Qt00s4m9hv.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
CLIP-IN: Climate Policy Integration in Federal States: Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development in Austria, Germany and Switzerland
CLIP-IN: Climate Policy Integration in Federal States: Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development in Austria, Germany and Switzerland Analytical Framework by Juan Casado-Asensio & Reinhard Steurer with support from Klaus Jacob & Stefanie Korte This project is funded by the Austrian Climate and Energy Fund within the framework of the ACRP programme 1 Contents CLIMATE POLICY INTEGRATION IN FEDERAL STATES: ....................................................................................... 1 ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRIA, GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND ............................................................................................................................................... 1 1. TOPIC AND CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................... 3 2. POLICY INTEGRATION AND FEDERALISM.................................................................................................. 5 2.1. INTEGRATED STRATEGIES AND CLIMATE POLICY INTEGRATION ..................................................................................... 5 2.2. FEDERALISM AND ITS NET EFFECT ON CLIMATE POLICY INTEGRATION ............................................................................ 7 2.3. FEDERALISM AND MULTI-LEVEL-GOVERNANCE ....................................................................................................... 10 3. FRAMEWORK FOR CASE STUDIES .............................................................................................................. -
Policy 11.Qxd.Qxd
GERMANY’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AT 60: TRENDS AND REFORMS FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY AICGS GERMAN-AMERICAN ISSUES 11 Karen Donfried Olaf Gersemann Beate Jochimsen Jörg Siegmund AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 3 About the Authors 5 The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies strengthens the German-American relation - The Decline of the Volksparteien 7 ship in an evolving Europe and changing world. The Institute produces objective and original analyses of Economic Challenges for the New German Government 19 developments and trends in Germany, Europe, and the United States; creates new transatlantic networks; and facilitates dialogue among the busi - The German Fiscal Federal System 27 ness, political, and academic communities to manage differences and define and promote common inter - U.S. Expectations of Germany after the Election 37 ests. ©2009 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies ISBN 1-933942-22-3 ADDITIONAL COPIES: Additional Copies of this Policy Report are available for $5.00 to cover postage and handling from the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036. Tel: 202/332-9312, Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: [email protected] Please consult our website for a list of online publications: http://www.aicgs.org The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. germany’s electoral system at 60 FOREWORD When Germany elected a new government on 27 September 2009, it did so not with an eye to the party, economic, or political successes of the previous sixty years. -
Federalism in Germany, Italy, and the European Union: History, Characteristics, and Perspectives
Journal for Markets and Ethics/Zeitschrift für Marktwirtschaft und Ethik • 6(1) • 2018 DOI: 10.2478/jome-2018-0034 Journal for Markets and Ethics/Zeitschrift für Marktwirtschaft und Ethik Federalism in Germany, Italy, and the European Union: History, Characteristics, and Perspectives Beate Jochimsen* Berlin School of Economics and Law (HWR), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, Germany Received January 30 2018; Accepted February 18 2018 Abstract: Federalism is always torn between the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Defining the federal structure of a country by finding the welfare-maximizing amount and design of government layers is challenging. Thereby, the financial endowment of different layers of government which they need to fulfill their respective tasks is an important aspect. European countries have chosen quite different federal designs to address the question of an optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. The aim of this paper is to analyze these different approaches for Germany, Italy, and the European Union. Parallels can be found in that all the three entities share a form of institutional asymmetry, a kind of fiscal bailout system, and a sort of fiscal equalization scheme. Keywords: Federalism • Germany • Italy • Europe JEL-Classification: H77 • P51 • O52 • N43 European countries have chosen quite different 1. Introduction federal designs to address the question of an optimal Identifying the sources of individual well-being has degree of fiscal decentralization. Germany, Italy, and been a major challenge in social sciences for many the European Union (EU), for example, are all struc- years. To what extent federal institutions support life tured more or less in a federal, i.e., decentral, way. -
Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 47 Issue 5 Issue 5 - Symposium: Federalism's Article 3 Future 10-1994 Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms James F. Blumstein Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons Recommended Citation James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 1251 (1994) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol47/iss5/3 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms James F. Blumstein* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1252 II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERALISM AND THE FEDERALISM DEAL ...................................................... 1256 III. FEDERALISM AS A CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM ....................... 1259 A. The Nature of Federalism...................................... 1260 B. Federalismand Civil Rights: Voting Rights as a Case Study ...................................................... 1262 1. Voting Rights as Part of the Federalism Deal ......................................... 1262 2. The Tensions Between the Federalism and Civil Rights Paradigms: Voting Rights as an Example ............................... -
Federalism and Families
University of Pennsylvania Law Review FOUNDED 1852 Formerly American Law Register VOL. 143 JUNE 1995 No. 6 ARTICLES FEDERALISM AND FAMILIES ANNE C. DAILEYt TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................. 1788 I. THE LOCALIST STRAND IN CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 1794 A. Localism Under Dual Federalism ................. 1796 B. The Paradigm of Procedural Federalism: Process and InstitutionalModels .......................... 1805 C. The Reemergence of Substantive Federalism: United States v. Lopez ............................ 1816 D. Localism and Family Law ...................... 1821 II. FAMILIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC CHARACTER . 1825 A. Families in Liberal Theory .................... 1826 t Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. 1983, Yale College;J.D. 1987, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Matthew Adler, Steven Ecker, Richard Kay, Stephen Morse,Jeremy Paul,Judith Resnik, Tanina Rostain, Vicki Schultz, Nomi Stolzenberg, Kathleen A. Sullivan, and participants at the University of Pennsylvania Legal Studies Workshop for their helpful comments and criticisms. Heather Stuart and Marc Ubaldi provided valuable research assistance. (1787) 1788 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1787 B. Liberal Citizenship and Civic Character ............ 1835 C. Civic Characterand ParentalAuthority ............ 1850 1. The Relational View of the Situated Self ....... 1851 2. The Communal View of the Situated Self ..... 1856 III. A LOCALIST THEORY OF FAMILY LAW .............. 1860 A. The -
Federalism and Decentralization in Germany
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION IN GERMANY BASIC FEATURES AND PRINCIPLES FOR GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION As a federally owned enterprise, GIZ supports the German Government in achieving its objectives in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development. Published by: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH Registered offices Bonn and Eschborn Potsdam Center for Policy and Management University of Potsdam August-Bebel-Strasse 89 14482 Potsdam, Germany E [email protected] I www.giz.de Author: Harald Fuhr, Julia Fleischer and Sabine Kuhlmann Design/layout: Diamond media GmbH, Neunkirchen-Seelscheid Photo credits/sources: Shuttertstock.de URL links: This publication contains links to external websites. Responsibility for the content of the listed external sites always lies with their respective publishers. When the links to these sites were first posted, GIZ checked the third-party con- tent to establish whether it could give rise to civil or criminal liability. However, the constant review of the links to external sites cannot reasonably be expected without concrete indication of a violation of rights. If GIZ itself becomes aware or is notified by a third party that an external site it has provided a link to gives rise to civil or criminal liability, it will remove the link to this site immediately. GIZ expressly dissociates itself from such content. On behalf of German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 401 – Sectoral and thematic policies, governance, democracy and rule of law Bonn GIZ is responsible for the content of this publication. Printed on 100% recycled paper, certified to FSC standards. ©GIZ 2018 BASIC FEATURES AND PRINCIPLES FOR GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 3 FOREWORD GIZ is a federal enterprise in the field of international cooperation for sustainable devel- opment and international education. -
Between Reformstau and Modernisierung: the Reform Of
Between Reformstau and Modernisierung: The Reform of German Federalism since Unification Gunther M. Hega Department of Political Science Western Michigan University 1903 W. Michigan Avenue Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5346 E-mail: [email protected] 1. Draft -- October 22, 2003 Please do not quote without the author’s permission Paper to be presented at the Conference on “Europeanization and Integration” EU Center of the University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, October 24 – 25, 2003 Abstract: Between Reformstau and Modernisierung: The Reform of German Federalism since Unification This paper examines the changes of the German federal system and the role of the 16 states (Länder) in national politics and policy-making in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1990. In particular, the study focuses on the response of the German Federal Council (Bundesrat), the chamber of the national parliament which represents the Länder, to the processes of German unification and European integration in the last decade. The paper starts from the assumption that the Federal Council has been the chief beneficiary among the Federal Republic's political institutions of the trends toward "unitary federalism" at the domestic level and a "federal Europe" at the international level. Due to the evolution of cooperative federalism with its interlocking policies, the changes in the party system and coalition politics, and, in particular, the twin processes of German unification and European integration, the Bundesrat has gained additional, special powers by assuring the inclusion of the "subsidiarity principle" in both the German Constitution (the Basic Law) and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The amended Article 23 of the Basic Law and the Maastricht Treaty's Article 3b strengthen the participation of the Federal Council and the 16 German states in national and European policymaking. -
Constitutional Politics in East Germany and the Grand Coalition State by Werner Reutter
ISSN: 2036-5438 Constitutional Politics in East Germany and the Grand Coalition State by Werner Reutter Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 8, issue 3, 2016 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E - 23 Abstract Constitutional politics seemingly corroborate the assumption that Germany is a Grand Coalition state. In this perspective German cooperative federalism and the supermajority required for any amendment to the constitution privilege bargaining and intertwined policy-making as modes of conflict resolution and thus support grand coalitions. In this paper I will explore whether this theory can explain constitutional politics in the German Länder. Firstly, I examine how far sub-national constitutional politics match the functioning of cooperative federalism that is a defining feature of the Grand Coalition state. Secondly, I examine sub-national constitutional politics in the five new Länder and bring the role parties played in this policy field to the fore. Overall, I conclude that cooperative federalism did not impact on constitutional politics in East Germany and that the features of consensus democracy are only partly able to explain law-making in this sector. Key-words Land constitutions, German federalism, Grand Coalition state, consensus democracy, majoritarian democracy Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License E - 24 Apparently, constitutional politics corroborate the hypothesis that Germany is a Grand Coalition state or a ‘state which embodies high ‘“dispersal of power”’ and thus privileges bargaining and compromise as modes of conflict resolution (Schmidt 2008: 79; cf. -
American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*
AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES* Harry N. Scheiber** For an historian whose ear is attuned to Madisonian rhetoric and logic, there are many strains in the current-day debate on federalism that are difficult to hear as anything but cacaphony. On a day in January 1978, for example, the President of the United States delivered a half-trillion dollar federal budget proposal to Congress. Apart from that remarkable magni- tude of proposed spending, it was noteworthy that for military and political intelligence activities alone the budget (openly and covertly) appeared to contain appropriations greater than for the judicial and legislative branches combined. The very newspaper' that carried the Budget, with its stress on increased "grants-in-aid" to state and local government, also offered two stories with.apparently contradictory ultimate meanings. The first article told how the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop- ment was pleased to announce the allocation by Executive fiat of funds for revival of a mortgage-subsidy program for a specified number of uniden- tified (presumably-as-yet unchosen) middle-income potential house- holders - the amount of funds to exceed the proposed cut in school-lunch funds in the 1979 Budget. In the second article, the Sohio Corporation and the air pollution- control officials of the Los Angeles regional Air Quality Management District discussed with the press some of the complexities of their agree- * Copyright 0 1978 by Harry N. Scheiber. This article consists of material toappearina forthcoming study of American federalism to be published by Oxford University Press. ** Professor of American History, University of California, San Diego. -
US Constitution & Federalism
US Constitution & Federalism Shared Power Between National, State, & Local Gov’t Basics of the Constitution • Three Branches = Legislative, Executive, & Judicial • Separation of Powers • Checks & Balances • Bi-cameral legislature (House of Rep’s & Senate) • Enumerated Powers vs. Implied Powers • Bill of Rights (Amendments 1 thru 10) Unitary vs. Confederation • Unitary System = Central gov’t has supreme power over governing the nation • Confederation = The local provinces or state governments have most of the power. • Federalism = The national, state, and local governments all have a role in governing (shared power) Unitary Systems Confederate Systems American Federalism • Supremacy Clause (Article 4) vs. The 10th Amendment • Some powers given the Nat’l Gov and some powers give to the State Gov • Many areas of gov’t ~ shared powers between many levels of gov’t • Dual Federalism vs. Cooperative Federalism Dual Federalism • “layered cake model” ~ Fed’s & states have clearly defined roles Cooperative Federalism • “Marble Cake Model” ~ Fed’s and states share power Multi-layered Gov’t • Just like a “marble” cake • Cooperative Federalism (shared responsibility) • We live in many jurisdictions all at once • Local = school districts, fire districts, cities or counties • State = Washington gov’t (State Constitution) • National (Federal) = US Constitution (Congressional representation; federal court jurisdiction) • Numerous examples of Federalism Education Funding of public schools: • National gov’t allocates money based on student population (per -
What Can Federalism Teach Us About the European Union? the German Experience
What Can Federalism Teach Us About the European Union? The German Experience Tanja A. Börzel Universität Heidelberg Paper prepared for the Conference „Governing together in the New Europe“, Robinson College, Cambridge, 12-13 April 2003. Prof. Dr. Tanja A. Börzel Associate Professor of International Relations Institute for Political Science Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Marstallstr. 6 D-69117 Heidelberg Tel: +496221/5428-68 Fax: +496221/5428-96 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] Website: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/compliance/ © Royal Institute of International Affairs,,2003 Published in Great Britain in 2003 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House,10 St James ’s Square,London SW1Y 4LE (Charity Registration No.208223) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted by any other means without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author. A European Federation or a Federal Europe? In an attempt to re-launch the discussion on the future shape of the European order, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, described the European Union (EU) as a ‘European Federation’.1 His intervention provoked a heated political -
Fiscal Federalism in Germany
Fiscal Federalism in Germany Ronald L. Watts Institute of Intergovernmental Relations Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario Canada Paul Hobson Department of Economics Acadia University Wolfville, Nova Scotia Canada December, 2000 * The major contributions to this project by Gerard Horgan and Jean François Tremblay are acknowledged. TABLE OF CONTENTS A. FEDERALISM IN GERMANY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................... 1 1. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF VARIOUS ORDERS OF GOVERNMENT ........................ 2 The Federal and Land Legislatures ......................................................................... 2 The Courts ............................................................................................................... 4 Constitutional Status of the Federal and Land Governments ................................. 4 Local Governments ................................................................................................. 5 2. CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROVISIONS RELATED TO INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS Constitutional Allocation of Revenue ........................................................................ 6 Personal Income Taxes .................................................................................. 6 Corporate Income Taxes ................................................................................ 7 Sales Taxes ...................................................................................................