The US Army and the Omaha Race Riot of 1919
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URL of article: http://www.nebraskahistory.org/publish/publicat/history/full-text/NH1991USArmy.pdf Date: 3/01/2011 Article Summary: In 1919 Fort Omaha’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, was unfamiliar with recent policies regarding the use of troops in domestic disorders. He hesitated when he was called upon to help put down the Omaha riot on September 28. The Army did eventually intervene, but only after three deaths and massive property damage that might have been avoided. Cataloging Information: Names: Newton D Baker, Edward P Smith, Agnes Loebeck, Will Brown, Jacob Wuest, P A Barrows, Leonard Wood Place Names: Omaha, Nebraska; Fort Omaha, Nebraska; Fort Crook, Nebraska; Camp Dodge, Iowa Keywords: Revised Statutes of 1874, Posse Comitatus Act (1878), cease and desist proclamation (RS 5300), martial law, War Department General Order No 147, strikebreakers, union workers, corruption, Omaha Bee, Mediator, Monitor, Douglas County Courthouse, Fort Crook, Fort Omaha, Camp Dodge, American Legion, Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Newton D Baker, Edward P Smith, Will Brown, Jacob Wuest, P A Barrows, Leonard Wood Photographs / Images: soldiers on guard at Twenty-fourth and Lake Streets, Omaha, following the 1919 riot; editorial cartoon reflecting Omaha’s gratitude for federal military assistance during the riot (Omaha Evening Bee, September 30, 1919); US Secretary of War Newton D Baker; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, commander of Fort Omaha; P A Barrows, Nebraska lieutenant governor THE U.S. ARMY AND THE OMAHA RACE RIOT OF 1919 By Clayton D. Laurie In late September 1919 a race riot laws and court orders; and to protect Federal troops could then be used as a exploded in Omaha. Although it lasted the civil rights of American citizens. posse comitatus to aid beleaguered less than ten hours, it indicated the Between 1792 and 1919 numerous civil officials. If disturbances were high level of racial hatred in the United presidents exercised this authority and especially severe, only the president States that had caused more than forty dispatched federal troops on at least could declare martial law and authorize racial clashes in 1919 alone.' The riot 150 occasions to quell disorders arising the army to exercise civil functions and further indicated a surprising lack of from labor disputes, tax protests, race supplant civil authority for any period knowledge on the part of some com riots, and sectional differences.? of time specified. Although the pro pany, field, and flag-grade officers in To prevent the abuse of federal visions of the Posse Comitatus Act the U.S. Army concerning federal civil military power, Congress had passed were contained in every version of and military policies regarding the use the Posse Comitatus Act in June 1878 Army Regulations following its of troops in domestic disorders, even at the behest of southerners who re passage, many army officers were though such use had been widespread sented use of the army to enforce unfamiliar with it, and the law was before and during World War I. This unpopular civil rights legislation en violated on several occasions." lack of knowledge, the resulting confu acted by Radical Republicans during Federal military and civil officials sion, and the hesitancy of federal com Reconstruction. The act explicitly for had realized in 1878 that the statutes manders in Omaha to use the forces bade the military from aiding civil and procedures governing domestic under their control to quell the disor officials or usurping their law enforce military interventions, including the der in its early stages were responsible ment powers on the local, state, and Posse Comitatus Act, failed to take into for the deaths of three people and federal levels unless the president had account emergency situations where millions of dollars of property damage. received a formal request for such aid.' the formal process to gain federal When the army did respond with large This seminal piece of legislation had a military aid slowed reactions or other numbers of heavily armed troops, they lasting effect on the federal military wise hampered civil authorities performed functions that were already role in domestic disorders. Con attempting to cope with a crisis. They being carried out by civil authorities. siderations of whether army interven further realized that in many areas, the The army intervention was both over tions constituted violations of the army was the only visible sign offederal whelming and late. Posse Comitatus Act became a peren authority. Army officers, therefore, The United States Army had ample nial concernof federal civiland military were authorized by General Order 71 of precedent and legal justification for officials, especially field officers who October 1, 1878, and subsequently by intervening in domestic disturbances. could be prosecuted for violations of paragraph 489 of Army Regulations, to The president in 1919 was authorized the act under both civil law and military intervene without prior authorization by the Constitution and by sections regulations. in emergencies where loss of life or 5297, 5298, and 5299 of the Revised However, once a request for federal massive property damage was likely if Statutes of1874 to use federal troops to troops was received and once the presi federal military aid was not promptly protect state governments from insur dent had determined that civil officials given." They were warned, however, rection, domestic disorders, and other could not quell a disturbance with that the criminal and civil penalties threats to legally constituted civil National Guard or police forces under that applied under the Posse Com authority; to enforce state and federal their control, he was authorized to dis itatus Act were always in force and that patch troops under authority of the they could face court martial and Constitution and U.S. statutes after criminal prosecution if their actions Clayton D. Laurie is a historian with the issuing a formal cease and desist proc were later deemed unjustified. Such United States Army Center of Military His lamation as required under section caveats made many officers hesitant to tory in Washington, D.C. 5300 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. act without orders from higher 135 Nebraska History - Fall 1991 Soldiers on guard at Twenty-fourth and Lake streets, Omaha, following the 1919 riot. (NSHS-K586.6-17) authority, although no army officer was federal service, was unavailable to a cease and desist proclamation. Baker ever court martialed or prosecuted for state officials for riot duty. The role of thus unilaterally and arbitrarily voided violating the Posse Comitatus Act or maintaining domestic order fell to the the constitutional and statutory checks for intervening without prior authority regular army or to federalized National on the domestic use of federal military between 1878 and 1919.6 Guard units, neither of which could be forces for the nextfour years. His policy The entry of the United States into dispatched to aid civil authorities further weakened the restrictions World War I caused a major policy without the cumbersome request pro imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. 8 change and a loosening of the legal cess through the state legislatures to Army departmental commanders and framework regarding the domestic use the president." state governors were informed that if of federal troops. This added to the Realizing the danger that the there was a need for troops to quell dis confusion already experienced byarmy absence of the National Guard posed orders, the governors should contact officers, many of whom were unfamiliar for state officials faced with labor dis the nearest army garrison. with even the most basic pre-war civil putes and other threats to order Army officers were informed of this disturbance regulations. Prior to 1917 allegedly fomented by aliens and policy in War Department General the National Guard had been the radicals, Secretary of War Newton D. Order No. 147 of November 1917.They primary force available to state Baker instituted a policy during the were ordered to keep in close contact officials to quell domestic disorders. summer and fall of 1917 that allowed with civil officials in their areas and to However, according to the provisions state and local civil officials direct provide immediate military assistance ofthe 1903Dick Militia Reform Act and access to federal troops without going and support if requested for quelling the National Defense Act of 1916, the through the formal request procedure any form of disorder.9 Under this policy National Guard, once called into to the president and without obtaining the army aided state and local authori 136 Omaha Race Riot ties by arresting labor radicals, the ire of white union workers.'? four were charged to blacks and only strikers, anti-war dissenters, and Along with increasing racial ten three of these men were charged with aliens; and by breaking strikes, pre sions, Omaha was experiencing attacks on white women." venting demonstrations, and quelling economic instability and political By the late summer of 1919 labor race riots on at least forty-two change. Omaha had a reputation as a unrest, racial hatred, crime, and occasions between March 1917 and "wide open" city which had been con government ineptness, fueled by a sen November 1921.