Democratic Republic of Congo

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2.3

As 2011 came to a close, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faced serious threats to its stability. Presidential and legislative elections, held on 28 November, were rejected by the political opposition and criti- cized by many observers for lacking credibility. Etienne Tshisekedi, veteran politician and main rival of President Joseph Kabila in the elections, declared himself “elected president” after official reports of Kabila’s victory, with 49 percent of the vote versus 32 percent for Tshisekedi. Election-related tensions in urban centers, far from the conflict in the east, have stretched the strained resources of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) even thinner. And while regional relations in the east continued to improve, relations between the DRC and its western neighbors, the Republic of Congo and Angola, wavered. Meanwhile, MONUSCO continued to strug- UN Organization Stabilization Mission gle with its mandate to reform the security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) sector, extend state authority, combat armed groups, and protect civilians in the east. •Authorization Date 28 May 2010 (UNSC Res. 1925) • Start Date 1 July 2010 •SRSG Roger Meece (United States) Background • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Chander Prakash The DRC’s conflict can be seen as three in- (India) • Police Commissioner Abdallah Wafy (Niger) terrelated wars, the first two of which were • Budget $1,419.9 million fought with heavy influence by neighboring (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) states seeking to oust Congo’s contentious •Strengthasof Troops:16,823 leaders in 1996 and 1999 respectively. While 31 October 2011 Military Observers: 731 the first war successfully removed then- Police: 1,362 president Mobutu Sese Seko, the second war International Civilian Staff: 976 failed to remove Mobutu’s successor, Laurent National Civilian Staff: 2,865 Kabila, and the resulting stalemate led to the UN Volunteers: 595 signing of a cease-fire accord, the Lusaka For detailed mission information see p. 216 Agreement, in July 1999 by the various parties

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and state actors. Following the agreement, the up on human rights violations in the context UN authorized the UN Organization Mission in of elections. the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) While its mandate remained essentially to monitor the cease-fire and disengagement unchanged in 2011, MONUSCO’s available of forces. The withdrawal of foreign troops resources have been sharply curtailed, partic- after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement left ularly its utility, attack, and observation heli- a power vacuum in the rebel-held territories, copters. This has had a serious impact on the leading to a third war behind UN-monitored capacity of the mission, leading the Secretary- cease-fire lines in northeastern Congo. Fol- General to report that MONUSCO is “no lowing a national dialogue and series of re- longer able to implement critical parts of its gional agreements, a government of national priority mandated tasks, including in relation unity was formed in 2003, paving the way for to the protection of civilians, providing sup- the 2006 UN-sponsored elections that brought port to the elections and putting an end to the Joseph Kabila to the presidency. presence of armed groups, particularly in the Following intense negotiations with the Kivus.”1 government of the DRC in early 2010 regard- The mission’s stabilization work is fo- ing the future of MONUC, the UN Security cused around implementation of three initia- Council adopted Resolution 1925 on 28 May tives: STAREC, the ISSSS, and the UN’s 2010, transforming MONUC into MONUSCO. peace consolidation program, developed jointly The most recent extension of the mission’s au- by MONUSCO and the UN Country Team. thorization, Resolution 1991, left MONUSCO’s However, continued insecurity has delayed core priorities essentially unchanged. Protec- their implementation. Nearly ninety facilities tion of civilians under imminent threat of were constructed in 2011 in accordance with physical violence remains the top priority. the ISSSS, but many of the facilities have not Beyond direct action by MONUSCO to pro- been staffed. Magistrates are in short supply, tect civilians, this includes helping the na- and police detachments are under-strength. tional army bring ongoing military operations The UN’s peace consolidation program is against the Forces Démocratiques de Libéra- being supported by new joint MONUSCO- tion du Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord’s Resist- UN Country Team offices throughout the ance Army (LRA), and other armed groups to western provinces, in preparation for a completion, as well as supporting disarma- progressive transition of leadership from ment, demobilization, repatriation, resettle- MONSUCO to the UN Country Team in these ment, and reintegration (DDRRR) programs. areas. The mission’s second priority is stabilization Alongside MONUSCO, the EU Advisory and peace consolidation, including reform of and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the security sector, consolidation of state au- the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC thority as per the government’s Stabilization RD Congo) and the EU Police Mission in the and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD International Security and Stabilization Sup- Congo) have provided support to the DRC’s port Strategy (ISSSS), combating mineral ex- security and police institutions. EUSEC has ploitation, and providing technical and logisti- continued to provide advice and assistance to cal support, as requested by the government, the Congolese authorities in charge of secu- for presidential and parliamentary elections. rity. Its operations have primarily focused on Resolution 1991 elaborates on MONUSCO’s training Forces Armées de la République Dé- electoral responsibilities, mandating the mis- mocratique du Congo (FARDC) units in hu- sion to support the Commission Électorale man rights law and standards, military justice, Nationale Indépendente (CENI) in facilitating and prevention of sexual violence, while also dialogue among Congolese stakeholders, as addressing arms stockpiling and other logisti- well as monitoring, reporting, and following cal challenges and supporting the work of the 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 47

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EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region. EUPOL RD Congo, meanwhile, supports the reform and coordination of the police and justice system with a focus on capacity build- ing. In 2011 the mission focused on training judicial police officers and assisting the police in obtaining equipment ahead of elections. Both EUSEC and EUPOL continue to make technical progress in their mandates, although pressure from some EU member states for the closure of these missions persists.

Key Developments MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani Developments in the East The first electoral kits are unloaded from a MONUSCO cargo aircraft Despite its stabilization focus, MONUSCO at Ndjili Airport, 16 September 2011. continues to face prevalent insecurity and armed group activity in the east. The leadership of the FDLR in the DRC remained largely EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the intact in 2011, and the group continues to tar- Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) get civilians in the Kivus and northern Katanga province. While a steady stream of FDLR de- •Authorization Date 2 May 2005 (EU Council JointAction fectors entered DDRRR programs throughout 2005/355/CFSP) early 2011, these defections were balanced by • Start Date June 2005 new recruiting. Other armed groups, including • Head of Mission GeneralAntónio Martins (Portugal) Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple • Budget $17.6 million (CNDP) deserters and Mayi-Mayi militias, (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) have consolidated their positions throughout •Strengthasof CivilianStaff:51 30 September 2011 the east, and have established loose alliances with each other and the FDLR, partially in order to secure mining interests. Human rights violations in the east continued to occur at very high levels throughout 2011, including EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) several documented cases of mass rapes and a number of civilian deaths. The UN Joint Human •Authorization Date 12 June 2007 (EU Council JointAction Rights office in MONUSCO documented 300 2007/405/CFSP) human rights abuses attributed to armed groups • Start Date July 2007 and 320 human rights violations committed by • Head of Mission Commissioner Jean Paul Rikir (Belgium) elements of the armed forces between June • Budget $8.9 million and July 2011 alone. (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) The LRA continued to pose a significant •Strengthasof CivilianPolice:21 threat to civilians in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé. 30 September 2011 Civilian Staff: 19 MONUSCO has provided logistical and information sharing support for operations by the FARDC and the Ugandan People’s Defense 2011, decreasing in July and August due to Force (UPDF) against the LRA in these re- a possible regrouping of the armed group in gions, but attacks continued throughout early the Central African Republic. In October 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 48

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Box 2.3 Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX)

Since July 2008, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the African Republic (MICOPAX) has pro- Central African Republic (MICOPAX) vided support to peace and stability efforts in the Central African Republic •AuthorizationDate 2October2002 (CAR). Under the authority of the Eco- • Start Date December 2002 nomic Community of Central African • Head of Mission Ambassador Albert Akendengue (Gabon) States (CEEAC), MICOPAX is mandated • Force Commander Brigade-General Prosper Nabiolwa to support peace, security, and respect (Democratic Republic of Congo) for human rights, including through as- • Budget $27.2 million sistance in the promotion of democratic (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) governance, national reconciliation, se- • Strength as of Troops: 497 curity sector reform, and disarmament, 30September2011 CivilianPolice:139 demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. It also collabo- rates with the UN Integrated Peacebuild- atmosphere that characterized both rounds and has recently begun to expand its ing Office in the Central African Repub- of voting, the elections demonstrated the presence to the northeast. In April, lic (BINUCA). continued fragility of the CAR’s politi- MICOPAX, with financial support from MICOPAX was established to sup- cal process. There was strong turnout for the European Union, opened a military port the consolidation of peace follow- the January poll, and Bozizé garnered a barracks in Ndélé in the northeastern ing decades of instability, rebellions, and majority and was inaugurated on 15 prefecture to house several hundred sol- mutinies in the Central African Repub- March. However, opposition candidates diers through 2013.1 The rebel group lic. The CAR’s current leader, General quickly denounced the election as fraud- Convention of Patriots for Justice and François Bozizé, came to power in a ulent and several opposition candidates Peace (CPJP), the last holdout, signed a coup in February 2003. Conflict contin- petitioned the Constitutional Court for a cease-fire agreement with the govern- ued until the government and nearly all cancellation of the vote, a request that ment in June and agreed to begin the main rebel groups signed a comprehen- the Court denied as unfounded. After the DDR process, a positive step forward. sive peace agreement (CPA) in June second round of parliamentary elections, Despite gains in 2011, the CAR re- 2008. However, the government quickly Bozizé’s political party, the Kwa Na mains an environment of heightened po- demonstrated a lack of political will for Kwa, also won a legislative majority, litical and security concerns. Renewed following through on the CPA and the amid lower voter turnout and a boycott hostilities between the CPJP and a rival subsequent inclusive dialogue, resulting by the opposition. rebel group in the central town of Bira in in political and security challenges that In 2011 MICOPAX continued to sup- September over control of diamond continue to undermine the consolidation port the reform and restructuring of the mines demonstrates how tenuous the sit- of peace in the CAR. CAR’s security forces and assist the gov- uation remains. The withdrawal in De- The 2011 presidential and parlia- ernment in DDR activities for former cember 2010 of the UN’s peacekeeping mentary elections were held in January, combatants. However, DDR processes in operation places additional pressure on with a second round of parliamentary northern CAR have been repeatedly de- MICOPAX and BINUCA to support the voting in March. MICOPAX provided layed due to political, security, and lo- peace process. Continued fragility and support to the elections, including trans- gistical challenges. MICOPAX plays a an increasingly entrenched political elite port of voting materials to regional key role in the northwest as a guarantor are major obstacles to the consolidation polling stations. Despite the largely calm of security while rebel groups disarm, of peace.

Note: 1. Humanitarian and Development Partnership Team, Central African Republic, Info Bulletin no. 167, 12–26 April 2011, http://hdptcar .net/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/hdpt-car-info-bulletin-eng-167.pdf.

2011 the United States announced the deploy- training to Uganda’s armed forces and other ment of 100 “combat-equipped” soldiers to national armies that are combating the LRA. LRA-affected areas, primarily to provide MONUSCO and regional partners are paying 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 49

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close attention to the developing African Throughout 2011, MONUSCO has ex- Union regional cooperation initiative on the plored various methods to improve its capacity LRA, endorsed at its summit meeting on 1 to protect civilians with its limited resources. July. An AU interim Special Envoy was ap- These efforts have mostly taken the form of pointed in late November and is expected to improving communication and relations with work closely with the governments of LRA- local populations. The mission has established affected countries. Meanwhile, the Ugandan community alert networks, distributing mobile Allied Democratic Front (ADF) has increased phones and some high-frequency radios to iso- its presence in Beni and Lubero territories. lated communities, while also deploying com- FARDC exactions against civilians, par- munity liaison assistants to communities in ticularly from recently integrated and poorly their areas of operation and dispatching joint trained units, continue to be a very serious protection teams aimed at increasing civil and concern. Meanwhile, MONUSCO’s progress military knowledge and analysis of protection in improving military justice and accountabil- issues. The mission has also developed a sen- ity has faced difficulties. MONUSCO and the ior management group on protection. While UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for these initiatives have been generally well as- Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report sessed by the mission and many humanitarian on 22 July documenting human rights viola- partners, and address a crucial information gap, tions committed on 31 December 2010 and 1 the loss of helicopters has curtailed not only January 2011, allegedly by elements of the the mission’s rapid response capacity, but also FARDC, but the Congolese authorities have its ability to maintain many of its temporary not yet acted on the report’s recommendations. operating bases in the more remote areas of the In January 2011 the FARDC began to re- Kivus and Orientale province. structure its presence in the Kivus, with the ultimate goal of establishing several regi- Regional Relations ments of 1,200 elements each. However, the Despite ongoing violence in eastern DRC, re- withdrawal of army units has led to an in- lations in the Great Lakes region have been crease in activity by the FDLR, Mayi-Mayi improving. In January 2011 the ministers of Yakutumba, and Burundian Forces Nationals defense of Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC de Libération (FNL) in the Kivus. While adopted a draft protocol on mutual defense MONUSCO has carried out operations at- and security, which includes provisions for tempting to fill this security vacuum, the ex- border control and interception of armed tended restructuring process has hindered group combatants fleeing across national bor- progress in integrating former armed group ders. The Ugandan and DRC defense minis- elements, including the CNDP and other ters also met several times in 2011 to discuss groups, into the national army and police. joint military operations between the Congo- Throughout the restructuring process, ele- lese and Ugandan armies in Orientale prov- ments of these groups have deserted the ince against the LRA and the ADF. FARDC in significant numbers. Those remain- Improvements in relations to the east, ing have often refused orders to redeploy out- however, were not matched in the west. Rela- side their areas of operation. President Kabila tions between the DRC and Angola deterio- issued a decree on 31 December 2010 regard- rated in early 2011. Beginning as a dispute ing the redistribution of the ranks of former over maritime boundaries in the Bas-Congo members of armed groups, but many CNDP and Cabinda regions, Angola expelled over elements continued to reject their FARDC- 100,000 Congolese nationals between Sep- issued identification cards, citing confusion tember 2010 and August 2011. Returnees regarding their ranks. CNDP and other former have reported serious human rights violations armed group elements have also maintained associated with the expulsions, including de- parallel administration structures in the Kivus. tention, forced labor, sexual violence, and 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 50

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beatings. Repeated high-level bilateral dis- Electoral materials began to arrive in the cussions and visits from MONUSCO, the UN DRC on 15 September after significant de- Special Representative on Sexual Violence in lays. MONUSCO was faced with the signifi- Conflict, and the Office of the UN High Com- cant challenge of distributing the ballots to 15 missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have made “hubs” and 210 “sub-hubs” around the coun- little progress in addressing the problem. try, where they were distributed by road to However, relations between the two countries more than 63,000 polling stations. The mis- showed signs of improvement in late 2011, sion also carried out training of six national and Angola provided six helicopters to help police rapid response teams, with France distribute materials for the elections. training two and the DRC training two. How- The DRC recalled its ambassador to the ever, MONUSCO reported a lack of funds Republic of Congo on 25 March over disputes from donor countries to equip the police units related to the extradition of General Faustin with nonlethal weapons. Munene as well as the leader of the Enyele in- More troubling than the numerous logis- surgency of 2010, Mangbama Lebesse Udjani. tical hurdles, the period leading up to national elections was marked by an increasing Elections number of what MONUSCO described as The lead-up to national presidential and par- “politically-motivated human rights viola- liamentary elections in 2011 was marked by tions.”2 The mission documented over 145 the adoption of constitutional amendments on reported incidents targeting political opposi- 15 January that replaced the former two- tion members and supporters, journalists, and round presidential election with a single-round human rights defenders from January to Oc- poll. The amendments aimed to strengthen tober 2011, not including eighty additional the odds of President Joseph Kabila’s reelec- allegations of human rights violations. Both tion, exploiting a fractured opposition. They the UNC and the UDPS reported cases of re- also created the possibility of a presidential strictions in conducting political activities, victory with a small portion of the popular including arrests of and violence against sup- vote, with resulting concerns regarding the porters by the national security forces. victor’s legitimacy. The days immediately preceding elec- The beginning of 2011 also saw serious tions were marked by violence in urban cen- delays in electoral preparations. The voter ters. Human Rights Watch documented at registration process, for example, was ini- least eighteen civilians killed and over a hun- tially planned to take ninety days. However, dred injured in electoral violence between 26 the process, launched on 9 March in most and 28 November, mostly from Republican provinces, was not completed until 17 July, Guard elements firing into crowds of opposi- when the revised registration list was an- tion supporters. The Ministry of Interior sus- nounced with a preliminary total of 32 mil- pended short message service (SMS) commu- lion voters. Subsequently, opposition parties, nications on 3 December, allegedly due to the including the Union pour la Démocratie et le use of SMS to threaten domestic and interna- Progrès Social (UDPS), the Union pour la tional election observers. Nation Congolaise (UNC), and the Mouvement Despite intense pressure on the CENI to de Libération du Congo (MLC), demanded an briefly postpone elections to address logisti- audit of the voter registration list as a precondi- cal bottlenecks, the DRC held presidential tion for their adherence to the code of conduct, and legislative elections on 28 November which the CENI granted on 2 September. Op- 2011 as scheduled, though voting was ex- position parties signed the electoral code of tended by two days in some polling stations. conduct at the second meeting of the Forum of The day of elections was marred by a host of Political Parties, on 8 September, with the no- irregularities and incidents of violence. Op- table exception of the UDPS and its allies. position supporters clashed with security 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 51

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forces in Kasai and Katanga provinces. Ru- boxes from thousands of polling stations. The mors of pre-completed ballots, ballot stuff- Malemba-Nkulu tabulation center in Katanga, ing, and vote tampering led to attacks on for example, declared all of the 266,886 votes election officials and polling stations across cast in its area for Kabila, with over 99 per- the country. International observers reported cent turnout, compared to a national turnout confusion among electoral officials regarding average of 58.8 percent, and every polling voter lists and voting eligibility, and docu- station accounted for. In contrast, the Kin- mented a number of irregularities with the shasa tabulation center lost ballots from handling of electoral materials, highlighting nearly 2,000 polling stations, resulting in cases of electoral materials being unsealed 350,000 uncounted votes in a UDPS strong- outside of tabulation centers. hold. Results from another thousand polling In the days following the elections, the stations outside of Kinshasa were also lost, tabulation process raised further concerns due including a number from the major city of to serious logistical problems resulting in Lubumbashi. missing ballot boxes and untabulated votes, The Carter Center observer mission is- and due to the lack of transparency in the tab- sued a report on 10 December stating that the ulation process. The CENI released prelimi- election results “lack credibility” and “com- nary vote tallies indicating a strong lead for promise the integrity of the presidential elec- Kabila, but failed to disaggregate the num- tion,”3 and the DRC Catholic Church, the bers by polling station, making the numbers largest observer mission, announced on 12 impossible to verify against the records pro- December that the results “are not founded vided to electoral observers and political on truth or justice.”4 The rising tide of criti- party witnesses at each station. Tensions rose cism from domestic and international ob- in Kinshasa and other urban centers, resulting servers led MONUSCO to issue a statement in clashes between police forces and opposi- on 12 December calling on the CENI to “un- tion supporters. The UDPS announced that it dertake a timely and rigorous review of the would reject any results showing Kabila as issues identified by observer missions.”5 On the winner, while a coalition of other opposi- 13 December, EU election observers joined tion groups issued a joint call for the elec- the growing group of critics, noting that the tions to be annulled, citing massive irregular- election count was chaotic and lacked trans- ities and fraud. parency and credibility. On 9 December, after three days of de- While MONUSCO was not mandated to lays, the CENI published the full preliminary verify or observe the electoral process, Spe- results, declaring Kabila the winner with cial Representative of the Secretary-General 49 percent of votes, with Tshisekedi in sec- (SRSG) Roger Meece used his good offices ond with 32 percent and Vital Kamerhe in in the run-up to elections and the tense post- third with 7.7 percent. The results were im- election period to urge both Kabila and Tshi- mediately rejected by the UDPS as fraudulent, sekedi to refrain from resorting to violence. and Tshisekedi declared himself the “elected Although neither mass protests nor violence president,” citing UDPS tallies from polling occurred immediately following the elections, stations that put his share of the vote at 52 Congolese police began door-to-door searches percent. in opposition neighborhoods, reportedly drag- In the days following publication of the ging young men out of their houses and taking results, national and international election ob- them away in waiting vehicles. servers reported significant irregularities in Kabila, rejecting criticism from observers the published electoral results. Tabulation and backed by the South African Develop- centers in Kabila strongholds reported suspi- ment Community (SADC), held his inaugura- ciously high turnout and support for Kabila, tion on 20 December. During his speech, Ka- while centers in Tshisekedi bastions misplaced bila pledged to bolster national unity and 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 52

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abide by human rights. However, Tshisekedi significant irregularities in the elections them- still insisted he was president-elect and selves. As a result, the UN mission, tradition- planned a rival inauguration for 23 Decem- ally focused on the east, was operating in a ber. The police banned Tshisekedi’s swearing- fully fledged political crisis. in, placed tanks throughout the city, used tear Congolese opposition and civil society gas and stun grenades to disperse rock-throw- groups are demanding a review of the serious ing crowds, arrested opposition supporters, flaws in the electoral process by a credible and prevented Tshisekedi from leaving his independent party. President Kabila has ad- house, ultimately crushing the event as mitted that some “mistakes” were made, but planned in a Kinshasa stadium. Undeterred, rejects claims of widespread election rig- Tshisekedi, along with supporters and offi- ging.6 While Tshisekedi has so far refrained cials of the UDSP, swore himself in as presi- from calling on his supporters to contest the dent at his house, further straining the tense elections in the streets, the rhetoric being postelection situation. Having proceeded with used by both sides is very heated. Escalation the banned act without heed to threats of ar- into violent protests and clashes with the au- rest, it is unclear how Kabila will react to thorities are a very real possibility that Tshisekedi’s challenge, leaving the prospects MONUSCO is not equipped to address. Fur- for stability in the DRC uncertain. thermore, other Congolese actors may see the At the time of writing, much of the capi- current unrest as an opportunity to further tal and other major cities were gripped with their own political agendas, both inside and confusion, with unconfirmed reports of mili- outside the DRC. tary looting in outlying areas, widespread gun- The way forward is uncertain, as events fire, and unidentified groups of armed men in the weeks following elections will doubt- active in the streets. less change the political landscape. The situation will likely be further destabilized with the announcement of the legislative election Conclusion results in early 2012, which may prove simi- The electoral process in 2011 has resulted in larly contentious. Moreover, provincial and a shrinking of political space and left the sit- local elections are scheduled to be held in uation in the DRC extremely tense. Troubling 2012. As 2011 came to a close, MONUSCO incidents in the lead-up to elections culmi- faced both the significant challenges of its nated in killings by the Republican Guard, operations in the east, as well as the new door-to-door searches and arrests in opposi- challenge of a political crisis that could well tion neighborhoods by Congolese police, and engulf the rest of the country.

Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabiliza- tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, p. 14. 2. Ibid., p. 3. 3. Carter Center, “DRC Presidential Election Results Lack Credibility,” 10 December 2011, http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/drc-121011.html. 4. Rukmini Callimachi and Saleh Mwanamilongo, “Growing Criticism of Congo Vote,” Associated Press, 12 December 2011. 5. MONUSCO, “MONUSCO Calls on INEC to Address Electoral Observer Missions’ Concerns,” press release, 12 December 2011, http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=932&ctl=Details &mid=5262&ItemID=15947. 6. Emmanuel Peuchot, “DR Congo’s Kabila Admits Vote Flaws but Defends Re-Election,” Agence France-Presse, 12 December 2011.