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POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA; SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Seongyi Yun, B.A, M.A
*****
The Ohio State University 1997
Dissertation Committee: proved by Professor R. William Liddle, Adviser
Professor Bradley Richardson Adviser Professor Anthony Mughan Department of Political Science UMI Number: 9731753
Copyright 1997 by Yun, Seongyi
All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9731753 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Seongyi Yun 1997 ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the efforts and roles of social movements in South
Korean democratization from 1980 to 1987. The basic assumption of this study is that
civil society’s preparedness was more critical than any other factors in the success or
failure of democratization in South Korea. This study refutes a basic assumption of elite-
focused theories of democratization, which argue that no transition to democracy is
possible without significant divisions within the authoritarian regime itself. The
democratic transition in South Korea in 1987 did not follow the process of the splits
within the ruling bloc. Rather, it occurred without elite fragmentation. It was pressure
from the below, led by active social movement organizations, that forced the cohesive
regime to comply with the people’s demands for democratization.
The preparedness of civil society for democracy is explained by two factors: the
resources of social movement organizations, and alliances of diverse social sectors,
including student, labor, dissident groups, and the urban poor. The amount of resources
and the relative success of alliance were influenced by four aspects of the political opportunity structure: repression of the state, elite fragmentation, external support, and the overall power configuration in the political society. Substantively, this study examines not only state-society relations, but also the horizontal relations of the civil society with itself . Most earlier studies on democratization put their focus on the state or interactions between the state and one of the social sectors. Theoretically, this study accentuates the concept of “political opportunity structure,” which was developed by sociologists, in the study of transitions to democracy.
m Dedicated to my mother
IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I express deep appreciation to my adviser. Professor R. William Liddle, for his endless support and encouragement for all of my days at the Ohio State University.
His warm care made it possible for me to survive in the program and finish my dissertation. I also wish to thank my other committee members. Professor Bradley
Richardson and Professor Anthony Mughan for their academic guidance and instruction.
My appreciation also goes to Professor Shin, Myung Soon at Yonsei University.
Since my college days, he has shown constant affection and encouragement to me. I appreciate Father Na Jin Hum and other members of the Korean Catholic Church in
Columbus who have prayed for me and my family. My days in Columbus have been enriched by my seniors and fiiends including Sohn Sangmin, Kim Moonkyung, Lee
Choongmook, Kim Yongcheol, Lee Myonwoo, Kim Youngho, Roh Kisuk, David Han, Jo
Junhyung, Han Heechul, Min Byungwon, and Hong Wootaek. I appreciate their care and affections. My thanks also go to my colleague, Laura Luehrmann. She spared invaluable time to proofi-ead the final draft of my dissertation.
I cannot thank my mother enough. She is a woman who has sacrificed all her life for her dull son. I hope now that I am able to return even a small portion of her sacrifice and love. I have always been grateful for my wonderful parents-in-law. I will never forget their love and support. I deeply appreciate the other members of my family for their love and support. I must thank Jaehyun, my wife and lifetime partner, for her patience and trust in me. My lovely son and daughter, Donghyun and Suyoung, have been very understanding of their father who could not share enough time with them.
VI VITA
November 11, 1963 ...... Bom-Taegu, South Korea
1986...... B.A. Yonsie University
1988...... M.A. Yonsie University
1993-1994...... Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University
1995-1996 ...... Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University
PUBLICATIONS
1. Seongyi, Yun, “A Comparative Study of Party Faction in Japan and Korea,” Korea
Observer, 25:4, (Winter 1994).
2. Seongyi Yun, “Behavior and Characteristics of Korean Party Factions,” in Yoon
Hyung Sup and Shin Myung Soon, eds., A Study o f Korean Political Process (in
Korean) (Seoul: Bupmoonsa, 1988).
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Political Science
1. Studies in Comparative Politics Political Development Democratization Party Politics vii Japanese Politics Southeast Asian Politics
2. Political Theory Political Philosophy Philosophy of Science
VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ...... ii
Dedication...... iv
Acknowledgments...... v
Vita...... vi
List of Tables...... x
List of Figures...... xi
Chapters:
1. Introduction...... 1
1.1. Problématique...... 1 1.2. Trends of the previous studies on democratization in South Korea...... 7 1.3. Social Movements and the political opportunity structure...... 11 1.4. Periods and Materials ...... 28
2. Aborted democratization and shrunken social movements, October 1979-December 1983 ...... 31
2.1. Introduction...... 31 2.2. Changes in the political opportunity structure...... 33 2.2.1 Political vacuum and elite fragmentation...... 33 2.2.2 Aborted liberalization and retreat to harsh repression...... 38 2.2.3 Absence of external supporters...... 51 2.2.4 Power configuration in the political society...... 55
2.3. Shrunken social movements...... 59 2.3.1 Student movements ...... 59 ix 2.3.2 Labor movements...... 67 2.3.3 Religious community...... 76 2. 4. Implications of the political opportunity structure and social movements 77
3. Decompression and the resurrection of social movements, January 1984-April 1987..80
3.1. Introduction...... 80 3.2. Changes in political opportunity structure...... 82 3.2.1 Relaxation of political control and retreat to harsh repression...... 82 3.2.2 External supports...... 91 3.2.3 Power configuration in the political society...... 94 3.3. Social movements...... 97 3.3.1 Student movements ...... 98 3.3.2 Labor movements...... 115 3.3.3 The poor, farmers and the youth movements...... 125 3.3.4 The dissidents movement and efforts for solidarity ...... 129 3.3.5 Politics of constitutional revision...... 133 3.4. Implications...... 142
4. Democratic transition and the explosion of social movements, April 1987- June 1987 ...... 144
4.1. Introduction...... 144 4.2. Expansion of the political opportunity structure...... 145 4.2.1 Political repression...... 147 4.2.2 Political divisions among regime elites...... 157 4.2.3 External supports fi*om outside of the movement sectors...... 163 4.2.4 Power configuration in the political society...... 176 4.3. Explosion of social movements...... 179 4.3.1 Student movements ...... 182 4.3.2 Labor movements...... 186 4.3.3 TheNCDC and peoples’ power...... 187 4.4. Implications...... 194
5. After the transition; The decline of social movements, July 1987-December 1987 ... 197
5.1 Introduction...... 197 5.2 Constriction of the political opportunity structure...... 198 5.2.1 Revision of the constitution and loosened repression...... 200 5.2.2 Demobilization of the middle class...... 202 5.2.3 Split of opposition party and defeat in the presidential election...... 204 5.3 Social movements...... 213 5.3.1 Explosion of labor movements...... 213 5.3.2 Divisions of social movement forces...... 223
X 5.4. Implications...... 229
6. Conclusion...... 231
6.1 Implications of the political opportunity structure...... 233 6.2 Implications for social movements...... 238
Bibliography...... 243
XI LIST OF TABLES
Table Page 2.1 Number of labor disputes and their patterns ...... 69
2.2 Number of labor-management consultative body ...... 72
2.3 Number of unions and union membership ...... 74
3.1 The number of conscientious prisoners...... 83
3.2 The number of expelled students from school in relation to political protests 84
3.3 Macro-economic index of the Chun government...... 85
3.4 Number of the arrests by the political restriction law in 1980s...... 89
3.5 The result of 1985 National Assembly election...... 96
3.6 CDR, NDR and FDR ...... 107
3.7 Minmintu vs. Jam intu ...... 115
3.8 Number of labor disputes and participants ...... 118
3.9 Number of unions and union membership...... 119
3.10 Small group vs. Regional movement...... 124
4.1 Hunger strike by Catholic priests ...... 164
4.2 Number of professors issued statements demanding retraction of the April 13 measure...... 167
4.3 Trends of occupational wage gap...... 170
4.4 The number of arrest at June 26 rally ...... 187
xii 5.1 Results of the 1987 presidential election...... 210
5.2 Regionalism in 1987 election: Percentage of votes received by major candidates ...... 212
5.3 International comparison of wage raise...... 215
5.4 Number of monthly labor strikes in 1987 ...... 216
5.5 Number of yearly labor strikes, 1979-1987 ...... 216
5.6 Number of newly formed labor union, June 29, 1987-October 31, 1987 ...... 218
5.7 Number of labor disputes according to the size of firms ...... 221
XUl LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page 1.1 A schematic presentation of analytical framework...... 14
2.1 Organization of the NLDL...... 75
3.1 Development of student organizations...... 113
3.2 Organization of the UMMDU...... 132
5.1 International comparison of wage and working hour...... 214
XIV CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problématique
In the long term evolution of studies of democratization, there has been a shift from the modernization theorist or macro-oriented approach to genetic or micro-oriented approaches. ' The modernization literature of the 1960s proposed some socio-economic factors like per-capita income, education and urbanization as prerequisites for democratization of third world countries.^ However, this socio-economic determinism was criticized by genetic theory which emphasizes the key role of elites in democratic transitions. The genetic theorists put their focus on political calculation and choice instead of determination, and on political elites rather than on social structures. They explain democratization as a product of strategic interactions and arrangements among the
‘ Dankwart A. Rustow, “ Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, 3 (April 1970), p. 341. “ For the modernization theory see, Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,”American Political Science Review, 53 (1959); Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1971); Philips Outright, “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 28 (April 1963), pp. 253-264. 1 political elite. That is to say, the possibility of a democratic transition is largely influenced by elite dispositions, calculations, and pacts.^
Even though elite theorists emphasize contingent choice and criticize the modernization theorists for being too deterministic, they also implicitly set a prerequisite for a breakdown of authoritarian regimes and democratic transition. From studies of democratization in Latin America and southern Europe, scholars argue that no transition to democracy can occur without fragmentation of authoritarian elite. Guillermo
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter write: “2%ere is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence-direct or indirect- o f important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners."*
According to elite theorists, divisions within the ruling bloc, that is, splits between hard liners and soft-liners, weaken the authoritarian regime’s grip on the opposition forces and facilitate a democratic transition. As long as the regime keeps its coherence, Philippe
Schmitter says, it can effectively use repression against any significant challenge from the civil society to maintain the regime.^
The elite theorists’ thesis of “no transition without elite fragmentation” has been supported in many southern Europe and Latin America countries.® In the southern Europe
^ Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies” in Transition from Authoritarian Rule, eds. Guillermo O’Dotmell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.48. Guillermo O’Doimell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 19. ’ Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization by Golpe: Perspective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,” Armed Forces and Society, 2: 1(1975), pp. 5-33. ^ For a comprehensive and comparative discussion on the causes of deterioration of authoritarian regimes in southern Europe and Latin America see, Enrique A. Baloyra, “Democratic Transition in Comparative Perspective,” in Errrique A. Baloyra, ed. Comparing New Democracies, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 2 countries, specifically in Greece, Portugal, and Spain splits within the authoritarian
regimes led to their downfall. Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina and
Bolivia faced economic crises during the first half of the 1980s, which led to divisions within the authoritarian regimes and then to democratic transition.
However, the democratic transition in South Korea in 1987 did not follow the process of splits within ruling bloc. Rather, it occurred without elite fragmentation. At the time of the opening to democracy. President Chun Doo Hwan held an iron grip on the regime elite including Roh Tae Woo, his designated successor. No open challenge against
Chun was visible. The ruling bloc remained cohesive on the whole. Any symptoms of serious splits between hard-liners and soft-liners, which preceded democratic transition in southern Europe and Latin America countries, did not appeared in South Korea at the time of the opening in 1987.
Then, what caused the opening of the authoritarian regime in South Korea? I argue that it was the pressure from below, led by social movement organizations, that forced the cohesive regime to comply with the people’s demands for democratization.
The elite-oriented theory’s ‘top-down bias’ has conveyed a false picture that democratic transition is often imposed by elites on a politically inactive citizenry.^ That the ruling bloc is cohesive does not necessarily mean that the regime is being supported by
pp. 9-52. For other studies of this perspective see, L.B. Pereira, Development and Crisis in Brazil: 1930- 1983 (Boulder Westview Press, 1984); Nicos Poulantzas, The Crisis o f Dictatorship: Portugal, Greece, Spain (London: New Left Books, 1976): Phillippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization by Golpe: Prospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,”Armed Forces and Society 2:1 (1975); Donald Share, The Making o f Spanish Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1986). ’ Geroge Sorensen,Democracy and Democratization (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 57-58. 3 a docile population, and that it completely controls the opposition forces. Schmitter
argues that a collapse of authoritarian regime and democratization is caused mainly by
divisions within the authoritarian regime not outside it.* However, sources of regime
crisis are not limited to splits of ruling elite It may come from the outside of the regime,
i.e., the civil society. An empowered and politically active civil society can threaten the
authoritarian regime and force it to follow the process of democratic transition. Since
elite-oriented studies focus on the actual transition process, the ignoring long pre
transition period, they overemphasize the role of elites’ calculations, choices and pacts and
make the serious mistake of ignoring civil society.
Even though political elites are the principal actors in the process of democratic
transition, it must still be explained why the regime faces elite fragmentation. The elite-
oriented studies generally focus on the actual transition period and do not pay much
attention to the long pre-transition period in which the authoritarian regime deteriorates
and faces a regime crisis. Their discussions generally concentrate on how the
authoritarian, regime which is already facing crisis, collapses, rather than why and how the
regime was brought to that crisis. Actually, “divisions among ruling elites” are manifested
by elites’ diflferent opinion concerning how to deal with political crises. In most transition
cases the ruling elites did not voluntarily initiate the democratic transition, and they did not
step down from power without any significant challenges from below. Therefore, we need to study why and how the regime encountered serious challenges from below. Joe
Foweraker clearly points out that the elite-oriented theory unfairly gives whole credit for
Philippe C. Schmitter, Ibid. the democratic transition “to those who negotiated its terms in the last year or so of the
old regime, rather than to those thousands of individuals who fought and suffered over
many years to achieve democratic rights.”^
By overemphasizing the role of elites in the actual transition process, and ignoring the important, even decisive role sometimes played by components of civil society, the
elite-oriented perspective is unable to fully explain why democratization occurs. Elite theorists neglect the simple fact that “actors other than elites can choose democratization
(or its opposite) or follow paths of collective action that enhance the possibility of either one.”‘°
Another problem of elite-oriented theory is that it risks falling into excessive voluntarism by overemphasizing contingent choice. “ By being elusive to structural determinism and instead emphasizing contingent choice of the elite, the genetic theory enables political scientists to address more analytical explanation of the dynamic transition process. However, elite-oriented theory neglects the fact that political choices and strategies by actors are conditioned by structural constraints. In the process of transition, elites do not have unlimited choice. When elites make contingent choices, the social structure in which they are embedded must be considered.
® Joe Foweraker,Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, /P55-/P75(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. vii-viii. Sidney Tarrow, “Mass Mobilization and Regime Change: Pacts, Reform, and Popular Power in Italy (1918-1922) and Spain (1975-1978) in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandourous, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds. The Politics o f Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 207. " Terry Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,”Comparative Politics, October 1990, p. 3. 5 Social movement organizations played an extremely important role in South
Korean democratization. The South Korean case belongs to the “society-led regime
termination” typology among eight categories of democratization paths characterized by
Alfred Stepan. Other cases like Greece, Peru, and Argentina circa 1970, are cases in
which the transition was heavily influenced by the presence of strong opposition forces.*^
Authoritarian regimes, in those three countries, however, were characterized by poor
performance and low capacities. Their successful transitions were the results of having a
“weak state” and “strong society.”
However, due to the long tradition of a centralized state structure and the Japanese
colonial legacy of a strong state apparatus, the South Korean state has possessed an
unusually high degree of autonomy from society, as well as a tightly controlled economy
and society.The power of the state was only intensified during the successful economic
development under the Park Jung Hee administration. To Park Chung Hee, who usurped
power from the democratic government by a military coup, economic growth was
considered the only means to establish the political legitimacy of the regime. During the
Park regime, economic growth was achieved under the strong guidance and regulation of the “developmental state.” Successful economic development enabled the state to possess
sufficient resources to guide and regulate society. The Chun Doo Hwan government was also very successful in terms of economic development at the time of democratic transition in 1987. The negative economic growth rate of 1980 (-3.7%) changed to 13.0% in 1987,
*' GuiUermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, p. 19. Ibid., pp. 19-20. and the inflation rate had decreased from 28.7% to 3.0%. South Korea’s vicious foreign debt was redeemed until 1986, and the government’s account went into the black.
Therefore, we may find a more persuasive answer for the successful transition in South
Korea from the strong civil society, rather than from the poor performance of the authoritarian regime.
In order to overcome the limits of the elite-oriented studies and to fully explain the democratization processes in South Korea, this study will focus on the role of civil society, specifically social movements, during the pre-transition period, as well as the actual transition processes to consider change in the political structures conditioning them.
1.2 Trends of Previous Studies on Democratization in South Korea .
A modem polity may be divided into three important arenas; “civil society” where manifold social movements and civic organizations from all classes advance their interests;
“political society” in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus; and “the state” which includes the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive system.'^ For full appreciation of the dynamics of democratization, I argue all three arenas and their interactions should be carefully observed. However, previous studies on democratization in South Korea were too much skewed to one arena, “the state.”
Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in Hagen Koo, ed..State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.248. Aifted Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics'. Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University P r ^ , 1988), pp. 3-4. 7 To date, many studies on democratization in South Korea have singly emphasized
the role of political elites. They explain the democratic transition in 1987 as a product of
elites’ disposition, calculation and pacts. Their story is as follows*®: At the time of
transition, the Chun regime suffered from an internal power struggle between the hard
liners, who preferred to maintain the current constitution and to physically repress the
unrest in civil society, and the soft-liners, who would accommodate peoples’ demand for
constitutional revision, including direct election of the president. The soft-liners had the
momentum to forestall the hard-line faction when the latter attempted to cover up the
torture and death of a college student. Outrage spread throughout the country. Having
the initiative in the internal power struggle, the soft-liners then dramatically expanded their
support base in the military, bureaucratic, and business elite. At last Roh Tae Woo, the
presidential candidate of the ruling party, and his moderate followers, declared an 8-point
democratization package against President Chun Doo Hwan and the hard-liners.
However, elite-oriented studies attempted to apply too hastily the elitist
perspective in South Korean case. First of all, there was not any sign of significant elite
fragmentation at the time of the transition. Even though the elite-oriented studies
identified the divisions between hard and soft liners as a primary cause of democratic
transition, they did not specifically and clearly identify even core members of each faction.
At the time of the transition. President Chun held elites, both in the government and in the
James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,”Political Studies, 37 (1989), pp. 244-259: Im Hyug-Baeg, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,” Korean Social Science Journal, 21 (1995), pp. 133-151: Im Hyug-Baeg, Politics o f Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1989: Mah In-Sub, Capitalist Development and Democratization in South Korea: A Study on the Socioeconomic Structure and Political Process, Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1991. 8 military, in an iron grip. Second, elite-oriented studies neglect the role of social movement
organizations united under the leadership of the peak organization, the National Coalition
for Democratic Constitution. In the face of fierce pressure fi’om the opposition forces and
the people, the Chun regime did not have any choice other than to concede to the
demands for democratization. Third, elite theorists argue that Rho Tae Woo, leader of the
moderates, preemptively declared the 8-point democratization package over Chun’s
protests. However, it was revealed later that the June 29 Declaration, which promised
direct presidential elections, amnesty to the opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, release of
political prisoners, and more fi-eedom for the press, was originally Chun’s idea and that he
persuaded a hesitant Roh to accept it. According to many sources, Roh was at first
strongly opposed to Chun’s idea to accept a direct presidential election, believing that it
would be political suicide for Roh.^’
Another shortcoming of previous democratization studies is that many of them
deal very narrowly with one sector of civil society; either labor, student, farmers or the
middle class, focusing on interactions of this group with the state, and neglecting
horizontal interactions between difierent social sectors. Alfi'ed Stepan criticizes this trend
The most current material on this issue is Kim Yong 0, “6.29eui Jinsang,” (The real picture of the June 29th concession) WIN (March 1995), pp. 52-59. Also see, “6.29 Suneon, Chun Doo Hwaneui Jakpum,” (The June 29 Declaration, Work of Chun Doo Hwan) lFo/ga/j(monthly)Chosun (June 1989); Kim Sung Woo, “ Igeosi 6,29eui Jinsangida,” ( This is a True History of the June 29 Declaration ),Wolgan Chosun ( November 1992), pp. 162-169; “Roh Tae Woowa Nasaie,” (Between Roh Tae Woo and Me),Wolgan Chosun (August 1992), pp. 357-407; Kim Seong Woo, “Chun Doo Hwan, Yeoksaeul wihan yuksong jeungeun,” (Chun Doo Hwan, A live voice testimony for history),Wolgan Chosun (January 1992), pp. 290-336; (February 1992), pp. 292-401. of previous studies on civil society, saying that “[M]ost scholars became specialists on the oppositional activity of specific fragments of civil society.”
In the South Korean case, there has been a substantial attempt to locate the causes and momentum of democratic transition in civil society, rather than the political elites.
However, most of this research focuses on individual social sectors, and few studies analyze the cooperation and conflict between different social sectors and movement organizations. By focusing on the interactions of the state and one social sector, they ignore interactions among different social actors, like interactions between labor and student groups, the middle class and labor, etc. These interactions among various social sectors have as much significance as interactions between the social sectors and the state.
Collaboration and division among various social sectors were really significant factors conditioning the success or failure, as well as the speed and scope of democratization attempts. When diverse social movement organizations were able to succeed in accommodating their differences and establish an anti-regime coalition, they could use this initiative in their struggles against the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, when these organizations were unable to reconcile their differences on such matters as ideology, strategy and goals, divisions emerged which prevented them from becoming a significant threat to the authoritarian regime.
In South Korea, the successful formation of peak organizations by opposition forces, including the United Minjoong (masses) Movement for Democracy and
Unification, in March 1985, and the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution, in
Alfred Stepan, Ibid., p. 6. 10 May 1987, played an extremely decisive role in facilitating the democratic transition. In the face of vigorous challenges from the united opposition forces, the authoritarian regime could not but accommodate their demands for democratization.
1.3 Social Movements and the Political Opportunity Structure
Analvtical framework
Democratic transition is not solely a consequence of elite fragmentation, as many elite-focused studies of democratization contend. Instead, it may happen without elite fragmentation, if the civil society of the country is strong enough to force the authoritarian regime to accept some measures of democratization.
After the assassination of President Park Jung Hee in October 1979, there was a critical power vacuum in Korea. Even the military, arguably the most influential actor, was divided into two groups: the “new military” group, led by Chun Doo Hwan, and a group of senior general oflBcers. Yet, the transition to democracy in Korea did not occur in 1979, but rather in 1987. And, contrary to what elite theories would have predicted for
Korea at this latter time, there were no significant divisions among elites, and President
Chun Doo Hwan still held real and unchallenged power.
The critical difference between the abortive transition in 1979 and the successful transition in 1987 can be found in the different levels of pressure placed on the authoritarian leaders from the opposition forces, especially from social movements. In late
11 1979 and early 1980, social movement sectors in Korea were very weak and isolated from each other, so that their struggle against the regime was ineffective. On the other hand, social movement organizations in 1987 were much better organized, able to cooperate under the leadership of a peak organization, the National Coalition for Democratic
Constitution, and therefore played a critical role in the transition. In short. It was organized and powerful social movements, rather than elite fragmentation, which facilitated democratic transition in South Korea.
Where do these movements come from? Two factors determine the level of readiness of civil society for democratization: the resources available to social organizations, and the creation of alliances among social sectors. As social sectors such as student, labor, dissident groups, and the religious community build sound organizations, plentiful material bases, strong leadership, reliable quantity and quality of membership, etc., they become more prepared and able to carry out more productive and robust struggles against authoritarian regimes. Alliances among social sectors are often essential for effective struggle on the part of civil society. South Korea, for example, does not have a class structure in which one class is dominant enough to conduct a successful democratization movement alone. The strength of civil society comes instead from cooperation among diverse sectors. When these sectors are divided, as they were in the aborted democratization of 1980, they cannot successfully resist military intervention. On the other hand, when they succeed in building umbrella organizations, as they did in 1987, they are able to put more pressure on the authoritarian regime.
12 The increase and decrease in levels of resources, and the success or failure of alliance formation must be placed in the context of the political opportunity structure facing social movements. The political opportunity structure comprises the “consistent - but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.”'^ When the political opportunity structure expands, social sectors have more of a chance to increase their resources and establish alliances. In my study, the expansion and constriction of the political opportunity structure is determined by four variables: repression of the state; elite fragmentation; existence of supportive forces outside of social movement organizations; and the power configuration in the political society (i.e. political parties).
As the level of repression increases, the political opportunity structure for social movement organizations will be constricted, and vice versa. In South Korea, the alleviation of repression, beginning in late 1983, is a key factor explaining the revitalization of social movements and the transition from authoritarianism to liberalization. Elite fragmentation, the variable stressed by elite theorists, is important, but only as one dimension of the political opportunity structure. Elite fragmentation certainly opens space for opposition forces. Elite fragmentation occurs when hard-liners and soft- liners differ on how to handle civil discontent. The existence of sustained support from outside the social movement organizations, in the Korean case, this was the middle class and the United States, explains a large part of the difference between the aborted
’^Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New Yoric: 13 democratization of 1980 and the successful transition in 1987. The emergence of strong
opposition parties and their alliances with social movement forces place meaningful
pressure on the authoritarian regime and facilitated democratic transition. The success of
the opposition party, the New Korean Democratic Party, in the 1985 National Assembly,
election provided an expanded political opportunity structure in which opposition forces
could operate.
The relationship of the political opportunity structure and social movements is
reciprocal. That is to say, an expanded structure of political opportunity provides social
movement forces more political resources and chances for success, and simultaneously,
the strengthened social forces can transform the political opportunity structure in their
favor.^°
(ID) (DV) Social Movement Organizations------► Democratization 1. resources 2. alliances
Political Opportunity Structure 1. repression of the state 2. elite fragmentation 3. existence of supporting forces outside of social movement organizations 4. power configuration in political society
Figure 1.1: A schematic presentation of the analytical framework
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development o f Black Insurgency 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 146. 14 Plan of dissertation
To explain the democratization process in South Korea from 1979 to 1987,1 first
describe the political opportunity structure and its changes through four phases of the
Korean democratization process. These phases are: aborted democratization and
shrunken social movements (October 1979- December 1983), liberalization and
mobilization of social movements (January 1984-April 1987), democratic transition (April
1987-June 1987) and demobilization in the post-transition period (July 1987-December
1987). After this, I highlight how changes in the political opportunity structure affected
resource mobilization and alliance building by diverse social sectors.
Second, I demonstrate that “civil society” cannot be viewed as a unified actor or
set of actors in the pursuit of democratization. At some phases, social sectors cooperated
with each other, and at others they split. Even though they agreed in their hostility to the
authoritarian regime, their definitions of democracy and of methods of struggle were
rarely identical. Neither were their political opportunity structures the same. As the
structure of political opportunity transformed, some social sectors or some organizations in one sector gained more strength, while others lost their vitality.
In sum, changes in the Korean political opportunity structure had varying impacts on each sector of society: labor, students, dissidents, intellectuals, and church communities. By closely examining changes in political opportunity structures, I examine why and how each social sector gained strength and altered its goals, strategies, and alliances in the quest for democratic governance.
15 The concept of political opportunity structure
In this study, I use the concept of “political opportunity structure,” a concept
developed by sociologists to study social movements, and demonstrate its usefulness for the study of democratization. O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that “normal science methodology” is inappropriate in rapidly changing situations like liberalization and democratization, and this type of situation should be analyzed with distinctive political concepts, however vaguely delineated and difiBcult they are to conceptualize.^ The concept of political opportunity structure, I argue, satisfies these requirements. The concept of political opportunity structures help us understand why and how social movements gain strength, put reformist pressure on the authoritarian regime and then lose their vitality.^
The idea of political opportunity structure, however, is not a precisely organized fi-amework. Studies dealing with different cases of political opportunity structure fail to specify the same sets of variables that influence the success or failure of social movements in different contexts. This flexibility, however, it most effective in explaining diverse and rapidly changing political situations.
*' For the development of the idea of political opportunity structure, see Peter Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” i4/nmconPolitical Science Review 67:1 (March 1973), pp. II- 28; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1976); Doug McAdam, The Political Process and the Development o f Black Insurgency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti- Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,”British Journal o f Political Science 16:1 (January 1986), pp. 57-85; Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles o f Protest, Cornell University, Western Societies Paper no. 21 (1989); Sidney Tarrow,Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics ( New Yodc Cambride University Press, 1994). “ O’Doimell and Schmitter, “Tentative conclusions about imcertain democracies,” p. 4. ^ Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, pp. 85-86. 16 The concept of “political opportunity structure” was suggested as an alternative to
two approaches: “resource mobilization” theory, which focuses on factors internal to
social movements; and “new social movement” theory of macrosociological model. Both
resource mobilization theory and new social movement theory were criticized for failing to
show clear connections between politics and movements.^'* Resource mobilization theory
emphasizes internal variables including membership recruitment, internal organization,
goals, and coalition building. In this, it often overlooks such institutional constraints as
relations between strategic choices and societal impacts of movements, as well as specific
properties of the external political opportunity structures.^ New social movement theory
provides a global understanding of such diverse movements as the ubiquitous
environmental, feminist, and pacifist movements, by placing them under umbrella of “life
space”. However, it is not so successful in explaining variation in outcome fi-om one
movement and country to the next due to its disregard of indigenous characteristics of
varying political contexts.^®
As an alternative to both resource mobilization theory and new social movement
theory, the concept of political opportunity structure takes account not only organizational
resources, but also patterns of interactions between the state and movement organizations,
as well as interactions among movement organization themselves. The concept of political
opportunity structure is also sensitive to the diversity of difierent political contexts, and it
Sidney Tarrow, “National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States,” Annual Review o f Sociology (1988), p. 421. ^ Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,”British Journal o f Political Science, 16 (1986), p. 60. Sidney Tarrow, “Understanding Political Change in Eastern Europe,” PS: Political Science & Politics, 24:1 (March 1991), p. 14. 17 is therefore able to explain different processes and outcomes of similar movements in
different countries, or in different periods in the same country.
The concept of political opportunity structure evolved in the 1970s, in theories
elaborated by Eisinger, Piven and Cloward and Jenkins and Perrow.^’ The concept was
then discussed more formally by McAdam, Kitschelt, Tarrow and Brockett.^*
Eisinger used political opportunity structure as a set of independent variables to
explain which urban governments of the United States were most likely be targets of
protest in the late 1960s. From his study, Eisinger suggested the theory of an inverted U-
curve relationship between political opportunities and movement mobilization. He argued
that the mixture of “open” and “closed” institutions were most likely to encounter protest.
While extremely closed governments repressed and deterred protests, open and responsive
government assimilated discontent and demands.
In their study of farm worker movements, Jenkins and Perrow (1977) argued that
farm workers had more favorable political opportunities and greater chances of success
when outside support and tolerance of political elites were prevalent. The greatest
contrast between farm movements’ in the 1960s and their failure in the 1940s, they
argued, can be found in the attitudes of support organizations and the government. This is
Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,”American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), pp. 11-28; Frances F. Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York; Vintage Books, 1972); J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, “Insurgence of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972),” American Sociological Review, 42 (April 1977), pp. 249-268. ^ Doug McAdam, op. cit..; Herbert Kitschelt, op. cit.; Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform; Charles D. Brockett, “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics, 23 (1991), pp. 253-274. 18 in contrast to explaining outcomes as determined by an organization’s goals, tactics, latent
anxiety or the intensity of social change.
Sidney Tarrow elaborated on the concept of political opportunity structure and
also extended the applicability of it to the study of democratization. Criticizing the poor
preparedness of social scientists for the waves of mobilization in Eastern Europe, he
contended that “mass breaks of collective action are best understood as the collective
responses of citizens, groups and elites to an expanding structure of political
opportunities.”^
Tarrow identified four components of the political opportunity structure;(l) open
or closed polity; (2) stability of political alignments; (3) presence or absence of allies and
support groups; and (4) division within political elites.^" That is, political opportunities
are more open and the likelihood of movement success is higher when the channels of
movement organizations to the polity begin to open, when established political alignments are in disarray, when major conflicts within political elites exist, and when influential allies are available within or outside the system.^'
From his study of civil right movements, McAdam suggested a political process model as an alternative to classical theory on social movements and resource mobilization theory. He argued that the existence of strains or a significant increase in the resources available to movement organizations are necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for insurgence to occur. The generation of insurgence, according to McAdam, can be
^ Sidney Tarrow, “Understanding Political Change in Eastern Europe,” p. 13. “ Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics and Reform, pp. 34-35.
19 explained by three factors: (1) the level of movement organization; (2) the level of
“insurgent consciousness” within the masses; and (3) the structure of political opportunities available to insurgent groups/^
McAdam argued that the process of “cognitive liberation,” which transforms a certain objective structural potential for collective action into subjective meanings, is essential to the initiation of collective action/" An expanded political opportunity structure, according to McAdam’s political process model, is not enough to produce a social movement, even though it provides increased opportunities for successful social protest. An expanded political opportunity structure furnishes only the structural potential for successful collective action, while actual insurgency takes place only after cognitive liberation.^**
In the comparative study of anti-nuclear movements in four Western countries,
Kitschelt argued that strategies of collective action and outcomes of social movements can be explained by political opportunity structures. Kitschelt criticized Eisinger’s theory of a curvilinear relationship between openness and movement mobilization as a one-sided conceptualization of political opportunity structures. He argued that the output side of policy cycle, that is, the capacity of political system to implement public policy, should also be considered a significant component of any political opportunity structure. From his study, Kitschelt found that collective action, in a relatively open and capable political
Sidney Tarrow, “Understanding Political Change in Eastern Europe,” p. 15. Doug McAdam, op. cit., p. 40. Ibid., p. 48. ^ Ibid., p. 51. 20 system, can produce innovation, while in polities that are closed and weak, policy - making immobility is the common result./"
In his study of peasant mobilization in Central America, Brockett contended that
“collective action is as much a function of the political realities confronting members and challengers at any given time as it is of grievances, group organization, availability of resources, or underlying socioeconomic change—which can be conceptualized as the structure of political opportunities.”^® The expansion or constriction of the political opportunity structure available to peasants in Central America, Brockett argued, depended mostly on the following five variables: (1) the existence of support groups, such as church workers, foreign governments and private organizations; (2) meaningful access points such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, and top-level executive decision makers; (3) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression; (4) conflict among elites, which include not only domestic state and economic elites and a supportive middle class, but also a hegemonic power such as the United States; and (5) location in the protest cycle, even though this may be less significant in Central America, where meaningful access to the political system and rule of law are not institutionalized.
Brockett also evaluated the usefulness of each of the five variables of political opportunity structure. According to him, the existence of allies able to reconfigure the distribution of power was the key factor in the success of peasant mobilization throughout
Central America.^’ At the same time, however, he conceded that three regime-related
Herbert Kitschelt, op. ci t., p. 84. Charles Brockett, op. cit., p. 253. Ibid., p. 268. 21 variables, that is, elite fragmentation, repression, and political access, would be more
useful for explaining different collective action outcomes between different periods in a
country or between countries.^*
Political opportunitv structures and the studv of democratization in South Korea
Political opportunity structures may be comprehended in many ways. As was
demonstrated above, it is a cluster of variables rather than one single one. Even though
scholars of political opportunity structure share the basic assumption that the success of
social movements is a consequence of expanded political opportunity structure, they
suggest somewhat different variables conditioning fluctuations in the political opportunity
stmcture. This is one of the major problems with the political opportunity structure
approach. For example, even though electoral dealignment proved useful indicator of the
Civil Rights movement’s emergence in the United States, it would not be very functional
in authoritarian regimes.'’®
Political opportunity structure is a construct that must be specified and
operationalized in different ways for different cases, because variables affecting the
expansion or constriction of political opportunity structure will vary according to the
political circumstances found in individual countries. Therefore, researchers are required
to have detailed and correct knowledge of their cases, in order to identify the appropriate
Ibid. 39 Sidney Tarrow, “Understanding Political Change in Eastern Europe,” p. 16. 22 characteristics of their proper political opportunity structures. This naturally limits the
number of cases in comparative study.
Another major problem of political opportunity structure approach relating to my
study is that its application is mostly in industrialized democracies. Therefore, the
resulting frameworks cannot be usefully applied to non-Westem countries.'*^
Therefore, some identification of the elements of political opportunity structure is required to reflect the distinctive political reality of South Korea and her democratization movement. I suggest four variables which seem to have considerable significance for the
Korean political opportunity structure; repression of the state, presence or absence of supporting forces outside of the social movement organizations, elite fragmentation, and power configuration in the political society (i.e., political parties).
Analysis of these four variables helps overcome some limits of previous studies of democratization and civil society, specifically their neglect of the process leading to regime crisis, and their exclusive focus on the activities of a specific component of the civil society, e.g. labor or students. With this expansion of political opportunity structure, I can explain why and how movement organizations developed and succeeded in establishing alliances among themselves, and how social movements brought about a significant crisis in the authoritarian regime. With the construct of political opportunity structure, I can also see the horizontal relation of civil society with itself and the interaction of civil society and political parties, as well as internal contradictions within the state.
Charles Brockett, op. cit., p.253. 23 My first variable, “repression,” is similar to other scholars’ “openness or closure of polity.” In Eisinger’s 1973 study, “open or closed polity” was the most influential determinant of the level of political protest in urban government. The openness of a polity may be measured by the level of repression against the demands fi"om aggrieved people.
In South Korea, the relaxation of state repression in late 1983 played a critical role in revitalizing social movements that had been in hibernation since the Kwangju massacre in
May 1980. Based on its economic success, and on various legal and institutional devices facilitating repression, the Chun regime had confidence that it could curb opposition movements without resorting to physical repression. The regime also needed to rehabilitate its damaged legitimacy to obtain a stable majority in the National Assembly election scheduled for early 1985. The actual result of this decompression policy, however, turned out quite different fi'om its original intentions. By loosening repression, they intended to weaken social movements by separating the radicals firom the moderates.
However, the decompression measures provided the social movement sectors momentum to wake up fi'om their long dormancy.
The level of repression in South Korea varied depending on regime elites’ perception of and attitudes toward the opposition forces. The fluctuation of repression is manifest in several measures. First of all, the degree of repression can be assessed by exploring the legal restrictions imposed on the political activities of workers, students, opposition leaders and other dissidents. The authoritarian regime counts on various laws regarding assembly, national security, labor unions, the press, and others, to effectively
24 suppress the development of anti-regime movements. Infringements on human rights,
such as house arrests, torture, illegal detention by the government apparatus, are
indications of clear government repression. The degree of government repression is
affected by the number of political prisoners, political arrests, purged politicians and
bureaucrats, and expelled students and professors.
The second variable, “presence or absence of external supporters,” has been
presented in many studies as one of the most critical factors for the expansion of political
opportunities and movement success. In their study of the farm workers’ movement,
Jenkins and Perrow contend that external sponsorship played a critical role in launching
farm workers’ movements in the United States."**
The role of influential allies has proven almost essential for social movements in
non-democratic countries."*^ In South Korea, the ordinary people and the United States
have been influential external actors in democratization movements. In 1980, when the
two were inactive or supported the military regime, the democratization movement failed.
On the other hand, active support from ordinary citizens unattached to any social
movement organizations, was critical in the success of the 1987 transition. When the
ordinary people, the so-called “silent majority,” joined the protests in 1987, the
government could not but admit the fact that the voice of discontent was not limited to
radical segments in society. The participation of the formerly “silent majority” reduced the cost of protest and raised the cost of repression. Support from the United States was
also critical in the 1987 success. When the United States government, which had been an
25 ally of the authoritarian regime, decided to support the democratization movement in
1987, the Chun regime could no longer resist the demand to democratize.
Third, “elite fragmentation,” certainly gives more room for actors to maneuver, and increases challengers’ chances for success. As the elite-oriented approach explains, when elite fragmentation exists, there is simply more of a chance for a democratic transition. When political, military, and economic elites are cohesive, however, the political opportunity for challengers to mobilize resources and to create alliances is constricted, and the cost of protest is high.
This variable will be critically tested in the South Korean case. For the test of elite theorists’ axiom, “no transition without elite division,” the following questions will be closely examined. First, did regime elites remain cohesive during the pre-transition period, with elite divisions appearing only during the transition? Second, if there was elite division before the transition, was it as serious as an internal power struggle between the hard-liners and moderate faction? Third, as the elite theorists explain, was the democratic transition carried out by the cooperation between soft-liners in the regime and moderate opposition forces, over the protest of the hard-liners?
The final variable of the political opportunity structure I conceptualize is “power configuration in the political society.” The existence of a strong opposition party provided a significantly expanded political opportunity structure for demonstration movement.
Social movement forces and the opposition party had many differences in their ideologies
■" J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, op.cit., p. 266. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 88. 26 and tactics for the democratization movement. While most of the social movement forces advocated the pursuit of M injung (masses) democracy, guaranteeing masses rights and participation in the politics, the opposition party pursued liberal democracy. In terms of tactics, while social movement forces mostly resorted to force, in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and other violent means of accomplishing of their goal, the opposition party emphasized dialogue with the regime and party politics. Despite of their differences, however, they were able to cooperate with each other in the democratization movement because they had a common enemy, the authoritarian regime.
Another reason that an existence of the opposition party helped the democratization movement was that it existed as a credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. Because of their confrontation with a communist regime. North Korea, South
Korean people are relatively conservative, and especially distasteful of socialist ideas.
Therefore, extreme leftists and even moderate socialists have found it extremely difiBcult to survive in South Korean society, and social movement forces pursuing socialists ideas could not be perceived as an alternative to the authoritarian regime. When people joined the democratization movement, they thought the opposition party, rather than radical social movement forces, would replace the military dictatorship. The South Korean people perceived that only liberal democratic forces, the opposition party, had a legitimate claim to political power. This was demonstrated by the inability of any social movement forces to form an independent political group and compete in the presidential election, despite their decisive role in the democratization movement.
27 1.4 Periods and Materials
For my study, I divide the phase of the democratization movement into four
periods: abortive democratization movement and strong authoritarian regime (October
1979-December 1983); liberalization stage (January 1984-April 1987); democratic
transition (April 1987-June 1987); and demobilization in post-transition period (July 1987-
December 1987).
The first period covers the assassination of President Park Jung Hee until just
before the Chun government adopted its decompression policy. Except for the first
several months leading up to the Chun regime, political opportunities had been very
constricted, and social movements had been extremely inactive. The second period runs
from the government’s execution of its relaxation policy until President Chun’s April 13'*'
prohibition of any discussion of constitutional revision. Owing to the loosened repression
of the state and the emergence of a strong opposition party, the opportunities for social
movements considerably expanded, and movement organizations gathered the momentum
needed to revitalize themselves. The transition period continues until the Chun government surrendered to the opposition forces and announced an 8-point
democratization package. Social movements were highly potent, owing to support from the ordinary people and the United States. The fourth period starts after the June 29 transition and continues until the presidential election in December 1987. Opposition forces were defeated in the presidential election, primarily due to their internal divisions and procedural democratization did not lead to substantive democracy.
28 Data for this study were obtained basically through documentary search. For information on social movement organizations and their activities, I depended on organizational publications, yearbooks, handbills, manifestos, memoirs, etc. As part of their eflforts to advertise activities and gain support, many movement organizations published their own newspapers, weekly, monthly and yearly reports. For an objective and balanced interpretation of social movements, I used newspapers in South Korea and the United States, Korean government data, publications by international human rights watch organizations as well as the United States Congressional publications. Secondary sources for democratic movements are generally rich in Korean. Recently, considerable eflforts have been made by many scholars to evaluate the role of civil society and social movements in democratization process.
For detailed information on social movements and interactions between movement organizations, I conducted interviews with an opposition party member, former student activists, labor activists and dissidents. Interviews were conducted in August and
September, 1995 in Seoul. Interviewees include Park Chan Jong, a former National
Assemblyman and 1992 presidential candidate, Kim Young Chun, Seoul City
Assemblyman and a former member of the M ichuhyup (The Council for the Promotion of
Democracy, CPD), Park Hyung Kyu, a former expert advisor to the CPD, Whang In
Sung, a former member of the National Coalition for Democratic Coalition, and three student activists and students-tumed-workers.
29 Interviews focused on finding out collaborations and conflicts among diverse
opposition forces. Interviews with different organizations’ members enabled me to
understand their perceptions of each other. Opposition forces did not always cooperate
with each other in the democratization process. Their solidarity was not always based on
common interests and mutual trust, either. Sometimes, practical necessity made
heterogeneous forces cooperate. Interviews provided detailed information on relations
between the opposition party and social movement sectors, ideological conflicts among
student organizations, solidarity between different social movement forces, especially between students and workers, processes and operation of umbrella organizations, and
collaboration and competition between the two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young
Sam and Kim Dae Jung.
30 CHAPTER 2
ABORTED DEMOCRATIZATION AND SHRUNKEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, OCTOBER 1979- DECEMBER1983
2.1 Introduction
In the wake of long-time authoritarian leader Park Jung Hee’s assassination in
1979, many people believed South Korea had a very good chance to make a transition to democracy. All dimensions of the political opportunity structure were unexpectedly expanded in favor of successful social movements and democratization.
First, under the Park regime, power was centralized in the hands of the president, and recently exercised in collaboration with his close associates, Cha Ji Chul, head of the
Presidential Security Force, and Kim Jae Kyu, director of the South Korean Intelligence
Agency (KCIA). As all three men who had been in charge of regime maintenance and repression of the opposition forces were suddenly removed from the scene by death or detention, the government’s repressive control on civil society was considerably reduced.
Second, the assassination of President Park pushed South Korea into a political vacuum.
Since Park had not groomed an heir, there was no clear rallying point for the regime elite to gather to dispel uncertainty over the future of the country. Without an obvious center of the power structure, both the ruling Democratic Republican Party and the military
31 sufifered from internal conflicts. Third, with the death of their long time dictator, strong aspirations for democratization surfaced among the South Korean people. They were convinced that no force could stand in the way of the country moving towards mature democracy. The United States, which had been very critical of the Park regime’s violation of human rights, showed outright support for a peaceful transition to democracy, and warned the military not to intervene in politics. Fourth, Park’s demise bred a sudden and unexpected change in the balance of power, lending more weight to the opposition
New Democratic Party of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. The NDP, which outpoUed the ruling DRP by 1.1% in the 1978 National Assembly election, was popular and strong enough to be perceived as an alternative to the long time authoritarian regime.
Taking advantage of the expanded political opportunity structure in the immediate aftermath of Park’s assassination, social movement sectors such as students, labor, dissidents and the religious community gradually began to voice the accumulated and formerly unexpressed discontent and aspirations for democracy of the South Korean people. They were eager to cleanse the vestiges of Park’s authoritarian rule embedded throughout society. They pressed the interim Choi Kyu Ha government to speed up its democratization program, including lifting the Emergency Decree, releasing all political prisoners and amending the Constitution to provide for the direct, popular election of a permanent successor to Park.
However, the expanded political opportunity structure and associated vigor of social movements did not last long. Less than two months after the death of Park, a group of junior generals, led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan, seized power in a military
32 putsch. They did not conceal their ambition to control the presidency, and they were prepared to eliminate any obstacles in their way. Their brutality was clearly shown in their harsh crackdown of the Kwangju Uprising, with an estimated death toll of several hundred. Ordinary people would not risk their life by challenging the cruel military junta, even though they sympathized with the goal of democratization. The United States maintained its position of being more interested in the security of South Korea, than with its government’s democratization. The opposition NDP suffered from an internal power stmggle between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Neither prominent leader would concede the presidential candidacy to the other. Their division frustrated the public, and they could not envision a respectable alternative to the authoritarian regime.
Less than two months was too short a time to revitalize social movement sectors which had been dormant for a long time under the Park regime. They were still too frail to resist the rise of a new military regime. Under the very constricted structure of political opportunity, social movements abruptly receded. Until the Chun government turned to a relaxation policy in late 1983, social movement sectors, except for a few radical student groups, were quiet.
2.2 Changes in the Political Opportunity Stmcture
2.2.1 Political Vacuum and Elite Fragmentation
Since the Yushin system was established in 1972, the political power of Park Hung
Hee had become increasingly more consolidated. No signs of a serious crack in his ruling circle of the military, bureaucrats, and big business were visible, despite persistent defiance
33 from the opposition politicians and radical students. The collapse of the long-standing
authoritarian regime, however, came from the personal feud between Park’s faithful
servants, Kim Jae Kyu, director of the South Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA),
and Cha Ji Cheol, head of the Presidential Security Force, whose enmity had grown from
their different personalities and competition for Park’s favor. While Kim Jae Kyu was
Park’s old friend and a relatively meek person, Cha Ji Cheol had an arrogant and abrasive
personality. In dealing with student protests and opposition forces, Kim advised President
Park to selectively accommodate protester demands, while Cha wanted harsh repression
and even talked of “running over” dissidents with tanks. ‘ After the assassination of his
wife by a communist in 1975, Park brought in more repressive measures and leaned
toward Cha. In December 1979, the two rivals were confronted with each other over the
proper response to large-scale and violent demonstrations in Pusan and Masan. Berated by Park for not putting down the disturbances in Pusan and Masan at the early stage, Kim decided to turn against Park and killed both him and Cha at a party on October 26, 1979.^
With Park’s assassination, two other men who had been at the center of the power structure, Kim Jae Kyu and Cha Ji ChuL, were also removed from the political scene. This left South Korea in a political vacuum. The assassin, Kim Jae Kyu and an estimated 30-50 senior KCIA agents were arrested by the military, and some of them, including Kim, were later executed. After Park’s assassination, KCIA became the focus of criticism and lost its morality and power. Another main pillar of power, Cha Ji Cheol, the director of the
Presidential Security Forces, was killed with Park. The government party, DRP, also fell
' Far Eastern Economic Review, December 21, 1979, pp. 20-21.
34 into difficulties after the death of their strong leader. The conflict between the legacy of
the Park regime and the need to survive in a democratic future had brought about a
serious split within the DRP. A group of young DRP legislators demanded party
purification and the retirement of old and corrupt members. The DRP also failed to get
support fi-om the military.
After Park’s death, the premier, Choi Kyu Ha, became acting president. He was
later selected by the National Conference for Unification (NCU) as the 10th president on
December 6, 1979. Although Choi was in the presidency under the Yushin Constitution
that allowed the president to exercise absolute power, no one believed that he would be as
strong a leader as Park had been. Choi had been a long-time bureaucrat and lacked any
independent power base.
The military was the only group which could fill the power vacancy left behind by
the demise of Park. However, the military, the real power holder behind the facade of
Choi’s civilian government, was also divided between the young and politically conscious junior generals and the old and more moderate senior generals. The former group was
composed of some major-generals, including Chun Doo Hwan, and their followers. Since the major-generals who graduated fi’om the Korean Military Academy in 1955 were the first group to take the full four-year course, they had much pride as the first “professional”
Korean soldiers.^ They had been the main beneficiaries of Park’s patronage. Therefore, they did not want to rush into dismantling the Yushin structure and move quickly toward
■ For details on Park’s assassination, seeFar Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 1979, pp. 10-16. ^ Far Eastern Economic review, December 28, 1979, p. 28. 35 democratization.'* The other faction was a group of senior generals, including Martial Law
Commander Cheong Seung Hwa, who had made it clear that they did not have any intention of using their power and would support civilian efforts to democratize.^ The differences and hatred between the two groups were irreconcilable.
This fragmentation indwelled in the ruling circles provided opposition forces and civil society with a golden opportunity for democratization. However, divided and immature they could not seize the opportunity, and their opportunity soon receded.
Chun’s forces succeeded in gaining supremacy over the senior general group through an intra-military putsch. The Chief of the General Staff, Cheong Seung Hwa, and senior general ofBcers was to curb their rivalry occupying core positions by transferring Chun to a remote command on the East Coast. However, Chun, the head of the Defense Security
Command realized his rivals’ intentions in advance and carried out a preemptive strike against Chung. On December 12, 1979, Maj. General Chun and his followers moved some 7,500 troops including 6,000 Special Forces of the Ninth Division stationed at the truce line to Seoul without permission of General John A. Wickham, the United States-
ROK Combined Forced Commander.® They arrested the former army chief of staff and martial law commander general Cheong Seung Hwa and 15 other generals, on the pretext of suspicion of involvement in Park’s assassination. Cheong was suspected of being involved in plotting Park’s assassination because he had kept a close relationship with the assassin, Kim Jae Kyu and he was dining at a KCIA building only 50 yards from the shootings on the night of Park’s death.
■' The New York Times, November 2, 1979.
36 After the successful intra-military coup d’etat, in order to consolidate their grip on power. General Chun and his followers seized vital posts in the military including the commander of Special Forces, the commander of the capital Garrison Command, the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to these changes 40 senior ofBcers were forcefully retired. Chun placed Lieut. Gen. Lee Heui Seung at the post of Army
Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander and put his men at three powerful cabinet positions: Defense, Home Affairs and Justice.’ Chim became substantially a number one man in Korea, and there was little doubt that the he had the ability to impose his will on the government.
Once he had succeeded in eliminating opposition in the military, Chun continually moved toward the center of power. On April 14 he was appointed as the acting director of the KCIA, allowing him to report directly to the president, to attend cabinet meetings, and to participate in major government decision making. The KCIA appointment gave
Chun, who was already the head of Defense Security Commander, considerable power.
With concurrent control of South Korea’s two top secret service agencies, one overseeing the nation’s political activities, and the other watching over the armed forces, Chun was now unarguably the strongest man in South Korea.
On August 16, 1980, the figurehead president Choi Kyu Ha resigned to clear the way for Gen. Chun after only 36 weeks in office. Gen. Chun became the number one man in South Korea, both officially and substantially, by being elected the 1 Ith-term President
The New York Times, October 31, 1979. * Far Eastern Economic Review, December 28, 1979, p. 13. ’’ The New York Times, January 26, 1980. 37 on August 27, 1980 with 2,524 out of the 2,525 ballots cast by the electoral college of the
National Conference for Unification (NCU)/
2.2.2 Aborted Liberalization and Retreat to Harsh Repression.
Staggered liberalization
With the demise of long time dictator Park Jung Hee, South Korea seemed able to
begin the prolonged process of democratization. Both the interim government and the
opposition party agreed to the demolition of the Yushin structure and a transition to
democracy. Liberalization measures were taken to relax the strained political situation.
On December 8, 1979, the government revoked Emergency Decree No. 9, and released 68
political prisoners, including former president Yun Po Sun, former opposition presidential
candidate Kim Dae Jung, Quaker writer Ham Sok Hon, Catholic bishop Daniel Hak Soun
Tchi, Protestant leaders Mun Tong Hwan and Mun Dc Hwan, and professors Lee Yong
Hii and Pack Nak Chong.® The government also dropped charges against 224 others
awaiting trials for their anti-government activities under the Park regime. On January 23,
1980, a total of 511 expelled dissident students were allowed to return to school. A further 687 dissidents, including 373 students, 24 professors, 42 religious leaders, 22 opposition politicians and 9 journalists, regained their civil rights on February 29, 1980.*“
However, this early transition to democracy did not proceed continuously or smoothly. After Park’s death, all political and social forces in South Korea agreed that the first step to democratization should be the revision of Yushin Constitution which
Korea Newsreview, August 30, 1980, p. 4.
38 conferred extreme power to one person, the president, selected by a small group in the
NCU. On November 4, 1979, the head of New Democratic Party (NDP) demanded a substitution of the Yushin Constitution and direct elections for the new president and
National Assembly members by April of 1980. In his television address on November 10,
1979, acting president Choi Kyu Ha announced that the next president would be elected by the Yushin Constitution and that constitutional revision would be conducted after this election.*^ However, after Gen. Chun and his followers, opposing precipitate dismantling of the Yushin structure, seized power, the Choi government did not show a sincere will to substitute the Yushin Constitution with a democratic one. In his inaugural address on
December 21, Choi, by arguing that internal conflict and extreme competition for power would hurt national security and social stability, stated that the Yushin Constitution would be revised by the end of 1980 and direct election of the president would ensue within six months after that. And more disputably, the Choi administration established its own 68-man Constitutional Amendment Deliberation Committee on March 14, 1980, despite the fact that the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Constitutional
Revision had already been working on a new democratic constitution since November 27,
1979. Both the DRP and the NDP had agreed on the basic contents of the new constitution which provided for direct election of president for a maximum of two four- year terms, much strengthened powers for the elected parliament to check the operations of the administration and, most importantly, safeguards against the president using his reserve emergency powers to entrench himself in ofiBce as Park had done. This action of
® The New York Times, March 1, 1980.
39 the government raised doubts among opposition forces and the ordinary people about the government’s will to make a new democratic constitution.
The government’s sluggish action on constitutional reform was not tolerated by university students who had historically been an extremely volatile political group. The students were unlikely to remain passive to the government’s procrastination on reform.
On May 14, 1980, tens of thousands of students gathered in Seoul and six other cities to protest government’s retention of martial law. On May 15, in Seoul alone, some 60,000 students participated in demonstrations.'^
Along with student demonstrations, a chain of labor disputes occurred all over the country. A total of 809 labor disputes occurred during the first four months of 1980, which was seven times more than the number in the same period of the previous year.
On April 20, at the coal mining town of Sabuk in Kangwon Province, over 700 miners protested for wage increases. During the protests, they ousted police and occupied the town. One policeman died and over 50 miners and policemen were injured.
In the midst of social disorder, great anxiety over the political intervention of military spread among civilian politicians. On April 18, an influential opposition politician,
Kim Dae Jung appealed to a gathering of students that “we should maintain self-restraint and observe order, lest we should damage the national security and give an excuse for those who do not want democracy.”'"* On May 16, two rival opposition leaders, Kim Dae
Jung and Kim Young Sam issued a Joint communiqué in which they urged student
Far Eastern Economic Reviev/, March 14, 1980, p. 30. " Far Eastern Economic Review, November 23, 1979, p. 26. Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1980, p. 9. '^Dong-A Ilbo, April 29, May 2, 1980. 40 protesters not to lose their temper and to exercise maximum self-restraint.*^ The students agreed with the opposition leaders and many who had participated in the demonstration on
May 15 thought their demand to speed democratization was suflSciently expressed to the government, and they decided to go back to their campuses.*® From May 16, students in
Seoul called off demonstrations to await the government’s response.
The political parties also tried to find a way out of the volatile political situation.
On May 13, two major parties, the DRP and the NDP, agreed to hold a special session of the National Assembly to discuss the termination of martial law. Social disturbances seemed to be mitigated. Despite efforts made by civilian politicians and students, however, the politically conscious “new-military” group loyal to Gen. Chun Doo Hwan would not lose their chance to meddle in politics and to keep hold of power.
The rise of the military junta and return to brutal repression
The army-backed government proclaimed a nationwide Martial Law effective midnight May 17 and Cheju-do, a southern island which had previously been excluded fi-om martial law, now fell under it. In extending the Martial Law to the whole country, the Martial Law commander. General Lee Hee Seung, who was controlled by his nominal subordinate Major General Chun Doo Hwan, received the order directly fi’om the
President, rather than fi-om the Minister of National Defense. The Martial Law Command then issued Decree 10 “banning all political activities and other politically oriented
^*Korea Newsreview, April 26, 1980, p.8. ^^The New York Times, May 17, 1980; and Washington Post, May 17, 1980. '^The New York Times, May 17, l9iO;Washington Post, May 17, 1980; Tong~A Ilbo, April 17, 1980. 41 assemblies and rallies, both indoor and outdoor.”*’ It also dissolved the National
Assembly and shut down the headquarters of both major political parties, as well as colleges and universities. All newspapers, broadcasts transcripts and other publications were also subject to censorship. The Martial Law Command also arrested twenty six persons including many pro-govemment politicians as well as prominent dissidents on charges of social disruption. Among them were DRP chairman Kim Jong Pil, former
KCIA director Lee Hu Rak, former head of the Presidential Security Service Park Jaong
Kyu, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, the vice president of Yonsei university Kim Dong
Gil and the outspoken minister Moon Dc Whan. **
The Kwangju Uprising: On May 18, approximately 5,000 students clashed with police in Kwangju. They demanded the end of martial law, the release of their local hero
Kim Dae Jung, and the resignation of General Chun. Riot police and special airborne troops armed with rifles and bayonets quelled student demonstrators by indiscriminately beating, mutilating, and stabbing unarmed students. In the suppression, several dozen people were killed. The brutality of the police and special paratrooper forces infuriated the townspeople, and several thousands of citizens joined the student demonstrations. The enraged demonstrators filled the downtown streets and clashed with police. Peaceful demonstrations quickly turned into open insurrection. An angry crowd threw stones and
Molotov cocktails and obtained arms fi’om police stations and army stockpiles. Many police stations and two radio-television stations were burned down for broadcasting falsified news reports about the situation.
Korea Newsreview, May 24, 1980, p. 9.
42 The situation was rapidly growing from bad to worse as paratroopers, who were
losing control of the violent demonstrators, decided to use gunfire. The first gunfire
exploded around 2 p.m. on May 20. About 300 paratroopers guarding the South ChoUa
provincial government building in downtown Kwangju fired their M l6 rifles at
demonstrators who tried to scatter the military with hijacked armored personnel carriers.
On May 21, the angry Kwangju citizens succeeded in pushing the paratroopers out of the
city and taking over the Provincial Administration Building. Demonstrations had spread
to neighboring areas including the town of Mokpo, the birthplace Kim Dae Jung.
Once in control of Kwangju city, demonstrators formed a committee of leading
citizens and students to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the government. However,
the wall of distrust between demonstrators and the military was too high and deep to
produce a peaceful solution of fierce confrontation. The committee of citizens called for
the abolition of martial law and the release of Kim Dae Jung. An apology from the
government, reparation for the damage, and no revenge on the demonstrators were
suggested as conditions for surrender. The Martial Law Command, on the other hand,
insisted that the rebellion should return the captured weapons before serious negotiations
could start.
On May 27, thousands of martial law troops invaded the city. After hours of battle
the rebellions was crushed and the military regained control of the city. During the nine
^^Dong-A Ilbo, May 19, 1980. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 1980, p. 9. 43 days of the clash, an uncounted number of people were dead and wounded.^® The
Kwangju Uprising, thereafter, has been the root cause of the lack of legitimacy in the
Chun and Roh governments. It has also been a serious obstacle to democratization in
South Korea. The antagonism between Kyongsang where former president Park Jimg
Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo came from and ChoUa province was deepened
after the Kwangju massacre^V It also marked the beginning of anti-American sentiment
among the South Korean people^.
By harshly crushing people’s protests in Kwangju, the new military government tried to show the whole country how they would respond to opposition. Their brutality was enough to scare off any organized political force as well as the ordinary people. Until the end of 1983, when some gestures of liberalization were initiated by the government, all forces in political and civil society in South Korea were extremely quiet.
Physical violence against dissidents: The harshness of the repression of political opponents during this period is clearly indicated by the high number of political prisoners, lengthy prison terms for activists, and widespread torture practices. According to the
State Department of the United States, the number of political prisoners in Korea at the end of 1983 was 325, despite the fact that about 80 political prisoners were released in
^°The number of dead has not yet become clear. OfiBcial figures given at the time cited 189 killed, but Western officials put the toll as high as 300. Dissidents claimed about 2,000 were killed in Kwangju Uprising. The New York Times, August 25, 1981. ■'During the Kwangju Uparising, alleged rumors were spreading that “the soldiers of Kyongsang Province origin came to exterminate the seeds of the ChoUa people.” ^ The Twentieth Infantry Division, which was under the United States-ROK Combined Forces Command, was released finm its duties in the Seoul area to suppress demonstrations in Kwangju. 44 1982 and about 300 were released in 1983.^ The number was higher than the number of
political prisoners in the last years of the Park government. At the end of 1978, the U.S.
State Department estimated the number of political prisoners between 180 and 220 and
church groups in Korea estimated it at about 280.^“*
The Chun government treated political prisoners tougher and tougher every year in
this period. Prison terms for students arrested for anti-government political averaged 12
months in 1981, but rose to 24 months in 1982 and even to 36 months in 1983.^
Widespread torture, practiced by the police and security agencies, is further evidence of
the brutality of the new military government. Several hundreds of students and dissidents
who had been arrested in this period for demonstrations were generally believed to have been tortured for confessions and some of them died from torture. For example, in 1982,
Gi Jong Do, an unemployed politician, allegedly died from torture. In his letter written in the hospital he claimed that the police had beaten him for five days to force a confession.
In October, 1982 Park Kwan Hyun, a political prisoner in Kwangju prison, was found dead after leading a hunger strike to protest torture by investigators.^® In most cases, both political and non-political prisoners were victims of interrogation and torture. In 1983
Kim Kun Jo, a business executive, was beaten to death during a interrogation for a non-
United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice 1982, p. 743 and Country Reports on Human Rights Practice 1983, p.813; International League for Human Rights and the International Human Rights Law Group,Democracy in South Korea: A Promise Unfulfilled (New York: The International League for Human Rights, 1985), p. 113. Country Reports on Human Rights Practice 1982, p. 376. ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, December 8, 1983, p. 43. International League for Human Rights and the International Hiunan Rights Law Group,op. cit., p. 116. 45 political case. Following his death, the police lieutenant who interrogated Kim was fired
and the Home AfiFairs Minister publicly apologized.^’
Government terror was not limited to anti-regime activists. In the name of the realization of a just society, the Chun government arbitrarily put criminals and even innocent people in military camps. According to a South Korean human rights group, between August 1980 and January 1981, a total of 57,561 “hooligans” were detained under the Social Protection Law without trial and with no formal charges against them.
38,259 out of these underwent “correctional programs in military camps.”’* The Social
Protection Law, which was passed in December 1980, a month before martial law ended, allows the state to hold people under “protective custody’ for years.
The institutionalization of repression
Ad hoc committee: After the Kwangju Uprising, the new military assumed tight control of national affairs. The military devised supra-Constitutional organizations and revised the constitution and many laws to allow the sophisticated and institutionalized repression of opposition forces. For the consolidation of their already strong grasp on power, the new military established a 26-member Special Committee for National
Security Measures (SCNSM) on May 31. In a press conference for the foreign news media, the government explained that SCNSM was neither a supra-Constitutional organization nor a decision-making or legislative organization. They explained that it was
“an advisory committee to the President,” aimed at “assisting the President and
27 Country, Reports on Human Rights Practice 1983, pp.815-816.
46 deliberating on various state affairs while Martial Law is in effect.” They also said that
SCNSM was a consultative body for “effective civUian-müitaiy coordination under Martial
Law.”^ However, SCNSM practically took over all Amotions of the cabinet and legislature. The committee was composed of eight cabinet members including Acting
Prime Minister Park Choong Hoon, two top Presidential aides and 14 generals, including
Lieut. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan, acting director of the KICA. Even though the SCNSM was headed by President Choi Kyu Ha, actual power resided in the 30-member standing committee led by Lieut. Gen. Chun. The standing committee comprised of 13 subcommittees of seven to nine staff members each. The subcommittees exercised authority over the government ministries and took charge of national affairs. Therefore, it was the standing committee and its subcommittees, not the cabinet, which in effect managed the government.
Purification program: The government launched an extensive purification campaign beginning June, 1980, to depoliticize society and discourage opposition forces mobilizing and organizing their resources. The task of cleansing civil and political society was undertaken by the “social purification committee,” one of 13 subcommittees under the
SCNSM. The first target of their extensive cleanup drive was the KCIA, which had been a major pillar of power and used as a tool to repress opposition in Park’s era. On June
20, the KCIA announced that 36 out of its 40 top political appointees and some 300 other
^ The New York Times, September 20, 1981. ^Korea Newsreview, June 7, 1980, p. 6. 47 agents were accused of incompetence, corruption, a lethargic attitude and a tendency to
promote personal greed. They were subsequently ousted^®.
The next victim of the purification was government ofiBcials. On July 9, the
SCNSM announced that a total of 232 ranking officials, approximately 12 percent of the
country’s top bureaucracy were axed in charges of various malfeasance.^‘ This dismissal included a cabinet minister and six vice ministers. On July 16, the SCNSM cleaned up
1,264 (5.4 %) third grade officials and 3,496 (1.4 %) officials with the rank of fourth grade and below. 400 bank officials, including four bank presidents and 1,819 employees of state enterprises including 39 presidents and vice-presidents were also dismissed.
The cleanup drive extended to the mass media. On July 31, 1980 the government discontinued 172 periodicals, or 12 percent of the total 1,434 registered periodicals, accusing them of distributing obscene, vulgar, and indecent material, or creating class consciousness and social unrest. 617 publishing firms were closed by force on August 19,
1980. The government also fired or imprisoned 711 journalists, amounting to over 30 percent of Korean journalists. The main aim of the government was to eliminate critical and unfavorable publications.^^ To monitor and control news coverage, the government established a highly centralized and hierarchical media structure. Many newspapers, broadcasting, and news agencies were coercively merged and only one newspaper was
^Korea Newsreview, June 28, 1980, p. 7; Far Eastern Economic Review, July 4, 1980, p. 32. Korea Newsreview, July 19, 1980, p. 7; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1, 1980, p. 21. ^^Korea Newsreview, July 26, 1980, p. 6. ^^yu Hae Chun, “5 gong gwa ulron,” ( 5th Republic and mass media), in 5 gong pyeongga daetoron (Grand discussion on the evaluation o f the 5th Republic), p.278; By demand of the government, Joongang Dbo purged 30 reporters, Hankuk Dbo removed 29 staffers, Dong-A Dbo sacked 25, and the pro- govemment newspaper Kyunghyang Shinmun purged 40 journalists. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 15, 1980, p. 16. 48 allowed in each province. The state-run broadcasting company, KBS absorbed two
private broadcasting companies and took over 70 % of the stock of MBC, a private television and radio broadcasting company.All news coverage was strictly inspected, and guidelines regulating the content of reporting were regularly issued. Any item which did not conform to guidelines was completely eliminated from the news. For example, a
23-day hunger strike by prominent opposition leader Kim Young Sam in May 1983 was reported only once, in conformity with specific guidelines. Student demonstrations could be reported only in a limited way. Students’ demands and their reasons for conducting demonstrations could not be explained by the media.
Constitution: On October 22, 1980, the South Korean people passed a new constitution with a record-breaking 91.6 % approval rate.^^ In the new Constitution, all powers were concentrated in the hands of the President, and there was no real separation of powers.^® First, the new Constitution endowed the President with the right to issue an emergency measure or martial law. A majority vote of the National Assembly was required to lift such decrees. However, the current proportional representation system made it almost impossible for opposition parties to gain a majority of seats since the electoral system rewarded the leading party from the district election two thirds of the total seats. Second, according to the new Constitution, the President could be impeached with two-thirds of National Assembly members’ agreement and approval from the
^Ryu Hae Chun, “5 gong gwa ulron,” (5th Republic and the mass media), p. 281. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1980, p. 27. ^®Kim Ho Jin, “Je 5 gong hwa guk eui jeongkweonjeok seonggyeog,” (The regime character of the 5th Republic), in ), in 5 gong pyeongga daetoron( Grand discussion on the evaluation o f the 5th Republic). pp. 102-103. ; Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, pp. 54-57.; Christian Institute for the
49 Constitutional Committee. However, this was practically impossible, because there was
no chance for opposition parties to win two-thirds of the seats, and members of the
Constitutional Committee were appointed by the President. Third, the new Constitution
allowed the Constitutional Committee, which was under the control of the government, to
dissolve any political party whose activities were believed to threaten the fundamental
democratic order. Fourth, the President could control the courts at his own will. The
President could appoint the Chief Justice with the approval of the National Assembly and justices of the Supreme Court were also appointed by the President with the consent of
the Chief Justice.
Even more problematic were supplementary provisions attached to the end of the
new constitution. According to them, the National Assembly and all existing parties were
dissolved upon the approval of the new draft constitution by a simple majority. As the
constitution went into effect on October 27, the National Assembly and all political parties were dissolved and the Legislative Council for National Security (LCNS) was established by the junta as the interim lawmaking body. The 81 members of the LCNS, appointed by
Chun, handled some 220 bills and motions until March 31, 1981, just before the new
National Assembly was summoned. Among them were the Presidential Election Law,
Political Purification Law, Political Party Act, Laws concerning the National Assembly and its Election, Laws concerning Assembly and Demonstration, National Security Law,
Society Protection Act, Basic Press Law, and Labor Union Laws. Section 3, Article 6 of the supplementary provision of the Constitution spelled out that all laws established by
Study of Justice and Development, Bupkwa minjuhwa, {Law and Democratization) (Seoul: MinJungsa,
50 the LCNS had full validity, and any lawsuit or objections was prohibited/^ Through the
LCNS, Chun restructured the nation’s entire political landscape, and paved the way for a period of constitutional dictatorship.
2.2.3 Absence of External Supporters
A large part of the success of social movements is contingent on support from outside of the movement organizations. In South Korea, both the ordinary people, who were non-participants in movement organizations, and the United States have been critical actors in the democratization process. Although each possessed crucial potential to affect the balance of power between the opposition forces and authoritarian regime, neither provided outright support for the democratic movement in the early 1980s.
The ordinary Korean people were sympathizers with, rather than active participants in, social movements. Even though they showed their grievances against the government through elections, they did not want political disorder and feared the possibility of economic crisis caused by violent demonstrations.^® Even after the collapse of the repressive Yushin regime, they remained bystander of the democratization movement. They stood by and watched the rise of a new military re^me and its brutal crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising. Even though Kwangju citizens, who had traditionally been alienated from the government, gallantly resisted the barbarous military, their bloody protests could not rouse public support outside the city.
1986), pp. 19-26. ^’CISJD, Bupkwa minjuhwa, {Law and Democratization), p.26.
51 The other important external actor, the United States, was not a solid supporter of
the democratic forces in this period, either. Basically, South Korea was important to the
United States for its military strategy. America’s primary goal in South Korea had long
been to preserve stability and maintain a military balance in the northwestern Pacific. For
that purpose, the United States needed a strong government in South Korea, regardless of
its absence of democracy. Therefore, the United States’ policy on the Korean peninsula
was to prevent Communist aggression, rather than promote democracy. Even though the
Carter Administration had repeatedly criticized the Park regime for its violations of human
rights, in its South Korean policy, security and social stability took precedence over
human rights issues. On his visit to South Korea only a week before Park was shot, the
United States Defense Secretary Harold Brown openly admitted that the United States
was really more interested in the security of the region than human rights issues.^® In his
interview with CNN, U.S. President Jimmy Carter also said that “in my judgment, the
maintenance of a nation’s security fi-om Communist subversion or aggression is a
prerequisite to the honoring of human rights and the establishment of democratic
processes.
The United States policy on South Korea was revealed in its reaction to the release of troops by Gen. Chun during the process of the military putsch on December 12, 1979, as well as its crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising. For the military putsch, Gen. Chun
Doo Whan mobilized troops fi-om the Combined Command without proper permission
“ in the National Assembly election of 1978, the opposition party (NDP) outpoUed the government party (DRP) by gathering 34.7 percent against 30.9 percent, even though they could not win a majority of seats due to the distorted proportional representation system. “ Far Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 1979, p. 14. 52 from General Wickham. For this breach of the chain of command, the United States did not issue any ofiBcial reprimand. More controversially, during the period of the Kwangju
Uprising, United States Ambassador Gleysteen allowed the Twentieth Division to be released from the United States-ROK Combined Forces Command in order to retake the city which was in the hands of demonstrators.'*^ After the bloody crackdown, the United
States indicated its embarrassment at the brutality of South Korean government by postponing the second ROK- United States Policy Conference which was to be held in
Washington in late June of 1980, and also deferring the vote on a loan from the Asian
Development Bank."*^ However, its lukewarm response to military aggressions meant that many Koreans would blame the United States for acquiescing to the military takeover.
After the Kwangju Uprising students and opposition forces began to have a firm belief that the United States was not a supporter of democratization in South Korea, but was in league with the Korean military.
The United States position that security and political stability in South Korea took precedence over democracy did not change in the Reagan Administration. In February
1981, President Chun was invited to Washington, as the first foreign president to visit the
United States during the Reagan Administration. Chun’s visit had significant meaning since it seemed the United States was conferring legitimacy on Chun despite his defiance
*°Korea Newsreview, Vol. 9, No. 23, June 7, 1980, p. 7. “'‘Mark Peterson, “Americans and the Kwangju Incident; Problems in the Writing of History,” in Donald N. Clark, ed. The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 56. Lee Sangwoo, “Migukeun wae Chun Doo Whaneul jijihaessna,” (Why did the United States support Chun Doo Whan?),Shin Dong A, March, 1988. pp. 251-252. 53 of the United States-Korea treaty governing the movement of troops in South Korea/^ At
the time of Chun’s first United States’ visit, the United States Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr. said that “on Korea in particular our concern for human rights will
be tempered by a preeminent concern for the security realities.”'*^
The United States officials’ reckless and arrogant remarks only aggravated anti-
American sentiment that had been pervasive among students and opposition forces after the Kwangju Uprising. In his interview with the Associated Press and the Los Angeles
Times, Gen. John Wickham, the United States commander-in-chief, said that Koreans are like “lemmings,” meaning that they would always line up behind their leader whoever he was."*^ In February 1982 the U.S. Ambassador, Richard Walker, called dissidents in South
Korea “spoiled brats” who have no public sympathy."*^
Anti-American sentiment had been expressed by radical students as they attacked buildings related to the United States operation in South Korea. On December 9, 1980, a group of student activists attempt to set a fire at the United States Cultural Center in
Kwangju. On March 18, 1982, the United States Cultural Center at Pusan was also attacked by student activists. In this protest one student using the library was killed and two others were injured. There was also a small bomb explosion in the Cultural Center in
Taegu on September 22, 1983.
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 20, 1981, p. 20. ^The New York Times, February 1 ,1981. Los Angeles Times August 8, 1980, quote from Mark Peterson, “Americans and the Kwangju Incident; Problems in the Writing of History,” p. 62. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 23, 1982, p. 11. 54 2.2.4 Power Configuration in the Political Society; A Divided and Impotent Opposition
Party
Even though their militant and intransigent struggles had been a significant menace
to the authoritarian regime, social movement forces had certain limits in attracting support
fi-om the more conservative public. First of all, the more or less radical ideology and
strategy of social movement forces caused uneasiness among a South Korean public that
instinctively favored political stability and continuous economic development. Second,
social movement forces did not have nationally popular leaders who could easily be perceived as a legitimate alternative to the authoritarian leader. Due to these weaknesses, it was very desirable for the social movement forces to cooperate with forces within institutional politics, that is, opposition parties. A strong opposition party equipped with prominent leaders and could compensate for the weak points of the social movement forces. However, the opposition parties have not always been functional for the democratization movement. When they were divided or not willing to battle against a authoritarian regime, they had only a negative influence on the democratization movement.
Unfortunately, South Korean opposition parties in this period did not perform their expected roles in the democratization movement. The major opposition party, the New
Democratic Party (NDP) had minimal qualifications to compensate for the shortcomings of social movement forces. As a result of its struggle for democracy in the arena of institutional politics, it received significant support from the people as a legitimate alternative to the Park regime. It outpolled the ruling DRP by 1.1 % in the 1978 National
Assembly election. It also had nationally popular and charismatic leaders, Kim Young
55 Sam and Kim Dae Jung. In the wake of Park’s death, the NDP had a very good chance to be the governing party. Social movement forces had no choice but to support the NDP in the election.
However, internal conflicts ruined the NDP’s opportunity to replace the authoritarian regime. Its factional divisions and the arch rivalry between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were the main causes of its impotency. The NDP was largely divided into two blocs, the mainstream supporting Kim Young Sam and the opposition bloc led by
Lee Chul Seung. Since Kim Young Sam had defeated Lee Chul Seung by only a narrow margin in the party presidential competition in May 1979, he was unable to completely control the party. His authority was even more shaken as the government restored the civil rights of his long time rival, Kim Dae Jung, on February 29, 1980. The reinstatement of Kim Dae Jung, who almost defeated former President Park by collecting 46 % of the votes in the 1971 election, meant that the two Kims would compete keenly for the presidential candidacy . Even though Kim Dae Jung had been out of active politics for seven years, he still had a high reputation and a considerable number of followers due to his charismatic personality and unyielding resistance to the Park system. Kim Dae Jung strongly hinted at his intention to challenge for the presidential candidacy by accusing Kim
Young Sam of failing to lead the opposition NDP effectively since the October 1979 assassination of President Park."*’
The two rivals could not arrive at an agreement for the presidential candidate of the NDP. Neither Kim was willing to step down to the other, and their obduracy split the
■*' The Mew York Times, March 2, 1980. 56 party. The tension between the two blocs surfaced in a series of violent district party chapter conventions. The sight of rival faction members confronting each other with rocks and sticks so disenchanted the public that questions arose about the NDP’s ability to be a legitimate alternative to the Park regime.
With the rise of a military junta, the opposition party was totally demolished. The military coup of May 17, 1980 and the promulgation of Martial Law Decree No. 10 made the already fragmented opposition party completely impotent. The military junta shut down the NDP headquarters and arrested its leaders. The new constitution that came into effect on October 27, 1980 formally disbanded the National Assembly and all existing political parties. They also deprived the old politicians of their right to run for the presidency, parliament or any other public office, to support or oppose candidates for public offices, and to join social or political organizations until June 30, 1988."** The
Political Renovation Committee, with nine members appointed by President Chun Doo
Hwan, screened all politicians and finally banned 567 politicians from engaging in any political activities. The reasons given were the amassing of illegal fortunes, creating social unrest, political irregularities and demagoguery and engineering labor disputes and campus agitation.
After eliminating all the perceived dangerous politicians, the new military government allowed the establishment of political parties and the holding of elections with docile and pro-govemment figures. The government could not totally discard constitutional formalism to assort a form of minimal democracy. They manipulated the
Far Eastern Economic Review, November 21, 1980, p. 21.
57 law to make a multi-party system consisting of a dominant ruling party and several weak
opposition parties, instead of a two party system that might produce a strong opposition
party like the old NDP. On November 19, 1980 the government passed the new Political
Party Law which promoted a multi-party system by easing requirements for the creation of
new political parties*”. On November 21 the Military Martial Command partially lifted the
ban on political activities, and more than 15 new political parties had been formed by late
January 1981. Major parties among them were the Democratic Justice Party (DJP)
headed by President Chun Doo Hwan, the Democratic Korean Party (DKP) formed by the
former lawmakers of the disbanded opposition party NDP, and the Korean National Party
(KNP) established by members of the former ruling party DRP, the Democratic Socialist
Party (DSP), led by Koh Chung Hoon, an old-time democratic socialist, and the Socialist
Party (SP), organized by Kim Chul. Even though opposition parties were allowed, none of them represented a significant threat to the new military government because only pro- govemmental and cooperative figures were allowed to participate. All the three powerful
Kims, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil, and their followers were excluded.
The intention of the new political party law was to make a party system characterized by a dominant ruling party and multiple powerless minority parties. This aim was successfully realized in the National Assembly election of March 25, 1981.In the election, the ruling DJP succeeded in securing a majority by winning 151 seats (90 from district and 61 from PR seats) due to “unproportional” PR system, which assigned
Korea Annual, p. 58, 1982.
58 two thirds of the PR seats to the majority party of district seats, in spite of winning 35.6 % of the votes cast. The opposition DKP won 81 seats (57 from districts and 24 from PR) with 21.6 % of the vote and the KNP had 25 seats (18 and 7) with 13.3 % of the popular vote.
2.3 Shrunken Social Movements
Faced with the hastily expanded political opportunity structure in the aftermath of
Park’s assassination, social movement forces woke from their long dormancy under the
Yushin system and rolled into vigorous action. Students and workers staged a series of demonstrations at their campuses and work places, demanding the eradication of the
Yushin legacies. However, social movement sectors which had been decimated under the
Park regime were unable to sustain their favorable momentum. Unorganized and sporadic demonstrations were easily broken up by physical force. The rise of a new military junta and its brutal crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising completely dwarfed civil society.
2.3.1 Student Movements
After the Kwangju Uprising, social movements were wholly inert due to a political opportunity structure which was not conducive to their political action. Only student groups were able to raise their voices and keep the democratization movement alive.
However, student activists in this period could stage only scattered and isolated struggles.
^Korea Annual, pp. 58-9, 1982.
59 Due to the harsh repression of the military regime, they were unable to develop healthy organizations and alliances among themselves or with other movement sectors.
Ideological disputes among the activists made the student movements go from bad to worse.
With the withdrawal of the five year old Emergency Decree 9 in December 1979,
639 of about 800 students ousted since 1973 were reinstated and 25 of 39 expelled professors were rehired.*^ The return of student activists dramatically revitalized campuses. Student movements, at first, had confined their protests to intra-campus affairs including the abolishment of Student Defense Corp., the restoration of autonomous student associations, the resignation of collaborationist professors, and the cessation of campus surveillance. Direct confrontation with the regime was avoided. As the government’s political reform dragged on, however, student groups broadened their demands by including political issues such as the immediate lifting of martial law, freedom of the press, better treatment of industrial workers, and rapid progress toward full democracy. Campus disturbances, which began at major universities in Seoul and
Kwangju, quickly spread to other universities. Tens of thousands of students at most of the 98 colleges and universities in South Korea held anti-government demonstrations almost everyday. As student protests spread, demonstrations spilled over into the streets.
On May 14, 1980, the deadline set by the students for the lifting of martial law, about
50,000 -60,000 students staged in downtown of Seoul and other major cities the largest anti-government demonstration in 15 years. However, isolated and violent student
^'77ie New York Times, March 26, 1981.
60 demonstrations alienated the moderate public and only provided the military with a convenient excuse to intervene in politics. On May 17, 1980, the government, under the control of Gen. Chun and his associates, extended martial law nationwide and utterly demolished all opposition forces.
Repressive measures toward student movements
Since the military coup, student movements had been remarkably weakened by harsh repression from the state. Chun Doo Hwan clearly recognized that violent and massive students demonstrations in Pusan and Masan in late 1979 had shattered the base of the Park regime and brought about its final collapse. In order to avoid previous mistakes and to paralyze student activism, the Chun regime devised various legal and institutional methods.
On July 30, 1980, the government introduced a graduation quota system which intended to prevent ordinary students from concerning themselves with social and political problems. The Graduation Quota System required each university department to admit an extra 30 % above its graduation quota and to flunk out the lowest 30 % in the course of their studies. Under this system, students had to diligently spend more time on their studies and fiercely compete with each other to graduate. Facing strong opposition from students, professors and parents, the Graduation Quota was virtually abolished in August
1983.
^^tVashington Post, March 13, 1980. 61 The government also intensified ideological education to indoctrinate government
policies and to prevent new college students fi"om being imbued with leftist ideology.
During their fi-eshmen and sophomore years, students were required to take several
courses on ethics and critiques of Marxism. The government also made professors
responsible for individual students and the guidance of student circles. More
controversially, the government endowed the president of a university with the authority
to expel ‘problem’ students before formal prosecution. Between May 17 and the end of
1983, a total of 1,363 students were expelled fi-om school, with the number dropping to
538 in 1980, 300 in 1981, 198 in 1982 and 327 in 1983.^^
Following the Kwangju Uprising, the new military government initiated a
‘greening’ process which forcibly inducted expelled students into the military. Since
South Korea adopted a mandatory conscription system and only college students were
able to defer their army service until graduation, the expelled were forcibly enlisted. The
compulsory enlisted students were closely watched and harshly treated in the army. By
1983, about 465 students were drafted into the military by force for a ‘greening’ process, according to Education Minister Kwon E Hyuk.^“* Moreover, five of those appear to have been murdered while on military duty. Since no coercively drafted students had died during the Park era, the death of five students suggested the relative brutality of the Chun regime.
As the Chun regime consolidated its grip on society, it dealt with opposition forces more sternly. In 1983, approximately 250 people, mostly students, were arrested for
Korea Herald, December 24, 1983.
62 violation of the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations. The sentences given out in 1983,
2 to 3 years, were longer than the 12 to 18 months of those in 1982.” Government
repression was exercised on night schools established by church groups and student
activists who were attempting to educate poor young workers. The government defined
these schools as illegal, communist, anti-government associations and arrested between
150 and 500 student activists working in night schools in 1983 and closed approximately
20 night schools in the period between August and December, 1983.”
Facing harsh repression, the student movement was obviously damaged, but never
dead. It just went underground and reorganized into smaller and more radical groups.
The number of student demonstrations continuously increased fi"om the Spring of 1982
onwards. In the spring of 1982, twenty eight demonstrations were ofiBcially reported, 41
in the fall of 1982 and 128 in the spring of 1983.”
Characteristics of student movements
After the bloody repression of the Kwangju Uprising, the student movement
appeared much different fi'om the previous period, in terms of its goals, ways of struggle,
perspective on Korean society and attitude toward the United States.
Immediately after the assassination of Park, the most common issues in student movements were campus democratization and guarantees of student autonomy. In their leaflet, the ‘campus democratization declaration,’ on November 22, 1979 the Seoul
^ International League for Human Rights and the International Human Rights Law Group,Democracy in South Korea: A Promise Unfulfilled, 1985, p.67. Korea Herald, December 24, 1983. ^ International League for Human Rights and the International Human Rights Law Group,Ibid., p. 71. 63 National University students wrote that campus democratization could be realized on the premise of eradication of the Yushin legacy and the introduction of legal and institutional guarantees of democratization.** Until early May, 1980, student movement organizations emphasized that their goal was the promotion of liberal democracy. On May 2, 1980 students gathering at Seoul National University for a democratization campaign announced their intention to lay a foundation for real democracy by completely eliminating the remaining Yushin forces.*^
However, after the bloody crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising, the goal of student movements ceased to be the establishment of liberal democracy and became the realization ofMinjoong (masses) revolution and the overthrow of the fascist regime. The student movements defined the Chun regime as an anti-nationalist, anti-masses, fascist regime which sought the elimination of liberal democracy, the deprivation of people’s basic right to live and the exploitation of the masses for preservation of the vested interests of the privileged group.®® On December 11, 1980, thousands of Seoul National
University students issued an ‘Anti-imperialists, Anti-fascist Struggle Declaration.’ In this leaflet, the students stated that their eventual goal was to establish a unified national state where the Minjoong (masses) forces took the initiative, and this could be realized when
57 Korea Times, June 15, 1983. ^ Han Young, SOnyundae Hankuksahwoiwa Haksaengundong (Korean Society and Student Movements in the 1980s) (Seoul: Chungnyunsa, 1989), p. 23. Seoul National University Students, Sifcuk Seoneunmun (Declaration on the Situation), May 2, 1980. Leaflet, cited from Han Young, Ibid., p. 29. “ Seoul National University Students, Banfasho Sikuk Suneonmun (Anti-Fascist Declaration on the Situation), March 19, 1981. A leaflet. Cited from Han Young, Ibid., pp. 65-66. 64 labor, farmer and progressive intellectuals together ousted the ruling system from the
country through popular struggle/^
Students’ attitudes toward the United States radically changed after the Kwangju
Uprising. Anti-Americanism spread widely and deeply among the student activists. In
the1970s, opposition forces had assumed a basically favorable attitude toward the United
States because of its criticism of the Park regime’s violations of human rights. Until the
Kwangju Uprising students and ordinary people believed that the United States would
support the democratic cause in South Korea. During the Kwangju Uprising a student
organization encouraged dissidents by claiming that two U.S. aircraft carriers were
anchored at Pusan port to stop brutal murder by the Special Forces and to support the democratic movement.®^ However, this claim was not true and, in fact, precisely the opposite turned out to be the case. The Twentieth Division, which was under the authority of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, was ordered to end the demonstrations.®^ Due to the controversial troop movement, many students believed that much of the responsibility for the Kwangju Massacre lay with the United States. President
Reagan’s invitation to Chun in February 1981 reafiSrmed the students’ belief that the
United States strongly supported the Chun regime. Students’ anti-Americanism manifested itself in concrete actions. Student activists set fire to the United States
Cultural Center in Kwangju and Pusan on December 9, 1980 and March 18, 1982
Han youn^ Ibid., p. 55-56. “ Seongbo Kim, “SOnyeondae banmi undongsa,” (History of anti-American movements in the 1980s), Sahoewa sasang (Society and Thought), May, 1989, p. 135. ^Mark Peterson, “Americans and the Kwangju Incident: Problems in the Writing of History,” p. 56. 65 respectively. On April 22, 1982 students at Kangwon University demonstrated chanting
“Yankee Go Home” and burned the American flag.
The attempt to systematically understand and analyze Korean realities was another
change that appeared in the student movement after the Kwangju Uprising. Students
believed that they had to understand Korean realities in the context of a world system to
effectively engage in struggle against the fascist regime. Students’ perspectives on the
contemporary situation were clearly explained in a small pamphlet, called “Insikkwa
Jeonryak” (Understanding and Strategy), which had been widely circulated among
students activists since 1982. According to the pamphlet, the students defined
contemporary South Korea as a neocolonial society whose primary contradiction was
between the South Korean masses and the U.S.-Japanese Imperialists. Also, the substitute
ruling force of the imperialist power was the military fascists in South Korea. Finally, in
the process of economic development South Korean society had pursued dependent state
monopoly capitalism in which the masses were doubly exploited by both imperial capital
and comprador capital.^
However, not all student organizations agreed to this interpretation of the contemporary situation. Their different perspectives frequently caused internal conflicts between movement organizations, resulting in critical waste of their resources in the anti- government struggle. After the Kwangju Uprising and the aborted democratization movement, student activists entered into a heated dispute on the causes of failed democratization and the future direction of student movements. This dispute split the
66 students into two groups, Moorim and Hakrim^^ The Moorim group emphasized the protracted strengthening of movement organizations, arguing that reckless demonstrations would be faced with harsh repression from the authoritarian power and the destruction of student organizations. On the other hand, the Hakrim group emphasized a continuous and acute political struggle against the authoritarian regime. Beginning in early 1981, the
Hakrim had the upper hand.“ In 1982, strategic debates within the student movement developed into the Yabi (Critique of Night School) vs.Jeonmang (Prospect of Student
Movement) debate.®’ While the former group emphasized the mobilization of the students by focusing their struggles on intra-campus affairs, the latter emphasized direct political struggle and street demonstrations.®*
2.3.2 The Labor Movement
In the wake of the death of Park Jung Hee and the relaxation of repression, workers also began to articulate their suppressed discontent, related to wage increases, the improvement of working conditions and the democratization of labor unions. Even though some protests were successful in attaining changes such as wage increases and improvement of working conditions, unorganized and isolated labor movements quickly
^ Kang Shin Chul, SOnyundae Haksaeng Undongsa (The History of Student Movements in the 1980s) (Seoul: Hyungsungsa, 1988), pp. 38-40. “ The literally meaning oiMoorim and Hakrim is not clear. It is believed to be named by the police for some reason. ^Choi Yeongu, “80nyeondae haksaengundongeui yinyeomjeok. jogikjeok baljeonkwajeong,”(Ideological and organizational development of the 1980s student movements) in Jo Heeyeon ed. Hangyk sahwoi undongsa {History o f Korean social movement), 1990, p. 247. ^ Yabi and Jeongmang are the titles of pamphlets published by each organizatioru ®Choi Yeongu, p.248. 67 met the limits to what they could achieve. Spontaneous and sporadic labor activities were
easily broken down by the military government.
The Kwangju Uprising was a decisive turning point. After the crackdown of the
Kwangju Uprising, the new military government harshly repressed labor movements.
They arrested labor union leaders, dissolved active and uncooperative unions and replaced
them with collaborate and captive ones. Although thereafter there were a few efforts and
struggles for democratic labor movements, they fell into a long period of dormancy until
late 1983, when the government turned into decompression pohcy.
Explosion of labor protests after Parks’ death
The explosion of labor unrest in this period reflected the political and economic
situation in Korea. Politically, the cost of popular action against the government was
drastically reduced with the collapse of the repressive Yushin regime. Action for wage
increases, improvement of working conditions and the formation of new unions became much less risky than before. Economically, the second oil shock in 1979 and the depression of international market caused significant damage to Korea’s export-led economy. During the first period of 1980, GNP growth was recorded at -1.7 % and this was 14.5 % lower than the same period of the previous year.®^ The factory operation rate dropped fi'om 82 % in 1979 to 74 % in 1980. The trade deficit rose fi'om 4.4 biUion to 4.7
Unknown author, “Insikkoa Jeonrak,” (Understanding and strategy) a pamphlet written by movement activists. Reproduced in Kim Yongki and Park Seoungok eds. Hankuk Nodong Undong Nonjaengsa (History of the Korean Labor Movement Dispute) (Seoul: Hyunjang Munhaksa, 1989), p.54. 68 billion in 1980.™ Inflation worsened from 14.5 % in 1978, to 18.3 % in 1979, and 28.7 %
in 1980.’* Unemployment rose between 1979-1980 from 3.8 % to 5.0 % .^
Reflecting the political and economic situation, the number of labor disputes in
1980 totaled 206, compared to 105 in 1979. This number counted only the ofiBcially
reported labor disputes to the Labor Department, so the real number is likely much higher
than that. Some data estimates the number of labor dispute in 1980 up to 2,168.^
Year Total Refusal to Work Sit-in Strikes Demonstrations the Others 1979 105 60 43 2 - 1980 206 76 100 5 25 1981 186 88 40 32 26 1982 88 67 16 3 2 1983 98 62 27 6 3
Table 2.1 : Number of Labor Disputes and Their Patterns Source: Adapted from Korea Employees’ Federation,Nodonggyungje Yongam, 1984 (Yearbook of Labor Economy, 1984), p. 61.
The most conspicuous labor protest before the Kwangju Uprising was the Sabuk
Affair, which lasted for ten days from April 15 to April 24, 1980.™ It was an extremely militant labor action in which more than 3,000 mineworkers participated. The miners
™ Kim Jin Ok, “SOnyubdae Nodongwoondongeui Chungae” (The development of the labor movement in the 1980s) in Lim Chae Jung et al., Nodonghyunsilgwa Nodongwoondong (Labor reality and the labor movement) (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1985), pp. 260-1. ” The Bank of Korea,National Income in Korea (Seoul: BOK, 1982), pp.352-3. Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea (New York and Washington D C.: Asia Watch Committee, 1985), p. 186. Jang Myeong Kuk, “Haebanghu Hankuk Nodongeui Baljachi,” (The Trace of Korean Labor since Liberation) in Kim Gum Soo, et al.,Hanguk Nodong Undongron 1 (Discourse on the Korean Labor Movement I) (Seoul: Mirae Sinseo, 1985), p. 136. See Ibid. pp. 58-61; Asia Watch Committee, op.cit., pp. 188-190. 69 occupied the whole town of Sabuk for four days, confronting the combat police. The miners’ strike began as a protest against their corruptive union chief who had privately agreed with management on a 20 % wage increase, ignoring the national union’s guidelines for a 42.8 % increase. The sit-in strike turned into a violent confrontation when a scared intelligence detective rammed into three miners blocking his exit while trying to escape from the angered crowd. This accident triggered the ire of miners and they battled with combat police, taking a union chiefs wife as a hostage. This confrontation produced
70 casualties and 28 workers were arrested. The strike proceeded spontaneously and it was driven by an unplanned and unorganized force. Therefore, even though the workers succeeded in securing a 30 % wage increase and the resignation of a corrupt union chiefs these achievement did not represent an improvement of workers’ future relations of coping with the management.
Repressive measures and the decline of labor movements
After brutally crushing the people’s protests in Kwangju, the new military brutally repressed democratic social forces. The labor sector was no exception. For effective repression of the labor movement the government resorted to both legal restriction and physical violence over workers.
The LCNS, which replaced the National Assembly, revised labor-related laws to control and isolate labor movements from other social sectors. They included “Guidelines for Labor Union Activity Under Martial Law” (July 1, 1980), “Guidelines for the
70 Purification of Labor Unions” (August 21, 1980), and the “Prohibition of Labor Activities
by Purged Labor Union Cadres’ (November 4, 1980).
Article 12 of the Labor Union Act prohibited political action by unions, for
example, supporting a specific political party or a specific politician and collecting political
contributions fi’om its members. The Act prohibited building industrial and regional
unions and allowed unions only at individual workplaces so as to prevent inter-labor
linkage and to reduce and weaken labor disputes at the unit level. The Act (Article 12-2)
also prohibited third party involvement in the organization and the dissolution of union
and collective bargaining with employers, in order to forestall labor activism by the
Christian community and the students. Labor disputes in Wuonpoong Industrial
Company, and Control Data Unions were strongly affiliated with the Urban Industrial
Mission (UTM). The UIM, a Christian organization founded in 1961, had been very active, in part because the UIM ministers were required to serve time in the factories as a condition of the ministry.’®
The Act made it harder to form new unions, by strengthening the basic requirements for a union. According to Article 32 of the Labor Union Act, a union likely to become detrimental to the public interest might be ordered by the appropriate
Administrative Authority to be dissolved. The Chonggye garment workers’ union was dissolved under these provisions. Article 23 of this law prohibited dismissed union officers fiom serving as union officers for three years.
For revisions of the labor law, see Kim Young Cheol, “SOnyeondae Hanguksawboiwui Jibaegujowa geui Seonggyuk,” (Governing Structure and its Characteristics of 1980s Korean Society) in Jo Jin Kyung et al., Hanguksahwoieui Seonggyungkwa Undong (Characteristics and Movements of Korean Society) (Seoul: Gongdongche), 1987, pp. 210-215; CISJD, Bupkwa minjuhwa, (Law and Democratization), pp. 169-199. 71 The revision of Labor Standard Law allowed employers to extend working hours
to 60 hours per week by agreement. The Mediation Law was revised in order to prohibit
collective action of workers employed by central and local governments, state and public-
run enterprises, and defense industries (Article 12). This law (Articles 19, 28, 40) also
restricted collective action by allowing the administrative office to investigate, arbitrate,
and stop the strike. On the other hand the government encouraged the establishment of a
Labor-Management Consultative Body (LMCB) for a smoother resolution of labor-
management disputes. LMCB was composed of representatives from employees, employers and government officers. Therefore, the intention of LMCB was to give the government the right to intervene in labor disputes. The number of LMCB has increased since 1981 while the number of labor unions decreased.
1981 1982 1983 No. of LMCB 4,720 4,756 4,845 No. of Unions 2,125 2,089 2,065
Table 2.2; Number of Labor-Management Consultative Bodies Source: The Ministry of Labor,Nomugwcmri-Ironkwa Silje (The Management of Labor Administration-Theory and Practice), 1985, p.70.
The other way to repress labor was to expel union leaders through purification measures and violent union-busting. The government removed 12 leaders of the
Federation of Korean Labor Unions and industrial unions on August 20, 1980. As the second purge of labor, 191 democratic union leaders were ousted and 106 local chapters
Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1, 1987, p. 43. 72 were illegally dissolved on September 20. A number of labor leaders were sent to the barracks of Samchung Training Camp and brutalized, being subjected to insults and beating and being treated like a dog.^
Utilizing distorted labor laws, the government purged democratic labor leaders, dissolved unions and replaced them with pliant unions. Cheongkye Textile Union, which had played a leading role in labor movement since the immolation of Cheon Tae H in 1970, was forcibly dissolved in January 1981, and replaced by a compliant union in March 1981.
Many other democratic unions were also dissolved by force. The prominent cases were
Bando Company Union, in March 1981, Control Data, in July 1982, and Wonpung Wool
Company union, in October 1982.’*
As a result of the harsh repression of labor organizations, the number of union members and rate of union density continuously decreased until 1984, when the government introduced its decompression policy.
” Kim Jin Ok, “SOnyeondae nodong undong eui cheongae,” (The Development of the Labor Movement in the 1980s) in Nodong Hyunsilkwa Nodong Undong (The Current Labor Situation and the Labor Movement), No.2 in a series called Hyunjang (On the Scene) (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1985), p.306. Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, pp. 195-201. 73 Year Unions Employees(l,000) Members Rate of Membership 1979 4,392 5,379 1,088,061 20.2 (%) 1980 2,618 5,461 948,134 17.4 1981 2,125 5,785 966,738 16.7 1982 2,089 6,189 974,909 15.9 1983 2,065 6,541 1,009,881 15.4
Table 2.3: Number of Unions and Union Membership. Source: The Ministry of Labor,Nomugwanri-Ironkwa Silje (The Management of Labor Administration-Theory and Practice), 1985, p.70; Korean Employees’ Federation, Nodonggyungje Yongam , 1984 (Yearbook of the Labor Economy, 1984), p. 55. Rate of Membership = (Members / Employees) x 100
Attempt to build national organization: The National League of Democratic Labor (May 5. 1980-Sept. 198U
In this period, there was an effort by some students and labor activists to build a new democratic national labor organization outside of the Federation of Korean Labor
Unions (FKLU) which had cooperated with the government. A primary goal of the effort to build the National League of Democratic Labor (NLDL) was to form a mass base for the future democratization movement. NLDL organizers realized the importance of mass participation for a successful democratization movement, and they set production workers as a principle target.
To broaden their mass base and to prevent the radicalism of intellectuals, they fixed the labor and intellectual members in the ratio of 6 to 1. They also tried to systematize the organization by forming chapters (jihwoi) in industrial complexes, branches (jibu) in city and province, and locals (bunhwoi) at the level of factory. They
74 were very cautious in recruiting new members, by selecting a preliminary group at first and
admitting them as a regular member after four or five months training
Centralu v^oramiueeCommittee ^^ branches (Jibu) in city and province
chaptersTk R (jihwoi);nîhwnîV Figure 2.1 : Organization of the NLDL The NLDL collapsed in September, 1981 when leaders of the organization were arrested. Their effort to build a democratic national labor organization was not completely successful because of a firail mass base and unskilled leadership. It was a reckless attempt to build a nationwide organization without a base at the company level. They were not equipped with the experienced or capable leadership needed to form an illegal labor movement. Leaders had experience only in legal union activity and student movements, and they lacked organization building skill and ideological armaments. After the failure of NLDL, the need to build a national organization was emphasized and small group movements through night schools were pursued for that purpose. Night schools were intended to provide contact points between the student and labor movements.™ ™ For NLDL see. Public Prosecutor’s Office, “NLDL, A written arraignment ” Reproduced in Kim Yongki and Park Seoungok eds. Hankuk Nodong Undong Nonjaengsa (History of the Korean Labor Movement Disputes) (Seoul: Hyimjang Munhaksa, 1989), pp. 24-32: Hanguk Gidokgyo Saneop Gaebalwin, ed. Hanguk Nodongundongeui YinyumJ Ideology of the Korean Labor Movement) (Seoul: Jeongamsa, 1988), pp. 185-187. 75 2.3.3 The Religious Community In South Korea, about 8.5 million Protestants and 1.5 million Roman Catholics account for 25 % of the total population. Christians, by and large, have exercised strong political and social influence. Under the Park regime, committed Christians led human rights campaigns and the struggle for democratic freedom. Since Chun rose to power, political activists among the clergy had maintained a generally low profile, engaging in only intermittent political activities. In May 1981, a group of 30 Roman Catholic priests from Kwangju Diocese staged a hunger strike in memory of the Kwangju Uprising. On October 25, 1981, about 800 Presbyterian ministers held a prayer meeting and demanded the release of 168 students and the reinstatement of 83 professors ousted from their jobs for political reasons.*® In February 1982, the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission held a news conference to ask for the release of all “prisoners of conscience.” A serious confrontation between the Chun government and the religious community came from the arrest of Catholic priest. Father Choi Ki Shik, in March 1982. The government arrested Father Choi for providing shelter to a student activist, Mun Bu Shik, who had participated in the burning of the United States Cultural Center in Pusan. The church’s ties to Left-leaning extremists was the ostensible reason. The arrest of a priest enraged and reawakened a Christian Church that had been dormant since May, 1980. Cardinal Stephen Kim strongly endorsed the decision of Father Choi saying that it ' Far Eastern Economic Review, November 27, 1981, p. 30. 76 was the job of priests to show compassion to people in distress and suffering, including those pursued by the police.*^ The confrontation between the government and the Christian community developed into anti-Americanism by the church. After the arrest of Father Choi, the Korean Christian Action Organization (KCAO), an ecumenical group, argued that the United States provided ample causes for the Pusan fire, blaming the United States approval of Chun’s use of regular troops to quell the Kwangju Uprising. The organization also urged the recall of the United States Ambassador Richard Walker, who labeled Korean dissidents “spoiled brats,” and the United States commander-in-chief in South Korea, who called the South Korean people lemmings who would follow any political leader.^ 2.4 Implications of the Political Opportunity Structure and Social Movements. From the study of social movements in the first period, I draw the following implications. First, the enfeeblement of the ruling elite does not always produce a democratic transition. Even though the elite is divided and weakened, the result could be a rise of new authoritarian regime, rather than a democratic transition, unless civil society and opposition forces have the capacity to take advantage of elite fragmentation. The assassination of President Park left a political vacuum and an internal power struggle among the ruling elite. However, the poorly prepared civil society was unable to take advantage of the elite fragmentation for democratic transition, and a junior general group, led by Major General Chun, took power through an intra-military putsch. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 23, 1982, p. 10. 77 Second, unorganized and sporadic popular movements are vulnerable to harsh state repression. In the wake of the sudden death of President Park and the undermining of the repressive capacities of the regime, the popular movement was able to regain its vigor and become very active. However, the social movement sectors did not have enough time to build strong organizations and firm solidarity networks before the new military junta took power. Isolated and scattered protests were easily broken up by harsh repression of the regime. Third, the attitude of external supporters, the ordinary people and the United States, were primarily opportunistic. The social movement forces faced the task of having to demonstrate their capacity for success in order to draw their support. The ordinaiy people and the United States principally wanted South Korea to embark on a process of democratic transition after the demise of the Park regime. However, they would not support the democratization at the expense of compromising their own interests. When social movements were openly crushed, the ordinary people kept silent on the brutality of the military regime and the United States chose political stability over democratic transition. Fourth, for a successfiil democratic transition, the opposition has to demonstrate its capacity to compromise their differences once the initial rallying point of a common enemy disappears.*^ The two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, had closely cooperated on their common goal, the collapse of the Park regime, before their common enemy suddenly died. After Park’ death, however, their arch-rival ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1982, p. 54. 78 relationship surfaced, and they competed with each other for the presidency. Their division frustrated the public and deteriorated a valuable opportunity for democratization. “ Georg Sorensen,Democracy and Democratization (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford; Westview Press, 1993), p. 60. 79 CHAPTERS DECOMPRESSION AND THE RESURRECTION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, JANUARY 1984-APRIL 1987 3.1 Introduction The social movement forces which had been extremely thwarted for the previous four years began to reemerge in late 1983, owing to expanded political opportunity structures. Two dimensions of the political opportunity structure, elite fragmentation and external support, did not show much changes in this period. President Chun still had a strong grip on power and the ruling elite remained cohesive. Ordinary people stayed as a “silent majority” all the same and kept a certain distance from the opposition forces. Even though they showed unexpected support for the NKDP in the election, they were not ready yet to demonstrate outright support for democratization movements. The United States still preferred political stability to uneasy democratization in South Korea and Washington stood by the Chun government. However, two other dimensions of the political opportunity structure appeared much different from the previous period: governmental repression was relaxed, and a strong opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), emerged. 8 0 First, from late 1983 the government carried out a series of liberalization measures in order to restore its le^timacy which had been seriously damaged result of the bloody crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising and the ensuing harsh repression of opposition forces. As a gesture to relax social tension, the government released political prisoners, restored the civil rights of purged politicians, and reinstated expelled students and professors. Second, a new opposition party, the NKDP, formed by two eminent leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, achieved unexpected success in the 1985 National Assembly election. The advent of a strong opposition party became a serious threat to the authoritarian regime and added a valuable asset to the social movements. Taking advantage of the government’s decompression measures and emergence of a strong opposition party, social movement sectors had momentum to escape from the state of lethargy. Many new organizations emerged in many aspects of the social movement: including students, labor, farmers, dissidents and youth. Student groups began to conduct joint demonstrations with other student and labor organizations. Laborers in this period could build sectoral and regional organization for more effective struggles. Once the student and labor groups were organized to some level, their struggles had become more violent and extreme. The extreme elements in their goals and method of struggles alienated many ordinary people and isolated themselves. One of the most distinguished developments in the social movements of the second period was a formation of an umbrella organization, theMintongryun (the United Minjung (masses) Movement for Democracy and Unification, UMMDU) composed of 23 organizations from among dissidents, labor, rehgious community, farmers, the poor and intellectuals. The UMMDU 81 played a significant role in producing cooperation and solidarity among diverse movement sectors and organizations. In this period, social movements were led by representational organizations, rather than a few notable individuals, and they were relatively successful in broadening their popular bases. 3.2 Changes in Political Opportunity Structure 3.2.1 Relaxation of Political Control and Retreat to Harsh Repression Liberalization measures In late 1983 and 1984, the Korean government announced a series of decompression measures designed to relieve some of the social tension that had arisen as a result of earlier protest and societal mobilization.' Some of these measures included the reinstatement of expelled professors and student activists, rehabilitation of purged politicians, withdrawal of the police fi'om campus and the release of political prisoners. On February 25, 1984 the government lifted the ban on 202 politicians who had been ousted fi’om politics since November 5, 1980, when the government prohibited 567 politicians fi’om involving any kind of political activities. 99 politicians remained under the ban. On November 30, 1984 the government released aU except 15 politicians including the three Kims: Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil.^ After the 1985 National Assembly election, the three Kims were released fi’om the ban. However, Kim ' Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., “Prospects for Continuing Democratization In Korea,”Current Policy No. 829, (Washington: United States Department of State, 1986), p. 2. ^ The United State Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice 1983 (Washington: GPO, February 1984), p. 817. 82 Dae Jung was still legally barred from joining a party or running for political office because he was technically a criminal with a suspended prison sentence. The government also released student activists. As part of a Christmas amnesty, 131 student were released in late 1983, and 181 students who had been charged under the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations were released in spring 1984.^ During the spring semester of 1984, 86 professors and 479 among 1,373 students who had been expelled since May 1980 were allowed to return to their campuses.'* Owing to the government’s liberalization measures the number of conscientious prisoners had been reduced to 109 in November 1984. This number was less than a fourth o f457 conscientious prisoners in November 1983. Time Total NSL LAD H T Other Nov. 10, 1982 413 168 204 30 14 July 7, 1983 428 137 285 3 Nov. 25, 1983 457 93 362 2 Nov. 27, 1984 109 Table 3.1: The Number of Conscientious Prisoners NSL: The National Security Law; LAD; The Law on Assembly and Demonstration; HT: High Treason Source: Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), Hankuk Sahoijmgeui Jipyo {Index o f Korean SocialJustice) (Seoul: MinJoongSa, 1986), p. 105. ^ Asian Wall Street Journal, December 26, 1983; Korea Herald, March 6, 1984. International League for Human Rights and the International Human Rights Law Group,Democracy in South Korea: A Promise Unfulfilled (New York: The International League for Human Rights, 1985), p.75; Korea Herald, June 6, 1984. 83 As a result of these decompression measures, the number of expelled students in relation to political activities had also been dramatically reduced from 332 in 1983 to 47 in 1984. Year 1975-1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Number 786 542 290 209 332 47 Table 3.2: The Number of Expelled Students from School in Relation to Political Protests Source: Joongang Hbo March 2, 1984; Don-A Hbo June 6, 1985. The background of the government’s liberalization policy can be explained by several factors. First, the Chun government believed that it revived public support to no small degree, owing in large part to the rebounding South Korean economy. The national economic indexes were very positive in many respects. The rate of economic growth turned from -3.7% in 1980 to 12.6% in 1983, unemployment rate decreased from 5.2 % in 1980 to 4.1% in 1983, the inflation was down from 28.7% in 1980 to 3.4% in 1983, and for the first time, the financial balance went into the black in 1983. 84 1980 I981j 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Economic Growth -3.7 5.9 7.2 12.6 9.3 7.0 12.9 13.0 (%) Unemployment 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.1 (%) Inflation (%) 28.7 21.3 7.2 3.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.0 Financial balance 292.0 663.2 643.9 958.5 905. (billion) 584.2 1.050..9 712.6 3 Table 3.3: Macro-economic Index of the Chun Government Source: Jung Woon Chan, “Sgongeui Kyungjerul Pyunggahanda,” (Evaluating the Economy of the Fifth Republic) in Dong-A Ilbosa,Sgong Pyungga Datorongoi (A Grand Forum on the Fifth Republic) (Seoul: Dongsa Dbosa, 1994), p. 174, p. 176. Second, the elite believed that their rule had been fairly consolidated and that opposition movements could be controlled by more sophisticated and institutionalized means than physical violence. They had confidence in the institutional mechanisms of their control, such as the police and the internal intelligence agency, the Agency for National Security Planning, and various repressive laws regarding the press, assembly, demonstrations and labor unions. Third, their legitimacy was badly damaged by the brutal repression of opposition movements, especially the Kwangju Uprising. As a result, the authoritarian regime needed to recover this lost legitimacy by showing gestures of reconciliation toward the people. The government had to especially show some gestures to obtain support from the middle class at the next National Assembly election scheduled in February 1985. Above all, because repression tactics were unsuccessful in quelling protests against the authoritarian regime, the government felt it had to implement a decompression policy. Despite the harsh repression of opposition movements, student movements did not perish. In fact, many ordinary people became more sympathetic to 85 their cause because participants in many of the earlier repressed social movements were able to mobilize martyr images to their benefit. The state therefore needed to search for different strategies to isolate movement forces fi"om the ordinary people, and choke off this possible venue for opposition to the authoritarian regime. However, the results of these decompression policies turned out quite contrary to what the ruling elite intended. Eased repression helped opposition forces regain momentum in revitalizing themselves and, as a result, outbursts of autonomous organization emerged in each movement sector. Retreat to harsh repression Despite these decompression policies, the government continued to supervise student activists. After the government announced the withdrawal of police fi’om the campus, agents disguised as students, infiltrated the campus to observe student activists. The government’s secret supervision of campuses was exposed during the so-called Proxy incident in September 1984. Four secrete informers were disclosed by students at Seoul National University in September 1984 and one of them was detained for 26 hours by students. These informers were beaten and forced to confess their identity and covert purposes.^ As the social movements continued to aggressively take advantage of the government’s decompression measures, the government rescinded its liberalization policy and returned to its high repression campaigns fi’om late 1984. Two violent actions of the 86 students quickened the government’s return to repression: students’ occupation of headquarters of the ruling Democratic Justice Party in November 1984 and their seizure of the U.S. Cultural Center in May 1985. On November 14, 1984, 264 students from Yonsei, Korea and Seongkyunkwan universities occupied the ruling Democratic Justice Party headquarters to protest the sexual abuse of women by the police. The police had allegedly sexually abused female students who were arrested on September 4, 1984 during a protest of Chun’s visit to Japan. It was alleged that the female students had their clothes ripped ofr in front of male oflBcers in the police station.® Once this incident was revealed and the government became the target of criticism from opposition forces and ordinary citizens, the police intimidated the women and their families, urging the women to change their story and say that the alleged police misbehavior was a fabrication. For their attack on the DJP headquarters, all 264 students were arrested and 19 of them were detained. Since mid-1985 government’s repression of social movements returned to the level of the previous period. The student occupation of the United States Cultural Center occupation by student activists on May 23, 1985 was a turning point in the government’s abandonment of its campus autonomy policy. Despite the United States Embassy’s request for the lenient treatment of the arrested students, they received harsh sentencing * Whang Euiboog, "'Seoul I984nyon Daehaksaeng siwi (Student Demonstrations in Seoul in 1984,” Sin Don-A, December, 1984, p.208-209. ® Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea (New York and Washington D C.: Asia Watch Committee, 1985), p. 105. 87 and 18 students were charged with violent action/ One of the students. Ham Ungyeong, the chairman of Seoul National University’s Sammintuwi (Struggle Committee for Three Mins: People, Nation, and Democracy) was accused of violating of the National Security Law, the toughest law on anti-government activists. Ham was not oflBcially charged with his participation of the United States Cultural Center seizure but with the anti-state crime of possessing “communist” books. After the incident, the government announced that it would investigate not only the students who participated in the occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center but also leaders of student organizations who did not directly participate, in but who might have masterminded it from behind the scenes. The government used the incident as an opportunity to eliminate radical organizations and their leaders. On June 29, 1985 the police raided the ofiBces of student organizations at nine universities. In a sudden attack, they arrested 66 students and confiscated 75,000 copies and 125 difterent pamphlets, 1,300 copies of underground newspapers, 158 Molotov cocktails, 10 liters of gasoline, and 118 cotton wadded torches.* On July 18 the police arrested 63 students who were members of the Sammintuwi from 19 universities. On July 23 nine more students were arrested under the National Security Law and one of the leading underground campus papers, the Gibbal (The Flag) was ordered to cease publication On ugust 5, seven students involved in the publication of the Gibbal were arrested and put under detention. ’ Testimony by Edward J. Baker, professor. Harvard University at the Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific ASkirs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 99* Congress, “Political Developments and Human Rights in The Republic of Korea,”, on April 16, 1986. * Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, p. 128. ® Dong-A Dbo, July 24, 1985. '“Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, pp. 142-143. 88 The rise of government repression after the students’ seizure of the U.S. Cultural Center was clearly demonstrated by the number of political prisoners and expelled students. After the seizure, the number of conscientious prisoners who were students jumped to 519, up fi’om 14 before the incident. “ While only 47 students were ousted fi’om their schools in 1984, 102 students were dismissed in the seven months between March and October 1985.^^ Natio’l Anti - PoHtical Social Rallies and Total Security Communism Purification Protection Demonstrations Law Law Law Law Law 1980 23 136 811 365 1,355 1981 169 311 480 1982 171 197 368 1983 153 388 541 1984 108 4 156 268 1985 143 1 840 981 1986 525 3 2,574 3,102 1987 786 3 4,172 4,961 Total 2,078 136 811 11 9,003 12,039 Table 3.4: Number of the Arrests by the Political Restriction Law in 1980s Source: Ministry of Court Administration,Sabupyoungcan (Judicial Yearbook), 1980- 1987; recited fi’om Kim Ho Jin, “JeSgonghwagukeui Jungkwanjeok Sunggyuk” (Political Characteristics of the Fifth Republic) in Dong-A Dbosa, Sgong Pyungga Datorongoi (A Grand Forum on the Fifth Republic) (Seoul: Dongsa Dbosa, 1994),p. 105. In terms of the political prisoner population, while there were 109 political in November 27, 1984, this number swelled to 704 on November 20, 1985 as the police " CISJD, Hankuk Sahwoijungeui Jisu (Index of Korean Social Justice) (Seoul: MinJoongSa, 1986), p. 105. '* Chosun Ilbo, November 7, 1985. 89 cracked down on the Sammintu}^ The next sharp increase in arrests came in May 1986, following riots in the port city of Inchon. This time, police attention focused on the Mintongnyon (the ÜMMDU), a strong umbrella organization composed of 23 aflBliated organizations from among dissidents, labor, religious community, farmers, the poor and intellectuals, as well as two new and decidedly more radical student groups, the ]amintu (Self Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee against the U.S. and Fascism) and the Minmintu (National Democratic Struggle Committee against Imperialism and Fascism). In August 1986, according to the estimation of the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), about 1,200 political activists were in custody, and by December the number had risen to between 1,800 and 2,000.'"* Reports of torture also significantly increased. In September 1985 a young antigovemment activist was reported to be tortured while under police detention and three senior journalists were also beaten by security of ofiBcials while being interrogated for breaking a government embargo on a news story. The most shocking case was a case of sexual torture to a female student-turned worker. On July 3, 1986 a student-turned labor activist Kwon In Suk disclosed that she was sexually harassed while being investigated by the police.'® This incident revealed the immorality of the regime and enraged Korean people. On January 14, 1987 Park Jong Cheol, a student at Seoul National University, was tortured to death during an investigation for participating in a demonstration. The exposure of the government’s intention to cover up the torture death of Park infiiriated CISJD,/i/i/., p. 105. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 30, 1987, p. 26. '^The United State Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice 1985, p. 804. 90 people of all social strata and provided crucial momentum for the democratic transition of July 1987. 3.2.2 External Supports Social movements in this period did not receive much support from either ordinary Korean citizens or the U.S. government. The reason why many ordinary people hesitated to show active support for various social movements may be explained by two factors; the high risk of confronting the repressive government, as well as the perceived extremism of student and labor organizations. Even though the government announced a series of decompression policies and assumed a gesture of reconciliation toward opposition forces and the public at large, many people still remembered the bloody crackdown on the Kwangju citizens’ protest in May 1980, and could feared harsh retaliation by the government. Government repression was still very harsh and most of people did not want to risk the safety of themselves or their family by directly confronting the regime. The National Assembly election in February 1985 provided an opportunity for many people to reveal their discontent. Unprecedentedly large number of people gathered at campaign rallies for the new opposition party, the NKDP, which rallied support around its campaign promise to revise the current constitution to include direct election of the president. The NKDP, formed three weeks before the election, was unexpectedly successful during the election. The unanticipated success of the NKDP showed the Kang Sin Shul, SOnyundae Haksaengundongsa (History of the Student movement in the 1980s) (Seoul; Hyungsungsa, 1988), p. 354. 91 possibility of what could be achieved if the “silent majority” was turned into active supporters for the democratic movement. Beginning in 1986, college professors began to express their support for the democratization movement. In his “State of the Nation” message in 1986, Chun Doo Hwan announced that the issue of constitutional revision could indeed be discussed, but only following the successful conclusion of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. His announcement provoked considerable repulsion from the intellectuals, ordinary people and opposition forces, who wanted more immediate selection of the president. On April 11, 1986, 47 professors at the Seoul National University made a demand for direct presidential elections. They were soon joined by 763 professors from 28 universities.’’ The professors’ actions revoked a substantial response in the Korean society in which scholars were highly respected. Faced by fervent repulsion, Chun retreated from his original position and announced that he would not object to the revision of constitution during his term if the National Assembly was able to reach to agreement on the issue. This was the first time in recent memory that the ordinary people and intellectuals publicly expressed their discontent against the regime. But the government’s retraction of its decision to shelve constitutional revision until after the Seoul Olympics in 1988 provided the opposition forces, especially radical student and labor groups, a groundless confidence that the government could be overthrown if they pushed more aggressively. They staged highly violent battles to ignite peoples’ discontents and enfeeble the base of the government. However, their calculations were incorrect. Intense confrontations 92 between movement activists and the riot police in many rallies and demonstrations scared off many citizens who prefer to be more moderate in their views and expression. Especially high levels of violence and radical slogans of anti-U.S., anti-imperialism and anti-Fascism which appeared in Inchon Incident in May 1986, occupation of Konguk university in October 1986 and the demonstration in Youngdungpo District in Seoul in November 1986 made many people turn their backs on the social movements sectors and provided the government an opportunity for harsh repression. In this period the United States continued its support for the authoritarian regime in Seoul, and did not alter its policy of promoting stability over democratization. The United States supported the Chun regime’s stance on constitutional revision. During his visit to South Korea on May 7 and 8, 1986, the Secretary of State, George Shultz, obtained Chun’s pledge and clarified the United States support of the Chun regime. In his news conference, Schultz said that President Chun clearly believed in the peaceful transfer of the government and was sincerely cooperating with the opposition parties to deepen the process of democratization, including constitutional revision.’* He also criticized the opposition forces for linking democratization so singly to the contentious issue of direct elections. Schultz stated that the United States and Japan do not have direct presidential election systems and that only a few countries in the world choose their leader by popular election.’® The United States did not seem to expect too much fi’om the Korean CISJD, Gaehunkwa Minjuwhaundon (Constitutional Revision and Democratization Movement) (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), p. 42. ’* Nam Chan Soon, “Migukeui daehansigak, 4.30eseo 4.13ggaji,” (The U.S. Perspective on S. Korea, from April 30 to April 13 Measure),Shin Dong-A, July 1987, pp. 169-171. Im Dong Dyung & Kim Chang Ki, “Gaehunjungkukeui Tamsaekjon,” (Constitutional Revision and its Political Situation),Wolgan Chosun, June 1986, p. 167. 93 democratization movement. It considered Chun’s pledge to step down at the end of his single seven-year-term alone as a quantum jump toward democracy in South Korea. 3.2.3 Power Configuration in the Political Society As one measure designed to lessen political and social tension, the Chun government lifted the ban on political activities by the purged politicians. By allowing purged politicians to participate in institutional politics, the government intended to further decentralize opposition parties and weaken social movement forces by absorbing members of movements into the institutional political area. Some of those opposition politicians released from the purification ban organized a new party, the New Korea Democratic Party on January 18, 1985, less than a month before the election. During the election campaign, the opposition party encountered severe limitations and unfair treatments. Opposition candidates were prohibited from using the term ‘dictatorship’ in reference to the present government and mentioning the Minchyhyup (the Council for the Promotion of Democracy) founded by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Opposition parties also suffered from physical attacks by government agencies. Many opposition party workers were arrested and interrogated by the police without any justifiable reasons. Some opposition candidates were even beaten by gangs of pro-govemment youth and hospitalized.^® However, under the strong leadership of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, the NKDP achieved considerable electoral success in the 1985 National Assembly election. 20 Dong-A Ilbo, January 26, 1985. 94 The result of the election was completely different from the authoritarian elite’s intention. Even opposition politicians themselves and the social movement forces did not expect such a good performance by the NKDP. Even though the ruling Democratic Justice Party still achieved a legislative majority, reportedly owing to illegal campaign practices and the manipulation of the electoral system, they were badly outperformed by the NKDP in major cities. The ruling Democratic Justice Party won only 35.3% of the popular vote, and 87 National Assembly seats out of a total of 184 directly contested seats. Owing to proportional representative system which awards two thirds, or 61 seats; of the total 92 proportional seats to the party winning a majority of electoral districts, the DJP could win 148 seats (53%) out of 276 total seats. The leading opposition party, the New Korea Democratic party, won 28.7% of the popular vote and 50 districts seats. They had only 17 proportional seats and total of 67 seats. The Democratic Korea Party, the leading opposition party in the last election, gained only 17% of popular vote and 26 district seats. With nine proportional seats it had total of 35 seats. When we examine the urban turnout, the success of the NKDP becomes more clear. The NKDP won 42.7% of the popular vote in Seoul and 35.9% in Pusan, while the governing DJP won 27% and 27.6% respectively in those cities. Also, only 66.3 % of the DJP’s 87 elected officials finished first in their districts, each of which elected two assemblymen, whereas 85.9% of the party’s 90 elected officials took the first place in their constituencies in the 1981 election.^' Washington Post, Februaiy 14, 1985. 95 DJP NKDP DKP KNP Popular Votes % 35.3 29.2 19.5 9.2 District Seats 87 (47.3 %) 50 (27.2) 26 (14.1) 15 (8.2) Proportional 61 (66.3) 17(18.5) 9 (9.8) 5 (5.4) Total Seats 148 (53.6) 67 (24.3) 35 (12.7) 20 (7.2) Four Big Cities* 30% 36% 20.8 % 8.0 % 9 Provinces 40.1 % 19.2 % 16.4 % 10.3 % Table 3.5: The Result of 1985 Assembly Election Source: Koh B. C , “The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,”Asian Survey, 25:9 (September 1985), p. 889; Lee Kyung Jae, “Mineuiga Hwoirichin Chongsunhyunjang,” (The Scene of General Election Where the Will of People Blew Hard) Shin Dong-A, March 1985, pp. 188, 191. *: Four Big Cities are Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, and Inchon. After the election, the NKDP could consolidate its position as a threatening opposition party by merging the other opposition parties. About two months after the assembly election, on April 3, 1985, 29 out of 35 assemblymen belonging to the Democratic Korean Party (DKP) defected to the NKDP. With additional defection from the other minority party, the Korean National Party (KNP) the NKDP could obtain 102 out of 276 seats in the National Assembly and passed over 91 seats, a third of total seats which made it possible to initiate certain actions such as convening an assembly session and presenting a resolution for dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet.^ But on December 31, 1985, 12 NKDP assemblymen, displeased with the leadership, quit the party. The defection of these assemblymen allowed the NKDP to occupy two seats shy of one-third of the National Assembly seats. The defection also damaged the public’s perception of the NKDP.“ ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, April 18, 1985, p. 34. ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, January 16, 1986, p.23. 96 The 1985 election showed increased possibilities for forging alliance between the opposition political party and social movement forces. Throughout the campaigns of the election, social movement organizations mobilized thousands of voters for the NKDP. The opposition forces appealed to the public by highlighting such volatile issues as the military dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan, the ill-fated Kwangju Uprising, direct presidential election, and possibly the most threatening and most encompassing issue of all, the legitimacy of the Chun regime. Even though the NKDP and social movement sectors were united in their opposition to the Chun government, this unity did not persist below the surface, and among the social movements themselves, there were also many discrepancies. Above all, the NKDP did not agree with extremism of the student and labor organizations. They opposed the excessive use of violence and mass revolution which some radical organizations clearly articulated as their goals. As a conservative party, the NKDP based their constituency on the moderate public, rather than radical students or workers. Therefore, concerned with emotions of its voters it could not always support the social movement sectors. 3.3 Social Movements The decompression measures which were used by the authoritarian regime to deflate the atmosphere of social unrest increased the “space” available to social movements for action. Since 1984, various social forces including student, labor and dissident groups began to form representative organizations. Owing to expanded room 97 for action, laborers, farmers and the poor waged explosive struggles for their right to live. Labor and farm sectors began to build organizations and execute movements by themselves, rather than relying on students or religious communities. In this period, participants in social movements sectors made substantial efforts in building cooperative linkages between themselves by establishing sectoral and regional movement organizations. They also explored opportunities for solidarity and unification among their diverse groups, possibly even uniting their forces under the leadership of an umbrella organization. Previously expressed ideological conflicts among different student and labor groups were only aggravated as time went on. Differing perspectives and interpretations of the current situation of Korean society and economy produced diverse prescriptions for the current problems in South Korea. Vehement ideological debates brought about serious losses of movement resources and undermined their strength for political struggles. For the development of their ideologies and wide access to the mass social movement organizations employed a diverse medium of propaganda including newspapers, leaflets, stickers, posters, and tapes. In general, social movement forces were somewhat successful in developing organizations and broadening their popular bases in this period. 3.3.1 Student movements While in the first period the student movements were isolated and led by small groups, in this period the student movements showed more sophisticated patterns in their 98 battles against the regime. In December 1983, the government inaugurated policies which increased the autonomy of universities, including the acquittal of arrested students, reinstatement of dismissed students and the withdrawal of the police from campuses. This policy provided student activists more open space for organizations and movements. Resurgence of student movement Beginning in 1984, student movements started to once again take advantage of the government’s liberalization policy. For about 40 days following the spring semester, 45 out of 99 universities in the country carried out some kind of demonstrations and the number of demonstrations increased seven times over the previous year.^"* For the two months between March and April the student movement put its focus on the achievement of campus autonomy and the demonstration places were generally confined to the campuses. After May, 1984 the student movements turned their attention to political issues and staged street demonstrations. On May 4, 1984 students from sbc universities gathered at the Korea University and demanded the removal of compulsory conscription and the withdrawal of the police from school, as will as the end of human right violations by the government. On May 18, 1984 some 3,000 students gathered at the Sungkyunkwan University to memorialize the Kwangju Massacre by staging a massive street demonstration. In late 1984, the student movement appeared more violent and waged audacious battles, including attacks on police stations and other governmental related facilities. On 99 November 14, 1984, 264 students from Yonsei, Korea and Sungkyunkwan universities occupied the headquarters of the Democratic Justice Party demanding such things as release of all imprisoned students, restoration of dismissed professors, investigation of the deaths of forcibly conscripted students on military duty and so on.^ It has been a tradition that students carry out massive demonstrations on April 19 to commemorate the day in 1960 when the student movement threw Syngman Rhee out of his presidency. Since 1980, the anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising has become another day of huge demonstrations. Coming into 1985 the student movements became more extensive and intensive. According to a “White Paper on Campus Disturbances” issued by the Education Ministry, on April 19, 1985, 56 universities staged demonstrations, double the number of 1984, and on the 1985 anniversary of Kwangju Uprising, about 12,000 to 30,000 students in 67 universities carried out demonstrations, whereas in the previous year only about 2,700 to 6,400 in 19 universities participated in demonstrations.^® According to Home Ministry statistics, in the spring semester in 1985 alone, about 272,000 students participated in 995 rallies and the number of street demonstrations among them was 139, more than double the 55 demonstrations in 1984.^’ Whang Euibong, “Seoul 1984nyon Daehaksaeng siwi (Student Demonstrations in Seoul in 1984,” Sin Don A, December, 1984, p.202. “ Whang Euibong, /hid., pp.200-205. ^ Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, pp. 114-115. The Korea Herald, May 24, 1985. 1 0 0 Characteristics of the student movements Joint demonstrations among différent universities, solidarity with labor movements, dual organizations, and extremism appeared as new characteristics of movements in this period. First, for effective struggles, several neighboring colleges carried out collective demonstrations. In joint demonstrations they usually adopted guerrilla tactics. That is to say, they carried out demonstrations at several different places simultaneously to disperse the police power. For joint demonstrations representatives from several universities gathered and arranged places which each university should cover and time to start demonstration.^* Second, the promotion of student-labor solidarity was the most vivid development in the student movement during the second period of democratization. Since the 1980 revisions of the Labor Law prohibited third party intervention in labor disputes, many students and graduates infiltrated into working places by concealing their educational background, hoping to educate workers and help organize labor unions. The number of disguised students workers increased considerably from 1985. According to government estimates, there were about 50 student-turned workers in March 1985 and the number continuously increased to 120 in May; 190 in June; 230 in July; and 400 in August.^ According to the Labor Department, as of November 1986, 699 students-tumed-workers ^ The process of consultation was not regularly and formally set up. Instead, representatives gathered whenever they needed. They usually did not consult up to the details of the demonstrations and they just fixed the place each university should cover and the time to start; Interview with Sung Jong Kyu, a former student activist of the Yonsei University, on August 25, 1995. ^ Kim Jong Chan, “ Nodongundong Dancheduleui Hyunjuso” (Current Situation of Labor Movement Organizations), Sin Dong -A, December, 1986, p. 480. ICI were working at 377 factories and they were responsible for 38 among 249 labor disputes in 1986/° In order to avoid a crackdown by the government, disguised student workers were organized as a line-system. They were connected with the higher organization through only one person and they were not allowed to openly contact other student-tumed workers even in a same working place/* The participation of student activists in labor problems developed increased political consciousness and action by workers. This newly forged solidarity between students and labor made the military government fearful of possible revolutionary potential. Even though there had been many attempts at cooperation among different universities and efforts to increase solidarity between the students and labor for effective battles against the regime, there still had been serious conflicts among student factions concerning their ideologies, perspectives on Korean society and ways of struggle. In the whole period they never succeeded in building an umbrella organization to embrace the entire student movement arena. Third, organizational duality was a new appearance of the student movement in this phase. Besides the ofBcial legal student organizations, student activists formed many underground and illegal organizations for intense and effective strife against the government. The Sammintuwi (Struggle Committee for Three Mins: People, Nation, and Democracy) in 1985, and the Jamintu (Self-Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee Against the United States and Fascism) Minmintu (National Democratic Struggle Committee Against Imperialism and Fascism) in 1986 were the representative umbrellas ^Jung Ang Ilbo, November 7, 1986. 102 organizations combining illegal vanguard forces in each university. Although they were formally political arms of legal student associations likeJeonhakryunQi^àonaX Federation of Student Association), practically they assumed leadership in most of student actions. Fourth, extremism and violence were conspicuous in ±e student movements in this period. Student movements assumed much more radical and violent struggles against authoritarian rule in this period. Students heavily resorted to violence. They threw stones, bricks, Molotov cocktails, and torches to bum police boxes and vehicles. Student violence was in part an attempt at self-defense against police brutality. Their goal of struggle did not include the establishment of liberal democracy. Revolution was promoted as the goal of the student movement in this period and their radical ideology alienated ordinary people as well as mass students and isolated themselves. The extreme elements in the student movement clearly emerged in Inchon incident in May 1986. During an opposition rally calling for constitutional revision, an angry mob led by radical students set on fire the ofiBces of both government and opposition parties. Radical students were not pleased with the perceived opportunistic attitude of the NKDP. They blamed the NKDP for not standing on the side of the Minjung (masses) since its eventual goal lay in not a realization and pursuit of the masses interest but in its own selfish grasp of government power. Another violent confi’ontation between students and government took place on October 28, 1986 when over 1,500 students fi’om 26 universities occupied the main library building of Konkuk University in the middle of their rally to form Aehaktu (Students’ Interview with BCim Sung Wook, a former student-turned worker, on September 10, 1995. 103 Struggle League for Anti-imperialism Anti- authoritarianism). One of the biggest antigovemment, anti-American student demonstrations continued for four days until it was stormed by 8,000 policemen. With helicopters dropping tear gas canisters, policemen overpowered and arrested all the student protesters in the building. As result of this demonstration 1,525 students were arrested and 85 students were wounded.^^ In both cases students resorted to heavy violence, resulting in the arrests of hundreds of students. The growing radicalism of the students was helpful for neither the students themselves nor the overall opposition forces. Their radicalism, pro-communist rhetoric, and high level of violence isolated the social movement forces from the ordinary people and even the opposition party, and consequently shrunk their support base. The extremism also provided the authoritarian government a good excuse for harsh repression of the democratic movements. In the pretext of recovering social stability, the government took stem action against antigovemment forces. Development of student organization and their divisions Sophistication of the student movement can be seen in the establishment of nationwide organizations. In March 1984, student activists organized the Hakwon jaeutwha chujin euiwonwhoi (Committee for the Promotion of Campus Autonomy) as a preparatory organization for rebuilding autonomous student representative bodies.^"* Until Lee Kyung Jae, “Gaehunkwa Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung,” (Constitutional revision and Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung), Sin Don-A, July 1986, p. 185. Editor, Chunhwan (Conversion) (Seoul: Salg^ejul, 1987), p. 76. ^ Jeong Chang Min, “80nyeondae Haksaengundongeui Nonriwa Hyunsil,” (Logic and reality of student movement in 1980s) in Jo Jin Kyung ed., Hankuksahwoieui seonggyeokkwa Undong (Characteristics and movement of Korean society), (Seoul: Gongdongche, 1987), p. 317. 104 late 1984, most universities resurrected the General Student Association (Chonghaksaengwhoi) as a preparation stage to build linkages between individual universities. Beginning with Korea University on September 20, 1984, Yonsei University on September 25 and Seoul National University on September 27, revived their GSAs.^^ As an efifort to build umbrella organizations linking individual universities, Jeonkuk Haksawng Daepyo Gigu Hoieui (The Representative Organ of the National Student) was established by 2,000 representatives from 42 universities on November 3, 1984.^® In April 1985, the student movement succeeded in building a more systemic umbrella organization, '^Jeonguk haksaeng cAo/rgygowAop' (Jeonhakryon) (National Federation of Student Associations) which had regional organs nationwide.^^ By building nationwide organizations, the students could unfold cooperative and systematic struggles against the repressive regime. Along with the formation and sophistication of movement organization, students also created their own news media, since they judged that the existing news media were controlled by the government and were unable to report the truth. The most popular form of communication was a big poster such as Jayueuibuk (Freedom Walls) in Seoul National University, Yonjabo (Yonsei Poster) in Yonsei University, Minjueuibuk (Democracy Walls) in Sungkyunkwan University, Jayueuisori (Voice of Freedom), and Jo Hee Yon, “SOnyundae Sahoiundonglcwa Sahoikusungchenonjaeng” (Social Movements in the 1980s and Debates on Social Structure) in Park Hyun Chae and Jo Hee Yon eds., HankukSahwoi Kusungchenonjaeng (I) (Debate on Korean Social Structure (I) ) (Seoul: Juksan, 1991), p. 58. ^ Editor, Haksaengundong Nonjaengsa 1 (The History of Student Movement Debate 1) (Seoul: Dsongjung, 1988), p. 186. Jeong Chang Min, “80nyeondae Haksaengundongeui Nonriwa Hyunsil,” (Logic and reality of student movement in 1980s) p. 318. 105 others.^* Through the posters students communicated such diverse issues as the revisions of school regulations, absence under guidance system, compulsory conscription, the Kwangju Uprising, and reports of the previous day’s demonstrations and slogans. These posters also carried foreign news articles, editorials and sarcastic cartoons. Some universities published underground papers and magazines to overcome the limits of posters. Among them areJayu Eullon (Free Speech), Minju Jeonsun (Democratic Front) and Jeonjin (Forward) at Seoul National University and Sunguja (Pioneer) at Korea University. The Jqyti Etdlon (Free Speech) allegedly printed five to six thousand copies of its eight page publication weekly, which was significantly longer than the authorized biweekly Daehakshinmun (University Newspaper).^® Split in the student movements In spite of these organizational developments and the increased solidarity between student groups and other social forces, ideological differences still existed among student groups. These differences often revolved around groups’ concrete analyses of the current politico-economic situation. Since 1984 three different ideologies existed in the social movement forces: CDR (Civil Democratic Revolution), NDR (National Democratic Revolution) and FDR (People’s Democratic Revolution). Their differences lay in the interpretation of conditions of current Korean society, main actors conducting transformations of the society and ways of revolution. Their ideas can be summarized as follows. ^®Whang Euibong, 76/4., p.207. 106 Contradictions in Main actor of the Method of organizat Korean Society movements movement ions CDR (Peripheral Minjung encompass the Build CPD Capitalism) middle class, national bourgeoisie PCDR Military bourgeoisie; democracy through authoritarianism Intellectuals, youth and civil democratic vs. Minjung students groups are revolution. (masses) main actors, and labor is supportive actor. NDR (Neo-Colonial Labor, farmers, and the Anti-imperialist, CDS State Monopoly poor are main actors, anti-fascist struggle. Capitalism) the middle class is National and opportunistic and fascistic necessary to draw them contradictions are intoMinjung side. mixed. PDR (State Monopoly Labor, farmers and the Restrain reckless Labor Capitalism) poor are main actors, open political Conservative vs. excluding the middle struggle and focus Progressive forces. class and not necessary on supporting the to cooperate with them Minjung forces to strengthen them. Table 3.6: CDR, NDR and PDR CPD (The Council for Promoting Democratization); PCDR (People’s Coalition for Democracy and Reunification); CDS (Committee for Democratization Struggle). Source: Editors, Haksaengundong Ronjaengsa (History of Student Movement Debates), (Seoul: Dsongjeong, 1988), pp. 57-65: Choi Yon Ku, “80nyundae haksaengundongeui Inyumjuk. Jojikjuk baljunkwajung” (The Process of Ideological and Organizational Development in the 1980s Student Movements) in Jo Hee Yon ed.. The History of Korean Social Movement (Seoul: Juksan, 1990), pp. 253-256. According to the CDR, major contradiction in Korean society exists between military authoritarianism and Minjung (masses). Bourgeoisie democracy should be established through a civil democratic revolution. The national bourgeoisie, progressive 39 Ibid., pp. 207-208. 107 intellectuals, youth, and students should play a major role in the revolution and the labor class should play only a supportive and marginal role. On the other hand, the NDR argues that the targets of struggle are not only military fascists but also imperial forces, such as the United States. They argue ûaxMinjung (masses), including workers, peasants and the poor should be the main actor in the revolution and that tactical cooperation with the opportunistic middle class is required. The PDR represents the most radical interpretation on the South Korean society. They emphasize class struggle between the haves and the have-nots. According to the PDR, strategic cooperation with the opportunistic middle class is not necessary, and the alienated classes such as workers, peasants and the poor should conduct class revolution by themselves. Gibbal (Flag) vs. \nû-Gibbal'. Until early 1986, student activists generally divided into two groups concerning their perspective on Korean society, roles of students, and ways of struggle against the government; “flag” and “anti-flag.The anti-flag group preferred the tactics of step by step struggles against the military regime. They contended that student movements should exert eflbrts on building healthy legal organizations and making issues of campus problems to draw support from students before transferring to full-scale violent battles against the military regime. They attempted to broaden their mass base by solidifying sector movements and building mass organizations. On the other hand, the Flag group, the successor of theHakrim group, thought that feeble struggles through legal organizations had made the student movement stagnant because legal student The Gibbal (Flag) was a title of magazine published by a student group that criticized the Moorim group which emphasized expansion of mass base and democratization in campus first as a preparation stage before shifting to s tru ^ e s for democracy in the society. The “Anti-Flag” group, the successor of 108 organizations had a certain limit in developing ways of struggles and leading battles. They insisted, therefore, that special vanguard forces should be established for effective and steady political struggles. They organized the Mintuwi (the Struggle Committee for Democratization) in late 1984 which directed the occupation of headquarters of the governing Democratic Justice Party on January 14, 1985.'** The two groups had different ideas on the roles of students in relating to labor movement. The Flag group saw the workers as a target of propaganda and guidance. They insisted that the student movement give more positive aid to the labor movement and this is one of main axis of the student movement with political struggles. On the contrary, the “Anti-Flag” group argued that the workers had very low level of political consciousness and they were not ready to cooperate with the student movement. Workers themselves, they argued, had to take a fundamental responsibility for enhancing political consciousness and the student movement had a certain limit in leading the labor movement. In spite of their differences and their competitive relationship, they succeeded in organizing a vanguard force in which both groups participated and cooperated. When the Flag group established another vanguard force, the Sammintuwi (Struggle Committee for Three Mins; People, Nation, and Democracy), and planned to occupy the United States Embassy building in early 1985, the Anti-Flag group agreed to carry out the plan together. The Sammintuwi was led by co-leaders from both the Flag and Anti-Flag groups. the Moorim, was also called as MC (Main Current) because they had been main stream in the student movement in the pre-liberalization period. 109 Sam m intuwi : Sammintuwi (Struggle Committee for Three Mins; People, Nation, and Democracy) was first organized on March 25, 1985, and then put under the leadership of the Jeonhakryim(^aü.QxaX Federation of Student Association) on April 17, 1985. By July 18, the Sammintuwi was established and operating at 34 universities.^^ As seen fi'om their name of the organization they advocated “the liberation of the masses” (minjung haebang), “the fight for democracy” (minju jaengchwi), and “national unification” (minjok tognilf^. They interpreted Korean society on the basis of Marxist theories of class stmggle. They defined the three classes: workers, peasants and urban poor as the “masses” (minjung), excluding the opportunistic middle class and the predatory reformers firom their conceptualization of the “masses”. The masses, they argued, should be the leading class for revolution to overthrow the system of comprador dictatorship. For a successful revolution, students were to support the masses by attracting intellectuals and influential figures to the masses’ side and raising the overall consciousness of the masses. The government found their doctrine to be in consonance with theJuche ideology, the theory of class struggle, advocated by the North Korean communists, and defined the Sammintuwi as anti-capitalist and anti-liberal democratic forces, not just anti- govemment.^ As the mastermind of the U.S. Cultural Center occupation, Sammintuwi ■*' Lee Jae Oh, “SOnyundae Haksaengundongcui Sajoe Kwanhan Sogo” (A study of the trend of the Student Movement in the 1980s) Hyunsangkwa Insik (Situation and Perception), 12:4 (Winter 1988), p. 79. ^^Dong-A Ilbo, July 19, 1985. Choi Yon Ku, “SOnyundae haksaengundongeui Inyumjuk. Jojikjuk baljunkwajung” (The Process of Ideological and Organizational Development in the 1980s Student Movements) in Jo Hee Yon ed., Hankuk Sahoiundongsa (The History of Korean Social Movement) (Seoul: Juksan, 1990), p. 252. ^ Dong-A Ilbo, July 19, 1985.. 1 1 0 had become a target of harsh repression by the government. On July 8, 1985 Kim Min Suk, the chairman of Jeonhakryun (National Federation of Student Association) and president of the Seoul National University general student association, was arrested and indicted for violation of the Law on Assembly and Demonstration.'** On July 18, 63 members of Scanminticwi at 19 universities were arrested and 13 were charged with violation of the National Security Law and 50 with violation of the Law on Assembly and Demonstration."** According to the Minister of Justice, 120 students were investigated in connection with theJeonhakryun and Sammintuwi cases, and among them 86 were held in detention and 65 of these were indicted."*^ Minindntu Jamintu : Since early 1986 the Sammintuwi was criticized for its extreme elements and alienation from the masses. Critics argued that the Sammintuwi isolated themselves from the masses by excessively sticking to vanguard forces, carrying out immoderately violent battles such as the occupation of public buildings, arson, and terror and failing to represent real demands of the masses. The critics at the Seoul National University organized the Jamintu (Self-Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee Against the United States and Fascism) advocating the ideology of NLPDR (National Liberation People’s Democracy Revolution) on April 11, 1986.'** The Jamintu defined the South Korean society as “colonial semi-feudal” society which was controlled by the United States imperialists and their puppet, the The Korea Herald, July 13, 1985. Dong-A Ilbo, July 19, 1985. Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, p. 153. Kim Hwa Ju, “Cbuljeoyonku Minmintu” (A th o u ^ Study on Minmintu) Wolgan Chosun, September, 1987, p. 452. I l l military authoritarian government of Chun/^ Therefore, the main enemy of the Korean people, they contended, was the United States, and all resources of movements should be concentrated on the struggle against American imperialists. Along with the struggle for democratization, the Jamintu considered their struggle for reunification to be their main goal because they perceived the real cause of division of the Korean peninsula to be the United States Imperialism. The Jamintu had several sub-committees including “the Struggle Committee for Anti-war, Anti-nuclear, and Peace protection,” “the Struggle Committee for Obtaining Democratic Constitution,” “the Struggle Committee for Labor-Student Solidarity,” and “the Struggle Committee for National Reunification.” It also published own magazine, Haebang Seoneun (Independence Declaration).^® Until the spring semester of 1986 the Jamintu was organized only at the Seoul National University and the NDR ideology still prevailed among other universities. Since June of 1986 the NLPDR ideology began to spread among student activists and the Jamintu was formed in many universities. On October 28, 1986 Jamintu groups fi'om 23 universities formed an umbrella organization, Aehaktu (Students’ Struggle League for Anti-imperialism and Anti- authoritarianism) and masterminded the occupation of the Konkuk University, one of the most violent students action in this period. In March 21, 1986 the “Flag” group built the Minmintu (National Democratic Struggle Committee Against Imperialism and Fascism) succeeding the ideology of NDR. Jang Sung Wook, “ Jungmil Chuijae Minmintu, Jamintu, Aehektu” (A close cover onMinmintu, Jamintu, Aehektu) Sin Dong-A December, 1986, p. 320. “ Editor, Haksaengundong Nonjaengsa 1 (The History of Student Movement Debate 1), p. 193. 112 They viewed Korean society as a "neocolonial monopoly capital” society. They put priority of their battles on the overthrow of the military fascists. 1980-3 Hakrim Moorim 1984 Flag Anti-frag Jeondaeeut Mintuhakryun 1985 Jeonhakryun Sammintuwi 1986 Minmintu Jamintu Minminhakryun Aehaktu 1987 Minminhakryun Seodaehyup Jeondaehyup Figure 3.1 : Development of Student Organizations Jang Sung Wook, “ Jungmil Chuijae Minmintu, Jamintu, Aehektu” (A close cover on Minmintu, Jamintu, Aehektu, p. 326. 113 While the Jamintu count the relation between the U.S. and the Korean government as that of lord and retaioer, the Minmintu took it for dependency relation emphasizing relative autonomy of the Korean government. The two had differences in defining the boundary of the Minjoong (masses) which was considered as a main agent of social transformation. While the Jamintu included the petty and national bourgeoisie and democratic soldiers as well as workers and peasant in the Minjoong (masses), the Minmintu regarded only labor and peasant as the Minjoong (masses) class. The Jamintu emphasized the necessity of solidarity with the opposition party and Jaeya (Korean term of dissident groups) for robust struggles against the military regime. But the Minmintu argued that those groups could not be the object of an alliance because they basically had conservative natures and their eventual goal was to take the reins of government, not conduct a peoples’ revolution. The Minmintu had several sub-committees such as “The Struggle Committee for Labor- Student Solidarity” and “The Struggle Committee for Obtaining Democratic Constitution,” and published its own magazine M/yoArM/«/i/Seoneun (Nation Democracy Declaration).^^ On April 29, 1986 the Minmintu groups fi'om 30 universities established their umbrella organization, Minminhakryun (Federation of Nation Democracy Student).^^ ^^Kim Hwa Ju, “Cbuljeoyonku Minmintu” (A though Study qü Minmintu) Wolgan Chosun, September, 1987, p. 453. Ibid., p. 454. 114 Minmintu Jamintu Perspective on society neocolonial monopoly colonial semi-feudalism capitalism Ideology NDR NLPDR Main enemy military regime the U.S. imperialist boundary oiMinjoong labor, peasant, the poor, only labor, peasant and the including petty bourgeoisie, poor and democratic soldiers Umbrella organization Minminhakryun Aehaktu Propagation pamphlet ‘T^ation Democracy “Independence Declaration” Declaration” Table 3.7: Minmintu vs. Jamintu Jeonminhaktyun: Federation of Nation Democracy Student Aehaktu: Students’ League for Anti-imperialism Anti- authoritarianism Struggle Even though both the Jamintu and Minmintu criticized the radical and violent tactics of the Sammintuwi, they actually were not much different from their predecessor and were even more violent. The Minmintu and the Jamintu directed the two most violent demonstrations, the Inchon Incident in May 1986 and the occupation of Konkuk University in October, respectively. 3.3.2 Labor movements Labor movements in this period developed many distinctive features from that of the previous period. The most distinctive was workers’ efforts to build national or regional organizations to broaden workers’ solidarity. The workers learned some lessons from the failure of the previous period, including that individual and isolated battles against the mighty regime and the capital could not be successful. They realized that an 115 individual union was not strong enough to secure their demands and umbrella organizations are required to collect and organize resources of isolated unions. As the first effort to overcome the limit of isolated battles, ex-workers who had been dismissed because of their involvement in democratic movements in early 1980 formed a national labor organization,Hanguk Nodongja Bokji Hyeopeuihoi (The Welfare Council of Korean Workers, WCKW) in March 1984. Efforts for solidarity in the movement also appeared as the joint action with other social sectors, especially with students. A group of former student activists in the labor field played a significant role in educating workers through “night schools” and connecting labor organizations to the student activism. The Kuro alliance strike in 1985 was the most vivid case of joint action, in which six democratic unions and student activists staged solidarity strikes for several days. In this movement 30 workers were arrested, 20 were charged and more than 1,000 lost their jobs.^* Labor movements in the second period showed changes in their movement issues and targets. In the first period, most collective action by the labor concerned economic issues such as wage increases, improvements in working conditions, and the clearance of overdue wages. The target of these movements was often the owner of the company. However, the battle was not just between the workers and the owner of company. Workers’ struggles for wage increases and establishment of democratic unions were frequently broken down by government intervention and harsh repression. From the failure of the first period the workers learned that their demands could not be obtained 116 without the breakdown of the repressive regime. Therefore, the issue of labor movement was not confined to economic matters and expanded to political struggle. Their target also shifted to the repressive regime in the second period. In this period, labor was not immune from the ideological conflicts either. As shown in the student movement, labor movement organizations also collided and divided concerning their perspective on the situation of Korean society, desirable form of labor organization, ways of struggle. Resurgence of labor movement As the government announced a series of appeasement measures, labor awakened from its dormancy and became animated. On March 10, 1984, about 2,000 workers, students and youth gathered at Hongje Catholic church to memorize the labor day announcement of the establishment ofHanguk Nodongja Bokji Hyeopeuihoi (The Welfare Council of Korean Workers, WCKW). In their foundation manifesto, they armounced that they founded the WCKW to overcome the limits of unorganized and isolated movements and to improve the identity, unity and solidarity of the labor movement. They published their own journalMinjunodong (Democratic Labor) and founded branches in some cities. Even though the organization was profoundly significant in that it was the first national organization in the labor sector, it was not very successful in leading the labor movement ^ Hangukyeoksa yeonguhwoi (A society for the Study of Korean History),Hanguk Hyundaesa 4 (Korean Modem History 4) (Seoul: pulbik, 1991), p. 120. Hanguk Nodongja Bokji Hyeopeuihoi (The Welfare Council of Korean Workers), “Nodongundongeui saeroun chulbaleul euihan seonsun” (A Declaration for new beginning of labor movement), in Kim Yongki and Park Seungok, eds., Hanguknodongundongsa (History of Korean Labor Movement Debates) (Seoul: Hyimjangmunhaksa, 1989), p. 124-5. 117 due to its composition and unclear strategy. The WCKW was a outer organization which consisted of labor activists without organized labor masses at individual companies, so a large gap existed between the leaders of the WCKW and the working masses. They also insisted on economic struggles through legal unions rather than direct political battles, which could not be effective under the harsh repressive regime. Indebted to loosened political control of the government workers, began to release their repressed discontents. The number of labor disputes and participants in them increased dramatically after the government announced decompression measures. Year No. of disputes No. of participants 1984 113 17,000 1985 265 29,000 1986 276 30,000 Table 3.10: Number of Labor Disputes and Participants Source; Jung Ang Ilbo, November 7, 1986; Korea Employees’ Federation, Nodonggyungje Yongam , 1989 (Yearbook of Labor Economy, 1989) p. 56. In addition to the establishment of the WCKW, workers at individual factories began to restore their unit unions which had been destroyed under the harsh repression. On April 8, 1984, the Cheonggye Textile Union which was forcefully dissolved after the Kwangju Uprising, victoriously announced its restoration. The revised Labor Law in late 1980 allowed only company unions and prohibited regional and industrial unions. However, the Cheonggye Textile Union decided to boldly confront the government and hold a open forum to confirm its legitimacy on May 1. In late May, taxi drivers in Daegu carried out a strike which spread to many other cities including Pusan, Masan, and Daejun. 118 Even though the strike by taxi drivers was spontaneous and not well planned, it showed the possibility of mass mobilization and solidarity movement in the same industry. Beginning in June, 1984 many companies in the Kuro area such as Daewoo Apparel, Hyosung Trading Company, and Garibong Electric established democratic unions. Year Union Employees(1,000) Members Rate of membership 1984 2,365 7,283 1,010,522 13.9 1985 2,534 7,660 1,004,398 13.1 1986 2,658 8,005 1,035,890 12.9 1987 4,086 8,854 1,267,457 14.3 Table 3.8: Number of Unions and Union Membership Source: Adapted from Korea Employees’ Federation,Nodonggyungje Yongam , 1989 (Yearbook of Labor Economy, 1989), p. 48. Rate of Membership = (Members / Employees) x 100 Labor activists in the Kuro area tried to build small groups through which they cultivated friendly relations among workers and developed their political consciousness. There were various interactions among small groups which facilitated the first full scale alliance strike possible in the Kuro area in June 1985. Kuro alliance strike Workers’ protest reached its peaked in 1985. A number of companies including Samsung Pharmacy, Daewoo Apparel, Hyosung Trading Comapany, Daewoo Automobile, Pusan Pipe, and Dongbo Electric were involved in such collective actions as strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins. When three union leaders of Daewoo Apparel were 119 arrested in the middle of a wage increase struggle, 2,000 workers from eigth companies in the Kuro area waged alliance strike for six days blaming the government’s illegal action. On June 24, 900 workers from the Garibong Electric, Hyosung Trading Company, and Sunil Textile joined the strike and on the next day 600 workers from Namsimg Electric, Sejin Electric and Rom Korea also agreed to participate in the strike. On June 26, students and dissidents joined the workers and carried out violent demonstrations in the Kuro area. From this alliance strike more than 36 workers were arrested and about 2,000 workers were forcefully dismissed from their companies. In seveual respects, the “Kuro alliance strike” could be considered a critical turning point in labor movement activism in contemporary Korea. First, the alliance strike promoted class consciousness among workers. The workers became aware that the government repression of Daewoo apparel union was not a matter of one company and that they could be the next target of the repression. Second, after the Kuro strike, the focus of the labor movement shifted from the economic struggle of workers against employers into a political struggle against the authoritarian state. Leaders of the labor movement recognized that since the military dictatorship always repressed their demands on behalf of employers, labor demands could not be realized without an overthrow of the authoritarian regime. The slogans shouted by the workers were “Withdraw Labor Ministry,” and “Abolish the Evil Labor Law.” Thirdly, the Kuro alliance strike expedited the building of regional unions to overcome weakness of struggles at the levels of the small group and company union. After the Kuro strike, two large regional organizations. ^ Dong-A Ilbo, December 15, 1985. 1 20 Senoryon (Seoul Area Labor Movement League) and Innoryun (Inchon Area Labor Movement League), were established by fired workers fi’om the Kuro strike and students- tumed-workers. Emergence of Regional Organizations. On August 25, 1985, labor activists fi'om Nodongundong tanap jeojitujaengiwonhoi (The Struggle Committee for Hindering Repression of Labor Movement), Kurojiyuk Nojominjuwha Chujinwawonhoi (The Committee for Promoting Democratic Labor Union at Kuro Area),Cheonggye Pibok Nodongjohap (Cheonggye Textile Union), and Nodongja Yondaetujaeng Yonhap (The Union for Labor Solidarity Struggle) agreed to build an umbrella organization, Senoryon (Seoul Area Labor Movement League).” In their foundation declaration, they proclaimed that the eventual goal of the labor movement was to make a society in which workers were not repressed. They argued that a democratic labor movement was impossible without persistent struggle against the military authoritarianism. They adopted the Sammin (Democracy, Mmjimgjms&sei) and Nation) ideology and criticized unionism and economic struggle. Senoryon published own newsletter named ‘^'^Senoryon Shinmun” Since the establishment ofSenoryon other area organizations of the labor were formed in such cities as Anyang, Sungnam and Inchon. On February 7, 1986, Inchon branch of the Hanguk Nodongja Bokji Hyeopeuihoi (The Welfare Council of Korean Workers) dissolved their organization in order to build a more politically oriented organization,Innoryun (Inchon Area Labor ” Editor, Chunhwan (Conversion) (Seoul; Sakyejul, 1987), p. 61. 121 Movement League). Senoryon and Innoryun set a goal of building a national umbrella organization on the base of the regional organization. The two organizations jointly published a newspaper named “Nodonja Shinmud' (Labor Newspaper).^* These two organizations were not very successful in organizing and mobilizing mass labor, largely because they neglected economic issues such as wage increases and the improvement of working conditions, emphasizing political struggles by vanguard forces instead. They also failed to strengthen labor organizations in individual factories, by putting too much value on expanding regional organizations. Both organizations abruptly went downhill under the harsh repression of the government after the violent Inchon Incident in May 1986. Divisions in the Labor Movement When the government announced a series of decompression policies in late 1983, there were two conflicting responses in the labor movement sector. Some groups interpreted the government’s action as a trap. They feared the decompression measures would be applied only to the middle class, and not to the labor and Minjoong (masses) forces. They believed heedless offensive movement would only bring about severe suppression and the eventual destruction of labor organizations. On the other hand, some groups argued for an active utilization of the decompression phase for the revitalization of the labor movement. The former position was represented by the ‘small group movement’ and the latter was the ‘regional labor movement,’ respectively. Jund Dae Young, “Jaeya Minjunodongundongeui Jungaekwajungkvva Hynhwang” (Development and 1 2 2 The supporters of the ‘small group movement’ argued that the labor movement still remained at an incipient stage, during which it was in need of prior preparation before conducting open and aggressive struggles. The spontaneous participation of mass labor in demonstrations without developed organizational capacity, they argued, would not be helpful for the growth of the labor movement.” This position was mainly advocated by the student-tumed-workers. They emphasized the importance of education to enhance workers’ consciousness and they ran many night schools to educate the workers. They argued that the small group movement would naturally evolve into regional labor movements through different stages of friendship, economic struggle and then political struggle.®” While the advocates of the ‘small group movement’ emphasized preparation and education, the ‘regional labor movement’ leaders demanded immediate battles. According to this view, workers’ consciousness for political struggle could be enhanced through direct actions, rather than education. They argued that strong leadership and organization could not be possessed without visible outcomes from mass struggles. They also believed that the desire for struggle had already surged among the workers, due to the constant and severe repression of labor movements as well as aggravating working conditions, including extended working hours, deficiencies in industrial safety, forced dismissals, and delayed payments. Therefore, what was necessary, they contended, was a strong Situation of Democratic Labor Movement) in The Korea Christian Industry Development Institute ed., Hankuk Nodongundoneui Inyum (Ideology of Korean Labor Movement) (Seoul: Jumiamsa, 1988), p. 198. Lee Jong Oh, “80nyundae Nodongimdongron Jungaekwajungeui Ihaerul wihayu” (For Understanding of the Development of Labor Movement in 1980s) in The Korea Christian Industry Development Institute ed.. Ibid., P. 240. “ Jung In, Nodongjohap Undongron (Study of Labor Union Movement) (Seoul: Gureum, 1985), p. ix. 123 leadership and organization to unite the angry workers and to turn their anger into active and effective battles. They perceived that an individual union had formidable limitations in fighting against the potent regime, and regional and industrial labor organizations should be the center of the labor movement for durable and united struggles.®^ Small Group Regional Movement mass/ guidance emphasize guidance role by emphasize mass activists mobilization perception of the a trap for harsh repression have to utilize the decompression measures decompression phase perception of the current remain at the incipient stage ready to build regional movement capacity organizations priority in movement preparation & education immediate mass struggles Table 3.9: Small Group vs. Regional Movement The position of the ‘regional labor movement’ was represented by the Senoryon and Innoryun. They disapproved of importance of a legal union in an individual factory. From the Kuro strike they learned the necessity of regional organization for continuous and drastic political struggles. Even though the two groups formed a main-current, they could not exercise leadership over the whole labor movement sector. Opposing the position of theSenoryon and Innoryun, small group movement leaders established a loosened solidarity organization.Neon Seoul Nodong Undong Yonhap (The League of South Seoul Labor Movement). They insisted that an ividual union should be the basic unit of the labor movement and that mass labor could be effectively mobilized through Song Jung Nam, “Jiyuk Nodongundongeui Mosaek” (Exploration of Regional Labor Movement) in Kim Yongki and Park Seungok, eds., Hanguknodongundongsa (History of Korean Labor Movement Debates), 124 economic struggles within a factory.*^ They believed that regional organizations which were not equipped with an organizational foundation at the level of individual factory, and political struggles which did not consider the concrete lives of workers, simply could not succeed. Divisions in the labor movement continued in the struggles for wage raises in 1986. Sometimes, movement organizations exerted their efforts on the struggle for leadership over an individual union rather than for wage increases. Divisions among movement organizations and their struggles brought about the immobilization of mass labor and the rapid deterioration of the labor movement. After the establishment of Senoryon and Innoryun, the labor movement sector experienced fierce ideological disputes concerning their perception of the current political situation and ways of movement. It was true that their theoretical debates and divisions brought about a significant loss of movement resources, and it did not help promote workers’ practical interests. However, heated ideological debates among movement groups had some positive aspects in that they helped elevate the level of the labor movement by improving mass workers’ political consciousness. 3.3.3 The Poor, Farmers and the Youth Movements Many social sectors that had been quiet under harsh repression began to organize themselves after the government’s decompression policy. Dismissed professors formed Haejikkyosuhyupeuihwoi (Dismissed professors council) on December 30, 1983. On p. 150-161. 125 December 19, 1984 literary men organized Jayousilcheon Muninhyupeuihwoi (Freedom Practice Literary Council). On May 4, 1985 some Buddhists formed Minjungbulgyo Undongyeonhap (Federation of People’s Buddhist Movement).^^ The urban poor also organized themselves to fight against the government’s policy to destroy their unauthorized houses. South Koreans have accomplished unparalleled economic development in history. However, rapid industrialization and urbanization has caused many harmful side effects. The government’s policy of focusing on industrial development impoverished rural communities and many hungry farmers migrated to cities to sell their labor. The immigrants formed slum villages in several places of Seoul. In 1984, when the government decided to clean the slum areas before hosting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, the urban poor at Mokdong, Sadangdong, Sanggyedong and Yangpyungdong in Seoul violently demonstrated against the government officers who attempted to demolish the slum quarters. The struggles of Mokdong slum residents continued for seven months fi'om May 1985, including some 100 demonstrations. ^ Farmers, arguably the biggest victims of industrialization, also became more active in voicing their discontent. Farmers’ discontent had been increased by unstable and low prices for their products. Farmers’ movements in 1984 and 1985 had been represented by ‘struggles to impede government’s open market policy,’ and ‘struggles to demand reparation for the loss of cattle raising farmers.’ The government’s decision to open Jund Dae Young, Ibid., 198. ® Jo Hee Yon, “SOnyundae Sahoiundongkwa Sahoikusungchenonjaeng” (Social Movements in the 1980s and Debates on Social Stnicture), p.62. 126 import markets for the agricultural and livestock industry aggravated an already impoverished rural community. On September 2, 1984, Hampyung-Muan farmers carried out demonstrations demanding an end to agricultural and livestock products imports and the cancellation of farmer’s debt. This movement is significant in that it was organized by the farmers themselves, rather than the religious community which had acted as a guardian for farmers’ movement, since 1970s. After this movement, farmers in Hampyung formed the ‘Hampyung Farmers’ Association’ which was independent from the religious organizations.®^ In 1985, the farmers’ movement reached out to the mass of fanners. Through July and August of 1985 more than 20,000 angered farmers participated in demonstrations in about 20 counties, protesting the government’s open market policy. Although there had been frequent collective actions by farmers in this period, most of them were not planned and organized by farmers themselves but by religious organizations such as K inong (Protestant Farmers’ Association) andKcmong (Catholic Farmers’ Association). Since 1986, many movement organizations formed by farmers themselves began to appear, and their demands included not only economic issues but also political ones like ‘step down military authoritarian regime,’ and ‘anti-imperialism and anti-America.’®® In February ^ Yang Yon Su, “Dosibinminundongeui Taedongkwa Gui Baljunkwajung” (The Emergence of and Development of the Urban Poor Movement) in Jo Hee Yon ed.,Hankuk Sahoiundongsa (The History of Korean Social Movement ), p. 229. “ Lee Jung Chan, “Jaju. Daejungnosuneui Jungchakkwa Nogminundongeui Junkukdaniljojik Kuksul” (Fixation of Independent. Mass Line and Establishment of Farmers’ National Umbrella Organization) in Jo Hee Yon ed., Hankuk Sahoiundongsa (The History of Korean Social Movement ), pp. 193-196. “ Kim Su Young, “ SOnyimdae Minjungundongeui Sungjagkwa Kwaje” (Development and Problem of Mass Movement in the 1980s) in Jo Jin Kyung ed., Hankuksahwoieui seonggyeokkwa Undong (Characteristics and movement of Korean society), pp. 275-276. 127 1987, the first national organization,Cheomonghyup (The National Farmers’ League) was formed by about 10 county farmer orgnizations/^ Even though there were some collective actions against the authoritarian regime by intellectuals, farmers and the poor, these movements were not well organized nor consistent. The young dissident groups carried out more organized and powerful movements. Minchongryun (Democratic Youth League), formed on September 30, 1983 by young dissidents and former student activists, was one of the leading organizations in the dissidents’ movement. Being different fi'om the student activists, leaders of Minchongryun recognized the importance of mobilizing inactive ordinary people and they adopted somewhat moderate tactics. As a rallying point to draw support fi'om the ordinary people, they suggested constitutional revision for direct presidential election under the slogan of “president by the hand of people” Their tactic was effective. Even though they could not call for immediate responses fi'om other movement sectors and ordinary people, their slogan of direct presidential election became a real rallying point to unite diverse social forces and non-organized people in the transition period. Despite their successfully mapped movement strategy they failed to hold together as a unified organization. Minchongryun was divided around the issue of the National Assembly Election scheduled on February 12, 1985. Some members wanted to boycott the election, which was expected to be held under unfair atmosphere, and believing the election would only provide legitimacy for the military government. However, other members in the Minchongryun argued that they had to positively utilize the space ^Lee Jung Chan, Ibid., pp. 198-199. 128 provided by the election to broaden their base among the ordinary people.®* After long discussion they decided to participate in the election. After the election, the Minchongryun was divided into two factions again. One faction, strongly impressed by the mobilization power of the new opposition party, NKDP, suggested cooperation with this party in order to effectively struggle against the military regime. The other faction insisted on independent struggle.®^ 3.3.4. The dissidents’ movement and efforts for solidarity In the wake of government relaxation measures, two major dissident organizations, the M inminhyup (People’s Democratic Movement Council) and the Minjoo Tongil Kukminhwieui (the National Conference for Democracy and Unification) were established. On June 29, 1984, \h& Minminhyup was organized by young leaders of youth, labor and farmers’ movements. Some old notable leaders of the democratic movement fi’om the 1970s formed the Minjoo Tongil Kukminhwieui on October 16, 1984. The two organizations were competitive with each other, since they put their organizational foundations in the same movement sector, the dissidents. While the M inm inhyup consisted of several independent organizations and was able to carry out more effective practical struggles than the Minjoo Tongil Kukminhwieui, they were unable to exercise considerable influence over the people without the notables.™ In the necessity of complementing their own weaknesses and unification of the movement, the two ® Jo Hee Yon, “SOnyundae Sahoiundongkwa Sahoikusungchenonjaeng” (Social Movements in the 1980s and Debates on Social Structure), pp. 85-86. pp. 87-88. 129 organizations agreed to merge and form a unified organization of democratic movement forces, theMintongryun (the United M injung Movement for Democracy and Unification, UMMDU) on March 29, 1985.’* However, this unification of the two organizations was not a easy process. Both organizations revealed many discrepancies in their operation, such as forms of leadership and membership, and ways of movement. The most difficult issue on which to reach agreement between the two organizations was the structure of the new organization, which was directly related to taking initiative in the new organization. M inminhyup preferred a looser collective leadership and decentralized power structure, since they did not have notables to be a leader. They also suggested that each opposition force join the umbrella organization as a group rather than as an individual member. On the other hand, the Kukminhwieui, composed of many popular individual dissidents, desired the new organization to have a strong unitary leadership and centralized power system. They insisted on forming regional branches under the binding forces of the central organization. After a long discussion, the two groups comprised and established a symbolic joint leadership with one full time representative. They also agreed to build branches in the provinces. On September 20, 1985, eleven movement organizations including Minchongryun, Senoryon (Seoul Area Labor Movement League), K inong (Protestant Farmers’ Association), and some Protestant groups joined the UMMDU, Yun Jae Gui, “Jaeya Minju.Minjungimdongdanchedul” (Dissidents’ Organizations of Democracy and Mass Movement) Sin Dong-A, August, 1985, pp. 173-177. ” National Democratic Movement Institute, Mintongryun (UMMDU): Evaluation Report on People's Movement for Democracy and Unification (Seoul: National Democratic Movement Institute, 1989), 5-6. 130 which became a giant umbrella organization composed of 23 organizations from the dissident, labor, religion, farmers, the poor, and intellectual movement sectors.^ The UMMDU was the first umbrella organization to include the broad sectors of the opposition forces of workers, youth, farmers, religious communities, and journalists. As an organization with broad sectoral appeal, the UMMDU helped increase the productivity of the democratic movement by arbitrating common agendas and tactics among diverse associations. The leadership of the UMMDU, however, was limited and could not have binding power over the members because they joined as a group, not individuals, and each group maintained independence from the umbrella organization. The dissident groups did not agree on such things as the state of the current Korean society and the ways to promote a democratic transition. Therefore, the integration and cohesion of the organization was not strong. The leadership of the headquarters had some limits in its ability to reach branches in provinces. Chae Man Soo and Kim jang Han, “Tongiljunsunundongeui Jimgae” (Development of United Front Movement) in Jo Hee Yon ed., Hankuk Sahoiundongsa (The History of Korean Social Movement), pp. 374-376. 131 Board of Representative Advisers Body of Ctrairmen Direction Central Committee Central Executive Committee Regional Movement Council Standing Committee - Labor Committee Central Region— - Farmer Committee Chungmtieong Region — - The Poor Committee Honam Region . - Youth Committee - Women Committee Youngnam Region — - Civil Right Committee - Culture Committee Editorial Department Policy Planning Executive office r-General Affôir Bureau Organization Bureau - Public Information Bureau Enterprise Bureau Figure 3.2: Organization of the UMMDU Despite its organizational feebleness, the UMMDU demonstrated its leadership by successfully impeding legislation such as the “Campus Stabilization Law,” which intended to exclude student activists from the society at the government’s own will. In opposition to the government’s plan to pass the law, the UMMDU formed a national committee with other social movement organizations including Protestants and Catholic groups and 132 Minchongryun on August 12, 1985.The committee revealed some hidden intentions of the regime and succeeded in drawing support from other social sectors and public opinion. Many intellectuals, including college professors and organizations, like the Korean Bar Association, launched a signature-collecting campaign to oppose the law. Confronting vehement protests from opposition forces, the Chun government finally announced it would cease to enact the law on August 17, 1985. From the success of their efibrts to resist the “Campus Stabilization Law” the UMMDU gained considerable confidence as a leading organization in the democratization movement. The bigger success of the UMMDU and social movement forces could be found in its struggle for constitutional revision. 3.3.5 Politics of the Constitutional Revision The most common ground of opposition forces in this period can be found in the struggle for the constitutional revision for direct presidential election. The success of the NKDP, which suggested the constitutional revision for direct presidential election as one of their election pledges in the 1985 National Assembly campaign, gave the whole opposition forces a fresh shock. From the election, they could confirm what the cherished desire of the people was and the possibility of mass mobilization. Most movement sectors recognized the issue of constitutional revision as number one agenda item, attracting the Choi Woong, “Jaeyaserukeui Minjuhwaimdong” (Democratization Movement of the Dissident Forces), in Jo Jin Kyung ed., Hankuksahwoieui seonggyeokkwa Undong (Characteristics and movement of Korean society), pp. 295-296. 133 attention of the ordinary people, who poured their resources into it regardless of whether or not it was the eventual goal of their movement. The opposition party NKDP wanted to leave the job of constitutional revision in the National Assembly. By doing so, they intended to control and represent all opposition forces in the process of negotiation with the government. With support from the movement sectors, it could also give pressure to their counterpart. However, the movement sectors did not believe that the revision of the constitution could be done in the National Assembly by the negotiation of the government and the NKDP. The revision of the constitution, according to the current constitution, could be proposed by the President or majority of the assemblymen and the new draft was required to be endorsed by over two thirds of the assemblymen and then to win a majority of the votes in the referendum to be declared as a new constitution.Under the current distribution of seats in the National Assembly, in which the government party held an absolute majority, it was impossible for the NKDP to revise the constitution without the consent of the government. The government did not agree to establish a special committee for constitutional revision in the regular session of the National Assembly in December, 1985. The government argued that early revision of the constitution would cause political instabUity, including possible interference and disruption by North Korea during the 1988 Olympic games. In his 1986 “State of the Nation” Message, President Chun demanded that opposition forces cease any discussion on constitutional revision until after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and declared his government would harshly repress any deviation from this line. Therefore, the NKDP had Republic of Korea, Constitution Article 10. 134 to resort to the struggles outside of the National Assembly by appealing to the movement sectors and the ordinary people. On February 12, 1986, the anniversary of the 1985 National Assembly election, the M inchuhyup (The Council for the Promotion of Democracy), a dissident organization formed by the followers of the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and the NKDP launched 10 million signature-collection drive for the constitutional revision. The government immediately cracked down harshly on this defiance. They put top officials of the two organizations, including Lee Min Woo, the head of the NKDP, and Kim Dae Jung, under house arrest and raided their offices to confiscate copies of the petition and lists of signatures.” The NKDP’s petition drive was supported by many opposition forces. In a sermon on Sunday, March 9, 1986, the highly respected Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan expressed his support for early constitutional revision and democratization as a way to promote national reconciliation. Cardinal Kim’s speech decisively turned the direction of the public opinion toward the issues of democratization and constitutional revision.” 3,130 members of Myungdong Cathedral joined the signature collection drive.” On March 14, the National Council Churches in Korea (NCCK), the largest organization in Protestant community, declared that the constitution should be revised to guarantee direct presidential elections, fundamental human rights and people’s right to live; and these right should begin with the election of the very next president. They also made public the list of 2,748 signatures of The Washington Post, February 15, 16, 18, 1896. Testimony by Edward J. Baker, Professor, Harvard University at the Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 99* Congress, April 16, 1986. 135 ministers on April 26. The umbrella organization of the dissidents, UMMDU, also joined the petition drive. On March 5, 1986 UMMDU released the list of 303 members who signed the statement calling for constitutional revision. Many college professors supported early revision of the constitution and participated the signature collection drive. On March 28, 1986, beginning with Korea University professors, 783 professors from 29 universities signed the statement requiring democratization, specifically constitutional revision and campus autonomy.’* It was really quite significant that the documents criticizing the government’s position were endorsed by professors, who had generally kept silent on the undemocratic political situation for long time due to a great deal of risk involved in defying the authoritarian regime.’® The professors’ action attracted a great deal of public attention and significantly aflfected the whole political situation. Along with the constitutional revision petition drive, the NKDP launched a series of rallies in major cities including Seoul, Busan, Kwangju, Daegu, Daejeon, Cheongju, Inchon, Masan and Jeonju between March 11 and May 31, 1986. Not only social movement sectors such as the student, the labor, the youth and UMMDU but also a large number of ordinary people, participated in these rallies. These rallies played a significant role in spreading the struggle for constitutional revision into the ordinary people. About 4,000 to 5,000 people gathered in the Seoul rally on March 11 and the number increased to about 50,000 to 60,000 in the Kwangju rally on March 30. As the rallies attracted ” CISJD, Gaehunkwa Minjuwhaundon (Constitutional Revision and Democratization Movement), p. 149. ^^Ibid., p. 42. 136 much more attention from the people than the government expected, the government had to make a decision between a political concession and ultra-harsh repression. The Chun Administration was vividly remembered the outcome of harsh repression in the Kwangju Uprising in 1980 and decided they could not afford another massacre. On April 30, President Chun met with heads of various opposition parties and announced that he had no intention to oppose constitutional revision during his term, if the government and the opposition parties came to the agreement on it, even though he personally preferred constitutional revision after the Seoul Olympic Games. He also demanded that the signature collection drive should cease immediately. The NKDP and social movement sectors could gain a certain product in their struggles by placing pressure on the authoritarian regime through signature-collection drive and a series of rallies. The struggle for the constitutional revision provided the opposition forces with momentum for building a united front against the authoritarian regime. The struggle for constitutional revision, however, did not work wholly well for the opposition forces. Through the struggle they confirmed their discrepancies once again. Even though all forces agreed that the current constitution should be revised and the regime be overthrown, clear and obstructive differences in their attitudes on the current regime and the United States government, the priority of violent struggles and the contents of the new constitution came to the surface. Even though the NKDP and the UMMDU established the M inkukryun (People’s Liaison for the Democracy) on March 15, 1986 for cooperation and coordination of their Testimony by Chong-Sik Lee, Professor, University of Pennsylvania at the Hearing before the 137 opinions in the constitutional revision struggle, these uncomfortable bedfellows were unable to overcome some of their fundamental differences.*® The UMMDU argued that the constitutional revision struggle should presuppose the overthrow of the current regime and the current regime must be excluded from discussion of the constitutional revision. On the other hand, the NKDP believed that the constitutional revision should be conducted by the National Assemblymen and considered the authoritarian regime as an object of compromise. The UMMDU criticized the NKDP that the current regime could not be a main body in the constitutional revision and regarding it as an object of compromise would be the same with recognizing their legitimacy and constitutionality.*' Failing to overcome their differences, the UMMDU announced its defection from the M inkukryun on April 29, 1986. After the M inkukryun meeting on April 29, 1986 Kim Dae Jung voluntarily aimounced that he could not support the anti-American demands of the student groups, and UMMDU withdrew themselves from the Minkukryun, criticizing that the announcement did not correctly represent the position of theMinkukryun^ The social movement forces and the opposition party staged democratization movements independently and failed to form a united front until the NCDC (National Coalition for Democratic Constitution) linked students, labor, church community, dissidents and the opposition party in May, 1987. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 99* Congress, April 16,1986. Lee Kyung Jae, “6. lOsiwi makjimmakhu,” (June 10 Demonstration, Front and Behind the curtain). Shin Dong-A July 1987, p. 204. *' The UMMDU, Minjungeui Sort (Voice of the People), No. 11, November 8, 1985. ^ Im Dong Dyung & Kim Chang Ki, “Gaehunjungkukeui Tamsaekjon,” (Constitutional Revision and its Political Situation),Wolgan Chosun, June 1986, pp. 164-165. 138 On the other hand, labor and student groups argued that what really mattered was not the revision of the current constitution but the establishment of aM injvng (masses) regime. They consisted that the M injung, including labor, the poor and the farmers should be a main body in the constitutional revision and the Sammin (Nation, Democracy, and Masses) Ideology should be embodied in the new constitution. The Senoryun declared that their eventual goal was not pursuing constitutional revision for direct presidential election but obtaining Scanmin Constitution which would promise a new society of the M in ju n g ^ A student movement organization like M inm intu demanded the convocation of a so-called ''''Jechormihoe” (Constituent People’s Assembly) arguing that the new constitution should be made through a Jechonuihoe in which representatives from labor, students, the poor, farmers, and the youth. Discrepancies among the opposition forces were concretely revealed through the NKDP’s rallies in major cities. The NKDP designed a series of rallies to place political pressure on the government by demonstrating their capacity of mass mobilization with support from social movement sectors. On the other hand, the movement sectors considered the rallies as opportunities to publicize their ideologies to the public. Therefore, in the rallies each groups exerted themselves to advertise their ideas on constitutional revision rather than showing solidarity of the opposition forces to the people. The NKDP desired their political rallies to progress peacefully. They were correctly aware that they would lose support from the ordinary people who were not 83 Seonoryun Shinmun, no. 2, September 19, 1985. 139 ready to suffer personal sacrifices, if the rallies turned into violent disturbances. The NKDP also could not completely disregard messages fi’om the United States. The United States had continuously expressed their opinion that the government should dialogue with the opposition party and the opposition party, and the dissidents groups should pursue peaceful, institutional and incremental reforms. The U.S. pressured the NKDP to retract their persistence in the direct presidential election and to compromise with the government saying that direct presidential elections were not only way to build democracy.*^ The U.S. also pressed the NKDP for a clear attitude on the radical demands of the student groups and asked to break with radical student groups. Once the govermnent accepted early constitutional revision, what mattered was the content of the new constitution. As mentioned above, the opposition forces were not under a mutual agreement on the content of the new constitution, even though they agreed that democracy could not come true under the current constitution. As the NKDP kept a distance fi’om dissident groups and other social movement sectors, they aroused suspicion that they might compromise with the government to introduce a parliamentary system in the new constitution. The suspicion of the social movement forces on the NKDP was vividly expressed in the Inchon rally on May 3, 1986. During the rally, students and labor activists attacked the NKDP ofiBce and carried out a violent demonstration criticizing their illicit connection with the government. The targets of the demonstrations were not only the government but also the NKDP. The Inchon rally clearly demonstrated divisions and conflicts among the opposition forces. ^ Minjuseoneun (Democracy Declaration), no. 1, September, 9, 1985. 140 Being alienated from the social movement forces, the NKDP returned to the Assembly to discuss the constitutional revision with the ruling DJP. On May 27, 1986, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung agreed to form a Special Committee on Constitutional Revision in the National Assembly.^ The ruling DJP needed to separate the opposition party, NKDP, from the social movement forces, and agreed to create a Special Constitution Revision Committee in the National Assembly on June 14, 1986.*’ However, their discussion immediately reached an impasse, due to basic differences among them concerning form of the government. The DJP, lacking nationally popular figures, preferred a parliamentary cabinet system to cling to the reign of power. On the other hand, the NKDP believed that DJP’s parliamentary cabinet system was a scheme to perpetuate its rule. The NKDP suspected the DJP preferred a parliamentary to a presidential system since it was easier to commit election fraud and manipulate elections in a National Assembly election which had many small constituencies than one large constituency of a single presidential election. Another reason the NKDP favored presidential system was the two Kims. The NKDP was convinced that its prospective presidential candidates, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had a very good chance of getting popularly elected over the DJP candidate, whoever it might be.** *^ Im Dong Dyung & Kim Chang Ki, “Gaehunjungkukeui Tamsaekjon,” (Constitutional Revision and its Political Situation),Wolgan Chosun, June 1986, p. 167. Dona-A Ilbo, May 27. ^ Korea Herald, June 25, 1986. ** Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 1896, p. 15. 141 3.4 Implications. First, the elevation of repression did not always bring about the collapse of social movement forces. In the first period (October 1979-December 1983), when the social movement forces were extremely weak and not well organized they were very vulnerable to government repression. However, once the social movement forces had a certain strength they could survive under harsh repression. Even though the Chun regime revoked its liberalization policy and returned to high repression after the students’ occupation of the United States Cultural Center in mid 1985, it could not destroy social movement forces as complete as it did in the previous period. Far fi'om destroying them, the government’s harsh repression, including the enactment of the Campus Stabilization Law, sexual harassment to women and the torture death of a college student produced strong resistance fi'om opposition forces and provided momentum to strengthen their solidarity, instead. Second, even though they were fighting against a common enemy, the social movement forces were never a unitary sector. All social movement organizations did not agree on their perspective on the current South Korean society, movement goals, ways of struggle or attitudes toward the Chun regime. Therefore, the establishment of an umbrella organization to mediate their difterences and form a united fi'om in their struggle was very important for the success of movement. Third, extremism in the social movement forces was very unhelpful, and moderate goals and strategy were required for their success. Destructive power was a valuable asset 142 for the social movement forces, but excessive violence and radical ideologies only alienated them from the public, and provided the regime with an easy excuse for harsh repression. But destructive power of the social movement forces could give some limited damage to the regime and the opposition party needed it as a political leverage in compromising with the regime. After the 1985 National Assembly election, the opposition NKDP carried out street politics in cooperation with the social movement forces to press on the Chun regime to accept constitutional revision for a direct presidential election system. However, the NKDP had to keep its distance from social movement forces and return to the institutional politics when extreme violence prevailed over its rallies, because it could not neglect the emotion of their electorate. Fear of social disorder and its possibility of producing direct confrontation with the North Korean communists kept most South Korean people from sympathizing with or accepting radical ideologies. 143 CHAPTER 4 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE EXPLOSION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, APRIL 1987-JUNE 1987 4.1 Introduction In this period, explosive social movements forced the authoritarian Chun government to accept demands of the people and paved a way for democratic transition. The success of social movements in this period can be explained by two factors: the good strategy of social movement organizations and an expanded political opportunity structure. Despite their ideological differences, most of the participating social movement sectors, under the leadership of the NCDC, agreed on one primary goal: direct presidential elections. They also tried to avoid violence and radicalism which deteriorated support by the ordinary people. In terms of the political opportunity structure, the most dramatic difference compared to the previous period was the attitude and support of the ordinary people. The Chun government’s decision to postpone the discussion of constitutional revisions until after the 1988 Olympics, as well as the disclosure of the cover-up of the torture and death of a university student infuriated many otherwise patient and passive intellectuals and 144 ordinary people and drove them to the streets to fight against the arrogance of the corrupt authoritarian regime. 4.2 Expansion of the Political Opportunity Structure In this period, the Chun regime remained coherent and united despite vehement protests fi'om opposition forces and ordinary people. Even though differing opinions existed among the regime elite regarding how to deal with challenges against their regime, Chun’s grasp on political power remained firm. With less than one year remaining in his term, Chun prior to the end of his term, Chun was far fi’om a lame duck president. The most striking variation in the political opportunity structure during this period appeared in the reactivation of the formerly quiescent and passive middle class, as well as the United States government’s support for the democratic movements across the world. During earlier democratization movement, the middle class had not been politically active. Few people were ready to assume the risk that they might incur by confi’onting the militant authoritarian regime, and most people were instead satisfied with the role of stabilizer, rather than active participant. The momentum that ignited the participation of many formerly quiescent and passive people was the April 13 measure in 1987, which expressly prohibited any political discussion of the constitutional revision for direct presidential election until after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.* Chun’s announcement of this measure to cripple prospects for constitutional change infuriated many moderate Korea Newsreview April 18, 1987, pp.4-5. 145 intellectuals and ordinary people who had placed great hope in the possibility of selecting the president by their own hands. Another incident that turned ordinary people into active supporters for the social movement forces was the disclosure of the government’s attempt to cover up the torture and death of a college student at Seoul National University. The revelation of the government cover-up attempt stirred public outrage and provided a clear moral justification for the struggle of social movement forces against the increasingly harsh Chun regime. The United States government had and continues to have a definite interest in Korean domestic stability, due to its geopolitical and strategic importance. As a result of this interest, the U.S. government has sometimes stood on the side of the military regime, when they judged that social movements caused political instability. However, the participation of hundreds of thousands of the “silent middle class” in democratic movements in 1987 conveyed a clear message to the U.S. and other countries that dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime was not confined to radical students, laborers, dissident groups or opposition forces. Dissatisfaction and repulsion in South Korean society were no longer confined to any particular social group. Facing outbursts of mass demonstrations for democracy, the United States government could no adhere to a policy advocating political stability over democratization. Through various channels, the Washington sent a strong message to the authoritarian elite in Seoul that they opposed any form of military intervention or martial 146 law in dealing with the protesters. To confirm this stance. Assistant Secretary of State, Gaston J. Sigur Jr., visited Seoul on June 23, 1987.^ 4.2.1 Political Repression In this period the government did not hesitate to use every repressive means including physical force against opposition parties and social movement sectors. They did not leave any room for dialogue or compromise with opposition forces in dealing with the issue of constitutional revision for direct presidential election. On April 13, 1987 President Chun declared the postponement of any discussion on constitutional revision until after the peaceful transfer of governmental power and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, arguing that current constitutional debates caused social disorder which might endanger a peaceful transfer of government.^ His declaration that the next president would be elected by the electoral college, under the terms of the current constitution, provoked protests from the moderate public as well as every opposition forces. The authoritarian regime and the opposition forces were two trains running against each other on the same track until the government surrendered to the people’s power and accepted demands for the direct presidential election on June 29, 1987. Escalation of the repression Since the second half of the previous period the government had continuously raised the level of repression against the opposition forces. By launching the The Washington Post, June 27, 1987. 147 decompression policy, the government expected some moderate opposition forces to enter the arena of institutional politics, which might lead to the weakening of radical movement forces. In reality, however, precisely the opposite situation developed. Taking advantage of the relaxed oppression, social movement sectors began again to mobilize and organize. As the movement sectors gained resources and momentum, they became increasingly more radicalized and delivered a serious threat to the military regime. The government could not leave the opposition forces as they stood. Since the Inchon Incident of 1986 the NKDP had lost their confidence in controlling the movement sectors and gave up their attempt to build solidarity. Believing that many of the ordinary people had turned their back on the NKDP and the social movement sectors after the violent rally, the government ordered the dissolution of the umbrella dissident organization, the UMMDU, and arrested their core activists. Another incident which provided the government a good excuse to repress the social movement forces happened at the Konkuk University on December 28, 1986. About 2,000 student activists from 26 universities occupied the university building for four days and violently confronted with the police until the crack down by the riot police during which 1,290 student activists were arrested.** The social movement sectors sustained critical damage from these two violent incidents and, as a result, entered into a relatively stagnant period.* The government also prevented another two big rallies by the NKDP and the social movement forces. The police successfully blocked a rally commandeered by the NKDP on ^ Kim Choi, “4.13 Gaehunyubogyuldankwa Jungkukbanghang,” (April 13 Decision of postponement of Constitution Revision and a Direction of Political Situation),Shin Doang-A, May 1987, p. 159. ■' Eidtor, Chunhwan (Conversion) (Seoul:Sagyeojol, 1987), p. 76. 148 November 29, 1986 to promote direct presidential election, as well as the People’s Grand March for Democratization and Expulsion of Torture.” This latter march on March 3, 1987, marked the 49* day after the torture and death of Park Jong Choi. The success in blocking these demonstrations gave the government confidence in its capability to break up opposition movements with physical force. On January 13, 1987, President Chun admonished that if the ruling and opposition parties could not reach agreement on the constitutional issue, he would have no choice but to make a “grave decision” in order to smoothly execute the political schedule.** Chun’s “great decision” talk was not the kind of thing that could be taken lightly. It implied that he might dissolve the National Assembly, take extreme measures to control the country, and relinquish constitutional reform.’ Little time had passed before Chun’s true intentions were plainly revealed to the Korean people. On April 13, 1987 the President Chun Doo Hwan announced that he prohibited all kind of debate on the constitutional revision until after the peaceful transfer of government power and successful host of the Olympic Games.* Since President Chun, in April 1986, promised he would not oppose constitutional revision as long as the government and opposition party could come an agreement, an ad hoc National Assembly Committee for Constitutional Revision was created and the two rival parties attempted to reach a compromise. However, discussion between the rival parties soon came to a deadlock due to their unbending differences on the political structure. The opposition ^ Koh Sung Kook, “6wol Hansaeng-Onuleui Euimi,” (June Democratic Struggle-Today’s Meaning), Wolgan JungAng, June 1989, pp. 222-223. * Dona-A Ilbo, January 14, 1987. ’ Manwoo Lee,The Odyssey o f Korean Democracy: Korean Politics, 1987-1990 (New Yoris: Prager Publishers, 1990), p. 26. ® Hankukllbo, April, 13, 1987. 149 party firmly stuck to the plan for a presidential system with popular presidential elections. They believed that the current system of the president being chosen by an electoral college was too open to manipulation by the government. On the other hand, the government party proposed a parliamentary cabinet system. In essence, mutual consent was impossible until one party made an exceptional and unexpected concession. President Chun was well aware of this, and the unlikelihood of compromise may be why he confidently turned the issue over to the National Assembly. As anticipated the rival parties wasted much time without any significant progress on the debate. This gridlock provided the Chun regime an excuse to nullify the long time attempt by the opposition forces to gain direct presidential elections. In a statement President Chun said that it had become impossible to amend the constitution during his tenure due to the shortage of remaining time; the time left was not even enough to carry out the necessary political agenda and the practical preparations for the change of government.® The Special Constitution Revision Committee, which was formed on June 24, 1986, was dissolved after Chun’s statement to shelve constitutional revision until after the Olympic Games. The committee had been virtually shutdown since September 29, 1986, when the NKDP boycott it due to confi-ontation with the governing DJP over the issue of live television coverage of public hearings. The opposition NKDP hoped that peoples’ enthusiasm for direct presidential elections could be revived by televising the public hearings live. On the other hand, the ruling party refused live television coverage asserting that the special committee was not in the position to call on the networks to guarantee such coverage. ' Ibid.. 150 After Chun’s statement, the ruling DJP announced its political timetable that then- presidential candidate would be nominated in a national convention in June and the next president would be elected in December by an electoral college. Roh Tae Woo, chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, pledged that constitutional revision could be considered again if the two great national undertakings, a peaceful transfer of government and the Olympics, were carried out successfully. As an effort to alleviate the opposition camp’s discontent and attract them to participate in the next presidential election, the government promised a revision of the current presidential election law for more fair elections. Under the current law persons running for the electoral college had to collect petitions from more than 100 individuals residing in their constituency. The revised law would dispense with this provision, thereby paving the way for freer candidacies by opposition politicians for the electoral college. Another revision suggested by the government was, like the U.S. presidential system, to have electoral college members disclose the name of the presidential candidate whom they pledged to back while soliciting voters’ support to be elected as members of the electoral college. Under current law, persons running for the electoral college did not have to reveal whom they would support in the presidential election." Repression of the opposition partv After Chun’s April 13 statement was declared, every social strata, including the moderate intelligentsia, religious community , and the social movement groups, strongly The Korea Herald, April 19, 1987. 151 demanded that he retract his decision. However, Chun did not have any intention to revoke his decision or compromise in the least with the opposition forces. He was fully ready to crack down on the opposition’s protest with physical force. The first thing that the government did was to strengthen its suppression of the opposition party to break through the anticipated rebellion against Chun’s April 13 statement. On that same day, a Representative of the NKDP, Yu Sung Hwan, was sentenced to a one-year prison term including the suspension of his civil rights for one year, because of alleged violation of the National Security Law. In the text of his speech, prepared for delivery in the National Assembly, Representative. Yu asserted that Korea’s supreme national policy goal should be unification with the North Korea rather than anti-communism. The government denounced Representative Yu that his statement was supporting the cause of radical students and workers. The accusations were unable to limit his speech, however, since, under the Korean Law, a legislator cannot be prosecuted for any statement made during an assembly session. The government’s repression of the opposition party more plainly appeared when a new strong party was formed by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. On April 8, 1987 the two Kims declared to form a new opposition party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) denouncing head of the NKDP, Lee Min Woo’s support for the parliamentary cabinet system. When the two leaders decided to form a new party, 69 out of 90 of the NKDP lawmakers followed them. The repressive government could not tolerate the appearance of a new hard line opposition party. The government used every The Korea Times, April 19, 1987. 152 means to obstruct the formation of a new opposition party. The RDP had extreme difiBculty finding a venue for its convention and a suitable party headquarters because building owners were warned oflFby the government.*^ In fear of organizing a massive demonstration, the government confined the prominent opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung under house arrest on April 8. Kim had been barred fi'om engaging in politics since he was convicted of sedition in connection with a bloody riot in Kwnagju in 1980, during which he was given a 20 year suspended sentence by military courts. Since his return fi'om the United States in early 1985, Kim Dae Jung had been placed under house arrest 55 times, for a total of 179 days.*^ House arrest for Kim had continued until the authoritarian government surrendered to the peoples’ power on June 29, 1987. The party platform of the RDP was also a target of the government’s attack. The government claimed that the RDP’s reunification policy, delineated clearly in its party platform, threatened the development of democracy and was likely to cause a split in national opinion about the contentious reunification issue. In its inaugural convention on May 1, 1987, the RDP adopted the policy that “national reunification, being recognized as the foremost task of the nation transcending the differences in ideology and political systems, shall be adopted as the primary goal of state administration. ”*'* The Ministry of Justice argued that “transcending ideologies and systems” meant the acceptance of political systems other than the liberal democratic system and thus violated the National Security Law which bans activities “favoring anti-state organizations.”*^ The RDP Far Eastern Economic Review, May 7, 1987, p. 27. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9, 1987, p. 9. Korea Times, May 3, 1987, p. 2. Korea Herald, May 14, 1987, p. 1. 153 ignored the government’s warning to revise its platform, arguing that their reunification policy was no different fi'om the July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communique and the 1982 presidential policy statement, which declared that reunification should be made through the people’s total unity, transcending differences in ideology and system/® On June 7, the Seoul prosecution issued writs of detention for four RDP members including Lee Hyup, a senior member of the Council for Promotion of Democracy, Kim Kyung Doo, a member of the policy committee, Lee Tae Ho, aide to Kim Dae Jung, and Ahn Kyeong Yul, secretary to the RDP vice president who participated in drafting the party platform/’ Repression of street protests In complete disregard of the peoples’ protests, the DJP held a party convention on June 10, 1987, during which it selected Roh Tae Woo as its candidate for the presidential election in the electoral college. To protest the government’s arrogance, the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC), a giant alliance of opposition forces including the RDP, dissident groups, students, religious groups, andothers, planned to hold a political rally on the same day requesting the cancellation of the April 13 measure. The rally by the NCDC faced harsh repression from the government. To block the rally, the government issued a Class A emergency alert order and mobilized a force of 60,000 police, equivalent to half of all the police forces throughout the country.^* Just as it did during earlier rallies, the police conducted overnight raids at universities and the Korea Times, May 15, 1987, p. 1. 154 offices of opposition groups, and seized about 25,000 items, including fire bombs, clubs and leaflets. The government also placed about 40 senior dissident leaders under house arrest.During the rally the government arrested Yang Soon Jik, a senior National Assemblyman from the RDP, 12 clergymen, and other anti-government figures.^ As massive demonstrations continued several days, the government urged colleges across the nation to close early for their summer recess. On June 17, 33 universities went into summer recess by indefinitely putting off their term exams and 98 universities among a total of 103 universities were shut down until the next day.^' Despite the closures of these campuses, massive demonstrations persisted. The protests reached a fever pitch on June 18, when 73,600 people in 14 cities, including 58,730 students in 78 universities, staged violent rallies. Almost 1,500 people were arrested.^ As tens of thousands of demonstrators took control of the streets, overpowering tired and demoralized riot police, the government attempted to seek some type of mediating solution. On June 19, Prime Minister Lee Han key warned South Koreans that the government would make an “extraordinary decision” if peace was not soon restored.^ However, the government’s threat of mihtary intervention could not stop the already empowered demonstrations. After negotiation to end demonstrations failed on June 24, the NCDC staged another huge rally the following day. This was the last blow to the Chun regime, which conceded to the people’s demands for democratization. As result of ” Korea Times, June 7, 1987. '* Dong-A Ilbo, June 9, 1987. The Washington Post, June 10, 1987. “ The New York Times, June 14, 1987. The Korea Times, June 18, 1987. ^ The Washington Post, June 19, 1987. 155 this rally 2,960 people nationwide were arrested and 230 dissidents were put under house arrest/'* According to knowledgeable politicians and foreign diplomats, during this tense time. South Korea had come much closer to military intervention than most people ever realized. On June 19, after the night that riot police lost control of the streets to anti- government protesters in several major cities. President Chun was ready to resort to the military to restore order in the cities.^ However, President Chun was unable to call the troops into the streets for several reasons. First, the Kwangju Massacre in 1980 had remained the largest single barrier to stability and political legitimacy of the Chun regime.^ Since the Kwangju Massacre, the military had suffered from the criticism that they killed their own people, rather than the “enemy.” Many commanders did not want to repeat this mistake.Second, some moderates within the government and ruling party opposed military action. Observing the explosive street violence, they realized that it would be impossible to achieve a peaceful change of government without reversing the April decision to suspend discussion on the constitutional revision.^* On June 27, Lee Choon Koo, Secretary General of the ruling party said it was “unthinkable” that President Chun could peacefully transfer power to his successor, Roh Tae Woo, under the current constitution.^ Moderates believed that ^ The Washington Post, June 20, 1987. The Washington Post, June 27, 1987. ^ The New York Times, July 7, 1987. “ Jang Ki Pyo, SONyundae Sanhwangkwa Silchon (Situation and Practice of 1980s) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1991), pp. 199-200. The Washington Post, July 5, 1987. ^ The Korea Herald, June 23, 1987. ^ The Washington Post, June 28, 1987. 156 military intervention could not be a political cure-all, though it might temporarily put down rampant anti-government rallies. Third, President Chim did not want to permanently damage his reputation in history. Chim had staked his reputation on the promise of peaceful transfer of power to a successor, a precedent which had not been established in South Korean history. Chun had argued that his non-violent departure, in and of itself would be the single greatest stride toward democracy in South Korean history.^® Imposing emergency steps would have made it impossible for President Chun to transfer power to his hand-picked successor, Roh Tae Woo. Fourth, Seoul was scheduled to be the site of the 1988 Summer Olympics and the government was extremely anxious to avoid steps that would create an image of repression and dictatorship.^^ The successful hosting of the Olympic Games would require the voluntary participation of the people, which was inconceivable if martial law were in force. Fifth, imposing martial law would have brought innumerable harm to the government’s international relations, particularly with the United States.^^ Since the people’s protests exploded the United States had constantly urged the Chun regime to avoid troop mobilization. 4.2.2 Political Divisions among Regime Elites During the transitional period in South Korea any significant signs of elite division or power struggle among them had been strictly concealed. Although some moderate voices existed in the ruling DJP and the military, it was a far cry fi-om being an all-out power struggle between hard and soft liners. Despite vehement protest from opposition “ The New York Times, July 6, 1987. 157 forces and ordinary people. President Chun retained a firm grip on power. Chun had a broad-based patronage in the military as a leader of Hana Hoe (One Association), a secretive fi'atemity of Korean Nfilitary Academy graduates which existed through the 1960s and into 1980s.^^ Many studies on South Korean democratization interpreted the process of transition as a victory of soft-liners, led by Roh Tae Woo, over the hawkish Chun’s faction.They explained that Roh, by himself planned and announced an 8-point democratization proposal which erased the political confi’ontation and paved the way for democratic transition without any prior consultation with President Chun. On June 29, 1987 Roh Tae Woo announced the 8-point proposal for resolving the current political confi-ontation, including constitutional revision for direct presidential elections, and complete amnesty and reinstatement for Kim Dae Jung. Roh hinted that he had made his final decision on his own discretion. Despite Roh’s statements, however, many knowledgeable politicians and diplomats said that it seemed almost unimaginable that Roh could have done such things without prior consultation with President Chun.^^ The Western press also believed that President Chun was, in the very least, aware of the fimdamental basics of the Roh’s plan, especially those involving direct presidential The Washington Post, June 14, 1987. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9, 1987, p. 9. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 21, 1989, p. 24. ^ James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,”Political Studies, 37 (1989), pp. 244-259: Im Hyug-Baeg, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,” Korean Social Science Journal, 21 (1995), pp. 133-151: Im Hyug-Baeg, Politics o f Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea, Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1989: Mah In-Sub, Capitalist Development and Democratization in South Korea: A Study on the Socioeconomic Structure and Political Process, Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, I99I. The New York Times, Jime 30, 1987. 158 elections and political freedom for Kim Dae Jung, if not every detail of the eight-point democratization proposal/^ Judging from their personal relationship and the personalities of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, it is hardly imaginable that Roh announced the democratization proposals without prior consultation with Chun. Chun and Roh have been together since the start of their careers. They attended the Korean military academy together and advanced through the ranks of the South Korean Army. Even though they were friends, Chun had always been a forerunner among his classmates and gathered many colleagues and his juniors around him, while Roh had to be satisfied with succeeding Chun’s position after he was promoted to a higher position in the military. After they entered into politics, Roh remained under the protection of Chun and had never tried to increase his own influence beyond Chun. In the process of compromise, Roh was not considered a “real force” by the opposition leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. Chun suggested to the two Kims that negotiations be conducted with Roh since he endowed all authority on domestic politics to Roh. However, the two Kims assailed Chun that his suggestion was a sign he was insincere about democratization. They argued that “[R]oh Tae Woo is not the man who can decide such things. Only Chun can do it.”^^ Some years later it has been revealed by many sources that it was Chun who persuaded and forced Roh to accept direct presidential elections. According to many ^ The New York Times, July 6, 1987. The Washington Post, June 25, 1987. 159 sources Roh, at first, strongly opposed Chun’s suggestion, arguing that it was a political suicide for him to accept a direct presidential election/^ In June 1987, Chun and his government faced unprecedented pressure fi'om the Korean people and the United States for democratization. They had only two choices: accept the peoples’ demand or mobilize the military for a bloody crackdown on the peoples’ protests. The Chun government was too well aware of the aftermath of the military crackdown of the Kwangju uprising in 1980. Chun was never regain full legitimacy throughout his tenure as a result of the bloody repression of this protest in 1980. Chun realized that mobilizing the military would severely detract fi’om the two national tasks, the peacefijl transfer of government and the successful hosting of Olympic Games, which he himself considered the dearest exploits of his presidency. Chun also hoped he could be recorded as the first Korean president to peacefully transfer political power. Chun did not want to ruin his opportunity to go down in history. Accepting direct presidential elections was the only way to defuse the political crisis that had produced the most sustained anti-government protests in many years. When the government decided to accept direct presidential elections, they believed the opposition would be unable to unite and agree upon a single candidate, and therefore the government party would have an extremely good chance of remaining in office. By The most current material on this isuue is Kim Yong II, “6.29eui Jinsang,” (The real picture of the June 29th concession) WIN (March 1995), pp. 52-59. Also see, “6.29 Suneon, Chun Doo Hwaneui Jakpum,” (The June 29 Declaration, Work of Chun Doo Hwan) lFo/gan(monthly)Chosun (June 1989); Kim Sung Woo, “ Igeosi 6,29eui Jinsanida,” (This is a True History of the June 29 Declaration),Wolgan Chosun ( November 1992), pp. 162-169; “Roh Tae Woowa Nasale,” (Between Roh Tae Woo and Me),Wolgan Chosun (August 1992), pp. 357-407; Kim Seong Woo, “Chun Doo Hwan, Yeoksaeul wihan yuksong jeungeun,” (Chun Doo Hwan, A live voice testimony for the history),Wolgan Chosun (January 1992), pp. 290-336; (February 1992), pp. 292-401. 160 accepting direct presidential elections, considerable pressure was put on the main opposition forces, the RDP. The two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, had been political rivals for more than 20 years, and neither of them would make a concession for the presidency, the government believed. In 1980, the two Kims fought so fiercely for the presidency that General Chun used their tussling as a pretext to move in with his troops. The government’s strategy was “Let the two Kims kill each o±er.”^® Even though the two Kims would divide a large percent of the vote, the government was still not convinced of Roh Tae Woo’s ability to win against the popular opposition leaders. Roh had failed to produce any deep impression on the people since he had been in President Chun’s shadow for a long time. Therefore, Roh was required to change his public image into a strong and confident politician. Roh’s seemingly unilateral announcement was calculated to place distance between him and the highly unpopular Chun, and build the perception of Roh as the champion of democracy.'”’ By fi-aming the June 29 announcement as Roh’s sole decision the government intended to win the respect of the middle class and regain credibility and legitimacy for the ruling party. Even after the authoritarian government yielded to the opposition’s demands. President Chun retained a strong grip on power. After the June 29 announcement, Chun kept out of the public eye as much as possible, allowing Roh to take over many political responsibilities. However, he clearly continued to exert a considerable influence over security matters, both as head of the National Security Council and as the sole authority 39 The New York Times, June 30, 1987;The Washington Times, June 30, 1987. 161 over the Agency for National Security Planning/* Chun put his men at key posts in the military, such as Defense Security, Capital Garrison and 3"* Army commands, even after Roh had been elected president. This meant that Chun maintained a strong grip on power and he hoped to wield some influence after his retirement. Though it was certain that President Chun still exercised sweeping power, different opinions were expressed about how to deal with the explosive demonstrations from the ruling DJP. During a DIP discussion on June 21, many lawmakers admitted that democratic reforms were long overdue. One of them said, “People want direct elections. People are fed up with the military running politics....We should get rid of the smell of military barracks from our party. We should regain the confidence of the people to escape from being an object of hatred.”'*^ Some soldiers in the military also expressed their objection to the military mobilization as an option of solving the current problem. Opinions objecting to military mobilization from the ruling DJP and the military surely made some affect on Chun when he decided to accept the demands of the people and the opposition forces. However, this does not mean that Chun’s authority was seriously challenged from the DJP or the military. There was nothing to suggest that he had lost the confidence of the army or the loyalty of key generals.^ The Washington Post, June 30, 1987. ■*' Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, p. 14. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 21, 1988, p. 35. The New York Times, July 6, 1987. ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, 1987, p. 9. 162 4.2.3 External Support from Outside of the Movement Sectors Compared to the previous period, support from outside of the movement sectors increased considerably in this period. The most significant change in the political opportunity structure was that moderate intelligentsia and religious groups as well as ordinary people began to raise their voices against the repressive government. Another factor helping to increase political opportunities for social movements was the variation in the United States attitude toward the Korean government and democratization. Intellectuals’ protests Legal and Religious Community : The first protest against the April 13 Measure came out of the Korean Bar Association. Just a few hours after the April 13 measure was announced, it delivered a statement that national consensus had already been reached on the constitutional revision itself, and therefore no person would be able to reverse it. The lawyers argued that only discussions on the fine details concerning government structure remained.'*^ The reaction of the religious community was more intense. On April 21, eighteen Catholic priests of Kwangju Diocese began to fast in protest of the government’s decision to forestall constitution revision. This was followed by series of hunger strike by priests in Seoul, Andong, Wonju, Inchon, Busan, Suwon, and Cheongju Dioceses. These hunger strikes continued about 6-10 days. The fasting fathers held masses supporting direct 163 presidential elections and pointed out the gross injustice of the April 13 Measure through their preaching. The priests’ hunger strikes were supported by many church members. Many Catholics held prayer sessions backing the fasting fathers. On April 24, about 1,000 Catholics at 20 churches in Kwangju simultaneously conducted on overnight prayer session in support of the fasting fathers.^ Protestant groups also severely condemned Chim’s decision to stop all debates on the constitutional amendment. Diocese Date No. of fasting fathers Kwangju April 21 18 Jeonju April 24 23 Seoul April 27 62 Andong April 29 17 Wonju April 29 16 Inchon April 30 45 Busan May 3 26 Suwon May 6 28 Cheongju May 11 10 Table 4.1: Hunger Strikes by Catholic Priests Source: Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), Kisayeon Report I (CISJD Report 1) (Seoul: CISJD, 1987), p. 14. When some 1,000 students took shelter in the Myongdong Cathedral from police tear gas during massive demonstrations on June 10, the church decided to protect the students and negotiate with the government for their safe return to campus. As the clashes between students and police persisted, about 300 priests and nuns held a prayer Moon Myung Ho, “Gaebeunnoneui jaegaerul Jujanghanun Saramdul,” (Peoples who contend resumption of a discussion on the constitutional revision),Shin Dong-A, June 1986, p. 319. The Korea Herald, April, 25, 1987; Moon Myung Ho,Ibid. pp. 324-331. 164 service for the dissidents outside the cathedral and expressed their support/’ In his first sermon on the crisis. Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou Hwan, leader of South Korean’s 2 million Catholics, called for the government to reverse its April decision to suspend talks with the opposition on amending the constitution. He also preached that “[A]ll politicians should abandon their selfish greed for power and narrow partisan interests in the cause of democratization.”'** Professors : Another moderate intellectuals group who took actions against the government’s April 13 Measure was college professors. Since scholars were traditionally accorded great respect and social prestige in Korean society, collective actions by professors had the possibility of wielding considerable influence over the public. The professors’ protest was initiated by thirty professors of the Korea University who issued a joint statement criticizing the suspension of talks on an amendment to the Constitution on April 22, 1987. In the statement, the Korean University professors insisted that amending the Constitution was the most important task of the nation, so the government, in cooperation with people of all strata, should resume efforts to change the Constitution.'*® The next protesting action by professors came out on May 4, 1987 when a total of 152 professors fi'om Chonnam National University, Hansin University, Seoul City University and Hanguk University of Foreign Studies issued statements calling for the realization of democracy through constitutional revision. In the statements, they argued that the government’s decision to put off debate for constitutional revision until after the Olympics dashed the people’s ardent hopes for a legitimate and democratic government through The New York Times, June 13, 1987. 165 constitutional revision.Professors’ protests of issuing statements rapidly spread across the nation. On May 6, more than 200 professors from Chungang, Kangwon National, Kukmin, Kyunggi, Keimyung University, and Inha Institute of Technology issued new statements demanding the resumption of free discussion about the constitutional revision.By June 25, 1987, a total of 1,510 professors from 48 universities, representing about 22 % of Korea’s faculty members, expressed their opposition to the April 13 presidential decision to suspend debate on constitutional revision. This number was about three and half times the 434 professors who issued similar statements in 1986. Besides professors, 4,136 members of 34 civil associations of lawyers, priests, actors, musicians, doctors, nurses, literary men, teachers, etc. expressed their objection to the April 13 measure. The hunger strike by Catholic priests and professors’ renunciation of the April 13 Measure combined to exert considerable influence over the ordinary people and hastened demands for the resumption of constitutional debate. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, p. 12. The Korea Herald, April 24, 1987. ^ The Korea Times, May 5, 1987. The Korea Herald, May 7, 1987. Hankukllbo, June 27, 1987 ;Moon Myung Ho, Ibid., pp. 333-335. ^^Hankukllbo, June 27, 1987. 166 University Date No. of Prof. University Date No. of Prof Korea April 22 30 Kwang. Ca* April 28 16 Seogang April 29 28 Sungkyun** April 30 43 Catholic April 30 15 Seoul May 2 122 Jeonnam May 4 60 Hansin May 4 42 Hanguk May 4 33 Chonnam May 4 60 Seoul City May 4 17 Chungang May 6 55 Kwangwon May 6 40 Kukmin May 6 23 Kyunggi May 6 20 Keimyung May 6 54 Inha. May 6 28 Kyungbuk May 7 57 Jeonbuk May 7 51 Duksung May 7 57 Youngnam May 8 65 Wonkwang May 8 45 Kyungnam May 8 35 Sungshim May 8 28 Jeonju May 8 19 Dongkuk May 8 14 Kangrung may 8 11 Busan May 9 39 Mokpo May 9 20 Ulsan May 9 35 Sungshil May 9 21 Yonsei May 9 40 Kunkook May 9 22 Hannam May 11 24 Kyunghee May 11 22 Dankuk Mayll 24 Chungbuk May 11 36 Chun. Te*** May 11 15 Gamshin May 11 12 Donga May 11 12 Kyungsang May 11 38 Bangtong# May 12 18 Chungju May 12 29 Kyungwon May 12 10 Busan Wo## May 13 14 Daejun May 14 12 Busan May 14 31 Total: 1,437 (46 Univ.) Sa### Table 4.2: Number of Professors Issued Statements Demanding Retraction of the April 13 Measure in 1987 Source: The Korea Herald, April, 24, 1987; May 7, 1987: The Korea Times, May 5, 1987: Yonhap News Agency, May 9, 1987: CISJD, Kisaryun Report I (CISJD Report 1) (Seoul :CISJD, 1987), pp. 16-17. *: Kwangju Catholic University; **:Sungkyunkwan University; ***: Chungju Teacher’s College; #: Bangsongtongshin (Air and Correspondence College); ##: Busan Woman’s University; ###: Busan Industrial College. 167 Defection of the middle class from the Authoritarian regime Maintenance of the authoritarian Chun regime was based largely on the support of expanded middle class, who enjoyed the fruits of rapid economic growth and preferred political stability. According to data from the Economic Planning Board (EPS), by 1985 the size of the middle class population in South Korea was approximately 38%.^“* However, the self-identified middle class was much larger than the objective middle class. In a 1988 national survey, the EPB reported that 60% of the population thought they were in the middle class on the “basis of income, education, property and living standards. A common belief is that the South Korean middle class, who desire stability to protect the cause of economic development, would never be able to make common cause with the rock-throwing radicals of the campuses. Even though at 1985 National Assembly Election, they showed unexpected support for opposition party, NKDP, many members of the middle class were not prepared to risk losing the material gains they have worked hard for. However, beginning in June 1987, South Korean middle-class citizens were no longer the “silent majority.” In their actions, they demonstrated a willingness to risk their futures for democracy and human rights. The motive behind the middle class defection can be understood with economic and political explanations. First, economically the middle class was not a prerogative ^ The EPB defined the middle class people who, 1. have a family income of at least 2.5 times as much as that of the legally -defined minimum living cost; 2. own and dwell in a separate house or apartment, or rent a house or apartment with a deposit to be repaid on leaving; 3. are employed on a full-time basis or own his/her enterprises; and 4. attain high school graduation or above in education;Hankukilbo, Hankukeui Jungscmcheung (The Middle Class in South Korea) (Seoul: Hankukilbo, 1987), p. 10. Cited from Womno Dong, “The Democratization of South Korea: What Role Does the Middle Class Play?” Korea Observers, p. 261. Dong-A Ilbo, January 25, 1989. 168 group any more. The middle class, especially new intermediate strata made up of government ofiBcials, white collar workers and professionals, had been the principle beneficiaries of the industrialization processes in the 1960s and 1970s, while the working class had suffered fi’om low wages and miserable working conditions. White collar workers had enjoyed more prerogative in terms of wages, opportunities for promotion, job security and working conditions than blue collar workers. However, in the 1980s white collar workers could no longer enjoy the prerogative of elite positions and the differences between them and blue collar workers had been significantly narrowed. 56 The Washington Post, June 16, 1987; The New York Times, June 18, 1987. 169 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1975 wage (1,000) 252 233 209 180 150 126 42 whole rising rate* 8.2 11.3 15.9 20.0 19.1 36.6 18.1 occupation gap** 126 128 127 126 128 127 131 wage 423 394 363 302 265 233 83 professionals rising rate 7.4 8.5 20.0 13.8 13.9 30.3 39.1 gap 212 217 222 211 225 234 257 administrative wage 631 589 533 492 437 402 146 positions rising rate 7.1 10.5 8.4 12.5 8.6 38.2 49.0 gap 316 325 326 343 370 403 451 ofiBce workers wage 278 258 239 212 177 162 65 rising rate 7.9 7.6 12.8 20.1 9.0 33.3 20.7 gap 139 142 146 148 150 163 201 sales workers wage 242 224 192 136 108 106 38 rising rate 8.0 16 41 25.7 2.2 22.4 11.2 gap 121 123 117 95 92 106 119 service wage 193 175 161 138 115 95 32 industry rising rate 9.8 9.2 16.1 20.3 21.4 37.3 25.2 workers gap 97 97 98 97 98 95 101 productive wage 199 181 163 143 118 99 32 workers rising rate 10.0 10.8 14.1 21.7 18.2 38.9 12.6 gap 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Table 4.3 ; Trends of Occupational Wage Gap (unit: won, %) source: CISJD, Hankukeui Sahwoijungeui Jipyo (Social Justice Indicators of Korea), Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986, p.38. *wage rising rate in comparison with the previous year **ratio when make average wage of the productive workers 100 The relative depreciation of the white collar workers may be explained by two factors. First, in the 1980s, the South Korean economy did not experience the high growth as they had achieved in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, South Koreans’ enthusiasm for education had provided an abundant supply of college graduates who were no longer 170 the privileged few/^ Relative depreciation made this class feel disempowered and disenfranchised. Secondly, public anger had accumulated as a result of a series of the government’s political misdeeds, including the torture and death of a student by police, Chun’s cancellation of talks with the opposition regarding constitutional reform, his nomination of a military classmate to succeed him, and the reckless use of tear gas.^* The accumulation of grievances over these misdeeds had come to a boil when the government’s cover-up attempt of Park Jong Choi’s death was disclosed. On May 18, Father Kim Sung Hun read a leaflet published in the name of the Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace alleging that the results of the investigation into the death of Park Jong Cheol had been fabricated.The story of the cover-up of Park’s death and the revelation that policemen had taken bribes to stonewall the investigation prompted a national outcry and violent street demonstrations that confronted Chun with the worst political crisis of his presidency. Public anger was also stirred by indiscriminate tear gassing by police during many protests. During the early stages of the June protests, the middle class had been somewhat cautious in expressing their support for protesters. Their support was generally limited to looking at the demonstrators on the streets and clapping their hands. However, the tear gas transformed the people into active participants : collecting money, food and drinks for the students, throwing stones and assisting the escape of arrested students from riot Lee Hyuk, “Geunalcui Junggancheung, Udirogagoinna” (Middle class of the day, where they are going) Wolgan yMngnng(monthly), June 1989, p.239. ^ The Washington Post, June 18, 1987. ” Dong-A Ilbo, May 19, 1987. 171 police.^ The fumes of tear gas had settled over thousands of homes and workplaces, choking millions of adults heading for markets and children walking to school. According to the National Police Headquarters, the riot police fired 351,200 tear gas canisters fi’om June 10 to June 26. That meant that an average of 20,660 canisters per day were fired in the 17-day period.®^ The police fired tear gas at hundreds of office workers who came out on their lunch break to watch the sit-in confi-ontation between the police and students at the Myongdong Cathedral. The indiscriminate firing of tear gas had generated an outpouring of support for the students fi-om people who might not normally get involved in political protests. People dropped food, drinks, first-aid equipment and clothing at tables prepared by the students. Cash donated for the protesters totaled approximately about $25,000.®^ Increasingly, ordinary people came out to openly demonstrate and they were increasingly radicalized by the police response. On June 15, about 10,000 middle-class office workers and shoppers joined the protests at the Myongdong Catholic Cathedral, constituting one of the largest protests held in downtown Seoul in years.®^ The size, boldness and persistence of the demonstrations surprised the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Gaston J. Sigur Jr., who was visiting Seoul fi'om June 23-25. After his visit he commented that “I got the feeling almost as soon as I arrived that a sea change was taking place in South Korea.”*” “ Lee Young Hee, “ Jungsangcheungcun Kwayon Bosuhwadoiko Inneunga" (Is the Middle Class Really Becoming Conservative) Sahwoiwa Sasang (Society and Ideas) April 1989, p. 163. The New York Times, July 1, 1987. “ The Washington Post, June 16, 1987. “ The New York Times, June 16, 1987. ^ The Washington Post, July 1, 1987. 172 Participation by the ordinary people, the so-called “silent majority,” strongly indicated that dissatisfaction with the government was not confined to students, radical labor, opposition politicians or a small number of dissidents, as the government had long argued.®^ As the ‘silent majority” turned their back on the government, the ruling elite had no other choice but to surrender to the peoples’ demands.*^ The United States Whenever being criticized as a wirepuller of the authoritarian regime in South Korea, the United States government argued that its influence on Korean domestic politics has been very limited, wielding influence on limited economic and security issues. However, many South Korean people and politicians have believed that the United States has had a considerable interest in Korean peninsula and therefore has actively exercised its influence over Korean politics. During the June protests, the United States clearly voiced its position on the situation in South Korea. Traditionally, the United States foreign policy placed precedence on political stability and security in the Korean peninsula, over democratization. Therefore, the United States government had stood on the side of the authoritarian regime, rather than the democratic forces, as long as it sustained its anti-communist stance. Until the late stage of the June protests the United States maintained this policy position with South Korea. Asian Wall Street Journal, November 30, 1987. “ Lee Do Sung, “Roh Tae Woo Chejechulbumeui Makjunmakhu” (Front and Behind the Curtain of the departure of Roh tae Woo Government),Shin Song-A, August 1987, p. 159. 173 Immediately after April 13, when Chun halted discussions on the constitution, the United States State Department lacked any public statement criticizing this action. Instead, it seemed resigned to the fact that it was unlikely that Chun would reverse his decision.®* Even when violent demonstrations had exploded, and anger over the Chun regime had begun to spread into the moderate ordinary people after June 10, the Washington still stood on the side of the Chun regime. As massive demonstrations continued the United States government asked the South Korean people to avoid violence and engage in dialogue, rather than encouraging the Chun regime to accept the people’s demands.®^ The United States government thought that South Korea, which was enjoying a booming export-driven economy, would not follow the example of the Philippines, where “people power” was able to unseat the unpopular Marcos regime the previous year.™ On June 17, Secretary of State George P. Shultz disputed the view that President Chun’s April 13 measure was responsible for the disruption of talks with the opposition, saying that the opposition was partly responsible because it had been unresponsive to his initiatives.^^ After the night of June 18, when the worst overnight violence erupted and demonstrators took control of streets at major cities, the United States began to realized the critical nature of anti-government demonstrations. As violent demonstrations continued, and the possibility of military intervention was rumored across the nation, the ^ Nam Chan Soon, “Migukeui daehansigak, 4.30eseo 4.13ggaji” (The U.S. Perspective on South Korea, from April 30 to April 13 Measure),Shin Dong-A, July 1987, p. 166. ® Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, p. 10. ^ The Washing Post, June 10, 1987. '°The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1987. The New York Times, June 18, 1987. 174 United States sent a message to the Chun government warning it not to use the Army to quell the disturbances. On June 19, the United States Ambassador James Lilley delivered a letter to Chun from President Reagan, urging him to use restraint in curbing violence and calling for new talks with the opposition. On N.B.C. TV’s “Meet the Press,” Assistant Secretary of State Gaston J. Sigur Jr. said that he would try to pressure the South Korean Government to hold open elections and resume negotiations with opposition leaders.^ As the situation in South Korea deteriorated, the United States had to think about changing its approach to the Chun regime. It judged that the people’s wrath could be appeased only by promising open and direct presidential elections. During a regular State Department briefing on June 22, spokeswoman Phyllis Oakley said that “[W]e urge Korean military commanders to concentrate on the defense of Korea and allow the political process to develop in a maimer agreeable to the Korean people.”^ Secretary of State George P. Shultz, at a news conference in Australia on June 22, strongly urged Chun to reverse his decision. He said “[Wjhat we believe should happen is a resumption of talks not simply about the violence, but about the process through which a transfer of power will take place in a way that reflects the will of the Korean people in a democratic manner.”’'* The Reagan administration turned up its public pressure on the Korean government on June 26. It bluntly recommended the Chun government to take “further concrete positive moves,” including tolerance for peaceful demonstrations, release of The Washington Post, June 22, 1987. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, 1987, p. 10; The Washington Post, June 23, 1987. The Washington Post, June 23, 1987. 175 people in prison for political activities, and an end to preemptive arrests and house arrests/^ At the late stage of democratic transition in South Korea the United States played a significant role by pressuring the Chun regime to avoid mobilizing the military and to accept the opposition’s demands. However, it is not a correct estimation that the United States played a pivotal role in South Korean democratization, even though the United States lent its weight to the opposition forces by supporting democratization measures. The dynamics of South Korean society were already moving things in the direction of democratization before the United States changed its policies to support the opposition forces. 4.2.4 Power Configuration in the Political Society Since late 1986, the NKDP was embroiled in internal feuds over the issue of constitutional revision and party leadership. The two Kims faced with strong resistance fi-om the “non-mainstreamers” over strategies on constitutional amendments and their plan to change the party leadership. On December 24, 1986 Lee Min Woo, a figurehead president of the NKDP, proposed a 7-point democratization formula as a condition to discuss the parliamentary cabinet system with the DJP. The seven points were: 1. guarantee of the fi-eedom of speech and press, including abrogation of the repressive Basic Press Law; 2. guarantee of the people’s basic rights; 3. political neutrality of government officials; The Washington Post, June 27, 1987. 176 4. release of political prisoners, giving amnesty and restoration of civil rights, except for radical procommunist elements; 5. establishment of two-party system; 6. implementation of local autonomy; and 7. feir election laws/® Lee Min Woo expressed his willingness to negotiate the establishment of a parliamentary cabinet system with the DJP, arguing that negotiations on steps for democratization should precede discussions on the form of the next government. The two Kims urged Lee to give up his proposal. They warned that his idea might be politically manipulated by the ruling camp as if Lee was willing to give up direct presidential elections and conditionally accept a cabinet system. As expected, the ruling DJP positively responded to Lee’s suggestions, saying that they would positively discuss the democratization measures if the opposition party accepted a parliamentary cabinet system. In an apparent move to solidify their control of the NKDP, the two Kims decided to form a six-man policy consultation committee, which would act separately from the existing policy consultation setup of the party. ^ The two Kims had virtually excluded Lee Min Woo from the decision-making process of the NKDP, by forming a committee comprised exclusively of their followers. “Nonmainstreamers,” who were unhappy with the two Kims’ autocratic leadership of the party, demanded the abolition of the six-man panel, charging that the committee was formed without consultation. Lee Cheol Sung, a minor faction leader, and some other “nonmainstreamers” of the NKDP, challenged the ofiBcial line of the party, seeking a direct presidential election system and advocating a cabinet form of government favored by the ruling camp. The two Kims convened the The Korea Herald, December 25, 1986. The Korea Herald, March 24, 1987. 177 party’s Disciplinary Committee in an attempt to take punitive measures against Representative Lee Cheol Sung and his followers. “Nonmainstreamers” formed a united front against the two Kims, and they filed a complaint with the committee seeking punishment against the two Kims for damaging the party’s image. Amid a fierce intra-party clash, the two Kims, de facto leaders of the NKDP, decided to form a new party, with the hope of splitting teh troublesome nonmainstreamers and intensifying the cohesion of the party. 69 of the 90 NKDP lawmakers defected from the NKDP to form a new party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), under the leadership of the two Kims.^* The RDP was certainly anticipated to take a hard-line course. The breakup of the NKDP and the emergence of a “hawkish” opposition party under direct control of the two Kims left little room for bipartisan negotiations on the issues. On April 17, the RDP announced that it would boycott a presidential election under the current Constitution.™ The Party pushed the Chun regime to call a plebiscite on constitutional amendment. It argued that the best solution for the current political turmoil would be to call a national plebiscite to ask the public which proposal they favor— a direct presidential election system as pushed by the opposition or a full-fledged parliamentary cabinet system as promoted by the ruling DJP. The RDP closely cooperated with the social movement sectors during the June uprising by joining the NCDC. In the previous period, the NKDP neglected to join the umbrella organization ofMintongryun. The NKDP tried to keep much distance between 78 Dong- A Ilbo, April 8, 1987. 178 themselves and the extremism of this organization of social sectors, even though it occasionally exploited destructive power of the social forces to put more pressure on the regime. The RDP’s participation in the NCDC added an invaluable asset to the social movement forces in both symbolic and practical aspects. The lawmakers’ participation in street demonstrations induced more moderate ordinary people to support the democratization movement and they also provided vital financial assistance for the protests.*® During the June protests, RDP lawmakers were dispatched to the fi'ont line of the demonstrations. Since notable politicians, including Kim Young Sam and Kira Dae Jung, led the demonstrations at the fi'ont line, they were able to draw more attention fi’om the press and the ordinary people.** 4.3 Explosion of Social Movements As the radical student and the labor groups were further enfeebled by the government’s brutal repression, moderate social forces such as dissident groups and intellectuals took the initiative in the democratization movement. Most social forces agreed on their immediate goal, constitutional revisions calling for direct presidential elections, as well as the moderate strategy for pursuing it. The agreement on the goal and strategy made it possible for them to form a grand coalition and to awaken the fiightened ordinary people by lowering risk costs. The Korea Times, April 18, 1987. Interview with Paric Hyung Kyu, a former expert advisor of the Council for Propelling Democratization, a politicians’ organization founded by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung in 1984, on September 5, 1995. Interview with Park Chan Jong, a former National Assemblyman and 1992 presidential candidate, on September 2, 1995. 179 It was Chun’s awkward management of the political crisis that ignited a grand coalition among diverse social forces. On April 13, 1987, President Chun issued a special announcement to conclude the on-going debates on constitutional revision on the pretext of a peaceful transition in February 1988, and of successfully holding the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The “April 13 measure” which allowed for the indirect election of the president by the electoral college under the current constitution, enraged not only opposition forces but also moderate intellectuals and the middle class who had been anxious for the commencement of the direct election of their president. Beginning with 30 professors at Korea University on April 22, thousands of intellectuals including professors, religious persons, literary persons and artists issued statements expressing their views on the situation and urging immediate constitutional revision for direct presidential elections.^ There was another incident that decreased the morality and legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and induced the seemingly moderate “ordinary” people to join the democratic movement. On May 26, Father Kim Seoung Hoon revealed that a Seoul National University student. Park Jong Cheol, had been tortured to death during interrogation by the police. Top ranking police ofiBcers were directly involved in this death by torture of a young university student. In 1985 and 1986, the authoritarian regime felt it had a justifiable excuse for the harsh repression of the social movements, since they lacked mass support, due in large part to the activists’ radical ideologies and violent clashes with the government. Most of ^ Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), Kisayeon Report 1 (CISJD Report I) (Seoul; CISJD, 1987), 16. ^ Jo Ji Hun, Sonyeondae Huban Cheongyeon Haksaeng Undong (The Youth and Student Movement of the Late 1980s) (Seoul: Hyungseongsa, 1989), 16. 180 the leaders of the radical movement organizations were arrested in late 1986 and, during this time they had reevaluated their strategy. Since 1987, the student leaders reconsidered their violent struggles and focused their energy on intra-campus affairs to broaden their support from the masses. The existence of a common goal, constitutional revision calling for direct presidential elections, and the agreement on a strategy of moderation provided anti-regime forces with the necessary momentum to cooperate with each other. On May 27, 1987, the RDP and representatives of broad sectors of social movements succeeded in forming a gigantic umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution (NCDC).*^ The NCDC, whose founding members were composed of representatives from most social sectors including politicians. Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, the Mintongryun, the literary world, academic circles, women’s organizations, farmers, urban poor, artists, workers, journalists, youth, and relatives of political prisoners, was the largest social movement organization to emerge in the struggle for democracy in South Korea.** The NCDC’s peaceful action guidelines, including tactics such as sounding car horns, turning off the television for 10 minutes, tolling church bells, etc., appealed to the ordinary people who earlier had been reluctant to join because of the government’s harsh repression of violent demonstrations. On June 10, the NCDC organized the “People’s Rally to Denounce the Cover-up of the Torture-Murder and the Scheme to Maintain the ^ Lee Kyu Taek, “6.10 Kukmindaehwoi Simal,” (The Beginning and the End of Peoples’ Movement on June 10), Wolgan JungAng (monthly), June 1989, p. 248. National Democratic Movement Institute,Kukminundongbonbu {National Coalition for Democratic Constitution): Evaluation Report (Seoul; National Democratic Movement Institute, 1989), 4-10. 181 Current Constitution” and some 240,000 people from 22 cities participated. These “people’s demonstrations” escalated all over the country day by day and peaked in the “grand peace march” on June 26, 1987, in which over a million people from 34 cities and four counties participated.*® In the face of sustained massive demonstrations, the authoritarian regime had only two options: mobilize troops to quell the demonstrations, or make concessions to the opposition forces. On June 29, the Chun government finally surrendered to “people’s power” and the presidential candidate of the ruling DJP announced the so called “June 29 Declaration” which referred to an 8-point democratization package including speedy constitutional revision leading to direct presidential election, amnesty for opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, guaranteeing human rights and free press, etc..*’ 4.3.1 Student Movement The student movement in the spring of 1987 may be characterized as moderation and popularization of the struggle to achieve democracy in South Korea. From the experience of the previous period, students learned that radical and violent struggles scared off the masses and brought repression from the government. Since the violent struggles of the Inchon incident in May and occupation of Konkuk University in October of the previous year, students lost much of support of the masses and many of their leaders were arrested. The student movement fell into a swamp of stagnation. It was desperate for the students to restore their damaged organization and earn back support 86 CISJD, 6wol Minjoohwadawtoojang (Great democratization struggle in June) (Seoul: Minjungsa, 182 from the masses. In an effort to recover more moderate elements and build a broader public base, student organizations launched a so-called campus democratization drive aimed at deposing pro-govemment university presidents, refining private school foundations, and improving school facilities. ** The student movement in the spring of the 1987 can be characterized as follows. First, in order to rebuild mass popularity and to avoid the government’s brutal repression, they rescinded much of their previously extreme elements and tactics. Even though the actual number of demonstrations did not decrease, they were mostly restricted to on- campus assemblies. They voluntarily dissembled after a certain time, and protests did not take to the streets. Second, the issue of the protests was focused on very narrowly intramural problems, such as the promotion of students’ welfare and the dismissal of pro- govemment professors and university presidents, rather than broader, more contentious political issues. Third, the role of the general student associations was strengthened vis-a- vis the vanguard organizations. Fourth, as these vanguard forces were enfeebled, ideological struggles among the organizations were also mitigated. Fifth, efforts for solidarity between the labor sector and student organizations became very weak. Even though the Sodaehyup (The Conference of the Representatives of the College Students in Seoul Area) was built on May 8 in an attempt to unify campus councils under one banner, its level of solidarity was much lower compared to the previous organization, the Jeonhakryun (The National Federation of Student Association). 1987), 58-71. ^ Korea Newsreview, 4 July 1987, 4-5. ' Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9, p. 37. 183 Even after the government announced the April 13 Measure, the student organizations concentrated their efibrts on restoring mass popularity. It was intellectuals and dissident groups, rather than the students, who initiated fierce protests against the April 13 decision. Since mid-May, the students began to carry out active political struggles. Traditionally, college students had staged massive demonstrations on May 18 every year in protest of the Kwangju massacre in 1980. In 1987, student demonstrations became more violent and fierce due to an exposure by a Catholic priest, Kim Sung Hun, a chairman of the Korean Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, that the result of investigation into the death of Park Jong Cheol who had died as a result of torture inflicted on him had been fabricated and covered up. According to the National Police Headquarters, more than 22,000 students from 62 colleges and universities across the country took part in rallies and demonstrations on May 18, 1987.^ As an effbrt to launch cooperative and effective anti-government struggles, they organized an umbrella vanguard force, the Seohakhyup (The Student Council to Obtain Democratic Constitution in Seoul Area) in Seoul on May 27 and the Buchonghyup (The Student Council in Pusan Area) in Pusan on June 1. With the launch of a gigantic umbrella organization, the NCDC, the student movement groups could stage more active and aggressive movements. Even though big rallies on June 10, 18 and 24 were organized by the NCDC, it was the student organizations which conducted real battles at the front lines of demonstrations everyday for 20 days. During a series of mass protests from June 10 to June 29, students played a ^ The Korea Herald, May 19, 1987. 184 significant role in keeping the demonstrations alive and spreading protests across the country. While the NCDC emphasized principle of non-violence during all the rallies and demonstrations, the student demonstrators fi’equently resorted to heavy violence. Confronted with brutal repression by the police, students threw incendiary bombs and stones. Sometimes the students attacked police boxes and government related facilities, occupied highways, forcefully stopped trains and formed barricades with trucks and buses. Even though the NCDC’s non-violence principle was conducive for the ordinary peoples find ways to participate in the demonstrations, the students’ physical force which often overpowered the police gave the ordinary people courage to express their resentment against the dictatorship. Since June 10 the students staged explosive non-stop demonstrations across the country and their protests continued to draw more support from the ordinary people as time went on. During the period of the sit-in strike at the Myongdong Cathedral, students on campuses staged demonstrations and took to the streets to go to the Myongdong Cathedral. Students’ demonstrations were not restricted to Seoul. Students in provincial cities such as Pusan, Masan, Daejeon, Iri, and other places carried out acute demonstrations every night and day. On June IS a total of 60,000 students took part in campus incidents at 45 universities and the next day approximately 41,000 students from 57 universities staged demonstrations.^ On June 17, according to the National Police Headquarters, a total of 72,750 students from 70 colleges and universities across the The Korea Times, June 17, 1987. 185 country held antigovemment rallies and on June 19, about 46,500 students from 79 universities took part in anti-government demonstrations.®^ Most demonstrations involved only a single campus. Occasionally, however, neighboring universities staged joint demonstrations. On June 24, about 20,000 students from the Seoul and Inchon areas gathered at Yonsei University in Seoul for a antigovemment rally and pledged their support for the “grand peace march” scheduled on June26bytheNCDC.®^ 4.3.2 Labor Movements Contrary to the active students, workers largely did not participate in active political struggles during this period. Workers’ organizations such as Seonoryun and Innoryun had been considerably weakened due to harsh repression by the government in the previous year. In the spring of 1987, the labor movement put its focus on the issue of wage increases and did not pay much attention to the political issues like the constitutional revision. During a series of massive demonstrations beginning on June 10, the labor organizations did not participate in the rallies organized by the NCDC and did not independently stage any demonstrations. Even though the organizations of the labor movement had been very quiet during the transitional period, this did not mean that individual workers were also inactive in demonstrations. Quite the contrary individual workers actively participated in street demonstrations. The enthusiastic participation of workers can be seen in the number of The Korea Times, June 24, 1987. 186 arrested workers during demonstrations and from the fact that demonstrations had been very common factory complex areas in many cities.” Occupation students ofiBce labor merchant im- total worker employed No. of arrest 20 2 9 1 7 39 Table 4.4: The Number of Arrests at the June 26 Rally. Source: Dong-A Ilbo, June 29, 1987. 4.3.3 The NCDC and Peoples’ Power As the Chun regime revealed its intention to extend its rule to the next government through the April 13 Measure, both social movement sectors and the opposition party, the RDP felt an absolute necessity for establishing a united front. The umbrella organization of dissidents, the Myntongryun, had suffered from weakened movement resources and capability due to the arrests of its leaders and loss of its mass base following the violent Inchon protests in the previous year. For the RDP, since it was badly outnumbered by the ruling DJP in its parliamentary seats, the support of the social movement sectors was essential to put pressure on the authoritarian regime. On May 27, the RDP and dissident forces agreed to form a nationwide organization linking students, church people, politicians, and labor leaders for a joint anti govemment struggle. The NCDC was inaugurated with a total 2,191 promoters from “all ^ The Washington Post, June 24, 1987. ” CISJD, 6yul Minjuhwadaetujaeng (Grand Democratization Struggle in June) (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1987), pp. 88-91. 187 walks of life” including 253 Catholics, 270 Protestants, 160 Buddhist monks, 162 representatives of women’s circles, 213 politicians, 308 family members of political prisoners, 171 farmers, 39 workers, 35 members of Mintongryun, 66 cultural and artistic persons, 43 former journalists and publishers, 34 writers and 18 representatives of poor citizens.^ The permanent Advisory Council included prominent opposition leaders such as Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, Stephen Cardinal Kim Su Hwan, and dissident leaders Ham Suk Hun and Mun Dc Hwan. In the inaugural manifesto, they established movement headquarters in order to dedicate themselves to the achievement of democracy by uniting formerly isolated and sporadic movements into one, and extending it to the heart of the people. They also pledged to launch “national and systematic action” to realize the people’s opposition to the maintenance of the current Constitution and their demand for constitutional revision.®^ From the beginning, the NCDC clearly announced that its goals lay in the achievement of a democratic constitution featuring direct presidential elections and the recovery of liberal democracy. Even though some radical activists and organizations joined the NCDC, it rejected any radical element in order to prevent providing the government with an excuse for harsh repression and to appeal to the moderate ordinary people.’® On June 10, the NCDC staged a mass rally to denounce the police cover-up in the torture death of Park Jong Cheol, to protest the prohibition of debate concerning ^ Lee Kyung Jae, “6. lOsiwi malguiunakhu,” (June 10 Demonstration, Front and Behind the curtain). Shin Dong-A, July 1987, pp. 212-213 The NCDC, “Minjuhunpubjaegnchi Kukminundongbonburul Balkihamyunseo” (Founding the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution), leaflet. May 27, 1987, cited from CISJD,Kisayon Report I (CISJD Report 1) (Seoul; CISJD, 1987), p. 106; The Korea Times, May 28, 1987. Lee Kyung Jae, Ibid., pp. 210-212. 188 constitutional revision and to achieve a democratic Constitution. The rally was timed to coincide with the national convention of the ruling DJP, during which it was nominating its presidential candidate. In preparing a mass rally, the NCDC stressed the principles of absolute pacifism and establishment of democratic government through a election. Before the rally, the NCDC issued a code of action for the peaceful rally, including singing the national anthem, honking car horns and ringing church and temple bells at 6 p.m. as a sign of opposition to the government. People were also asked to turn off their televisions at 9 p.m., so they would explicitly avoid watching the news coverage of the ruling party’s national convention.” Despite the NCDC efforts for a peaceful rally, however, the June 10 rally transformed into violent demonstrations in confi-ontation which was met with harsh repression by the riot police. According to National Police Headquarters, demonstrations took place at 104 places in 20 cities across the nation and 16 government buildings. 23 police and other vehicles were burned or destroyed.®* The antigovemment demonstration ignited by the June 10 rally continued for 20 days until the government’s concession on June 29. The violent demonstrations peaked on June 18. According to the police, 73,500 people at 247 places participated in demonstrations throughout the country and 58,700 students at 78 universities and colleges nationwide staged rallies on their respective school campus.” The worst violent protests erupted in the southern city of Pusan where demonstrators rallied throughout the night, viciously fought with the police during which they attempted to attack the KBS(Korean Broadcasting System) building, captured fire ^ The Washington Post, June 11, 1987. 189 trucks, oil trucks and a trailer, and several hundred militant taxi drivers blockaded streets. As serious violence continued day after day across the country, riot police armed with tear gas met their limit in controlling widespread protests. In several cases, isolated groups of riot policemen, their tear gas supplies exhausted, were overpowered by angry demonstrators and forced to discard helmets, shields and protective gear.*®* On June 20 the NCDC declared that it would launch a nationwide demonstration on 26 June if the government fails to take acceptable measure by June 22 in response to its demands including the abolition of the April 13 measure, release of all political prisoners, guarantee of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and demonstrations, and an immediate stop to use of tear gascanisters.As an effort to appease the wrath of people President Chun met with the opposition leader Kim Young Sam on June 24. In the meeting Kim asked Chun to withdraw the April 13 measure, to conduct a national referendum, to release about 3,000 people arrested for their involvement in recent demonstrations, and amnesty and the restoration of civil rights for about 500 people including Kim Dae Jung. However, President Chun only agreed to resume parliamentary negotiations and did not promise an immediate nation referendum on whether Chun’s successor should be chosen by popular vote or by an electoral college.'” The opposition blamed Chun’s contention that the constitutional revision should be discussed in the The Korea Times, June 12, 1987; The Washington Post, June 11, 1987. ^ The Korea Times, June 20, 1987. '°°lbid. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, p. 9; The Washington Post, June 21, 1987. Jungang Ilbo, June 20, 1987. The Korea Times, June 25, 1987. 190 National Assembly, which had failed to make any progress on the debate over the past year, meant regressing to circumstances such as before the AprillS measure. By offering negotiations, the government tried to break an alliance between social movements forces and moderates ordinary people that had helped give momentum to the protests. However, its intention did not succeed. As the negotiation between the two side resulted in a rupture, the NCDC held another nationwide protest, “grand peace march,” on June 26. The NCDC stressed that the march should be conducted in a peaceful and non violent manner, and issue the same code of action as in the June 10 rally. At this time much bigger size of people participated in the protest across the nation. According to the National Police Headquarters, demonstrations took place in 33 cities and four counties and were participated in by a total of 58,000 citizens and students. The figure was in sharp contrast to the 1.8 million claimed by the NCDC, the organizer of the peach march, and the RDF’s 200,000. A total of 3,467 people were apprehended by police during the grand peach march. The intensity of massive demonstrations which sustained for 20 days fi"om June 10 to June 29 could be well evinced by the New York Times headlines during that period. The headlines read as follows; June 11 Violent Protests Rock South Korea June 11 Worst Street Protests in Years Rock South Korea June 12 New Clashes Keep Central Seoul Under Siege June 13 Tear Gas Envelops Much of Seoul June 14 Government is Reported to Be Considering Martial Law June 15 Seoul Police Lift Siege of a church Held by Dissident June 16 Street Protests by South Koreans Resume and Grow June 17 The Protests Ripple Across Korea Dong-A Ilbo, June 25, 1987. The Korea Times, June 28, 1987. 191 June 18 U.S. Olympic Officials Monitor South Korea Unrest June 19 Police Controlling Slipping. Reports Say Government May Allow the Resumption of Constitutional Debate June 20 Premier Warns That Country Is Heading Toward Chaos June 21 Anxiety Pervades Washington’s Korea Policy June 22 Seoul Said to Plan Concession Offers to the Opposition June 23 Crisis is Unsettled Despite Overtures Offered in Seoul June 24 South Korea Chief Meets Key Leader of the Opposition June 25 Opposition is Seoul Rejects Offer by Chun Aimed at Ending Crisis June 26 Korea Cardinals Asks Chun for Direct election June 26 Seoul’s Great Divide: Distrust Between Opposing Forces Leaves the Gap Unbridged June 27 Seoul Protesters Again Face Police in Fierce Clashes June 28 Seoul Authorities Report Preparing New Concessions June 29 Seoul Party Chief Backs Direct Vote for the President June 29 For Koreans, Sighs of Relief as Air Clears‘“ There was no deadlines to demonstrating opposition forces and the ordinary people. Demonstration movement in South Korea seemed irreversible. In face of unprecedentedly intensive and sustained demonstrations the Chun government learned that it might lose everything including peaceful transfer of power and successful holding of the 1988 Olympic Games, which would be regarded as the most remarkable merits of the regime, unless they conceded to the opposition’s demands. On morning of 29 June, DJP leader Roh Tae Woo made a dramatic statement which turned the South Korean political scene upside down. It contained the following main points: 1. The speedy amendment of the constitution allowing for direct presidential elections and a peaceful transfer of power in February 1988; 2. Revision of the presidential election law to guarantee freedom of candidacy and feir competition; 3. Amnesty for Kim Dae Jung and the restoration of his civil rights, and freedom for all political prisoners apart from those accused of treason and violent crimes; 4. Maximum promotion and protection of basic rights, including a drastic extension of habeus corps; 5. Freedom of the press, with maximum improvements to the Basic Press Law; 6. Local autonomy, including the election of local councils and the estabUshment of municipal and provincial councils and self-government for college and universities; 7. Guarantees to allow the free and democratic growth of political parties; The New York Times, June 10-29, 1987; Manwoo Lee,The Odyssey o f Korean Democracy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), pp. 37-38. 192 8. Bold social reform aimed at stamping out crime and deep-seated corruption."” The NCDC successfully organized grand rallies on June 10, 18 and 26, which eventually forced the Chun government to surrender to the peoples’ power and accept their demand, the constitutional revision featuring direct presidential election. The success of the NCDC, the largest umbrella organization for social movement in the Korean history, could be explained by such factors as the component of leadership, organization, their strategy for mobilizing people to the rallies and cooperation with the opposition party. First of all, the NCDC leadership class included most of important figures of opposition forces who had gained reputations fi"om their active struggles against the dictatorship since 1970s. Based on their reputations, the NCDC could emerge as an umbrella organization which could wield symbolic leadership across the nation. Besides, leaders of the NCDC were also playing leading roles in some movement organizations, so they could mobilize their own organizations if necessary even though they participated in the NCDC in their individual capacity. Secondly, the NCDC was equipped with local network across the country, which made united actions possible across the nation. Even though the NCDC could not have enough time to establish its own branches and connecting lines in the province cities, it could take use of the networks of the Catholic and Protestant and the UMMDU which had built organizations for democratization movement across the nation and intensified organizational connection with them. Thirdly, the NCDC developed various tactics based on non-violence principle to attract more Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9 p. 9. 193 people to the street demonstrations. Ordinary people could express their support for the democratization movement without much risk of their safety by homing honk, waving handkerchiefs, singing national anthem and turning off T.V.s. In addition, the NCDC’s slogans “down with the dictatorship,” and “scrap current constitution,” were moderate and acceptable to the ordinary people. Fourthly, the participation of the opposition party, the RDP, was a great asset to the success of the NCDC. As the two leaders of the RDP, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, participated in the NCDC, it could exploit their popularity and organization of the party in mobilizing ordinary people. Another contribution was that the participation of the RDP leaders had major newspapers cover the activities of the NCDC in detail everyday. 4.4 Implications First, elite division was not a necessary condition for democratic transition in South Korea. At the time of transition any sign of power struggle between soft and hard liners was revealed. Even though there were some moderate voices in the ruling party and the military opposing to the military intervention, they were individual voices, rather than a organized one. President Chun did not face any serious challenge fi’om the regime elites and still held strong grip on power. Unitedness and cohesiveness of the regime did not always guarantee survival of the regime. The source of regime crisis could come from outside of the regime, that is to say, social sectors and the people. The united regime may quell down antigovemment demonstrations by physically repressing it, if the opposition 194 forces are enfeebled. However, in this period, the cohesive Chun regime had to surrender to strong and united opposition forces supported by the ordinary people. Second, cooperation among diverse social sectors was essential for a successful democratization movement in South Korea where one social sector, like labor, was not dominant enough to conduct a effective struggle against the authoritarian regime alone. For cooperation of the diverse social sectors, the umbrella organization, the NCDC, played a significant role. The NCDC mediated diSerences of diverse social sectors and organized joint demonstrations across the country. Third, both common goal and moderate strategy were primary factors binding diverse social forces and the ordinary people. All social movement organizations did not agree with each other in terms of their final goals and ideologies. Even though they pursued different goals and ideologies, they considered “revision of the current constitution’ as the first stage to reach their final goal. Diverse social movement organizations could unite by a mutual agreement on the issue of constitutional revision. Moderate strategy of the struggle also induced conservative opposition party and the ordinary people. Moderate code of action in demonstrations made the ordinary people easily express their support for the democratization movement. Fourth, external supporters to the social movement forces, the United States and the ordinary people, assumed a kind of opportunistic attitudes in the transition process. Even though they agreed democratization of South Korean society in principle, both the United States and the ordinary people hesitated to actively support the opposition forces since the did not want to risk their vested interests for the unpredictable future. They 195 would stick to the stable authoritarian regime, rather than uncertain transition to democracy. However, as the opposition forces displayed their strength and considerable chance to overthrow the authoritarian regime, both of them turned to active supporters for democratization movement. 196 CHAPTERS AFTER THE TRANSITION: THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, JULY I987-DECEMBER 1987 5.1 Introduction The success of social movements did not continue in this period. Even though they were successful in their demands for a direct presidential election, the opposition forces lost in the December 1987 election. One dissident explained the problem faced by opposition forces in South Korea, “[W]e are very strong in fighting against something. We are very weak in building up something. When we are persecuted we show our strength. When we are given a chance to build we are prone to divide.” ‘ The June 29 Declaration was a big surprise to both the ordinary people and the opposition forces. No one seemed to expect such decisive, sudden action fi'om the government. Although the opposition forces generally agreed on the need to dissolve the authoritarian regime, they were less able to agree upon the “after authoritarian regime.”^ Once they achieved their common goal of direct presidential elections, the opposition ' Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1, 1987, p. 43. “ Interview with Paric Hyung Kyu, a former expert advisor of the Council for Propelling Democratization, on September 5, 1995. 197 forces revealed their wide differences in basic interests, ideologies, and preferences on the nature of the next government. Changes in two dimensions of the political opportunity structure facilitated decline of the social movement forces : divisions within the opposition party, the RDP, and the demobilization of the ordinary people. The two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung failed to agree on a single presidential candidate to represent the opposition forces. Their divisions dramatically affected social movement sectors and brought about a collapse of a cohesion and solidarity of the opposition forces. The ordinary people were dramatically demobilized once they attained their primary goal of direct presidential elections. Explosive labor strikes after the June 29 Declaration also hastened the demobilization of the ordinary people who did not want the lose fiuits of economic development. 5.2 Constriction of the Political Opportunity Structure The expanded political opportunity structure of the previous period was not sustained after the transition. The regime elite remained united around the departing president Chun Doo Hwan. Explosive labor strikes following the June 29 transition scared off ordinary people who wanted a gradual reform, through which they would preserve political stability and continue economic development. A division of the opposition party played havoc with the alliance of the opposition forces. 198 The “June 29 Declaration” was not a triumph of the soft-liners over the hard liners. No serious splits appeared among the regime elite either before or after the Chun regime’s concession to opposition forces. President Chun retained strong support in the military and the number two man and presidential candidate of the ruling DJP, Roh Tae Woo was unable to present a formidable challenge to the authority of Chun. As protagonists in the 1979 military coup and the 1980 Kwangju Uprising, Chun and Roh faced many of the same challenges fi’om angry social sectors. As a result, they had to win in the presidential election in order to avoid vengeance firom the opposition forces. The middle class, after the “June 29 Declaration” and the attainment of direct presidential elections, were abruptly demobilized. Although members of the middle class shared democratic aspirations with the opposition forces, they did not want bold change and instability in current social relations. Explosive labor disputes in July and August 1987 stirred concerns among the general public over social stability and consistent economic development. In August 1987 alone, there were over 2,500 labor strikes, more in the previous 10 years combined.^ When the regime elites accepted direct elections for the president, they calculated that the opposition forces were unlikely to agree on a single candidate. With such a division in the opposition forces, the DJP candidate, Roh Tae Woo, would have an extremely good chance to win. Their calculation was correct. After the June 29 concession, serious divisions appeared in the opposition party, which prevented them fi’om ^ The Federation of Korean Industries, Hankuk Gyungfe Yongam, 1988, (Korean Economic Yeartxwk, 1988) (Seoul: FKI, 1989), p. 131. 199 facing the DJP as a united force. This failure to unify was a large factor in explaining the DJP victory of Roh Tae Woo in 1987 presidential election. 5.2.1 Revision of the Constitution and Loosened Repression The eight member bipartisan committee to revise the South Korean constitution was composed of four senior lawmakers from the ruling DJP and the main opposition RDP. This committee began to revise the constitution on July 30, 1987. It submitted a constitutional amendment bill to the National Assembly on September 18, which was overwhelmingly approved, 254 to 4, by the legislature on October 13.“* The amended constitution was approved by the South Korean people in a referendum on October 27 by 93.1 % of the voters, and it was ofiBcially proclaimed on October 29.* It was the only time since the foundation of the First Republic in 1948 that the Constitution was made by a mutual agreement between two opposing parties. South Korea had taken a fundamental step toward achieving a democratic system. The new Constitution paved the way for direct and popular elections of the president in December of the year, which was the first in 16 years that the South Korean chose their national leader by popular vote. The new constitution introduced the right ofhabeas corpus, and explicitly stated the freedoms of expression, human rights, as well as a basic right to collective bargaining except in defense-related industries. For the first time, the 1987 Constitution clearly stated that the army should remain outside of politics.* Under the new constitution, the next president of South Korea would serve a single five-year term, succeeding President The New York times, October 13, 1987. 200 Chun on February 25, 1988. The Constitution curtailed presidential power in order to prevent the accumulation of sweeping autocratic power. The president’s emergency powers, which had frequently been used to control the opposition forces and demonstrations, was sharply delimited to cover only economic matters and circumstances produced by natural disasters. In addition, the new constitution abolished the president’s right to disband the national assembly and call for new elections, while it enhanced the authority of lawmakers by guaranteeing the right to investigate government affairs.’ After the June 29 concession, the government began to release political prisoners and antigovemment demonstrators, as a gesture of reconciliation to the people. On July 6 the government released 177 people who had been detained since the June 10 rally. Among them were 12 members of the NCDC, including Yang Sun Jik, vice president of the RDP, Kim Myung Yun, and Rev. Park Hyung Kyu.* On July 8, another 357 people arrested for their involvement in recent anti-govemment demonstrations were released. Among them were Rev. Mun Dc Hwan, chairman of UMMDU, and Yi Chang Bok, vice chairman of UMMDU.® Decreased repression by the government could also be seen from its flexible attitude toward labor protests in July and August of 1987. Throughout this labor unrest, the government, which had previously suppressed workers’ protests, urged both management and labor to reach an autonomous solution. The government did not want to risk losing workers’ votes in the forthcoming presidential election scheduled in December ^ The New York times, October 28, 1987; Hankuk Ilbo, October 29, 30, 1987. ® A full text of the bill is in Hankuk Ilbo, October 30,1987. ’ Far Eastern Economic Review, September 17, p. 40. * The Washington Post, July 7, 1987. 201 by becoming directly involved in disputes between labor and management/" At a news conference in August, Roh Tae Woo pledged that the government would assume a “neutral role” in labor disputes. He said that “(TJn the past, the government’s role was to regulate the demands of labor by suppressing their demands for higher wages.” “By changing attitudes, enabling labor and management to deal with each other without government interference, our laborers stand a better chance,” Roh said." However, as labor disputes quickly spread nationwide and violence in these disputes increased, the government adopted a different attitude. The government began to pursue “a double tracked policy” in the labor situation by arresting agitators while at the same time expressing general support for the workers in their demands for higher wages. By November 5, 1987, 935 people had been arrested on charges related to political protests and labor disputes. 580 of those were arrested in relation to labor disputes alone. " 5.2.2 Demobilization of the Middle Class The South Korean middle class played a significant role in the June transition. The common belief had been that the middle class, which had made great gains as a result of economic development, would not risk much on political issues. However, the traditional “silent majority” actively participated in street demonstrations in June, which had forced ® Yonhap News Agency, July 8, 1987. The New York Times, August 19, 1987. " Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, 1987, p. 10. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 28, 1988, p. 60. 202 the Chun regime to surrender to the opposition forces. After the June 29 concession, the middle class was abruptly demobilized, considerably undermining the strength of the social movement forces. Several factors led to the declining potency of the middle class. First, as a group, they had been primary motivated by the fundamental desire to institute direct, popular election of the president. Once the Chun regime promised to revise the constitution to accommodate this demand, the middle class achieved their primary goal. Many decided to wait and watch the process of democratic reform unfold before they would risk more contentious activity. Second, explosive labor disputes after the June transition reawakened the middle class’s concern for social stability. While in many people there was obviously a deep-seated desire for faster democratization, many agreed that this must be achieved within orderly boundaries. At the early stage of the labor disputes South Korean people were sympathetic to labor, even though the strikes caused a significant decrease in exports. However, as labor disputes spread nationwide and violence increased, many people raised a critical eye to all of the activity. The pictures of violent labor protests appearing on televisions and newspapers fostered much anxiety in the minds of the middle class. There were pragmatic concerns as well. Small and medium-sized self-employed proprietors suffered great economic damage fi'om the workers’ demonstrations.^^ The middle class desired democracy, but not at the expense of broken Shon Kwang Woon, “Yangsimsu Sukbangeui Jemunje” (Several EYoblems on Release of Conscientious Prisoners), in Korean Bar Association, ed.,Inkwon Bogoseo, 1987.1988 (Civil Rights Report, 1987.1988) (Seoul: Youksa Bipyung, 1989), p. 394. '■* Far Eastern Economic Review, July 9, p. 37; October 1, 1987, p. 20. Lee Young Hee, “ Jungsangcheungeun Kwayon Bosuhwadoiko Inneunga” (Is the Middle Class Really Becoming Conservative) Sahwoiwa Sasang (Society and Ideas) April 1989, p. 163. 203 rice bowls. Third, much of the responsibility for the demobilization of the middle class rested on conflicts between the two opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and the resulting factionalization of the social movement forces. As both Kims ran for the presidency, the political chessboard was not simply a confrontation between the authoritarian regime and democratic forces. It was a confrontation among the democratic forces as well. 5.2.3 Split of the Opposition Party and Defeat in the Presidential Election As the peoples’ power forced the Chun regime to accept popular presidential elections, the opposition RDP had a golden chance to get rid of military-tainted regime and take over the government. Given the unpopularity and the illegitimacy of the Chun government, the ordinary people as well as the opposition forces never believed that the ruling DJP candidate, Roh Tae Woo, would be able to could beat the opposition candidate in a fair election. This firm conviction was based on the assumption that the opposition forces would unite behind a single candidate against Roh Tae Woo. The two leading opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, had frequently vowed that they would cooperate even after full democratization and that they would not repeat the sad history of 1980, when they ran separate presidential elections until stopped by Chun’s seizure of power.However, the rivalry between the two Kims continued. The Korea Times, July 2. 1987. 204 The division between these two men began to resurface on July 4, when they met to discuss the formation of a pan-national interim government and the timing of National Assembly elections. While Kim Dae Jung insisted on a neutral pan-national cabinet, Kim Young Sam argued that it might be too risky to push the Chun regime further into a comer, since the government had already accepted most of opposition demands. Thereafter, the coalition of the two Kims, widely characterized as “a political marriage of convenience,” began to sharply fracture. Once again, each man began to seek his own way to the presidency. In November 1986, Kim Dae Jung had pledged that he would not run for the presidency if the Chun government accepted the opposition proposal for direct presidential elections.** However, as the circumstances changed, so too did Kim Dae Jung’s words. On July 9, Kim Dae Jung stated that many people protested his declaration not to seek the presidency.*® Eight days later, a clique of Kim’s political advisers argued that Kim Dae Jung should withdraw his declaration not to run because “the situation was changed” by president Chun’s April 13 Declaration.^** For a while, rather than oflBcially declaring his candidacy, Kim Dae Jung said that his run for the presidency depended on the will of the people. As time passed, Kim Dae Jung more forcefully presented his determination to run for president. Speaking at a rally in Songnam, Kyungki Province, on October 11, he openly revealed his intention to run for president because of the mandate of the people. He said that “[I]f I do not accept their ” The Korea Times, July 4, 1987. '* Lee Kyung Jae, “Kim Dae Jimgeui Bulchulmaseoneun” (Kim Dae Jung’s Declaration not to Run for the Presidency), Shin Dong-A, December 1986, pp. 143-163; Far Eastern Economic Review, July 30, 1987, p. 27. Hankuk Ilbo, July 10, 1987. “ Hankuk Ilbo, July 18, 1987. 205 wish that I am, not only would my future as a political leader be lost but I would be betraying the hopes of the people.”^^ On October 28, Kim Dae Jung officially announced his candidacy by saying that “I hereby declare that I will run for the presidency to fulfill my responsibility to history and to accept the opportunity of service that has been finally afforded to me.”^ On the other hand, Kim, Kim Young Sam had on October 10 already formally announced that he would enter the race for the presidential election.^ Kim Young Sam argued that he had more of a chance to beat Roh TaeWoo than Kim Dae Jung, since he had broader support fi'om the moderate middle class and the military would not veto his presidency. Kim Young Sam capitalized on the fact that many army generals regarded Kim Dae Jung as radical, even pro-communists. Some officers, including Park Hee Do, the Army Chief of Staff, said that Kim Dae Jung retained these views, and many in the military openly warned that an “unfortunate thing” might happen if Kim Dae Jung would win the election. Given his superior strength in the party, where he retained the loyalty of as many as 40 of the 69 RDP assemblymen, Kim Young Sam suggested that the party select a presidential candidate through the party convention. However, Kim Dae Jung, whose organizational strength was much inferior to his rival rejected the suggestion, while pointing out that his political support came directly fi-om “the masses.”^ Finally on October 29, a day after he formally announced his candidacy, Kim Dae Jung and 23 The New York Times, October 11, 1987. ^ The New York Times, October 28, 1987. ^ Hankuk Ilbo, October 11, 1987 The New York Times, July 18, 1987. 206 National Assemblymen seceded from the RDP. On the next day, the followers of Kim Dae Jung held a preparatory convention to form a new party, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) and they selected Kim to head the new party.^ According to his supporters, Kim Dae Jung decided to run on the new party’s ticket after a rally at Korea University on October 25, where students endorsed him and urged his rival to concede.^ Anti-govemment forces continuously urged the two Kims to field a single candidate to prevent the hectic competition between them which helped to abort the democratization movement in 1980. They were concerned that the division of the two Kims might enable the ruling party’s candidate, Roh Tae Woo, to slide to victory in the coming presidential election. In early October, 14 junior members of the RDP, 8 belonging to Kim Young Sam’s faction and 6 to Kim Dae Jung’s, withdrew from their factions, demanding that their party leaders compromise for a single candidate. Cardinal Kim Sou Hwan also urged the two Kims to check their personal ambitions and cooperate for democracy.^* All efforts to field a single candidate came to naught and both Kims ran separately for the presidency. When a third Kim, Kim Jong Pil, a former premier under Park Jung Hee, formed the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) and declared candidacy in early October, the presidential election became a four-way race.^ Quickly, the political situation developed the way that the Chun government hoped it would when it agreed to direct presidential elections. ^ The New York Times, October 11, 1987. Asian Wail Street Journal, November 2, 1987. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 5, 1987, p.48. ^ Dong-A Ilbo, October 6, 1987. 207 Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung came from the traditional rival provinces of southern Kyungsang and ChoUa Provinces respectively, and division which the two Kims developed into a regional antagonism. The fracturons competition between the democratic forces deeply disappointed the Korean people, and the social movement forces lost their moral justification to request support from the ordinary people. The hostility between Kyongsang and Cholla Provinces was deeply embedded in South Korean society due to both historical reasons and perceived discrimination against Cholla Province under both Park and Chun regimes. Between 1960 and 1988, 35 % of South Korea’s ministers and vice ministers came from the Kyongsang Province, while only 12 % came from Cholla Province.the Honam region. 31 % of South Korea’s generals were from Kyongsang Province and only 13 % from Cholla Province Kyongsang people owned over 50 % of the nation’s large chaebol (conglomerates) companies, while Cholla people owned less than 5 The two Kims deliberately used this regional antagonism to demonstrate their support base and push their opponent to resign from the presidential race. On September 8, 1987 Kim Dae Jung visited Kwangju, his support base and was greeted by tens of thousands of his supporters. With this visit, Kim Dae Jung wanted to send a strong message to his rivalry that peoples wanted him to run for president and he simply could not ignore the peoples’ will. Kim Young Sam countered this action by mobilizing a huge crowd, estimated at between 700,000 and 1 million, in Pusan, his hometown, on October ^ Hanlcuk llbo, October 6, 1987. “ Hanguk Ilbo, Jan 1, 1989. Cited from Manwoo Lee,The Odyssey o f Korean Democracy (New Yoric: Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 51. 208 17/' The tumultuous welcome of the two Kims in their hometowns rekindled the age-old antagonism between Kyongsang and Cholla regions. As both Kims formally declared their presidential candidacies, the malady of the regional tension was sharply aggravated. Kim Dae Jung heightened this animosity by repeatedly criticizing the government for favoring Seoul and the Kyongsang regions at the expense of the Cholla region. The regional animosity often became physical. When Kim Young Sam visited Kwangju on November 14, his speech was interrupted by heckling ft-om supporters of Kim Dae Jung. The next day, Kim Dae Jung also attacked by stones, eggs and other flying objects in Taegu, the hometown of Roh Tae Woo. On December 7, supporters of Kim Young Sam in Masan set fire to the automobile of Kim Dae Jung’s aid during his campaign. Kim Young Sam was forced to cancel his rally in Yosu, Cholla Province in fear of campaign violence. Campaign placards and wall posters for Kim Dae Jung were vandalized in Taegu, Pusan, and Kyungsang provinces, and wall posters for other candidates were also damaged in Kwangju and Cholla provinces.^^ South Korean voters, already disappointed by political bickering, became increasingly disillusioned with Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung as their rivalry became more and more intense. People began to question whether or not the two Kims truly were heroes of democratization. Extreme violence in the campaign also brought about serious concerns for security and stability among the people. Roh Tae Woo benefited greatly from the increasingly chaotic contention between the two Kims. He turned the campaign violence in his favor as well. The violence directed against Roh in Cholla province Korea Herald, October 18, 1987. 209 brought an angry reaction from his hometown in Kyongsang province and allowed him to be portrayed as the feeble victim.^'* Roh argued that the feud between the two Kims clearly demonstrated that they were incapable of running a government. ^ In a survey, many voters revealed their disillusionment with the two opposition leaders, and many expressed that they would support Roh in the election, even though they did not especially like him. Roh KimY. S. Kim D. J. KimJ. P. Total 8,282,738 (35.9) 6,337,581(27.5) 6,113.375 (26.5) 1,823,057(7.9) Seoul 1,682,824 (29.4) 1,632,347 (28.6) iWBBjwaüsü##I 460,988 (8.0) Pusan 640,622 (31.7) 1.117,011 (55.2) ' 182,409 (9.0) 51,663 Taegu 800,363(69,8) : 274,880 (23.9) 29,831 (2.5) 23,230 Inchon 326,186(38*7) ' 248,604 (29.4) 176,661 (20.9) 76,233 Kwangju 22,943 (4.5) 2,471 (0.4) 1 1,111 Kyimgki 1.204,235(40.6) ' 800,274 (27.0) 647,934 (21.8) 247,259 Kangwon 546,569(57.9) : 240,585 (25.4) 81,478 (8.6) 49,954 N. Choongchung 355,222 (47.0) : 213,851 (27.4) 83,132(10.7) 102,456 S. Choongchung 402,491 (26.6) 246,527 (15.8) 190,772(12.1) N. ChoUa 160,760 (13.7) 17,130(1.4) 948,955(80.9) Î 8,629 S. Cholla 119,229 (7.9) 16,826(1.1) 1,317,990(87.9) 5 4,831 N. Kyungsang 1,108,035(64.8) i 470,189 (27.5) 39,756 (2.5) 43,227 S. Kyungsang 792,757 (40.4) 987,042(50.3) 86,804 (4.4) 51,242 Cheju 120,502 (48,6) 1 64,844 (26.1) 45,139(18.1) 10,930 Table 5.1; Results of The 1987 Presidential Election: ( )= % Source: Adapted from Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 December, 1987, p. 9; Korea Herald, December 20, 1987. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1987, p. 24. Manwoo Lee,Ibid., pp. 75-78. ^ Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, 1987, p.8. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1987, p. 23. ^ The New York Times, October 15, 1987. 210 In the 1987 presidential election, regionalism virtually decided the outcome. If the two Kims were not separated and succeeded in fielding a single candidacy, the election could be a competition between the authoritarian and democratic forces, which could be absolutely favorable to the two Kims and their followers. However, the division of the two Kims made the elections a field of regional confirontation. The returns of the election clearly showed that regional loyalties were the strongest determinant of voting behavior in much of the country. All three major candidates, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, overwhelmed their opponents in their individual territories. Roh received 70 % and 65 % of the votes in Taegu and North Kyungsang province, respectively. Kim Young Sam garnered 55 % in Pusan and 50.3 % in Kyungsang province. Kim Dae Jung overwhelmed his opponents in Cholla Provinces and Kwangju city by receiving 85 % and 93 % of the vote, respectively.^’ Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, 1987, p. 9. 211 Roh KimY. S. KimD. J. KimJ. P. Nationwide 35.9 27.5 26.5 7.9 Seoul 29.4 28.6 32.1 8 Ycungnam 50 43 5 2 N. Kyongsang 64.8 27.5 2.3 3 Taegu 69.8 23.9 2.5 2 S. Kyongsang 40.4 50.3 4.4 3 Pusan 31.7 55.2 9 2 Honam 10 * 89 * N. ChoUa 13.7 * 80.9 * S. Cholla 7.9 * 87.9 * Kwangju 4.5 * 93.3 * Chungchong 42 27 14 18 Table 5.2: Regionalism in 1987 Election: Percentage of Votes Received by Major Candidates * Less than 2% Source: Adapted from Far Eastern Economic Review^ 31 December, 1987, p.9; Manwoo Lee, The Odyssey o f Korean Democracy, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1990, p. 85. After the election, both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung accused the government and the ruling party of election fi’aud and their supporters waged street rallies to invalidate the election results. They argued that the government was responsible for large scale election irregularities, including fake registrations, misuse of the absentee ballots and computer manipulation in counting ballots. However, their protests were largely ignored by the public who believed that the two Kims’ failure to field a single candidate was a major cause of their defeat.^* Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, 1987 p. 8; January 7, 1988, p. 16. 212 5.3 Social Movements After the June 29 declaration, the social movement forces could not sustain their success due to demobilization of the middle class and split of the opposition party. The Chun government’s June 29 declaration not only cut the much-feared link between ordinary citizens and social movement sectors but also divided the opposition forces. All social forces except labor poured their movement resources into the presidential election scheduled for December 1987. 5.3.1 Explosion of Labor Movement The Chun government had been very successful in economic development and industrialization. GNP per capita had grown from $1,589 in 1980, when Chun took power, to $2,296 in 1986. The growth rate of GNP transformed from -4.8 % in 1980 to 12. 5 % in 1986. The amount of exports dramatically increased from $17.5 billion in 1980 to $34.7 billion in 1986.^^ The unemployment rate also dropped from 5.2% in 1980 to 3.1% in 1987.“*® Much of the Chun government’ economic success had been based on cheap labor and labor docility. For international market competitiveness. South Korean workers had been compelled to work over 54 hours a week, over 9 hours a day for 6 days a week, under terrible working conditions and low incomes. Comparisons between the South Korean workers’ wages and working hours and those of workers in developed Woo S. Jung, “The U.S.-Korea Trade Imbalance: Much Ado About Competitiveness,” in G. Camerron Hurst m , ed., Korea 1988: A Nation at the Crossroads (The University of Kansas: The Center for East Asian Smdies, 1988), pp. 69-70. Chung Woon Chan, “Sgongeui Kyungjerul Pyunggahanda” (Evaluation of the Economy in the Fifth Republic) in Dong-A Dbo ed., Sgong Pyungga Daetoron (Grand Forum for the Evaluation of the Fifth Republic) (Seoul: Dong-A III», 1994), p. 174. 213 countries clearly presented how much they had been exploited by the management and the government. 60r 54.7 50 42.7 41 40.5 40.7 40 38.6 33.7 30 20 12.31 10.39 10 6.24 6.48 7.66 7.68 1.29 i I S. Korea Japan England France Italy W. GI erm a U.S.I □ weekly working hour H hourly wage Figure 5.1; International comparison of wage and working hour Source: ILO, Year Book, 1986. Cited from Kim Gap Bae, ‘TSfodongjaeui Kuonri” (The Rights of Labor), in Korean Bar Association, ed.,Inkuon Bogoseo, 1987.1988 (Civil Rights Report, 1987.1988) (Seoul: Youksa Bipyung), 1989, p. 193. The Chun government had always excluded labor in pursuit of exported -oriented industrialization, including maintaining “disciplined low-cost labor” policy in alliance with capital. During the Chun government, raise rates for South Korean workers were much 214 lowered than those of other developing countries such as Taiwan and Singapore, while their labor productivity increased at much faster rates than those same countries. S. Korea Japan Taiwan US Singapore average 1980 241.6 1,078.8 223.2 1,250.6 209.4 wage* 1987 399.6 2,164.7 481.6 1,716.0 340.1 wage raise rate (%) 165.3 200.6 215.8 137.2 162.7 labor productivity index 217.4 135.5 158.4 122.8 137.5 (1987)(1980=100) ratio of wage raise to .76 1.48 1.36 1.12 1.18 labor productivity Table 5.3: International Comparison of Wage Raise US and Singapore are based on 1986 data. (1986 figures) *: average wage of workers in manufacturing firms. source: Donag-A //6o(daily), July 13, 1988, p.6.; Jo Young Hwan, “Observation of Civil Right Situation in 1987-88,” (in Korean) in Korean Bar Association,Civil Right Reports, 1987.1988, Seoul: Youksa Bipyung, 1989, p. 28. Grievance of the workers, which had long been accumulating, began to burst in wake of democratization and loosened control by the government. Since the Chun government’ 8-points democratization package failed to mention economic reform and improvement of workers’ lives, labor protests were certainly expected. Over 2,500 job disputes occurred during the first two months following June 29. This meant that labor disputes averaged 33 a day, which is at least three times as many as during the turbulent month of April, 1980.'*^ Asian Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1987; Han Sung Joo, “South Korea in 1987; The Politics of Democratization,”Asian Survey, 28: I (January 1988), p. 58. 215 Month Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Strikes 3,749 16 17 23 15 23 32 86 2,552 703 100 103 79 Table 5.4: Number of Monthly Labor Strikes in 1987 Source: Kim Gap Bae, “Nodongjaeui Kwonri” (Rights of the Labor) in Korean Bar Association, ed.. Civil Rights Report, 1987.1988 (Seoul: Youksa Bipyung, 1989), p. 165. In terms of numbers and intensity these workers’ protest were unprecedented in South Korean history. By September, the number of labor disputes reached over 3,300, which was more than twice the total strikes in the previous 10 years. The number of labor disputes in 1987 equaled about 13 times the 276 strikes in 1986 and over 8 times the 407 disputes during the abortive attempts at democratization in 1980. Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Total 105 407 186 88 98 113 265 276 3,749 Table 5.5: Number of Yearly Labor Strikes, 1979-1987 Source: Adapted from Korea Employees’ Federation,Nodonggyungje Yongam , 1989 (Yearbook of Labor Economy, 1989),p. 55. Workers in heavy chemistry conglomerates initiated and led labor disputes in this period. On July 5, workers in the Hyundai Engine Company in Ulsan broke the long taboo of forming a union. For five days, they had staged massive demonstrations to form a democratic union to oppose intimidation and appeasement by the management. By July 15, ten days after the union was established, about 15,000 out of total 25,000 workers 216 joined the union/^ Encouraged by the success of workers in the Hyundai Engine Company, other subsidiary companies under the Hyundai conglomerate, including the Hyundai Mipo Shipbuilding, the Hyundai Heavy Industry and the Hyundai Shipbuilding Company in Ulsan staged strikes to build democratic labor unions. On August 8, ten subsidiary companies under the Hyundai Group established an umbrella union, Hyundaigroup Nodongjohaphyupeuihwoi (The Council of Labor Unions under Hyundai Group)."*^ Labor strikes which began in the Hyundai Company located spread to other heavy chemistry companies including the Kukje Trading Company and the Daehan Shipbuilding Cooperation in late July. By August, labor protests had extended to neighboring Changwon, Masan and Kumi where giant industrial complexes existed. Labor protests which began in southeastern areas spread to big companies in the Seoul area, including Daewoo Heavy Industry, Daewoo Motor Company, Youngchang Musical Instruments and Samik Musical Instruments. Until August, most big businesses, as well as medium sized companies, were embroiled in labor disputes. The labor strikes peaked on August 28, the day of the funeral ceremony for Lee Suk Kyu, who had died because of tear gas canister during demonstrations. On this day, about 200 new companies staged strikes, and 759 companies nationwide were in the middle of contentious labor disputes. Between June and September, over 1,100 new labor unions formed."*^ Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1987. CISJD, 7-8wol Nodongja Daejungtoojaeng (Massive Labor Struggles in July and August) (SeoulrMinjungsa, 1987), pp. 45-46. Hankukyunksayonguhwoi (Institution for the Study of Korean History),Hankukhyundaisa 4 (Korean Modem History 4) (Seoul: Pulbik, 1991), p. 151. 217 period I No. of New Labor Union daily average June 29-July 15 33 1.94 July 15-July 31 j 126 4.06 August 1-Augusts 1 1 681 22.06 September 1-September 31 | 319 5.31 1 Total: 1,159 Table 5.6: Number of Newly Formed Labor Union (June 29, 1987- October 31, 1987) Source: Kim Gap Bae, “Nodongeui Kwonri” (Rights of the Labor) in Korean Bar Association, ed., Inkwon Bogoseo, 1987.1988 (Civil Rights Report, 1987.1988) (Seoul: Youksa Bipyung, 1989), p. 166. Before the June 29 Declaration, the government’s role was to regulate labor by calling in the riot police to quell labor disputes and suppress demands for higher wages. However, after June 29, the government changed its attitude toward labor disputes, largely in consideration of the forthcoming presidential election. The government assumed a neutral position by urging both the employers and the labor to reach an autonomous solution. As labor disputes spread nationwide, and workers in conglomerates staged violent joint demonstrations, the government gave up its neutral stance. Beginning on August 28, the government turned to a full-scale intervention since. Before this day, the total number of arrests related to labor strikes was only 57. The number of imprisonments related to labor disputes more than doubled after the government arrested 67 workers staging massive demonstrations in memory of Lee Suk Kyu on August 28.'*^ The increasingly radicalized labor protests evoked serious concerns among the public and provided the government a moral justification for harsh repression. On September 2, striking workers of Hyundai Heavy industries in Ulsan stormed city hall, set 218 cars on fire and smashed windows, furniture and other property. This violence angered the government and some residents who did not work for Hyundai. On September 4, riot policemen stormed the company where about 15,000 workers had been on strike since September 2 and took away about 200 striking workers."*^ It was the biggest roundup since labor troubles had reemerged two months prior. The police also arrested 100 workers in a Daewoo car plant in Pupyong, 18 miles west of Seoul, who had occupied the administration building and held company executives hostage.'*’ The police ofiBcially requested arrest warrants for 38 Hyundai heavy Industries workers and 91 Daewoo Car Plant workers."** By September 9, a total of 388 workers had been arrested for labor disputes."*® The labor disputes which had peaked in August were dramatically reduced in September, and only 100 disputes were reported in October. Most labor disputes had been settled by bilateral negotiation between employers and workers. Among the 1,700 disputes which occurred between the June 29 transition and August 24, some 1,200 disputes, over two thirds of the total, were settled by mutual agreement between management and labor.Indebted to the robust South Korean economy, employers were able to absorb a large portion of the workers’ demands. In 1986, firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange made an average increase of 32 % in profits compared to the previous year, while the average wage raise was only 7.5 %. When the Ministry of Trade CISJD, 7-8wol Nodongja Daejungtoojaeng (Massive Labor Struggles in July and August), p. 57. ^ Hankuk Ilbo, September 5, 1987. The New York Times, September 5, 1987. ^ Hankuk Ilbo, September 6, 1987. Hankuk Ilbo, September 9, 1987. ^ Dona-A Ilbo, August 24, 1987. 219 and Industry investigated 44 companies which experienced labor disputes after June 29, the average workers’ wage had increased by 18.5 % compared to the previous year.^' Over time, labor disputes clearly attributed to a reduction of production and exports. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, between July 25 and September 3, the manufacturing companies lost 821.5 billion Won of production and failed to export 384.5 million dollars of products. The characteristics of labor disputes after the June 29 Declaration can be explained as follows. First, while labor movements in the early 1980s were led by female workers in small and the light industries, labor protests in this period were largely initiated and led by male workers in heavy chemical industries of giant conglomerates. Workers in giant conglomerates had been under much more severe restrictions and repression than company workers before June 29. The conglomerates, with their economic power and state protection, could effectively thwart labor movements in their companies. However, once state repression loosened, the grievances of workers in big companies exploded. While only 1.3 % of companies which hired less than 100 workers experienced labor disputes between June 29 and October 31, over 60 % of companies with over 1,000 workers experienced labor disputes. Dong-A Ilbo, September 2, 1987. Jungang Ilbo, September 7, 1987. 220 Size of Employees under 99 100-299 300-499 500-999 over 1,000 No. of total firms 99,995 5,534 943 598 342 No. of firms where 1,255 1,301 303 243 209 disputes occurred (1.3 %) (23.5%) (32.1 %) (40.6 %) (61.1 %) Table 5.7; Number of Labor Disputes According to the Size of Firms. Period: June 29, 1987- October 31, 1987. Source: constructed from “1987nyundo Nosabunkyusiltae Bunsukjaryo” (Analysis Data of Labor Disputes in ’987) Sasangkwa Jungchaek (Idea and Policy) (Summer 1988), p.l80. Second, workers staged joint struggles with workers in neighboring regions, same conglomerates and industries. In early September, workers of Daewoo Heavy Industries in Changwon, Inchon, Anyang and Seoul staged simultaneous strikes. Workers in the Hyundai conglomerate staged joint struggles through its umbrella organization, Hyundaigroup Nodongjohaphyupeuihwoi (The Council of Labor Unions under Hyundai Group).” Third, while the labor explosions in early 1980, payments of delinquent wages and wage increases were the main causes of labor strikes, in this period the call for “democratic unions” topped the list of workers demands. According to the Labor Department, 1,344 labor unions, which amounted to 50.6 % of 2,658 existing unions in 1986, were newly formed in the first ten months of 1987 and the total number of unions reached 42,000. By the end of September, the number of union members increased 36.5 Park Hyun Chae, “7.8wol Nodongjaengeuieui Yangsangkvva Minjuhwa” (The Pattern of Labor Disputes in July and August and Democratization), in Kim Yong Ki and Park Seung Ok, eds., HanKuk Nodongundong Nonjaengsa (The History of Korean Labor Movement Disputes) (Seoul: Hyimjangmunhaksa, 1989), p. 579. 221 % from 1,050,201 in 1986. The rate of union organization increased from 16.9 % in 1986 to 23.1 % in 1987. This number was higher than the United States’ 20.9 % union organization rate.^'* Fourth, labor protests in this period had become more stubborn and durable. To put pressure on management and attain their purpose, they often resorted to illegal and drastic measures including violence, strikes and demonstrations. During their strikes, many workers forcefully occupied not only their working places but also administration buildings, highways, railroads and other public facilities. By September 7, forty three companies were staging strikes over ten days and four companies continued their protests for over 30 days.^^ Fifth, labor protests in this period failed to form solidarity with opposition party and other social movement sectors.^® Since the Chun regime accepted the constitutional revision and direct presidential elections, a matter of primary concern in opposition forces had been preparing a candidate who would represent the democratic forces. In this, the labor movement was unable to draw much attention or support. Solidarity between students and labor was also absent. During June, protests seemed to all be united around the common goal of scrapping the current constitution and achieving democratic constitution. However, their specific political goals to achieve through a democratic constitution were different, depending on their political and economic interests. While the ^ Maeil Kyungje Shinmun, November 10, 1987. Shin Keumho, “Nodongundongeui Daejungjuk Jungaewa Jojikhwaeui Kwaje,” (Massive Unfolding of Labor Movements and a Problem of Organization), in Editor,Jeonwhan (Conversion) (Seoul: Sagyejul, 1987), p. 196. “ Kim Geum Su, “Hanguknodongundong Hyunhwangkwa Kwaje” (Situation and Problems of Korean Labor Movement) Sasangkwa Jungchaek (Idea and Policy) (Summer 1988), p. 104. 222 conservative opposition party, religious circles and middle class each aimed to establish a civilian government, radical students and labor sectors wanted legal and institutional provisions to guarantee their political and economic interests/^ 5.3.2 Divisions of Social Movement Forces. Diverse social sectors in civil society cannot be considered a united actor. Their vision of democracy, including issues such as the extent of reform and methods of struggle, were rarely identical. Social sectors such as student, labor, dissident groups and intellectuals agreed to compromise and cooperate with each other in order to confront their common enemy, the authoritarian government. Unified action among these divergent social groups also seemed necessary to accomplish their one common goal, the all- important direct presidential election. After the realization of this goal, however, rifts within these groups rose to the surface. While they succeeded in forming a united front in the struggle against the authoritarian government, they failed to arbitrate différent political visions and projects. After successfully organizing protests in June, the NCDC was expected to play a critical role in advancing the next step toward complete democratization, fielding a single candidate for the opposition forces. However, the NCDC failed to force the two Kims and opposition forces to make compromise on the single candidate issue. This failure came from its organizational nature, as well as changes in the political situation. The NCDC, rather than being a cohesive single organization, was instead a temporary Shin Keumho, Ibid., p. 187. 223 configuration of diverse opposition circles/* It could not compulsorily execute its decisions over its aflBliated organizations. The power of the NCDC in the June protests was based on voluntary cooperation and subordination fi’om its members and affiliated organizations. With a common enemy and a common goal, the umbrella organization was able to execute powerful struggles against the authoritarian regime. However, once their common goal was achieved, the unity of the opposition forces quickly dissolved. The NCDC was unable to mitigate the differences between diverse groups, since it did not possess any binding force over its members. On September 21, 1987, the NCDC held a meeting of the Standing Executive Committee and required the two Kims to field a single candidate by mutual agreement. However, the two Kims declared their running for the presidency on October 10 and 11. In face of the split between the two Kims, the NCDC lacked any device to compulsorily execute its decision on the two Kims. It was unable to even mediate different views on the single candidate issue between its members and sub-organizations. On October 12, the NCDC leaders decided to step back fi-om the single candidate issue and to concentrate its resources on the campaign for a fair election.*® As the NCDC gave up its effort to provide room for discussing and mediating the single candidate issue, differences and conflicts among opposition forces were aggravated. Social forces divided into three groups concerning opposition party candidate for the presidential election. The first group, composed of leaders ofMintongryun Jang Ki Pyo, SONyundae Sanhwangkwa Silchon (Situation and Practice of 1980s) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1991), p. 194. CISJD, Daetongryung Sungutoojaeng, (Presidential Election Struggle) (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1988), pp.23-24. 224 (UMMDU), Association of the Representatives from Nationwide Universities), and Minchungryun (Democratic Youth League) proposed “critically” supporting Kim Dae Jung. They argued that even though they did not wholeheartedly support Kim Dae Jung, they did not have another option but him. On the other hand, six suborganizations of the UMMDU, Kanong (Catholic Farmers Association), EYC (Ecumenical Youth Council), Seoulnoryun (The League of Labor Union Movements in Seoul) and some conservative dissidents criticized the hasty judgment by pro-Kim Dae Jung circle. They argued that Roh’s victory was plain enough in a four way race, and fielding a single candidate for the opposition forces was essential for the transfer of government power. This group largely assumed a pro-Kim Young Sam position. The third group, a radical leftist group including the Inminnoryun (The Federation of Democratic Laborers in Inchon Area) and CA (Constituent Assembly), vetoed both Kims by presenting their own candidate, Paek Ki Wan. After the NCDC declared its ‘no position’ on the single candidate issue, the Mintongryun (UMMDU) announced that it would critically support Kim Dae Jung as the candidate of opposition forces because of his relative progressivism compared to Kim Young Sam. Declaring its support for Kim Dae Jung, UMMDU presented four conditions for the presidential candidate. First, the candidate must possess a strong will to terminate the military dictatorship and to block political intervention by the military; Second, he must refuse to build a pro-American conservative coalition and establish an autonomous democratic government: Third, he must perform democratic reform for the masses: The final condition was for the candidate to allow the formation of a political party by the 225 progressive camp.“ On October 12, 1987 the Central Committee of the UMMDU put two questions to the vote. The first issue was ‘whether the Central Committee would support a particular candidate’ and the second was ‘if yes, who they would support.’ The vote for the first issue stood at 25 ayes, 10 noes and 6 abstentions and the result of the second vote was Kim Dae Jung 29, Kim Young Sam 2 and 6 abstentions.®* They believed that Kim Dae Jung had a more progressive stance toward social and economic issues favoring workers, farmers and the urban poor than Kim Young Sam. Some students and youth organizations also publicly declared their support for Kim Dae Jung. The Seodaehyup (Association of the Representatives from Seoul Universities) emphasized the necessity of building the anti-U.S. united front and nationalist federation for the victory of the democratic forces in the election. For that purpose, it argued, they should support a candidate who stood closest to their position.®^ The Association of the Representatives from Nationwide Universities), an umbrella organization formed by representatives from 96 universities on July 19, perceived the presidential election as an opportunity to accomplish national unification and independence. It suggested five principles for the unity of democratic forces and triumph in the election; first, release of all conscientious prisoners; second, removal of all evil laws and repressive apparatus; third, guarantee of national unification movements; fourth, collective struggles for military neutrality; and fifth, punishment of persons who are “ CIDJD, Gunbydokjae Jonsikkwa Sungutujaeng, (Termination of Military Dictatorship and Election Struggle) (Seoul; Minjungsa, 1987), pp. 29-30. CISJD, Daetongryung Sungutoojaeng, (Presidential Election Struggle), pp. 42-43. (Wolgan Chosun Dec. 1987) ° /W ., p. 65. 226 responsible for Kwangju massacre in 1980. On November 26, the Jeondaehyup announced its full support for Kim Dae Jung saying that he accepted these principles.^^ The decision of the Central Committee of UMMDU to support Kim Dae Jung created a stir in opposition forces. Many critics argued that supporting a particular candidate would disturb the goal of a single candidate and only bring disorder and disintegration to the opposition camp.^ 44 Mintongryun members and six afiBliated organizations announced a statement criticizing the UMMDU Central Committee that it was not desirable to ofiBcially endorse a particular candidate. 122 persons fi’om various social movement circles announced a statement criticizing the decision of Mintongryun Central Committee and to demand sustained efforts for fielding a single candidate on October 22.®^ The “single candidate” position was supported by a few student organizations, including those at Seoul National University and Yonsei University. On November 24, the Yonsei University General Students Association held a forum to request the two Kims to compromise on the single candidate issue. 19 stafif member of the General Students Association of Seoul National University went on a hunger strike demanding a single candidate. The ‘single candidate’ supporters argued that the opposition circle would not be able to defeat Roh Tae Woo, the ruling party candidate, with the defection of either Kim. Therefore, it was more critical for the success of opposition forces, they contended, to force one Kim to concede to the other. To them the two Kims did not have many fundamental differences in terms of their ideologies or policies. They contended that Ibid., pp. 67-68 227 relative progressivism between the two Kims should not be a determining factor in deciding the candidacy. However, the single candidate supporters did not have enough appropriate means to encourage the two Kims to compromise, other than appealing to their good sense and patriotism. To supporters of Kim Dae Jung ‘the single candidate’ group was considered as upholding Kim Young Sam. Some of the ‘single candidate’ groups hinted at their preference for Kim Young Sam by commenting that Kim Young Sam’s appeal to the middle class was a very important weapon to win in the presidential election.^ As the two Kim camps failed to show the slightest sign of mutual agreement on the single candidate issue, some radical circles such as the Inminnoryun (The Federation of Democratic Laborers in Inchon Area) and CA (Constituent Assembly) groups insisted that they have their own political party and presidential candidate representing the social movement forces. The social movement forces, they contended, had accumulated considerable resources and capacity to form their own political party representing the masses interests and could compete with the conservative forces. The two Kims, according to them, could not satisfy the peoples’ desire to terminate the military dictatorship, which could be possible only by forming a democratic coalition government in which all Minjung and democratic forces participated. On November 15 they announced Paek Ki Wan as their presidential candidate.®’ ^ Jang Ki Pyo, Ibid., p. 236. “ 76/2/., p. 85. CIDJD, Gunbydolgae Jonsikkwa Sungutujaeng, (Termination of Military Dictatorship and Election Struggle), p. 34. ^ CISJD, Daetongryung Sungutoojaeng, (Presidential Election Struggle), pp. 125-129. 228 However, this group did not believe they could win in the presidential election. Their intention was to use their candidate to eventually lure one of the Kims to their side. After demonstrating their capability at rousing the masses to their side, they intended to eventually support one of the Kims. However, they were unable to draw enough support from the people to impress the two Kim camps. On December 14, Paek Ki Wan withdrew himself from the presidential candidacy. On December 16, 1987, some 89.1 % of South Korea’s 23.1 million registered voters cast their ballots to choose a new president. Roh Tae Woo, the ruling DJP candidate, won by garnering 35.9 % of the popular vote. The RDP leader Kim Young Sam finished second with 27.5 %, trailed by the PPD head Kim Dae Jung , who received 26.5 %. The two Kims together received 54 % of the vote. It meant that the opposition might win in the election unless they were divided.®* These statistics stood as a plain and clear truth that, had the opposition united against Roh Tae Woo, they might have been able to win the election and unseat the fiercely unpopular DJP. 5.4 Implications First, the uneasy coalition of opposition forces did not last long following the democratic transition. The opposition forces had been very strong in their struggles against the authoritarian regime. However, they were very weak in building up a new political system after the democratic transition. Before the democratic transition, diverse social forces, united by a common enemy and goal, were able to build a grand coalition. ® Far Eastern Economic Review, December 31, 1987, p. 8. 229 However, after the transition, these rallying points were no longer present and all their discrepancies surfaced. Before the June 29 concession, all opposition resources of had been concentrated on the struggles of overthrowing the Chun regime. They prepared very little for what would follow. Without any preparation for the new circumstances after the Chun regime accepted demands for direct presidential elections, the opposition forces were sharply divided. Second, for a successful democratic transition, the opposition needed to foreshadow the possibility of a political alternative.®^ An authoritarian regime does not collapse unless a real alternative is presented to the people.™ Before the Chun regime conceded to peoples’ power, the opposition forces were united and the leading opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were perceived as a real alternative to the military regime. However, after they clinched the popular presidential election, the two Kims staged a hectic competition for the presidency and people were increasingly disillusioned. To the people they ceased being heroes of democratization, and had become only greedy politicians pursuing private ambitions. The division of the two Kims shifted the political circumstances from a field of confrontation between democratic versus anti democratic forces to regional antagonism, which ultimately allowed the anti-democratic forces to reign victorious. ® Leonardo Morlino, “Democratic Establishments; A Dimensional Analysis,” in Enrique A Baloyra, ed.. Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), p. 73. Adam Frezeworski, “Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds.. Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 52. 230 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION The processes leading to the transition to democracy in South Korea demonstrate that elite fragmentation is not a necessary precondition to democratic transition, as has been suggested in much of the elite-focused literature. In South Korea in 1987, opposition forces successfully forced the seemingly cohesive Chun regime to accept demands for political liberalization. This political opening occurred at a time when the Chun regime was quite cohesive, and power struggles between hard and soft-liners did not exist. The June 29 Declaration was more than the sole work of Roh Tae Woo, the ruling DJP presidential candidate and alleged head of the soft-liners, against the President Chun’s hard-liners. Under vigorous pressure from opposition forces and ordinary people. President Chun had few choices but to accept the constitutional revision to provide for direct presidential elections. Facing this, he persuaded the reluctant Roh to follow. President Chun made Roh aimounce the democratization package on June 29, as if he came to this decision without any prior consultation with Chun. Differentiating Roh Tae Woo as the DJP candidate from the wildly unpopular Chun was a deliberate and premeditated action to gamer more votes. 231 Elite-oriented studies have often misinterpreted the complex processes of democratic transition in South Korea by ignoring two factors. First, most elite theorists argue that the collapse of an authoritarian regime leading to democratization is caused mainly by divisions within regime elites. However, this ignores the fact that the sources of regime crisis are not limited to splits within ruling elites. Indeed this rupture derive fi'om outside of the regime, that is, from civil society. According to most elite theorists, democratic transitions occur when regime elites divide, and which provides broader political space for opposition forces. They argue that, as long as regime elites remain united, they are able to control and diftuse protests from opposition forces. However, this view neglects an important variable, the strength of opposition forces. It was true that the military junta in South Korea harshly quelled peoples’ protests and intensified its grip on power in 1980. At that time, social movement forces in South Korea were unorganized and weak, so they were easily quashed by the physical force of the military regime. On the other hand, in 1987, the Chun regime remained cohesive, but was unable to control peoples’ protests. At this time, opposition forces in South Korea were well organized and united under the leadership of the NCDC. Therefore, a cohesive regime cannot always control opposition movements. It is possible only when the opposition forces are weak. Second, most elite-oriented studies put their focus on a short transition period, ignoring the long pre-transition period. Their discussions generally concentrated on pacts made by regime elites facing political crisis. These approaches largely ignore the gradual degeneration of regime legitimacy, brought on by increased protests and other forms of organized opposition. It was true in South Korea that political elites took the initiative in 232 discussing the compromise of a new democratic constitution. However, this did not mean that democratization was initiated and led by political elites. The Chun regime did not voluntarily agree with the opposition party to establish a new democratic constitution. It was the social movement forces which urged the Chun regime to introduce democratization procedures. Therefore, it is unfair to give the whole of credit for the democratic transition to political elites who negotiated its term in the last stage of the transition. This neglects the credit that should be given to those who fought for a long time to reach that stage. 6.1 Implications of the Political Opportunity Structure Following the demise of the long time authoritarian leader Park Chung Hee, South Korea had two chances for democratic transition. The first opportunity for democratization was aborted. It was only in 1987 that South Korea successfully achieved democratic transition. A critical difference between the two cases lay in the strength of the opposition forces. Immediately after the death of Park in 1979 the social movement forces were isolated and very weak, so their protests were easily repressed by the new military government. On the other hand, in 1987 much better organized and closely united social movement forces urged the Chun regime to concede to their demands for democratic transition. The success and failure of these social movements were conditioned by the political opportunity structure consisting of four variables: repression of the state, elite fi'agmentation, external support, and the power configuration in political society. From my study I derive the following implications. 233 Repression : Repression by the government certainly had a certain affect on social movements. Loosened repression provided more political space for the movement forces to act. However, it is too simple and somewhat inaccurate to directly relate loosened repression with social movement activation and increased repression with stagnation of the movement. In the first period, especially after the Kwangju massacre, the government’s harsh repression demolished the incipient social movement forces, even the formidable students sector. The social movement forces simply could not awake fi"om their dormancy until the government turned to its decompression policy in late 1983. Beginning in early 1984, taking advantage of the series of government liberalization policies, the social movement sectors began to escape from their stage of lethargy and establish new organizations. However, the decompression policies did not last a long time. As the social movement became explosive, the government returned to the harshest repression on the social movement since mid 1985. However, this time, the social movement forces were prepared. That is to say, earlier, when the social movement forces were very weak, government repression could easily demolish them. However, once they had a certain strength to fight against the state, they were not totally demolished by the physical violence of the state. In fact, the brutality of the regime produced such a strong resistance that it provided momentum to build a united front against the regime. The 1986 disclosure of sexual harassment and the 1987 torture and death of a college student by the police investigators infuriated the social movement forces to conduct forceful demonstrations against the brutality of the regime. 234 Elite Fragmentation : It is true that elite splits facilitate democratic transition in most cases. Fragmentation in the ruling elite camp weakens political power, including the elites' ability to contain the opposition forces. However, elite fragmentation is not the only variable necessary for the democratic transitions. Democratic transitions can be initiated and forced by the social movement forces themselves. As the social movement forces grow and accumulate their resources they strengthen their power as a challenger to the regime. Even though the ruling elites was fragmented, democratic transition may not happen, if social movement forces are too weak to force it. On the other hand, even though the ruling elite is cohesive and firmly united, democratic transitions may occur, if the social movement forces are strong enough to force the united ruling elite to make the transition process. In South Korea, elite fragmentation did not automatically lead to a democratic transition. Immediately after the assassination of Park Jung Hee, no single power could fill the gap left behind him. Even the military, the most powerful force, was divided into two groups, the “new-military” group versus the “senior generals” group. The democratic transition that was predicted by many elite-focused studies of democratization did not happen in South Korea, because no opposition forces were prepared to utilize the opportunity for democratization. As a result of long-term repression, both the social movement forces and the opposition party lacked organization and cooperation that would have facilitated their challenge of the status quo. On the other hand, in the period of the 1987 transition, the ruling elite was strongly united, due in large part to President Chun Doo Hwan. Elite cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners, which are a central 235 component of most elite-focused studies of democratization, simply did not exist in late- 1980s Korea. “Elite fragmentation,” therefore, could not have been the prerequisite for the transition to democracy in South Korea. External Support : Much of the success of social movements was contingent on the existence of external supporters. In the South Korean case, support from middle class and the United States had been critical in the success of democratic transition. However, both the middle class and the United States had an opportunistic approach to South Korean democratization; they wanted to maintain stability and continue steady economic modernization and development. Even though they had been basically sympathetic to the cause of democratization, the middle class did not want to risk their economic and political interests for democratization. During the first period, neither the ordinary people nor the United States protested against the brutality of the Chun regime, despite the hundreds of people who had been killed during the Kwangju Uprising. Ordinary people expressed their aspiration for democratization by casting their votes for the opposition party in the 1985 National Assembly election. In the election, the young opposition party, the NDP, unexpectedly advanced as a significant challenger to the regime. It was only after the risk of confronting the regime had been considerably reduced that the ordinary people actively supported the social movement forces and participated in street demonstrations. The United States, which wanted to maintain political stability rather than risk an unstable transition, also decided to give up its long time support for the Chun regime when infuriated South Korean demonstrators clogged the streets of major cities in their protests which continued day after day. It was the united social movement forces 236 which induced the formerly opportunistic “silent majority” and the United States to support the democratic transition in South Korea. After the June 29 democratic transition, however, the ordinary people was rapidly demobilized. At the early stage of the labor protests the ordinary people had been sympathetic to workers’ demands for raises. However, they did not want to risk losing the Suits of economic development. As labor strikes, which continued for several months, caused significant damage to the national economy, many people withdrew their support for the workers’ protests. Many people also became disenchanted with the hectic competition between the two Kims, and they eventually turned their back on the opposition forces. Before the June 29 declaration, the opposition forces could appeal to the ordinary people as a democratic force fighting against the authoritarian regime. However, as the opposition forces divided and bickered among themselves for private ambition, they lost their moral justification to ask for the support of the public. Power configuration in the political society : The existence of a strong opposition party definitely helped the success of the democratization movement. Social movement forces and the opposition party had many differences in terms of their ideologies and tactics in democratization movement. Most of the social movement forces pursued M injim g (masses) democracy which emphasized guarantee of masses’ rights and their participation in politics. These people mostly resorted to physical force, such as demonstrations and strikes, and they included violent means to accomplish their goal. On the other hand, the opposition party pursued liberal democracy and wanted to accomplish 237 it in the arena of institutional politics. They could basically cooperate each other in the democratization movement since they had a common enemy, the authoritarian regime. Another reason that the existence of an opposition party helped the democratization movement in South Korea was that it could be considered viable alternative to the authoritarian regime. Because of their confrontation with the communist North Korea, the South Korean people were very cautious and conservative about socialist ideas. Therefore, extreme leftists and even moderate socialists found it very hard to survive in South Korean society. Social movement forces which pursued socialists ideas were never credible alternative to the authoritarian regime. When people joined the democratization movement, they thought the opposition party, rather than radical social movement forces, could supersede the military dictatorship. South Korean people believed that only liberal democratic forces, the opposition party, possessed a legitimacy to contest political power. This could be proven by the fact that no social movement forces succeeded in forming independent political forces and competing in the presidential election, even though they forced the authoritarian regime to accept the direct presidential election. 6.2 Implications for Social Movements The 1987 democratic transition in South Korea was a result of continuous and robust struggles by all social movement sectors including students, dissidents, labor, the poor, farmers, and religious actors. However, many differences appeared in their role and degree of contribution to the democratic transition. 238 Labor, farmers and the poor traditionally had not been as politically conscious as students or dissidents. These three sectors had been organized with support of the either students sector or member of the religious community. The students educated and indoctrinated workers through night-schools. Some students infiltrated working places by concealing their educational backgrounds to help workers organize unions. The religious community also led farmers’ movements through such associations asKanog (Catholic Farmers’ Association) and K inong (Protestant Farmers’ Association). The primary concerns of workers, farmers and the poor had basically been economic issues directly related to their daily lives. The most frequent issues of their protests included wages, the stabilization prices for agricultural products and the protection of unauthorized housing. The exclusionary policies of the Chun regime to the lower class transformed them into antigovemment protesters. The students traditionally had a sense of mission that they had to save their country from the hands of authoritarian leaders. To many students, this translated intothe need to lead their country down a democratic path. Throughout history, Korean students had been extremely politically conscious. They would not support a politically corrupt and immoral government. Student movements toppled the Syngman Rhee administration in 1960 which committed election fraud on a large scale to extend its rule. Explosive student movements also provided the underlying cause of President Park’s death. Kim Jae Kyu, a head of KCIA , was severely berated by the President Park for not crushing student disturbances at the early stage. As a result, he killed president Park and his rival Cha Ji Chul. The student group staged tenacious and vigorous battles against the Chun regime. 239 Only the students survived the atrocious repression of the regime during the first period and preserved a kindle for antigovemment movements. Even though their ideological extremism and violent actions scared off the moderate public and made the opposition party keep a certain distance fi’om social movement forces, their destructive power sometimes delivered considerable damage to the regime and encouraged inactive people to participate in antigovemment demonstrations. During the June protests in 1987, student demonstrators’ force overpowered the riot police and gave ordinary people the courage to actively express their resentment against the dictatorship. While the students carried out actual battles in the streets, the dissidents wielded symbolic leadership in the antigovemment movements. The dissidents played a pivotal role in establishing the two most important umbrella organizations, theMintongryun and the NCDC. Students criticized the conservatism of the opposition party and considered them anything but a real democratic force. On the other hand, the opposition party was concemed about votes fi"om the moderate middle class, and they tried to keep their distance fi"om the radical students. The dissidents played a significant role in establishing the united anti-govemment fi"ont by moderating the extremism of the students and cooperating with the conservative opposition party. From this study of social movements in South Korean democratization I have found the following implications. First, strong and united social movement organizations were essential for a successful democratic transition. The grievances of isolated individuals could not pose a real threat to the authoritarian regime as long as they were not well organized. Isolated individuals were very vulnerable to physical repression of the 240 regime. However, once they were organized as a political force, they were able to stage sustained and vigorous battles against the authoritarian regime. The social movement forces produced a ground in which inactive and frightened people could express their discontent and participate in antigovemment battles. In June 1987 the “silent majority” became active participants in anti-govemment demonstrations when the cost of challenging the repressive regime considerably decreased as social movement forces fought in the front line and sometimes overpowered the riot police. Second, for successful movements, social movement forces had to succeed in framing a national consensus for their cause. The number of movement activists was limited, so they were unable to achieve their goal without evoking the people’s sympathy and support. A reasonable goal and moderate strategy were essential for eliciting broad support from the ordinary people. A radical ideology pursuing peoples’ revolution and excessive violence scared off moderate people and made the opposition keep away from the movement forces. In the June protest, social movement forces were able to win broad support from the people by suggesting the achievement of democratic constitution featuring direct presidential elections and highlighting liberal democracy as their primary goal. “Direct presidential elections” were the common denominator for all social forces as well as the ordinary people. They also suggested a peaceful code of action for political rallies including singing the national anthem, honking car horns and ringing church and temple bells as a sign of supporting the anti-govemment movements. The principle of pacifism made moderate people easily express their support for the movement forces without risking their safety. 241 Third, even though they all agreed in overthrowing the Chun regime, the social movement forces had never been a unitary sector. While student groups pursued peoples’ democracy through mass revolution, the primary concern of workers and farmers lay in their economic interests, rather than political issues. Even a single sectors like students or labor were divided aroimd such issues as the interpretation of conditions of the current society, main actors of the revolution and appropriate methods for movements. The student sector never succeeded in building a single organization representing themselves. However, these differences among social movement forces were concealed by the existence of common enemy, the Chun regime. Even though they pursued different goals with various methods, they agreed that the first step to reach their final goal should be the overthrow of the Chun regime. Once the regime surrendered to the opposition forces on June 29, 1987, all the differences had surfaced. 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