SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) NATO ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: REBUILDING CAPABILITY, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE Special Report by Leona ALLESLEV (Canada) Special Rapporteur 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin | Original: English | 13 October 2019 150 STC 19 E TABLE OF CONTENT I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA FOR THE ALLIANCE ...................................................... 2 III. THE RUSSIAN SUBMARINE THREAT TO NATO ................................................................. 3 A. SUBMARINES IN RUSSIA’S STRATEGY .................................................................... 3 B. THE STATE OF RUSSIA’S SUBMARINE FLEET ......................................................... 6 IV. A VIEW TOWARDS EAST ASIA ............................................................................................ 8 A. RECENT CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................ 8 B. NASCENT NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES ............................................................ 11 V. ALLIED ASW CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS AND ONGOING MODERNISATION ................ 11 A. THE OVERALL STATE OF ALLIED ASW CAPABILITIES .......................................... 11 B. TACTICAL SUBMARINES: HIGH QUALITY, MIXED PICTURE OVERALL ................ 13 C. MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT: A KEY SHORTFALL AREA .................................... 14 D. ONGOING FRIGATE MODERNISATION ACROSS THE ALLIANCE ......................... 15 VI. TOWARDS A NEW VISION FOR ASW ............................................................................... 16 A. SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES ....................................................................................... 16 B. MARITIME UNMANNED SYSTEMS ........................................................................... 16 VII. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 19 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 21 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin I. INTRODUCTION1 1. In recent years, Allies have seen a sizeable increase in Russian submarine patrols in Allied areas of operation. In 2018, then UK Minister of Defence Gavin Williamson estimated that Russian patrols had increased by a factor of ten between 2011 and 2017 (Cecil and Collins, 2018). Worryingly, navies spotted Russian submarines in some very sensitive spots: a mere 350 kilometres from the US eastern seaboard, close to the UK nuclear deterrent’s home base, and near critical undersea communication cables (Perkins, 2018; McLaughlin, 2017; and Birnbaum, 2017). All of this led Admiral James G. Foggo III, current Commander of US Naval Forces Europe and NATO Joint Force Command Naples, to argue that “Russian submarines are prowling the Atlantic, testing our defences, confronting our command of the seas, and preparing the complex underwater battlespace to give them an edge in any future conflict” (Foggo and Fritz, 2016). 2. Russia may be the most immediate submarine threat to the Alliance, but there are other submarine fleets which should concern Allies. First, China’s expanding global forays – such as the One Belt, One Road initiative or its increasing Arctic presence – go hand-in-hand with increasing naval defence investments, including submarine modernisation. Second, as North Korea seeks to create an operational nuclear deterrent directed against one NATO Ally in particular, its navy is seeking to develop submarines armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles. 3. The increase in Russian submarine patrols should concern the political and military leadership of the Alliance. Since World War I, submarines have been a critical threat to civilian and naval vessels because of their stealth, silence, and speed (Perkins, 2016). A single submarine could shut down a strategic maritime chokepoint, threatening everything from merchant vessels to carrier strike groups. Submarines can thus deny naval power projection and disrupt critical sea lines of communication. When equipped with land-attack cruise missiles, they can also hold critical points on land at risk. In short, “every submarine is a strategic asset”, as Germany’s Submarine Force Commander, Captain Timo Cordes, has noted (Bliddal, 2019). 4. Unlike other ‘hard’ military capabilities like tanks or even missiles, submarines are also very well suited for asymmetric and hybrid tactics because they lend themselves to deceit and deniability. In particular, the threat to undersea communication cables has risen substantially. Such cables carry about 80% of data between North America and Europe, Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, Deputy Commander of Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), told a NATO PA Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS) delegation in June 2019. Satellites could only make up for 10% of the total transatlantic data transfers, he said. Special purpose submarines play a key role in the threat to undersea cables, as they can covertly tap or cut these cables to gain valuable intelligence or disrupt vital services. 5. Another fact should worry NATO even more: a severe shortfall of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities across the Alliance. In the words of then MARCOM Commander Vice Admiral Sir Clive Johnstone, NATO faces a situation where “we are very short of high-end submarine warfare hunters” (Fabey, 2018). Allies have belatedly woken up to this capability shortfall and have committed to remedying the situation. NATO has conducted strategic assessments, reinforced its maritime posture, initiated reforms of command and control mechanisms, and intensified its ASW exercise regime. 6. Certainly, the ASW challenge requires adaptation across the board, but no adaptation can compensate for possessing enough of the right capabilities. This special report thus squarely focuses on the need to rebuild NATO’s ASW assets in the short and long term – a topic which must deserve the Allies’ full attention. Before ending with a set of recommendations, the report: 1 Unless otherwise noted, information contained in this report is derived from publicly available sources. For more information, please contact the Committee Director. 1 150 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin - demonstrates the importance of the sea for the Alliance; - examines the concrete Russian submarine threat to NATO; - highlights key developments in the Chinese and North Korean submarine fleets; - outlines the most critical ASW capability shortfalls in the Alliance; - presents important national and NATO modernisation efforts; and - sketches a future vision of ASW based on emerging technologies. 7. Notably, 2019 Committee visits to Singapore and the United Kingdom reinforced the analysis and findings of this Special report. In both countries, delegates gained insights into specific ASW challenges and the way these two naval nations address them, in particular the maritime unmanned technology challenge. The report also complements this year’s Report Evolving Security in the North Atlantic of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC). II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEA FOR THE ALLIANCE 8. The importance of the sea for the Alliance can hardly be overstated (see also Map 1). The conventional defence of Europe rests on two pillars (Breedlove, 2018). First, the Alliance must have robust military power, including Canadian and US forces, present and ready in Europe, including its maritime approaches. Second, the North American Allies must be able to reinforce and resupply the European continent with materiel and personnel in times of crisis or war. International law, norms, and multinational institutions underpin the principle of freedom of navigation in peace time (Tamnes, 2018). However, in contingency situations, the Alliance will only be able to guarantee such freedom if it can exercise control of the sea and project power into and across it. 9. As its name makes abundantly clear, the North Map 1: GIUK and Suwalki Gaps Atlantic Ocean is at the core of the North Atlantic Treaty (map: Google Earth; labelling: NATO PA) Organization. It is a vital part of NATO’s area of responsibility and its most important sea line of communication (Olsen, 2018). It is “NATO’s lifeblood”, as General Philip M. Breedlove, NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, so aptly puts it (Breedlove, 2018). In addition to its military importance, it also remains the key to economic prosperity in North America and Europe and hosts critical undersea communication cables. 10. While the North Atlantic may be the most important maritime environment for the Alliance, NATO should also be in a position to exercise control of, or guarantee access to, its other maritime areas of responsibility, most importantly the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. 11. The Baltic Sea connects nine European countries, including six Allies. Maritime traffic is extremely dense. Almost 15% of global maritime cargo traffic is related to the region (Nordenman, 2018). Moreover, the Baltic Sea is the third most important energy node after the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. If Russia ever succeeded in closing the 104-kilometre land border between Poland and Lithuania (the Suwalki gap), the maritime approaches in the Baltic Sea would also be the only viable reinforcement and resupply route for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 12. In recent decades, the Mediterranean Sea has become increasingly important for