Republic of Korea
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures financing counter-terrorist and laundering Anti-money Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Republic of Korea Mutual Evaluation Report Korea April 2020 2020 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standard. For more information about the FATF, please visit the website: www.fatf-gafi.org. This document and/or any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. This assessment was adopted by the FATF at its February 2020 Plenary meeting. Citing reference: FATF (2020), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – Republic of Korea, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, FATF, Paris http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-korea-2020.html © 2020 FATF-. All rights reserved. No reproduction or translation of this publication may be made without prior written permission. Applications for such permission, for all or part of this publication, should be made to the FATF Secretariat, 2 rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France (fax: +33 1 44 30 61 37 or e-mail: [email protected]). Photo Credit - Cover: © Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Key Findings 3 Risks and General Situation 4 Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness 5 Priority Actions 10 Effectiveness & Technical Compliance Ratings 11 MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 13 Preface 13 CHAPTER 1. ML/TF RISKS AND CONTEXT 15 ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher Risk Issues 16 Materiality 19 Structural Elements 19 Background and Other Contextual Factors 19 CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL AML/CFT POLICIES AND CO-ORDINATION 33 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 33 Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Coordination) 34 CHAPTER 3. LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 45 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 45 Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial Intelligence ML/TF) 49 Immediate Outcome 7 (ML investigation and prosecution) 62 Immediate Outcome 8 (Confiscation) 73 CHAPTER 4. TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION 83 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 83 Immediate Outcome 9 (TF investigation and prosecution) 86 Immediate Outcome 10 (TF preventive measures and financial sanctions) 91 Immediate Outcome 11 (PF financial sanctions) 98 CHAPTER 5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES 105 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 105 Immediate Outcome 4 (Preventive Measures) 106 CHAPTER 6. SUPERVISION 117 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 117 Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision) 118 CHAPTER 7. LEGAL PERSONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 131 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 131 Immediate Outcome 5 (Legal Persons and Arrangements) 132 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Korea – © FATF-APG | 2020 2 │ CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 143 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 143 Immediate Outcome 2 (International Co-operation) 144 TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE ANNEX 157 Recommendation 1 – Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach 157 Recommendation 2 - National co-operation and co-ordination 160 Recommendation 3 - Money laundering offence 161 Recommendation 4 - Confiscation and provisional measures 163 Recommendation 5 - Terrorist financing offence 164 Recommendation 6 - Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing 166 Recommendation 7 – Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation 170 Recommendation 8 – Non-profit organisations 172 Recommendation 9 – Financial institution secrecy laws 177 Recommendation 10 – Customer due diligence 178 Recommendation 11 – Record-keeping 181 Recommendation 12 – Politically exposed persons 182 Recommendation 13 – Correspondent banking 183 Recommendation 14 – Money or value transfer services 184 Recommendation 15 – New technologies 184 Recommendation 16 – Wire transfers 185 Recommendation 17 – Reliance on third parties 187 Recommendation 18 – Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries 188 Recommendation 19 – Higher-risk countries 189 Recommendation 20 – Reporting of suspicious transaction 189 Recommendation 21 – Tipping-off and confidentiality 190 Recommendation 22 – DNFBPs: Customer due diligence 190 Recommendation 23 – DNFBPs: Other measures 191 Recommendation 25 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements 197 Recommendation 26 – Regulation and supervision of financial institutions 199 Recommendation 27 – Powers of supervisors 201 Recommendation 28 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs 201 Recommendation 29 - Financial intelligence units 202 Recommendation 30 – Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities 204 Recommendation 31 - Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities 205 Recommendation 32 – Cash couriers 207 Recommendation 33 – Statistics 209 Recommendation 34 – Guidance and feedback 209 Recommendation 35 – Sanctions 210 Recommendation 36 – International instruments 212 Recommendation 37 - Mutual legal assistance 213 Recommendation 38 – Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation 214 Recommendation 39 – Extradition 215 Recommendation 40 – Other forms of international cooperation 216 Summary of Technical Compliance – Key Deficiencies 221 Glossary of Acronyms 225 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Korea – © FATF-APG | 2020 Executive Summary Executive Summary 1. This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in the Republic of Korea as at the date of the on-site visit from 30 June to 18 July 2019. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Korea’s AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings a) Korea shows a good understanding of its money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks informed by an ongoing risk assessment process. Its identification and cross-government response to the emerging risks posed by virtual assets is particularly positive. A deeper understanding of the risks relating to legal persons and arrangements would be useful. Strong policy and operational structures are in place to co-operate and co-ordinate at the national level on AML/CFT issues with involvement from a broad range of public and private sector agencies and institutions. However, co-ordination on proliferation financing (PF) issues is largely ad hoc and would benefit from a more formal system. b) Financial institutions (FIs) and casinos are subject to a comprehensive AML/CFT framework which is generally well implemented. However, there are technical gaps and shortcomings in implementation relating to TF and PF- related targeted financial sanctions (TFS), and requirements for domestic politically exposed persons (PEPs) and PEPs of international organisations. FIs and casinos and their supervisors generally have a sound understanding of AML/CFT risks. Supervisors largely take a risk-based approach to supervision with the exception of the casino supervisor in Korea’s self-governing province, Jeju. These strengths are somewhat undermined by designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) other than casinos not being subject to Korea’s AML/CFT framework nor monitoring. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in Korea – © FATF-APG | 2020 44 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY c) Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) make good use of financial intelligence. This could be strengthened by increasing the resources of the Korean financial intelligence unit (KoFIU) and enhancing the strategic and operational analysis, in particular related to high-risk areas such as tax crime. LEAs take a “follow the money” approach which has been further strengthened by operational and structural changes since 2017. Korea makes efforts to pursue ML in line with its risks. However, while tax crime is identified as Korea’s largest proceeds- generating offence, Korea’s predicate offence framework only covers a tiny portion of tax offences preventing the pursuit of ML related to tax crime. Despite steps to prevent and detect the use of borrowed name accounts, (see para.39), this remains a common typology and is inherently difficult to investigate. d) Asset recovery is actively pursued and has been a formal government priority since 2017 which has allowed for increased resources and specialisation. Between criminal asset recovery, tax levies, and restitution, Korea is able to deprive criminals of a reasonable value of proceeds. Further efforts are needed to increase the recovery of assets subject to confiscation and take advantage of available mechanisms to facilitate and ensure recovery. Authorities confiscate and recover both proceeds and assets of equivalent value in a manner largely in line with Korea’s risks. e) Korea has not had any TF prosecutions or convictions, which is consistent with its risk profile. Inquiries into 86 suspicions of TF show Korea is pursuing TF in line with its risks and vulnerabilities and demonstrate that authorities are well equipped to identify and investigate TF should it arise. Inter-agency co- operation and co-ordination in this area is strong and agencies actively use