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Article Title: The US Army and the Omaha Race Riot of 1919

Full Citation: Clayton D Laurie, “The US Army and the Omaha Race Riot of 1919,” Nebraska History 72 (1991): 135-143.

URL of article: http://www.nebraskahistory.org/publish/publicat/history/full-text/NH1991USArmy.pdf Date: 3/01/2011

Article Summary: In 1919 Fort Omaha’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, was unfamiliar with recent policies regarding the use of troops in domestic disorders. He hesitated when he was called upon to help put down the Omaha riot on September 28. The Army did eventually intervene, but only after three deaths and massive property damage that might have been avoided.

Cataloging Information:

Names: Newton D Baker, Edward P Smith, Agnes Loebeck, Will Brown, Jacob Wuest, P A Barrows, Leonard Wood

Place Names: Omaha, Nebraska; Fort Omaha, Nebraska; Fort Crook, Nebraska; Camp Dodge, Iowa

Keywords: Revised Statutes of 1874, Posse Comitatus Act (1878), cease and desist proclamation (RS 5300), martial law, War Department General Order No 147, strikebreakers, union workers, corruption, Omaha Bee, Mediator, Monitor, Douglas County Courthouse, Fort Crook, Fort Omaha, Camp Dodge, American Legion, Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Newton D Baker, Edward P Smith, Will Brown, Jacob Wuest, P A Barrows, Leonard Wood

Photographs / Images: soldiers on guard at Twenty-fourth and Lake Streets, Omaha, following the 1919 riot; editorial cartoon reflecting Omaha’s gratitude for federal military assistance during the riot (Omaha Evening Bee, September 30, 1919); US Secretary of War Newton D Baker; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, commander of Fort Omaha; P A Barrows, Nebraska lieutenant governor

THE U.S. ARMY AND THE OMAHA RACE RIOT OF 1919

By Clayton D. Laurie

In late September 1919 a race riot laws and court orders; and to protect Federal troops could then be used as a exploded in Omaha. Although it lasted the civil rights of American citizens. posse comitatus to aid beleaguered less than ten hours, it indicated the Between 1792 and 1919 numerous civil officials. If disturbances were high level of racial hatred in the United presidents exercised this authority and especially severe, only the president States that had caused more than forty dispatched federal troops on at least could declare martial law and authorize racial clashes in 1919 alone.' The riot 150 occasions to quell disorders arising the army to exercise civil functions and further indicated a surprising lack of from labor disputes, tax protests, race supplant civil authority for any period knowledge on the part of some com­ riots, and sectional differences.? of time specified. Although the pro­ pany, field, and flag-grade officers in To prevent the abuse of federal visions of the Posse Comitatus Act the U.S. Army concerning federal civil military power, Congress had passed were contained in every version of and military policies regarding the use the Posse Comitatus Act in June 1878 Army Regulations following its of troops in domestic disorders, even at the behest of southerners who re­ passage, many army officers were though such use had been widespread sented use of the army to enforce unfamiliar with it, and the law was before and during World War I. This unpopular civil rights legislation en­ violated on several occasions." lack of knowledge, the resulting confu­ acted by Radical Republicans during Federal military and civil officials sion, and the hesitancy of federal com­ Reconstruction. The act explicitly for­ had realized in 1878 that the statutes manders in Omaha to use the forces bade the military from aiding civil and procedures governing domestic under their control to quell the disor­ officials or usurping their law enforce­ military interventions, including the der in its early stages were responsible ment powers on the local, state, and Posse Comitatus Act, failed to take into for the deaths of three people and federal levels unless the president had account emergency situations where millions of dollars of property damage. received a formal request for such aid.' the formal process to gain federal When the army did respond with large This seminal piece of legislation had a military aid slowed reactions or other­ numbers of heavily armed troops, they lasting effect on the federal military wise hampered civil authorities performed functions that were already role in domestic disorders. Con­ attempting to cope with a crisis. They being carried out by civil authorities. siderations of whether army interven­ further realized that in many areas, the The army intervention was both over­ tions constituted violations of the army was the only visible sign offederal whelming and late. Posse Comitatus Act became a peren­ authority. Army officers, therefore, The United States Army had ample nial concernof federal civiland military were authorized by General Order 71 of precedent and legal justification for officials, especially field officers who October 1, 1878, and subsequently by intervening in domestic disturbances. could be prosecuted for violations of paragraph 489 of Army Regulations, to The president in 1919 was authorized the act under both civil law and military intervene without prior authorization by the Constitution and by sections regulations. in emergencies where loss of life or 5297, 5298, and 5299 of the Revised However, once a request for federal massive property damage was likely if Statutes of1874 to use federal troops to troops was received and once the presi­ federal military aid was not promptly protect state governments from insur­ dent had determined that civil officials given." They were warned, however, rection, domestic disorders, and other could not quell a disturbance with that the criminal and civil penalties threats to legally constituted civil National Guard or police forces under that applied under the Posse Com­ authority; to enforce state and federal their control, he was authorized to dis­ itatus Act were always in force and that patch troops under authority of the they could face court martial and Constitution and U.S. statutes after criminal prosecution if their actions Clayton D. Laurie is a historian with the issuing a formal cease and desist proc­ were later deemed unjustified. Such United States Army Center of Military His­ lamation as required under section caveats made many officers hesitant to tory in Washington, D.C. 5300 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. act without orders from higher 135 Nebraska History - Fall 1991

Soldiers on guard at Twenty-fourth and Lake streets, Omaha, following the 1919 riot. (NSHS-K586.6-17) authority, although no army officer was federal service, was unavailable to a cease and desist proclamation. Baker ever court martialed or prosecuted for state officials for riot duty. The role of thus unilaterally and arbitrarily voided violating the Posse Comitatus Act or maintaining domestic order fell to the the constitutional and statutory checks for intervening without prior authority regular army or to federalized National on the domestic use of federal military between 1878 and 1919.6 Guard units, neither of which could be forces for the nextfour years. His policy The entry of the United States into dispatched to aid civil authorities further weakened the restrictions World War I caused a major policy without the cumbersome request pro­ imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. 8 change and a loosening of the legal cess through the state legislatures to Army departmental commanders and framework regarding the domestic use the president." state governors were informed that if of federal troops. This added to the Realizing the danger that the there was a need for troops to quell dis­ confusion already experienced byarmy absence of the National Guard posed orders, the governors should contact officers, many of whom were unfamiliar for state officials faced with labor dis­ the nearest army garrison. with even the most basic pre-war civil putes and other threats to order Army officers were informed of this disturbance regulations. Prior to 1917 allegedly fomented by aliens and policy in War Department General the National Guard had been the radicals, Secretary of War Newton D. Order No. 147 of November 1917.They primary force available to state Baker instituted a policy during the were ordered to keep in close contact officials to quell domestic disorders. summer and fall of 1917 that allowed with civil officials in their areas and to However, according to the provisions state and local civil officials direct provide immediate military assistance ofthe 1903Dick Militia Reform Act and access to federal troops without going and support if requested for quelling the National Defense Act of 1916, the through the formal request procedure any form of disorder.9 Under this policy National Guard, once called into to the president and without obtaining the army aided state and local authori­ 136 Omaha Race Riot

ties by arresting labor radicals, the ire of white union workers.'? four were charged to blacks and only strikers, anti-war dissenters, and Along with increasing racial ten­ three of these men were charged with aliens; and by breaking strikes, pre­ sions, Omaha was experiencing attacks on white women." venting demonstrations, and quelling economic instability and political By the late summer of 1919 labor race riots on at least forty-two change. Omaha had a reputation as a unrest, racial hatred, crime, and occasions between March 1917 and "wide open" city which had been con­ government ineptness, fueled by a sen­ November 1921. Furthermore, the U.S. trolled for many years by a political sationalist press, had provided the Army Military Intelligence Division machine. A small group of corrupt ingredients for crisis in Omaha. (MID) aided Justice Department individuals determined who was Violence finally erupted on September investigators and private "Liberty elected to public office and controlled 28. When it ended, a black man had Leagues" in the surveillance of alleged city services and institutions such as been lynched, the Douglas County subversives, aliens, and disloyal the police department, courts and courthouse lay in ruins, and the city citizens. All ofthese activities were car­ juries, and the Omaha Bee news­ found itself under federal military ried out under the direct access policy paper.P control. or under the emergency provisions of Progressive Omahans, however, The alleged assault on Agnes Army Regulations. None was accom­ began pushing for reforms as early as Loebeck, a white woman, by a black, panied by a presidential cease and 1908 and slowly chipped away at the Will Brown, was the spark that set desist proclamation as required by RS machine. In 1918 a new reform-minded events in motion. After one failed 5300.10 Amid this confused legal situa­ administration led by Mayor Edward attemptto lynch Brown as he was being tion federal military forces were called P. Smith entered office with a mandate transferred to the Omaha jail, rumors to quell an increasing number of labor to remove the last of machine corrup­ began to circulate that a mob would try disputes and race riots in 1919 that tion from the city. However, the again. By early afternoon on Sunday, were a direct outgrowth of wartime deposed bosses were not willing to September 28, a group of youths changes in American society. This was accept their loss of power and began a gathered in South Omaha and began a especially true concerning race concerted attack on the new city march to the Douglas County relations. government through their one remain­ courthouse downtown, where Brown Racial tensions, which had been ing weapon, the Omaha Bee. To erode had been taken for safekeeping. By 4:00 almost exclusively confined to the public confidence in the municipal P.M. a large crowd had gathered near South since Reconstruction, became a administration, the Bee attacked the the courthouse and its mood had nationwide phenomenon in 1919. police force in a series of articles that become increasingly hostile. Omaha was no exception and was portrayed it as corrupt, inept, and vice­ By early evening the situation had a microcosm of postwar America. ridden. The newspaper published escalated beyond the control of the Although racialclasheshadtakenplace numerous sensational, front-page Omaha police and city officials, who in the past, Nebraska had a relatively accounts of sexual assaults on white had become virtual prisoners inside the small black population of approx­ women committed by black men. courthouse. The size of the crowd was imately 13,000 out of a total pop­ These attacks, the Bee maintained, estimated at from 5,000 to over 15,000 ulation of nearly 1,300,000. Omaha, the took place because of police incom­ people. By 8:00 P.M. the mob began fir­ largest city in the state, had a popula­ petence or with their connivance.!" ing on the courthouse with guns looted tion of about 191,000 people of whom This newspaper campaign, which from nearby stores and by 8:30 had set 10,315 were blacks. Despite these small was sometimes joined by the other fire to the building, thwarting attempts numbers, the rate of growth of the Omaha papers, convinced a majority of by the fire department to extinguish minority population was alarming to Omaha residents, especially women, the flames. many whites, increasing by over 130 that in the present environment no The riot culminated about 10:30 percent during the previous decade as white female was safe. The Mediator P.M. after the mob had tried to lynch blacks came to the city during the war even called for the formation of Mayor Ed Smith, who had been years to take jobs left open by white vigilance committees to do the job of dragged from the building after appeal­ military service and labor disputes.'! the police if city officials could not end ing for order. The suspect, Brown, had The role of blacks as strikebreakers the crime wave. These charges went also been seized, beaten, riddled with was especially evident in 1919, when unrefuted despite the efforts of the bullets, and hung from a lamp post. His many black packinghouse workers fled city's black newspaper, the Monitor, body was then burned and dragged Chicago and East St. Louis, Illinois, and despite records heldin the Douglas through the streets. Some members of after race riots in those cities, to fill County attorney's office which showed the mob continued to mill around in the strike-vacated jobs in Omaha's meat­ that of the seventeen cases of alleged downtown area until after midnight. packing industry. Such actions raised assault during the previous year, only Sometime between 10:40 and 10:50, 137 Nebraska History - Fall 1991

federal troops arrived on the scene tect the federal prisoners confined in post-riot reports of Colonel Alexander after considerable delay and repeated the courthouse. This was a legitimate L. Dade of the Inspector General's pleas from local and state civil request to protectfederal property and Division and CaptainHenryT. Lewis of authorities. 16 authority, a request which had Army Intelligence, who both stated Omaha and Nebraska officials began prompted numerous, unquestioned that widespread looting was in prog­ seeking federal military aid as early as interventions during the previous forty ress at 8:00. The initial report by 6:20, but because they directed their years. But Wuest again refused to act Wuest's adjutant was followed by requests to both local army posts, Forts without authorization from Washing­ another call at 8:15 statingthat the mob Crook and Omaha, and to the War ton, citing the same reasons as was "boisterous but no violence had Department in Washington, their before. 19 been committed," although again the signals became crossed, and army Local authorities continued to call on reports of Dade and Lewis claimed that intervention proceeded slowly at all Wuest between 6:30 and 7:30. But he the looting of a gas station and torching levels. The paths eventually converged remained firm, informing local, state, of the courthouse began around at 10:45 P.M. when Secretary of War and federal officials that "federal 8:30. 22 Baker issued orders for federal troops troops could not be used as a posse At about this time Nebraska Adju­ to intervene. 17 comitatus" without authorization from tant General H.J. Paul called Wuest to Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, higher authority and that their request federal troops for riot duty as commanding Fort Omaha, was the applications for aid should be made to no state troops were available. He army commander closest to the riot. He Washington. Wuest was directly refer­ asked Wuest to contact the captain of received his first news of the formation ring to the form of deployment the local National Guard unit, located of the courthouse mob at 6:20, although expressly forbidden prior to 1917 by at Benson, west of Omaha, to have that he later indicated that he had the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.20 Had force sent to the city. However, the unit knowledge of its existence as early as Wuest been aware of current civil and had been disbanded after completing 5:30. During a telephone call request­ military policies regarding federal wartime federal service. Soon after ing aid from a captain of the Omaha military intervention in civil disorders, speaking to the adjutant general at police, Wuest replied that he could not the emergency provisions of Army "about 8:45" Wuest received a report deploy troops without the direct Regulations, and recent wartime prec­ that the mob had gotten out of control authority of the War Department and edents, troops could have been dis­ and was threatening to burn the "after civil authorities had exhausted patched to the scene of the riot as early courthouse, an act not reported to him all the means at their disposal to quell as 6:20 when the first call for aid was by his adjutant until thirty minutes the disorder" as required by federal received. Wuest was unwilling to risk later." statutes. While it appears that Wuest criminal prosecution or damage to his Wuest responded by dispatching a was familiar with at least a portion of career by interveningin a civil disorder, truck downtown to transport troops the pre-war laws regarding the sum­ perhaps illegally, without explicit back to Forts Crook and Omaha. A moning of federal forces to aid civil orders to do so. second truck was sent at 8:55, a third at authorities, his actions were contraryto However, Wuest did begin to mon­ 9:30, and a fourth at 10:03. Instead of the emergency provisions of army itor the developments at the carrying armed troops to the riot, each regulations that allowed immediate courthouse after 6:30. He sent his adju­ vehicle contained one officer and three intervention in situations where a delay tant to the scene, while two other to four armed men who did nothing could result in the loss of life and de­ officers, Major Clarence H. Maranville more than ferry troops away from the struction of property. In addition, his and Captain Henry T. Lewis, were sent scene of the disturbance as ordered. reply indicated his lack of knowledge of downtown to collect army personnel. After the return of the last vehicles at the direct access policy formulated in At the same time, he ordered that 10:25, Wuest decided to intervene 1917, published army-wide in General machine guns be taken out of storage, without awaiting orders from Washing­ Order No. 147 of November 1917, that units prepare for action, and that ton. He later explained his reasoning: which had been acted upon repeatedly rifle ammunition be made ready. The situation at this time had become so acute elsewhere in the nation by other more While these preparations were that it was evident that any further delay would be disastrous and thatin order to protectthe lives junior officers during the last two underway, Wuest began to receive the and property of the citizens of Omaha years.!" first of several reports from his adju­ prompt action would have to be taken without Less than ten minutes after he had tant near the courthouse. At 8:00 P.M. longer awaiting instructions from Washington. received this first call for aid, Wuest he was informed that the crowds were He stated that he withheld action received a second request from the increasing "but were not viciously dis­ "until it became apparent that the civil federal marshall, who wanted Wuest to orderly and were capable of control.">' authority had failed to make use of the send troops from Fort Omaha to pro­ These reports were contradicted by the means provided by law to suppress dis­ 138 Omaha Race Riot

orders" and was "helpless in coping manded all troops in Omaha and the with the situation." The colonel's deci­ Real Protection reinforcements, which had arrived sion came approximately four hours from Camp Dodge, Iowa; Camp Grant, after he first learned of the existence of Illinois; and Camp Funston, Kansas. the mob at the courthouse. The largest detachment, from Camp As Wuest began to deploy his own Dodge, consisted of a provisional troops, he contacted Colonel J. E. machine gun company of eleven Morris, the commanding officer at Fort officers and 152 men. The army com­ Crook, informing him of his decision to manders quickly promulgated emer­ intervene. He then assembled his com­ gency measures to prevent a repetition mand and ordered six officers and 206 of the previous day's events. Colonel men to move into the city. However, as Wuest had already issued a proclama­ the troops began to move out, a report tion to all newspapers informing the was received that the mob was now de­ public that the situation was under con­ scending upon the black neighborhood trol and warning residents that any in north Omaha. Dividing his forces, citizen "bearing arms" faced imme­ Wuest sent the Twenty-seventh diate arrest. A second proclamation Balloon Company under the command was later issued ordering all blacks to of Major Henry C. White to disperse remain indoors. By nightfall of Mon­ the mob at the courthouse, while the day, September 29, the army could Seventeenth Balloon Company, under report that Omaha was quiet. Major Maranville, proceeded to the That evening Army Central Depart­ black district to protect the populace. ment Commander Major General At 10:45 Wuest finally received Leonard Wood, who had just arrived in instructions to intervene from Sec­ Bismarck, North Dakota, received Cartoonist Doane Powell expressed retary of War Newton D. Baker, who Omaha's gratitude for federal military news of the disturbance. The call from was responding to a request for aid assistance during the 1919 riot. From Omaha triggered a flurry of activity. from Nebraska Lieutenant Governor The Omaha Evening Bee, September Wood immediately called Army Chief P.A. Barrows. Perhaps because of 30,1919. of Staff Major General Payton March, Wuest's refusal to intervene on his own who granted him authority "to call initiative, Barrows put his request for putting an end to scattered looting, upon any troops within the limits of the military aid in the pre-war form Major White's troops experienced no department" to restore order.> required by RS 5297, rather than as a resistance. Meanwhile, Major Maran­ Although Wuest's initial interven­ direct access request, which had failed ville's force found the black community tion could be justified under the con­ to prompt action through the initiative tense. Soldiers reported exchanging ditions outlined for emergency of the local military commander. Baker shots with "snipers" on rooftops, but situations in army regulations, General approved the request on his own no casualties were incurred by either Wood now assumed overall control authority and directed Wuest to offer side. At midnight a second detachment under authority of the wartime policy of all possible assistance to Omaha civil of 108 officers and men of the Four­ direct access formulated by Secretary authorities and to request whatever teenth and Twenty-fourth Balloon of War Baker in 1917. To calm edgy troops he deemed necessary in the sec­ companies based in Omaha arrived to public officials nationwide, and to retary's name from the commander of reinforce the Seventeenth Balloon review federal policies for the benefit of the nearest sizable army garrison at Company in the black neighborhood. army commanders, Baker reaffirmed Camp Dodge, Iowa. By 1:15A.M. the area was reported to be the direct access policy on October 3 Meanwhile Wuest's initial deploy­ quiet. Wuest's adjutant at the and 15, 1919, in light of the recent race ments proceeded. Major White's force courthouse made his final report forty­ riots in Omaha andin Elaine, Arkansas, arrived in the vicinity ofthe courthouse five minutes later, also stating that all and due to the outbreakof a nationwide in time to preventany further loss oflife was quiet. steel strike and threats of a nationwide or property and quickly dispersed the Garrisons throughout the Midwest coal strike." President Wilson, who remaining small groups milling around immediately responded to calls for had suffered a stroke on September 25 the charred building. The largest por­ troops. By 10:00 A.M. on September while on a tour promotingthe League of tionof the crowd, however, had already 29, Fort Crook commander Colonel Nations, was not consulted about the departed. Apart from breaking up John E. Morris, Twentieth Infantry, a deployment of troops to Omaha. No these small gatherings of rioters and more senior officer to Wuest, com­ cease and desist proclamation was 139 Nebraska History - Fall 1991

issued prior to the dispatch of federal provisional company, a provisional troops to Omaha as required by RS machine gun company, and a pro­ 5300. However, Wood did issue a proc­ visional battalion based at the city lamation in Wilson's name informing auditorium. Three other company-size the citizens of Omaha of the arrival and detachments were deployed at mission of the army, adding incorrectly Twenty-fourth and Lake streets (the that the governor of Nebraska had black neighborhood), atthe courthouse called upon the president requesting and city hall, and at Twenty-fourth and federal aid. In reality, the first request o streets (South Omaha). General to the War Department for aid came Wood threatened to use deadly force if from Lieutenant Governor Barrows necessary to keep order-" and arrived in Washington at 9:43 on Wood's next step was to issue a proc­ September 28 during the riot after lamation outlining the reasons for the requests for military intervention on federal military presence in Omaha. the local level produced no results. Citizens were forbidden to carry Governor Samuel R. McKelvie was in firearms or to attend any large public North Platte when the riot began." gatherings. Drawing on community General Wood was an army officer support to help with local policing, with vast experience in civil-military Wood approved the deputizing of 200 affairs, a penchant for publicity, and a white men belonging to the American man with presidential ambitions. His Legion. On October 1, 1919, in a move prior service as chief of staff and as a of dubious legality, General Wood, military governor in Cuba and the without advice, input, or orders from Philippines gave him unrivalled either President Wilson or Secretary knowledge on how to restore faltering Baker, declaredmodified martial law in civil authority. He would soon gain Omaha. Such an action was a rare event additional civil disturbance experience in American history and was uncalled and useful publicity in the coming for in this case. All violence had ended weeks in Gary, Indiana, where he was four days previously; civil courts, the initial commander of the federal police, and officials were in place and troops sent for riot duty during a steel functioning; and in all respects the city strike. His quest for the 1920 had returned to normal. Because Republican presidential nomination soldiers are not legally authorized to gave him an air of notoriety that declare martial law of any form without augmented an already decisive per­ the express direction of the president. sonality. After receiving orders from Wood was oversteppinghis authority." the War Department, he set off from Wood next took it upon himself to Bismarck for Omaha by special supplant civil officials for the purpose train." of rebuilding the law enforcement Wood arrived in Omaha on Septem­ agencies of Omaha to prevent any ber 30, two days after the riot had repetition of the recent violence. In vir­ ended, and immediately met with tually all after-action reports, army Governor McKelvie, Acting Omaha officers criticized the performance of Mayor William Ure, and Colonel the police. Colonel Wuest, for example, Morris. He approved the earlier troop noted: dispositions and issued new orders to The most impressive feature of the riot was the prevent further rioting and to lack of preparation on the part of the authorities ... to meet a crisis which was known by them emphasize the seriousness of the situa­ to be impending. tion. The revised troop deployment created a strong reserve capable of He further stated that "the police on being rushed to any trouble spot, duty made no effort to disperse the although the likelihood of further trou­ u.s. Secretary of War Newton D. crowds when opportunity offered to do ble already seemed remote. This cen­ Baker. Courtesy of National Archives so," and that "they remained as scat­ tral reserve consisted of one and Records Administration. tered individuals ... and as such their 140 Omaha Race Riot

Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Wuest, commanding Fort Omaha. Courtesy of Historical Society of Douglas County ... (right) P. A. Barrows, Nebraska lieutenant governor. (NSHS-P853)

timidity and their isolation made them ing the rearming of the police, Wood Although no charges were initially ineffective."30 While these were proceeded to investigate the riot and filed against those arrested, police charges that the police could just as arrest mob ringleaders. On the basis of officials later arraigned suspects on a easily have leveled against Wuest, they photographs confiscated from the variety of crimes from arson to murder. were willing to accept any aid the army public, the army (aided by police and The police compiled an additional list could offer. deputized American Legionnaires) of over 300 alleged participants in the The cornerstone of Wood's plan was identified and arrested 100 men sus­ mob who were now being sought for to augment the police force by adding pected of being mob participants, questioning. Pending trial and the con­ 100 "carefully selected men" and by although such actions by the army vening of a grand jury, the suspects purchasing an impressive array of would have beenviolations ofthe Posse were held without bond in army cus­ modern weapons including A5-caliber Comitatus Act in pre-wartimes, under­ tody despite the dubious legality of the revolvers, riot guns, and .30-caliber taken as they were without a presiden­ measure, while army intelligence Browning machine guns. The general's tial proclamation and during an officers aided police interrogations. request that these items be supplied unauthorized state of martial law. General Wood himself interviewed from federal arsenals, however, was Wood told the Legionnaires to "use no several suspected mob participants. denied by the War Department, which more force than is necessary and use all Even though photographic iden­ cited statutes forbidding the sale of the force that is necessary." "Remem­ tifications of mob members were avail­ federal arms to municipalities. ber," he stated, "you are sent for a cer­ able, including a grisly view of Omaha However, the other restructuring tain man. Come back with him. Bring residents surrounding the bonfire con­ efforts went forward." him in alive if possible. But bringhim suming Brown's remains, all ofthe sus­ Undaunted by the setbacks involv­ in."32 pects were eventually released." 141 Nebraska History - Fall 1991

Wood's publicized conclusions con­ only two companies of regulars Within a week of the Omaha riot cerning the causes of the Omaha riot remained in the city to support General Leonard Wood was sent to relate closely to his presidential municipal authority and the recreated command federal troops in Gary, aspirations. Much of his strategy for and rearmed Omaha police force. The Indiana, where violence had erupted capturing the 1920 Republican presi­ lastfederal troops departed on Novem­ due to a steel strike. There he used the dential nomination rested on his ber 15.36 same dubious legal tactics as in Omaha, philosophy of "Americanism" and a The army's performance in Omaha declaring martial law withoutpresiden­ staunch opposition to radicals and was effective in preventing further dis­ tial approval and usurping many of the aliens. Although he had initially order even though the fury of the mob functions normally performed by the blamed sensational reporting by the had largely subsided before the civil government. local press for the outbreak of racial soldiers arrived. The troops had little Wood's leadership in Omaha and in violence in Omaha, he soon concluded to do besides patrol quiet streets, and Gary gave him a strict law and order that the Industrial Workers of the they performed no functions that reputation that appealed to many World (IWW) was responsible. Two Omaha civil authorities could not have Americans during that time of days after he arrived in the city, he performed themselves. Considering heightened fear of revolution at home recorded in his diary, perhaps for later past instances of federal military inter­ and abroad. Although he was a strong public consumption, that "there were a vention in labor disputes and race riots, contender for the Republican presi­ number of requests for IWW meetings the time for army intervention with dential nomination, the nomination and one Russian soviet, all of which overwhelming numbers of heavily went instead to Warren G. Harding of were declined," and that "every day armed soldiers was on the early after­ Ohio. Wood returned to command of demonstrates more and more the fact noon of September 28. the army's Central Department, and in that preparations have been made by Colonel Wuest, while familiar with 1921 became Governor General of the the IWW or some other organized ele­ the basic pre-war guidelines governing Philippines. He died during surgery to ment of disorder, to create very serious the use of federal troops in domestic remove a brain tumor in August trouble and probably burn a good sec­ disorders, was unfamiliar with the 1927.39 tion of the city."34 changes that had taken place since While the army intervention in the On the eve of his departure Wood 1917 and he was evidently not aware of Omaha race riot was only a small inci­ addressed the Omaha University Club the emergency provisions contained in dent in American racial history and in and publicly blamed the IWW for the Army Regulations concerning the use the history of the use of federal troops trouble. His speech reflected the Red of troops to quell a riot. His lack of in domestic disturbances, it serves as a Scare hysteria which was sweeping the familiarity with the regulations reminder of the need for alert, nation, but in the case of Omaha, there explains his hesitancy to intervene knowledgeable, and aware military was a significant gap between Wood's until the riot was nearly over, as well as officers who are willing to take the campaign rhetoric and the actual his desire to avoid taking any initiative initiative and who are capable offulfill­ causes of the racial violence. His that could have costly ramifications if ing the internal defense mission of the actions in deploying troops, rebuilding unsupported by higher authority. army within the bounds of law and prec­ the Omaha police, investigating the However, Wuest was commended by edent. Prompt, decisive action by riot, and arresting the ringleaders of General Wood for "the promptand effi­ Colonel Wuest could have prevented the lynch mob indicated that the cient manner" in which "he responded the gathering of the mob that even­ general had a better understanding of to the call of the civil authorities during tually attempted the murder of Mayor the situation than his public utterances the recent disturbances," even though Smith, lynched Will Brown, and de­ revealed. Combating anti-radicalism Wood had discussed the causes of the stroyed the Douglas County Court­ was more popular and politically riot with city officials and supposedly house. The army succeededin prevent­ expedient than charging whites with had read the contradictory reports of ing further bloodshed and destruction the lynching murders of blacks and the other army officers present.37 in Omaha, but more timely interven­ destruction of public property." Wuest's performance during the tion could have prevented the The army's efforts in Omaha Omaha race riot had no effect on his violence altogether. involved the largest contingent of subsequent career in the Army Air federal troops (upwards of seventy Corps. He served in a variety of posts officers and 1,222 enlisted men) before being promoted to full colonelin NOTES deployed to deal with racial violence 1934, and before retiring on disability "This study is drawn from the unpublished during the 1919-20 period. The initial with the Legion of Merit in May 1944. "The Race Riots of 1919," by the author, Ron Cole, and Paul C. Latawski, the latter two for­ emergency had already passed before He died in January 1977 at age ninety­ merly of the U.S. Army Center of Military His­ the troops arrived and by mid-October six.38 tory, Washington, D.C. It will be part of the 142 Omaha Race Riot

center's second volume (1877-1945) of a three­ Bulletins, 1917 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1918), War Dept. File AG 370.6, RG 407, Records of the volume history concerning the role of federal GO No. 147, Nov. 20, 1917. Adj. Gen., USA, NARA; and Butte Mine Strike, troops in domestic disturbances, 1787-1970. IONo comprehensive list of domestic federal 81-83, Box 10, Glasser File, RG 60, NARA. "Our Own Race War," NorthAmericanReview, military interventions exists. The author has a 19Wuest Rept. 210 (1919),436-38;"The LynchingIndustry," The partial list showing 137 separate deployments 2°Ibid. Crisis 19 (Feb. 1920), 183-84.The army was called between June 1877 and July 1945. For wartime 21lbid. to deal with six of these disturbances. The examples see War Department, Annual Report of 22Wuest, Dade, and Lewis Repts. remainder were quelled by local and state the Secretary of War, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: 23Until stated otherwise the following is from military and police forces. GPO, 1920),68-70; Berman, Labor Disputes, 207; the Wuest Rept. 2Cassius Dowell, Military Aid to the Civil Power Rich, President and Civil Disorder, 152. The 24Papers of Leonard Wood, Library of Con­ (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.; General Service Schools, Glasser file in RG 60 is a rich source of primary gress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., 1925),201-10 passim. For a composite history of material on the use of federal troops in labor dis­ Accession 4488, Container 12, General Leonard the army role in civil disturbances between 1787 putes during the World War I period. Wood Diary (hereafter Wood Papers). and 1919, see Frederick T. Wilson, Federal Aid in "Lawrence H. Larsen and Barbara J. Cottrell, 25Wood Papers, Diary and Proclamation of Domestic Disturbances (Washington, D.C.: GPO, The Gate City: A History of Omaha (Boulder, Sept. 30, 1919; Rich, Presidents and Civil Disor­ 1903); Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Pruett, 1982), 157, 167-68; Michael L. Lawson, der, 155;ArthurI. Wascow, From Race Riot to Sit­ Military Forces in Domestic Disturbances, 1787­ "Omaha, A City in Ferment: Summer 1919," Ne­ In, 1919 and the 1960s (New York: Doubleday, 1878 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military His­ braska History 58 (Fall 1977), 398, 415; Robert H. 1966), 129-30. tory, 1989); Jerry M. Cooper, The Army and Civil Lyman, ed., The World Almanac and Book of 26Memo, Baker to Bliss, May 29, 1917,25-28, Disorder (Westport, Ct.: GreenwoodPress, 1980); Facts for 1933 (New York: New York World Box 12, Glasser File, RG60, NARA; U.S., War Bennett Rich, The President and Civil Disorder Telegram, 1933), 342. Dept., General Orders and Bulletins, GO No. 147, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 12"Another Woman Attacked in Omaha," New Nov. 20, 1917 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1918); 1941); Edward Berman, Labor Disputes and the York Times, Oct. 2, 1919, 1:4;Larsen and Cottrell, and William Preston, Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: President ofthe United States (New York: Colum­ The Gate City, 156; Lawson, "Omaha, A City in Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 bia University Press, 1924). Ferment," 398. For labor troubles in Omaha see (New York: Harperand Row, 1963), 105.All troop 3For the effect of the Posse Comitatus Act on Lawson, 395-400. movements in the Omaha situation were ordered the army see H. W.C. Furman, "Restrictions I3"The Real Causes of the Two Race Riots," by Wood or Baker and were made without the Upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse The Crisis 19 (Dec. 1919), 62; Lawson, "Omaha, A knowledge or approval of President Wilson, see Comitatus Act," Military Law Review 7 (Jan. City in Ferment," 395-417. For a detailed history Rich,155. 1960), 85-129. For the act itself see Adjutant of Omaha politics see Larsen and Cottrell; 27Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A General's Office, Index of General Orders Orville D. Menard, "Tom Dennison, the Omaha Biography (New York: Harper Brothers, 1931), (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1879), GO No. 49, July Bee, and the 1919 Omaha Race Riot," Nebraska 333; Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General 7, 1878; and subsequent Army Regulations History 68 (Winter 1987), 152-65. Leonard Wood (San Rafael: Presidio Press, beginning as early as the Regulations of 1894. 14Menard, "Tom Dennison," and Larsen and 1978), 234-35. The act is contained in either paragraph 484 or Cottrell, The Gate City, cover the riot. For a 28"General Wood Orders The Arrest of 486, depending upon the date of issue of the review of Omaha's reform administration, see Omaha's Rioters," New York Times, Oct. 1, regulations. Louise Rickard, "The Politics of Reform in 1919. 4Several inquiries were held by the army con­ Omaha, 1919-1925," Nebraska History 53 (Winter 29Wood Papers, Container 12, Wood Diary; cerning officers who allegedly violated this act, 1972), 419-45. Annual Rept. ofthe Secretary of War, 1920, 68-69; including ColonelNathan Dudley during the Lin­ 15Report of Colonel Alexander L. Dade to Wood used American Legionnaires in Army coln County War in New Mexico Territory in Commanding General, Central Dept., Oct. 15, strike quelling efforts in Gary, Indiana, and Den­ 1878-79andBrigadier General Henry C. Merriam 1919, Box 5, Glasser File, RG 60, NARA, (here­ ver, Colorado, in 1919 and 1920. following the Coeur d'Alene disputes in 1899. after Dade Rept.); Lawson, "Omaha, A City in 30Lewis, Wuest, and Dade Repts. Both were exonerated. Brigadier General George Ferment," 412-13. Lawson quotes newspaper 31WoodPapers, Container 12, Wood Diary; For Crook was reprimanded for violating the act in figures stating that between June 7 and Sept. 27, the telegrams concerning this matter see Box 5, Hastings, Nebraska, in 1879, as was Brigadier 1919, twenty-one attacks took place, sixteen of Glasser File, RG 60, NARA. General George Gibbon during the anti-Chinese which were committed by blacks. Only one victim 32"Another Woman Attacked in Omaha." riots in Washington in 1885-86. was black. 33ForWood's role see Wood Papers, Container 'Adjutant General's Office, Index of General "There are numerous sources for the events of 12, Wood Diary; "Gen. Wood Orders The Arrest Orders, GO No. 71, Oct. 1, 1878. The emergency September 28, including the Dade Report; of Omaha's Rioters"; "Another Woman Attacked provision as set down in GO No. 71 is repeated as Report of Captain H.T. Lewis, intelligence in Omaha"; Wascow, From Race Riot to Sit-In, either paragraph 487 or 489 of Army Regulations. officer, Fort Omaha, Oct. 27, 1919, in Record 114-16; Larsen & Cottrell, The Gate City, 172. The applicable paragraph in 1919 was para. 487, Group 165, Records of the War Department 34Wood Papers, Container 12, General see Regulations for the Army ofthe United States General Staff, File 10218-371-11: Military Wood's Dairy. 1913, corrected to Sept. 24, 1917 (New York: Intelligence Division, NARA (hereafter Lewis 35"WoodAccuses the IWW," New York Times, Military Publishing, ca. 1918). Rept.); Larsen and Cottrell, The Gate City, 169­ Oct. 5, 1919; Lane, Armed Progressive, 233-34. 6Furman, "Restrictions Upon the Use of the 72;Menard, "Tom Dennison," 158-60;and files of 36Wascow, From Race Riot to Sit-In, 115-17; Army," 86. the Omaha Bee, Omaha Daily News, and Omaha Report of the Secretary of War, 1920,68-69. 7Adjutant General, Index of General Orders World-Herald beginning September 29, 1919. 37Letter, Wood to Wuest, Oct. 14, 1919, and (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904), GO No. 55, No. I7Report of Lieutenant Colonel Jacob W.S. reply, Wuest to Wood, Oct. 20, 1919, Container 19,1903;Federal Aid, App, G, "Sec. 111,National Wuest, CO, Fort Omaha, Oct. 2, 1919, RG 165, 131, Wood Papers. Defense Act of 3 June 1916." 322. Records of the War Dept. General Staff, Files 38Fora biography of Wuest, see "Jacob Win­ 8See Memo, Baker to Bliss, May 29, 1917, Box 10218-371-4 and 10218-317-11, Military Intelli­ field Scott Wuest," Assembly 37 (December 12, Glasser File, Wartime Strikes and the Army, gence Division, NARA (hereafter Wuest Rept.); 1978), 106; and William H. Donaldson, ed., Record Group 60, Records of the Department of see also Lewis and Dade Repts. Biographical Register ofOfficers and Graduates of Justice, National Archives and Records 18Wuest Rept. Most wartime interventions the United States Military Academy, 1920-1930 Administration, Washington, D.C., hereafter RG under direct access were initiated by company (Chicago: RR Donnelley and Sons, 1930), 60, NARA. Baker's actions followed the render­ and field grade officers responding to the calls of 7:598. ing of a dubious legal opinion by the army judge local civil authorities. In one case, Captain Omar 39Who Was Who in American Military History advocate general's office. See Opinion on Legal Bradley intervened under emergency provisions (Chicago: Marquis' Who's Who, 1975), 645-46; Theory on the Use of Troops in Civil Areas Dur­ of Army Regulations to disperse a parade held by Roger Spiller, ed., Dictionary of American ing War, Mar. 12, 1917, Box 11, Glasser file­ striking Irish-American miners in Butte, Mon­ Military Biography, 3 vol. (Westport, CT: Green­ Lumber, 7e-7f, RG 60, NARA. tana in March 1918. See Rept., Bradley to Com­ wood Press, 1984),3:1209-12. 9War Department, General Orders and manding General, Western Dept., Mar. 19, 1918, 143