Texas A&M University School of Law Texas A&M Law Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 1-2014 Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review Nuno Garoupa
[email protected] Jud Mathews Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Nuno Garoupa & Jud Mathews, Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review, 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (2014). Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/440 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. NUNO GAROUPA & JUD MATHEWS* Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Reviewt This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law re- gimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies' exercise of discretion,and judicialpractices of def- erence to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-nationaldifferences in institutions' capacitiesand the environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibrium outcomes. We ap- ply our model to explain patterns of administrativelaw in the United States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions. I. INTRODUCTION In this Article, we develop a general model to explain cross-na- tional variation in administrative law regimes.