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Democratic Republic of Congo 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 45 2.3 Democratic Republic of Congo As 2011 came to a close, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faced serious threats to its stability. Presidential and leg- islative elections, held on 28 November, were rejected by the political opposition and criti- cized by many observers for lacking credibil- ity. Etienne Tshisekedi, veteran politician and main rival of President Joseph Kabila in the elections, declared himself “elected presi- dent” after official reports of Kabila’s victory, with 49 percent of the vote versus 32 percent for Tshisekedi. Election-related tensions in urban cen- ters, far from the conflict in the east, have stretched the strained resources of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) even thinner. And while regional relations in the east continued to improve, relations be- tween the DRC and its western neighbors, the Republic of Congo and Angola, wavered. Meanwhile, MONUSCO continued to strug- UN Organization Stabilization Mission gle with its mandate to reform the security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) sector, extend state authority, combat armed groups, and protect civilians in the east. •Authorization Date 28 May 2010 (UNSC Res. 1925) • Start Date 1 July 2010 • SRSG Roger Meece (United States) Background • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Chander Prakash The DRC’s conflict can be seen as three in- (India) • Police Commissioner Abdallah Wafy (Niger) terrelated wars, the first two of which were • Budget $1,419.9 million fought with heavy influence by neighboring (1 July 2011–30 June 2012) states seeking to oust Congo’s contentious •Strengthasof Troops:16,823 leaders in 1996 and 1999 respectively. While 31 October 2011 Military Observers: 731 the first war successfully removed then- Police: 1,362 president Mobutu Sese Seko, the second war International Civilian Staff: 976 failed to remove Mobutu’s successor, Laurent National Civilian Staff: 2,865 Kabila, and the resulting stalemate led to the UN Volunteers: 595 signing of a cease-fire accord, the Lusaka For detailed mission information see p. 216 Agreement, in July 1999 by the various parties 45 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 46 46 • MISSION REVIEWS and state actors. Following the agreement, the up on human rights violations in the context UN authorized the UN Organization Mission in of elections. the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) While its mandate remained essentially to monitor the cease-fire and disengagement unchanged in 2011, MONUSCO’s available of forces. The withdrawal of foreign troops resources have been sharply curtailed, partic- after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement left ularly its utility, attack, and observation heli- a power vacuum in the rebel-held territories, copters. This has had a serious impact on the leading to a third war behind UN-monitored capacity of the mission, leading the Secretary- cease-fire lines in northeastern Congo. Fol- General to report that MONUSCO is “no lowing a national dialogue and series of re- longer able to implement critical parts of its gional agreements, a government of national priority mandated tasks, including in relation unity was formed in 2003, paving the way for to the protection of civilians, providing sup- the 2006 UN-sponsored elections that brought port to the elections and putting an end to the Joseph Kabila to the presidency. presence of armed groups, particularly in the Following intense negotiations with the Kivus.”1 government of the DRC in early 2010 regard- The mission’s stabilization work is fo- ing the future of MONUC, the UN Security cused around implementation of three initia- Council adopted Resolution 1925 on 28 May tives: STAREC, the ISSSS, and the UN’s 2010, transforming MONUC into MONUSCO. peace consolidation program, developed jointly The most recent extension of the mission’s au- by MONUSCO and the UN Country Team. thorization, Resolution 1991, left MONUSCO’s However, continued insecurity has delayed core priorities essentially unchanged. Protec- their implementation. Nearly ninety facilities tion of civilians under imminent threat of were constructed in 2011 in accordance with physical violence remains the top priority. the ISSSS, but many of the facilities have not Beyond direct action by MONUSCO to pro- been staffed. Magistrates are in short supply, tect civilians, this includes helping the na- and police detachments are under-strength. tional army bring ongoing military operations The UN’s peace consolidation program is against the Forces Démocratiques de Libéra- being supported by new joint MONUSCO- tion du Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord’s Resist- UN Country Team offices throughout the ance Army (LRA), and other armed groups to western provinces, in preparation for a completion, as well as supporting disarma- progressive transition of leadership from ment, demobilization, repatriation, resettle- MONSUCO to the UN Country Team in these ment, and reintegration (DDRRR) programs. areas. The mission’s second priority is stabilization Alongside MONUSCO, the EU Advisory and peace consolidation, including reform of and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the security sector, consolidation of state au- the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC thority as per the government’s Stabilization RD Congo) and the EU Police Mission in the and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD International Security and Stabilization Sup- Congo) have provided support to the DRC’s port Strategy (ISSSS), combating mineral ex- security and police institutions. EUSEC has ploitation, and providing technical and logisti- continued to provide advice and assistance to cal support, as requested by the government, the Congolese authorities in charge of secu- for presidential and parliamentary elections. rity. Its operations have primarily focused on Resolution 1991 elaborates on MONUSCO’s training Forces Armées de la République Dé- electoral responsibilities, mandating the mis- mocratique du Congo (FARDC) units in hu- sion to support the Commission Électorale man rights law and standards, military justice, Nationale Indépendente (CENI) in facilitating and prevention of sexual violence, while also dialogue among Congolese stakeholders, as addressing arms stockpiling and other logisti- well as monitoring, reporting, and following cal challenges and supporting the work of the 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 47 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO • 47 EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region. EUPOL RD Congo, meanwhile, supports the reform and coordination of the police and justice system with a focus on capacity build- ing. In 2011 the mission focused on training judicial police officers and assisting the po- lice in obtaining equipment ahead of elections. Both EUSEC and EUPOL continue to make technical progress in their mandates, although pressure from some EU member states for the closure of these missions persists. Key Developments MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani Developments in the East The first electoral kits are unloaded from a MONUSCO cargo aircraft Despite its stabilization focus, MONUSCO at Ndjili Airport, 16 September 2011. continues to face prevalent insecurity and armed group activity in the east. The leader- ship of the FDLR in the DRC remained largely EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the intact in 2011, and the group continues to tar- Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) get civilians in the Kivus and northern Katanga province. While a steady stream of FDLR de- •Authorization Date 2 May 2005 (EU Council JointAction fectors entered DDRRR programs throughout 2005/355/CFSP) early 2011, these defections were balanced by • Start Date June 2005 new recruiting. Other armed groups, including • Head of Mission GeneralAntónio Martins (Portugal) Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple • Budget $17.6 million (CNDP) deserters and Mayi-Mayi militias, (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) have consolidated their positions throughout •Strengthasof CivilianStaff:51 30 September 2011 the east, and have established loose alliances with each other and the FDLR, partially in order to secure mining interests. Human rights violations in the east continued to occur at very high levels throughout 2011, including EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) several documented cases of mass rapes and a number of civilian deaths. The UN Joint Human •Authorization Date 12 June 2007 (EU Council JointAction Rights office in MONUSCO documented 300 2007/405/CFSP) human rights abuses attributed to armed groups • Start Date July 2007 and 320 human rights violations committed by • Head of Mission Commissioner Jean Paul Rikir (Belgium) elements of the armed forces between June • Budget $8.9 million and July 2011 alone. (1 October 2010–30 September 2011) The LRA continued to pose a significant •Strengthasof CivilianPolice:21 threat to civilians in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé. 30 September 2011 Civilian Staff: 19 MONUSCO has provided logistical and in- formation sharing support for operations by the FARDC and the Ugandan People’s Defense 2011, decreasing in July and August due to Force (UPDF) against the LRA in these re- a possible regrouping of the armed group in gions, but attacks continued throughout early the Central African Republic. In October 2011_CIC_2.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/12 1:44 PM Page 48 48 • MISSION REVIEWS Box 2.3 Mission for the
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