Why the St. Roch? Why the Northwest Passage? Why 1940?
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ARCTIC VOL. 46, NO. 1 (MARCH 1903) P. 82-87 Why the St. Ruch? Why the Northwest Passage? Why 1940? New Answers to Old Questions For almost half a century, the reasons behind orders sending of the St. Roch to a government plan to defend and occupy the the RCMP schooner St. Roch through the Northwest Passage island in the spring of 1940 (Caulkin, 1940; Fripps, 1940). during the Second World War have puzzled historians and otherSubsequent evidence from Larsen’s personal papers confirms scholars. True, there wererumours of a defence-related mission, that the captain was fully aware of the original purpose of his but there was no hard evidence,no tangible proof. Nor did the mission (Larsen, 1957a,b). captain, Sgt. Henry Larsen, provide many clues other than Although these memos might appear to contradict Larsen’s “Canada was at war and the government had realized the needown explanation, careful study of the documents and related todemonstrate the country’s sovereignty over the Arctic circumstances suggests that the reference to sovereigntyin the islands” (Larsen, 1967), a statement not verified in official autobiography published posthumously could also be defined documents. Then unexpectedly last year, during research on in very broad terms to include security considerations. Omission Canadian wartime relations with Greenland,two memos were of any reference to the initial motive behind the orders was found in RCMP archival files that directly linked the voyage entirely in keeping with his responsibility as a memberof the The Sr. Roch moored to ice in the Western Arctic in the mid-1930s. According to Henry Larsen, the only major changes made to the ship in 1940 were the addition of ‘‘a little auxilliary engine to charge thebank of batteries” and new shoeing around the stem to create a “knife sharp bow” (Larsen, 1967). Refitting at Halifax during winter 1943-44 made other changes. Credit: Parks Canada, St. Rcch National Historic Site Division. @“he Arctic Institute of North America ~~ ~ ARCTIC PROFILES / 83 Royal Canadian Mounted Police to maintain a confidence in forces, otherwise Canada would be “blamed for takingover” thenational interest. Today, the rationale for that secrecy (Skelton,1940a). is no longer valid, and the once-secret documents explaining High-level discussion followed basedon reports preparedby the circumstances and eventsare now accessible to the public. External Affairs (Skelton, 1940b). Initially, the objective was Perhaps it was a stroke of fate that this information should clearly precautionary: “to prevent enemy nationals gaining a come to light during the 50th-anniversary celebrations of the foothold there and giving them an opportunity to sabotage the venerable ship’s historic voyagethrough the Northwest Passage. cryolite mines.” In the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) estima- Along with pride of achievement is now added new pride of tion, only a small force wouldbe required to occupy the island a greater purpose. “and a small police detail at the two or three more important What was the crisis that triggered Canadian plans to occupycentres is all that will be necessary to maintain.” Whether this Greenland, and what possible role was the RCMP expected to was a realistic assessmentor not, the navy didnot have frigates play? These questions involve a much longer narrative, already or destroyers available for the mission, nor would“any of these related byJames Eayrs (1965: 169-171) and C.P. Stacey ships be risked in the ice conditions prevalent in the Davis (1970:367-370),whose accounts were based primarily on Strait. ” Instead, it was suggested that the CGS N.B. McLeun files originating with External Affairs and National Defence could“easily be armed with 4 in. guns” (Department of respectively. The RCMP commissioner’s files do not contradictNational Defence, 1940a). thesenarratives, butthey do add furtherdetails ofpolice On 14 April, a subcommittee meeting chairedby the director involvement. A synopsis of events provides background to of Military Operations and Intelligence supported plans for the involvementof the St. Roch and explanationof the secrecy defence of the mine and occupation of the former Danish colony, surrounding her mission. with the recommendation that an advance party of 100 - In the winter and early springof 1940, public attention was including12 RCMP officers and constables - proceedto focused on events abroad as Germany advanced across Europe. Greenland in early May aboard the icebreaker CGSN.B. McLean. When Denmark fell on 9 April 1940, British and Canadian The expedition was given the illustrious name of “Force X,” military strategists were understandably concerned about the and alI supplies and participants were to be mobilized and ready future of the Danish colony of Greenland. In light of the for departure within two weeks. Their task was to select gun increasing German U-boat activity in the North Atlantic, defencesites and lay out a military camp in preparation for the arrival of the large ice-covered island was considered a matterof high of the main contingent. Clearly, though, RCMP detachments priority, partially because of its location on the periphery of were considered critical to the successof the mission (Depart- North America and its excellent harbours for submarine bases, ment of National Defence, 1940b,c). but also because of the cryolite mine situatedon the shores of The Chiefsof Staff Committee subsequently issued a formal an isolated 12-mile fiord in southwest Greenland. document that expanded on the details to include specific lists Cryolite was crucial in the productionof aluminum, and this of participants and necessary equipment. The main ofbody the one mine represented the only natural source available to the occupation force would constitutean army unit of approximately Allied warindustries. Although a synthetic substitute had 250 to arrive in early June. In addition to the mine location, recently comeon the market, the Greenland mine was the onlysmall occupation forces would be posted to the two Danish known sources of the raw mineral, with the only refineries beingadministrative centres, Godhavn and Godthaab, on the west in Denmark, the Penn-Salt Company in the United States, and coast of Greenland. The cost of establishing and maintaining the Aluminum Company of Canada, located at Arvida, Quebec. the occupation forces for one year was estimated$585 at O00, Previously, Britain reliedon production from Danish smelters, excludingpurchase of armamentsand RCMP expenses and to a lesser extent upon Norwegian refineries that used the (Department of National Defence, 194Od,e). synthetic alternative. With both countries now in German hands, Afterthe 14 April meeting, Imp. T.B.Caulkin, A/A/C theAllies were dependent on UnitedStates and Canadian “G” Division, sent a memoto the commissioner suggesting the production. As long as the United States remained neutral and names of four officers for Greenland duty. He also raised the wasutilizing vast quantities of aluminum for its own war question of employing the St. Roch: industry, it was considered urgent that ALCAN gain assured It is considered that the R.C.M.P. schooner St. Roch would access to the Greenland cryolite. Should Germany have decided be of inestimable value to our Personnel stationed at Godhavn to take over or merely sabotage the mine, the effect would haveand Godthaab and would be in communication with the Force crippled the British and Canadian war efforts (Department of Headquarters by wireless. External Affairs, 1940a,b). If approval is given to have the St. Roch proceed from the Pacific to the Eastern theatre, I feel confident that Sergt. [sic] ’ Adding to the urgency were“reports of enemy ships heading Larsen would prove a valuable man in that area in several in the direction of Iceland and Southern Greenland” (Secretary different ways. of State, 1940) and requests from the United Kingdom “of If the St. Roch should go, consideration might be. given to utmost importance to obtain maximum possible tonnage of increasing the personnel on the boat, also whether she should aluminumfrom Canada” (Department of External Affairs, be armed with at least a machine gun. 1940a). Encouraged to take action by officials of the U.K. Further, arrangements would haveto be made for some fuel government (Massey, 1940) and the Aluminum Company of to be sent in for her, such as diesel oil, etc., this could be Canada (Bruce, 1940a,b,c), it is not surprising that Canada despatched from Montreal later [Caulkin, 19401. would seriously cbnsider all means to protect Allied interests. Considering that in 1940 Canada hadno arctic airstrips and At first hesitant to commit forces and concerned about the no RCN vessels available for polar navigation, the RCMP “danger of disturbing American opinion,” Mackenzie King schooner was a logical support ship and patrol vessel. finallyagreed, with the proviso that Canada was merely After retirement of the CGSBeothic in 1932, the Canadian looking into the defence of Greenland in cooperation with Britishgovernment had rented space on the Hudson’s Bay Company ~. 84 / ARCTICPROFILES ship theNascopie for the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which supplied theRCMP posts and provided medical aid to the isolated communities. While the Nascopie was also participating in the war effort, it was still needed to supply the company’s fur trading posts. Thus it was logical that the RCMP should have its own means of supply and transportation in the Eastern Arctic quite apart from other duties it might fulfil as partof security measures. The St. Roch was the only ice-capable police vessel of any appreciablesize available for arctic patrols and, if neces- sary, to serve as a communications and supply link with the proposed Canadian occupation forces in Greenland and the newly established consulate. The ship’s home port was Vancou- ver, as its primary function since 1930 had been to supply and patrol the Western Arctic. The plan to bring the ship to the Eastern Arctic through the Northwest Passage seemed a logi- cal solution, since a southern route through the Panama Canal would have destroyed any attempt at keeping the mission secret.