THE ANSO REPORT Page 1

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THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 109 REPORT 1‐15 November 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-2 3-5 In the Central region, a three-day occupa- rural setting. In Farah, a GOA venue host- Northern Region tion of an INGO clinic by an ANA/IMF ing a meeting with IMF and NGO partici- Western Region 6-7 combat force in Wardak, occurring in late pants came under a hand-grenade attack, 8-10 October, highlighted the risks faced by the while a local AOG commander in Ghor, Eastern Region NGO community in areas undergoing owing to his known ambition to raise his Southern Region 11-13 ’clearing’ operations ahead of IMF with- personal profile in the community, sub- drawal. Whilst the sheer scope of the in- jected a well-accepted NGO to several acts ANSO Info Page 14 trusion - the clinic was used as a mortar of intimidation. The ring-road in Badghis firing base as well as a detention center - and Farah remained a hub for conflict ac- made the incident a clear outlier, it raises tivity; the former also underwent substan- HIGHLIGHTS concerns as to the level of ANSF account- tial transfers of authority from IMF to ability in the field post-transition. The high ANSF. ANA & IMF occupy an pace of IMF withdrawals was apparent in NGO clinic in Wardak In the Eastern region, the number of the peripheral districts of Wardak and NGO incidents in Nangarhar exceeded the NGO clinics robbed in Logar, although the pro-Government 20 mark, representing 16% of the current Kunduz and Herat forces significantly outpaced AOG opera- country-wide total for the year. A bold tions across the region, including the re- Off-duty NGO de-miner AOG assassination of an off-duty NGO moval of key IEA commanders in de-miner in Sherzad and an abduction of assassinated in Nan- Ghorband and Kohi Safi (Parwan). garhar another NGO member in Bati Kot high- A similar reduction in AOG activity was lighted the risks of early morning move- Civilian casualties in observed in the Northern region, with ments in the province, also casting doubt IED blasts in Kandahar and Helmand Faryab remaining the key contested area. on the ANSF capability to maintain control The province featured several high- over key access routes including the Tork- intensity conflict engagements. Further, ham-Jalalabad highway. In Kunar, where ANSO is supported by AOG tactical reliance on conventional the opposition maintained a high pace of close-range attacks, as opposed to lower- operations, including a failed BBIED at- risk stand-off tactics, served to demon- tack on the ANP counter-terrorism depart- strate their confidence. In the North-East, ment chief, an NGO field site was struck an NGO clinic was burgled in Kunduz, by stray RPG rounds during an AOG at- while in Badakhshan, ANP briefly detained tack on a passing ANA convoy. NGO staff following a local dispute with The Southern region did not see any an influential power-broker. The province changes to the NGO incident count, but witnessed a more significant police opera- recorded the largest share (34%) of AOG tion in Ishkashim, where an ANP/NDS activity country-wide. Despite this, virtu- unit tracked down a local commander at- ally all of its provinces exhibited a signifi- tempting to re-sell a Stinger missile. cant downturn in AOG activity. Prevalent Three out of four provinces in the trends included AOG reliance on close- Western region witnessed NGO incidents. range tactics in 54% of attacks region-wide, Two armed robberies were recorded in although IED activity exacted a significant Herat, whilst a third case involved an at- toll on the civilian population in Kandahar tempt by an ANSF commander to force an and Helmand whilst Kandahar city wit- INGO into renting his own vehicles in a nessed the tenth suicide attack this year. ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION ABUL NGO Incidents KABUL K Year to Date 14 50 This Report Period 0 Despite ANSF supremacy in the 40 capital - GOA forces authored on the 4th and the 13th, the latter 30 80% of all security incidents in case consisting of multiple projec- 20 Kabul city this cycle, primarily tiles which killed one civilian and 10 dealing with criminality - the op- injured two others in the Maslakhi 0 position managed to launch two area of PD 9. The attacks were rocket attacks towards the city, consistent with established pat- whilst sporadic AOG activity (6 terns both in terms of targeting KABUL AOG KABUL Crime attacks in total, primarily IEDs) (Airport and large ANSF/IMF was also reported from the main facilities) and their inaccuracy. section), further attest to the fact that the roads in the rural districts of From 2006 to 2010, AOG rocket threat from IDF has greatly decreased in the Paghman, Shakardara, Mir Bacha attacks averaged 16 a year, city over the last 2 years. In counterpoint, the Kot and Kalakan. whereas since 2011, such activity 13 civilian fatalities resulting from attacks of AOG rockets, attributed to net- has steadily declined - dropping this kind in the past seven years warrant works operating in Kohi Safi and from 10 in 2011 to the current 4 against complacency when selecting the loca- Deh Sabz, impacted in the vicinity in 2012. ANSF-IMF preventive tion of NGO premises and implementing site of the airport and ANSF facilities counter-measures such as seen security measures. in the north-east parts of Kabul this cycle in Kohi Safi (see Parwan NGO Incidents Year to Date 7 WARDAK W ARDAK 70 This Report Period 1 60 rd On the night of 23 October, 50 IMF helicopters dropped a size- prominence last year with 16 cases 40 able ANA detail, accompanied by recorded since January 2011, 30 an IMF special forces unit, to Se- mostly in Nangarhar, Logar and 20 wak in Chaki Wardak, apparently Kunar provinces. The latest case, 10 0 to ‘clear’ the area. During the however, stands out for the total next three days, the security forces disrespect shown for the sanctity of the clinic and its staff. It re- occupied an INGO clinic in the WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime location, using the facility as a mains to be seen if the rate and detention center but also as a severity of such incidents will in- and Nirkh attracted every second AOG escala- mortar firing base throughout crease with the security transition. tion - while the remainder consisted mainly of several engagements with AOG. Along with an increased pace of stand-off attacks against the district adminis- The forces departed on the 25th IMF-ANSF operations in Chaki trative centers, with Jaghatu DAC notching 6 with 6 suspected AOG members Wardak and Saydabad, the cycle such attacks alone. Besides marking the high in custody, leaving behind a dam- featured IMF withdrawals from morale of local AOG cadres following the de- aged perimeter wall and equip- Jalrez, Nirkh and Jaghatu - with parture of IMF, the AOG effort in Jaghatu was ment, as well as an amount of live only small-scale IMF teams re- partly a response to the on-going talks among ammunition and UXOs. The af- maining in situ embedded with local elders and the GOA about their eventual fected INGO has lodged a formal ANSF. reconciliation, and the roll-out of the ALP pro- complaint with the GOA. In contrast, the opposition au- gram in the district. This would suggest that Although Wardak has not wit- thored 65% of the security inci- the current frequency of conflict engagements nessed forceful breaches of medi- dents in Wardak this cycle. Two in Jaghatu is likely to be maintained in the cal facilities by ANSF/IMF since thirds were attacks along the main short term. 2009, such incidents rose to roads - the highway in Saydabad THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 2 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 Despite the seasonal decline, the 40 Parwan-Bamyan road continued the duties of the IEA provincial 30 to attract early-morning AOG shadow governor in Parwan. 20 attacks on police targets. An IED Nonetheless, his removal will do little to reverse the expansion of 10 blast and a SAF attack resulted in 0 a total of five casualties – four AOG influence sustained over the policemen and a civilian – on the course of this year. Most recently, the IMF withdrawal from Kah- road this cycle. Off the main ar- PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime tery, the opposition networks in mard district in Bamyan - located along the main access route from Ghorband suffered a serious set- ing season. back, when during another SAF southern Baghlan - was reflected attack on an ALP checkpoint in upon locally as another chance for Elsewhere in the province, an IMF surgical Taykhan, a key IEA commander the opposition, entrenched north airstrike killed another prominent IEA com- sustained fatal injuries. Besides of Salang in Baghlan, to maintain mander in the Pachakhak area of Kohi Safi, his military leadership, the com- significant access between Bagh- known for his involvement in IDF attacks in mander was known to perform lan and Parwan for the next fight- Kabul and Bagram districts. NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40 Although security reporting re- mained scarce this cycle, ANSF Omarkhel), which ultimately re- 30 clearing operations and three sulted in a combined 24 AOG, 20 AOG attacks attested to the high five ANA and five civilian casual- 10 ties.
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