DOCSLIB.ORG

Strategic Forum No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Strategic Forum No No. 254 Strategic Forum February 2010 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Compatible Interface by Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker new sense of trust and friendship between our experiences over the past 6 years, we find Key Points people; similarly, the Merida Initiative is assist- implausible the notion that USNORTHCOM ing our neighbor in defeating the drug threat, is not staffed or experienced enough to sup- and has further helped to build trust between The United States and Mexico share a port Mexico’s security cooperation needs. our countries. common history shaped by military incursions Hence, U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A Hence, the term interface during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The compatible Compatible Interface is intended to set the in the title of this paper refers to the fact that bond between the American and Mexican record straight by pointing out the numer- the United States and Mexico have comple- people, however, has continued to grow closer ous areas of cooperation between Mexico and mentary areas of concern in each of our four over time despite occasional negative rhetoric the United States since the establishment of instruments of national power (diplomatic, from politicians in Washington, DC, and USNORTHCOM. information, military, and economic), which Mexico City. At local and state levels, relations The term compatible interface in the have been shaped by events that uniquely im- solidified through the closely knit fabric of our title of this paper refers to the fact that the pact upon North American neighbors. Hence, border towns, intermarriage between families expanded cooperation between Mexican United States and Mexico have complemen- on each side of the border, and the develop- counterparts and the U.S. Northern Command tary areas of concern in each of our four ment of infrastructure (to include water, and our interagency community will improve instruments of national power: diplomatic, wastewater, and gas and electricity utilities) the security and prosperity of the citizens of information, military, and economic. A firm that serves communities to the north and south. both our nations. understanding of where we were, and where At the national level, our relationship became we are, in these elements of power gives the closer due to economic growth resulting from This paper responds to a previous reader a better picture of the strong relation- the North American Free Trade Agreement Strategic Forum (no. 243, July 2009) enti- ship between Mexico and the United States. (NAFTA), which now accounts for almost $1 tled U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An billion (U.S. dollars) in trade per day between the two countries. Incompatible Interface by Craig Deare. Diplomacy and The events of 9/11 helped political leaders Some of the assertions and conclusions Information realize that an attack on one NAFTA partner within Dr. Deare’s paper were flawed due to could have significant impact upon all trading an outdated U.S.-Mexico paradigm that pre- During the first 100 years of U.S.- partners. Trade decreased among all three ceded the 9/11 attacks and recent counter- Mexican relations, diplomacy and informa- NAFTA nations due to security concerns, drug operations in Mexico. If his work had tion-sharing suffered setbacks due to armed which brought together our elected officials been published prior to the establishment of conflicts between the nascent powers. School to discuss areas of mutual concern in defense U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), children who study history on both sides of and security. Mexican military support in the it would have been well received, but times our borders are familiar with the early inter- aftermath of Hurricane Katrina helped build a have changed. Because of our collective ludes between our countries: No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 1 U.S. Exports to and Imports from Mexico (US$ billions) $400 $350 $300 $250 $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Exports to Mexico Imports from Mexico ■ 1836: Texas gained independence from matic relationships between Mexico City relationship as a glass half-full, with much Mexico. and Washington did not inhibit the win- of the fruit-bearing diplomacy occurring at ■ May 1846: Congress declared war on win relationships among families and local local levels. Mexico, which was ended with the Treaty of governments in our border communities. Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). Formally, relationships between the govern- Economic ■ April to November 1914: The United ments of our two nations remained distant States occupied Veracruz due to the Tampico in the last century;1 informally, however, The United States and Mexico have sep- Affair. our ties have grown stronger over the past arate and distinct national centers of gravity, ■ March 1916 to February 1917: The 150 years. Despite the distance between var- but from a bilateral perspective, the North United States retaliated against the Francisco ious political leaders and occasional neg- American economy, trade, and related crit- “Pancho” Villa raids. ative rhetoric used in election campaigns ical infrastructures are shared centers of north and south of the border, the people of gravity that must be defended to preserve our Diplomacy and misinformation the United States and Mexico married, nur- way of life. Over the past century, collabora- appeared to remain in a continuous state of tured extended families, developed trade, tion and economic prosperity grew due to the conflict, in part due to accusations thrown and collaborated on many social and eco- initiatives of small businesses, corporations, across the border that typically served nomic issues. In short, while our politicians and local governments. In addition, bor- the needs of U.S. and Mexican politicians saw a glass half-empty, the citizens in our der communities developed common water, who sought reelection. In contrast, diplo- border communities saw the U.S.-Mexican wastewater, and electric and gas utilities that shared costs, which benefited citizens from General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, is Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command both nations. These growing economic rela- and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Dr. Biff Baker is a USNORTHCOM Senior Policy Analyst in tionships were further enhanced and for- Security Cooperation and Partnerships. malized when Mexico, the United States, and No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 2 Canada implemented the North American tured goods (such as computers and electri- of President Felipe Calderón and his counter- Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, cal equipment). drug initiatives. which eliminated tariffs and many nontariff Partnering in World War II. The barriers, resulting in current trade between In recent years, almost 85 percent of Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was one of the the United States and Mexico of almost $1 Mexico’s exports have gone to the United defining moments in U.S. history leading to billion per day. States, making Mexican economic success a declaration of war against the Axis pow- The increasing integration of the Mexican, dependent on the balance between trade and ers. Canada had been at war with Germany American, and Canadian economies represents security. U.S. economic success is also depen- since September 1939 and, showing solidarity a model of mutually beneficial trade. In con- dent on this balance. Continued prosperity with the United States, immediately declared trast to the gloom-and-doom debates held in depends on reliable homeland defense and war against Japan. Mexico immediately broke 1993, NAFTA’s implementation has been ben- security, which can only be achieved through off relationships with the Axis powers in 1941. eficial to each nation’s economy. While main- Then, due to the sinking of the oil tanker taining distinct monetary, fiscal, economic, and Portero de Llano and numerous submarine social policies and practices tailored to each continued prosperity attacks on Mexican ships throughout 1942, nation’s particular needs and economic struc- depends on reliable Mexico declared war against Nazi Germany ture, our countries have managed to forge an and Imperial Japan. The war led to greater open marketplace where goods, services, and homeland defense and trade between our nations, with Mexican oil capital can move freely. To preserve that eco- security, which can only fueling the U.S. war machine. Due to a com- nomic freedom and prosperity, our homeland be achieved through mon threat, historical animosities were set defense and security initiatives must be planned greater coordination and aside, which led to enhanced military coopera- and coordinated continentally. tion for the mutual defense of North America. As shown in the figure, security mea- information-sharing among This new level of cooperation resulted sures and concerns about further terror- military partners as well as in the training of Mexican fighter pilots ist attacks resulted in a short-term recession the law enforcement and in the United States, and the creation of a that adversely impacted our economies. This Mexican P–47 Thunderbolt fighter squadron short-term decline in trade started in 2001 interagency community called the “Aztec Eagles.” The 201st Mexican and continued through 2003, with substantial Fighter Squadron, Mexican Expeditionary recovery in 2005 and 2006. These
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002
    ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN MEXICO, 1999-2002 A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States Government February 2003 Researcher: Ramón J. Miró Project Manager: Glenn E. Curtis Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540−4840 Tel: 202−707−3900 Fax: 202−707−3920 E-Mail: [email protected] Homepage: http://loc.gov/rr/frd/ Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Criminal and Terrorist Activity in Mexico PREFACE This study is based on open source research into the scope of organized crime and terrorist activity in the Republic of Mexico during the period 1999 to 2002, and the extent of cooperation and possible overlap between criminal and terrorist activity in that country. The analyst examined those organized crime syndicates that direct their criminal activities at the United States, namely Mexican narcotics trafficking and human smuggling networks, as well as a range of smaller organizations that specialize in trans-border crime. The presence in Mexico of transnational criminal organizations, such as Russian and Asian organized crime, was also examined. In order to assess the extent of terrorist activity in Mexico, several of the country’s domestic guerrilla groups, as well as foreign terrorist organizations believed to have a presence in Mexico, are described. The report extensively cites from Spanish-language print media sources that contain coverage of criminal and terrorist organizations and their activities in Mexico.
    [Show full text]
  • War on the Mexican Drug Cartels
    THE WAR ON MEXICAN CARTELS OPTIONS FOR U.S. AND MEXICAN POLICY-MAKERS POLICY PROGRAM CHAIRS Ken Liu Chris Taylor GROUP CHAIR Jean-Philippe Gauthier AUTHORS William Dean Laura Derouin Mikhaila Fogel Elsa Kania Tyler Keefe James McCune Valentina Perez Anthony Ramicone Robin Reyes Andrew Seo Minh Trinh Alex Velez-Green Colby Wilkason RESEARCH COORDINATORS Tia Ray Kathryn Walsh September 2012 Final Report of the Institute of Politics National Security Student Policy Group THE WAR ON MEXICAN CARTELS OPTIONS FOR U.S. AND MEXICAN POLICY-MAKERS POLICY PROGRAM CHAIRS Ken Liu Chris Taylor GROUP CHAIR Jean-Philippe Gauthier AUTHORS William Dean Laura Derouin Mikhaila Fogel Elsa Kania Tyler Keefe James McCune Valentina Perez Anthony Ramicone Robin Reyes Andrew Seo Minh Trinh Alex Velez-Green Colby Wilkason RESEARCH COORDINATORS Tia Ray Kathryn Walsh September 2012 Final Report of the Institute of Politics 2 National Security Student Policy Group Institute of Politics ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP The Institute of Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. It is a living memorial to President John F. Kennedy, and its mission is to unite and engage students, particularly undergraduates, with academics, politicians, activists, and policymakers on a non-partisan basis and to stimulate and nurture their interest in public service and leadership. The Institute strives to promote greater understanding and cooperation between the academic world and the world of politics and public affairs. Led by a Director, Senior Advisory Board, Student Advisory Committee, and staff, the Institute provides wide-ranging opportunities for both Harvard students and the general public.
    [Show full text]
  • The Slippery Slope U.S. Military Moves Into Mexico
    The Slippery Slope - U.S. Military Moves Into Mexico Page 1 of 24 The Slippery Slope U.S. Military Moves Into Mexico By S. Brian Willson Contents z Foreword z Section I: United States Militarization of Mexico z Section II: Unmasking the Drug War z Section III: Poverty and Misery-Aggravation by NAFTA z Section IV: Militarization and Repression in Mexico Personal Introduction On February 9, 1995, while traveling south on curvy, mountainous Chiapas Highway 173, we encountered a long, heavily supplied Mexican military convoy, carrying hundreds of armed soldiers. Among the new uniforms and equipment, I believed I recognized U.S. material, armored personnel carriers among them. The convoy moved north towards Simojovel, the highland's village we had just left. Later I learned that we had seen the beginning of a major military offensive which ravaged many communities, and whose goal was the capture of Zapatista leaders. Only a few days earlier, on January 31, 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton had begun orchestrating the controversial $50 billion bailout of the then collapsing Mexico economy. Though Congress opposed the deal, Clinton was adamant. He bypassed Congress and facilitated the fiscal relief package through other channels: loans from discretionary public sources and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international funds. This unprecedented action suggests the high stakes involved in assuring a "healthy," stable Mexican economy so important under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the new corporate global economy that NAFTA promotes and requires. I have come to understand that this kind of economy is defined and driven by various international speculators, domestic wealthy interests, and World Bank and IMF theorists and programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Than Neighbors New Developments in the Institutional Strengthening of Mexico’S Armed Forces in the Context of U.S.-Mexican Military Cooperation
    More than Neighbors New Developments in the Institutional Strengthening of Mexico’s Armed Forces in the Context of U.S.-Mexican Military Cooperation By Iñigo Guevara February 2018 More than Neighbors New Developments in the Institutional strengthening of Mexico’s armed forces in the context of US-Mexican Military Cooperation By Iñigo Guevara “With Mexico, very, very strong, quiet military-to-military relations” … … “This is a relationship that has been many decades in the making. Just go back - just for an example - go back to World War II. It doesn't start with us. It will not end with us.” -U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis1 Strategic Reasoning for Closer U.S. –Mexico Military Ties Despite the deep cultural and economic diversity of North America’s 486+ million inhabitants, the interconnectedness of the three countries means that they all face, to various degrees, the same threats, which range from serious to existential. Existential threats have long been narrowed to a nuclear war with Russia, to a much lesser degree China, and the now aspiring North Korea. The lack of an existential threat from the south has meant that Mexico was not a priority for the U.S. defense community. Mexico’s non-interventionist interior-looking foreign policy, the lack of an external threat, and an extremely complex politico-military relationship also meant that the defense relationship with the United States was cordial, but distant over several decades. Since the 1980’s, the Mexican Navy and Air Force did source their token conventional fighting capacity from the United States: a squadron of tactical jet fighters and a flotilla of second-hand destroyers and frigates; however, this was mainly out of convenience rather than a strategic decision to develop binational defense ties.
    [Show full text]
  • Los Zetas and Proprietary Radio Network Development
    Journal of Strategic Security Volume 9 Number 1 Volume 9, No. 1, Special Issue Spring 2016: Designing Danger: Complex Article 7 Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors Los Zetas and Proprietary Radio Network Development James Halverson START Center, University of Maryland, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss pp. 70-83 Recommended Citation Halverson, James. "Los Zetas and Proprietary Radio Network Development." Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (2016) : 70-83. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1505 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Los Zetas and Proprietary Radio Network Development Abstract The years from 2006 through 2011 were very active years for a number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. However, the group that probably saw the most meteoric rise in this period, Los Zetas, had a unique and innovative tool at their disposal. It was during these years that the group constructed and utilized a proprietary encrypted radio network that grew to span from Texas to Guatemala through the Gulf States of Mexico and across much of the rest of the country. This network gave the group an operational edge. It also stood as a symbol of the latitude the group enjoyed across vast areas, as this extensive illicit infrastructure stood, in the face of the government and rival cartels, for six years.
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico. Background Paper. RBA/COI/MEX/14/01
    AMERICAS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN SERIES MEXICO BACKGROUND PAPER May 2014 Regional Bureau for the Americas United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees P.O. Box 2500, 1211 Geneva 2 Switzerland E-mail: [email protected] Web Site: www.unhcr.org RBA/COI/MEX/14/01 The document was prepared by UNHCR on the basis of publicly available information and analysis. All sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not purport to be fully exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. The paper is available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld. © United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014. 2 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 6 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ............................................................................ 6 2.1 Political and institutional developments ................................................................ 6 2.2 Legal Human Rights framework ........................................................................... 7 3. SECURITY SITUATION AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CRIMINAL DRUG- TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS ....................................................................... 14 3.1 Criminal drug-trafficking organizations .............................................................. 16 3.2 Impact of criminal violence on civilians .............................................................. 19 3.3 Deployment and
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico's Drug-Related Violence
    Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence June S. Beittel Analyst in Latin American Affairs May 15, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40582 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence Summary Drug-related violence in Mexico has spiked in recent years as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have competed for control of smuggling routes into the United States. Drug trafficking issues are prominent in Mexico because the country has for at least four decades been among the most important producers and suppliers of heroin, marijuana and (later) methamphetamine to the U.S. market. Today it is the leading source of all three drugs and is now the leading transit country for cocaine coming from South America to the United States. Although previous Mexican governments had accommodated some drug trafficking in the country, when President Felipe Calderón came into office in December 2006 he made battling the Mexican drug trafficking organizations a top priority. He has raised spending on security and sent thousands of troops and federal police to combat the DTOs in states along the U.S.-Mexico border and throughout the country. In response to the government’s crackdown, the DTOs have responded with escalating violence. In recent years, drug trafficking violence in Mexico has claimed thousands of lives and reached a level of intensity and ferocity that has exceeded previous periods of drug-related violence. The government’s intensified campaign against the DTOs resulted in changes in the structure of these criminal organizations. The seven major DTOs in Mexico have reconfigured.
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico's Government Begins To
    JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY MEXICO’S GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO RETAKE NORTHEASTERN MEXICO BY GARY J. HALE NONRESIDENT FELLOW IN DRUG POLICY JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY DECEMBER 9, 2011 Mexico’s Government Begins to Retake Northeastern Mexico THESE PAPERS WERE WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER (OR RESEARCHERS) WHO PARTICIPATED IN A BAKER INSTITUTE RESEARCH PROJECT. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, THESE PAPERS ARE REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE THEY ARE RELEASED. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THESE PAPERS ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER(S), AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. © 2011 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. 2 Mexico’s Government Begins to Retake Northeastern Mexico I. All Enemies Are Equal It is increasingly apparent that the government of Mexico is not playing favorites anywhere in the country, and is attacking any drug cartel it encounters or that government forces have sufficient intelligence to combat. While this has had a significant and disruptive effect on the drug trafficking environment, government pressure on cartels has also affected drug trafficking organizations (DTO),1 causing the latter to savagely kill each other as they desperately attempt to maintain control of geographic turf. Government attacks on the infrastructure of the Gulf cartel and the Zetas (a DTO once part of the Gulf cartel) in recent years are concrete examples of Mexico’s efforts to retake Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Veracruz from the hands of the traffickers, regardless of which cartel is wreaking havoc in those northeastern states.
    [Show full text]
  • Mexico: the Presence and Structure of Los Zetas and Their Activities Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa
    Home > Research > Responses to Information Requests RESPONSES TO INFORMATION REQUESTS (RIRs) New Search | About RIRs | Help 5 March 2010 MEX103396.FE Mexico: The presence and structure of Los Zetas and their activities Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa According to an article published by Cable News Network (CNN), Los Zetas have existed since the 1990s (6 Aug. 2009). More specifically, the group was founded by commandos (CNN 6 Aug. 2009; NPR 2 Oct. 2009) or members of the special forces who deserted from the Mexican army (Agencia EFE 30 Jan. 2010; ISN 11 Mar. 2009). According to the United States (US) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Los Zetas have adopted a business-style structure, which includes holding regular meetings (CNN 6 Aug. 2009). According to a DEA official’s statements that were published in an article by the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), “their willingness to engage in firefights” separates Los Zetas from all other criminal groups in Mexico (ISN 11 Mar. 2009). According to an article published by CNN in August 2009, the US government has stated that Los Zetas is “the most technologically advanced, sophisticated and dangerous cartel operating in Mexico” (6 Aug. 2009). National Public Radio (NPR) of the US indicates that the DEA considers Los Zetas to be “the most dangerous drug-trafficking organization in Mexico” and that its members are “the most feared” criminals in the country (NPR 2 Oct. 2009). An article published in a daily newspaper of Quito (Ecuador), El Comercio, describes Los Zetas as [translation] “the most violent” organization because it executes and kidnaps its enemies (1 Feb.
    [Show full text]
  • Fatal Riot at Nuevo Leã³n Penitentiary Exposes Major Deficiencies in Mexico’S Prison System Carlos Navarro
    University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository SourceMex Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) 3-2-2016 Fatal Riot at Nuevo León Penitentiary Exposes Major Deficiencies in Mexico’s Prison System Carlos Navarro Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex Recommended Citation Navarro, Carlos. "Fatal Riot at Nuevo León Penitentiary Exposes Major Deficiencies in Mexico’s Prison System." (2016). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex/6235 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SourceMex by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 79906 ISSN: 1054-8890 Fatal Riot at Nuevo León Penitentiary Exposes Major Deficiencies in Mexico’s Prison System by Carlos Navarro Category/Department: Mexico Published: 2016-03-02 The fatal riot at the Topo Chico penitentiary on Feb. 11 was the first major crisis for Nuevo León Gov. Jaime Rodríguez Calderón, also known as El Bronco, who was elected as an independent candidate in June 2015 (SourceMex, June 24, 2015) and who took office in October of that year. The riot––reportedly a battle for control of the prison between two factions of the criminal organization the Zetas—left 49 casualties. Prison sources said most of the victims were stabbed to death with homemade weapons or beaten to death with sticks. By all accounts, Rodríguez Calderón did not handle the situation well, taking too long to react to the emergency and then placing the blame on missteps that occurred during the administration of his predecessor, former Gov.
    [Show full text]
  • Monica Cruz Rosas a Juarez Drug Lord Saved My Life Confessions Of
    Monica Cruz Rosas Master’s Project UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism Monica Cruz Rosas A Juarez drug lord saved my life Confessions of an accidental narco. When the Mexican security forces arrest someone involved in drug trafficking, they make sure everyone knows. A news release isn’t enough. The press officers hold a special kind of photo-op. All the elements of a good crime story are conveniently placed in one room: the agents, their detainees and the evidence of their crime. One of these press events took place at midnight in the military headquarters of Ciudad Juarez. It was 2009, one of the most violent years of the Mexican drug war. Five armed soldiers guard two men on top of a platform. The men stand still, handcuffed, squinting at the constant flickering of camera flashes. Dozens of small packets wrapped in brown tape and plastic are lined up in front of them. Below, about 20 reporters await to hear details of the arrest. Minutes later, a military official greets them and reads a news release at loud: Personnel of the Mexican Army arrested two men in Ciudad Juarez, after finding 99 packets of marijuana inside their vehicle, 52 kilos in total, valued at 1.3 million pesos or $100,000 in the black market. The arrested individuals are Americans Shohn Erich Huckabee, age 22, and Carlos Guillermo Quijas Ruiz, age 36. It was one more story about drugs in Mexico. By 2009, the military and federal police had apprehended nearly 80,000 people linked to organized crime, mainly drug trafficking.
    [Show full text]
  • Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana Drug Trafficking Organizations
    Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) Albert De Amicis, MPPM, (MPIA, 2010) University of Pittsburgh Graduate School for Public and International Affairs Masters of Public and International Affairs Capstone Final Paper November 27, 2010 March 12, 2011, (Updated) Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) ii Table of Contents Abstract..................................................................................................................iv I. Introduction..........................................................................................................1 Los Zetas.......................................................................................................1 La Familia Michoacana.................................................................................3 II. Leadership...........................................................................................................7 Los Zetas........................................................................................................7 La Familia Michoacana..................................................................................8 III. Structure..............................................................................................................9 Los Zetas.........................................................................................................9 La Familia Michoacana.................................................................................10 IV. Force Structure.................................................................................................
    [Show full text]