Bridging the Divide? an Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories

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Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories

Authors Michael Balz, Morgan Courtney, Nathan Hodson, Lena Hull, Seth Lynn, Eric Melancon, Julia Morse, Bill Parsons, Arian Sharifi, Sehar Tariq

Project Advisor Jeff Fischer

January 2010 About the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University

The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs was founded at Princeton in 1930, created in the spirit of President Woodrow Wilson’s interest in preparing students for leadership in public and international affairs. The Woodrow Wilson School has celebrated over 75 years of preparing talented individuals for careers in the service of the nation and the world. Today, the School educates a wide range of students from the U.S. and around the world who seek to apply their knowledge and skills to the solution of vital public problems in both the domestic and international realms.

About Graduate Policy Workshops

Graduate Policy Workshops are a unique part of the curriculum of the School’s graduate program. Workshops provide students with an opportunity to use what they have learned from their first year in the program, their summer work, and their other experiences to analyze a complex and challenging policy issue. The workshops emphasize policy implementation, and it is this that distinguishes it from regular coursework. The goal of the workshops is not just to understand a policy issue, but to devise policy recommendations that are both creative and realistic, given the relevant institutional and political constraints.

All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. The authors take full responsibility for any errors or omissions in this report.

Acknowledgments

A number of people and institutions provided critical support to conduct this research workshop on managing elections in fragile states.

We would like to express our gratitude to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University for this opportunity. In particular, we would like to thank Melissa Lyles, Karen McGuinness, the staff of the Graduate Program Office, Rebecca Anderson, and Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer.

We would like to thank our clients at the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and the United States Agency for International Development for providing direction on our project and constructive feedback on our analysis and recommendations. We would also like to thank Lisa Moore for providing critical contacts and logistical assistance for the Sri Lanka research trip. Likewise, Vlad Pran of IFES, as well as Chris Gunness and Sami Mshasha of UNRWA provided invaluable support to the group studying the Palestinian elections.

We are also grateful for all of the individuals who agreed to be interviewed during the course of this project. A list of organizations consulted may be found in the appendix.

This project could not have been successful without the guidance, support, encouragement, and expertise of our advisor, Jeff Fischer. His good humor, patience, and endless wisdom from his years of experience with elections in fragile states were invaluable. We thank him for his tireless dedication to us, and to the success of this project.

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544-1013 wws.princeton.edu

Cover Photo Credit: Ballot Boxes. Used with a Creative Commons license. http://www.flickr.com/photos/kitoy/1597912606. Table of Contents

List of Acronyms...... ii

Executive Summary...... 1

I. Introduction...... 4

II. Elections in the Palestinian Territories: Constraints and Opportunities...... 5

III. Postwar Elections in Sri Lanka: A Pathway to Peace?...... 17

IV. Conclusion...... 32

Appendix I: Key Political Parties and Actors in Sri Lanka...... 33 i Appendix II: Electoral Systems in the Palestinian Territories and Sri Lanka...... 34

Appendix III: List of Organizations Consulted by the Princeton Team...... 38

Appendix IV: Background on the authors...... 39 List of Acronyms

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CaFFE Campaign for Free and Fair Elections CEC Central Elections Commission CIDA Canadian International Development Agency EMPPR Emergency Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers Regulation EPDP Eelam People’s Democratic Party EU European Union GoSL Government of Sri Lanka GSP+ Generalized System of Preferences Plus IDP Internally Displaced Person IFES International Foundation for Electoral System IO International Organization JHU Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party) JVP Janatha Vimukti Permuna (People’s Liberation Front) LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MP Member of Parliament ii NGO Non Governmental Organization NSF National Security Forces PA Palestinian Authority PAFFREL People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PNC Palestinian National Council PR Proportional Representation PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party TNA Tamil National Alliance UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNP United National Alliance UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Executive Summary

Elections are one of many tools that contribute to an overall territories, both Fatah and Hamas have expressed a willingness democratic culture within a country. In the right context, elec- to engage in negotiations, but neither party has initiated con- tions can foster an accountable and inclusive government, and fidence-building measures necessary to create an environment provide marginalized groups an outlet to address grievances. conducive to holding elections. Meanwhile, the United States, However, without an underpinning of practices that protect Israel, and many other international actors remain opposed or minority rights and foster government credibility, elections at least ambivalent toward any reconciliation agreement that can exacerbate internal tensions and even engender violence. does not first require Hamas to meet the Quartet Conditions.

This report is a comparative study of elections in two divided Key challenges societies: the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka. In both of The CEC is highly respected and capable of administering these locations, elections are often presented as a way to repair high-quality elections. However, key questions remain about internal schisms, but in practice, elections in the current con- location of elections, the electoral system, and internal party text could exacerbate long-standing divisions. The inclusion dynamics. Even if Fatah and Hamas can reconcile and reach of these two cases makes it possible to analyze how different an agreement that is designed to overcome the electoral im- political environments can foster similar electoral challenges. passe, Palestinian leaders must still implement confidence- building measures to create a political environment conducive This report addresses three important research questions to de- to elections. Challenges include integrating security forces and termine how elections can bridge societal divides: putting in place a system that allows all parties to move and campaign freely throughout the Palestinian territories. For this • What type of political environment needs to exist reason, the role of Israel and the international community in for elections to prevent further entrenchment of allowing elections to go forward is crucial. Even then, the po- societal divisions? tential for voter intimidation and violence in the period lead- 1 ing up to and including election day must be addressed. • In such an environment, what is the minimum standard for an election to be perceived as legitimate Recommendations by all parties? To enhance the prospects that a reconciliation agreement is • What can the international community do to signed and create an environment conducive to holding elec- improve the political context for elections and tions, the international community should: increase the likelihood that electoral outcomes will be accepted as legitimate by all parties? • Continue to strengthen the CEC so that it remains a model institution of Palestinian democratic Palestinian Territories governance and is able to meet the new challenge of managing elections in a divided society. Currently, the timing, sequencing, and locations of elections are uncertain. In October 2009, Palestinian Authority (PA) • Issue a statement from the Quartet that indicates President Mahmoud Abbas called for elections in January a willingness of the international community to 2010, citing a constitutional requirement as the basis of his recognize any elected government in the Palestinian executive decree. However, after it became clear that Hamas territories as long the PA continues to respect the would not allow elections to take place in Gaza, Abbas de- Quartet Conditions. cided to take the advice of the Central Election Commission • Encourage parties to build trust and create an (CEC) and postponed elections. While the Cairo Agreement environment conducive to holding elections by stipulates a June 2010 target date, Hamas has yet to sign on, designing and maintaining benchmarks that ensure and the longer reconciliation negotiations continue the less compliance with a reconciliation agreement. realistic June elections become. • Encourage parties to reintegrate the security forces in a manner acceptable to both domestic actors and Assessment of the political context the international community. Legitimate and peaceful elections in the Palestinian territories depend upon active political and financial support from international and domestic political actors. Within the Palestinian

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Sri Lanka mission was never established. Appointing these independent commissions would impede the ruling party’s use of state re- In May 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sources during their election campaigns, which they currently were militarily defeated by the Sri Lanka Army, effectively do with impunity. This is not unique to the current ruling ending Sri Lanka’s brutal 26-year civil war. The LTTE had party, but has been the case in previous governments ruled by led a separatist movement for the creation of an independent other political parties. Tamil state on the majority-Sinhalese island. It held significant control over the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The defeat In addition, emergency powers remain in effect despite the end of the LTTE comes on the eve of parliamentary elections, to of military hostilities. These emergency powers allow deten- be held no later than April 2010. The current president has tion without charge or trial, restrictions on civil liberties, and decided to capitalize on his popularity from winning the war limits on freedoms of movement, speech, and expression. The and has called for early presidential elections, to be held on independent media is self-censored due to threats and fear of January 26, 2010. Much is at stake—and few, if any, efforts abduction, limiting real political dialogue. Local civil society have been made to integrate the Tamil populations into the organizations also tend to censor themselves for fear of threats majority Sinhalese society in the wake of the LTTE’s defeat. or retaliation, and some international non-governmental orga- The ruling party has little incentive to do so. The political at- nizations have left Sri Lanka due to safety concerns. mosphere is plagued by distrust among the political parties. Yet, if the presidential and parliamentary elections are viewed There is deep distrust among all parties; opposition parties as fair and inclusive of all Sri Lankans, they could represent the are wary that the ruling party (the SLFP) will employ public first real step toward postwar unity and reconciliation. resources when campaigning, gaining unfair advantages that are unchecked by the current system. With the victory of the Assessment of the Political Context government over the LTTE, there is little political will to pro- The end of the war has been marked by a national sentiment of vide concessions to the Tamils, and even fewer incentives to 2 relief and euphoria. A considerable segment of the public sup- create mechanisms to even the electoral playing field. Further, ports the military, the current President, and the ruling party the massacre of Tamil civilians during the military operation for having accomplished a task that was considered impossible against the LTTE and the slow resettlement of Tamils from by most. The success of military action against the LTTE has IDP camps across the Vanni region have only increased Tamil negatively affected the public’s views on creating a path to sus- resentment toward the government and the political process. tainable peace through concessions or power sharing. Many believe that since the LTTE has been eliminated, there is no Reconciliation and confidence-building are understandably need for further dialogue. lacking, given this environment of distrust. Without efforts to discuss the past and promote some degree of inclusion for Despite the lack of enthusiasm among the majority to estab- minority groups, the election could serve to further divide, lish dialogue or successful reintegration of minorities within rather than unite, the country. If Tamils continue to feel that the national framework, there is a sincere desire among many they are underserved by or excluded from this government, Sri Lankans to create sustainable peace. Such peace can only it is possible that tensions will resurface and hostilities could be achieved if the majority of Sri Lankans begin to realize that continue. The current peace, tenuous as it is, would be lost. further oppression of minorities will only increase resentment and alienation, which could lead to a fresh wave of violence Recommendations in the future. Long term peace requires political participation The international community should support institutional and equitable representation, facilitated by a legitimate elec- reform in Sri Lanka to strengthen electoral processes and de- toral process. velop a more inclusive government system. This would help to advance national reconciliation and the creation of lasting Challenges peace in Sri Lanka. The international community should: Sri Lanka’s government structure consists of a parliament and an executive president. The executive president has few checks on his power. Recognizing this, the parliament in 2001 amended the constitution to establish a Constitutional Coun- cil that would appoint members of three independent commissions: the Elections Commission, the Police Commission, and the Civil Service Commission. While the latter two were briefly established (but have now lapsed), the Elections Com-

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 • Encourage the Sri Lankan Government to • Support political freedom for parties, implement the constitutional amendment creating candidates, and individuals. One of the independent governmental commissions. fundamental principles of democracy is the right of • Promote political party development through individuals to organize or assemble along political financial and capacity-building assistance. lines. Placing restrictions on opposition parties, as in Sri Lanka, or preventing political party members • Provide technical assistance to elections and electoral from convening even informal gatherings, such processes. as Hamas in the West Bank or Fatah in Gaza, • Encourage the Sri Lankan Government to build undermines democratic ideals. In such a context, greater minority inclusion into government it is unlikely that all interested parties will view the institutions. elections as fair and legitimate. • Encourage the Sri Lankan Government to acknowledge the end of military hostilities by ending the administration of emergency powers.

Implications for Elections in Divided Societies

Based on more than 120 interviews with representatives of the Palestinian and Sri Lankan governments, political party members, international organization officials, and civil society actors, we identified a number of ways to improve the political environment for elections in divided societies.

• Foster a strong and independent Electoral 3 Commission. In both the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka, the Chief Electoral Commissioner is highly-respected by all factions of society. However, due to logistical and administrative constraints, the ability of the Electoral Commission to impact the overall political process is severely limited. A strong but neutral Board of Commissioners with an expanded mandate could use its political capital to build a democratic culture that respects minority rights. In particular, an empowered Electoral Commission could offer programming and electoral adjudication throughout the political process. The period in between election years offers an opportunity to address controversial issues in a less divisive environment. • Design and implement mechanisms for confidence-building between parties. Changing the political environment for elections requires that all parties feel that they have a stake in the current system of government. One way to build trust between actors is to integrate disputants into the civil service and security forces. Interaction between high- and low-level officials during this process builds more sustainable networks.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 I. Introduction

Aims of the Report information ‘on the record,’ while others preferred to remain anonymous. A list of sources for this report can be found in This report analyzes the political context in Sri Lanka and the Appendix III. This fieldwork was preceded and followed by Palestinian territories and the environment in which elections extensive research and interviews with country experts. will be held in 2010. While the authors of this report recognize that elections are not a panacea for conflict, the manner in Structure of the Report which elections are conducted has been able to contribute to an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation. The next two sections provide detailed assessments of the current situation in the Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka. Each The recommendations in this report seek to address the chal- section addresses the background and political context in each lenges to holding free and fair elections in the Palestinian ter- country and assesses the main challenges for holding elections ritories and Sri Lanka and to produce processes and outcomes in both the short and long term. Each case study also provides that can be accepted by all parties and viewed as legitimate. If recommendations that are effective, feasible and affordable appropriate action is taken, elections can be used as a tool for ways to address such challenges. The case studies outline pos- furthering national reconciliation among Sri Lankans and uni- sible scenarios for electoral outcomes and the implications that ty among Palestinians that is crucial to creating lasting peace each scenario has on the peace process. The final section draws in both places. together some key lessons learned from these case studies and points out the similarities that exist across both the Sri Lankan Research Design and Palestinian cases.

The purpose of this report is to provide a current analysis of 4 the political context in both Sri Lanka and the Palestinian territories and to provide useful recommendations to the international community on how they can encourage and further the peace and reconciliation process in both places. The research for these two case studies focused on the following questions:

• What type of political environment needs to exist for elections to prevent further entrenchment of societal divisions? • In such an environment, what is the minimum standard for an election to be perceived as legitimate by all parties? • What can the international community do to improve the political context for elections and increase the likelihood that electoral outcomes will be accepted as legitimate by all parties?

Research Methodology

To develop a cogent set of recommendations, members of the research team travelled to Israel, the West Bank, and Sri Lanka to conduct interviews with stakeholders and experts, including election administrators, political parties, government officials, domestic and international NGOs, multina- tional organizations, and media representatives. In total, the team interviewed over 60 individuals and organizations, in Israel, the West Bank, and Sri Lanka, some of which provided

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 II. Elections in the Palestinian Territories:2 Constraints and OpportunitiesPalestinian Territories

Main railway LEBANON Main road Introduction Kiryatat Shemona International boundary 1974 Ceasefire lines (UN buffer zone established May 31st 1974)

Main airport R Golan

a Heights

d Nahariya r SYRIA Major town Zefat o

J Other town Akko Free and fair elections in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Je- Kiryat Motzkin Lake Tiberias Palestinian territory fully or Haifaa partially administered by Kiryat Ata Tiberiaserias rusalem are the goal of most Palestinians and members of the the Palestinian Authority Nazareth Palestinian territory administered by Hamas Afula international community. However, the path to Palestinian BetBet Shean 0 km 25 50 75 100 Hadera Jenin elections is obstructed by internal political divisions and the 0 miles 25 50 Netanya Tulkarm

Nablus competing interests of international actors. Current electoral Herzliyya Kefar Sava WEST BANK . R Petah Tiqwa n a Tel Aviv d r

o regulations require that elections be held in the West Bank, Holon J Bat Yam Lod Rishon le Zionon MEDITERRANEAN SEA Ramla Rehovotovot Ramallah Gaza, and East Jerusalem simultaneously, and elections ex- Jericho Ashdod Jerusalem Bethlehem cluding any part of the Palestinian territories would be un- Ashqelon ISRAEL Kiryat Gat

acceptable to most Palestinians. Since Hamas controls Gaza, Gaza City Hebron GAZA STRIP Dead 1949 Sea Armistice line and Fatah exerts significant power over the West Bank, recon- Khan Yunis ciliation must occur before the Palestinian Authority can hold Beersheba Arad 1950 Armistice line elections in both territories. Such elections will also require the Dimona JORDAN

cooperation of Israel, which controls East Jerusalem, as well Qeziot as access to the West Bank and Gaza. A reconciled Palestin- En Hazeva ian government, however, would likely include—or even be led by—members of Hamas. For this reason, Israel and other members of the international community are reluctant to pro- EGYPT

vide the Palestinian government with the necessary assistance TURKEY

Yotvata and cooperation. The current status quo, in which elections SYRIA

LEBANON IRAQ and reconciliation are continually delayed, will likely prove to Mediterranean 5 Sea JORDAN be disastrous if it continues indefinitely. Before reconciliation Israel occupied then annexed East Jerusalem after the 1967 war. Eilat The Israeli government sits in West Jerusalem, but the UN and most countries do not recognise Jerusalem as the true capital EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA and Palestinian elections can occur, domestic and internation- and have their embassies in Tel Aviv. © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009

al actors must make concessions to and cooperate with parties Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009 Country Report October 2009 www.eiu.com © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009 whose interests often compete with their own. Background and Historical Context

Before Palestinian elections and reconciliation Overview of the Conflict in the Palestinian Territories can occur, domestic and international actors The current Palestinian electoral impasse is best understood 1 must make concessions to and cooperate with in the context of previous elections. In January 1996 Hamas boycotted the first presidential and Palestinian Legislative parties whose interests often compete with Council (PLC) elections in which Fatah and its leader, Yassir their own. Arafat, won overwhelming majorities. On January 10, 2005, several months after Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) was elected president with over 60% of The purpose of this report is to explain the current climate 2 surrounding Palestinian elections and to make recommenda- the vote. The second-ever PLC election followed a year later tions to domestic actors and the international community. The in January 2006. Hamas, running under the heading Change first section details previous Palestinian electoral experiences and Reform, won 74 seats to Fatah’s 45 with a particularly and explains how they have led to the current situation. The strong showing in district voting. Despite worldwide condem- second section explores the influence of domestic and internation of the outcome, international observers reported that 3 national parties who have a stake in the Palestinian elections. the elections were free and fair. Following the election, Ismail The third section identifies the major challenges to holding Haniyeh, a Hamas-elected Member of Parliament (MP), be- elections. The fourth section explores ways that the status of came Prime Minister and formed a Hamas government under reconciliation will affect possible future electoral scenarios. Fi- Abbas’s presidency. nally, the fifth section recommends four policies for domestic 1 See Appendix 2 for more detailed background on previous and international actors to lay the foundations of a strong rec- Palestinian elections and current electoral issues. onciliation agreement and free and fair elections in the Pales- 2 Greg Myre, “Mandate in Hand, Abbas Declares He’s Ready for tinian territories. Talks,” New York Time, 11 January 2005. 3 Scott Wilson, “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Middle East,” Washington Post, 27 January 2006.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 The United States, Canada, Israel, and the EU responded by • Coordination councils to liaise between the West freezing financial support for the PA, and Israel arrested one- Bank and Gaza until elections; third of Hamas MPs, preventing the PLC from reaching a • Reintegration of PA security forces in Gaza under quorum. Arab supervision; and

In June 2007, after numerous failed attempts to reconstitute a • The election of a new parliament using 75% unity government, Hamas militants ousted the Fatah-led Pal- proportional representation and 25% district estinian security forces from the Gaza Strip.4 Abbas responded representation. by declaring a state of emergency, dissolving the government, Uncertain Timing of Elections and replacing Prime Minister Haniyeh with unaffiliated tech- nocrat Salam Fayyad.5 The resulting situation has left Hamas The status of elections is currently uncertain. In October in control of Gaza while the PA controls the West Bank. The 2009, Abbas issued a presidential decree calling for elections United States and the EU have resumed aid to the PA, where in January 2010. Hamas criticized Abbas for announcing elec- the majority of the government remains unelected. Mean- tions unilaterally and signaled its opposition to elections be- 8 while, given the impossibility of holding elections, Abbas uni- fore reconciliation. As such, it prevented Palestinian Central laterally extended his term as president, which lapsed in Janu- Elections Commission (CEC) officials in Gaza from taking ary 2009. Hamas has not recognized the extension. preliminary steps to prepare for elections. Since the CEC’s mandate is to hold unified elections in Gaza, the West Bank, Ongoing Negotiations in the Palestinian Territories and East Jerusalem, the Commission subsequently announced 9 Egypt is currently leading negotiations between Hamas and that it would be impossible to do so in January. Fatah to foster an agreement that will lead to elections, rather than a unity government. As such, the Egyptian approach ef- Abbas now faces a serious legitimacy crisis, not only because fectively transfers the problem of Palestinian disunity to vot- his term lapsed at the beginning of 2009, but also because of the increasingly widespread Palestinian perception that his 6 ers, who are expected to end political bickering at the ballot box. There are, however, no mechanisms to guarantee that the concessions to Israel have yielded few results. The U.S. deci- losing party—or Israel and the international community— sion to moderate its position on Israeli settlements furthered will accept the results. this perception. Abbas’s approval rating recently dropped to just 12 percent and he has announced that he will not par- Current discussions have focused on the framework of future ticipate in the next Presidential election, although there is still 10 Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, plans to re- speculation that he may reverse his position. unify the West Bank and Gazan security services, methods for integrating Hamas into the PLO, and arrangements for The next Palestinian elections will likely face new obstacles be- the release of political prisoners from both parties. Both Fatah yond those encountered in 2006. Israel and the international and Hamas have accepted the latest “Cairo Proposal” in prin- community’s aversion to supporting elections that could re- ciple, although Hamas subsequently reneged following the turn Hamas to power, and the current divided control of the Goldstone Report controversy.6 Key aspects of the proposal Palestinian territories, will make holding Palestinian elections include:7 in the near future politically and practically difficult.

Political Context

Both Fatah and Hamas have expressed a willingness to engage 4 The most notable attempt to bring about Palestinian unity was the Saudi-brokered Mecca Accords, which Hamas and Fatah signed in in negotiations but neither party has initiated the confidence- February 2007 to establish a national unity government. The power sharing arrangement officially ended in June 2007 with the Hamas takeover of Gaza. 8 “Hamas condemns ‘unlawful’ Abbas election call,” The Associated Press, 2 November 2009. 5 The legality of Fayyad’s appointment is questionable. Although the Palestinian Basic Law allows the president to dismiss the prime 9 The CEC is an autonomous PA office that administers presidential, minister, it also states that the outgoing prime minister leads a caretaker legislative and local elections in the Palestinian territories. It has government until the parliament approves a new cabinet. Since the eight part-time, independent commissioners drawn from civil society PLC was unable to meet, Fayyad’s appointment was never confirmed. institutions and the legal system oversee the commission’s work, while a permanent staff of around 85 employees carry out the CEC’s day-to- 6 The PA’s decision to delay action on the Goldstone Report—a day work. The CEC’s impartiality and professionalism in past elections UN investigation into the war in Gaza—led Hamas to cancel unity has earned it an excellent reputation among Palestinian political parties, discussion in Cairo and delay signing the reconciliation agreement. international donors and the Palestinian people. 7 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Fatah, Hamas close to reconciliation,” 10 “Abbas popularity dips over response to Goldstone Gaza report,” Jerusalem Post, 26 September 2009. Reuters, 18 October 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 building measures necessary to create an environment condu- Some Palestinian politicians and NGO officials also expressed cive to holding elections. The high level of uncertainty about concern that Fatah is not yet prepared for another election. the outcome of elections makes them unappealing for Fatah The results of the 2006 Palestinian elections showcased Fatah’s and Hamas, both of which would risk losing power. internal and external problems.12 Fatah’s August 2009 Sixth Party Congress was convened to incorporate new voices into Fatah and the Palestinian Authority Fatah’s decision-making apparatus and to consolidate power Under Fayyad’s leadership, the PA has made significant state- within the party. Some analysts see the Party Congress as suc- building progress, particularly in the area of reforming the cessful, integrating a new generation that has a larger grass- security services and promoting economic development.11 roots constituency and is thus more aware of popular concerns. American officials involved with the training of the National Security Forces (NSF) believe that security cooperation be- Evidence of dissent, however, remains. While the Party Con- tween the United States and the PA has professionalized the gress itself was democratic, certain candidates stacked voting NSF. Training has emphasized human rights, rules of engage- delegations with their supporters in the days before the meet- ment, and loyalty to PA institutions rather than to political ing, and no Fatah delegates from Gaza were able to attend.13 parties. A number of Palestinian leaders, however, believe that Several Fatah members have since threatened to campaign un- Abbas’s unilateral control has led to an increasingly authoritar- der a separate electoral list if candidates are chosen in a similar ian, pro-Fatah government within the West Bank. fashion during elections. This would split traditional Fatah voters and bolster Hamas’s prospects. Although the current PA government is composed of non- affiliated technocrats, Fatah remains extremely influential in Hamas and Gaza the West Bank through PA institutions, including the presi- In Gaza, the realities of day-to-day governance have report- dency. The consolidation of Fatah power within the PA has edly made some Hamas leaders less dogmatic. According to direct implications for the prospects of multi-party democracy an official involved with the Cairo negotiations, the focus on in future Palestinian elections. PA-controlled security forces governing has led to a split between the political and military 7 within the West Bank reportedly conduct surveillance of divisions within Gaza. More radical elements of Hamas are Hamas-affiliated MPs—many of whom were recently released said to be disappointed that the group has not been zealous in from Israeli prisons—making it difficult for these individuals implementing Islamic policies. This may have led to a similar to convene or attend even non-political meetings. Likewise, rift between Hamas leaders in Gaza and Damascus as the lat- the Fatah patronage network, through which political lead- ter’s calculations are less driven by daily events. ers are able to provide supporters with money, jobs, and con- tracts, makes it difficult for independents and third parties to Hamas politicians in both the West Bank and Gaza are unlikely compete for supporters. PA officials have reportedly prevented to run in any election without prior reconciliation. They see an independent political parties from running candidates in lo- elections deal as part of a broader reconciliation package, in- cal elections, and several individuals voiced concern about the cluding the integration of security services and inclusion in the possibility of voter coercion by Fatah leaders. PLO. Hamas officials have stated their commitment to respect the results of democratic processes, regardless of outcome, but party members are concerned about the international com- In Gaza, the realities of day-to-day munity’s response to future elections, given the events of 2006. governance have reportedly made some Hamas leaders less dogmatic. The focus on Influence of the International Community governing has led to a split between the Legitimate elections in the Palestinian territories depend upon political and military divisions. active political and financial support from international and domestic political actors. However, the United States, Israel, and the EU are likely to oppose any reconciliation agreement that allows Hamas to control the PA without first accepting

11 In August 2009 Fayyad announced a state-building plan, designed to build “strong state institutions capable of providing, equitably 12 Fatah’s decision to put forward too many candidates in district- and effectively, for the needs of [Palestinian] citizens, despite the level elections resulted in a disproportionate loss of seats and revealed a occupation.” The plan involves reducing dependence on Israel and lack of party discipline stemming from internal divisions. international aid, unifying and modernizing the legal system, attracting foreign investment, building infrastructure, and downsizing the 13 For more on the Fatah Sixth Party Congress, see “Palestine: government. The text of this plan is available online at: http://www. Salvaging Fatah,” International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. mop-gov.ps/issues_details.php?pid=15. 91, 12 November 2009.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 the Quartet Conditions.14 Voting in East Jerusalem: A Closer Look Israel: Given its occupation of the West Bank and blockade on Gaza, Israel has the ability to prevent Palestinian elections. Voting in East Jerusalem has historically been a highly Israeli checkpoints and barriers control the flow of resources politicized and significant challenge for Palestinian elec- and the movement of people throughout the West Bank; as tions. The PA intends for East Jerusalem to be the future such, Israel will need to allow the CEC to distribute election Palestinian capital and recognizes that voting in East Jeru- materials and facilitate voters’ access to polling stations. Israel salem legitimizes its claim of sovereignty. Israel perceives has an even more profound impact on the Palestinian popu- Palestinian voting in East Jerusalem as a threat to its own lation in East Jerusalem, where the majority of voters in the past have been required to vote at West Bank polling stations. sovereignty there, and is also concerned with Hamas par- While Israel does not maintain internal control of Gaza, it will ticipation in elections. Israel initially refused to permit need to allow the CEC to transport elections materials from East Jerusalem voting in the 2006 elections, but eventu- the West Bank to Gaza, transiting through Israel. ally agreed to allow absentee voting through post offices, under significant U.S. pressure. Candidates were permit- U.S. diplomatic efforts will likely determine the level of Israeli ted to campaign after registering with Israeli police, but support for elections. Most Israelis view Hamas’s 2006 vic- Hamas was barred from campaign activities. Turnout was tory as a disaster, and it will thus be politically difficult for the very low; out of approximately 100,000 eligible voters, Israeli government to allow elections with Hamas participa- only 1,212 East Jerusalemites cast their ballots in East Je- tion. Some experts, however, believe that if a reconciliation agreement were signed and successfully implemented, Israel rusalem while another 5,000 voted outside the city. In the would facilitate elections because it would not want to be seen next election, turnout will likely remain low, as in previous as impeding Palestinian democracy. One U.S. government of- years. The few East Jerusalem Palestinians who chose to ficial suggested the Israeli government would provide logistical vote will probably have to travel to the West Bank to do 8 and security support for elections if it believed elections would so, as a result of restrictions limiting Palestinians’ ability to result in a change in control of Gaza or cement the current PA campaign and rumors of retribution. leadership.

United States: The United States has refrained from issuing Egypt and other Arab states: Egypt has traditionally exer- public statements about the possibility of elections in the Pal- cised considerable influence over Hamas, though its power ap- estinian territories; however, the U.S. government has made pears to have waned in the past several years. It is staunchly it clear that it will only support a reconciliation agreement opposed to the Palestinian political split, not least because it between Fatah and Hamas if Hamas explicitly accepts the fears that Gaza could eventually become Egypt’s responsibil- Quartet principles. While the United States does not play a ity. Egyptian officials are facilitating the reconciliation process direct role in facilitating elections, many international elec- through the Cairo Agreement, which envisions a role for a toral assistance organizations receive funding from the U.S. number of Arab states in assisting with confidence-building government. Moreover, Washington has played a significant measures including the integration of security forces in the role in securing Israeli agreement to hold and assist with previ- West Bank and Gaza. ous Palestinian elections. Challenges Facing the Palestinian Territories European Union: In previous elections the Palestinian CEC relied heavily on European Union funding to cover the ex- While the Cairo Agreement sets elections for June 2010, penses of elections. EU officials have indicated that they could this date becomes increasingly less realistic as reconciliation not imagine providing resources if elections are not held si- negotiations linger and Hamas resists signing the document. multaneously in the West Bank and Gaza in a fair, transparent, Whenever elections do occur, certain technical and political and open manner. requirements will be essential to ensure legitimate outcomes. This section will examine some of the key challenges at each stage in the process: pre-reconciliation, post-reconciliation, 14 The Quartet on the Middle East, which was established in 2002 in order to serve as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process, is and Election Day. In many ways, the implementation of the composed of the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Nations, and the European Union. The Quartet calls on all Palestinians electoral process will determine the future of domestic Pales- to accept three conditions: 1) renounce violence, 2) recognize Israel, tinian politics, regional dynamics, and the peace process. and 3) accept all previous Israeli-Palestinian obligations and agreements. For more information, see: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/ sg2152.doc.htm.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Many politicians, civil society representatives, and interna- Hamas and Fatah have different preferences about tional officials in the West Bank share the position that elec- what type of electoral system should be used in future tions are not a catchall solution to the current divide in Pales- Palestinian elections. As suggested by the outcome of the tinian society. Most experts interviewed believe that peaceful previous PLC election, a system with a higher proportion of elections will be a result of reconciliation rather than the cause. open list district-level seats would favor Hamas, since it has the internal party discipline to run only one candidate for each Pre-Reconciliation Challenges available seat. Fatah leadership believes a system with a higher proportion of PR seats would yield more favorable results for Pre-Reconciliation Challenges its candidates. The Cairo Agreement stipulates that 75 percent of PLC seats will be elected through PR and 25 percent of • Internal party dynamics seats will be selected through multi-member open list districts. • Lack of trust between parties, especially regarding In principle, both parties have agreed to this electoral system, security and officials from both stated that they believe their respective parties have a good chance of winning a plurality of seats in • Different preferences about the electoral system a new election under this system. The longer reconciliation • Disagreements about Hamas representation in the discussions continue, however, the more likely it is that one PLO party will want to reconfigure the electoral system to try and maneuver a more favorable outcome.

Reconciliation discussions in Cairo focus on measures to fos- Hamas and Fatah disagree about if and how to include ter a political environment that is conducive to holding elec- Hamas in the PLO. Hamas has demanded a larger role with- tions in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Without in the PLO, which the international community recognizes an agreement, there is nothing requiring Hamas to allow PA- as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. declared elections in Gaza or to ensure that the PA will allow Hamas representation in the PLO or in the PLO’s legislative 9 Hamas candidates to campaign freely in the West Bank. body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), would give the movement more internal and international legitimacy, but Domestic and international actors have different views it is unclear how the inclusion of Hamas would affect Pal- about the necessity of reconciliation. Within both Hamas estinian-Israeli peace negotiations. Though prior agreements and Fatah, certain factions are reportedly opposed to reconcili- have identified mechanisms to bring Hamas into the PLO, the ation. Most accounts suggest that while Abbas favors reconcili- Fatah-controlled organization has yet to allow Hamas to join. ation, factions within his party believe that holding elections Hamas has thus called for worldwide PNC elections among without Gaza will enable Fatah to consolidate its power. While the Palestinian Diaspora, which international, U.S., and Pal- some of Fatah’s new Central Committee members, such as estinian officials have stated would be difficult, if not impos- Marwan Barghouti, are thought to be conciliatory to Hamas, sible, to implement. In the absence of such elections, observers other newly elected leaders, such as Mohammed Dahlan, were suggested determining PNC membership as a function of the involved with intra-Palestinian violence and may not support PLC’s composition. Such a formula is less desirable to Hamas, reconciliation. Meanwhile, Hamas’s leadership in Gaza is in- since Hamas’s support outside of the Palestinian territories is creasingly splintered between military and political factions, assumed to be higher than its internal support. and to accommodate both groups, any reconciliation agreement will likely be part of a package deal that allows Hamas Post-Reconciliation Challenges to maintain some political power through the PA or the PLO. Post-Reconciliation Challenges There is currently no agreement on how to reintegrate security forces. Due to Fatah’s influence over security person- • Security force integration nel in the West Bank and Hamas’s unitary control in Gaza, • Internationalization of elections neither party is confident that a reintegration agreement will be implemented fairly. In its current form, the Cairo agree- • Implementation monitoring ment lacks a specific plan for security force integration. This • Elections monitors deadlock not only impedes reconciliation, but also strengthens • Acceptance of results the positions of factions within each party that seek to consolidate power rather than reconcile. • CEC membership, role in elections

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Hamas and Fatah must sign a reconciliation agreement in or- nor the Palestinian people see the utility of holding elections der to create the political context necessary for simultaneous that do little more than bring sanctions and entrench the po- elections in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Yet even litical split. after signing an agreement, Palestinian leaders will still face the challenge of implementing confidence-building measures The United States, Israel, and the EU all maintain that Hamas to create a political environment conducive to elections. Con- must agree to the Quartet Conditions in order participate in ditions on the ground must allow each party to campaign in the PA. Depending on the specific language that Hamas ac- areas controlled by its rival and allow Palestinians to vote their cepts as part of the reconciliation process, elections involving conscience without fear of violence or political reprisal. both parties would have the potential to split the international community. As one U.S. official in Jerusalem said, there is Security under any reconciliation agreement will remain “daylight” between the U.S. and EU positions on how much a key point of contention between Fatah and Hamas. Hamas has changed. Some European countries believe that Both sides have suggested the reintegration of security forces Hamas has demonstrated a willingness to change its position is necessary before elections can be held. This process would vis-à-vis a two-state solution, whereas the United States points ensure that politicians from both sides are able to campaign to Hamas’s stated goal of destroying the Israeli state as evi- freely and that voters are not intimidated in the period preced- dence that the group is not interested in peace. According to ing elections. The reintegration of security forces in the West one Quartet official, if Hamas ambiguously announced that it Bank and Gaza is crucial for free and fair elections, but short “accepts all previous agreements,” the international commu- of significant international pressure and concessions from the nity would likely split on how to interact with Hamas. Some Palestinians, Israel will likely prevent Hamas members from countries would accept such a concession as adequate and joining the NSF. recognize a Hamas-led Palestinian government, while others would continue to demand that Hamas explicitly accept the The reintegration of security forces in the Quartet Conditions. 10 West Bank and Gaza is crucial for free Depending on the reconciliation agreement and the and fair elections, but short of significant context of elections, the international community might international pressure and concessions from decide not to provide electoral funding to the Palestinians. the Palestinians, Israel will likely prevent In the past, the European Union (among others) has generally Hamas members from joining the NSF. provided funding for elections. The EU will not make a decision about whether to fund the next Palestinian elections until certain details about the elections are clear. While such fund- Additionally, the U.S. government is currently training PA se- ing is not absolutely necessary to hold elections, it would be curity forces in the West Bank in an attempt to professionalize logistically difficult for the PA to implement elections without the NSF. All NSF members are cleared by the United States, additional international funding. Israel, Jordan, and the PA before receiving training. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which all parties would allow The CEC currently lacks the mandate and capacity to Hamas members to receive training. Furthermore, many Pal- address significant challenges that could arise during the estinians, including those staunchly opposed to Hamas, view implementation of a reconciliation agreement. The incen- the U.S. training mission with great distrust and antipathy. diary political environment in the run-up to elections is likely And even if a unified NSF were established in both the West to require additional capabilities for the CEC. Despite its in- Bank and Gaza, there is always a chance that voter intimida- dependent status and professional composition, the CEC has tion could occur, perpetrated by the security forces, factions of constrained authority and sees its own mandate as limited. The political parties, or individuals. CEC has received a great deal of international assistance and has established itself as a capable bureaucracy, but its power Unless the reconciliation agreement addresses and authority are largely concentrated in the hands of the international concerns, it will be difficult to obtain chairman and the commissioners, all of whom are part-time international political support for implementing the employees. This structure limits the CEC’s capacity to address necessary measures to lay the groundwork for elections. efficiently a variety of electoral challenges that could arise prior Even if the two parties are able to reach an agreement in the to elections. While the CEC is well-equipped to run smooth Cairo negotiations, both Hamas and Fatah have indicated that elections, one UN official opined that it is not ready to handle they will only hold elections if the international community serious political or security challenges that could arise in a va- agrees to respect the results. Neither Palestinian political actors riety of electoral scenarios.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Scenario 1 – Elections delayed, Scenario 2 – Elections held Scenario 3 – Elections status quo prevails throughout Palestinian Territory without Gaza

• Absence of intra-Palestinian • Post-agreement • Fatah consolidates power expense agreement • US pressures Israel to allow of legitimacy • Neither party willing to call elections • CEC composition changes elections • Elections supported by • Possibility of violence • Convenient to internal and international community • Internal divisions solidify external actors • Possibility in context of a peace • Hamas response: Elections in agreement Gaza

Most Likely Likely Unlikely, but Plausible (Short-term) (Medium-term) (Medium- to long-term)

In Advance of Election Day Electoral Scenarios

Election Day Challenges In this context, implementing confidence-building measures to establish the basis for reconciliation will be difficult. Not • Potential for factional violence only is there a gap between the parties’ ideologies, but events • Obtaining Israeli government approval to facilitate in the last three years have resulted in tremendous acrimony the movement of people and materials on both sides. Even Palestinians who believe reconciliation is possible acknowledge that serious challenges currently impede In addition to the challenges facing all parties before and after the scheduling of elections and are likely to continue to delay 11 reconciliation, there will also be potential stumbling blocks elections in the immediate future. Several observers suggested in the immediate run-up to Election Day that will need to be that it could take two years before the political environment addressed. would be conducive to holding elections.

Elections in the Palestinian territories require the Most Likely Scenario: Elections Postponed in the Near active support of the Israeli government to facilitate the Future movement of people and materials during the campaign The most likely scenario is that elections will be delayed in period and on polling day. Israel could impede access for the near future, perhaps even for several years. Just as Abbas voters and electoral observers in the West Bank on Election postponed the January 2010 elections only weeks after declar- Day or prevent the transfer of materials between the West ing them, a delay is likely even if elections are called for June. Bank and Gaza. Israel could also prevent voting in East Jerusa- Reconciliation talks have already broken down multiple times, lem, which many Palestinians consider an essential condition and at this point, neither party is willing to lose legitimacy by for elections. holding unilateral elections without the full participation of the Palestinian people. Potential exists for factional violence, particularly voter intimidation and targeted attacks. Even if Hamas and Fa- The most likely scenario is that elections will tah reached an agreement, either side could have an incentive be delayed in the near future, perhaps even to play spoiler to the elections if they felt like they were going for several years. to lose substantially. Additionally, grassroots party supporters could be difficult to control. While this could be the case for either side, it is likely to be particularly a problem for Fatah, A delay of elections, while not meeting internationally accept- which has been fragmented since 2006. The central leadership ed standards for regular and genuine elections, is nonetheless of Fatah might not be able to control the actions of all factions convenient for most Palestinian, regional, and international within the party, potentially leading to violence. actors. The two main Palestinian parties would likely entrench themselves in their respective statelets, each blaming the other for the failure to hold elections. Major actors in the international community—including the United States, Israel, and

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 some Arab states—would likely have no objection to the The outcome of any election is likely to depend on the po- cantonization of the Palestinian territories. If this happens, it litical context in the months immediately prior to the elec- would effectively solve Israel’s potential problem of having to tion. Diverse testimonials from Palestinian politicians, NGO negotiate with a PA that includes Hamas. Although Abbas’s activists, and UN officials suggest the popularity of Hamas mandate as president of the PA has lapsed, Washington has and Fatah within the West Bank and Gaza remains uncertain. indicated its willingness to work with him in his capacity as Many of the problems that plagued Fatah in 2006—specifi- chairman of the PLO to further the peace process. Such a sce- cally corruption and lack of progress on the peace process—are nario would allow Israel and the United States to continue to more pronounced in 2009, suggesting support for Hamas may work exclusively with Fatah and the PA as partners in the peace have increased. On the other hand, many Gazans are report- process, at the expense of Gaza and Palestinian democracy. edly disillusioned with the consequences that Israel and the international community have imposed on them as a result In the long run, continually delayed elections are likely to of Hamas’s takeover. While corruption is a charge generally erode public support for democracy in the Palestinian ter- levied against Fatah, the tunnel economy in Gaza has raised ritories. Independent, democratic voices within Palestinian charges of Hamas corruption as well. Moreover, the distribu- society increasingly regard delaying elections as an acceptable tion of $4.5 billion pledged by the international community outcome. The Palestinian polity has begun to lose faith in elec- for Gaza reconstruction, will not be distributed as long as tions as an institution. As one independent observer pointed Hamas remains in power there. As such, it is uncertain that out, the Palestinian territories are perhaps the only place in the votes from Gaza would go overwhelmingly to Hamas. world where leaders are democratically elected under occupation and then subject to international approval. Prospects for Least Likely Scenario: Unilateral Elections in the Long the growth of a democratic political culture in the Palestin- Run ian territories seem to be dwindling, and potential alternatives While few Palestinians support separate elections in Gaza and could well include renewed violent resistance or the loss of the West Bank, such a scenario will become increasingly plau- 12 hope in statehood for the Palestinian people. sible if Fatah and Hamas fail to reconcile. Senior Fatah representatives took great pains to stress that this scenario is out of Likely Scenario: Reconciliation and Elections in the the question, but persistent rumors in Ramallah and Jerusa- Medium Term lem suggest that some members of Abbas’s inner circle favor In the medium term, it is likely that elections will be held holding elections in the West Bank and East Jerusalem only. If throughout the Palestinian territories. Presumably this would intra-Palestinian discord persists, Fatah may come under pres- be the result of some sort of reconciliation agreement between sure to call for elections at a certain point, either because the Hamas and Fatah. If such an agreement were reached, elec- 74 year-old Abbas’s term has lapsed for too long or because he tions that involve both parties and take place in the West leaves office. PA leadership may also decide it needs electoral Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem would probably require U.S. legitimacy to effectively negotiate with Israel. pressure on Israel, as Israel is highly reluctant to allow Hamas to repeat its 2006 victory. Under this scenario, a series of con- Some independent observers suggested that under such a sce- fidence-building measures would be required before elections nario, Fatah leadership might convince several West Bank- could be held. based Hamas members to run as independent opposition candidates on a PLO list, to give the election the veneer of While few support separate Gaza and West inclusiveness. Since the election would generate widespread Bank elections, such a scenario will become criticism, it is also unclear whether smaller parties, includ- increasingly plausible if Fatah and Hamas ing independents and those in the PLO loosely affiliated with fail to reconcile. Hamas, would participate.

In the absence of reconciliation, elections in all parts of the Many believe that separate elections would Palestinian territories might occur in the context of a peace solidify internal divisions and reduce the agreement with Israel. If a draft agreement between the PLO likelihood of a unified Palestinian state. and the Israelis were reached and elections were held in the same timeframe, such elections would be perceived as a refer- The decision to hold elections under these circumstances could endum on the peace process. This would encourage Israel to incite violence. Hamas or other Gaza-based groups could ac- help facilitate elections within the West Bank and East Jerusa- tivate their networks in the West Bank to interrupt voting to lem, and would also make it very difficult for Hamas or other delegitimize the elections. They might also launch rockets into domestic actors to impede elections.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Game Changers

Given the bleak political landscape, it is unlikely that Party Congress. A Fatah split could be advantageous elections will take place in the immediate future. The for the younger, more grassroots segments of Fatah best chance for reconciliation and elections is thus because they would be able to disassociate them- that an unexpected event dramatically changes the selves from Fatah’s history of corruption and inef- situation on the ground. The following game chang- fectual negotiations. Such coalitions would likely be ers are not likely but possible: able to translate their increased popularity into electoral gains. Change in the status of the peace process: Since the erosion of Palestinian support for Fatah is linked in Change in control of Gaza: Hamas may eventually part to the failure of the peace process, meaningful decide that it no longer wants the liability of ruling progress in negotiations would seriously strengthen Gaza. If the tunnel economy broke down, for example, Fatah’s position, at the expense of Hamas. If Fatah Hamas would find itself starved of both a financial life- were able to gain concessions from Israel through line for itself and a humanitarian lifeline for its peo- negotiations, Hamas’s strategy of Islamic resistance ple. It could face similar calculations if Israel launched would be called into question, which would decrease another war on Gaza. If the situation in Gaza becomes support for violence among the Palestinian people truly intolerable, Hamas may step aside to allow the and potentially force the group to participate in the PA to reassume control, likely through elections. political process. This would make both Fatah and Is- 13 rael more willing to hold elections, and it would be dif- End of Gaza Siege: If Israel decided to end its siege of ficult for Hamas to boycott such a scenario. Gaza, it would be seen as a huge political victory for Hamas. However, a gradual easing of the blockade tied The release of Marwan Barghouti: If Marwan Bargh- to political steps could also be a powerful incentive to outi were released from prison—perhaps as part of a encourage more moderation among Hamas’s leaders deal to free captured Israeli solider Gilad Shalit—and and give them more political space to be able to rec- began to play a major role in Palestinian politics, he oncile with Fatah and carry out elections throughout might be able to precipitate a reconciliation agree- the Palestinian territories. ment. Barghouti’s reputation is more conciliatory towards Hamas than other Fatah figures who came to Change in Hamas Leadership: If Hamas’s leadership power through the Sixth Party Congress. Because he changed, the group’s position toward both negotia- has been in prison since the beginning of the decade, tions with Israel and its position vis-à-vis Fatah would Barghouti is not identified with the stigmas of corrup- likely evolve. Such a policy shift would be more pro- tion or failed negotiations that are attached to other nounced if the external political leaders—notably senior Fatah members. Khaled Meshal in Damascus—changed, since Hamas’s external leadership is more dogmatic than policymak- Split within Fatah: Stagnation on reconciliation, a ers in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel’s history of tar- push towards elections, or Abbas’s departure could geted assassinations makes such a scenario possible, cause a formal split within Fatah. It might not even especially given the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah take such a dramatic event to split Fatah, since some member Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus. If the new powerful, but relatively independent, members of Fa- Hamas leadership was more willing to compromise tah are not fully comfortable with the Fatah Executive with Fatah, the likelihood of reconciliation and elec- Committee that was elected at this summer’s Sixth tions would increase.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 southern Israel, causing the Israelis to rethink their support for tant factions may form a more extreme breakaway organiza- elections in the West Bank. Factional violence could also affect tion that would not be restrained by Hamas’s political wing. voter turnout, which would most likely be low in this scenario Hamas would likely be moderated, however, by inclusion in because the vast majority of Palestinians view elections with- the Palestinian government. Therefore, the international com- out Gaza as inherently illegitimate. munity should agree to recognize any elected Palestinian government that accepts the Quartet Conditions, and ignore the Although both parties would consolidate their power through positions of political parties. separate elections, both would also lose legitimacy and key support in the Arab world and among the Palestinian people. Effect: This conditional recognition agreement would ac- Since the PA would be the first to call elections as the official complish two primary objectives. First, it would empower the governing body, the majority of the blame would likely fall on political factions of Hamas that are currently more interested Fatah. The current members of the CEC, which is universally in retaining some amount of political power than in pursu- regarded as independent and highly professional, would prob- ing armed resistance at all costs. Such a policy would provide ably not provide support to elections that were held in only Hamas the political cover to effectively accept the Quartet part of the Palestinian territories. A new CEC would therefore Conditions without actually incurring the political liability of have to be appointed, further tarnishing the legitimacy of the making a statement to this effect. Second, a public statement elections. along these lines would address one of the major mental blocks to reconciliation, namely the sense among actors that recon- The consequences of partial elections are likely to be severe. ciliation is pointless if any new government is not going to be Many believe that separate elections would solidify internal di- acknowledged by the international community. visions and reduce the likelihood of a unified Palestinian state. This would entrench the bifurcation of Palestinian politics, as If Hamas accepts the Quartet Conditions, Fatah would effectively cede Gaza to Hamas while consolidat- its more militant factions may form a more 14 ing its power in the West Bank. In such a scenario, Hamas has indicated that it would follow Fatah’s example by holding its extreme breakaway organization that would own elections in Gaza. not be restrained by Hamas’s political wing.

Recommendations Once a reconciliation agreement is signed, this policy will effectively require Hamas candidates to accept that they must International actors are capable of taking actions to encourage respect previous PA government agreements, and to campaign or undermine reconciliation efforts. Although it is impossible on ways to work within the system to affect change. Thus, to foresee all potential challenges, we believe certain policies without explicitly requiring candidates to sign an agreement will greatly enhance the chances of arriving at a feasible and recognizing the Quartet Conditions, this policy manages to strong reconciliation agreement that will establish a founda- limit party platforms and reassure international actors as to the tion for elections. These recommendations will not only en- intentions of any elected government. hance the prospects that a reconciliation agreement is signed, but also create an environment conducive to the implemen- 2. Strengthen the CEC and expand its mandate. tation of such an agreement, which would pave the way for elections. The CEC is widely respected among Palestinians, regardless of their political affiliations or backgrounds. However, the CEC 1. The international community should agree to commissioners and staff members view the CEC’s mandate as recognize the Palestinian government if it accepts the limited and are reluctant to become too involved in the politi- Quartet Conditions, regardless of the positions of cal process for fear of seeming biased. The limited responsibili- individual political parties. ties of the CEC underutilize this valuable resource, which is one of the few institutions in the Palestinian territories that is Israel and many members of the international community perceived as an honest broker by all parties. As such, the CEC will not recognize a Hamas-led Palestinian government until could potentially play a much larger role in promoting recon- Hamas accepts the Quartet Conditions. However, this would ciliation between the West Bank and Gaza, although such a be politically difficult for Hamas because it would mean losing role should not extend beyond issues pertaining to elections. some key supporters without receiving any tangible gains. If Hamas were to accept the Quartet Conditions, its more mili-

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Given the current lack of trust between the parties, any future under 30.15 Apart from the 2006 elections, young Palestinians elections are likely to generate new challenges for the CEC. have little experience with the democratic process and many Specific policies to enhance the CEC’s capabilities in advance do not appreciate its potential benefits. The CEC could use of elections include: funds to sponsor voter education programs targeting leaders in high schools and universities throughout the Palestinian ter- Provide financial support for full-time electoral ritories to both highlight the potential for Palestinian elections commissioners. Currently, all CEC commissioners serve and bridge gaps between Hamas and Fatah supporters. in a part-time capacity, and this limits their involvement in the current negotiations. The lack of full-time commission- Effect: During the negotiations over any reconciliation agree- ers could also make it difficult for the CEC to respond ef- ment, the CEC could work with international electoral or- fectively to complaints of campaign restrictions, voter registry ganizations to anticipate challenges that might arise during fraud, or voter intimidation, all of which are likely to be bigger the electoral period and find ways to address these potential problems than in the past due to the lack of trust between the problems in the reconciliation document. The CEC could also parties. Providing the funding to pay commissioners to work help facilitate a discussion about the electoral system to en- full time would increase the capacity to engage in reconcilia- sure both sides understand the implications of their decisions tion discussions and address unanticipated problems that may vis-à-vis this process. Following the signing of a reconciliation arise during the implementation phase of any agreement. If agreement, a stronger CEC would be better able to serve as a commissioners became full-time CEC officials, it is important mediator in electoral disputes that arise during the implemen- that they remain non-partisan, widely respected members of tation phase. The CEC would also be better equipped to use society. traditional challenges to resolve individual complaints regarding actions by one party that might infringe on a free electoral Provide training to CEC officials about how they can environment, such as voter suppression or intimidation. assist with electoral system debates in the Palestinian territories. CEC officials could educate the political parties 3. Encourage parties to build trust and create an 15 about the advantages and disadvantages of different electoral environment conducive to legitimate elections. systems to ensure that parties understand the implications of any reconciliation agreement. Developing this capacity within Once a reconciliation agreement is signed, it will be essential the CEC may also allow the CEC to play a more active role in that both domestic and international actors take steps to fa- future attempts to reform the electoral system, thus increasing cilitate the implementation of such an agreement by support- the legitimacy of future reforms. ing confidence-building measures between the parties. Hamas representatives outlined several possible ways to build trust Provide technical assistance to the CEC to anticipate in the interim period between the signing of a reconciliation and respond to challenges that arise during the agreement and elections, which would presumably be incor- implementation of a reconciliation agreement. Given the porated into an eventual reconciliation deal. unstable political context, it is likely that new challenges will arise during the implementation of any reconciliation agree- Release political prisoners on both sides. During the con- ment. Technical assistance to anticipate such problems, de- flict in 2007, a number of Fatah members were arrested by velop policy solutions, and build the skill set to respond ef- the Hamas security service while many Hamas officials were fectively to them will leverage the CEC’s unbiased reputation arrested by the PA security forces. A first step in building con- to create a more stable electoral context. In particular, inter- fidence and demonstrating goodwill between both sides would national actors should help the CEC develop the capacity to be to release some or all of these political prisoners who have monitor and address potential violations of the reconciliation been incarcerated since 2007. agreement that directly impact elections, such as voter suppression and intimidation, candidate and campaigning restric- Rehire civil service party-members who lost their jobs. In tions, and election day security. the West Bank, over 1,200 Hamas-affiliated civil service employees lost their jobs after the split, while in Gaza, numerous Provide funding for a youth voter education program. Fatah-affiliated officials were dismissed. Planning and imple- According to a 2007 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics menting a policy to integrate the two sets of civil service em- report, 56 percent of Palestinians in the Palestinian territories ployees and compensate those who lost their jobs in 2007 will are under 19, and in Gaza 76 percent of the population are 15 ”Years of Strife and Lost Hope Scar Young Palestinians,” The New York Times, 12 March 2007.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 help build a unified bureaucracy that can function under the Given the role of the security forces in the 2007 split, it will be next elected government. essential for Fatah and Hamas to find an acceptable way to reintegrate the security services in the West Bank and Gaza. This Reinstate suspended university and civil society activities. challenge is confounded by the fact that international actors, Both Hamas and Fatah have political and social networks that in particular Israel and the United States, are likely to oppose extend to universities and NGOs. The political climate since the integration of Hamas members into the U.S.-trained NSF. 2006 has not allowed either group’s organizations to operate However, the U.S. military recently overcame a similar chal- openly in zones of the other’s political control. Hamas, for ex- lenge during the Anbar Awakening, when insurgent groups ample, claims that it members have been harassed and that its switched loyalties and joined the Iraqi Army. These former in- institutions have been impeded from functioning over 30,000 surgents were separated and placed piecemeal into larger Iraqi times since 2006.16 Allowing some of these groups to resume Army units, preventing them from reconstituting and pos- their activities would build confidence between the parties. ing a threat. The United States would normally be adamantly opposed to any policy that would require cooperation with Find a third party to ensure compliance and verify the Hamas, a group it considers a terrorist organization. However, electoral climate. The most essential component of confi- the United States (and Israel) would likely be more amenable dence building is to establish a framework for overseeing the to this type of reintegration if it is framed as a strategy based implementation of such agreements and providing a way for on a recent American military success. parties to present infractions in a productive manner. Although the CEC will likely have some capacity to assist with this en- Effect: The ultimate goal of the reintegration of the security deavor, it would be beneficial to seek monitoring assistance services is to create a national security structure that is loyal to from an international body such as the Arab League as well as a the PA and its institutions rather than either political party. respected international NGO like the Carter Center. Accord- For this reason, it will be essential to have policies that allow ing to Hamas officials, if such a party declared the political the United States and Jordan to continue to train NSF offi- 16 environment suitable for elections, it would reassure all actors cers and help the NSF develop policies that professionalize the that elections were likely to be transparent and legitimate. service. Integrating units and restricting membership to individuals without major transgressions will allow international Effect: Establishing and effectively implementing mechanisms actors to continue to provide some assistance to the security for confidence-building between Hamas and Fatah will ensure service while also creating a force that is viewed as a legitimate that when elections are actually held, it will be very difficult for representative of the state, rather than one political party. either party to reject the outcome as fraudulent. Additionally, voter participation is likely to be higher if Palestinians believe Conclusion the electoral context will allow them to vote for whichever party or candidate they prefer without suffering harassment The current political context makes 2010 legislative and presi- or intimidation. Overall, a stable electoral environment makes dential elections uncertain, undesired by most parties, and it more likely that all Palestinians, including members of both inadvisable. While elections at some future point do provide Fatah and Hamas, will accept the outcome as legitimate. hope and a means toward creating a unified Palestinian state, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas is a prerequisite to elections that will be viewed as legitimate. In order to develop 4. Encourage parties to reintegrate the security forces the necessary confidence-building measures like the integra- in a manner acceptable to both domestic actors and the tion of security services, political party dialogue, transparency, international community. and credibility with the Palestinian people, months or even years will likely be necessary to reestablish the democratic political culture whose foundation is in the process of eroding. Given the recent success of integrating Sunni The overriding desire for statehood and the reputation and ef- insurgents into the Iraqi Army, a similar fectiveness of the CEC contribute to better prospects for fu- method of reintegrating Hamas into the NSF ture elections, but energy and incentives need to be applied in might be acceptable to Israel and the United order to overcome the worrying deadlock that persists. Pro- States. active measures by the PA, political parties, NGOs, IOs, the Israeli government, and international actors are necessary to bring about real change. Without sustained efforts and sub- stantive reconciliation, the prospects for a democratic and uni- 16 “Where is Hamas in the West Bank?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009. fied Palestinian state seem bleak indeed.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 III. Postwar Elections in Sri Lanka: A Pathway to Peace?

Introduction Figure 1.Data from the 1981 Sri Lanka Census; Graphics from the Princeton GIS Library, 2009. With the recent military defeat of the LTTE, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads; it can either continue with the divisive status quo, or it can move toward a more inclusive society. With Presidential and Parliamentary elections scheduled for early 2010, either of these outcomes is possible. Without making substantial changes to the political environment, the elections could serve to further entrench the current political players, and the concerns of minorities, particularly Tamils, will be minimally considered. However, if the Sri Lankan government makes efforts to strengthen the rule of law and works to establish a more inclusive system, elections can be a solid first step toward national reconciliation and the creation of lasting peace in the country.

This report analyzes the current political context, examines challenges to free and fair elections and the establishment of an inclusive political system, proposes likely electoral scenarios, and recommends actions that can be taken to help create an enabling environment for participatory elections in Sri Lanka. 17

Background and Historical Context

Demographics of Sri Lanka According to the latest inclusive census for Sri Lanka, conducted in 1981, the country’s population is 74 percent Sinhalese, 13 percent Sri Lankan Tamil, 6 percent Indian Tamil,17and 7 percent Sri Lankan Moor.18 The vast majority Overview of the Conflict in Sri Lanka of Sinhalese only speak Sinhala, while the vast majority of For more than 25 years, there was armed conflict between the Tamils only speak Tamil. The differences in religion, ethnic- Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), which is majority-Sinha- ity, and language between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have lese, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Tam- only exacerbated the conflict in the country over the last three il group that fought an insurgency for the establishment of an decades. In the past, the substantial Sri Lankan Tamil minority independent state for the Tamil minority in the northern and has been in a position in which it could swing elections, mak- eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Over the course of the conflict, ing their vote very important. It is possible that this will also LTTE terrorists carried out suicide attacks and bombed public be the case in the 2010 elections. buildings, transportation hubs, Buddhist temples and other public locations. Meanwhile, the GoSL was accused of kill- ings, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, denial of fair public trials, and infringements of freedom of movement, all of which appeared to be directed toward Tamil communities.19 Both the GoSL and LTTE have been criticized for their 17 Indian Tamils are partly descended from workers sent from South abuse of human rights. India to Sri Lanka by the British in the 19th and 20th centuries to work on coffee, tea and rubber plantations. Department of Census and Statistics - Sri Lanka, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/home.asp The LTTE, in part fearing increased American support of the 18 The 1981 Census is used for this report because of the government GoSL’s counterterrorism activities in the wake of September of Sri Lanka’s inability to conduct a safe and accurate census in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which have, until recently, been under the control of the LTTE. Department of Census and Statistics - Sri 19 “Report to Congress on Incidents During the Recent Conflict in Lanka, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/home.asp Sri Lanka,” U.S. State Department, October 2009.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 11, 2001, signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government Figure 2: The Constitutional Council in 2002. Negotiations soon began for a political solution to Ten-Member Constitutional Council the conflict. However, when President Mahinda Rajapaksa (Not Active) came to power in 2006, he stated that eliminating the LTTE was the only solution to end ethnic conflict in the country. 5 Appointed by Parliament When further peace talks were scheduled in June 2006, the LTTE refused to meet directly with the government officials 1 Appointed by the President and the negotiations broke down. In 2006, the LTTE pulled out of peace talks indefinitely. By early 2008, the GoSL had 1 Leader of the Opposition withdrawn from the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement. The GoSL began a full-scale military campaign in the LTTE-controlled 1 The Prime Minister areas, successfully recapturing control by April 2009. Open 1 Ex-Officio Speaker of the House hostilities came to an end shortly after the founder and leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed by the Sri 1 Representative of Minority Parties Lankan Army on May 17, 2009, and the GoSL declared military victory over the LTTE. Commissioner of the Department of Elections to remain at his Constitutional Reforms in Sri Lanka post and granted to him many of the powers and responsibili- The constitution of Sri Lanka has been amended 17 times ties of the Election Commission under the 17th Amendment since its adoption in 1978. The most controversial changes until a formal commission is established. This commission pertinent to elections are the 13th and 17th Amendments. can only be appointed by the Constitutional Council. Dif- ferent political actors have cited the unwillingness of other In 1987, the 13th Amendment established Tamil as a “nation- political parties to establish the Constitutional Council and 18 al” language and English as a “link” language (while maintain- subsequently appointing an Elections Commission. Some of ing Sinhala as the “official” language of Sri Lanka). More im- these same political players have suggested that the GoSL has portantly, the 13th Amendment created provisions to devolve no interest in establishing an Elections Commission, as it will authority from the central government to the provincial level constrain the ruling party’s ability to employ state resources with impunity. and create mechanisms for accountability on the local level. Provincial councils have been established and elected through- In 2005, the terms of the Council expired, and as of this writ- out the country, but the central government has been slow ing, no official nominees have been put forward by the Parlia- to hand over local control of resources to these bodies. Many ment or the President to fill the vacancies. The appointments who criticize the 13th Amendment fear that full devolution of to the National Police and Public Service Commissions have powers to the provincial level will embolden Tamil separatists also lapsed, and the current Commissioner of Elections has in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. surpassed the age of compulsory retirement.21

In 2001, the 17th Amendment created a Constitutional Coun- Political Context cil charged with the responsibility to appoint independent commissions to oversee major government operations. The The end of the war has been marked by a mixture of relief amendment was drafted in an attempt to reduce Presidential and euphoria among the public. A considerable segment of patronage and the politicization of government institutions by the public supports the military, the current President, and the calling for the establishment of several independent commis- ruling party for having accomplished a task that was consid- sions. Among these were the Election Commission, the Public ered impossible by most. The military defeat of the LTTE has 20 Service Commission, and the National Police Commission. negatively affected a majority of the public’s views on creating a path to sustainable peace through concessions or power- After appointments to the Constitutional Council were made, sharing. Many people believe that because the LTTE has been the body established the country’s first Police and Public Ser- eliminated, there is no need for further dialogue. vice Commissions, but it never established the Election Com- mission. Instead, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ordered the

20 The other commissions that would be created by the 17th Amendment include: the Human Rights Commission, the Bribery and Corruption Commission, the Finance Commission, and the 21 Conversation with Commissioner of Elections, November 5, Delimitation Commission. 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Furthermore, the system of government is structured to fa- “In the villages, they don’t mind vor incumbents by providing them with extraordinary powers [Rajapaksa]. There’s a sense that he’s one of and direct control over state resources. Many incumbents will us.” -Civil Society Member, Colombo often misuse state resources, both financial and institutional, to assist their campaign efforts and for their own benefit. The most egregious method by which they wield this power is by There is also an inability on the part of the majority to dif- preventing opposition parties from campaigning in designated ferentiate between the separatist goals of the LTTE and the areas.22 legitimate demands made by the Tamil minority for political and personal freedoms and greater integration into the system “Democracy was bestowed on us. We of power. Tamil demands for greater say in the government are didn’t fight for it. So voting is viewed as viewed as milder versions of the separatists’ demands, and are a responsibility as a good citizen, not a unacceptable to the Sinhalese majority. The popular belief is right.” – Representative of the National that peace has already been achieved through the defeat of the Peace Council LTTE, and that collaboration with minorities is unnecessary. This could have ramifications during the elections, as the concerns of the Tamils may not be considered, serving to further Ruling Party Interests exclude them from the political process. The current president, the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), has been criticized for consolidating his power Despite the lack of enthusiasm among the majority to estab- by placing relatives and trusted friends in key positions of lish dialogue or successful reintegration of minorities, there power. He has gained considerable popularity among the Bud- is a sincere desire for sustainable peace. Such peace can be dhist Sinhalese majority by continuing to espouse Buddhist- achieved if the political context of the military defeat of the Sinhalese nationalist rhetoric and refraining from making LTTE is allowed to fade, and the majority of Sri Lankans real- meaningful conciliatory gestures towards the Tamil minorities. 19 ize that further marginalization of minorities will only increase The main aim of the SLFP is to secure the Buddhist Sinhalese resentment, which could lead to a fresh wave of violence in vote before the upcoming Presidential elections. As the largest the future. Long-term peace can be established only through voter bloc, the party that is able to attract a significant major- political participation and equitable representation facilitated ity of the Buddhist Sinhalese vote is most likely to win the by a free and fair electoral process. elections.

Political Culture President Rajapaksa has claimed that he wants to abolish the Executive Presidency and replace it with an Executive Prime Minister with strong powers and no term limits. In order to “Being a politician is lucrative.” bring about these changes, the SLFP requires a 2/3 majority in —Civil society member, Kandy the new parliament so that they can amend the constitution. Such a majority can only be obtained by a spectacular success at the polls, successful political coalitions, or buying the al- Sri Lankan politics are dominated by two major political par- legiance of opposition members. ties and several strong personalities. Policy positions are sec- ondary to the personality of political leaders and regional, ethnic and religious linkages. Politicians operate through a de facto system of patronage in which they use state resources and the power of their offices to sanction development projects, provide jobs, and facilitate legal and illegal activities of their supporters. In a country with pervasive poverty and corruption, personal linkages with politicians are often a reliable way to access resources. This undermines the democratic process, 22 This was seen in the Jaffna municipal elections in 2009, in which travel to Jaffna was restricted to officials until just before the elections. but it is a generally accepted political paradigm among the This gave an unfair advantage to the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) people, and there is little pressure from any source to change and its associated Tamil party, Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), by preventing other parties from being able to campaign until it. the last minute. People’s Action for Free and Fair Election, “PAFFREL Election Day Report: Provincial Council Elections for Uva Province and Local Government Elections for Jaffna Municipal Council and Vavuniya Urban Council,” August 8, 2009.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Figure 3: Chart of major political parties and stances during the 2010 election litical solution to the north.23 Ironically, given his noted views on Sinhalese nationalism, Other SLFP UNP TNA his entrance into the election and subsequent Parties splitting of the Sinhalese vote may end up em- Presidential powering the Tamil minority, giving it a voice Candidate Selection it did not expect to have in the presidential Abolition of election. Executive Presidency 17th Amendment All opposition parties agree that the Execu- Implementation tive Presidency should be abolished and that 13th Amendment the 17th Amendment be implemented. The Implementation 17th Amendment was enacted by a UNP-controlled parliament in 2001. The opposition be- 2/3 Majority lieves that enacting this amendment will curb the powers of the Executive President and will Foreign and Anti Pro Pro Varies level the playing field for the opposition, al- Economic Policy West West West lowing free and fair elections without the mis- NO YES use of state resources.

Opposition Interests “This Constitution has to be changed There is lack of a cohesive and powerful opposition that can because it kicks the citizen in the present a serious challenge to the present government. The back.” –Journalist, Colombo 20 United National Party (UNP) has historically been the major opposition to the SLFP, but it does not currently enjoy the same level of popularity among voters as the ruling party. In Tamil and Minority Interests 2005, the UNP was widely expected to win the Presidency if Given the demographics of the country and electoral process, the Tamil community gave them their full support. Instead, it is unlikely that candidates from the Tamil, Muslim or other they were narrowly defeated at the polls due to an LTTE-led minority groups will claim the office of the Executive President boycott of the elections. anytime in the near future. A strong and powerful Executive President from the dominant majority is not in the interest of A coalition of the UNP, the Muslim Congress and several the minority communities, so they support the abolition of other parties (notably, not the Tamil National Alliance) came the office of Executive President in favor of a Prime Minister together in November 2009 to build a credible opposition to controlled by Parliament. the SLFP. The UNP, having failed to find a strong presidential candidate from among its own ranks, decided to support Minority groups are also demanding the implementation of the candidacy of General Sarath Fonseka, the nominee of the the 17th Amendment in order to bring impartiality to the Marxist People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukti Peramu- electoral system, bureaucracy, judiciary and law enforcement na, or JVP). The JVP is not a member of the UNP coalition. agencies. By placing key functions of government under the General Fonseka was the military leader who developed the impartial control of civil servants rather than politicians driven successful strategy that led to the defeat of the LTTE, and is by the desire to please the Sinhalese majority, minorities are seen as the only person who can challenge Rajapaksa for the likely to see more representation of their interests in policies nationalist Sinhalese vote. from the government and have better access to resources.

General Fonseka is said to hold ultra-nationalist views and a “We need our status to be protected.” staunch allegiance to the Buddhist Sinhalese concept of na- tionhood. Given his beliefs and his role in the civilian casual- –Tamil, Colombo ties following the defeat of the LTTE, the Tamil parties have stated in the past that they will not support him. Fonseka, 23 General Fonseka has promised to “dismantle high security zones in the north, expedite resettlement, and consider a political however, has begun to realize the importance of the Tamil solution to the north,” and has won over some members of the Tamil vote, and has begun to court it actively, even considering a po- National Alliance, though as of writing, he had not earned an official endorsement. “Sri Lanka: Concern Grows Over IDP Voting Rights,” IRIN News, January 11, 2010.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 The minority groups, particularly the Tamils, are politically divided. They lack a cohesive political voice that can become a “The democratic institutions are powerful advocate for minority interests. Currently, the largest not working.” –UNP leader Ranil Tamil voice in parliament is represented by the Tamil National Wickremesinghe Alliance, a loose coalition of Tamil political parties. The Alli- ance is simply an association and has no political organization, Emergency Powers no unified voice, nor any unified policy platform on matters Article 155 of the Constitution includes the Public Security pertaining to the Tamil community. The Eelam People’s Dem- Ordinance, which provides the legal basis for the declaration ocratic Party (EPDP), another Tamil political party, is allied of a state of emergency in the interest of public security. It with the SLFP, and is not viewed by many Tamils as represent- empowers the President to make emergency regulations and ing their interests. provides individuals acting under the emergency regulations immunity from prosecution except with the consent of the At- Minority groups, especially Tamils, also seek the implementa- torney General. Regulations under the Ordinance may over- tion of the 13th Amendment, which will guarantee greater au- ride all existing law except provisions of the Constitution. tonomy and control over resources to local governments and local representatives of the people. They believe that this will Since independence, emergency regulations have been imple- be a crucial step toward allowing minorities more influence on mented on various occasions. The most important of these the local administration of resources. regulations are the Emergency Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers Regulations (EMPPR), providing, inter alia, detention The Tamil Diaspora is well-connected to the Sri Lankan Tamil without charge or trial on renewable detention orders. community,24 and can be expected to remain influential in se- cessionist politics despite the defeat of the LTTE. Many in The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 (PTA) has also been the Tamil Diaspora seek to establish a Tamil homeland de- widely used, which provides for the detention for up to 18 spite having no intention of returning to Sri Lanka. While not months, without trial or access to lawyers or relatives, of indi- 21 all in the Diaspora are supportive of the LTTE, the Diaspora viduals suspected of a wide range of offenses including murder, served as the main source of funding and arms supplies for the kidnapping, criminal intimidation, robbery of state property, LTTE during the civil war. Members of the Diaspora are scat- possession of unlicensed weapons, incitement to communal tered throughout the world, but are especially concentrated disharmony, mutilation of street signs, and other such offens- in Canada, the U.S., and the U.K., where some have “con- es. After the military defeat of the LTTE, the Government still gresses” to meet and discuss the future of Tamils. They are also maintains a state of emergency, with the Parliament renewing very effective at using media (predominantly websites) to pass the provisions every month. The Government’s stated reasons their messages and attract supporters and funding for their for doing so are the continued threat of terrorism, residual causes. Depending on how the Diaspora reacts in the wake LTTE extremists, and the incomplete investigations of detain- of the LTTE defeat, it could prove to be a spoiler to peace in ees. As a result, human rights violations and restrictions on the future. civil liberties continue. These include: freedom of speech and expression; freedom to travel, particularly to the north; access Other Domestic Concerns to information; and a fair implementation of the rule of law.

Beyond the political context and the interests of stakeholders, Domestic Civil Society and Media there are other domestic concerns that have also played a sig- A large body of domestic civil society organizations is mak- nificant role in the way elections are conducted in Sri Lanka: ing valuable contributions to social and political development namely, the indefinite prolongation of emergency powers, the in the country. Over a dozen private media outlets, including restrictions and controls placed upon domestic civil society television and radio stations and print media, are active in the and the news media, and the poor level of integration of mi- country. Despite this, Sri Lanka’s civil society has been vastly norities into Sri Lankan society. restricted and weakened by political patronage and the government’s emergency restrictions. The government has historically sought to bring domestic and international NGOs under tight state control. This has caused many NGOs to tread carefully for fear of retribution, and excessive threats have caused some international NGOs to leave the country altogether.25 24 Many families in the North rely on foreign remittances to make 25 Information obtained from interviews with local civil society ends meet. organizations in Sri Lanka.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 diciary, and all security forces. One of the main challenges to “Emergency powers give full and this goal is language. Sinhalese and Tamils, in general, do not unquestioned authority to the security speak each other’s languages. Since the official administrative forces to intimidate, question and language is Sinhala, there is a sense of tacit exclusion of Tamils detain people. The ramifications are from the government system. that, under such a tightly-controlled situation, it is very hard to have Internally displaced persons (IDPs) also pose a challenge to reconciliation in the post-war period. As a result of the recent transparency in any meaningful escalation of military operations by the GoSL that led to the way.”—Staffer of a Member of military defeat of the LTTE, more than 300,000 Tamils were Parliament, Colombo driven out from their homes in northern part of the country, and collected in IDP camps. More than half of the IDPs have been resettled so far. While the government intended to re- Many people from the civil society, including media organi- settle the remainder by January 2010, this was not achieved; zations, civil society organizations, think tanks, and political approximately 90,000 remain in camps at the time of writ- parties expressed frustration with the current situation, and ing.26 The Elections Department says that polling stations will told us that the execution of the emergency powers by the be set up inside the camps so that voters in the camps can government creates severe and deliberate impediments to their participate in the Presidential elections. The question that re- efforts. mains is whether the few IDPs who have registered to vote and have been resettled will be able to do so, as many have not received their voting cards. The Elections Commissioner “If your reports favor the Government, has stated that provisions will be made to facilitate voting for you are given good access to these populations. 22 information and get to travel freely to the north [Jaffna], but if you happen Role of the International Community to criticize government activities, you are denied access to information, Relative to many other developing countries, the international community plays a minor role in Sri Lanka, particularly with are restricted in your travels, even regard to elections. The international community does, how- face threats and intimidation.”- Sri ever, have significant economic influence, which it could use Lankan Journalist, Colombo to encourage the Sri Lankan government to respond to governance needs.

In June 2009, the Sri Lankan government reactivated the Sri The European Union (EU): The EU arguably has more in- Lanka Press Council Act of 1973, allowing stringent control fluence in Sri Lanka than most because it is the largest im- over the media. Although the reinstatement of the Act received porter of Sri Lankan goods.27 This is in part due to Sri Lan- criticism from opposition parties and media groups, it remains ka’s qualification for Generalized System of Preferences Plus in effect. This has led to severely restricted public access to (GSP+) status. Under GSP+, Sri Lanka enjoys reduced tariffs information, and journalists often censor their work to avoid on its exports to EU markets provided that it uses raw materi- being targeted. Journalists discussed the prevalence of “White als from EU countries when producing such goods. Van Syndrome,” referring to cases where reporters who openly criticized the government have been kidnapped by unidenti- Recently, however, the EU threatened to disqualify Sri Lanka fied men, allegedly working for the government, in white vans. from GSP+ status because of concerns about human rights violations, IDPs and lack of media freedom. The EU is expected Minority Inclusion to provide the GoSL with an outline of actions to take in order The military conflict against the LTTE has ended, but the un- to be able to maintain or regain preferential status. The GoSL, derlying grievances of minority exclusion in the socio-political however, is concerned about whether the EU’s recommenda- sphere that led to the open conflict have yet to be addressed. tions will be politically feasible to domestic constituencies. If the government hopes to establish lasting peace, it must 26 “Sri Lanka: Concern Grows over IDP Voting Rights.” IRIN News, consider the integration of minority groups in the education January 11, 2010. system, local and federal civil service, the Parliament, the Ju- 27 EU Director General for Trade, “Sri Lanka: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,” September 22, 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Japan: Japan is the single largest aid donor to Sri Lanka, chan- about the status of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka due to the neling millions of dollars in the form of grants and loans into Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu state. It is alleged that the Indian the island each year. In addition, Japan provides technical as- Government had turned a blind eye to the LTTE’s access to sistance packages to Sri Lanka.28 Japan and Sri Lanka enjoy support lines from Tamil Nadu in the past. cordial relations due to their shared Buddhist religious and cultural values, which may contribute to some hesitation on Over 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees currently live in the part of Japan to take a stronger position against the current Tamil Nadu, 73,000 of them in refugee camps.31 Now that administration’s human rights abuses. In the past, however, Ja- the war against the LTTE is over, India has requested that the pan has played a role in the peace process. GoSL allow repatriation of these refugees. The state of Tamil Nadu has also proposed offering these refugees Indian citizen- China: While GSP+ status is certainly an advantage to Sri ship.32 Lanka, the magnitude of its importance to the country’s exports is debated. It is argued that regardless of what happens United States: As Sri Lanka’s most important single-country with the GSP+ status, China will attempt to sell raw materials market, the U.S. enjoys a reasonable amount of influence with to Sri Lanka at a lower cost than their current sources (both government officials. 33 The two countries maintain normal EU and ASEAN countries29), enabling the country’s garment diplomatic relations and the U.S. provides some economic aid industry to reduce production costs. Therefore, even if the to the island through USAID and its contractors. USAID has preferential status is revoked, Sri Lankan garment exporters funded the computerization of the voter registration system will be able to compete in the European markets. This may be and has provided language training for provincial and local conditioned on opening Sri Lanka to more goods from China; government workers in Sinhala and Tamil.34 however, the resultant influx of cheap Chinese products could serve to undermine the Sri Lankan economy. International and Non-Governmental Organizations: Various international organizations are active in Sri Lanka. A As part of its regional geo-strategic expansion, China is in- handful of United Nations (UN) agencies work in develop- 23 creasingly investing in Sri Lanka. Last July, Sri Lanka granted ment and humanitarian assistance. The UN is often invited China an exclusive economic zone, to be built by a Chinese as an observing organization during elections; however, it has company in Mirigama, near Colombo. China is building a refused the request of the Sri Lankan government to monitor billion-dollar naval port in Hambantota, which it reportedly the presidential elections, citing the short timeframe between plans to use as a refueling and docking station for its navy, as when the election was announced and when it will be held. it patrols the Indian Ocean and protects Chinese shipping.30 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) China has also increased its aid to Sri Lanka and has sold the has been implementing a program to computerize the voter country significant amounts of military equipment. These ac- registry in Sri Lanka. A number of other international orga- tions have been amplified and promoted by the GoSL, which nizations such as the Asia Foundation, CARE International, sees China as a less intrusive partner than the U.S. or the Euro- the Asian Development Bank, and others keep presence in the pean Union. China’s principle of non-interference in the inter- country. Some international organizations, however, have left nal affairs of other countries has meant that Sri Lanka has been Sri Lanka over the past five years due to death threats and able to accept Chinese aid without preconditions—in particu- intimidation. lar, those regarding human rights. This could potentially undermine efforts by Western countries to convince Sri Lanka to improve its human rights record and elections practices.

India: China’s deepening ties with Colombo have stoked concern in India, which fears that Sri Lanka is becoming one more link in a chain of Chinese allies in South Asia that are en- circling India. Historically, relations between New Delhi and Colombo have not been friendly, with India being concerned 31 Matt Wade, “Civilian death toll soars in Sri Lanka.” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 2009. 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Sri Lanka Relations,”http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/srilanka/index.html 32 Matt Wade, “Crisis, what crisis? India stays calm as refugees keep coming,” Sydney Morning Herald, 9 November 2009. 29 A.H.H. Saheed, “Sri Lankan Garment Industry,” Asian Textile Business, 1 January 2007. 33 EU Director General for Trade, “Sri Lanka: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,” September 22, 2009. 30 Sui Noi Goi, “China not planning Sri Lanka naval base.” The Straits Times (Singapore). 24 June 2009. 34 Interview with a contractor for USAID/Sri Lanka.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Challenges Facing Sri Lanka for the Tamil population. The lack of Tamils in the security forces presents a major challenge to keeping the peace in a seg- While the opportunity is ripe for establishing a culture of rec- ment of society that is already distrustful of the government. onciliation in Sri Lanka, several challenges prevent the practice If a majority-Sinhalese security force continues policing Tamil of free and fair elections in the country. regions, their presence may foster resentment or a belief that they are living under indefinite military occupation. The current political system concentrates too much power in the hands of the incumbent authority, regardless of Even though the war has ended, the Government of Sri who is elected to office. Under the current political system, Lanka has yet to restore basic freedoms suspended by the Executive President wields nearly unlimited powers in the past declarations of national emergency. The government form of appointments and the allocation and management curbed basic freedoms of movement and speech during the of state resources. This translates to excessive advantages of war in the interest of national security; however, maintaining politicians’ allies at the national and local levels. In general, these restrictions compromises the prospect of free and fair incumbent politicians enjoy broad access to public resources, elections. Some freedom of movement has been restored with which some exploit to secure votes in the months preceding the opening of the north-south highway; civilians are no lon- and on Election Day. Elections are widely viewed as smooth ger required to carry special documentation to gain passage.36 and uneventful on Election Day only because the damage is It remains to be seen if and how this will impact campaigns in typically done prior to the day of voting. This occurs with rela- the north. A free media is also critical for successful elections; tive impunity due to the lack of transparency and enforcement the current restrictions threaten the media’s ability to provide of the rule of law. Political challengers are at a disadvantage as open, unbiased, and accurate coverage of policy debates perti- a result, impairing the ability to hold truly fair elections.35 nent to the election in addition to Election Day events.

“The Constitution is skewed heavily With the defeat of the LTTE, the Tamil community 24 in favor of politicians and the ruling now lacks any cohesive political force to speak for their interests. party. As citizens, we can’t do things.” For over 25 years, the LTTE sought out and eliminated any alternative source of political leadership among the Journalist, Colombo Tamil community. Now that the LTTE has been defeated and lacks leadership, there is no individual, organization, or insti- There is a lack of democratic principles in the internal tution in the country to speak on behalf of Tamils’ interests. structure of the major political parties. Political parties Tamil political parties are currently fragmented, which makes in Sri Lanka are not required to hold elections for political advocating for a political system that justly incorporates Tamil party leadership, nor are they required to make any other party interests a significant challenge. decisions through democratic methods. Instead, personalities dominate party politics. Party platforms and issue stances are Electoral Scenarios often an afterthought because policies are ultimately decided by the leaders of the party. Those who oppose the leadership The Presidential elections are to take place on January 26, are often coerced, intimidated, or in some cases met with vio- 2010, with Parliamentary elections to follow, no later than lence. The fact that the political institutions that serve as the April 2010. As it stands, there is deep distrust among all par- foundations for Sri Lanka’s democratic culture do not uphold ties; opposition parties are wary that the SLFP will employ democratic principles in their internal structure and decision- public resources when campaigning, gaining unfair advantages making poses a significant challenge to cultivating issue-based that are unchecked by the government system. The SLFP dis- politics and a culture of competing ideas. trusts the UNP’s tactics of splitting the Sinhalese nationalist vote by choosing General Sarath Fonseka as a common presi- Tamils are actively and passively excluded from working dential candidate. The Tamil parties, which are not unified, in state institutions. In Sri Lanka, the vast majority of the are finding their political footing. It is unclear if, as a group, government is staffed by Sinhalese; Tamils are not proportion- they will field a presidential candidate. Both President Raja- ally represented in the civil service, the police or the military, paksa and General Fonseka are courting the Tamil vote, as it making access to government services a significant challenge is now perceived as being able to make the difference, as was 35 For example, in the runup to the 2010 elections, President 36 Dhaneshi Yatawara, “All restrictions on A9 highway lifted,” Rajapaksa issued a text message to every owner of a mobile phone on Sunday Observer, 20 December 2009. There have been accounts that January 1, 2010 with a campaign message. No other candidate was movement is still constrained, as buses are held for up to eight hours by able to use this media to campaign. See “Every Vote Counts Now,” The Sri Lanka Army forces before being allowed to proceed, and travelers Sunday Times, 3 January 2010. are not allowed to leave the buses during this time.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3

• Rajapaksa wins the Presidency • Rajapaksa wins a marginal • Fonseka wins the Presidency • SLFP does not win a 2/3 majority victory and is re-elected • SLFP wins a simple majority in in the Parliament, but builds one • The UNP and its allied parties Parliament after the election win a simple majority in • Executive President remains Parliament • Executive Prime Minister created • 13th Amendment not • 13th and 17th Amendments not • Executive President remains implemented implemented • 13th and 17th Amendments not • 17th Amendment could be implemented implemented

Elections in the North • Elections in North likely to be won by Tamil parties; particularly the Tamil National Alliance and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party. • Presence of the Sri Lanka Army could impact voting and ability of opposition parties to campaign. • Tamil participation will be higher than the 2005 boycotted elections.

projected in 2005. At present, most Tamil National Alliance are not enfranchised in time for the Presidential election, Raja- parliamentarians have pledged their support for Fonseka, al- paksa could win a marginal victory in January. Growing dissat- though one wing of the TNA is advocating a boycott. isfaction with the economy and Fonseka’s endorsement of the UNP could lead the UNP and JVP coalitions to gain a major- Scenario I ity of parliament. Should the UNP assure the TNA that it will 25 Rajapaksa wins the presidency, SLFP does not win a 2/3 work toward a political solution for the Tamils, the TNA may majority in Parliament, but builds one following the join the UNP alliance. In this scenario, Rajapaksa would not election. be likely to end the Executive Presidency, as his party would not control the parliament, and he would not be appointed Given the current political situation in Sri Lanka and the gen- Prime Minister. The UNP is not likely to have enough sup- eral popularity of President Rajapaksa, he has a strong chance port to implement the 13th and 17th Amendments, but may of winning reelection. Rajapaksa has repeatedly stated that bring the issues forward for consideration, particularly if this he anticipates the SLFP will win a 2/3 majority in the Parlia- is a bargaining chip with Tamil groups. 37 Should this scenario mentary election, but the Fall 2009 elections in the Southern occur, it is possible that Rajapaksa would dissolve the parlia- Province, his most significant base of support, indicate that ment after one year and hold another parliamentary election.38 this is unlikely. It is probable that other elected officials will be convinced to join the SLFP coalition after the election, as Scenario III this happened in 2004 with the UNP and smaller parties. This Fonseka wins the presidency, SLFP wins a simple would provide the SLFP coalition with a 2/3 majority that majority in Parliament. could amend the constitution to abolish the Executive Presi- dency and install an Executive Prime Minister. The SLFP is The recent endorsement of General Fonseka from many in the not likely to implement the 13th or the 17th Amendments, Tamil National Alliance could move the presidential election but parliamentarians who join the SLFP coalition to create a in Fonseka’s favor, especially if the Sinhalese nationalist vote is supermajority may be able to negotiate their implementation split evenly between Fonseka and Rajapaksa. The SLFP could as a condition for joining the coalition. rally votes in the months following Fonseka’s election, and could secure a simple majority in Parliament. Without a 2/3 Scenario II majority in the parliament, Fonseka will not want to end the Rajapaksa wins the presidency, UNP and its allied 37 The 17th Amendment was drafted and passed by the Parliament parties win a simple majority in Parliament. on the insistence of minority parliamentarians who joined the UNP coalition, creating a 2/3 majority. With the Sinhalese vote split, a significant proportion of Tam- 38 According to the Constitution, the president of Sri Lanka may dissolve parliament one year after s/he comes to office. This happened ils boycott the presidential election, and if many Tamil IDPs in 2001, when President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga of the SLFP dissolved the UNP-led Parliament.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Executive Presidency, because he will likely not be appointed Election Security Issues Prime Minister. The UNP may attempt to implement the In the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, there have 13th and 17th Amendments—especially if this was a bargain- already been several recorded cases of electoral violence, par- ing chip to bring the Tamil National Alliance on board for the ticularly attacks on candidates and opposition party support- Presidential election and to gain an ally during the parliamen- ers. Historically, electoral violence in Sri Lanka has occurred tary elections. Implementing the 17th Amendment would be during the campaign period, within political parties as well as in the SLFP’s best interest, as it would limit Fonseka’s ability between political parties. In this election, however, there is a to exploit state resources in future elections. In this scenario, possibility of post-election violence, as well. there is a possibility that the 17th Amendment will be implemented, although the SLFP is unlikely to support the imple- The SLFP, due to Rajapaksa’s popularity in the wake of the mentation of the 13th Amendment. It is possible that Fonseka LTTE defeat, had not anticipated tough competition in the could dissolve the parliament and call for new parliamentary presidential race. The pre-election violence indicates that there elections. is a possibility that should Rajapaksa be defeated, SLFP supporters may reject the results, and the situation could devolve Tamil Participation into retributive post-election violence. This violence has the While there is one Tamil candidate running for President, he potential to become especially acute, as the SLFP controls all has not been officially backed by the Tamil National Alliance, of the security forces in the country; it is possible that the secu- and it is uncertain that he will be able to win a large bloc of rity forces would passively manage the post-election violence, Tamil votes. With the partial endorsement of General Fonseka or worse, participate in it themselves. This would result in a by the TNA, he may win the majority of Tamil votes. Raja- serious deterioration of security throughout the country, and paksa has been increasing his pursuit of Tamil votes, holding could have a severe impact on the parliamentary elections. rallies in the north of the country, opening up the north-south highway, and expediting the resettlement of IDPs in advance Recommendations 26 of the election. It appears that many IDPs may not be able to vote in the Presidential election, as most of the resettled have Promoting a lasting peace in Sri Lanka relies on recognition not requested to be included in voting lists, and only 35,000 that critical changes to the existing system of government of the approximately 300,000 displaced people had registered must be made in the immediate post-war period. The follow- for voting cards. For those who have registered, the polling ing recommendations are intended to promote a more inclu- cards have been arriving at the IDP centers, but the IDPs have sive political environment in which elections can be held, en- already left. The Elections Commissioner has made provisions sure the fairness and increase the transparency of elections, and for IDPs to be able to vote at other polling stations, which strengthen democratic processes through increased account- could lead to fraud.39 The lack of enfranchisement of IDPs ability, information, and political diversity. These would serve could be very influential in the election; in 2005, the Tamil as confidence-building measures in the presidential and parlia- boycott of the presidential election caused Rajapaksa to win mentary elections, and in the tenuous postwar environment, with only approximately 180,000 votes over UNP candidate they would help to advance the country toward a lasting peace. Ranil Wickremesinghe. (See Appendix II for the 2005 election results.) The 2010 elections represent an unprecedented opportunity for the country to make gains toward peace. To do so effective- Parliamentary elections in the North will likely be won by ly, we propose to the International Community the following Tamil parties, including the Tamil National Alliance and the recommendations: Eelam People’s Democratic Party, the SLFP-aligned Tamil party. The overwhelming presence of Sri Lanka Army forces in the 1. Implement the constitutional amendment north may impact whether and how people vote, and whether creating independent governmental parties in opposition to the current government will be able commissions; to campaign. There will be higher Tamil participation in the 2. Promote political party development through 2010 elections than there was in 2005, when Tamils were dis- financial and capacity-building assistance; 3. Provide technical assistance to elections and couraged from voting due to LTTE intimidation. Tamils are electoral processes; also likely to win Parliamentary seats in the Eastern Province. 4. Build broader minority inclusion into government institutions; and 5. Acknowledge the end of military hostilities 39 “Sri Lanka: Concern Grows Over IDP Voting Rights,” IRIN by ending the administration of emergency News, 11 January 2010. powers.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 The Rajapaksa government has announced that the end of the all political camps, it is unsustainable to place all operational war means the beginning of a new era in Sri Lanka. Yet, his and decision-making power into the hands of a single person. ruling party—as well as opposition parties—is fully aware that In addition, the lack of an Election Commission has required they have no real incentive to make concessions or change a that local NGOs fill the gaps in state capacity. system that favors the incumbent. However, the peace that the country currently enjoys will be finite unless the ruling Similarly, an independent Police Commission is essential to party makes good-faith measures to establish a more transpar- establishing a strengthened rule of law. Currently housed ent and inclusionary government system. The international under the Department of Defense, the police should be its community can play a strong role to ensure that this happens. own entity charged with providing civilian security. It should Bilateral pressure, through aid and trade incentives from Ja- be viewed as distinctly separate from the Sri Lankan Army, pan, the European Union, and the United States can help to which, in the post-war period, should no longer be perform- foster change. As the Sri Lankan government places significant ing internal counterterrorism operations but should turn its weight on the opinions and statements of the United Nations, focus toward border and national security. The police should the UN can also be a force for greater inclusion, accountabil- be solely responsible for all election-related security. The sub- ity, and ultimately, peacebuilding. stantiated complaints that police were employed to put up campaign posters by the ruling coalition in the recent Jaffna 1. Implement the constitutional amendment creating municipal elections further highlight the need for a de-politi- 40 independent governmental commissions. cized, independent police force.

Transparency and accountability are two hallmarks of good Implementation: Bilateral pressure through economic in- governance, and are essential to ensure the legitimacy and centives could be very effective in convincing whichever party fairness of elections in Sri Lanka. The 17th Amendment, wins the presidency and the parliament to implement the 17th which was ratified by the government in 2001 but never fully Amendment. It is also in the interest of donors to do so, as implemented, calls for the establishment of a Constitutional implementing this amendment also ensures the establishment 27 Council, an Independent Election Commission, and a Police of the Human Rights Commission, the Bribery and Corrup- Commission, all of which are critical for free and fair elections. tion Commission, and the Finance Commission. While some argue that the imperfect way in which the amendment was drafted makes implementation difficult, this appears 2. Promote political party development through to serve as little more than a convenient reason to prevent any financial and capacity-building assistance. movement toward establishing independent bodies free from significant political influence. Given the history of ruling par- Develop laws governing political parties. For elections to ties’ abuses of public resources, the SLFP has no real interest be truly democratic, the structure of the political parties must in implementing the 17th Amendment, whose independent be democratic; yet, there is currently no law in Sri Lanka gov- election and police commissions would regulate and prevent erning political parties’ internal or external activities. The in- continued abuse of power. ternational community should assist in developing such laws, and call for transparency in funding sources and allocation. However, given the short window of opportunity that ex- Democratizing the way that party leadership and candidates ists in the period following the military defeat of the LTTE, are selected contributes to the development of a broader cul- there is greater urgency than ever to generate national unity by ture of popular participation and free and open competition. demonstrating to minority parties (Tamil and otherwise) and The vanguards of democracy must be democratic themselves the political opposition that Sri Lanka’s government system is for Sri Lanka to be a vibrant democracy. moving toward being more responsive and responsible. Implementation: The United Nations or legal experts fund- The current system is untenable. The Commissioner of Elec- ed through USAID could assist local legal experts in the devel- tions has been obligated to serve by the Supreme Court until opment of these laws. an Election Commission is established, despite the fact that he has surpassed the age of mandatory retirement. Further, in ab- Contribute to an independently-managed public finance sence of a group of commissioners among whom decisions can system. In Sri Lanka, it is relatively easy to register as a political be made, and in absence of a formal means to create or amend 40 People’s Action for Free and Fair Election, “PAFFREL Election electoral law, the Commissioner often makes ad hoc execu- Day Report: Provincial Council Elections for Uva Province and Local tive decisions. While the current Commissioner is trusted in Government Elections for Jaffna Municipal Council and Vavuniya Urban Council,” 8 August 2009.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 party, and few political parties are well-resourced. The propor- that is elected. Exploring this possibility would entail trial runs tional representation system and the relative ease of forming in different areas of the country and must be accompanied by a political party have led to the proliferation of small political voter education on how to use the machines, training for tech- parties, some of which consist of only one person. Instead of nicians to fix the machines in case of malfunction, and secu- contributing to increased diversity of opinions and views in rity for the machines so that the software is not manipulated. the parliament, these small parties recognize the opportunity While electronic voting machines are expensive relative to the to exercise a small degree of influence as a member of a larger current ballot box system, they can be more cost-effective over ruling coalition. These coalitions are typically dominated by the long term through a reduction in counting center staffing the largest parties, diluting political diversity, and resulting in and ballot printing costs. Affordable electronic machines can what resembles a two-party political system with only a hand- be imported from India, which has successfully used machines ful of alternative parties. in recent elections. The Commissioner of Elections has argued very strongly in favor of moving Sri Lanka toward electronic An independent public finance system should be established, voting.41 Some have alleged that the real impediments toward incorporating a political party trust fund designed to give moving to this system are the major political parties, who are smaller parties an incentive to exercise their individual voices. reticent because such a system would prevent them from being Under this system, political parties receiving at least five per- able to tamper with the vote counts. The international com- cent of the vote in the previous parliamentary elections would munity could play a critical role in ensuring the integrity of be eligible for public financing in the subsequent election. elections in Sri Lanka by financing the country’s purchase of This would discourage the formation of single-person parties, electronic voting machines. and encourage the building of smaller coalitions that are more likely to yield seats to members of smaller parties (in large co- Implementation: The United Nations Electoral Assistance alitions, seat apportionments to small parties requires negotia- Division or USAID could provide funding to pilot electronic tion with the larger parties). This would also foster increased voting in different areas. The International Foundation for 28 accountability of political parties to constituents, as smaller Election Systems could lead the pilot testing on the ground. groups are often more closely aligned to their constituents While any pilot testing would not occur before the presiden- than large coalitions. tial or parliamentary elections of 2010, it would still be beneficial to begin testing as soon as possible for the next elections, Implementation: The Asian Development Bank or UN which could be as early as 2011 if the parliament is dissolved. could take the lead on managing the fund. Initial contributions could be provided by donor countries, but the fund Promote policy-focused civic education. Many Sri Lankans would be sustained by contributions from domestic sources, informed our team that voting is viewed as a responsibility, including the Sri Lankan government; for example, the Na- not a right—and that Sri Lankans go to the polls not to de- tional Lotteries Board of Sri Lanka may be a good source of mand accountability from their leaders, but because it is part contributions. The Elections Commission, when established, of being a citizen. The international community should fund would decide which political parties are eligible for public fi- a civic education campaign that capitalizes on the culture of nancing, and how much funding should be apportioned. voting as a responsibility by informing voters that they can influence policy directions of the country by considering po- 3. Provide technical assistance to elections and electoral litical platforms. For example, messages could include state- processes. ments such as: “In this election, ask your candidates what they plan to do for you and your community.” This would increase Explore the possibility of providing electronic voting awareness among the Sri Lankan people that they can and machines in order to minimize opportunities for fraud. should play a role in directing policy, and would contribute Paper ballots are viewed as a means to commit fraud in elec- to an increased demand of accountability from politicians. tions. By eliminating the paper ballots, it is believed that the Understandably, this is politically sensitive. Concerted efforts fraud will diminish. One way of doing this is to use electronic should be made to not take positions or appear to promote any voting machines. In addition to reducing the likelihood of bal- particular domestic policies, but rather to remain neutral and lot stuffing, vote count discrepancies and ballot box security general, broadening messages to a macro-level. For maximum issues, voting machines would provide rapid and relatively reli- outreach, such messages should be displayed on billboards in able vote counts. This boosts voter confidence in the results of Sinhala and Tamil, and broadcast via television and radio. elections, thereby reducing allegations of fraud or mistrust in the result, and building greater confidence in the government 41 Interview with the Commissioner of Elections, November 5, 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Implementation: Funding for civic education should ide- Similarly, the composition of the police force should be more ally come through a neutral international organization such reflective of Sri Lanka’s diversity. Increasing neighborhoods’ as the United Nations in order to minimize fears of individual sense of security will also increase trust in government institu- foreign governments meddling in domestic political processes. tions. This is especially important in former LTTE stronghold The advertising campaign itself could be conducted by a coali- areas. If the security forces in an area are not reflective of the tion of domestic civil society organizations such as the People’s population in the area, the population may begin to feel that Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL) and Campaign those forces are intruders, which could serve to heighten ten- for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE). sions. The lack of a Police Commission (which would also be established with the implementation of the 17th Amendment) Provide financial and technical assistance to local should not prevent increased inclusion from moving forward. organizations providing election observers and election Greater minority inclusion into the civil service and the police assistance. Several local elections and civil society organiza- are key signals to minority groups that, in the postwar era, the tions provide critical assistance to elections, including provid- political culture will be more unifying than divisive and is a ing observers, training election workers, monitoring pre-elec- first step toward building trust. tion campaign activities, and reporting election complaints and irregularities. The current political administration is wary Implementation: The impetus to ensure that the government of significant direct international involvement, which means service becomes more diverse can and should come from bilat- that these local groups are filling a gap that no international eral actors, perhaps through economic incentives. The reform organizations can. Since these groups are independent of the itself should be conducted by the Sri Lankan government, but government, they require independent funding. The interna- it could be assisted by technical experts from the UN, USAID, tional community, which supports these organizations to an and the EU. In particular, post-conflict security experts could extent, should increase funding for these local actors while advise on the security sector-specific ethnic integration, as this simultaneously working to encourage the building of govern- is currently underway in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic ment capacity so that it can perform these critical tasks instead Republic of Congo, and Burundi, as examples. 29 of civil society. Promote dual-language skills within the civil and police Implementation: USAID currently provides funding for sev- forces by providing financial incentives.The current status eral domestic civil society organizations. Bilateral donors can of Tamil as a national, but not an official, language has con- also contribute financially. Capacity building for the govern- tributed to a government system in which the vast majority ment can be provided by development agencies such as the of civil service employees do not speak Tamil. Further, while U.K. Department for International Development (DfID) some documents are available in both Sinhala and Tamil, this and USAID as well as elections experts like the International is not true of all government documents. As a result, many Foundation for Electoral Systems. Tamils, particularly those who come to Colombo, are unable to access the government system. An inclusive postwar gov- 4. Build broader minority inclusion into government ernment should work to unify the country by mandating that institutions. all official government documents be available in Sinhala and Tamil, and that all government workers should make efforts to Reform the civil service and police in order to build a be able to communicate in both. This model would resemble government representative of its people. As it stands, Tamil the Canadian model of bilingual government; in order to be and other minority groups are underrepresented in govern- hired into government service, employees must be profession- ment service. Increasing the number of Tamils and other mi- ally conversant in both French and English. If they are not, norities in the government to a proportionally representative the government provides educational opportunities toward 42 level would help to create an enabling environment for par- this end. ticipatory elections, and would more broadly help to further peace in Sri Lanka by showing that the government is making efforts to create an inclusive system. While this task would 42 The Canadian model provides an excellent comparison to Sri Lanka, as the French-speaking Quebec region was, for many years, normally fall under the Public Service Commission, the estab- fervently seeking separation from the rest of Canada for linguistic and cultural reasons. The Canadian government’s efforts to ensure that all lishment of this commission has been stalled by the non-im- of its employees, even those not posted in French-speaking areas, could plementation of the 17th Amendment. Despite this impedi- operate in both languages was a clear signal to the Quebecois that the Canadian government was making an effort to be as inclusionary ment, civil service reform can still be achieved by presidential as possible to their language and culture. For more details, see Marc or parliamentary order. Chevrier, “Laws and Language in Quebec, The Policy and Means of Quebec’s Language Policy,” February 1997.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 It would be impractical to impose a mandatory requirement cross-cultural) for the service workers before they go to the on the Sri Lankan civil and police services at this juncture, field. but it should remain a long-term goal. By providing financial incentives (e.g. through increased salaries or bonus payments) 5. Acknowledge the end of military hostilities by for new job applicants and current employees who can operate ending the administration of emergency powers. in both Sinhala and Tamil, all civil service employees would work toward bilingualism. For those who wish to learn, the Restore the freedom of movement, access, and speech to government should provide free classes. The same is true for all Sri Lankans. Before the military defeat of the LTTE, the civil servants and police in Tamil-speaking areas; they, too, government limited certain human rights in order to facilitate should be incentivized to learn Sinhala. A bilingual govern- its counterterrorism operations. Now that the government has ment is necessary for all citizens to be able to access public declared military victory, it should end the administration of services, and sends a strong message to the Sri Lankan people emergency powers, since they are no longer necessary. All peo- that all citizens are equal and that the country is unifying. ple should have free access across the country, with the tempo- rary exception of mined areas in the Vanni region.43 Implementation: USAID has already undertaken a project to provide language lessons in Sinhala and Tamil for local and Internally displaced persons who have been confined in camps provincial officials. Expanding this to the national level would are slowly being resettled, and were recently accorded the right require additional resources and expertise; funding for the lan- to leave for a couple of days at a time.44 This is insufficient guage training should be provided by the Sri Lankan budget progress, as continued detainment in camps will contribute to in order to ensure the program’s sustainability. Since the model an increase in resentment toward the ruling government, po- would closely resemble that of Canada, Canadian experts, per- tentially derailing opportunities to build peace. Screening of haps from the Canadian International Development Agency these displaced persons for possible LTTE sympathizers should (CIDA) could assist in advising the structure of such a pro- be expedited and innocents should be resettled as quickly as 30 gram. possible. Further, every effort should be made to ensure that these individuals are enfranchised in time to participate in the Implement a service program to foster cross-cultural presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010. understanding between Sinhalese and minority groups. Even in the most ethnically diverse areas of Sri Lanka, such as Military roadblocks, which are very common in Colombo Kandy, ethnic groups tend to self-segregate, propagating the and are scattered throughout the rest of the country, should continuation of stereotypes and misconceptions. To help to be minimized. Tamils with whom the team spoke complained increase cross-cultural understanding, improve language skills, that their movement has been restricted by these roadblocks build a more unified state, and advance the development of purely on account of their ethnicity, contributing to contin- the country, the Sri Lankan government should establish a sys- ued division. In addition, while remnant spoilers may emerge, tem of mandatory development service for all students enter- the risk of attacks has dropped significantly since the end of ing public universities. The program, which would provide a the war, and the deployment of troops at their current levels “gap year” in education, would send students to areas of Sri is unnecessary. Further, the right of free speech should be re- Lanka to work on development projects in communities with stored in order to foster the return of full political expression. a different ethnic background than that of the student. Im- This includes the restoration of press and media freedoms and mersion in these communities is critical to building a common unfettered access by all citizens to information. Open dialogue understanding of a national Sri Lankan identity, and would and discussion about the past and the way forward can help contribute to building unity. Since many college graduates to mend wounds and bridge the divide, so that all parties can desire to enter government service, the government would move forward together. benefit from the recruitment of talented graduates who would have experience in ethnically diverse areas, making them more Implementation: Bilateral pressure through economic sensitive to the needs of those communities. means, whether through incentives or withheld assistance, can help to ensure that emergency powers are lifted. In particular, Implementation: The United States Peace Corps has priori- Japan, the EU, and the U.S. would likely be able to apply tized assisting other countries in establishing domestic volun- the most pressure. Defense training and assistance from the teer organizations. The Peace Corps could contribute advisors 43 “Countering terrorism and healing wounds,” Daily News (Sri to help to structure the domestic service program and assist Lanka), 30 September 2009. the development of training modules (both sector-specific and 44 “Sri Lanka Tamil refugee camps ‘to be opened next month.” BBC News, 21 November 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 United States could also be offered in exchange for an end to emergency powers, as the Sri Lankan government may fear to lift restrictions due to possible security threats.

Conclusion

The 2010 elections in Sri Lanka, the first of the postwar period, are not enough to create lasting peace on their own. They can, however, provide an opportunity to address longstanding grievances and increase minority inclusion in the government. The defeat of the LTTE is unprecedented, and should be used to bring unity to an otherwise deeply divided country. Yet, where there should be hope in the reunified Sri Lanka, there is distrust. The democratic institutions are skewed in favor of the ruling party, government resources misused, and information limited. Tamils continue to feel excluded. There is a short window of time in which trust-building can occur, and few efforts have been made in this direction.

Where the Sri Lankan government is unwilling or unable to act, the international community can play a significant role. Elections and the deals made in political coalitions will not be strong enough to effect the radical changes required to put Sri Lanka on a path toward reconciliation, fairer elections, greater 31 political accountability, and reduced corruption. Success in this regard can be partially measured by enfranchisement of Sri Lankan Tamils and other minorities, their willingness to participate in elections, and their greater representation in the civil and security services. Further, implementing these recommendations will contribute to ensuring the proliferation of political voices and an increased sense among the Sri Lankan populace that they can, and should, have an impact on the policies of their government.

Sri Lanka is facing a critical moment. The recent military success can be used to bring about real political and social change, but should this opportunity be wasted, Sri Lanka could easily backslide into conflict. Implementing these recommendations would help to ensure that Sri Lanka continues to move forward by advancing greater accountability, transparency, and inclusion of minorities in the political system. These would represent critical advances toward building trust and promoting reconciliation. Ultimately, these are the foundations for ensuring a sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 IV. Conclusion

The case studies on elections in the Palestinian territories and When confidence-building measures are successfully imple- Sri Lanka illustrate the importance of creating a stable and mented, they change the political environment and make all equitable political environment prior to holding elections in parties feel like they have a stake in the current system of gov- divided societies. In achieving the right context for elections, ernment. Even simple policies—such as integrating disputants some common themes emerge: into the civil service or rehiring certain professors at national universities—can be effective ways to demonstrate change. In 1. Foster a strong and independent Electoral the period prior to elections, building trust based on small Commission. steps initially, and then larger gestures later in the process, can create a political context where all parties perceive electoral Electoral commissions have the potential to play an incredibly outcomes as legitimate. important role in divided societies, serving as an independent source of information and arbitrator of disputes. In both the 3. Support political freedom for parties, candidates, Palestinian territories and Sri Lanka, the Chief Electoral Com- and individuals. missioner is highly respected by all factions of society, but his ability to impact the overall political process is limited by lo- One of the fundamental principles of democracy is the right gistical and administrative constraints. It is not enough to have of individuals to organize or assemble along political lines. one esteemed commissioner endowed with significant author- Restricting this right undermines democratic ideals and some ity; instead, a strong but neutral Board of Commissioners is parts of society will view elections as illegitimate. If the Sri necessary to address all of the challenges that might arise dur- Lankan government continues to disenfranchise minorities ing the electoral process. In Sri Lanka, this board would have like the Tamils, such groups are more likely to opt out of the to be established. A Board of Commissioners already exists in system and search for alternative ways of finding a political 32 the Palestinian territories, but its role should be widened and voice. Similarly, when elected representatives affiliated with its mandate strengthened. An Electoral Commission with this Hamas are unable to convene even informal gatherings in the type of mandate will also be able to use the period between West Bank, the Palestinian people start to perceive democracy election years to address controversial issues in a less divisive as subject to the whims of a particular leader or party, rather environment. than an essential institution of the state.

When electoral commissions are adequately staffed and Implications for Electoral Assistance trained, they are able to manage elections in a manner that increases the legitimacy of elections. In divided societies, elec- In many emerging democracies, elections are viewed as the tions must meet a minimum standard of acceptability for all cornerstone of future democratic development, and as such, parties to acknowledge and respect the results. A strong and international assistance helps countries develop the capacity to independent Electoral Commission can provide the necessary administer and manage elections. Electoral aid, however, needs education, outreach, and adjudication so that voters perceive to be situated in the broader context of building a democracy. the elections as an essential step toward building an inclusive It is not enough for international actors to simply provide bal- democratic culture that protects minority rights. lots or staff polling stations. Rather, the international community needs to think about how to foster a political environ- 2. Design and implement mechanisms for confidence- ment in which elections will reinforce a population’s faith in building between parties. the government. Without this broader conceptual framework, elections will entrench societal divides and may eventually un- Creating the right political context for elections in divided dermine democratic institutions. societies requires formulating and implementing policies designed to build confidence between different internal actors. In the Palestinian territories, elections are unlikely to occur if Hamas and Fatah do not follow through on trust-building measures like the release of political prisoners and the reintegration of security forces. In Sri Lanka, elections may still take place without any type of government outreach to the Tamils, but in this context, the results of the election will only serve to further divide the people and generate instability.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Appendix I

Key Political Parties and Actors in the 2010 Elections in Sri Lanka

Presidential Candi- Political Party Head of Party Description date

Buddhist, Sinhalese Sri Lanka Freedom Mahinda Rajapaksa Mahinda Rajapaksa nationalist party. Cur- Party (SLFP) rently the ruling party.

Liberal, minority- friendly, generally Sarath Fonseka (com- United National Party Ranil Wickremesinghe pro-Western party. mon candidate) Currently the largest opposition party.

Tamil National Sarath Fonseka The largest alliance of R. Sambanthan Alliance (common candidate) the Tamil parties.

33 Marxist, Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi nationalist party. Not Peramuna (JVP) (also Somawansa Amaras- Sarath Fonseka aligned with the UNP, People’s Liberation inghe but has offered a com- Front) mon candidate.

Eelam People’s SLFP-sympathetic Douglas Devananda Mahinda Rajapaksa Democratic Party Tamil party.

There are more than 60 political parties in Sri Lanka, many of whom align with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the United National Party, or the Tamil National Alliance.

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Appendix II

Electoral Systems in the Palestinian Territories and Sri Lanka

The Electoral System in the Palestinian Territories The Palestinian Authority (PA) is the administrative body that governs the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. It was formed in 1994 pursuant to the Oslo Accords and, according to the 2002 Basic Law, consists of three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judiciary. The president of the PA is directly elected by popular vote and chooses a prime minister, who then forms a cabinet of ministers subject to parliamentary approval. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is an elected body of 132 members and acts as a parliament. The rules governing the Palestinian Authority is a document called the “Basic Law” that was drafted over several years, beginning in 1993. It was finally promulgated in 2002 and amended twice, once in 2003 and again in 2005.

There have been two rounds of presidential and PLC elections. The first were simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections held in January 1996. Fatah won 55 of 88 parliamentary seats and its leader, Yassir Arafat, won the presidency with 88 percent of the vote. Hamas boycotted the elections due to its disagreement with concessions the PA had made to Israel.

In January 2005, Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas to replace Arafat after his death in November 2004. Also in 2005, a set of amendments was introduced to allow for new parliamentary elections. These amendments fixed the term of the parliament and the president at four years. An election law passed in 2005 by the parliament increased the number of PLC members to 132 and established a parallel voting system with half of the seats allocated according to district and half elected nationally via closed list proportional representation. The PA held PLC elections in 2006. Hamas, which ran under the name Change and Reform, actively participated and won 74 seats to Fatah’s 45. Despite worldwide condemnation of the outcome, international observers reported 34 that the elections were free and fair.

In September 2007, President Abbas issued a new election law by decree because the PLC was not in session. This law changed the electoral system from a mixed PR/block system to one in which Palestinians would vote solely for party lists, eliminating district- level elections. The 2007 law also required candidates in presidential and legislative elections to recognize the PLO, the Basic Law, and the Independency Charter. The law has not been tested although the Palestinian Central Elections Commission seems to accept the validity of the decree law.45 However, Hamas insists that the 2005 law is still in force.

45 Nathan J. Brown, “Fact Sheet: Palestinian Presidential Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2008, http://www. palestinianbasiclaw.org/palestinian-elections-fact-sheet-by-nathan-j-brown.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council Elections

Votes Percent Seats (Proportional Parties and Blocks (Proportional) (Percent) / District)

Change and Reform 440,409 44.45% 74 (29/45) (Hamas)

Fatah 410,554 41.43% 45 (28/17)

Popular Front for the 42,101 4.25% 3 (3/0) Liberation of Palestine

Al-Badeel 28,973 2.92% 2 (2/0)

Independent Palestine 26,909 2.72% 2 (2/0)

Third Way 23,862 2.41% 2 (2/0)

Independents - - 4 (0/4) 35

Total 990,873 100% 132

1996 Palestinian Legislative Council Elections

Parties and Blocks Seats

Fatah 55

Independent Fatah 7

Independent Islamists 4

Independent Christians 3

Independents 15

Samaritans 1

Others 1

Vacant 2

Total 88

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 The Electoral System in Sri Lanka In 1978, Sri Lanka adopted a new constitution that provided for a unicameral Parliament and an Executive Presidency. The Parlia- ment is elected under a form of proportional representation, whereby 196 seats are divided among the 9 provinces (according to population). The seats in each province are allocated proportionally to political parties who receive greater than 5 percent of the vote in each province. The country also has a national district of 29 seats which are allocated to parties under proportional representation. Party lists are open and there is preferential voting for up to three candidates with the party’s list. Voters are required to present their national ID card or one of eight alternative forms of identification to the polling officer in order to cast their votes.

Voting occurs on a single Election Day with the Department of Elections office in Colombo taking the lead role in the administration of the election. Management of elections operations is highly centralized in Colombo and the district offices established throughout the country only act as information conduits back to the central office. District officers have little authority or discre- tion to arbitrate disputes on Election Day.46

Election monitoring is conducted primarily by local NGOs and political party representatives. As Sri Lanka has a large number of domestic elections observers, international observers are less prevalent. Election monitoring is limited to poll watching and social identification and verification. Monitors are not allowed to accompany police officers who transport the ballot boxes to counting centers, nor are they allowed inside counting centers to observe tabulation of votes.47 Votes are tabulated by the counting centers and information is faxed or phoned into the central office in Colombo where results are certified and disseminated.

The 2005 Elections During the 2005 Presidential election, the Department of Elections had considerable difficulty setting up polling stations in LTTE-controlled areas. As a result, cluster voting sites were established along the border of the LTTE areas, providing a way for people to vote if they desired. Since those within the LTTE regions were threatened with death if they attempted to vote, the cluster 36 voting did not work as effectively as expected.

46 Interview with the Assistant District Secretary, Kandy District, November 4, 2009. 47 Interview with the Program Director of PAFFREL, November 5, 2009.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 2004 Parliamentary Election Results

Political Party or Independent Votes District National Total Percent Group Obtained Seats Seats Seats

United People’s Freedom Alliance 4,223,970 45.60% 92 13 105 (SLFP)

United National Party (UNP) 3,504,200 37.83% 71 11 82

Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi 633,654 6.84% 20 2 22 (TNA)

Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) 552,724 5.97% 7 2 9

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 186,876 2.02% 4 1 5

Up-Country People’s Front 49,728 0.54% 1 0 1

Eelam People’s Democratic Party 37 24,955 0.27% 1 0 1 (EPDP)

All Other Parties 86,265 0.93% 0 0 0

Total 9,262,372 100% 196 29 225

2005 Presidential Election Results

Votes Candidate Percent Obtained

Mahinda Rajapaksa (SLFP) 4,887,152 50.29%

Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP) 4,706,366 48.43%

Other Candidates 123,521 1.27%

Total 9,717,039 100%

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Appendix III The Daily Mirror The Daily News List of Organizations Consulted by the Princeton International Crisis Group (ICG) Team International Finance Corporation The National Peace Council of Sri Lanka Palestinian territories The Nation Bitter Lemons People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL) B’Tselem Sri Lankan Department of Defense The Carter Center Sri Lankan Department of Elections Egyptian Representative Office to the Palestinian Authority Sri Lanka Freedom Party-Mangala (SLFP(M)) European Commission Sri Lankan Ministry of Constitutional Reform Fatah Central Committee Tamil National Alliance Fatah Parliamentary Block Tamil United Liberation Front Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) United National Party Independent Political Parties United Nations Development Program International Crisis Group (ICG) United Nations Electoral Assistance Division International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) U.S. Agency for International Development Israel Defense Forces (IDF) U.S. State Department Hamas Parliamentary Block Young Asia Television Hamas Cabinet (2006 government) Muwattin National Democratic Institute (NDI) Norwegian Royal Embassy, Tel Aviv 38 Palestinian Authority, Central Elections Committee (CEC) Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Planning Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) The Quartet on the Middle East (The Quartet) United Nations Development Program (UNDP)/Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA-oPt) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu- gees in the Near East (UNRWA) United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) United States Consulate General, Jerusalem

Sri Lanka48

Asian Development Bank The Asia Foundation Association of War Affected Women Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA) Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research Center for Strategic and International Studies District Elections Office, Kandy Embassy of Sri Lanka in the United States 48 Many interviewees asked that they not be named by person or by organization due to the sensitivity of this subject.

Bridging the Divide? An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10 Appendix IV: Background on the ly served as a Stryker Company Commander in Mosul and Authors Baghdad, Iraq. He earned his B.A. in International Politics and French from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The report authors are graduate students in International Re- lations, International Development, and Domestic Politics at Arian Sharifi has worked as a producer for ABC News, as a Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and research analyst at the Center for Political Violence and Ter- International Affairs. rorism Research in Singapore, and as Director of Communica- tions at the Afghan Government’s Ministry of Finance in Ka- Michael Balz previously worked as a research assistant in the bul. He holds a B.A. in International Politics from Wesleyan Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and Inter- University. national Studies, and then worked in political development, journalism and education in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. He Sehar Tariq has worked on elections and governance issues received his B.A. in International Politics and Arab Studies at for the Asia Foundation in Pakistan. She earned her B.A. in Georgetown University. Women’s and Gender Studies from Yale University.

Morgan Courtney has worked in post-conflict reconstruc- Project Advisor tion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and has experience with development programs and policy with Jeff Fischer currently serves as Team Leader for the Electoral the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Education and Integrity Program at Creative Associates In- U.S. Peace Corps in Africa. She holds a B.A. in International ternational, Inc. He has held three internationally-appointed Relations from Wellesley College. positions in post-conflict electoral transitions. In 1996, he was appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation Nathan Hodson has spent nearly three years studying, work- in Europe (OSCE) to serve as Director General of Elections ing, and living in the Middle East, most recently in Jeddah, for the first post-conflict elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 39 Saudi Arabia with the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. He was In 1999, Mr. Fischer was appointed by the United Nations also a Fulbright Fellow and has conducted research in Jordan (UN) as Chief Electoral Officer for the Popular Consultation and Yemen. for East Timor. And, in 2000, he received a joint appointment from the UN and OSCE to head the Joint Registration Task- Lena Hull has served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in force in Kosovo and served as the OSCE’s Director of Election southern Morocco. She received her B.A. in History from the Operations in Kosovo. He also served as a senior advisor to the College of William and Mary. UN and Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq during the 2005 election cycle. Seth Lynn is a Naval Academy graduate and former Marine Corps Officer. While deployed to Iraq, he grew interested in Since 1987, Mr. Fischer has participated in electoral assis- the Middle East and began studying Arabic. At Princeton, tance, observation, or conference projects in over 50 countries Seth studies international relations and founded Veterans and territories in the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Campaign, which trains veterans to run for office. and Asia. Mr. Fischer has a Master of Science from George Mason University in Peacekeeping Operations Policy. Eric Melancon has worked on political campaigns in the United States and for the Louisiana Department of Justice as a legislative liaison. He holds a B.A. in Political Science and Case Study Teams Economics from Louisiana State University. Palestinian Territories Julia Morse spent three years working as an analyst at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Her academic interests Michael Balz, Nathan Hodson, Julia Morse, Seth Lynn, include national security and conflict resolution in the Middle William Parsons East. She holds an A.B. in Public Policy and International Pol- itics from Duke University. Sri Lanka

Bill Parsons is a U.S. Army officer and has deployed to both Morgan Courtney, Lena Hull, Eric Melancon, Arian Iraq and Afghanistan as an Infantry officer and most recent- Sharifi, Sehar Tariq

Bridging the Divide?An Assessment of Elections in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian Territories 2009-10