Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice
Bo Bengtsson & Nils Hertting
What general lessons can be learned from the study of single cases? This is one of the most controversial methodological issues in the social sciences. Elsewhere, we have proposed a logic of generalization from case studies using thinly rationalistic ideal-type social mechanisms (cf. Elster 1983) as a conceptual bridge to make the ndings from one case (to some extent) portable to other contexts (Bengtsson & Hertting 2014; cf. also Bengtsson & Ruonavaara 2011; 2017). In this chapter, we recapitulate the general logic behind such `rationalistic generalizations' and apply it to one exemplary and well- known case study: Bent Flyvbjerg's thorough investigation of planning processes in the Danish city of Aalborg, as presented in his book Rationality and Power. Democracy in Practice (1998). Flyvbjerg implies some generalizing ambition when he interprets the object of his study, the so-called Aalborg Project, as `a metaphor of modern politics, modern administration and planning, and modernity itself'. It is, however, unclear what logic of generalization Flyvbjerg has in mind more precisely, and in Bengtsson & Hertting 2014, we actually suggest that it may be in line with our model of generalization based on thinly rationalistic social mechanisms. In this chapter, we attempt to translate Flyvbjerg's argument into such terms.
Purpose and outline
The main purpose of the chapter is to test the fruitfulness of a logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic ideal-type social mechanisms by applying it to the analysis of a case study that is largely actor-based but where the generalizing ambitions are not explicitly based on thin rationality. In Bengtsson & Hertting 2014, we argue that our suggested logic is not very original and should not be very controversial either. In that article, we illustrate our argument with examples from our own research on resident co- operation and local network governance, but we also maintain that in practice, many social scientists base their generalizing ambitions on ideas about rationalistic social mechanisms although largely implicitly. For example, we claim that Flyvbjerg's labelling of the Aalborg Project as a `metaphorical', `prototypical' or `paradigmatic' case (Flyvbjerg 2001; 2006) can possibly be interpreted in terms of thin rationality. Thus, the attempt in this chapter to apply our model of generalization to Flyvbjerg's study can be viewed as a rst and preliminary test of our claim in Bengtsson & Hertting 2014 that our thin rationality
15 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice logic only theoretically makes explicit what is already an implicit methodological practice in case study research. The chapter is organized in ve sections. In the rst section, we brie y introduce our logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic ideal-type social mechanisms. Then, we give a short summary of Flyvbjerg's empirical study and its conclusions. In the third section, we present and elaborate Flyvbjerg's generalizing argument. In the fourth section, we attempt to apply our logic to Flyvbjerg's case study. The nal section discusses the conclusions from our analytical experiment.
Generalization by mechanism a thinly rationalistic approach
John Gerring has de ned a 'case study' as an intensive study of a single unit for the pur- pose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units' (Gerring 2004, 342). Nevertheless, despite the current wave of innovative work on qualitative methods, drawing more general inferences on the basis of observations from single-case studies is still viewed as problem- atic in social science research. Authors such as King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 208212) even claim that generalization without more than one case (or `observation') is impos- sible, and as a solution, they suggest increasing the number of observations. However, in process-oriented research, such as Flyvbjerg's study of Aalborg, this move is seldom possible without mutating the research question from dynamics to comparative statics. Recently, it has been suggested that portability from one empirical case to others can be achieved through analysis based on causal mechanisms with deterministic properties (e.g., Mahoney 2001; Falleti & Lynch 2009; Goertz & Mahoney 2012, chap. 15). How- ever, assumptions of determinism are often too demanding in the social sciences. Other approaches have been suggested, e.g., those related to concepts such as Sartori's 'ladder of abstraction' (Sartori 1970), Yin's `analytical generalization' (Yin 2009) and Flyvbjerg's `paradigmatic cases' the latter model is discussed further below. However, the more precise rationales behind these concepts are not always clear. Lacking a convincing logic of generalization, qualitative studies of social and political processes are, too often and too modestly, framed as `explorative' or `pilot studies' or as `plausibility probes' (Eck- stein 1975) aimed at generating hypotheses for subsequent, and allegedly more conclusive, large-n studies. Unfortunately, however, it is often tricky to design relevant large-n studies of complex societal processes. In Bengtsson & Hertting 2014, we have suggested a logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic social mechanisms. Assuming `thin rationality' (roughly, that actors normally do things for a reason), we can derive ideal-type social mechanisms from em- pirical observations of social action and interaction in one empirical case. Based on the same assumption, we can also expect the same ideal-type mechanisms to be applicable in similar actor constellations in other contexts. Thus, thinly rationalistic mechanisms can be used as a generalizing bridge between contexts. From this perspective, generalization from single-case studies produces expectations about similar patterns of thinly rational action and interaction in similar contexts. In general terms, mechanisms are regular patterns of actions and interactions, patterns that are causally productive, which means that they bring about certain outcomes. To be
16 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice
Figure 1. Coleman's macro-micro model
(From: Hedström & Swedberg 1998, 22.) generalizable, a mechanism also implies portability, that is, that the pattern discovered in one context is also relevant in others (cf. Bengtsson & Ruonavaara 2011; 2016). Jon Elster suggests that mechanisms are `frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown circumstances or with indeterminate consequences' (Elster 1998, 45). We largely adhere to that de nition, although we ad- mit that the elements `under generally unknown circumstances` and `with indeterminate consequences' both may be contested and are not essential to the concept (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 56). To be portable, social mechanisms must be based on actors with intentions. We share this point of departure with Hedström & Swedberg (1998), who relate their discussion to James Coleman's 'macro-micro-macro' model of collective ac- tion (the so-called `Coleman's boat') that, in the spirit of methodological individualism, connects macro-level structural explanation to micro-level individual agency. Starting from Coleman's model, Hedström and Swedberg present a typology with three dier- ent types of mechanisms: (1) from societal macro-conditions to actors' perceptions and values ('situational mechanism'); (2) from actors' perceptions to their individual action (`action formation mechanism'), typically an individual `calculus' in a wide sense and often implicit and intuitive; and (3) from individual action to changes on the macro- level (`transformational mechanism'), e.g., via a game of collective action (Hedström & Swedberg 1998; cf. Coleman 1990, Chap. 1). The model is summarized in gure 1. Similar to Hedström and Swedberg, we view social mechanisms as micro-level links, but we go further in developing a logic of generalization that is explicitly based on thin rationality and ideal-type analysis. This perspective allows a particular form of portability and generalization in terms of reasonable expectations of similar mechanisms operating in similar contexts. The rst general idea behind our approach is an assumption of rationality in a wide
17 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice sense, i.e., that actors typically do things for a reason. A wide notion of rationality, we argue, is an analytical element that elucidates why we gain a sense of generalized understanding when identifying mechanisms in individual cases. Making this method- ological idea more explicit in qualitative analysis also makes the logic of generalization from single-case studies more convincing. This argument is less controversial than it may seem at a rst glance. As we view it, an assumption about some type of rationality underlies most micro-level mechanisms proposed by authors in the eld. Even actor-related mechanisms that are expressed in more structural terms, e.g., power dependencies, network relations and social norms, can often be deduced from assumptions about more or less rational actors who are attempting to reach their goals in a particular context within the limits of their perceived scope of action. Thus, our approach is based on `weak' or `structural' methodological individualism, where not only individual agents but also relations and relational structures are emphasized (cf. Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, p. 60). We view such notions of rationality in a wide sense as the fundamental logic of action behind all portable social mechanisms. The assumption that our fellow beings are largely rational and do things for a reason is absolutely basic to our orientation in society and everyday life. For instance, thinly rationalistic mechanisms are what we have in mind when we believe, rightly or wrongly, that we can learn from history (cf. Donaldson 1984; Ferejohn & Satz 1996). This more or less universal presumption of (thin) rationality places a heavy burden of proof on those who claim it is not valid precisely in social research. The analytical foundation of our mechanism logic need not be formally sophisticated but only assume that actors largely behave with some consistency in ways that they view as productive for achieving their explicit or intuitive goals or preferences, regardless of the character of these preferences, e.g., whether they are egoistic or altruistic, utilitarian or norm-based. The nature of these preferences is not necessarily assumed a priori but may be open to empirical investigation, where the social and institutional context is of crucial importance. The second general idea behind our approach is ideal-type analysis. Thin rationality is an analytical idea and methodological device that allows a systematic and analytical reconstruction of meanings, beliefs and preferences (cf. Johnson 1991). Conceptualizing (thin) rationality as a fundamental logic of action is close to Karl Popper's `situation analysis' and `rationality principle', i.e., an almost empty principle that only assumes that actors behave in accordance with the situation and its logic and nothing else (Popper 1985). Following Popper here, we view thin rationality as a necessary analytical assumption if we wish to use social mechanisms for generalization by rendering portability between contexts. Thus portability between contexts, in contrast to statistical analysis, is not based on empirical generalization from one case to other cases but, rather, on the use of ideal-type analysis as a bridge between empirical settings. Interpretation in terms of ideal type mechanisms generates portability by distilling how actors of dierent types perceive their situations in ways that make their intentions and actions appear reasonable and consistent and thus portable to other contexts. In summary, if we understand social mechanisms as consisting of intentionality-based patterns of individual action and interaction that are rational in a `thin' sense, then we
18 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice can expect that a certain mechanism or set of mechanisms observed in one context may be operative in similar contexts with a similar constellation of thinly rational actors. We cannot predict it with certainty or with some, more or less precise, probability. Neverthe- less, identifying a certain mechanism in one context generates reasonable expectations of nding the same mechanism operating in other similar settings. In this way, a relevant rationalistic mechanism also generates a reasonable expectation of what it means to be rational in a certain type of incentive and opportunity structure (Hertting 2007, 46). In principle, this ideal-type generalization from one case to others consists of two dierent steps: abstraction and inference. In the rst step, rationalistic patterns are abstracted from empirical observations in terms of an ideal-type mechanism or a combi- nation of mechanisms (e.g., a type game, a social norm or a belief-formation mechanism). In the second step, the ideal-type abstraction of the empirical observations is analytically inferred to other similar contexts. In contrast to deterministic or probabilistic generalization, this inference is not made to a de ned `population' of processes but as expectations in similar types of settings (e.g., urban planning processes or revolutions). If we nd an ideal type rationalistic mechanism to be fruitful for interpreting, understanding or explaining one observed case, then we can reasonably expect it to be of relevance for interpreting, understanding or explaining other similar cases as well. We cannot ex ante be certain of its applicability, as we would have been in the rare case of deterministic mechanisms. However, due to the analytical accentuation and abstract generalization that Weberian ideal-type concepts allow, we would still have a plausible prediction. Finally, our perspective does not presuppose that mechanisms are necessarily 'fre- quently occurring and easily recognizable' (Elster 1998, 45) or `hidden', `underlying' or `unobserved' (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 56). Although for a social mechanism to be of general interest it should not be too obscure and opaque, our approach only implies that a portable mechanism should be easily recognizable once identi ed. In retrospect, it should provide a logical and accessible understanding of how and why certain actions or outcomes came about in one studied case (`abstraction') and what they would be like in other cases (`inference').
Rationality and Power the empirical ndings of Flyvbjerg's case study
Flyvbjerg's case study of the Aalborg Project is unusually thorough, and the results are convincingly reported and discussed by Flyvbjerg 1998. The empirical description and analysis in the book are largely chronological, and the Project is followed more or less intensely over a 12-year period (197789). The Aalborg Project was an ambitious attempt to address the tra c problems of a middle-size Danish town (Flyvbjerg 1998, 11.). In this local context, Flyvbjerg demon- strates how, time and time again, power and rationalization replace democracy and ratio- nal argument. From the initiation, it took two and a half years before the rst stage could obtain a formal political go-ahead and ve years before the Project was nally accepted by the City Council. The ambitious original plan attempted to integrate urban renewal, land use, tra c and the environment, but the proposals on urban renewal and land use
19 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice were soon found to be too complex for the municipality to implement. The Project still included no fewer than 41 subprojects concerning tra c and the environment, but after eleven rounds of amendments and reductions, this list was cut down to seven. The main subproject that survived was a new gigantic central bus terminal built already as part of the ` rst stage'. Additionally, building `this monument to Aalborg's mayor and his buses' may well have been the real object of the project, at least in the mind of its lead- ing initiator, the then mayor, a leading Social Democrat who was also chairman of the municipal bus company. Most of the other six subprojects that were ultimately implemented were a series of unconnected bicycle paths. Flyvbjerg shows that, due to this fragmentation, the aim of the Project, to induce people to use means of transportation other than cars, was not achieved, and tra c accidents, noise levels and air pollution were not reduced either. In fact, the opposite occurred; thus, comprehensive ambitions transformed into fragmented planning that may have produced worse results than no planning at all. The concentration of public transport to the new bus terminal never obtained the necessary complements in the form of bus lanes, pedestrian malls and zoning arrangements, and in the end, the result was not only more buses but also more cars in the city centre. Additionally, the unconnected bike path network, only one-third the intended size, increased, rather than decreased, the number of bike accidents. Following Flyvbjerg's account of the gradual decline of the proud Project is similar to watching a Greek drama. It does not take long before the reader realizes what the fate of the Project will be, but that only makes following its decay all the more absorbing. It is a drama without heroes although it is obvious that Flyvbjerg's own sympathies are with the well-meaning and rule-abiding planning o cers rather than with the intriguing car lovers of the opposition to the Project. However, both sides are prepared to use power and rationalization, rather than rational argument and democratic procedures, when they stand to gain from doing so. The strongest opposition to the project came from a powerful and well-established coalition in Aalborg politics consisting of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Conservative local newspaper and the police. Flyvbjerg demonstrates how this troika, at a number of critical points, managed to combine their forces in the ght against aspects of the Project that they found disturbing, in particular those that would make it di cult to move about freely by car. Flyvbjerg also points to the historical ties between the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the Technical Department, whose political head or `alderman' a Conservative politician acted for a long period of time as the spokesman of the Project, often against opposition from his political backers among the merchants. An institutionalized agreement existed between the Chamber and the Department that all political matters of interest to the Chamber should be negotiated between the two institutions. This established and well-functioning power relation goes back for decades and centuries; sometimes it was strained by the Project, but whenever that occurred, the Conservative alderman managed to avoid open confrontation. The main merit of Flyvbjerg's study is his well-evidenced and analytically ingenious story-telling. Case study researchers can learn a lot from the manner in which he directs his drama, combining detailed process analysis with theory-inspired comments on the observed aspects of power and rationalization. This style of presentation can be illustrated
20 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice with the headings of some empirical chapters that may in themselves be interpreted as social mechanisms: `Rationality as frozen politics', `The longue durée of power', `The weakness of the better argument', and `Knowledge kills action'. In his interviews, Flyvbjerg confronted the actors with written material, statements from other actors and the outcomes of previous actions. This approach made it possible to extend beyond the sloppy rhetoric that decision-makers so easily fall back on when discussing matters that they nd awkward; needless to say, this is absolutely crucial in a study of power and rationalization. Flyvbjerg was able to realize this confrontation strategy without guaranteeing his actors anonymity, which illustrates how the wish of decision-makers to legitimize their actions can be used to the bene t of retrospective case study research. Flyvbjerg concludes that there is no clear demarcation line between `rationality' and `rationalization', where the latter stands for attempts by the powerful to dress exercises of power in a veil of apparent rationality. (He clearly means that the concepts are con ated in Aalborg politics; the conceptual distinction between rationality and rationalization is absolutely essential for Flyvbjerg's analysis.) Only when the planning o cials succeed in framing discussions in purely technical terms can they hold their own against the representatives of local capital and politics.
Flyvbjerg on generalization
Flyvbjerg challenges the reader to answer the standard question of any case study: `What is it a case of?', and we return to that challenge below. Before doing so, we conduct the analytical experiment of applying our logic of generalization from ideal-type thinly rationalistic mechanisms to Flyvbjerg's case. Let us make clear from the outset that our ambition is not to make an evaluation of Flyvbjerg's analysis. Flyvbjerg occasionally uses the term `mechanism' but does so in only a very general sense, and his own generalizing discussion is of a type that is very dierent from our suggested logic. What he does is largely to relate the development in Aalborg to general ideas from classical thinkers such as Machiavelli, Kant, Nietzsche and Foucault. What we evaluate in the following discussion is not Flyvbjerg's analysis but, rather, our own assertion in Bengtsson & Hertting (2014) that a generalizing logic based on thin rationality can also be used to draw out some generalizing conclusions from actor-based case studies that do not have an implicit rationalistic perspective. Two things make Flyvbjerg's book particularly well suited for such an experiment: his thorough em- pirical analysis and his occasionally somewhat impressionistic statements of generalizing character that are actually formulated in the book. We also forewarn the reader that we do not present an in-depth analysis of `the social mechanisms of Aalborg politics'; doing so would take too much time and space. As noted, our attempt to `put Flyvbjerg on mechanisms' mainly serves as an illustration and analytical test of our suggested logic of generalization. Flyvbjerg views the Aalborg case as a metaphor of modern politics, administration and planning. However, what type of generalization does that imply? One clue that Flyvbjerg gives us is that the Aalborg story is a story repeated all too often for comfort for
21 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice a democrat and that most people interested in politics know one or more Aalborg stories. It is true that we know other cases where power has de ned rationality. Additionally, most of us can most likely refer to other cases where comprehensive plans have been transformed by power and disintegrated into fragments. However, if we already recognize this pattern, what new general lessons can be learned precisely from Flyvbjerg's study? Is it not merely another illustration of a well-known phenomenon, only unusually well narrated? If, in contrast, the general lesson is that merchants (or car lovers) will always be the winners in urban politics or tra c planning, then we would have learned something new. However, that would most likely not be generally true, and Flyvbjerg actually does not make such a claim either. We return to this point in the next section. Instead Flyvbjerg's book ends with a discussion on democracy. He claims that modernity rests and relies on rationality as the means for making democracy work, and since rationality is a weak form of power, democracy based on rationality will be weak as well. As an antidote, the author prescribes participation, transparency and civic reciprocity. Although this normative discussion is de nitely inspired by the case study, we do not view it as an empirical generalization from it and do not discuss it further here (cf. Bengtsson 1999 for a critical discussion of Flyvbjerg's normative position on democracy). Flyvbjerg actually claims that the rational and coherent language that we use to un- derstand reality would be a general problem in studying power and fragmentation. Here, we do not agree; the problem is not scienti c language but, rather, an overly strong belief in holistic `rational planning' (cf. below). Without a rationalistic language, the social scientist would have nothing to add to the confusing fragments of reality. Additionally, we would be in trouble if we could not assume that social actors do what they do for some reason. Indeed, Flyvbjerg's own rationalistic case work convincingly refutes his somewhat postmodernist proposition. We need a rationalistic language not only to understand why actors often act sel shly but also the opposite, e.g., to understand why downtown mer- chants supported car tra c even when they would clearly gain economically from the proposed restrictions. One possible mechanistic interpretation of this particular pattern could be in terms of Festinger's (1985) theory of cognitive dissonance (in this case, between car driving and money making). Personal preferences for car driving may have gotten the better of pro t maximization among directors; a cultural or gender-related explanation may be fruitful here. This is indicated by a letter to the city engineer from a Copenhagen director complaining that his chaueur had di culties nding his way to the local department store due to provisional changes in the tra c system. Certainly, con rming this would demand a study of its own. A problem with Flyvbjerg's theoretical discussion is that he never de nes his central concepts, `power', `democracy', `rationality' and `rationalization'. Explicit de nitions are not always necessary and sometimes absurd but in this case, they would have revealed how far Flyvbjerg means his conclusions can be applied. De ning power is always a tricky exercise, but Flyvbjerg would have gained from making the simple distinction between the actor-oriented zero-sum concept of `power over' and the outcome-oriented plus-sum idea of `power to'. A characteristic of urban planning is not only that some actors have power over other actors but also that no actor can have things her or his way without the
22 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice support of others; i.e., urban planning is a situation of mutual and multiple veto power. This was clearly the case in the Aalborg Project. Flyvbjerg does not de ne rationality either, although he refers to Habermas' prin- ciple of the force of the better argument, which he contrasts to `Realrationalität' and rationalization. Furthermore, more importantly to understand his critique, his concept of rationality seems to be related to the so-called `rational planning model', which views planning as holistic and consisting of a number of well-de ned and delimited steps where the better argument prevails, e.g., the (democratic) de nition of goals, the identi cation of alternatives, the evaluation of alternatives, implementation, and the monitoring of ef- fects (e.g., Taylor 1998). Presently, most scholars and planners agree that this model is unrealistic as a description and naïve as an ideal since in practice, the steps are performed much in parallel and the model does not acknowledge the role of political and economic stakeholders and other members of the community aected by the planning. Thus, if `rational planning' is the norm of rationality, then we should not be surprised that it is di cult to ful l in a complex context of urban planning with several strong stakeholders. With these de nitions made explicit, Flyvbjerg's criticism of modernity loses much of its sting. Today, few believe in an impartial and comprehensive planning where actors do not prioritize their private interests. The contemporary catchwords of planning, such as governance networks, urban regimes, coalitions, and partnerships, de ne planning as a search for compromise and a negotiated order that keeps all veto holders satis ed. This perspective certainly has its own myths, and today those myths are much stronger than the old straw man of rational planning. In practice, planning and implementation follow a more incrementalistic step-by-step logic. In Aalborg, these steps are numerous and sequentially and simultaneously inter- twined in a complex manner. The challenge for the process analyst is to transform these complexities into a set of more limited and nested processes and games. Understanding these mechanisms, logics and rules in use seems to correspond to Flyvbjerg's ambition to go beyond `formal rationality' to understand `realrationalität'. Although using a dierent language, this is precisely what a rationalistic mechanism-oriented analysis would aim at, i.e., to understand `what rationality means' in dierent contexts (cf. Johnson 1991; Hertting 2007).
Flyvbjerg and generalization by mechanism
In this section, we conduct our analytical experiment to reconstruct some of Flyvbjerg's ndings in terms of our logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic ideal-type social mechanisms. More precisely, we discuss two such mechanisms and relate them to `Coleman's boat' and Hedström and Swedberg's distinction between situational (macro- micro), action formation (micro-micro) and transformational (micro-macro) mechanisms. First, we analyse Flyvbjerg's conclusion that power de nes rationality via rationalization and, second, the more speci c conclusion that merchants will be the winners in tra c planning (or perhaps in urban politics more generally), which is our interpretation of Flyvbjerg's `a story repeated all too often for comfort for a democrat'. Following our general logic, in both cases, we discuss generalization in terms of expectations in other
23 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice
Figure 2. `Power de nes rationality' as social mechanisms
similar contexts. We conclude this section by giving our response to Flyvbjerg's challenge to answer `what this is a case of'.
Power de nes rationality via rationalization Actors with power exercising supremacy and securing their future dominance by de ning what is rational is a very general mechanism (or, rather, a set of mechanisms), not quite as universal as the prisoners' dilemma but almost. We suggest that it can be applied to a number of dierent situations of power. In gure 2, we give our interpretation of this pattern and Flyvbjerg's main argument in terms of Coleman's boat and its dierent types of mechanisms. Here, we have translated Flyvbjerg's general and structural macro thesis to `In- equality of power leads to a culture of rationalization'. Our suggestion is that this would go via two dierent sets of micro mechanisms. Powerful actors use rationalization as a tool (mechanism AC1) on the basis of a calculus that says doing so will lead to support in an inexpensive manner (C1D1). Powerless actors, on the other hand, are prepared to accept powerful actors' rationalization (AC2) and view subordination as their pre- ferred strategy, given the power situation, perhaps to have the chance to be included in decision-making processes and to aect outcomes on the margin (C2D2) (cf. Hertting 2007, 4950). The nal outcome on the macro level, when these mechanisms meet, is a social culture where rationalization dominates the discourse in politics, planning and media as an outcome of what seems to be the rational strategies of both parties in an asymmetric power relation. There are numerous examples where such micro mechanisms are at work in the Aal- borg case. Poor investigations and reports based on minimal response rates are used as arguments against the plans, and the modest critique against these reports is ignored.
24 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice
Arguments for alternative locations for the bus terminal are not discussed since the de- cision is said to have been made already. As Flyvbjerg underlines, this rationalization is largely due to the institutionalized forms of co-operation between the local state and capital in matters of planning. Thus, this vicious circle between power and rationalization may have gone unbroken for decades. Can these mechanisms be generalized to other contexts? We would say that they can, at least with regard to some situations of power inequality. First, we would expect inequality to lead to rationalization via these micro mechanisms only in contexts where `rationality' and the strength of the better argument has some formal and moral standing and face value (and not in a totalitarian society or a full- edged post-truth community). Otherwise, why would the powerful even bother to produce and refer to investigations and reports of poor quality? Doing so would mean that the policy and planning processes addressing complex technical processes in situations where those in power have no absolute sovereignty would be strong candidates for contexts where this pattern could be expected. In contrast, one may ask whether `absolute power' actually needs rationalization. However, in this period of globalized mass communication, absolute power is most likely rare, and it seems that even dictators wish to refer to `facts' to keep international protest at bay. Hence, in the end, actors are always dependent on someone. As we view it, this reanalysis of Flyvbjerg in terms of social mechanisms raises some interesting questions about power relations in current governance practices, e.g., projects that attempt to develop deliberative and participative institutions on the micro and macro levels (cf. Smith 2009). If inequality of power may induce a political culture of rational- ization, then we should expect a mechanism of power that contradicts deliberation (as rational argument) paradoxically, in situations where deliberation is often viewed as being most needed by its advocates. In fact, rather than sincere attempts by political elites to integrate large parts of the community in `power to'-processes (Stone 2008), it may be more relevant to view limited projects of deliberation as a device to rationalize existing `power over' relations in the political sphere (cf. Swyngedouw 2005; Bengtsson & Hertting 2016, 137f.).
Merchants are the winners in tra c planning This second mechanism would be much less far-reaching than the previous one. (The alternative formulation `merchants are the winners in urban politics' is more far-reaching, but Flyvbjerg's material from Aalborg is mainly on tra c planning.) Figure 3 gives our interpretation of Flyvbjerg's argument on the role of merchants in urban planning in terms of Coleman's boat. Here, we suggest that the macro relation would be between merchants' dominance and control of the planning procedure, on one hand, and status quo in tra c regulation, on the other hand. The former condition is manifested in the institutionalized collaboration between local capital and the planning authorities in Aalborg, and the outcome of the status quo is undisputable, at least from a perspective of rational planning. We are not absolutely certain what would in fact be Flyvbjerg's dependent variable B here, but it seems that his focus is more on the planning procedure as such than on the physical outcome. Other alternatives may be `merchants get their way in tra c planning', which,
25 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice
Figure 3. `Merchants are the winners in tra c planning' as social mechanisms
in the Aalborg case, seems to be much the same as the `status quo' but would have other implications for portability and generalization. We nd the even broader `merchants get their way in urban politics' to be less credible, particularly keeping in mind that local merchants are not synonymous with capitalists in general. The micro mechanisms C and D are more obvious; they could also be more generally formulated as `con icting preferences over planning' and `con icting strategies', respec- tively. One could perhaps say that merchants' dominance should mean that they can dictate the contents of the plans, thus avoiding con icts over planning. The con ict in the Aalborg case, however, was largely due to the original ambition to support collec- tive transport and cycling at the expense of cars in the centre of the city (cf. above on merchants' somewhat paradoxical preference for car transport). To what other contexts can these mechanisms be generalized? In what types of pro- cesses should we expect a similar pattern? Drawing up and discussing such `scope condi- tions' is actually one of the most important elements from a perspective of `generalization by mechanism'. First, planning is almost by de nition controversial. It typically aects the con icting interests of several stakeholders. Additionally, if con icts are manifest, planning disinte- gration and failure are an obvious risk, which in practice often means an outcome of the status quo. Thus, a chain of mechanisms, CDB in gure 3, is always a possibility in cases of planning with strong stakeholders, regardless of whether local merchants have a dominant position. A general understanding of planning as a potential source of con ict is also what lies behind the current scepticism concerning the rational planning ideal. Thus, planning is con ict-ridden, and we can view CDB as a chain of mechanisms to be expected in a large number of planning situations. However, can we also generalize the more speci c pattern of tra c planning and local merchants that Flyvbjerg observes in Aalborg? Should we expect the same in other cases of tra c planning? Most of us probably know similar cases of local merchants resisting restrictions on car tra c in city centres, but we also know a large number of somewhat successful cases of inner-
26 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice city regeneration when car tra c has been restricted. Thus, what thinly rationalistic mechanisms can be generalized here? As Flyvbjerg convincingly shows, local merchants had an unusually strong in uence on planning generally in Aalborg, `stronger than their equivalents elsewhere', something that the author did not realize when he started his study (Flyvbjerg 2006, 231). Thus, the mechanisms of gure 3 would only be relevant in such a context. Another speci c feature was that the Aalborg Project aimed at diminishing car transport in the inner city, which clearly was not much appreciated by the merchant community. Had the planning intention counterfactually been to make it easier to commute by car, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and their local allies would most likely not have resisted so strongly. (Additionally, as noted, it is still unclear why local merchants had these preferences in Aalborg and often seem to have them elsewhere as well; cf. the discussion above on Festinger's cognitive dissonance, which may also be used as an ideal-type mechanism for generalization.) Thus, the ideal-type mechanistic pattern would be such that, in contexts of merchants' dominance, tra c planning aiming at decreasing the number of car transports in inner cities can be expected to fail and result in the status quo. Again, we do not know this for certain, but if the prediction would be falsi ed in a case that ful ls the same conditions, then the ideal-type mechanism would need to be reformulated. Path dependence may also have strengthened the merchants' position in this case, regardless of power relations in general. Whereas planning concerns change, resistance to planning may be supported by dierent types of institutionalized inertia.
Our response to `what this is a case of' The two sets of mechanisms discussed above are certainly relevant to other contexts. However, at least the broad pattern of power and rationalization was not a nding from Aalborg, but, rather, well known and most likely accepted even by strong believers in rational planning before reading Flyvbjerg's book. Thus, why is it that we nd his generalizing arguments about Aalborg so novel and revealing? Our answer to `what this is a case of' is that the Aalborg Project is best viewed as an arena of power and discourse, where social mechanisms of power can be observed and analysed. As we view it, the most interesting ndings concern neither power and rationalization in general nor which actors stand to win and lose in a game of city planning but, rather how dierent strategies and tactics can be used and abused by potential winners and losers in this type of setting. Paradoxically, what makes Flyvbjerg's study so interesting is that in retrospect, we nd the individual actors in the Aalborg Project to have acted fairly rationally, not in the manner in which a super-rational `economic man' or `rational planner' would have acted but on the whole consistently and persistently trying to obtain as much as possible, for themselves and for their peers, from the Project, considering what imperfect information they had. This is acting like thinly rationalistic actors. Again, this is why we expect similar actors in similar contexts to act in much the same manner. Thus, the nal outcome of the Project may not be the most relevant aspect to be generalized but, rather, the more detailed mechanisms, including the dierent `domination
27 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice techniques' used by powerful actors to borrow a concept from gender studies. Some examples are the game over the inadequate report referred to by the Chamber against the Project, the game over how the planners were excluded from meetings between politicians and shop-keeper representatives, and the game over how environmental concerns were run over. A closer inspection of these mini-processes would certainly produce a number of relevant and generalizable social mechanisms for application in future studies of urban planning and politics. Mechanism-oriented analysis is often related to middle-range theorizing. To develop ideal-type social mechanisms on the basis of Flyvbjerg's Aalborg narrative, it may be pro- ductive to apply theories about urban regimes or collaborative governance. Urban regime theory (Stone 2008) has at least two dierent analytical ideas that may contribute to a mechanism interpretation of Flyvbjerg's ndings. First, the theory provides a very simple logic for why the number of actors involved and interests aected escalates when moving from initial plan visions to implementation. In market-based societies, the capacity to govern needs to be mobilized from dierent spheres of society. To be eectively realized, policies need to be `anchored' among aected stakeholders. Second, urban regime theory hints at why private actors such as the merchants and real estate owners often obtain a veto position in urban development. Even nancially strong city administrations cannot rely solely on their own muscles if they want to revitalize the local economy (cf. Franzén, Hertting & Thörn 2016). According to contemporary theories of collaborative governance, such situations of interdependencies are constructive for innovative planning and policy-making (i.e., Ansell & Gash 2008). In the case of Aalborg, however, two dierent sets of actors, in two dierent phases of the process, seem to have acted from dierent perceptions of the structural situation. In the rst phase, the top level of the Aalborg planning machinery seems to have believed that they were able to realize their plan without the support of the private sector and local business. In the second phase, the Chamber of Commerce turns `rational' analysis into a strategy for resistance and mobilization against the Project. The outcome on an aggregated level of these strategies is not uncommon in politics: fragmentation and stagnation.
Concluding discussion
Flyvbjerg clearly has generalizing ambitions, and he labels his case `paradigmatic' (also `metaphorical' and `prototypical'; cf. Flyvbjerg 2001, 7981; Flyvbjerg 1998, 225). Judg- ing from his argument, an important element of this generalization is the reader's recog- nition. Recognition is also important in generalization by mechanism (cf. Elster's `easily recognizable causal patterns'). What makes Flyvbjerg's study of local politics in Aalborg so elucidating is that we nd ex post that stakeholders have acted in a plausible manner, given their preferences and constraints. Thus, `recognizing' the case of Aalborg means that we expect that thinly rational actors involved in comparable power games in other contexts will act and interact in much the same manner. Additionally, this would again be a case of rationalistic generalization. Flyvbjerg's study links the concrete practices of planning in a small-size Danish city
28 Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice with philosophers such as Kant, Nietzsche and Foucault. He does not give much room for contemporary theories about planning or power in cities theories with less grand ambitions. In philosophy, empirical arguments are often illustrative and may be some- what sweeping and impressionistic, whereas an empirical mechanism approach needs to be focused. To analyse mechanisms is to analyse very speci c input-output relations with a focus on the process from input to output. This demands not only a careful empirical analysis of the perceptions and motives of dierent actors, which Flyvbjerg admittedly provides, but also a theory-driven analysis of structures, strategies, interactions and out- comes. Flyvbjerg presents in detail and with elegance what has been the standard story for quite some time: It is a tricky challenge to conduct comprehensive planning according to the classic instrumental-rationalist approach when tasks are complex and ill-structured. It is simply too complicated for central planners and politicians to foresee the play-out of the implementation process and how dierent actors and representatives of aected interests will respond to the plans. This means that Flyvbjerg's programmatic scepticism concerning comprehensive ra- tional planning (which we share) is not an argument against a rationalistic analysis of the limits of instrumentalist `rational' planning in fact, quite the opposite. Flyvbjerg's narrative about planning and local politics in Aalborg involves several actors who all try to do their best, given their motives, perceptions and resources. It is not rationality as such that brings down the project but the holistic perspective of `rational' planning. In practice, planning in Aalborg was not to what surprise? holistic and comprehensive but, rather, a game where aected social actors used dierent strategies to play the game and to mobilize both support and resistance. As such, the Aalborg case is not remark- able; what is remarkable is Flyvbjerg's detailed study and fascinating narrative of it. Our argument is that the lack of 'rationality' on the macro level aects what it means to be rational on the individual micro level within the power structures and interdependencies in a case of planning such as the Aalborg project. What about our analytical experiment? First, it was possible, and we claim somewhat fruitful, to analyse the story of the Aalborg Project in terms of portable ideal-type mech- anisms based on thin rationality. The patterns suggested in gures 2 and 3 are not the only possibilities, but it seems that `putting Flyvbjerg on mechanisms' may be a clarify- ing methodological project even though the patterns as such are not novel. Moreover, it should be possible to develop the more detailed processes of the Aalborg case into portable micro mechanisms of urban planning and politics, related to some middle-range theory. We probably need to revise our previous position that Flyvbjerg's concept of the `paradigmatic case study' can be interpreted in terms of generalization by mechanism. In his methodological writings (e.g., Flyvbjerg 2006, 229233), he relates paradigmatic cases to the more traditional idea of `most likely' or `least likely' cases, models that are ultimately deterministic and that focus on the outcome rather than the process. In contrast, in his Aalborg book, he uses the empirical case mainly to illustrate somewhat abstract philosophical thinking. This possibly makes his book a better read, but it also makes his generalizing less convincing.
29 REFERENCES Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice REFERENCES
References
Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of public administration research and theory, 18(4):543571.
Bengtsson, B. (1999). Book Review-B. Flyvbjerg (1998): Rationality and power. Democ- racy in practice. Housing, Theory and Society, 16(4):204207.
Bengtsson, B. and Hertting, N. (2014). Generalization by mechanism: Thin rational- ity and ideal-type analysis in case study research. Philosophy of the social sciences, 44(6):707732.
Bengtsson, B. and Hertting, N. (2016). Makten i den etni erade staden invandrar- föreningar och lokal politik i Botkyrka. In Bengtsson, B., Myrberg, G., and Andersson, R., editors, Mångfaldens dilemman. Medborgarskap och integrationspolitik. Gleerups, Malmo.
Bengtsson, B. and Ruonavaara, H. (2011). Comparative process tracing in housing studies. International Journal of Housing Policy, 11(4):395414.
Bengtsson, B. and Ruonavaara, H. (2017). Comparative process tracing: making historical comparison structured and focused. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47(1):4466.
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Donaldson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eckstein, H. (1975). Case study and theory in political science. In Greenstein, F. and Polsby, N., editors, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Elster, J. (1983). Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge Uni- versity Press (CUP).
Elster, J. (1998). A plea for mechanisms. In Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R., editors, Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Falleti, T. G. and Lynch, J. F. (2009). Context and causal mechanisms in political analysis. Comparative political studies, 42(9):11431166.
Ferejohn, J. and Satz, D. (1996). Uni cation, universalism, and rational choice heory. In Friedman, J., editor, The Rational Choice Controversy. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Festinger, L. (1985). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA.
30 REFERENCES Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice REFERENCES
Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). Rationality and power: Democracy in practice. University of Chicago press.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again. Cambridge university press.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative inquiry, 12(2):219245.
Franzén, M., Hertting, N., and Thörn, C. (2016). Stad till salu: Entreprenörsurbanismen och det oentliga rummets värde. Bokforlaget Daidalos AB.
Gerring, J. (2004). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge university press.
Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2012). A tale of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences. Princeton University Press.
Hedström, P. and Swedberg, R. (1998). Social mechanisms: An introductory essay. In P. Hedström and Swedberg, R., editors, Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hedström, P. and Ylikoski, P. (2010). Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual review of sociology, 36.
Hertting, N. (2007). Mechanisms of governance network formation: A contextual rational choice perspective. In Tor ng, J. and Sorensen, E., editors, Theories of Democratic Network Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.
Johnson, J. (1991). Rational choice as a reconstructive theory. In Monroe, K., editor, The Economic Approach to Politics. Harper Collins, New York.
King, G., Keohane, R. O., and Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scienti c inference in qualitative research. Princeton university press.
Mahoney, J. (2001). Review essay: Beyond correlational analysis: recent innovations in theory and method. In Sociological forum, volume 16, pages 575593. Springer.
Popper, K. (1985). The rationality principle. In D.Miller, editor, Popper Selections. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. American political science review, 64(4):10331053.
Smith, G. (2009). Democratic innovations: Designing institutions for citizen participa- tion. Cambridge University Press.
Stone, C. (2008). Urban politics then and now. In Orr, M. and Johnson, V., editors, Power in the City. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
31 REFERENCES Rationality and portability: Case study research in practice REFERENCES
Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of governance-beyond-the-state. Urban studies, 42(11):19912006. Taylor, N. (1998). Urban planning theory since 1945. Sage. Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods 4th ed, volume 2. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
32