Introduction to Will Drafting for Accountants
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Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: the Dawn of the Electronic Will
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 42 2008 Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will Joseph Karl Grant Capital University Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph K. Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 105 (2008). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol42/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SHATTERING AND MOVING BEYOND THE GUTENBERG PARADIGM: THE DAWN OF THE ELECTRONIC WILL Joseph Karl Grant* INTRODUCTION Picture yourself watching a movie. In the film, a group of four siblings are dressed in dark suits and dresses. The siblings, Bill Jones, Robert Jones, Margaret Jones and Sally Johnson, have just returned from their elderly mother's funeral. They sit quietly in their mother's attorney's office intently watching and listening to a videotape their mother, Ms. Vivian Jones, made before her death. On the videotape, Ms. Jones expresses her last will and testament. Ms. Jones clearly states that she would like her sizable real estate holdings to be divided equally among her four children and her valuable blue-chip stock investments to be used to pay for her grandchildren's education. -
Number 27 of 1965 SUCCESSION ACT 1965 REVISED Updated to 4
Number 27 of 1965 SUCCESSION ACT 1965 REVISED Updated to 4 May 2020 This Revised Act is an administrative consolidation of the Succession Act 1965. It is prepared by the Law Reform Commission in accordance with its function under the Law Reform Commission Act 1975 (3/1975) to keep the law under review and to undertake revision and consolidation of statute law. All Acts up to and including the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Covid-19) Act 2020 (2/2020), enacted 27 March 2020 and all statutory instruments up to and including the Planning and Development Act 2000 (Subsection (4) of Section 251A) (No. 2) Order 2020 (S.I. No. 165 of 2020), made 8 May 2020, were considered in the preparation of this Revised Act. Disclaimer: While every care has been taken in the preparation of this Revised Act, the Law Reform Commission can assume no responsibility for and give no guarantees, undertakings or warranties concerning the accuracy, completeness or up to date nature of the information provided and does not accept any liability whatsoever arising from any errors or omissions. Please notify any errors, omissions and comments by email to [email protected]. Number 27 of 1965 SUCCESSION ACT 1965 REVISED Updated to 4 May 2020 Introduction This Revised Act presents the text of the Act as it has been amended since enactment, and preserves the format in which it was passed. Related legislation This Act is not collectively cited with any other Act. Annotations This Revised Act is annotated and includes textual and non-textual amendments, statutory instruments made pursuant to the Act and previous affecting provisions. -
Case and ~C®Mment
251 CASE AND ~C®MMENT. CROWN -SERVANT- INCORPORATION -IMMUNITY FROM BEING SUED. The recent case of Gilleghan v. Minister of Healthl decided by Farwell, J., is a decision on the questions : Will an action lie against a Minister-of the Crown in respect of an act admittedly done as a Minister of the Crown? Or -is the true view that the only remedy is against the Crown by petition of right? Does the mere incorporation. of a servant of the Crown confer the privilege of suing and the liability to be sued? The rationale for the general rule that a servant of the Crown cannot be sued in his official capacity is that the servant holds no assets in his official capacity which can be seized in satisfaction of a judgment. He holds only on behalf of the Crown.2 Collins, M.R., in Bainbridge v. Postmaster-General3 said : "The revenue of the country cannot be reached by an action against an official, unless there is some provision to be found in the legisla~ tion to enable this to be done." In the Gilleghan case the defendant moved to-strike out the statement of claim. The Minister of Health was established by the Ministry of Health Act- which provided, inter alia, that the Minister "may sue and be sued in the name of the Minister of Health" and that "for the purpose of acquiring and holding land" the Minister for the time being "shall be a corporation sole." Farwell, J ., decided that the provision that the Minister may sue and be sued does not give the plaintiff a cause of action for breach of contract against the Minister. -
The Decline of Revocation by Physical Act
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 2019 The Decline of Revocation by Physical Act Barry Cushman Notre Dame Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons Recommended Citation Barry Cushman, The Decline of Revocation by Physical Act, 54 Real Prop., Tr. & Est. L.J. 243 (2019). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1416 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE DECLINE OF REVOCATION BY PHYSICAL ACT Barry Cushman* Author's Synopsis: The power to revoke one's will by physical act was enshrined in Anglo-American law in 1677 by the Statute of Frauds. It remains the law in Great Britain, in such developed Commonwealth countries as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and in each state of the United States ofAmerica. Yet the revocation of wills by physical act has become badly out of phase with the law governing nonprobate transfers, which as a general matter requires that an instrument of transfer be revoked only by a writing signed by the transferor. This Article surveys the place of revocation by physical act in the law governing will substitutes, such as payable-on-death designations on bank accounts, transfer-on-deathdesignations on brokerage accounts, life insurance and annuities, beneficiary deeds, and revocable trusts. -
Convey 04 Eug. Amend 06 Aug. Final
LAW SOCIETY CONVEYANCING HANDBOOK CHAPTER 4 LANDLORD AND TENANT LEASES OF meeting of the solicitors acting for Lending Institutions in Dublin has considered the DWELLINGHOUSES Aeffect of Section 2 of the Landlord and Tenant (Ground Rents) (No. 1) Bill 1977, having regard to the practice of leases of dwellinghouses on building estates being executed 1978 (NO.1) ACT by all parties well in advance of the completion of the houses, and being held in escrow by the lessor’s solicitors, usually to enable stamp duty on the lease to be assessed and impressed prior to completion. It was the unanimous view of the solicitors present that such a lease even though dated prior to the date of coming into force of the Act would be void under the Act if it were held in escrow at the date of the passing of the Act and then delivered to the purchasers afterwards. The meeting further considered the difficulties which would face a Lending Institution’s solicitor presented, shortly after the passing of the Act, with a lease dated prior to the date of passing of the Act, of deciding whether such a lease were void because it had been held in escrow or valid because it had been delivered prior to the passing of the Act. The view of the meeting was that a Lending Institution solicitor could not undertake the burden of making such a decision. The meeting noted that the provisions of Section 2, Sub-section (4) of the Bill which protected the position of a purchaser of a leasehold interest deemed void under Section 2, Sub-section (1), did not extend to a mortgagee and accordingly agreed that the solicitors acting for Lending Institutions would not be able to accept leases of dwellinghouses after the date of coming into force of the Act even though the leases might have been dated prior to the passing of the Act. -
Trustee Act 1925 Chapter 19
Trustee Act 1925 Chapter 19 Part II General Powers of Trustees and Personal Representatives 12 Power of trustees for sale to sell by auction, etc (1) Where a trustee has a duty or power to sell property, he may sell or concur with any other person in selling all or any part of the property, either subject to prior charges or not, and either together or in lots, by public auction or by private contract, subject to any such conditions respecting title or evidence of title or other matter as the trustee thinks fit, with power to vary any contract for sale, and to buy in at any auction, or to rescind any contract for sale and to re-sell, without being answerable for any loss. (2) A duty or power to sell or dispose of land includes a trust duty or power to sell or dispose of part thereof, whether the division is horizontal, vertical, or made in any other way. 13 Power to sell subject to depreciatory conditions (1) No sale made by a trustee shall be impeached by any beneficiary upon the ground that any of the conditions subject to which the sale was made may have been unnecessarily depreciatory, unless it also appears that the consideration for the sale was thereby rendered inadequate. (2) No sale made by a trustee shall, after the execution of the conveyance, be impeached as against the purchaser upon the ground that any of the conditions subject to which the sale was made may have been unnecessarily depreciatory, unless it appears that the purchaser was acting in collusion with the trustee at the time when the contract for sale was made. -
Failure of Gifts by Will
Failure of Gifts by Will This month’s CPD will examine the many reasons why a gift made by Will may fail. This paper will look at the most common reasons for the failure of gifts, listed below, but practitioner’s should be aware that this list is non-exhaustive and gifts may fail for other reasons; including a contingency for a gift not being met, as a matter of public policy, or even because a condition attached to a gift is void. MAIN REASONS A GIFT MAY FAIL A gift may fail for one of the following main reasons: The beneficiary or a spouse or civil partner of the beneficiary is an attesting witness The divorce or dissolution of a marriage or civil partnership between the testator and the beneficiary Lapse Ademption Abatement Uncertainty The beneficiary is guilty of the unlawful killing of the testator The beneficiary disclaims their gift BENEFICIARY OR THEIR SPOUSE IS AN ATTESTING WITNESS This is the most well-known reason for the failure of a gift. Section 15 of the Wills Act 1837 deprives an attesting witness and their spouse or civil partner from receiving any benefit under the Will which they attest. If a beneficiary or their spouse is an attesting witness the attestation itself will be valid and this will not cause the Will to fail; only the gift to the witness or their spouse shall be void. There are some key exceptions to this general rule: If a beneficiary was not married to the witness at the time the attestation took place but married the witness afterwards then they will not be deprived of their benefit. -
'Whether Or Not the Law Relating to Modern Trustees' Power and Duties Have Achieved a Balance Between Managing the Trust As
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 6 No 2 ISSN 2039-9340 (print) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy March 2015 ‘Whether or Not the Law Relating to Modern Trustees’ Power and Duties have Achieved a Balance between Managing the Trust Assets and Protecting the Interest of the Beneficiaries: A Critical Analysis’ Md. Saifur Rahman Chowdhury Advocate, Chittagong District Bar Association, Bangladesh & Legal Expert Email: [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2p386 Abstract The purpose of this article is to critically analyse with the reference of appropriate authority whether or not the law relating to modern trustees’ power and duties have achieved a balance between managing the trust assets and protecting the interest of the beneficiaries.The duties, power and responsibilities of trustees are normally set out in the trust documents, at least in part. In this regard the range of underpinning statutory provisions contained, in particular, in the Trustee Acts 1925 and 2000 and the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. However there is a common law standard of duty expected of trustees and that it has been modified under s 1(1) of the Trustee Act 2000 in a range of situations. As we know fiduciary obligations are particular – and peculiar –obligations recognized by equity. In certain circumstances, typically in trusts but also in agency and other relationships, equity will require one party to the relationship, called the ‘fiduciary’, to act in the best interests of the other, called the ‘principal’. Failure to do so will mean that the first party commits the equitable wrong of breach of fiduciary duty vis-à- vis the second. -
Real Estate 2019
ICLG The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Real Estate 2019 14th Edition A practical cross-border insight into real estate law Published by Global Legal Group with contributions from: ALTIUS Maples and Calder Anderson Mori & Tomotsune Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal Blenheim Meyerlustenberger Lachenal AG Brulc, Gaberščik and partners, Law Firm, Ltd. Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa Inc. Cordero & Cordero Abogados Pepeliaev Group Eric Silwamba, Jalasi and Linyama Legal Practitioners Project Law Attorneys Ltd Ferraiuoli LLC Ropes & Gray International LLP Gianni, Origoni, Grippo, Cappelli & Partners Shepherd and Wedderburn LLP Greenberg Traurig Grzesiak sp.k. Simon Reid-Kay & Associates Greenberg Traurig, LLP Taras Burhan Law Office LLC Hogan Lovells Tirard, Naudin Kapellmann Tughan Kubes Passeyrer Attorneys at Law Valmas Associates L&L Partners Wintertons Legal Practitioners Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice Advogados Ziv Lev & Co. Law Office Mantis & Athinodorou LLC The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Real Estate 2019 General Chapter: 1 Forward Funding Now! – Iain Morpeth, Ropes & Gray LLP 1 Country Question and Answer Chapters: 2 Argentina Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal: Diego A. Chighizola 5 Contributing Editor Iain Morpeth, 3 Austria Kubes Passeyrer Attorneys at Law: Dr. David Kubes & Mag. Tina Vollmann 17 Ropes & Gray LLP 4 ALTIUS: Lieven Peeters & Kathleen Verbiest 27 Sales Director Belgium Florjan Osmani 5 Brazil Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice Advogados: Maria Flavia Seabra & Account Director Juliana Ribeiro 36 Oliver Smith 6 Costa Rica Cordero & Cordero Abogados: Hernan Cordero B. & Rolando Gonzalez C. 45 Sales Support Manager Toni Hayward 7 Cyprus Mantis & Athinodorou LLC: Michael Mantis 55 Senior Editors 8 England & Wales Ropes & Gray International LLP: Carol Hopper & Partha Pal 63 Caroline Collingwood & Suzie Levy 9 Finland Project Law Attorneys Ltd: Matias Forss & Sakari Lähteenmäki 75 CEO Dror Levy 10 France Tirard, Naudin: Maryse Naudin 83 Group Consulting Editor 11 Germany Kapellmann: Dr. -
A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes Kevin R
Hofstra Law Review Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 5 1988 A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes Kevin R. Natale Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Natale, Kevin R. (1988) "A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 5. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/5 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Natale: A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes NOTES A SURVEY, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION OF HOLOGRAPHIC WILL STATUTES I. INTRODUCTION Traditionally, a holographic will' has been deemed valid when it is "entirely written, dated, and signed" in the handwriting of the testator.2 While modern statutory provisions 3 may vary,4 one central feature remains constant-no attesting witnesses are required for valid execution.5 Thus, the formalities of attestation,' which serve important ritualistic, evidentiary, and protective functions,7 are not 1. Some jurisdictions utilize the term "olographic" will. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1588 (West 1952 & Supp. 1986) (providing for "olographic" testaments); S.D. CODMEt LAWS ANN. § 29-2-8 (1984) (providing for "olographic" wills). 2. See Dean v. Dickey, 225 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (stating the an- cient rule that "a will should be valid if entirely 'written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator.'" (quoting Iz re Dreyfus' Estate, 175 Cal. -
This Document Has Been Provided by the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL)
This document has been provided by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). ICNL is the leading source for information on the legal environment for civil society and public participation. Since 1992, ICNL has served as a resource to civil society leaders, government officials, and the donor community in over 90 countries. Visit ICNL’s Online Library at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/library/index.php for further resources and research from countries all over the world. Disclaimers Content. The information provided herein is for general informational and educational purposes only. It is not intended and should not be construed to constitute legal advice. The information contained herein may not be applicable in all situations and may not, after the date of its presentation, even reflect the most current authority. Nothing contained herein should be relied or acted upon without the benefit of legal advice based upon the particular facts and circumstances presented, and nothing herein should be construed otherwise. Translations. Translations by ICNL of any materials into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of a translation, please refer to the original language official version of the document. Any discrepancies or differences created in the translation are not binding and have no legal effect for compliance or enforcement purposes. Warranty and Limitation of Liability. Although ICNL uses reasonable efforts to include accurate and up-to-date information herein, ICNL makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its accuracy, currency or completeness. -
The 1837 Wills Act
The 1837 Wills Act: This month we will be having a detailed look at several sections from the Wills Act 1837. As will writers are aware the 1837 Wills Act (WA1837), as amended, supplies the detailed background legislation that must be followed whenever a will is drafted. The actual text of the Wills Act is provided along with the current amendments and commentary as to the meaning and effect of the statute. By the addition of the full text of the WA1837 will writers have the opportunity to read the actual words of this vital legislation governing the way in which wills are validly conceived, drafted, interpreted and executed. You should read the statutory WA1837 text extracted and the associated notes carefully and then answer the usual 15 CPD questions. Sections that are not mentioned below have been previously repealed. Section 1: [1.] Meaning of certain words in this Act: “Will”: “Real estate”: “Personal estate”: Number: Gender. The words and expressions herein-after mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall in this Act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the Act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows; (that is to say,) the word “will” shall extend to a testament, and to a codicil, and to an appointment by will or by writing in the nature of a will in exercise of a power, [F1and also to an appointment by will of a guardian of a child,][F2and also to an appointment by will of a representative under section 4 of the Human Tissue Act 2004,] .