The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1975
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The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1975 Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive Translated by Anna Melyakova http://www.nsarchive.org The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1975 http://www.nsarchive.org February 9, 1975 I can’t believe this is the first entry in the new year. That’s because I’m almost never home. Looking back, there have been a lot of events over these two months. Things are moving rapidly and at the same time there is a constant depressing feeling that you are fluttering in the same place, waiting for something that is about to happen (both in society and in your personal life). Yesterday I worked with Blatov (adviser to the General Secretary) on materials for [Harold] Wilson’s (British Prime Minister) February 13th visit. At this point, I can only briefly summarize the main points of recent events. Brezhnev’s illness. Rumors that it is irreversible and the talk about successors, both from “voices” and among the general public. January 14th-15th with Poles and Hungarians ([Bogumil] Suika, [Gyula] Horn), pulling together the results of the Preparatory committee for the European Conference of Communist Parties; preparing materials for the working group. This drafting committee work had actually been assigned to PUWP1 and HSWP2 in Budapest, but they asked us to join too. As the result we ended up with our concept: a 150-page “volume,” an “Introduction” plus a set of quotes from Warsaw and Budapest arranged according to our logic, the logic of the Gorky dacha. And a summary of everything that was said in Warsaw and Budapest following the plan and even the formulas from our draft Declaration. Now all of this has been translated and the Germans sent it to the 28 parties, so on the 17th the working group can get started in Berlin. Evening at Zagladin’s on Starokonyushennyi Pereulok with Suika and Horn. Debates. On January 17th with Harry Ott at the Embassy of the GDR. Pavlov, Poplavsky, Gostev and others from the industrial departments. Toasts to the international affairs guys. The industrialists probably felt that we were acting like “blue blood” and showing off. It was not very comfortable. January 17th – Ponomarev’s 70th anniversary. Hero of socialist labor. Our congratulations. Our gift – “His collected works” starting from 1931. Zagladin’s speech. B.N.’s response. For the first time I saw him deeply moved and patting his eyes with a handkerchief. He spoke about the “people,” that we are part of the people too. From January 20th-23rd – Berlin. Zagladin, Shakhnazarov, and I. From the other side – [Hermann] Axen, [Paul] Markowski, Malov, and others. They will be hosting the working group, 1 Polish United Workers’ Party 2 Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1975 http://www.nsarchive.org so we had to coordinate the strategy. Also about Chilean affairs: Communist and Socialist Parties of Chile. [Carlos] Altamirano. Plenum of the Socialist Party of Chile in Berlin, which of course the Germans eavesdropped on. The socialists are increasingly eager to take the Chile liberation movement into their hands. [Volodia] Teitelboim is a wet noodle. Going over the mistakes, and who is to blame? The socialists are guided by Fidel Castro, who almost publicly said that defeat was inevitable no matter what kind of assistance had been provided to Chile. This corresponds to my report during the visit to Chile in the fall of 1972, based on the words of the Socialist leaders: “If we don’t arm the people, and if you don’t supply us with weapons, we will perish. The revolution cannot develop further without a civil war.” During lunch in Varadero, Cuba, [Carlos Rafael] Rodriguez said, “We knew they would be overwhelmed, so we stocked up on their magnificent wine in advance.” This was a joke, but at the same time not open to discussion or questioning. Right now Altamirano is apparently moving things towards armed resistance. For him, the Chilean Communist Party is either a hindrance or an auxiliary power. But he will never accept its hegemony, which is why he does not have “our” understanding of “unity.” Haus an der Schpree [sic in German]… Dinner in a hut. Dinner in Potsdam, i.e. trip there late at night, 150km around Berlin. An incredible undertaking in the German style. Reception dinner with Honecker… He gives off the impression of being a person who is competent and very loyal to us, but one who knows that he would do a better job dealing with West Germans than we do. For this, we would need to give him a longer leash, if not complete freedom. The level and tone of the reception ([we were treated] almost like members of the CPSU Politburo) could be explained by the fact that right before our visit the Germans got a “dressing- down,” which was supposedly coordinated with Brezhnev but was initiated by Gromyko. The East Germans developed a plan of collaboration with West Germany – the “11 points,” including the construction of an autobahn to Hamburg, the Beltov channel, and other economic developments mostly paid for by the FRG. Naturally, all of this was coordinated with us in advance. One of the MFA Department heads, Bondarenko, even went to Germany in connection with this. However, maybe he didn’t report on time (although I saw the ciphered telegram from Berlin myself, in which Honecker reported to Moscow about these plans). Or maybe it was a deliberate provocation by Gromyko, Rusakov, and Blatov (who climbed on the bandwagon) to use the opportunity to “remind the Germans who they are, that if they want to have common policy with us, they should follow our policies.” Either way, Gromyko initiated this dressing- down, and the Germans were made to understand this before our visit. That is why when they received our delegation (which had nothing to do with this affair) they did everything they could to show that it was some kind of misunderstanding. I must say, The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1975 http://www.nsarchive.org we did the same (including Shakhnazarov; he and his boss Katushev were against this whole idea). We tried to emphasize that nothing is happening and “our friendship is as strong as ever.” When we put together the ciphered telegram we wrote it with the subtext that suspecting the Germans of disloyalty is silly and ludicrous, as well as harmful. By the way, Gromyko held the telegram for three days; it seemed he would not release it into broad circulation at all. He eventually released it, but not before the resolution was signed to immediately invite Axen, Markowski and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs [Oskar] Fischer to Moscow to carry out the planned dressing-down. And in fact they were in Moscow the day after we returned from Berlin. I had a nasty feeling that they might suspect us of adding fuel to the fire of Gromyko’s provocation. Shakhnazarov later told me that the meeting (Gromyko, Katushev, Blatov, and Rusakov from our side) was “rough.” The Germans were put through the wringer and their “11 points” were effectively revoked, despite Axen’s reasonable arguments and references to the fact that “all of this was coordinated with you in advance.” According to our ambassador, Axen’s report to the SED Politburo was “formal”: “a common point of view and complete agreement with Soviet comrades.” There was nothing about the atmosphere or the outcomes of the meeting in Moscow. It turns out that Honecker ordered the whole Moscow delegation to keep silent under threat of losing their party membership card. On January 29th I gave my triumphal speech at the theoretical conference of the CC Apparatus, in the great hall. “The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Contradictions of Capitalism.” January 31st-February 6th – raid on Cuba. February 10, 1975 Supplement to notes for Brezhnev on Wilson – about Portugal (not to encourage the socialists to split with the communists. Historical examples of such actions and the consequences). Comments to the draft speech for Brezhnev at the dinner with Wilson. Ciphered telegrams, more ciphered telegrams, and papers. Response to Kadar in connection to the confidential letter the CC HSWP sent to the Party organizations about our oil price increases. It’s a pretty angry letter, and in our estimation – quite a “nationalist letter”: now if there are any downturns in their economy, the Soviet Union will be to blame; since we did not even take into account that “they have a Congress coming up and they already put together their Five Year Plan.” Meeting with B.N. plus Katushev, Zagladin, Shakhnazarov, Brutents – on the upcoming March meeting in Prague of Secretaries on international issues (coordination of foreign The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1975 http://www.nsarchive.org propaganda). I’ve been assigned to this event, especially to B.N.’s report in Prague. This is now my most important project, of course (!). I have a meeting with the guys who will be working on Ponomarev’s report. Short morning report to B.N. about Cuba. There was little that interested him. He kept interrupting me to call his secretary about various trifles. I read [Herbert] Krolikowski’s (Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR) denunciation of Honecker, Politburo members, and other figures. What a bastard! I would return such papers to the [K]GBs of the respective country. Especially since everything [in the denunciation] is based on “personal impressions” rather than facts. And where would an MFA official get these impressions about the Politburo and its internal affairs if not from the stories of his brother [Werner] Krolikowski, who was recently kicked out of the Politburo.