led to loss of lives.

The protests reached their peak when a petition was delivered to the palace by the BNP and other members of the opposition parties. Supporters of the BNP had called for the dissolution of the Lesotho government and the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II to the throne. On the other hand, order and normalcy were compromised when the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) led two strikes to force the King to restore the (elected) BCP government. As a result, lives were lost during the skirmishes that followed what came to be popularly known as the ‘Palace Coup’. King Letsie III dissolved the BCP government on 17 August 1994 (Letsie, 2009).

The King later restored the BCP government following intervention by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding. Among others the King and the BCP agreed to the reinstatement of former King Moshoeshoe II. Failure by the BCP government to adequately address the issue of the reinstatement of King Letsie’s father to his former throne had rendered the relationship between the King and the BCP government volatile (Letsie, 2009: 16).

The next elections were held in 1998. There was an increase in the number of constituencies from 60 to 80. The main contestants for political power were the LCD, BCP, BNP and MFP (Monyane, 2005). The newly formed Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) (a breakaway from the BCP) overwhelmingly won 79 out of 80 constituencies with 60.7% of the total vote (Pherudi, 2016). The BCP had been relegated to opposition in 1996 when the LCD was formed in parliament. Following

49 the above sated elections the BNP became opposition with one seat. BCP remained out of parliament as it did not win any seat.

The BCP, BNP, the MFP and other smaller parties refused to accept the election outcome because of allegations of ballot rigging (Monyane, 2009). The electoral process was marred by post-election protests by the main opposition parties (BCP, BNP and MFP). Opposition protesters closed down government offices. There were forced strikes and violent clashes between the opposition and supporters of the LCD government. The clashes continued, and as the situation worsened, the country’s political and military leadership became helpless. The protesters had rendered the country ungovernable.

On 4 August 1998, disgruntled opposition parties marched to the royal palace in disagreement against what they described as fraudulent elections. They stayed around the royal residence gates waiting for King Letsie III to react to their requests. The triumphant LCD government censured this demonstration (Matlosa, 1999: 180).

The opposition parties later engaged in protests against the LCD government, in fact, these protests almost collapsed the LCD government. The opposition supporters went on the rampage, mounting unlawful road barricades, threatening street vendors, burning tires, and looting and burning shops. The capital, Maseru, became increasingly inaccessible. Notably, during these escalating tensions, the security forces failed to bring the situation under control. Seemingly, members of the LDF remained unconcerned about demonstrations of violence as they gravitated towards civil war (Monyane, 2009: 135). Consequently, the army staged a mutiny and the lower ranks dismissed all the senior officers.

Opposition parties became even more resilient in their position and kept demanding for the disintegration of the LCD government. The LDF members remained apathetic regarding demonstrations of violence, looting and the burning in the capital of Maseru. The army observed powerlessly as the police fought with the opposition protesters. As a result, opposition supporters exploited the hesitance of the military to stop the protest. They seized government vehicles, closed offices and took control of the state-run radio station (Radio Lesotho). Tensions rose between the military

50 and the police as they traded fire around the royal residence gates. As a result, junior armed force officials staged a mutiny and forced the officers of the military to resign. This was followed by the arrest and detention of 28 senior officials (Monyane, 2009).

Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, under pressure and unable to control the disgruntlement of the opposition parties, contacted the President of South Africa, President Nelson Mandela, who was also the Chairman of SADC, appealing for military intervention. Notably, South Africa reacted by sending its army to Lesotho. This military mediation driven by South Africa and later by Botswana took place under the watch of SADC. The mediation neutralised the military’s involvement in the political crisis and most importantly, quelled the opposition coalition that had camped outside the royal palace and laid siege to the LCD government. The intervention brought about the formation of a new political institution, the Interim Political Authority (IPA), which was mandated to plan for the next elections (Monyane, 2009: 138).

External mediation endeavours driven by South Africa under the support of SADC led to the establishment of the Langa Commission of Inquiry. The Commission was vested with powers to investigate the conduct of the 1998 elections in the light of the opposition’s grave claims that the elections had been rigged. Political tensions continued rising and this brought about violent clashes between the opposition and the LCD supporters (Matlosa, 1999).

The only peaceful elections in Lesotho were those of 2002 and 2007. In the 2002 elections, all in all, 19 political parties fielded candidates in both the constituency and party elections (Pherudi, 2016: 55). The LCD once again won the elections overwhelmingly, taking 77 of the 78 constituencies contested (Letsie, 2009). The 2002 elections were a decisive test of the MMP electoral model. It was the first election held in Lesotho under the MMP system, in which 80 seats were elected in the FPTP constituencies, and 40 using a Proportional Representation (PR). The remaining 41 seats were shared among nine opposition parties. This was seen as a milestone by many observers as, for the first time in its history; Lesotho had an inclusive parliament of 10 political parties.

The 2007 general elections were the second time the MMP model was used in Lesotho. The elections were again marked by intra-party power battles, factions and infighting across the political parties. Once more, opposition parties disputed the outcome of the elections citing electoral fraud. The ruling LCD won the elections by obtaining more than half of the 120 parliamentary seats, and 61 of 80 constituency seats while the All Basotho Congress (ABC), acquired 17 constituency seats. The ABC challenged the outcome and the ruling LCD government reacted by alleging coup-plotting.

The development of constitutional democracy in Lesotho took a bad turn after the 2012 elections produced inconclusive results. The 2012 general elections resulted in Lesotho’s first coalition government. In the May 2012 general election, Mosisili’s DC won 48 seats, the ABC 30, the LCD 26, and the BNP 5. The numbers fell short of an outright majority, therefore, the three opposition parties that came closest to the DC’s tally formed a coalition government. Therefore, Thabane’s ABC-led coalition became the ruling party not by winning an election outright but through the creation of a coalition government with the support of smaller opposition parties.

The electoral outcome of 2012 resulted in the birth of Lesotho’s first coalition government. The coalition was made up of parties previously in the opposition which were all breakaways. A simple parliamentary majority of 61 seats out of 120 held the coalition. This implied that the governing coalition was inherently unstable (Motsamai, 2018). Notably, all the parties in the governing coalition were breakaway parties held together by a parliamentary majority.

The governing coalition crumbled in acrimony in 2014 when the LCD, which was a major partner, announced its withdrawal. The LCD then formed a coalition with the opposition Democratic Congress (DC). Opposition MPs, together with the support of the LCD, proposed a motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Thomas Thabane. Thabane responded by dissolving parliament, and implicitly accused the opposition of staging a coup. After Thabane took a decision to replace the commander of the LDF, the army responded by occupying and disarming the police. Thabane fled to

52 South Africa, and implicitly accused Metsing of staging a coup (Banerjee & Rich, 2017: 6).

3.6 Conclusion

The objective of the study is to demonstrate that the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is caused mostly by political factors. The above historical overview of Lesotho is important in that it successfully identifies the political events that led to the coups, therefore, enhancing the main argument being made. The historical analysis introduces the key political players in the coups, which will be later analysed in order to establish their relationship to the political events and subsequently the coups. The classification of the eras is important in order to place the coups within the historical framework. As such, the thematic approach helps to demonstrate the political events that have contributed to the coups. The historical trajectory is also important as it establishes a thread of the political events and the key actors in the history and the coups. This helps to establish their role in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho.

There is a plethora of literature that explains the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. Be that as it may, the most important causes of the coups have been around political motives more than any other factors. The historical overview of Lesotho from pre- colonial rule to independence provides a historical narrative of the causes of these coups. Essentially, the causes of coups in Lesotho are fundamental to election- related conflict. Notably, it is not the elections themselves that led to the coups but, the violence that resulted from the outcome of the elections led to the coups. Second, the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is the result of the role of the military in Lesotho’s politics. Both civil-military and military-police relations have led to the coups in Lesotho. Third, the recurrence of coups in Lesotho have been attributed to the role of the monarchy in the country’s politics, the King’s unilateral actions caused the coup in 1994 and the King also played a key role in the attempted coup in 2014.

The above discussion is an overview of the direct causes of the coups; however, there are indirect conditions that have contributed to the coups. The recurrence of coups in Lesotho is driven by the neo-patrimonial politics and practice that exist within the state in Lesotho. This state of affairs has made winning elections in

53 Lesotho a highly competitive exercise and hence the constant violence associated with the results. This neo-patrimonialism has in fact created a situation where access to state resources is the only source of power in the country. As such, the political elite fight over the access to state resources. This is largely due to socio-economic challenges in Lesotho, leaving the state as the only source of economic resource. Lesotho is a very poor country facing high unemployment rates and poverty. Therefore, the state resources become the only source of economic wealth in the impoverished country.

Given this context, Lesotho experiences a lack of political will. This is evidenced by how elections are handled in the country. There is lack of tolerance for democracy practices as far as political parties are concerned. There is political violence, again this is prompted by eagerness to access state resources. However, what maintains the political violence even further is the culture of impunity. Perpetrators of the political violence are less likely to be prosecuted for their role in the political violence. This may be the result of corruption and the compromised judiciary system in the country.

Lesotho inherited a state highly dependent on South Africa, its geopolitical position which places Lesotho inside South Africa is not a situation that Lesotho can change; however, something could be done about its economic dependence on South Africa. Lesotho depends exclusively on South Africa for access to the outside world. This puts Lesotho in a dependent position, as such, not able to develop economically. This in turn leads to the socio-economic issues in the country which place a strain on the political environment which then experiences coups as everybody would like to have a piece of an already constrained economy.

Given the context of the above historical overview, one of the most important political events to emerge from the years leading up to Lesotho’s independence is the formation of the political parties, more especially how they related to the monarchy, the military, and the Church. Their relations to the above-mentioned institutions actually relates to their position on assuming a role in Lesotho’s politics. Also, their formation and political events surrounding it are important to attempts to better understand their greater role in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho.

When the BNP won the elections in 1965 this signaled the beginning of what would be extremely contested party politics in Lesotho. The two leading parties started to contest for the control of the state and the military. The monarch would then be seen to be used to gain access to these institutions by the governing party.

Another important actor in Lesotho’s transition from colonial to independent rule is the monarchy. Though the monarchy has always been an integral part of the Basotho nation since their formative years, the monarchy’s role in politics only became direct after independence when the King was relegated to a constitutional monarch. As the British administration was preparing to relinquish power over its protectorate, Lesotho needed a form of government that would perform the role of stewardship. The monarchy presented the ideal actor to take over the duty of the British in Lesotho. However, due to colonial structures that created other chiefdoms within the protectorate, contestation for political power upon the British departure was rife. For this reason, Chief Jonathan Leabua, a chief (headman) himself, clashed with the monarch and their relations became an important feature of Lesotho’s politics. Also, political parties such as the BCP and the MFP formed an alliance with the monarch to be in close proximity to power in the post-independent Lesotho.

The military in Lesotho was never involved in politics until its inculcation by the BNP government after the 1970 coup (Machobane, 2001). Lesotho became a one-party de facto state under Chief Leabua Jonathan, and during this period, the BNP government exercised strict control over institutions of the state (Monyane, 2009:113). Furthermore, the BNP managed to transform the military into its own political constituency. The military became highly politicised and acted as supporters of Chief Leabua Jonathan’s dictatorship as the BNP was in power (Ibid, 2009:113). When the army was no longer satisfied with Chief Leabua Jonathan’s rule, a coup was seen as an option to remove him from power (Pherudi, 2016:416).

The military staged a coup that eventually deposed Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime from power in 1986. Though there is a plethora of explanations for the coup, what is clear is the role of the military in the coup. The military surrounded Chief Jonathan

55 Leabua’s office and asked him step down as prime minister. Chief Jonathan Leabua was left with no choice but to vacate his office and he fled. The military’s actions show the extent to which the army in Lesotho played a key role in the country’s politics and the coups. The Basotho welcomed the coup as they felt the military had rescued them from Chief Jonathan Leabua’s dictatorship, which was during its final days characterised by economic sanctions by apartheid South Africa that brought serious economic hardships to Lesotho. As a result, there was a general acceptance of the military coup across the country. Military rule was characterised by corruption and maladministration that resulted from nepotism in the military governance structures. The military was characterised by strikes and protest.

The military overshot its mandate and accordingly abused its structures, mechanism and authority. Upon being utilised as an instrument at the disposal of politicians, the military then instrumentalised itself, that is, “it moved from being a politicised, partisan institute to governing the country in its own name” (Banyera 2017). In other words, the military in Lesotho intervened in politics to hold back the process of democratisation.

Noting the discussion above, when Lesotho returned to civilian rule in 1993, the government inherited a highly militarised state. The military was heavily armed and split along party lines. This resulted in the misuse of the army by opposing factions, which still endures today. Banyera (2017) argues that once in power, the civilian regime failed to rein in the military, and to an extent, became subservient to it. Historically, the civilian regime has consistently failed to institutionalise itself in a manner that would result in them stabilising political behaviour in Lesotho. Hence, it becomes increasingly difficult for the civilian regime to reform the institution. The military has the power to intervene against a civilian regime. Therefore, the army became a major source of instability in Lesotho (Moremoholo, 2005).

Lesotho returned to democratic rule in 1993. However, Lesotho’s democracy has been characterised by fragility since then. The first elections since the country returned to multiparty democracy were marked by political violence that eventually led to the military crisis. Elections, or rather the electoral model used was identified as one of the causes of the political instability. The 1993 military crisis is important in

56 the history of Lesotho and for this study because it led to the royal coup in 1994. The losing BNP and other opposition parties demanded that King Letsie prorogue a democratically elected BCP government citing that the BCP had rigged the elections. The King intervened in the crisis by dissolving the parliament. Some scholars argue that the King overtly intervened in support of the BNP. Therefore, the King’s actions constituted a coup because he dissolved a democratically elected government.

Another epoch in Lesotho’s history and closely related to the recurrence of coups in the country is Lesotho’s fragile democracy, that is, the period from 1993 until today. In 1993, Lesotho’s military returned the government back to civilian rule through general elections. These elections were marred by extreme election violence which plunged the country into serious political instability. The election-related violence in Lesotho was nothing new, in fact, the election violence was the result of a legacy of election violence which goes back to 1970. Therefore, the return of the country to democratic rule could not have prevented the election-related violence as its occurrence was linked to past political events in the country. Essentially, the fragile democracy presented another period in which the coups could continue to take place instead of preventing their occurrence.

These elections were one of the political factors that resulted in the royal coup in 1994. The elections provided an environment conducive to the dispute over the electoral outcome culminating into violence. This resulted in the security forces intervening in the electoral dispute. However, the security forces intervened along party lines leaving the responsibility of a mediator to the King. Ideally, the King would be expected to intervene to stop the warring parties; however, the King intervened in the greater electoral dispute also in support of one party over another. Naturally, the opposition party would not accept the King’s interference, more especially if it was biased. The actual coup then occurred when the King, in order to resolve the electoral dispute, dissolved parliament. This period in Lesotho’s history is important in the analysis of the recurrence of Lesotho’s coups because it shows the consequence of the historical legacy of election-related conflict and how it is linked to the occurrence of a coup. Also, it shows the role of the monarch in the coups. Historically, the monarch has always wanted to have a more prominent role in Lesotho’s politics. The monarch attempted to remove the BNP government between

57 1965 and 1970. Therefore, in 1994, the King was in a better position to conduct a coup and show supreme control over Lesotho’s politics.

The matter of unresolved election results remained a bone of contention even in the next elections in 1998. Opposition parties again refused to accept the election results, arguing that the winner, the LCD, had rigged the elections. As a result, the electoral period in Lesotho was marked by the worst political violence that the country had ever witnessed. Closely relating to the problem of the elections or electoral model, was again the problem of the military. The role of the military in the violence exacerbated the already existing tensions. The King again attempted to intervene but was this time stopped. The 1998 constitutional crisis marked the climax in Lesotho’s fragile democracy since the country’s return to multiparty democracy in 1993. Stability was restored after a SADC military intervention. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana intervened in Lesotho to prevent another coup from taking place. The political crisis presented a serious security challenge to the region. The intervention led to the establishment of the IPA whose mandate was to reform the electoral system. The IPA prepared Lesotho for the next elections.

Also important in the description of Lesotho’s fragile democracy and the relationship to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is the 1998 constitutional crisis. A coup did not happen; however, all the elements that had historically led to coups were present in what became known as the constitutional crisis. The crisis emerged from the dispute over election results. The opposition parties refused to accept the victory of the LCD. As such, political tensions erupted leading to serious political instability. Again, the crisis shows the issue of elections in Lesotho and how they lead to political instability. It was these elections that prompted Lesotho to transform its electoral system as it became clear that much of the scuffle around the elections, and the results in particular, was the electoral model being used.

The 1998 constitutional crisis is critical to the study on the recurrence of coups in Lesotho in that, although the crisis did not lead to an actual coup, the crisis exposed clearly the failure by the new civilian government and disappointedly the SADC- South African intervention to transform the security sector, particularly the military, in

58 the aftermath of the military crisis in 1994.The security force played a key role in the political instability that induced the royal coup in 1994. Therefore, failure to do so led to the security sector again playing a prominent role in the political instability in the country during the 1998 constitutional crisis. The security sector intervened in the political clashes following the dispute over the election results. The historical role of the security sector in Lesotho politics as well as the proclivity by the political parties together became the key characteristics that make up Lesotho’s fragile democracy. Arguably, the convergence of the above-mentioned characteristics is the prominent cause of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. As such, the ‘almost coup’ in 1998 shows the effects of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. Their recurrence has created a political environment susceptible to coups. This analysis also extends to an attempted coup in 2014.

Another political development that is arguably important in the analysis of Lesotho’s fragile democracy and its relationship to the recurrence of coups in the country, is the formation of coalition governments. While it is my assertion that the formation and running of coalition governments in Lesotho is in fact the climax of Lesotho’s political instability, the historical analysis of coalition governments in Lesotho is important for this study as it provides context to the 2014 attempted coup, which contributes to the study, that is, to critically analyse the recurrence of coups in Lesotho.

Lesotho’s first coalition government happened as the result of no single party winning a clear majority in the 2012 general elections. As a result, contesting political parties were forced to power-share with other parties in order to acquire enough representation in parliament and subsequently form a government. Notably, the first coalition was not successful. Political infighting and internal power struggles erupted within the ruling coalition and led to the collapse of the coalition. One of the major causes of the disagreements within the coalition was around the powers of the prime minister, this would in turn extend to powers he possesses in order to make decisions to change government institutions and ministers. And the triggering effect of the collapse came about when Thabane fired the lieutenant general of the army from the previous administration, that is, Mosisili’s government, and replaced him

59 with his own preferred general. Thabane’s actions sparked outrage within the ruling coalition; with the members now actively questioning his executive powers.

Scholars such as Motsamai, (2018) make the assertion that the coalition crumbled because the Prime Minister exercised executive powers over the decision-making in government; however, a closer scrutiny of what led to the triggering effect of the collapse, that is, the firing of the lieutenant general of the army, again shows the problematic nature of the civil-military relations in Lesotho. The military in Lesotho is heavily induced in the country’s politics such that a change in the institution’s governance structures is directly linked to the overall sustainability of Lesotho’s government. While the narrative at that time was that Thabane fired officials belonging to Mosisili’s government in a political ‘witch-hunt’, on the contrary, Thabane’s actions show the dependence of Lesotho’s politics on the military. In order to survive Thabane needed to have assurance that the military was in concord with his government.

The historical overview of Lesotho’s pre-colonial to independent rule therefore provides clarity and context to efforts to understand the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. As such, the historical narrative is important as it provides in depth, the political and economic sequence of events in a more chronological fashion. This in addition helps to better understand the causes of coups in Lesotho, which is an objective of the study. For the purpose of the stated research questions and study objectives, the colonial assessment of the historical overview of the study only focused on a few years before Lesotho gained independence. This is deliberate as the time frame selected provides satisfactory context to the study of the recurrence of coups.

CHAPTER FOUR UNRAVELLING THE RECURRENCE OF COUPS IN THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

4.1 Introduction This chapter provides explanations for the recurrence of coups in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The overall aim of the chapter is determining whether civilian-military relations play a role in the recurrence of these coups; what is the role of the military in these coups; were the military coups intended to restore the monarchy, and change the electoral system? What is the role of the Church in Lesotho’s politics? – does its role in history contribute to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in the Kingdom? What is the role of the monarchy in Lesotho’s politics? – does its role in history contribute to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in the Kingdom.

Since gaining independence in 1966, Lesotho has experienced coups and related problems of political control making it essential to probe into the history, and possibly the patterns of coups in Lesotho. All in all, Lesotho has experienced a total of 10 coups of which four were successful; five were attempted coups; and one was

61 undeclared (See Annex). The existence of coups in Lesotho can best be explained through an emphasis on the historical background of these coups.

Essentially, the chapter is concerned mainly with unravelling the causes of the coups in Lesotho. The chapter delves into the history of Lesotho in order to provide the context of these coups. The idea is to determine the socio-political factors that cause the coups. This helps in developing a trend that will help the study to critically analyse the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. Once a pattern of event(s) that led to a coup is discovered then recurrence of coups can be better managed as its causes in Lesotho have been identified. This chapter intends to put together the common causes of coups in Lesotho, analyse them, and attempt to determine the causes of recurrent coups in Lesotho. For the purpose of this chapter, the coups have been structured thematically, this helps identify similarities and differences in the factors that led to the coups. This chapter therefore helps to answer the research questions and study objectives on the critical analysis of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. 4.2 An Overview of the Root Causes of the Coups

This section is concerned with providing the historical context and analysis of the coups and introduces the key actors (direct and indirect) involved in the coup, namely Chief Leabua Jonathan and the BNP, the BCP and MFP, the Church and the King. The historical context provides more clarity on the political events and circumstances that led to the coup. This context is important as a chronological introduction of the key actors involved in the coup. Some of the actors became key drivers of the conflicts and causes of coups, while some to a great extent, became prominent actors, and remained a common factor in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The chronological ordering of the actors is deliberate to illustrate the circumstances leading to their involvement and subsequently, the coup. Through analysing the historical trajectory of specific events, the section provides a detailed explanation of the factors leading to the coup. The historical context, however, covers only a limited time before the independence of Lesotho, which is relevant to the background of the coup, and to the overall study on the recurrence of coups.

4.2.1 Formation of Political Parties and the role of the Church

62 The first ever political party formed in Lesotho was the Basutoland African Congress Party (BAC), which was formed in 1952. The BAC later changed its name to the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1959. Matlosa and Sello (2005: 20) argue that the change in the name reflected a change in both the political character and ideological outlook of the party. While Gill (1993) posited that the change in fact reflected the tensions influenced by power politics around the movement towards self-government. This was during the time the movement towards self-government gained momentum. Still, the changes within the BAC/BCP form an important element of Lesotho’s political history, more especially concerning the 1970 and 1994 coups.

As the movement towards self-government gained momentum, splits began became evident in the BCP (Gill, 1993). The first split occurred in 1957 when Chief S.S Matete left with other influential chiefs to form the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) with BM Khaketla and various ANC activists who left or were expelled from the ANC in the early 1960s (Ibid, 1993). The MFP, while adopting many of the policies of the BCP, differed primarily in supporting a constitution that would give the monarch executive powers. According to the MFP, the King would remain, not ceremonial but have executive powers (Matlosa, 1998)

Led by Ntsu Mokhehle, the BCP developed from the elements of the ANC, and sought to transcend the urban elite and mobilise broad national support, through temporarily uniting commoners, Protestants and Catholics, workers and peasants (Gill, 1993; Weisfelder, 1999:94). Therefore, the BCP was aligned to the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) because it did not fully support the traditional authorities especially chiefs and the monarchy.

The Roman Catholic Church (RCC) regarded the BCP as communist, intent on destroying the church. As a result, the formation of the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) in 1958 became the first attempt to compete politically with the BCP (Weisfelder, 2002). Some of the guidelines that formed part of the programme of the party were: (a) Self-government under the protection of England; (b) No annexation to South Africa, but good relations with the Union; (c) No colour bar and application of the principles of cooperation between all races; (e) Fight against Communism. Mphanya (2004:28) argues that the RCC formed the CDP as an alternative to the

63 BCP and that the church continued to use the CDP as a form of defence against communism. Although the CDP was, according to Mphanya (2004:28) a practical expression of a new political agenda as articulated by the Catholic Church”, the CDP still maintained its position that BCP was anti-white, anti-chieftainship, anti-Catholic, authoritarian and communist (Weisfelder, 2002). This was the position taken by Chief Leabua Jonathan when he went to London in 1958 for the first Constitutional conference Lesotho had with the British government.

4.2.2 Relationship between Chief Jonathan Leabua and King Moshoeshoe II

Chief Leabua Jonathan, born in 1914, was the son of Chief Jonathan Molapo by his junior wife Masekalakati, which makes him the great-grandson of King Moshoeshoe I, and the second cousin to Moshoeshoe II. Chief Leabua Jonathan became one of the advisors to the Regent Paramount Chieftainess, Mantšebo Seeiso. He also became a member of the old Basutoland National Council, where his main work was to advise the British High Commissioner, who was the legislative and executive head of the administration of Lesotho. In 1956, Chief Leabua was elected by the Basutoland Council to be a member of the Constitutional Reform Committee which worked out proposals that gave Lesotho its first constitution. Before that, Leabua had been a member of the Basutoland Congress Party, although he was never active.

To complete the political landscape that led to the coups, this section of the chapter focuses on a man who was greatly involved in the coups, King Moshoeshoe II. When the King, as Prince Bereng Seeiso, decided to discontinue his studies at Oxford University in submission to the public pressure back at home that he should take over the paramountcy from the Regent as he had come of age, Chief Leabua Jonathan was foremost among those who strongly supported the Regent, that the young prince should return to Oxford and complete his studies.

The British administration was also not keen that the prince should take over from the paramountcy, but intense pressure from the people was so great that the prince had no choice. Ultimately the British High Commissioner agreed to ‘place’ the prince as Paramount Chief of Lesotho in 1960, the year of the first elections for the Legislative Council. Chief Jonathan Leabua left Matsieng, the headquarters of the

64 Paramount Chief, as he had been in the service of the Regent. This apparently innocuous incident seems to have sown a seed of the ill-will in Chief Jonathan’s heart.

Khaketla (1970) argues that perhaps some of the King’s later difficulties, more especially regarding his relationship with Chief Leabua Jonathan, and the ruling BNP stem from the time of his ‘placing’, as discussed above. Arguably, the tensions resulted mainly because the British administration was reluctant on his placing. While the British were opposed, factions within the senior chieftaincy were even more opposed – basically it was a factional fight within the sons of Moshoeshoe (Weisfelder; Gill, 1993).

This is because the British administration feared that a young man, educated outside Lesotho, would be against the apartheid regime in South Africa, while the British administration boasted good relations with apartheid South Africa. Therefore, this would be a great embarrassment to the administration, particularly if he would be supporting the fight against apartheid, and the incorporation of Lesotho into the Union of South Africa.

In fact, also by showing reluctance in placing the King, the British administration could have been playing politics with an opposing faction. Chief Leabua Jonathan headed that faction, and it was from it that the BNP came into being (Khaketla, 1970). Gill (1993: 211), also assumes that the BNP was formed with a pessimistic attitude towards the King. And that explains the relationship between Chief Leabua Jonathan and the King going forward. When Chief Leabua Jonathan returned to Lesotho after the conference, in 1959, he changed the name of the CDP to the BNP. He did this with the support of the RCC in Lesotho. Gill (1993) argues that the name was changed to attract a more Protestant following. What made the BNP distinctive from both the BCP and MFP was that it was willing to work within a framework of good relations with South Africa (Gill, 1993). Some scholars such as Grimwood, (2017) have argued that the BNP’s position was motivated mainly by the realisation that there would not be imminent changes to the apartheid regime. Hence, the best alternative at the time was to work in tandem with the apartheid government. This argument however, is debatable.

4.2.3 Significance of the 1965 pre-independence General Elections

Lastly, the alliances formed around the monarchy before the 1965 pre-independence elections were switched completely when the BNP won the elections in 1965, and the BCP lost. The BNP was surprised that it had won the elections, while the BCP for its part was shocked that it had lost. At that point, suddenly, the sentiments were turned around. The BCP began clamouring for the King to have full control of the military since it considered this to be the only way by which it could have access to the military (Banyera, 2017). While the BNP, now needing the military to be under the Prime Minister and not the King, most likely on the grounds that it had won the elections so it needed to control the military (Ibid, 2017).

The surprise election results fuelled dishonesty among the political parties, as they increasingly wanted to align themselves with the army, with those who had been side-lined reverting alternatively to the police as a source of power. Banyera (2017) further argues that this partially explains the army-police clashes in the political history in Lesotho (Moremoholo, 2005), and that “such political practises relegate ideology and other political considerations to a peripheral status, as the control of the military becomes the ultimate political possession” (Banyera, 2017).

Besides the obsession with the army, the 1965 elections were important for other reasons. For the BCP, the election was a matter of finally enjoying the full fruits of victory. The BCP would reshape Basotho society based on the more egalitarian patterns which they believed reflected pre-colonial Basotho society, and do away with the autocratic tendencies which, in their perspective, had so corrupted the chieftainship as to render it useless in its present form (Gill, 1993). For the BNP, on the other hand, victory would mean preserving the chieftainship and the Church against the radical secularism of the BCP and its ‘communist’ allies. The BNP would progressively guide Lesotho into a future through cooperation with South Africa and cooperatively with the apartheid regime which controlled most of Lesotho’s imports and jobs for its citizens (Ibid, 1993).

66 Finally, the MFP hoped that victory would allow it to augment the powers of the monarch in a substantial way so as it to provide the proper balance between the chieftainship and political parties, and thus guarantee national unity and development (Ibid, 1993).

When the BNP government took office, it did so under precarious circumstances. It enjoyed a mere two-seat majority in Parliament while the civil service was mainly composed of BCP supporters. Moreover, the King was not prepared to accept the new constitution. Serious tensions built up over the role of the monarch. Moshoeshoe II was adamant that the constitution was ‘unsuitable and unpopular’ (Gill, 1993: 217), and should be replaced.

On one hand, the BCP began to build up its party organisation across the whole country exposing the weakness of the new and inexperienced government and establishing a broad coalition of forces against the BNP government. On the other hand, the BNP was overwhelmed by the task of running a growing bureaucracy and its party organisation suffered as a result. Nevertheless, the BNP was confident that its accomplishments would speak louder than the opposition criticisms and promises. “The BNP leadership, however started to believe its own propaganda about its great achievements, and lost touch with the grassroots. The BCP quickly moved into this void and established a broad coalition to vie for power in the next election” (Gill, 1993: 220).

4.3 Explaining the Recurrence of Lesotho’s Coups

Historically, the alignment between the Lesotho Evangelist Church (LEC) and the BCP on one side, and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) with the BNP on the other, informed relations between the two political parties. This worsened the already volatile political environment, and, with the advent of political parties in the build-up to independence, in the 1950s, the involvement of the Church in politics became more pronounced (Leshota, 2017:212). Weisfelder (2002) further argues that the Church played a major role in the history of political instability in Lesotho. Pherudi (2004) concurs that the Church emphasised political differences more than religious unity. Therefore, the rivalry between the churches, which emanated from long years of mutual persecutions in Europe in the 18th and 19th century, accompanied the

67 missionaries and disrupted the entire social fabric and political life of Lesotho (Ibid, 2004).

Though the RCC was a strong supporter of the BNP as a party and government, it attempted to distance itself from the political crises of the 1970s by appealing to the BNP government to protect peace and stability. The RCC appealed to the government to “align themselves with the law of God, who binds all men in peace and reconciliation” (Monyane, 2005; Machobane, 2001:28). Still, the Church created deep embedded political fractures among the Basotho, and turned on its noble mission of preaching peace, reconciliation and brotherhood. Moreover, the Church instead became an obstacle that created complications regarding the democratisation process in Lesotho.

As it became clear that Lesotho was going to be granted independence, ‘who should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces’ became a catalyst of the political discourse ahead of independence. The politics revolved around who should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The royalist MFP supported the monarch to be the Commander-in-Chief of the army. While the BNP, uncertain of its prospects in the pre-independence elections of 1965, also supported the constitutional monarch as the Commander-in-Chief, which was in conformity with the Westminster system. Following the 1965 elections, political parties traded places over the position of the monarch. The MFP maintained its original position on the monarch and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. In contrast, both the BNP and BCP traded positions on the issue in what would be a clear exhibition of political opportunism (reference?). The BNP’s position was fundamentally informed by their fear that a BCP-led government would abuse its power and use the security forces to crush the opposition. The BCP, still basking in the glory of its victory in the 1960 elections had adopted a contrary position that, the Prime Minister, as head of government, should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Some scholars (Matlosa, 2017; Banyera; 2017) have argued that, it is only after winning the election that the BNP changed its position to support the idea that the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces should be the Prime Minister. While the BCP, fearful that once in power, the BNP would abuse its powers over the security

68 force, reverted to its position. As a result, the BCP together with the MFP maintained powers previously reserved for the King. Matlosa (2017) further argues that the whole tussle over who should be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces relegated the important issues of the actual role of a military force in Lesotho. These included the question whether, given its economic and geographical circumstances, Lesotho needed an army (Ibid, 2017). Letsie (2018) posited a similar argument citing that given its geographical size and location, did Lesotho necessarily need an army.

Despite their electoral victory in 1970, the BCP did not assume state power. What followed was the BNP’s de facto one-party rule, predicated upon a coup, aimed at dismantling opposition parties and sustaining BNP dominance. Even before the results were announced, the opposition leaders including Mokhehle were arrested (Pherudi, 2016). Chief Leabua Jonathan and the BNP government were confident that they were destined to defeat the BCP. Seeing the political pendulum favouring the BCP, the BNP could not accept the results. The manner in which the BNP reacted to its loss of the elections led to a serious political crisis that plunged Lesotho into a coup, dictatorship and political instability.

Refusal by Chief Leabua Jonathan and cabinet ministers to transfer power to the BCP after the 1970 elections plunged Lesotho into serious crisis. In order to challenge the legitimacy of the BNP government, the BCP organised national campaigns mobilising citizens against the authority of the BNP. The BNP government reacted by warning and banning the BCP from engaging in political activities countrywide. “The BNP government further threatened to take serious measures should the BCP continue with protests” (Moremoholo, 2005: 42). The BCP turned a deaf ear to the BNP threats and continued to challenge the legitimacy of the BNP government.

As a continued struggle, the BCP militants attempted to overthrow the BNP government in 1974 (Khaketla, 1970). This led to the radical transformation of the country’s military by the BNP in order to control the opposition and consolidate its government. Following the BCP uprisings, the BNP government transformed the Lesotho Mounted Police into the Police Mobile Unit (PMU). The transformation affected the role and size of the military (Moremoholo, 2005). And, with the support

69 of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the force acquired aeroplanes, transportation and military operations in general. This resulted in increased expenditure and strength of the military to support government policy through use of force (Grundy, 1986:63). By 1980, the PMU was promoted to a fully-fledged army, the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF). This increased the power of the military in protecting the BNP government.

The transformation of the police force was aimed at preventing political competition, torturing and suppressing opposition. Eventually, the use of the military by the BNP government led to politicisation of the military, which in turn compromised the professional and apolitical nature of the military establishment in Lesotho (Matlosa & Pule, 2001). During this period, the organisational structure of the military was changed. People affiliated to the BNP were recruited to the military. This was done through political recommendation from the constituencies. Before the attempted coup, the selection and promotions to the PMU were on merit. After 1974, merit was replaced by political patronage.

Consequently, in 1979, the BCP formed the LLA, which was to become the party’s military wing. Due to the politicisation of Lesotho’s armed forces, the BCP was unable to operate in the country and thus the establishment of the LLA served to strengthen its attack against the BNP government (Moremoholo, 2005). Pherudi (2009: 267) argues that the aim of the establishment of the military wing was to destabilise Chief Leabua’s government. The LLA aimed to ensure that elections were held, and to fight for the restoration of the 1966 Constitution. It also aimed at “rallying people who had lost hope under the dictatorship of the BNP” (Ibid, 2009:267).

Notably, during the same year of the formation of the LLA, the Lesotho government established diplomatic relations with the countries of the eastern bloc, namely Russia, Cuba, China and North Korea to mention but four (Moremoholo, 2005). These countries provided Lesotho with military assistance thus expanding the country’s security services. This affected the long-standing relations between the government of Lesotho and South Africa to the extent that the South African government was prepared to work side by side with the BCP against the BNP

70 government (Moremoholo, 2005; Pherudi, 2009). Chief Leabua Jonathan refused to ban the South African liberation movements such as the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Chief Jonathan Leabua also refused to change Lesotho’s policy towards the communist bloc or to adopt a friendly policy towards apartheid South Africa. Importantly, the South African government had been a major partner, either politically, economically and socially to Lesotho.

South Africa responded by cutting off its assistance to the Lesotho government in 1980 and began providing military support to the LLA. Gill (1993) argues that this forced the LLA to cooperate with the South African apartheid regime or lose any chance of regaining power in Lesotho. Moremoholo (2005), further acknowledges that this exacerbated pressure against the legitimacy of the BNP government. “Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the South African government made use of Jonathan’s treatment of the BCP to its own advantage and attempted to capitalize on the party’s efforts to destabilize the BNP government” (Pherudi, 2009:269). Hence, the partnership between the South African government and the LLA should therefore be understood in the greater context of the threat posed to the apartheid government by the communist-supported ANC, PAC and SACP.

Another factor that contributed to the 1986 coup is that despite the electoral victory of the BNP in 1985, the election results worsened the already increasing tensions among the different factions within the BNP, which climaxed in disagreements and leadership struggles, and subsequently saw the emergence of two competing intolerant factions, with each pursuing its own agenda and fighting over the control of the party machinery (Monyane, 2009).

The BNP Youth League demanded new party leadership and had positioned itself as a central actor in government and attempted various strategies to replace the military as the official government instrument of power. The perceived threat by the BNP Youth League gave the military the impression that the League was a parallel institution to the army (Monyane, 2009: 118). According to Moremoholo (2005), the Youth League was to seize power and displace the army and in response to the threat.

As such, there are various interpretations as to what that led to the military coup in 1986. One theory suggests that the power struggles within the BNP, which included the military, were responsible for the coup, because they had caused insecurity among some party members. Letsie (2018) also argues that the coup emanated from intra-party power struggles within the then-ruling BNP, which unsettled some party factions and the army. This is largely because the BNP Youth League had begun to take over some of the army roles, which the army perceived as a threat to its position.

Another theory is that the coup was as a result of the successful destabilisation by the South African government (Gill, 1993: 243). The apartheid government in South Africa took advantage of the wedge between the executive government and the army, which was worsened by the role of the BNP Youth League to precipitate a military coup (Machobane, 2001). South Africa had imposed economic sanctions on Lesotho to expel ANC liberation fighters. Similarly, some scholars argue that the South African government engineered the coup in order to punish the BNP government for its support towards the liberation struggle in South Africa.

A different perspective is offered by Matlosa and Pule, (2002:3) who argue that the military in Lesotho was compromised not only by association with the BNP government but also because of its close association, which involved military assistance in financial, technical and logistic support; with the South African security establishment to stage a coup. This association continued throughout the 1980s despite the government’s anti-apartheid rhetoric (Matlosa & Pule, 2001).

On the contrary, the military felt exposed to South Africa's attacks because of Chief Jonathan's international strategy (Letsie, 2018). This incorporated the proxy attacks of the South African-supported LLA and direct attacks by the SANDF as a feature of South Africa's “total onslaught” (Machobane, 2001). The army had been humiliated and feared more severe consequences from stronger attacks (Ibid, 2001). On 20 January 1986, the military staged a coup and deposed the BNP from 16 years of one-party de facto rule.

72 The conclusions that could be drawn from the military government are that upon its assumption of power in 1986, it was convinced that Lesotho needed a new constitution relevant to the modern political developments of the 20th century. The military had previously served as the guarantors of civil dictatorship under the BNP government, controlled state power and was now heading the process of transition to democracy. However, it was inculcated in the political culture and legacy developed by the BNP government (Machobane, 2001: 133).

Letsie (2018) argues that regardless of these explanations, it is clear that the army exploited the government's predicament to legitimise its irregular intervention in politics. He further contends that citizens’ rights were violated during the military rule, “the seven-year military rule was more repressive than the sixteen-year authoritarian rule of the BNP” (Ajulu, 1995: 15). The most apparent of these violations was the suspension of all political activities in the country through the Political Activities Order (No 4) of 1986. Among various human rights abuses committed by the military were the assassination of those perceived to be opponents of the regime.

I argue that King Moshoeshoe II exercised executive powers in the early phases of the military administration, a situation he previously desired and preferred since the attainment of independence in 1966. An exploration into the military-monarchy alliance is important in order to analyse the monarchy’s persistent quest for executive power. Since independence, Moshoeshoe II had been on a quest for executive monarchy power. While the BCP had explicitly been against an executive monarchy, the King quickly aligned himself with the party when it changed its position after losing the 1965 elections (Sekatle, 1994: 68). Consequently, the King worked in concert with the two losing parties namely the BCP and the MFP, to stage a series of well-attended public gatherings across Lesotho were he campaigned for enhanced constitutional powers. King Moshoeshoe II, backed by the BCP and MFP, scheduled a prayer session at Thaba-Bosiu to undermine further the BNP government, police opened fire to disperse the crowds (Gill, 2010: 217). The government accused the King, the BCP and the MFP of secretly planning a coup. The Prime Minister forced the King to choose between supporting his government positively or being exiled (Ibid, 2010: 217).

73 Hence, in 1986 Moshoeshoe II welcomed his new role and the executive powers given to him by the new military regime. It remains a contentious issue whether the King played an active role in overthrowing the BNP or whether the military sought to legitimise the coup by giving him powers. Edgar (1987:379) explained this, “The King undoubtedly welcomed the turn of events since he had been relegated to a ceremonial function under Jonathan”. The problem emerged on the ‘balancing’ and monarchical interests that resulted in the King being exiled and dethroned in 1990.While I am reluctant to believe that the King was an innocent bystander in the coup, there is no evidence to suggest that he actively plotted with the military to depose Chief Jonathan Leabua.

Monyane (2005: 26) argues that negotiations between the military government and the King to arrange for his return to Lesotho were futile, since the King insisted on having executive powers. King Moshoeshoe II demanded the resignation of the military government and the formation of a government of national unity (Gill, 1993: 243). The King also demanded the suspension of the 1966 constitution and the lifting of Lesotho Order No. 2 of 1990. The military administration responded by replacing the deposed King with his son, Prince Mohato Bereng Seeiso, who became King Letsie III in November 1990 (Monyane, 2005: 26).

The military government, which was often confronted with the problems of indiscipline among junior ranks, was hostile to criticism and opposition (Machobane, 2001). Moremoholo (2005) argues that besides nepotism and corruption as another basis for employment in the military, these elements did have immediate impact on the stability of the PMU, although later their consequences were glaring especially regarding the 1991 military coup.

With Lesotho’s return to democratic rule in 1993, the first and arguably the most important challenge Ramaema’s time in the military was confronted with was the enormous task of deciding what to do with the now deposed King Moshoeshoe II. The military regime was under pressure from the Commonwealth Secretariat, royalist supporters and the majority of the Principal Chiefs to restore King Moshoeshoe to the throne. This added more pressure on the already collapsing military rule (Monyane, 2009: 122). Furthermore, the military regime increasingly came under

74 pressure from various civil society groups to return the country to civilian rule. The pressure from the various voices continued until the military eventually relinquished power in 1993 and held general elections around the same time. The 1993 elections returned Lesotho to multiparty democracy following 23 years of dictatorship and military rule.

A key challenge faced by the regime concerned the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II who had been deposed by the military and replaced by his son, King Letsie III, in 1990 (Mothibe, 2016). Moshoeshoe II came back from exile just before the 1993 elections. Prior to that, the BCP, BNP and MFP had committed themselves to settling the issue of the monarchy after the elections. The first step towards this was only taken in July 1994 (Sekatle, 1994). Mothibe (2016) argues that this challenge was one of the many that the BCP government had inherited from military rule; “anyway the BCP government alluded to the issue as a military issue as the previous military system's concern, and not theirs, and tried to side-line it” (Mothibe, 2016).

The BCP government set up a Commission of Inquiry through Legal Notice 81 to explore conditions that prompted the King's deposing. The Commission was likewise mandated, in addition to other things, to explore Moshoeshoe II's role since 1966 (Sekatle, 1994). At the point when the pressure to reinstate Moshoeshoe II increased and forced the government to decide, the government's reaction only exacerbated existing tensions. Mothibe (2016) notes that, the government’s response was seemingly insensitive, and comprised of appointing known rivals of Moshoeshoe II, including people known for their republican sympathies and hostile to monarchical views, to a Commission to investigate the reasons for his ousting. One of the Commission's terms of reference was that, it ought to explore how King Moshoeshoe II had related to post-independence governments since 1966. Moshoeshoe was opposed to the examination (Sekatle, 1994).

The government had routinely worked without informing the royal palace in contravention of the provisions of the constitution. In spite of noticing the above- mentioned, the King's actions were unconstitutional and amounted to a coup for two primary reasons; first and foremost, the constitution is clear on the procedures for the dissolution of parliament and government, and King Letsie's unilateral move fell

75 outside these procedures. Also, the King's actions undermined the people’s democratic right to choose their own representative in government (Sekatle, 1994). The ‘August coup’ became the fourth successful coup in the Kingdom since its independence in 1966.

The BCP government was ousted for its inability to restore Moshoeshoe II. The matter of the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II pushed the royal palace towards the BNP opposition which had not so much as acknowledged BCP's margin in the 1993 elections, and was looking to unseat the BCP by force if necessary (Mothibe, 2016). In addition, the military supported the royal coup. Note that Lesotho's military was built up along partisan divisions and in this way the military would lean towards anybody to form a BCP government. Notwithstanding, when the military had been forced to return the country to civilian rule, its leaders still attempted to make space for their political aspirations (Sekatle, 1994).

The BCP government likewise added to the coup. It neglected to assert its position, particularly over the security forces. The military mutiny in January 1994 was followed by a police strike, the government failed to resolve the crisis. The government was likewise frustrated by lack of experience, strategy and police.

Lesotho has consistently been characterised by coups and related politics of opportunism. Political parties, particularly the BNP and the BCP have switched their alliance to suit their own interests at any given time. Continually shifting alliances among these actors, has added to the factors underlying Lesotho’s political crisis. This pattern of behaviour dates back to the 1960s. Notwithstanding the above- mentioned, conditions, for example, the monarchy’s determined quest for power, the military’s continued interference, coupled further with the failure of the BCP government to assert its authority, and the BNP's hesitance to accept the 1993 elections; have all added to political events that have plunged Lesotho into turmoil.

4.4 The 2014 Attempted Coup and the role of ‘Coalition Politics’

76 This section is concerned with discussing the political events leading up to the 2014 attempted coup. The purpose of this background is to demonstrate the relationship between the recurrence of coups in Lesotho and the attempted coup. The attempted coup can only be understood fully through an exploration into Lesotho’s history, which has been covered exceedingly in the preceding chapters. Lesotho has a long history of political instability and has experienced high levels of factionalism, political tensions and violent conflict especially during and after elections. As such, although the study did not delve deeply into the analysis of the history and causes of attempted coups in Lesotho, the 2014 attempted coup nonetheless, particularly stands-out in answering the research problem on why Lesotho is coup-prone country. As a result, a detailed discussion on the 2014 attempted coup is important for the study. By doing so, I attempt to demonstrate that the attempted coup emanated from political environment conducive to coups. Most importantly, the 2014 coup introduces a new root cause of the coups in Lesotho that is, coalition politics. It is my assertion that the recurrence of coups in Lesotho contributed to the attempted coup. The frequency of coups in the country and the general reaction to them creates an enabling environment for their outbreak. Similarly, the attempted coup case shows the effect of the recurrence of coups on the political stability in Lesotho. Therefore, the main purpose of the discussion on the attempted coup is to demonstrate the role of coalition in the coups. This is important in identifying the triggers of the coups.

The development of constitutional democracy in Lesotho took a bad turn after the 2012 elections. These elections are important for two reasons; first, they resulted in the first ever peaceful transfer of power in Lesotho’s history. Second, they produced a hung parliament as there was no single party with requisite majority in the National Assembly to form a government alone. Lesotho’s government is formed on the constitutional requirement of 50%+1 of the parliamentary seats. Therefore, coalition partners’ ABC, LCD and the BNP had 30, 26 and 5 seats respectively, forming a simple majority of 61 seats out of the 120 that constituted the National Assembly (Motsamai, 2015).

In the events leading up to the 2012 snap elections, the then ruling LCD was engulfed in factionalism, which resulted in a bitter two-year internal tussle that

77 culminated in its former leader Pakalitha Mosisili and other party members leading a breakaway party to form the Democratic Congress (DC). The former Secretary General of the LCD, Mothejoa Metsing led an anti-Mosisili faction within the LCD, and eventually took over the position of the party president (Pherudi, 2016).

Therefore, “the Prime Minister and his deputy had come into an alliance based on an anti-Mosisili sentiment” (Delegise, 2018). To an extent, Lesotho’s ABC-led coalition was a marriage of convenience. All the parties in the governing coalition were breakaways. However, they held a simple parliamentary majority of 61 seats out of 120, meaning that the governing coalition was inherently unstable (Ibid, 2018). As unstable as it was, it reflected what was possible and negotiated at the time. These negotiations were done in haste. The ABC opened negotiations for a coalition government, and by the next day, it had sealed a coalition deal with the LCD, the BNP, the PFD and the MFP. These negotiations were conducted under pressure and involved intense political bargaining, especially between the ABC and the LCD as the main parties with the most parliamentary seats in the arrangement. The LCD agreed to form part of the coalition on the condition of list of strategic ministries it wanted to preside over, were it to join government. It gave the ABC an ultimatum to negotiate with the DC if its demands were not met. The negotiations culminated in an agreement that formed the ABC, LCD, BNP coalition government of political parties, prior to the 26 May 2012 elections.

Nevertheless, the coalition government collapsed in acrimony in June 2014 having only lasted two years when the LCD, which was a major partner in the coalition government, announced its withdrawal and signed a coalition alliance with the DC. Motsamai (2015) argues that the collapse was inevitable mainly because the coalition faced the challenge of governing with a mere one-seat majority. Therefore, it became increasingly difficult to pass legislation requiring a two-thirds majority because they would need to lobby the opposition for at least 19 votes (Ibid, 2018). Factional politics subsequently characterised the coalition, as the governing coalition was made up of parties previously in the opposition driven by their historically antagonistic relationship.

78 The crumbling of the coalition began to take root in the Prime Minister’s anti- corruption drive. Thabane had launched an anti-corruption campaign in 2012 as a response to a series of unprosecuted corruption cases involving prominent politicians. However, his detractors saw it as a ‘witch-hunt’ of his political rivals in the DC and the LCD. Most referred are those cases involving his deputy Metsing and DC deputy leader Monyane Moleleki – implicated for financial impropriety and mismanagement.

Between 2012 and 2014, the triggering issues within the coalition were that Prime Minister Thabane unilaterally changed appointments in key state institutions including the Electoral Commission, the justice portfolios, and the public service, including government secretaries and permanent secretaries. The deputy prime minister claimed that Thabane was making crucial government decisions without consulting the two coalition partners and as a result, the LCD was often aggrieved by Thabane’s attempt to restructure portfolios previously controlled by the LCD without consultations and that such conduct affected the coherence of the coalition government (Vhumbunu, 2015).

In 2013, Thabane endeavoured to take control of the exceptionally key LHWP. The LHWP fell under the Energy, Meteorology and Water Affairs Ministry, an LCD portfolio. The move was met by dissent from the LCD, and the two parties in the long run consented to a joint ministerial monitoring committee. But this stayed a bone of contention for the two sides. The Prime Minister reorganized the security portfolios. The police portfolio, previously under Home Affairs, was moved to Defence, and another Commissioner of Police, Khothatso Tsoona, was appointed.

Tensions within the ruling coalition had reached a peak by March 2014. The LCD with support from opposition MPs proposed a motion of no confidence in Thabane's government. Furthermore, tensions between Prime Minister Thabane and the officer of the LDF Lieutenant General Kamoli triggered the attempted coup when on 29 August 2014 Kamoli was fired by the King through Legal Notice No 64, on the advice of the Prime Minister as the constitution stipulated. Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao was then promoted to the position of Lieutenant General and appointed as the new

79 commander of the LDF. Be that as it may, Kamoli rejected the dismissal and would not surrender his position (Letsie, 2018: 99).

On 30 August 2014, following his dismissal, Kamoli and the army invaded the residences of the Prime Minister, the BNP leader, and his replacement Lieutenant General Mahao, and those of many other senior government officials including the commissioner of police. The military attacks included invasion operations of police stations and police headquarters in Maseru – demanding dockets investigating crimes implicating high-ranking LDF soldiers and politicians, including then Deputy Prime Minister Metsing. The military claimed to have received word that the police were planning to harm supporters of Metsing ahead of protests that had been planned for 1 September. The army took over wireless tele- communications headquarters including radio and TV stations (Ncube & Lukhele, 2014).

The purpose for which these ‘operations’ were carried out by the army has largely divided public opinion as there has never been any authoritative investigation to establish both what really happened and its purpose (Nyane, 2015: 63). While the army vehemently denied the widespread allegations of an attempted coup, the international community was almost unanimous that the operation bore all the hallmarks of an attempted coup (Ibid, 2015:63). Motsamai (2015) is also in agreement that the attempted coup was an accusation, which the leadership of the LCD and many MPs tacitly encouraged when they did not publicly denounce the act. Clearly the army, whose commander was appointed by DC leadership shortly before the 2012 elections sympathised with the new pact so much so that the Prime Minister in a letter to the Chairperson of SADC alleged that,

On the security situation, I have highlighted to Your Excellency the discomfort that is caused by the current Commander of the Lesotho Defense Force, who fatly refuses to cooperate with the Commissioner of Police and other law enforcement agencies in releasing members of the Lesotho Defense Force who are implicated in numerous acts of criminality, predominantly cases of murder and defeating the ends of justice.

80 To prevent the collapse of his administration, Thabane advised King Letsie III to prorogue Parliament from 10 June until 27 February 2015. With the approval of King Letsie III, Prime Minister Thomas Thabane suspended Parliament for nine months following a motion of no-confidence against him. While some observers argued that prorogation would provide a cooling-off for the coalition partners to iron out their differences, in reality, it intensified the conflict by removing any moderating element of parliamentary deliberation (Weisfelder, 2015: 64).

The dismissal of the Commander of the LDF, who was known to have strong ties with the LCD and the DC, became the last divisive and most controversial action by Prime Minister Thabane. Thabane had always taken Kamoli to be sympathetic to the former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili because Kamoli had been promoted by Mosisili in March 2012, a month before the 2012 elections, to command the army – a move which was criticised by many as untimely since the country was already in the election period (Nyane, 2015). It therefore, did not come as a surprise when Thabane failed to establish a good relationship with the army under the leadership of Kamoli when he came into power in 2012 (Letsie, 2018).

In a country prone to military-led coups, the firing of the army commander may have not been the best means by which to achieve peace in governance. The leadership of the LCD and many DC MPs argued that Kamoli’s removal was illegal and the Prime Minister had failed to follow due process. They also asserted that his replacement, Lieutenant General Mahao, was ill-suited for the post as he was being tried by court martial for improper behaviour (Motsamai, 2015). However, still, to allow such a commander to remain in power was not a viable option either. His retention could have sent the message that the army is untouchable, is not subject to civilian authority and is a power unto itself. This may have been the reason for the refusal of Lesotho’s then Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, to defy calls for the removal of the army commander. Or perhaps Mosisili had some nefarious dealings with Kamoli, who stood accused of illegal detentions and torture of detainees (Africa Conflict Monitor, 2016).

There had already been visible cracks in Lesotho’s democracy, and the military intervened bluntly to do more damage. The historical predilection of the LDF to

81 intervene in governance led to the attempted coup in 2014. The attempted coup revealed tensions in police-military relations. The army attacks were the trigger that brought down Thabane’s embattled coalition government. Civil-military relations are an inherently problematic concept because it seeks to harmonise two institutions – civilian authorities and the army –cast on diametrically opposed values. The natural chemistry of the army has been a political vendetta against opponents. Therefore, the problem is on both sides of the equation – the civilian political leaders as well as the army. The incidences arguably reflect the lowest ebb of civil-military relations since Lesotho’s return to constitutional democracy in 1993. The collapse of civilian control of the army in Lesotho was evidenced by the refusal of the army commander to vacate office as directed by the civilian authorities. Still, the pattern of military operations not sanctioned, whether tacitly or openly, by government, signal deeply embedded problems of poor civil-military relations.

The framework for the coalition was also a challenge, as it amounted to a gentlemen’s agreement, in the absence of legally binding agreement to provide guiding principles for the partners. Within the coalition, the ABC held the premiership, deputised by the LCD. The latter challenged most of the decisions by the Prime Minister, including attempts to dismiss senior public officials and ministers from the coalition government. The coalition’s composition presaged the strains that led to its demise. Thabane’s dependence on LCD support was evident in Metsing’s appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and in the distribution of Cabinet posts. Disagreements and tensions among coalition partners resulted from continued politicisation of the state administration. This is mainly because ministries were divided among parties. For this reason, coalition fissures and modalities for engagement, which should have been the business of the parties became issues for the state. The situation deteriorated to the point where the Prime Minister was supported by the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS). The Deputy Prime Minister was backed by the military.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide some explanation for the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The critical research question that the chapter endavoured to answer was: What are the factors (political and economic) that contribute to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho? As such, the chapter successfully, through an analysis of the trajectory of these coups and their relationship to national political events, determined that civilian-military relations in Lesotho play a role in the recurrence of these coups. The role of the military in Lesotho’s politics only became prominent in the years leading up to Lesotho’s independence. The problem was that given that the governance of the country would be handed back to the Basotho, who would rule – and most importantly, who would have power over the functions of the military? Then, civil-military relations again became a problem when the military in Lesotho was inculcated into politics in order to help protect Chief Jonathan’s regime. The climax of the role of the military in Lesotho’s politics was reached when the army deposed Chief Jonathan’s regime from power in 1986. From thereon, the military became a permanent feature of Lesotho’s politics until today. The role of the military in Lesotho contributed to the factors that led to the royal coup in 1994 as well as the attempted coup in 2014.

From its inception in 1980, the army was characterised by conflicting perceptions about the exact role it was expected to play. Most problems associated with the transition to democracy from military rule are that, once the military have tasted the benefits of state power, the military tends to become addicted to it (Acemoglu, Ticchi & Vindigni, 2010). These underlying theoretical shortfalls of Lesotho’s democracy seem to have escaped the notice of the constitutional reformers because the transition seems to have done very little about the deeply imbedded powers of the army. This is evidenced by the fact that hardly a year after the transition, the army showed its inextricability with politics. The recurrence of coups reached a climax when the monarch and the army played an active role in triggering the coup in 1994. The palace coup in fact mirrored the 1970 coup because of the similar convergence of actors involved, therefore signaling perennial coups in the fragile democracy.

Also, the chapter attempted to provide some of the explanations for the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Lesotho’s politics and the coups. The purpose of this

83 section on the role of the Church in Lesotho’s politics was to determine whether its role in history contributed to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in Lesotho. The study shows that the role of the Church in Lesotho’s politics is mainly historical. As such, there is no compelling evidence of the direct involvement of the Church in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. However, what is clear from the study is that the Church did have a historical role in the political instability in Lesotho, more especially in 1970. Given the scope of the study objectives, that is, to analyse critically the factors that contribute to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho, it is important to assess correctly the role of the Church in the political instability in Lesotho in order to unravel its role in the factors that led to the coups. Scholars (Mphanya) have only placed the Church’s role in Lesotho’s politics via its influence in the party politics.

The Church’s influence in Lesotho’s politics has not been critically analysed in relation to the impact it had on the political parties in their formative years which contributed to their trajectory in becoming primary actors in Lesotho’s coups. Historically, the Church regarded the BCP as communist, intent on destroying the Church. As a result, the formation of the BNP became the first attempt to compete politically with the BCP. Therefore, the Church continued to use the BNP as a form of defence against communism. Eventually this was the position taken by Chief Leabua Jonathan. The Church was complicit in the political behaviour of Chief Jonathan Leabua and the BNP. Upon seizing power through a coup, the Church failed to intervene and recall Chief Leabua Jonathan’s actions. Also, during Chief Leabua Jonathan’s dictatorial regime, the Church failed to restore law and order that had been diminished by Chief Jonathan Leabua and his BNP government. However, the role the Christian Council of Lesotho (which included the Catholics) played a key role in the negotiations that returned Lesotho to democratic rule in 1993.

Another important political actor that emerges in the analysis of the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is the monarchy. The chapter attempted to analyse whether the military coups were intended to restore the monarchy. The monarch began to feature in Lesotho’s politics in the years leading up to Lesotho’s independence. The monarch wanted to have political powers in the new constitution. When the BCP did not win the elections in 1965 as anticipated, the monarchy’s ambition to have more

84 political powers diminished. The King would spend the next years trying to mobilise support to have more powers in the BNP government. In his quest to undermine the BNP government, the King attempted, together with the BCP and other political parties that lost the 1965 elections, a coup against Chief Jonathan Leabua. The coup was unsuccessful. The King was exiled. When the military eventually deposed Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime from power, the coup actually presented an opportunity for the monarchy to have more power over governance in Lesotho. The King returned to Lesotho and formed the government with the military. This was the beginning of military-monarch relations in Lesotho.

However, the military-monarch relations were not without flaws. In general, the military rule in Lesotho was characterised by corruption and protests. The King blamed the military for the state of affairs in Lesotho. Naturally, this created tensions within the alliance. What exacerbated the already existing tensions was the killing of a university student by Major General Lekhanya. Major General Lekhanya’s actions fractured the military-monarch relations severely, with members of the army having to choose sides. Also, the King was accused of favouring certain individuals within the army which fuelled tensions and mistrust within the institutions which led to the army mutiny in 1990 and subsequently the military coup in 1991. Therefore, given the circumstances above the King played a role in the 1991 coup though not as directly as his involvement in the 1994 coup.

Due to the above-mentioned history of military-monarch relations, it is not surprising that the King intervened in the 1993 military crisis in support of the military in what were serious political tensions that emanated from the dispute over the election results. It is important to note in this coup the peculiar relationship between the BNP, the army and the King. In response to the political tensions and subsequent military crisis the King dissolved the BCP government. The King’s actions constituted a coup because the King single-handedly removed a democratically elected government from Parliament. Also, the decision to remove the government fell outside the jurisdiction of the King’s powers, which he used to have during the military rule which had since been taken back in the advent of the country’s return to democratic rule in 1993. Therefore, the King’s role in the history and politics of

85 Lesotho contributes to the recurrence of coups and related problems of political instability in the Kingdom.

The other problem, which arose during the new re-democratisation era, was problematic elections. The 1993 election was characterised by political instability triggered by a disputed election outcome. The army and the police joined in the political struggle further fracturing the civil-military relations. Again, the 1998 general election was marred by political instability. The instability was quelled by a military intervention from South Africa and Botswana.

Following a recurrence of problematic elections, which led to a military intervention by neighbouring countries, Lesotho reformed its electoral system from the FPTP to the MMP electoral system. After the 2002 elections, for the first time in Lesotho’s history, 10 political parties were represented in parliament. The electoral system seemed to have remedied the problem of representation of political parties in parliament, which was the issue with the FPTP system. The development of constitutional democracy, however, took a turn after the 2012 elections produced inconclusive results. The 2012 general elections resulted in Lesotho’s first coalition government. Since then, major causes of political instability have been around the formation and running of coalition governments.

The role of civil-military relations in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho has been covered at great length in this chapter. However, closely linked to the civil-military relations is military-police relations. Police-military relations in Lesotho were never established on a good note. Chief Jonathan Leabua transformed the police in order to establish the army in Lesotho. This created tensions between the military and the police. This explains the clash between the army and the police during the 1993 military crisis which led to the 1994 royal coup. The security force intervened in the political tensions that emanated from the electoral dispute. However, the security force intervened in support of the different parties.

Also, in 2014 in the events leading up to the 2014 attempted coup, the military-police played a key role in the attempted coup that led to dissolution of the Parliament and Thabane’s exile to South Africa. The security force was divided along party lines,

86 with the military in favour of Metsing and the LCD and the police on the side of Thabane and the ABC. When the coalition collapsed due to internal power struggles, the security force intervened in the coalition politics. However, they intervened along party lines which exacerbated the already existing tensions. The military-police’s role in the attempted coup illustrates their role in Lesotho’s politics and the coups.

The problem of the recurrence of coups in the Kingdom of Lesotho can be best explained through an emphasis on selected historical events. There is a plethora of factors that contributed to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. Not all of them could be covered in this study. However, what the study achieved and in particular this chapter, was to review literature on the coups in Lesotho and attempt to put together the common factors that contributed to the coups. This chapter therefore provided a historical analysis of the coups. The chapter was concerned mainly with unravelling the causes of the coups. This chapter showed that the most important factors that contributed to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho were not economic but political.

87 CHAPTER FIVE PROS AND CONS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERVENTIONS IN LESOTHO

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho. Given the sensitive geopolitical context of Lesotho and South Africa, the aim is to examine the rationale for the interventions and attempt to determine whether this portrays a distinct pattern to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. There have been various attempts to explain South Africa’s relations with Lesotho (Grimwood, 2017; Likoti, 2017; Folefac, 2015). Most of the arguments have focused on the intervention aspect and have centred around the LHWP. However, none of the literature has critically analysed South Africa’s overall role in the Lesotho conflict. Using a historical approach, this chapter tracks South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho’s conflict and the latter’s response. The aim is to explain that South Africa’s historical role in Lesotho’s conflict had a systemic trigger on how the country responded to political instability in the Kingdom.

Lesotho’s elite appears to regard and react to South Africa and the rest of SADC differently. Due to its location, South Africa is able to exert more direct political, economic and even security pressure, while SADC can only offer symbolic expostulation (Rupiya, 2016:15). This interpretation of South Africa’s interventions makes it essential to critically analyse its actions in Lesotho’s conflicts.

Historically, South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho have been subjected to many interpretations (Neethling, 1998; Grimwood, 2017; Likoti, 2003; Monyane, 2009). Most analysts are highly critical of the Lesotho intervention episodes or rather of the way in which they have been executed. SADC members denounce the actions as lacking explicit mandates from the organisation. Some members viewed the interventions as acts of bullying by a hegemonic South African army, which destabilised the region during the apartheid era, and this weakened the legitimacy of the interventions (1998) (International Peace Academy and Bekoe, 2002). Moreover, South Africa’s interventions exacerbated tensions in the region about its interest in

88 Lesotho as South Africa has been in a dominant position over Lesotho since the apartheid era.

The political crises in Lesotho are often used to measure South Africa’s capability since post-apartheid to resolve conflicts peacefully in the region. Therefore, South Africa used Lesotho to show the region its capability to resolve conflict. Given the landlocked status of Lesotho, the South African intervention in the country was inevitable since the political instability in Lesotho posed a security threat to South Africa and the region as a whole. Also, the interventions by South Africa to restore peace and stability in Lesotho were of great significance since, conflict resolution in the region informs South Africa’s foreign policy objectives (Folefac, 2015: 46). Therefore, South African interventions in Lesotho were guided by its foreign policy commitment of maintaining peace and stability in the region. In essence, the 1994 military crisis in Lesotho presented South Africa with an opportunity to test the objective of its foreign policy towards Southern Africa in practice. Notably, post- apartheid South Africa emerged during an era when the southern region was experiencing violent conflicts with various implications for economic and political development. South Africa being part of the regional power in the sub-region was on numerous occasions forced to be involved in the political instability facing its neighbours. As a regional power in the SADC region, South Africa was expected to play an important role in resolving conflict.

The many conflicts raging in the region required a peacekeeping role for regional organisations such as SADC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. As such, South Africa also became involved in peacekeeping missions in other countries in the region such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Burundi. It is against this background that Folefac (2015:1) argues that the absence of the UN amid Lesotho’s political crisis is one of the factors that propelled South Africa, together with other countries in the southern region (Zimbabwe and Botswana) under the auspices of SADC, to quell the political instability in Lesotho.

Since its democratic dispensation, South Africa has played a role in conflict management in different interventions in the region, more especially in Lesotho.

89 South Africa has attempted to promote its foreign policy of peacebuilding through peacekeeping, peacemaking and diplomatic mediation. 5.2 An Overview South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho 5.2.1 The 1986 Military Coup Case

This section of the chapter is concerned with critically analysing South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho before 1994, in the broader analysis of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho. It takes into consideration the historical role of pre- democratic South Africa, which is an integral part of an assessment of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho. Historical ties between Lesotho and South Africa date far back to the colonial era as discussed in chapter three. However, for the purposes of this chapter and subsequently South Africa’s role in Lesotho’s politics and the coups, this chapter is interested in South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in the events leading to the 1986 military coup.

When Chief Jonathan Leabua seized power through a coup in 1970, South Africa played a role although not directly. As discussed in the study, Chief Jonathan Leabua intended to hand over power to the BCP following its victory in the 1970 elections, however, it was Chief Jonathan Leabua’s cabinet ministers that advised him against handing power to the BCP. Notably, the cabinet ministers were supported by the apartheid regime in South Africa to do so. As a result, the ministers were successful in encouraging Chief Jonathan Leabua to seize power through a coup. Therefore, South Africa supported the coup in 1970. Furthermore, to help cement the BNP’s rule, the apartheid government provided aid to the BNP to help it to transform the police force into an army.

However, these relations turned sour when Chief Jonathan Leabua exiled the BCP to South Africa where they (BCP) established the LLA. The BCP established good relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa which helped the LLA to launch sporadic attacks on the BNP government in Lesotho. The South African government hoped to force the BNP to expel ANC exiles in Lesotho. Chief Jonathan Leabua had harboured the ANC fighters because of the lack of aid from South Africa to Lesotho. Therefore, this foreign policy war created tense political conditions for Lesotho.

90 Hence, it was during the 1970s that Chief Jonathan Leabua's back and forth relations with South Africa brought about direct clashes.

In 1976, South Africa decided that Lesotho would engage in foreign relations with the then Bantustan, Transkei. A question emerged as Lesotho declined to perceive Transkei, a South African 'country', as an autonomous state. In 1978, South Africa implemented cruel border controls between the Transkei and Lesotho (Grimwood, 2017). The shutting of the border was expected to economically incapacitate Lesotho.

Relations between the two countries worsened with the increased border control between the country and the role of Chief Jonathan Leabua and the apartheid government in South Africa. Relations reached a tipping point in 1982 when apartheid officials assassinated ANC exiles in Lesotho. The next year in 1983, Chief Jonathan Leabua threatened to compromise the LWHP if South Africa continued to work with the LLA. In response, South Africa threatened to invade militarily, and imposed economic pressure on Lesotho to force the highly dependent country into subservient behaviour. Moreover, border controls were imposed, resulting in food shortages in Lesotho. Therefore, South Africa was able to economically force Lesotho into giving in to its demands. Within a period of three days of the sanctions, Lesotho was in serious need of petrol. This marked an increased suffering of people under Jonathan’s regime. The military was, therefore forced to take over to save the people from hunger and suffering because of the economic sanctions by the South African government.

Once the military took office, relations between the neighbours stabilised. The military government in Lesotho unilaterally signed the LHWPT of 1986 with the apartheid regime of South Africa even though the former would have more leeway concerning the formulation of the LHWP (Mashinini, 2010). Thus, central to the agreement, Lesotho would sell water to South Africa in return for financial gain (Ibid, 2010). Moreover, the LHWP treaty proposed to create profound economic, environmental, social and political ramifications in Lesotho and between Lesotho and South Africa (Cobbe, 2014). Therefore, for South Africa, the LHWP was of strategic importance as South Africa relied heavily on the project’s success. As a result, South

91 Africa’s engagements with Lesotho were highly influenced by the LHWP (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016; 100).

Some scholars (Letsie, 2018; Moremoholo, 2005 & Monyane, 2009) point out different interpretations of what it was that precipitated the military coup. Among the theories, is that the power struggles within the BNP which involved the military were responsible for the coup. Even though elections, and in particular, their outcome, may have triggered the 1970 coup, I contend that while important, the 1985 elections did not have the same causal effect on the military coup in 1986. Some further argued that the military coup was in fact induced by the power struggles within the military itself. However, it is clear whether the military was assisted by the apartheid regime because of the interaction of LDF had with South Africa prior to the coup. What was even more clearer was that the coup was a result of the successful destabilisation by the South African government (Gill, 1993: 243). South Africa had imposed economic sanctions on Lesotho to expel ANC liberation fighters. Therefore, the coup was engineered by the South African government in order to punish the BNP government for its support of the liberation struggle in South Africa.

5.2.2 The 1994 Military Crisis Case

The 1994 military crisis in Lesotho was in fact the first time SADC intervened in the country. South Africa intervened in Lesotho amid the political crisis in 1994. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe are among the SADC countries that were directly in the intervention and peace process. This was done by South Africa and Zimbabwe holding negotiation settlements in Pretoria to which both King Letsie III and the Prime Minister were invited (Folefac, 2015: 47). The intervention managed to restore stability in the country and the BCP government was reinstated.

The outcome of the intervention led to the reform of the LDF in partnership with the Lesotho government. The reforms included (Matlosa, 2001 & Moremoholo, 2005) the establishment of the Ministry of Defence to provide central control and coordination of all defence matters in the country; career development and promotion systems; financial management; procurement; logistics and administration. Using technical assistance from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe; Britain, the United States of

92 America (USA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), conducted seminars for the peacekeeping operations, and on respect for democracy and human rights. The reforms process of the LDF were on a positive trajectory until 1998 when the political instability rendered the process futile. There had been a false assumption that the four governments were doing a good job (Moremoholo, 2005). Despite the efforts by external mediators, the root causes of the political instability in Lesotho were not addressed, and as a result, issues pertaining to the crisis culminated in the political meltdown in 1998.

5.2.3 The 1998 Constitutional Crisis Case

Following its victory in the 1993 general elections, the BCP was characterized by power battles mostly over the party’s rule. The BCP’s internal power struggles were additionally exacerbated by the incapacity of Ntsu Mokhehle, the then Prime Minister and founder of the BCP, which made him unfit to control the power battles inside the party. Dreading the probability of being expelled from the administration of the party, Ntsu Mokhehle split from the BCP and formed the LCD, taking with him a greater part of the BCP's members of parliament who had crossed the floor and joined the LCD (Sekatle, 1997:69; Pule 1999:25; Monyane, 2009: 133). Suspicion over the LCD’s victory in the 1998 elections emanated from the BCP’s (winners of the 1993 elections) relegation to the opposition (Monyane, 2009: 133).

The political events surrounding the formation of the LCD and its assumption of power created political mistrust concerning the LCD, and hence, the widespread condemnation of the party’s victory by the opposition parties. However, it is inaccurate to directly attribute Lesotho’s nature of violent elections to the internal split of the BCP. The biggest problem with Lesotho’s elections was the electoral system used, which remains a common factor in all the disputed elections since the country held its first independent elections in 1970.

There were fears of a coup as the violence increased across the country. The capital Maseru was vandalised, and chaos spread. Hence, South Africa argued that its intervention in Lesotho was justified to stop a military coup from taking place. In addition, South Africa argued that it intervened on behalf of SADC after being invited

93 by a legitimate LCD government and insisted that military intervention was necessary because the Lesotho government was democratically elected and therefore it was required of South Africa to exercise its role in regional peacekeeping (Likoti, 2003:32).

External mediation efforts led by South Africa on behalf of SADC established the Langa Commission of Inquiry. Chaired by the South African Constitutional Court Justice, Pius Langa, the commission was vested with the powers to investigate the dispute and validity of the 1998 elections results following the opposition’s claims that the elections were rigged. Likoti (2003:32) argues that despite the credibility and transparency which characterised the proceedings of the commission, the Langa commission created more anxiety and confusion among stakeholders. Matlosa, (1999) argues that the proceedings went at a slow pace while political tensions kept rising. Monyane (2009) argues that some delays in the publication of the report exacerbated opinions within the opposition ranks that the LCD indeed rigged the elections. Rumours were rife in Lesotho that the report was man-handled and its findings manipulated in favour of the ruling party. Matlosa (1993:183) stated, “instead of offering a solution to the political situation, the Langa report was unclear and inconclusive”. This resulted in violent clashes between the opposition and LCD supporters.

Through the promotion of democracy in Lesotho, South Africa also helped Lesotho to manage the conflict by setting up institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to administer elections in the country (Folefac, 2014:13). The main aim of the IEC was to ensure free and fair elections, organise a referendum, and manage any conflict related to the electoral issue (Piper, 2005:36).

The SADC South African-led military intervention mainly made up of officers from the SANDF resulted in at least 60 local deaths and 8 South African military personnel dead (African Conflict Monitor, 2014). The military attack brought about the formation of the IPA, which was mandated with getting Lesotho ready for elections. The intervention created a stable environment in which political parties in Lesotho could resume their dialogue on how to resolve the political crisis (De Coning, 2000:71). The ideological groups consented to make another discretionary model that would

94 incorporate every one of the parties. and bolstered the formation of a multiparty IPA that would manage the administration and restructure the dysfunctional electoral system until elections were held after 18 months of transitional rule.

The IPA created ways to eliminate the system of patronage in the conduct of party politics (Pherudi, 2016: 49). Overall, the IPA sought to create an environment in which all political parties cooperated with each other and also to create trust and confidence in the electoral process; create and implement an alternative electoral system that would be more inclusive, with wider popular acceptance (Ibid, 2016: 49). Moreover, the creation of the IPA was a milestone in the political history of Lesotho. Political collaboration through the IPA was the first of its kind in Lesotho wherein parties with contrasting views worked together for a common goal of restoring the legitimacy of the electoral process (Ibid, 2016: 48).

5.2.4 The 2014 Attempted Coup Case

SADC facilitated Thabane’s return to Lesotho as well as the return of those who had taken up refuge in South Africa (Pherudi, 2016: 245). Also, South Africa and SADC’s intervention in the conflict in Lesotho resulted in the signing of the Maseru Security Accord (MSA). The MSA was signed by Lieutenant General Tladi Kamoli, Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao and Commissioner Khotatso Tsoona (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016: 103). The accord provided for the leaders to do everything in their power to actively prevent, discourage and ensure that no further confrontations and hostilities were caused and occurred between members and units of the LDF and the LMPS (Ibid, 2016: 103).

South Africa intervened in Lesotho amid the 2014 attempted coup. This was after Prime Minister Thabane called on South Africa and SADC to send peacekeeping troops to Lesotho, after the army attempted to seized power through a coup (South African Press Association, 2014: Ramalepe & Shai, 2016). The attempted coup happened as a result of the events of increasing internal fighting within the governing coalition. The SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) plus Zimbabwe met in South Africa to consider the political situation in Lesotho (Pherudi, 2016: 243). South Africa reaffirmed the full support of the African Union’s (AU) position of

95 disapproving any form of unconstitutional change of government and called for the immediate restoration of the government. A political solution was only reached when South Africa appointed a mediator, Cyril Ramaphosa, to restore stability in the country. The South African intervention followed a previous SADC mediation process, the Windhoek Agreement (2014), which collapsed. South Africa dispatched an Organ Troika Assessment Mission (OTAM) to Lesotho comprising of the Organ Troika plus the SADC Chairperson to engage all the stakeholders, including the heads of the security sector institutions with a view to make recommendations to the MCO (Pherudi, 2016: 244). Ramaphosa as a mediator was mandated to facilitate talks between the conflicting parties. In 2015, the South African intervention created the Political Facilitation Agreement, in which all the party members agreed to snap elections in the following year (Rupiya, 2016: 15). The agreement facilitated the signing of a declaration for the road map of the Lesotho political stakeholders for resolving the political tensions called ‘Joint Declaration by Leaders of the Coalition Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho’ (Pherudi, 2016: 243). The declaration ordered the executives of the committees of the coalition parties to meet with King Letsie III in order to advise on the lifting of the prorogation of Parliament (Ibid, 2016: 243).

This intervention was successful as stability was restored and the Parliament which had closed down reopened, and preparations put in place for general elections scheduled for the following year in 2015. (E-News, 2014). It demonstrated the strategic role that South Africa played in restoring law and order in Lesotho and the intervention is seen as a commitment by South Africa to bring peace and order in Lesotho. South Africa’s role in the intervention reaffirms the country’s dominance in SADC as the organisation chose Ramaphosa as the facilitator in Lesotho (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016: 103). South Africa’s dominance is clearly demonstrated by the deployment of 140 members of the SANDF to Lesotho to ensure long-term political and security stability (SA news, 2014). Ramalepe and Shai (2016: 103) caution that the intervention should not be seen as a desperate measure by South Africa to protect the LHWP. On the contrary, the South African intervention demonstrates its maturity in terms of dealing with conflict in the SADC region as opposed to the unpredictable 1998 military intervention

5.3 An Analysis of the role South Africa’s Intervention in Lesotho’s Politics and the Coups

The chapter demonstrated that South Africa-Lesotho relations are grounded mainly on economics and politics. Economically, Lesotho depends entirely on South Africa. Besides SACU, its borders are completely surrounded by South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa relies on Lesotho for the supply of water. As such, the history of South Africa, and its relations with Lesotho show that South Africa has been dominating Lesotho since apartheid.

A critical analysis of South Africa's intervention shows the crucial difference between peace missions, which are neutral third-party actions, and military interventions or enforcement actions that take place in support of the parties (De Coning, 2000:71).

In order to analyse critically the relations between Lesotho and South Africa, and subsequently the pros and cons of South Africa’s intervention, it is important to note that Lesotho and South Africa’s commonalities do not end only with language, geography and culture, but their political history is inextricably intertwined (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016: 104). For South Africa, the LHWP was strategically important as South Africa relied heavily on the project’s success. Therefore, South Africa’s engagements with Lesotho were highly influenced by the LHWP (Ibid, 2016: 100).

The 1986 intervention case study demonstrates Lesotho’s enclave status, dependence on aid from South Africa, a weak industrial and infrastructural base, and migrant labour patterns from the 1800s that forced the BNP to have friendly relations with apartheid South Africa (Grimwood, 2017: 66).

Noting that Lesotho had already engaged with the services of SADC amid the military crisis in 1994 wherein the organisation’s mediation process failed to fully

97 transform the army, which had brought political instability in Lesotho; South Africa was caught between a rock and a hard place. Lesotho is a landlocked country, and given this context, I am inclined to disagree with some of the arguments of the popular interpretation of the South African intervention in 1998. Essentially that, Lesotho’s political crisis posed a security threat to South Africa whether South Africa had interests or not in the country. On the contrary, the SADC intervention was a matter of urgency to ensure peace and stability in Lesotho and protect regional security, if this had not been the case, how else was Botswana’s role in the intervention justified?

South Africa’s 1994 intervention in Lesotho was because of the political crisis that emanated as the result of the royal coup staged by King Letsie III (Folefac, 2015: 49). Thus, South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was guided by its foreign policy commitment of maintaining peace and stability in the region. In essence, the 1994 military crisis in Lesotho presented South Africa with an opportunity to implement the objective of its foreign policy towards Southern Africa in practice. The political crises in Lesotho served as a barometer for South Africa’s capability of resolving conflicts peacefully in the region. Given the ‘landlocked’ status of Lesotho within South Africa, the interventions by the former to restore peace and stability in Lesotho was of great significance because promoting peace in the region falls within South Africa’s foreign policy objectives (Folefac, 2015).

For South Africa, the 1998 military intervention was the first time that the post- apartheid government ever deployed the military in a foreign country in a conflict situation (Neethling, 1999). By doing so, South Africa would transform its relations with Lesotho and the region (Ibid, 1999). The way the Lesotho intervention was executed and the first disastrous hours of the intervention caused more harm to South Africa’s image as peacemakers (De Coning, 2000: 40). The military intervention was badly executed and resulted in several civilian deaths (Peacemaking in Southern Africa). Therefore, to a large extent, the ‘invasion’ exacerbated the conflict situation in the country. Consequently, the intervention resulted in a public-relations setback for post-apartheid South Africa, then only four years after its first democratic election (African Conflict Monitor, 2014). De Coning

98 (2000: 40), sums it up “the Lesotho intervention has shown that many a good intention can have negative consequences if not carefully planned and managed”.

Critics of South Africa and SADC’s 1998 intervention argued that it was used to camouflage the invasion of Lesotho by South Africa. The SADC Security Council did not authorise its intervention (De Coning, 2000). Among the detractors, Moremoholo (2005:89) supports the critique by arguing that the forces, tanks, armoured cars and warplanes that filtered into Lesotho were South African. Therefore, he argues that the entrance of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) into Lesotho following South Africa’s intervention was to protect the face of South Africa that invaded a member of the SADC family (Ibid, 2005: 89).

Neethling (1999) further argues that the intervention was intended to establish control over the South African-Lesotho border and protect South African interests such as the LHWP. The South African government paid for this project and both South Africa and Lesotho stood to benefit. But it is clear that South Africa is the primary beneficiary rather than Lesotho. This is also evidenced by how the SANDF first went to the northern part of the country, the Katse Dam, where they shelled members of the LDF guarding this strategic dam, which stored water en route to South African industries (Likoti, 2003:32). A move Likoti (2007:258) concurs would boost its reputation in the region, ensuring that where its national interests were threatened it had shown itself capable of providing the necessary security. Lesotho, despite the continued intervention efforts, remained unstable (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010).

The 2014 South African intervention in Lesotho demonstrates its maturity in terms of dealing with conflict in the SADC region as opposed to the unpredictable 1998 military intervention. It also shows its maturity in democratic processes in order to ensure peace and the law on international interventions. This time South Africa approached the political crisis in Lesotho by means of a peace facilitation as opposed to a forced military intervention like that of 1998, which had raised concerns in the region over South Africa’s hegemonic status and that it had militarily invaded Lesotho in order to protect its own interests. Following the attempted coup and the resulting political instability, South Africa worked together with SADC to resolve the

99 political impasse in Lesotho. This shows that South Africa does not necessarily dominate SADC as some analysts (Rupiya, 2017) have previously argued. The intervention effort was a SADC peacekeeping mission.

As such, SADC should continue its commitment to bringing about sustainable change in Lesotho through the implementation of its recommendations. SADC should also push for professionalism and de-politicisation of the Lesotho security forces, which is central to recurrence of coups and political instability, in order to bring sustainable conflict resolution as a preventive strategy.

During its intervention efforts, SADC should push for the inclusion of all key players in the Lesotho conflict namely, the government, opposition parties, security forces, civil society and other stakeholders in the national dialogue process. These actors should collaboratively develop a comprehensive and sustainable framework of multi- sector reforms that would drive socio-economic development in the country and ensure political stability.

The role of the AU is the most important of all in bringing an end to coups on the continent. In line with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the AU should actively push for the implementation of the SADC-recommended Constitutional, Public Sector and Security Sector Reforms by pressuring the government and opposition parties to take part in the national dialogue (Besong, 2005: 20).

The national government in Lesotho and political actors should be willing and committed to the implementation of SADC’s recommendations. An inclusive national dialogue on how to reform Lesotho’s economy, politics, society, and security forces should be executed between political elites, civil society, and state institutions, among others. More importantly, political elites should focus on practical ways that will lead the country to better governance and prevent temptations for securing political power.

South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho has helped the country to set up institutions such as the IEC (Folefac, 2015:13). South Africa’s intervention in the conflict

100 provided loans to Lesotho for the country to rebuild infrastructure that collapsed during the conflict. South Africa also called on the international community such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to lend financial assistance to Lesotho on condition that the government could use it to carry out development in a country that had been badly affected by violence and political instability. Therefore, through the promotion of democracy in Lesotho, South Africa has been able to help Lesotho strengthen its democracy.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comprehensive and highly descriptive analysis of the pros and cons of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho. It delved into the various channels and interactions between the two countries that have persisted and evolved from the colonial era to the post-apartheid period. The purpose of the description of the themes was to provide context to the highly complex bilateral relationship between Lesotho and South Africa. The chapter relied heavily on the interdependence theoretical framework that was employed to measure the level of cooperation and the transfers each country gained under formal and informal interactions, cooperative agreements and diplomatic ventures (Grimwood, 2017: 66). It explained how South Africa was able to indirectly or directly, intentionally or unintentionally exercise its influence over Lesotho. Therefore, the skewed relationship, in favour of South Africa, was seen throughout the interventions where South Africa was able to assert its political and economic dominance in pursuit of its own national interests.

The LHWP is particularly interesting as it involves an interdependent scheme of water transfers to South Africa and financial and infrastructural gain to Lesotho. As such, the chapter demonstrates clearly the controversial thread of South Africa pursuing its economic interests through military means. For South Africa, the LHWP served both political and economic importance as South Africa relied heavily on the project’s success. Therefore, South Africa’s relations with Lesotho, and South Africa’s interventions in particular were highly influenced by the LHWP (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016; 100).

101 In order to explain fully the complexity of the bilateral relations between Lesotho and South Africa, Ramalepe and Shai (2016: 104) argue that these relations can be best understood in the context of South Africa’s foreign policy in the SADC region. Historically, South Africa has intervened in member states as part of its foreign policy objectives to promote peace and security in the region. Therefore, Lesotho cannot be exempted from South Africa’s foreign policy, and even more so that Lesotho is practically within South Africa. However, what seems to complicate these bilateral relations even further is that, “seemingly, Lesotho does not have a solid foreign policy that informs how it relates to South Africa” (Ibid, 2016: 104). This is another explanation for the complex bilateral relations between Lesotho and South Africa, and the complex trajectory of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho. Given its geographical location, Lesotho’s foreign policy to an extent, and by default, is dependent on South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. Lesotho inherited a state completely dependent on South Africa. Hence, Lesotho has always assumed a more dependent position in how it relates to South Africa. As such, Lesotho inescapably does not have the capacity to leverage its foreign policy over South Africa. This has placed Lesotho in a weak position in how it relates to South Africa as far as foreign policy is concerned. As a result, this affects the relations between Lesotho and South Africa.

Notably, the 1986 intervention case study demonstrates Lesotho’s overly economic dependence on South Africa, a strong South African military power over Lesotho, and a historical and political trajectory between the countries that forced the BNP to have friendly relations with apartheid South Africa (Grimwood, 2017: 66). The extreme dependence of Lesotho on South Africa was demonstrated when South Africa imposed economic sanctions on Lesotho in order to coerce it to expel ANC liberation members. Therefore, the economic integration of Lesotho shows that its economic well-being is dependent on and sensitive to the economic performance of South Africa.

Again, and closely related to South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in the SADC region, is South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho during the 1994 military crisis. During this period, the new government in South Africa was faced with the challenge of reviewing and reforming exclusionary foreign policy objectives that had been crafted

102 over a period of years. Notably, this was also the first time that South Africa would intervene in a member state as a democratic dispensation. As a result, there was a great deal of expectations from SADC members and the rest of the world over the approach South Africa would adopt in resolving conflicts in the region. This is mainly because South Africa still remained a regional power, and therefore this created anxiety on how its power would be projected now that it had become a democratic country with changed foreign policy values. Ideally this raised concerns over how South Africa would conduct its foreign policy in the region, more especially in Lesotho. Seemingly, this intervention by South Africa was not seen as camouflage for the protection of its interests. The intervention was rather motivated by South Africa’s foreign policy objective to promote peace and security in the region, and to restore peace and stability in Lesotho.

However, things took a bad turn for South Africa’s foreign policy in the region (that is if foreign policy was even the matter) during the 1998 constitutional crisis in Lesotho. To this day, South Africa’s histo ry of interventions in Lesotho is in fact marked by this intervention. The chapter demonstrated how South Africa intervened in Lesotho to prevent what was a political crisis from spilling over the borders of South Africa. Based on the existing literature on this intervention, the bone of contention as far as this intervention is concerned is that South Africa intervened militarily in Lesotho in order to protect its own interests, that is, water. The military aspect of this intervention is of utmost importance to study because it speaks to the exercise of military power by South Africa over Lesotho which critics of this intervention have spoken to. Thus, in an attempt to critically analyse South Africa’s history of interventions in Lesotho and relate these to the distinct pattern of the recurrence of the coups, the chapter reviewed the context of South Africa’s intervention. Given the historical trajectory of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho, more especially with reference to South Africa’s role in the 1986 military coup vis-à-vis South Africa’s intervention in 1998, I concur that South Africa deviated from the doctrine of non- interference as it was anxious to protect its economic assets in Lesotho. The methodology of South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho in 1986 versus 1998 may have been different; however, the objective is the same, that is, to protect its interests.

103 There are various interpretations of whether the military intervention was legitimate or not. Critics (Neethling, 1999; Moremoholo, 2005; Likoti, 2017) have argued that while South Africa may have intervened in Lesotho in order to protect its own interest, by doing so, South Africa in fact projected its military power over Lesotho and subsequently the region as a whole. This sentiment is informed by some of the arguments that SADC actually did not endorse Lesotho’s intervention by South Africa. Therefore, essentially, this implies that South Africa, to an extent, dominates SADC also as a regional organisation. Hence, South Africa would get away with militarily invading Lesotho in order to protect its own interests.

Moreover, South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho ruined South Africa’s reputation in the region as a promoter of peace and security. After the intervention in 1998, South Africa would be seen as a regional hegemon that is willing to intervene in member states by all means possible in order to protect its own interests. Critics (Neethling, 1999; Moremoholo, 2005; Likoti, 2017) have often condemned South Africa for exercising its dominance over Lesotho for its own gains. This set South Africa back in terms of its foreign policy objectives in the region. South Africa had worked hard to rid itself of the image of apartheid that was associated with military interventions in Lesotho and economic sanctions to coerce Lesotho into subservient behaviour. I do not believe that South Africa has recovered fully from this disastrous intervention. Since then, South Africa’s bilateral relations with Lesotho have always been explained in the context of this notorious intervention.

Also, the 1986 and 1998 intervention case studies are important to this study on the recurrence of coups in Lesotho because of the historical trajectory of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho. The chapter was particularly interested in determining whether South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho portrays a distinct pattern to the recurrence of coups in the country. Closely related to the theory of the influence of a regional power on the likelihood of coups that underpinned this chapter, I therefore conclude that South Africa played a strategic role in the military coup in 1986 and the destabilisation of 1998. During the 1998 constitutional crisis, South Africa’s intervention in fact exacerbated the already existing tensions. Therefore, South Africa becomes one of the factors that contributed to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho.

104

South Africa’s intervention in the political instability in Lesotho following the 2014 attempted coup has seen South Africa using a different conflict resolution mechanism to mediate and stabilise the Lesotho crisis. During this intervention case, South Africa opted for a political resolution rather than a militant resolution. Therefore, demonstrating maturity in policy approaches concerning the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. This begs the question: has South Africa changed in how it relates to Lesotho, if so, why? And, will this case study have a bearing on how South Africa will intervene in Lesotho in future?

A critical analysis of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho shows that there are multiple causal factors for South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho's politics and the coups. Moreover, even after the South African interventions, there has been another attempted coup, politicisation of the military, constitutional crisis and the manipulation of the electoral system.

Most importantly, South Africa’s history of intervention in Lesotho has taught the region a number of important lessons. First, South Africa has shown the extent it is willing to go to, to protect democracy and the determination to use whatever necessary force to ensure that no unconstitutional changes of government take place (De Coning, 2000:40). Second, the interventions succeeded in that the region has been spared the misery of yet another coup (Ibid, 2000).

The South African intervention was successful as it prevented a spill over of Lesotho’s political crisis into South Africa as political instability in Lesotho is effectively a crisis within South Africa’s borders. The chapter demonstrated the various factors that contributed to South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho’s coups. Seemingly, a critical analysis of South Africa’s interventions in Lesotho’s politics has shown that South Africa does not intend to promote peace and security in Lesotho as per South Africa’s foreign policy objectives but rather to protect its own interests in the country. My observation is that to some extent, South Africa has always had the capability to coerce Lesotho. This has informed how Lesotho relates to South Africa and vice a versa. Therefore, the relationship is asymmetrical since South Africa is less dependent on Lesotho than Lesotho is on South Africa.

105

This chapter has successfully demonstrated that South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho has played a key role in the existence of the coups. Although not directly, South Africa has had an unwavering influence on the politics in Lesotho and subsequently the coups. Therefore, in the quest to determine the factors that led to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho, a thorough exploration of the role of South Africa in the country’s politics is essential. In fact, a historical analysis of South Africa’s interventions demonstrates the underlying framework of South Africa’s indirect influence in the coups. A closer look at the coup in 1970 shows South Africa backed Chief Jonathan Leabua and the BNP government to seize power forcefully through the coup. South Africa had provided electoral assistance to Lesotho in 1965 and as such it was in a position to influence the politics in Lesotho in future. When Chief Jonathan Leabua attempted to change his foreign policy to South Africa amid Lesotho’s internal political instability, it was rather too late for Chief Jonathan Leabua and Lesotho to compel South Africa to act in any given way. Lesotho had inherited a state economically and politically dependent on South Africa. As a result, South Africa was able to induce the military coup in 1986. This military coup would spill over to the next military coup in 1991, and so forth.

106

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Introduction

The aim of this study has been to search for a thorough understanding of coups, and how they occur in Lesotho. The understanding of the nature of this conflict will help not only those directly involved in the conflict, but also those who make policies aimed at bringing peace and stability to the Kingdom of Lesotho. The concluding chapter provides a summary of the study, it begins by providing a summary of the evolution of the coups, followed by what has been the response to the coups, a summary of the objectives of the study and research methodology, and lastly the meaning of these coups.

6.2 The Evolution of the Coups

The study has shown how the Lesotho army’s interest in politics, and how the state is managed, allowed for the military to become an important political actor, often acting similarly to a political party (Gebrenmichael, Feyissa &Kidane, 2019). Notably, the various functions within the Lesotho political system have also gradually been militarised since independence in 1966. This has had a destabilising effect on the political system in Lesotho. Therefore, in essence, the military in Lesotho has been one of the contributing factors to the recurrence of coups.

107 When civilian governments came into power they failed to reform the military, this was largely because the military was deeply entrenched in the politics of Lesotho making it difficult for the government to reform the institution. This was evidenced by the military crisis in 1994 that occurred after Lesotho had returned to democratic rule in the previous year in 1993. Again, the military was at the forefront of Lesotho’s 1998 constitutional crisis which plunged the country into serious political instability that was quelled by a SADC military intervention.

There have been two military coups (in 1986 and 1991) resulting in unconstitutional changes of government as well as two attempted coups (in 1998 and 2014) (Gebrenmichael, Feyissa & Kidane, 2019). Interestingly, this study shows the similarity between the attempted coups in 1998 and 2014: they share a similar pattern of polarisation along the security forces. This finding demonstrates a pattern of events that leads to coups in Lesotho, which is one of the objectives of this study. ”A country like Lesotho undergoing financial economic crisis, does not need ammunition” (Folefac, 2015:9).

Closely related to the role of the military in Lesotho’s politics, is the role of the security forces, that is, military-police relations, which have also had a destabilising effect on Lesotho’s political stability. The theory of military-police relations was used to explain the peculiar nature of these institutions in Lesotho, how they relate to one another, and mostly their role (collectively) in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The study shows how the hostile relationship between these institutions spilled over into party politics subsequently allowing them to be used as pawns in the political power struggles. Interestingly, military-police relations in Lesotho only date as far back as post-independence in 1966. Lesotho never had a military before independence, even a few years after its independence Lesotho relied only on the police force for security; given the country’s geopolitical context it was not a necessity. It was Chief Jonathan Leabua who reformed the LMPS in a successful attempt to keep the BNP in power after he seized power through a coup due to the BNP’s dismal performance in the first post-independence elections in 1970. In efforts to ensure longevity in power, Chief Jonathan Leabua developed the LMPS into a fully-fledged Lesotho army.

108 Chief Jonathan Leabua’s unilateral actions clearly created friction between the military and the police. In actual fact, the inculcation of the military into Lesotho’s politics by Chief Jonathan Leabua rendered the police force useless as far as national security was concerned. Naturally, this demotion of the police and subsequent promotion of the military (which was done under unscrupulous means) created tensions between these institutions. Historically, these institutions had never co-existed, thus creating even more challenges in establishing a methodology for them to function collectively.

Tensions between the military and police first reached a climax during the 1993 military crisis. Security forces were polarised along party lines during the constitutional crisis that resulted because of the disputes between the BCP, BNP and other opposition parties over the election results. The constitutional crisis plunged Lesotho into a serious political crisis. Notably, the 2014 attempted coup was the second time that military-police relations had brought Lesotho near brinkmanship. Again, both the military and the police allowed themselves to be used to settle political scores within the unstable coalition.

Another reason for the recurrence of coups in Lesotho is political parties. The study shows that the hostile relationship between political parties in Lesotho date as far back as the pre-independence era. Lesotho’s political parties were formerly woven around the ideology of the Church; Lesotho being a highly theocratic state, anything outside the Church was frowned upon. The BNP was formed from the Church, while the BCP identified with the LEC. This sharp contrast of political ideologies was a cause of conflict between the political parties. As a result, there was general suspicion and intolerance among these polarised groups which exacerbated the political tensions (Motsamai, 2015).

Yet another explanation for the hostile relationship between the political parties revolved around the role of the monarchy, when in actual fact, the real issue was around the power to control the military. Prior to the first post-independence elections, the political parties had positioned themselves around the King, who himself had aspirations to have political powers. Things changed in 1970, when the expected victor, the BNP, lost the general elections and the BCP won. Suddenly, the

109 alliances around the monarchy were switched. This sowed seeds of mistrust between the political parties as each party was now concerned with aligning with whoever was in power in order to gain access to military control, which was needed as every party was a threat to another. These tensions would characterise the relations of Lesotho’s political parties throughout Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime. Chief Jonathan Leabua accused the BCP of plotting to overthrow his illegitimate government, and of being communist. He spent his years in power trying to remove the BCP from Lesotho’s politics. To an extent, Chief Jonathan Leabua’s actions carved the relations of Lesotho’s political parties that still endure today. The history of political parties in Lesotho also plays a role in how political parties function and relate to one another in Lesotho today.

A reason for political parties’ induced role in the political instability in Lesotho stems from the history around the formation of political parties in Lesotho, or probably the formation of the BCP is the issue of party splits. The study shows that the politics of party splits in Lesotho date as far back as pre-independence in the 1950s. The MFP was born out of the split from the BCP in the late 1950s. The party split again in the 1970s. Essentially, some of the members opted to stay in Lesotho and became part of the cabinet while others went into exile in South Africa.

Herein lies an interesting observation, what many scholars regard as ‘the split’ from the BCP into the LCD in 1997, just before the 1998 highly contentious elections, was in fact the third time a split occurred within the BCP, and the second time that a political party emerged as a result. From thereon, Lesotho’s political scene witnessed frequent splinter parties between 1997 and 2012, all of them somehow or another emerging from the BCP. Hence, it was no surprise when the DC broke away from the LCD in the run-up to the general elections in 2012 and became the opposition. This is not to say that the BNP, or any other political party for that matter, have not played any role in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. A balanced analysis should provide the context of the political parties collectively in the explanation of their role in the coups in Lesotho.

Building on the above conclusion regarding the role of political parties and the recurrence of coups in Lesotho, the next paragraph shows the study’s observation

110 on coalitions and these coups. The most recent causes of political instability in Lesotho have been around the formation and running of coalition governments. There is a profound mistrust and lack of communication between the coalition partners which threatens the viability of the coalition (Pherudi, 2016: 245). Tensions within these coalitions that Pherudi (Ibid) makes reference to have spilled over into Lesotho’s politics, plunging the country further into political instability. This was evidenced by the fragmentation of the ABC-led coalition in 2014, which resulted in the attempted coup that same year. Generally, there is lack of consensus, especially by political parties over governance issues and this leads to political instability. The government in Lesotho is reluctant to tackle governance challenges such as corruption and reforming politicised public and security institutions (Motsamai, 2015). Most of the financial resources which could have been used to develop the country are constantly being diverted or invested to purchase military arms (Folefac, 2015:9).

Lesotho possesses a history and culture of impunity towards political violence (Motsamai, 2015). Historically, political parties, the army and the police in Lesotho have been involved in political crimes without ever having to face prosecution for their role in the political mayhem. This is largely perpetuated by the corrupt nature of the criminal justice system in the country, which is biased in favour of the elite. Hence, there is a general sense that some of the members of these institutions are indeed above the law.

The political, social unrest and instability in Lesotho can also be attributed to the role played by the King. It is worth noting that the role of the King is limited to performing ceremonial rights (Folelac, 2015). This has not been the case. The study shows that historically, the King has always aspired to have more political powers under the new constitution. He was rather disappointed when the BNP won the pre-independence elections in 1965. The BNP’s victory relegated the monarch’s position in Lesotho’s politics to essentially being a ‘nobody’. The King was seen working in concert with losing political parties to undermine the BNP government. Chief Jonathan Leabua never had good relations with the King. This is evidenced by him exiling the King following the 1970 coup.

111 The King continued to pursue more political power in Lesotho’s politics. It was the military coup in 1986 which provided the closest opportunity. The military had succeeded in deposing Chief Jonathan Leabua’s regime from power. However, the military needed a political institution that would provide legitimacy to its rule, the King was available. Upon his return from exile, the King worked with the military government in Lesotho.

Relations between the monarchy and the military have not been without faults. The King criticised the military’s rule for being corrupt and inefficient and the marriage of convenience collapsed when the King was accused of being partisan within the military. The King’s interference in the functioning of the military led to factions forming within the military, which subsequently led to the 1991 army mutiny. Scholars such as Moremoholo (2005) and Monyane (2009) have posed the question whether these military-monarch relations were a case of the monarchy using the military using the King to gain legitimacy or vice versa. Based on the study, I argue that the relations were symmetrical. Historically, the monarchy in Lesotho increasingly became perceived as a political actor. In 1994, again, the King interfered in Lesotho’s politics amid the military crisis. King Letsie dissolved an elected parliament and installed a hand-picked government, and a constellation of forces that included the BNP and the BCP (Folefac, 2015). Also, King Letsie III himself attempted to seize power in 1994 (Monyane, 2009: 16). Opposition, namely the BNP and BCP called on him to do the same in 1998. This time, the King showed little effort to respond to the demands of the combined opposition parties.

The study shows that one of the major factors influencing the conflict in Lesotho is the country’s socio-economic problems. Lesotho has experienced various challenges that have prevented the country from achieving political stability and economic growth. Lesotho is one of the poorest countries in the world with high levels of inequality and poverty and has one of the highest rates of unemployment on the continent. The recurrence of coups in Lesotho can also be attributed to the weak and poor dependent economy. As stated in the study, the post-colonial state in Lesotho did not inherit a manufacturing, commercial base (Aluju, 1995: 9). It was a dependent state. This dependent nature placed restrictions on whether the state was capable of achieving secured control of state power (Ibid, 1995: 9). The country was

112 left to be dependent on other countries such as South Africa. As a result, Lesotho cannot provide its citizens with good job opportunities. Given this situation, and the jobs often occupied by members of the ruling party, “This, in essence, creates competition among political parties for access to jobs and contributes to political tension as well as increase the likelihood of violence” (Rakuoane, 2003).

The biggest source of political instability in Lesotho is that the country’s economy has not improved since independence (Gebrenmichael, Feyissa & Kidane, 2019). If anything, the levels of dependence of Lesotho on South Africa have increased significantly. This is largely because Lesotho’s economy is directly linked to the economy of a developing country, which also suffers from economic crises. Due to this economic interdependence, Lesotho is more likely to remain a poor country in Africa (Grimwood, 2017: 71). Both countries need to work at decreasing the dependence of Lesotho on South Africa (Ibid, 2017: 71). As such, to an extent, Lesotho’s economic development is dialectically linked to South Africa’s underdevelopment.

6.3 What has been the response to these coups?

A number of initiatives were taken by the Lesotho government as an attempt to reduce the recurrence of coups. These included replacing of the Electoral Office by the IEC in 1997; reforming of the electoral system from the FPTP to the MMP in 2002; enlargement of the National Assembly from 80 to 120 in 2000; and implementation of the SADC national reforms dialogue in 2014. Despite these efforts, Lesotho still remains susceptible to the recurrence of coups.

6.4 The Objective of the Study and Research Methodology

The main objective of this study was to analyse the recurrence of coups in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The study attempted to answer the following questions and relate them to national political events: As Lesotho is a coup prone region, what are the socio-political factors that nurture this mentality? What are the political and economic factors that contribute to the recurrence of coups? What is the history and causes of the coups? Concerning the methodology, the study used both primary

113 and secondary data in the area of investigation. Secondary sources included books, journals, articles, published as well as unpublished research dissertations and the media (eg newspapers). I visited the NUL and Morija Museum and Archives to gather secondary information from the local library.

6.5 The Meaning of Coup(s)

Like many other social science concepts, there is not a universal definition of a coup d’état. Many authors (Thyne & Powell, 2014; McGowan, 2002; Luttwalk, 2016) to suit particular settings in which it has been used have defined the concept differently. Thyne and Powell (2014: 5) define a coup d’état as “an illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive”. Souaré (2014: 72) defined a coup d’état as

events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of relatively small groups, in which members of the military, police, or security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in conjunction with a number of civil servants or politicians.

A more loaded and specific definition of a coup d’état is provided by McGowan (2002: 342), he defines a coup d’état as “a change in government personnel, which may or may not alter a state’s fundamental social and economic policies or entail a significant redistribution of power among political groups”. A coup d’ètat involves some elements of either a revolution; civil war; pronunciamiento; putsch; liberation; war of liberation and insurgency by which power can be seized, but, unlike most of them, the coup is not assisted by the intervention of the masses or by any large- scale form of combat by military forces (Luttwalk, 2016:77). By nature, a coup does not imply any particular political orientation. Revolutions are usually leftist, and the putsch and the pronunciamiento are usually initially right-wing forces. A coup, however, is politically neutral and there is no presumption that any particular policies will be followed after seizure of power (Luttwalk, 2016:78). The phrase coup d’état is French for “stroke of the state” or “blow to the government”.

6.6 Summary of Research Findings

114 In seeking to understand why since independence Lesotho has experienced perennial coups the research found attempts to promote peace and stability through policy reforms and negotiation arrangements by conflicting parties and the government have been prevented by a number of political factors such as the politicisation of the military. The military in Lesotho has always been involved in politics since independence; this makes it difficult for the conflicting parties and the government to negotiate political solutions without the military constantly interfering and plunging the country further into crisis as a result. Election-related conflict is one of the contributing factors to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. This study has shown that this form of conflict has not been caused by the electoral models per se, but by manipulation of electoral models by the political elite who use any trick to ensure parliamentary dominance. The logic behind the conflict is precipitated by failure of losers to access economic benefits that come with being in parliament. The hostile nature of the relationship between the BNP and the BCP is one of the political factors that contributed to the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. The historical tensions between the political parties have spilled over into Lesotho’s political system often involving the security sector. This relationship is also informed by the role of the Church in Lesotho’s politics as shown in the study. Also, this relationship is informed by the party’s relations with the monarchy and the military (the military has been an important factor as the parties are a threat to each other).

The monarchy is also one of the key political actors in the recurrence of coups in Lesotho. In 1994, King Letsie III in fact dissolved a democratically elected BCP government in order to stop what had been an election-related conflict turned into military crisis. The monarch has always had aspirations to have more political powers under the new constitution. However, when the BNP came into power in 1965, these aspirations were crushed. This is because historically, the monarch was never allied to the BNP. The BNP’s power would inform the political behaviour of the monarch and the BNP going forward. In addition, the monarch was also central to the army mutiny in 1990 and the subsequent military coup in 1991. The military- monarch relations put pressure on the military as an institution. The King interfered in the functioning and governance of the military rule. This led to tensions forming in the military-monarch relations.

115 Lesotho’s return to democratic rule has been characterised by even more political instability. What contributed to this state of affairs are military-police relations. Historically, the military and police never co-existed until the formation of the army by Chief Jonathan Leabua from the LMPS. This naturally created tensions in what would be the two security institutions in Lesotho. This is largely because the LDF was elevated more than the police. The military and the police began to fight their battles in political party proxy wars. The military supported the BNP while the police supported the BNP. It was these security sector relations that led to the attempted coup in 2014. The attempted coup shows the extent of the legacy of military-police relations in Lesotho.

The recurrence of coups in Lesotho is exacerbated by the culture of impunity. Often, perpetrators of political violence are exempted from prosecution because of corruption and an effective justice system. This leads to the use of political violence to gain political power. The judiciary in Lesotho lack enforcing legislatures. At the heart of the political violence is the security sector, that is, the military and the monarch, and political parties. Until the justice system is reformed and capacitated to deal with political violence and atrocities, the elite in Lesotho will always use political violence to seize power illegally even through coups, military and non-military.

Lesotho is one of the poorest countries in the world. The socio-economic landscape in Lesotho has made the country susceptible to the recurrence of coups. Usually, the elite scramble for political power as it is the only means to gain access to state resources because of the lack of employment, poverty and overall socio-economic issues in the country. This in turn make elections highly competitive exercises as proximity to access state resources seems to be the only means for survival in an impoverished country such as Lesotho. This also explains the history of disputed election results and subsequent election-related conflict in Lesotho. This has been directly linked to the recurrence of coups in the country. The theory of neo- patrimonialism underpinned this explanation of the existence of coups in Lesotho.

Closely related to Lesotho’s socio-economic problems is Lesotho’s overdependence on South Africa. This study has shown that Lesotho naturally inherited a dependent state from the British administration (Zondi, 2014). Because the state in Lesotho was

116 developed to benefit the colonial interests in South Africa, its economy therefore was never designed to be independent to that of South Africa. This has put Lesotho in a precarious position in how it relates to South Africa. Essentially, Lesotho is economically reliant on South Africa. Given its geopolitical position, Lesotho cannot necessarily embark on economic and investment opportunities without the buy-in of South Africa. Even the SACU is in fact designed to benefit South Africa more than it does Lesotho. This asymmetrical relationship also extends to the LHWP. The study has shown the project or the bilateral relations between Lesotho and South Africa is more geared towards benefiting the former than the latter. Similarly, these skewed relations further cement Lesotho’s dependency on South Africa. It is a fact that South Africa’s military and economy is more powerful and bigger than that of Lesotho. These political and economic factors therefore place South Africa at an elevated position over Lesotho. And because of the nature of South Africa’s economy, being built on Lesotho’s migrant labour and natural resources; South Africa’s economic survival is dependent on Lesotho. Therefore, it is logical that South Africa would maintain its dominance over Lesotho. By doing so, South Africa is strategically guarding its own interests.

6.7 Recommendations

This study has made recommendation of what the Lesotho government needs to do to avoid the recurrence of coups.

6.7.1 The National Government

• In order to decrease the contestations for power among the political elites, which is usually the cause of coups the government should amend the constitution in a way that does not allow for the over-concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister as it is currently. The constitutional reform should involve the transformation of the overlapping mandates given to security institutions, particularly of the LDF and LMPS.

117 • The government of Lesotho should depoliticise the military and police in order to ensure stability in the country and work on the professionalisation and de- militarisation of security agencies. Checks and balances should be put in place to deter political elites from investing in the military for political gain.

• The government should consider developing the productive sector, which focuses on agricultural and rural development to address the dire poverty and unemployment conditions. This will reduce the propensity of political contestation over the control of the state and the violence that goes with this contestation.

• The government should review Lesotho’s MMP electoral model. This will lessen the fragmentation among political parties and, in turn, will enable the country to have stable coalition governments with maximum parliamentary majorities. The government should reform parliamentary rules and ban ‘floor- crossing' or at least introduce a by-election in case an MP crosses the floor.

6.7.2 The South African Government

• The government of South Africa should work with that of Lesotho to establish a strategy that would help the security situation in Lesotho. Notably, the South African government should exercise impartiality when intervening in Lesotho’s political conflict. The interest of Basotho should be put forward as the South African objective.

• The government of South Africa should help prevent electoral vote rigging and electoral fraud that is caused by the political parties. This will help restore stability and promote democracy in Lesotho.

6.7.3 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

• SADC should support wide-ranging national reforms that are practical and aimed to resolve specific problems in the political system.

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• SADC should intervene to protect and promote peace and stability.

• SADC should assess its member states such as Lesotho to see if they comply with the principles of the regional organisation.

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125 APPENDICES Appendix A

Table 1: The 1970 General Election for the National Assembly Contestants No. of Votes % of Votes No. of Seats BCP 152 907 53.603 36 BNP 108 162 37.917 23 MFP 22 279 7.8 1 Other 1 909 0.66 0 Total 285 257 99.97 60

Source: Monyane, C., 2005. Lesotho’s transition to democratic rule: an era of “fragile” democracy (Masters Dissertation).

Table 2: The 1993 General Election for the National Assembly Contestants No. of Votes %. Of Votes No. Seats BCP 398 355 74.7 65 BNP 120 686 22.6 0 MFP 7650 1.4 0 Other 6287 1.2 0 Total 532 978 100 65

Source: Monyane, C., 2005. Lesotho’s transition to democratic rule: an era of “fragile” democracy (Masters Dissertation).

Table 3: The 1998 General Election for the National Assembly Contestants No. of Votes No. of Votes No. of Seats LCD 355 049 60.7 79 BNP 143 073 24.5 1 BCP 61 793 10.6 0 MFP 7 460 1.3 0 Other 16 244 2.9 0 Total 584 740 100 80 Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Provisional Results, May 1998.

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Table 4: Types of Coups in Lesotho Successful coups Attempted coups Undeclared coups 30 January 1970- January 1974- September 1998- attempt Palace coup BCP attempted coup by opposition groups 20 January 1986- May 1991-military Military coup Attempt 30 April 1991 - February 1996-three military coup army personnel 17 August 1994-royal April 2009-insurgents Coup allegedly recruited by Jessie Ramakatane 30 August 2014-allegedly by members of the LDF

Source: Pherudi, M., 2016. Governance and Democracy in Lesotho: Challenges faced by SADC intervention 2007-2015. Preflight Books, Pretoria, pg. 414.

Table 5: The National Assembly Seat Allocation in the 8th Parliament

Party Seat Allocation ABC 30 BBDP 1 BCP 1 BDNP 1 BNP 5 DC 48 LCD 26 LPC 1 LWP 1 MFP 1 NIP 2 PFD 3 Total Seats in National Assembly 120

Source: IEC Lesotho, 2013

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