EU-Belarus Relations: State of Play Human Rights Situation and Ryanair Flight Diversion

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EU-Belarus Relations: State of Play Human Rights Situation and Ryanair Flight Diversion BRIEFING EU-Belarus relations: State of play Human rights situation and Ryanair flight diversion SUMMARY The falsified presidential elections of August 2020, and the brutal crackdown against peacefully protesting Belarusians, led to the isolation of the Aliaksandr Lukashenka regime. Despite the possibility of starting dialogue with the democratic opposition and Belarusian society, Aliaksandr Lukashenka chose another path, involving continued brutal repression of the country's citizens. The worsening human rights situation and hijacking of Ryanair flight FR 4978 provoked a response from the EU, including a ban on Belarusian air carriers landing in or overflying the EU, a major extension of the list of people and entities already subject to sanctions, and the introduction of sanctions on key sectors of the Belarusian economy. The EU policy also demonstrates a readiness to support a future democratic Belarus. In this respect, the European Commission presented the outline of a comprehensive plan of economic support for democratic Belarus, worth up to €3 billion. The European Parliament is playing an active part in shaping the EU's response. Parliament does not recognise Lukashenka's presidency and is speaking out on human rights abuses in Belarus. The Belarusian democratic opposition, which was awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize, is frequently invited to speak for the Belarusian people in the European Parliament. IN THIS BRIEFING Background Current trends in the human rights situation in Belarus Ryanair flight forced to land in Belarus The fourth package of sanctions Outline of the Commission's comprehensive plan of economic support for a future democratic Belarus Russian influence in Belarus International reactions EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Jakub Przetacznik Members' Research Service PE 696.177 – July 2021 EN EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Background EU-Belarus relations during Aliaksandr Lukashenka's long presidency, which began in 1994, have fluctuated. Although the EU-Belarus Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1995, ratification has been frozen since 1997, owing to a lack of progress in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Sanctions against Belarus were first introduced in 2004, as a response to the unresolved disappearance of four people in 1999 and 2000. The sanctions, which targeted four individuals connected with that case, together with arms embargo (initially introduced in 2011), have been prolonged each year, and are currently in force until 28 February 2022. Relations with the EU improved after Belarus refused to recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Political repression eased slightly, with the release of some political prisoners in August 2015 and non-violent October 2015 presidential elections. As a result, in February 2016 the EU decided not to extend sanctions against Lukashenka, 169 other Belarusians and 3 companies. A further sign of rapprochement came in 2020 with the signing of the EU-Belarus visa facilitation and readmission agreements. This improved climate changed dramatically with the presidential elections of 9 August 2020. Despite independent exit polls showing a victory for Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Belarus's Central Election Commission announced that elections had been won by Aliaksandr Lukashenka with over 80 % of the votes. The Lukashenka regime had permitted Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to run in the elections. Previously this right had not been granted to banker Viktar Babaryka or blogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's husband): both those candidates were arrested. Many commentators consider that Lukashenka was convinced that Belarusians would not support a female candidate. The openly falsified electoral results sparked widespread peaceful protests, provoking a brutal state militia crack down. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya decided to leave the country and she arrived in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius on 11 August 2020. She went on to establish the Coordination Council, with the aim of organising a peaceful transfer of power through dialogue, calling for the organisation of fresh, fair and democratic presidential elections. Opposition leaders – including members of Tsikhanouskaya's Coordination Council – were either forced into exile or arrested. The European Council did not recognise the election result, as 'the elections were neither free nor fair'. This statement was followed by the Council of the European Union conclusions, which stated that Aliaksandr Lukashenka lacked any democratic legitimacy. The above-mentioned events also led to the introduction of three new rounds of sanctions. They consisted of a travel ban and an asset freeze against a gradually widening scope of targeted individuals and entities. The first round was announced on 2 October 2020 and concerned 40 people responsible for repression and intimidation against peaceful protesters and journalists, as well as for misconduct of the electoral process. The day after the end of the previous Lukashenka presidential term, the list was further extended on 6 November 2020, with 15 names. The new list included both Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his son Viktar. The third list of sanctions was announced on 17 December 2020. At that time, the list was composed of 88 individuals and 7 entities and included, inter alia, companies that delivered the information technology (IT) systems and police equipment, such as IT surveillance platforms and barrier systems designed for riot control, used against Belarus civil society organisations. The decision of the Lukashenka regime to hijack a Ryanair flight on 23 May 2021 in order to detain the 26-year-old blogger and former editor-in-chief of Telegram channel NEXTA, Raman Pratasevich, further aggravated the situation. The EU's response of further sanctions against Belarus, was followed by the Belarusian announcement of a decision to suspend its participation in the Eastern Partnership, launch the procedure to suspend the readmission agreement, recall its permanent representative to the EU for consultations and request a reciprocal move on the EU side. 2 EU-Belarus relations: State of play Current trends in the human rights situation in Belarus The human rights situation in Belarus has been poor for decades, with continuing harassment and pressure against civil society activists and independent journalists. The political trials of the people arrested last year are currently taking place. There are 526 recognised political prisoners in Belarus according to Viasna Human Rights Center and this number is growing quickly. In May 2021 alone, at least 109 people were convicted in politically motivated criminal trials, including minors sentenced to two to five years in a juvenile facility. The conditions in prisons and detention centres are bad, with cases of torture and a lack of proper medical care, including refusal to give medicines delivered by families to detainees. One of many cases is that of Vitold Asharuk, an opposition activist aged 50, who died due to the rapid deterioration of his health conditions in prison. Other prisoners have attempted suicide, having suffered torture. Since August 2020, over 3 000 criminal cases have been initiated for violation of the procedure for holding mass events and protests. It is estimated that at least 480 students have been detained, and 158 students have been expelled from universities. As a result, over 14 000 Belarusians have decided to leave their country. Journalists are also subject to repression. Reporters Without Borders describe Belarus as the most dangerous country in Europe for media personnel. There are over 20 journalists in Belarusian prisons. This includes two young Belsat journalists, sentenced for two years in prison for live coverage of a demonstration in homage to murdered activist Roman Bondarenko, and Andrzej Poczobut, who contracted Covid while in prison. The internet portal tut.by, which reported widely about events in Belarus, was closed down on 18 May 2021 and several staff members were arrested. On 8 June 2021, Lukashenka signed a law tightening penalties for participation in demonstrations and promotion of 'extremist activities'. Participation in more than two demonstrations is now punishable by three years in prison, financing of opposition activities, by five years in prison, and participation in or promotion of 'extremist activities' by six years in prison. Furthermore, other sections of the penal code can also be used against those willing to stand up for a democratic Belarus. In May 2021, a court sentenced former military officer Dzianis Urad, to 18 years in prison, after he published a secret letter authorising the use of armed forces in law enforcement activities. As initially feared in the case of Mr Pratasevich, the Belarusian penal code also envisages the death penalty in some cases, including for terrorism. Mr Pratasevich was officially accused of organising mass unrest (possible penalty 15 years), but his inclusion on the Belarusian secret service list of 'individuals involved in terrorist activity', may result in further charges, with a possible death sentence. The practice of Communist judges announcing death penalties at the authorities' request was frequent in the USSR and other communist countries, especially during the Stalinist era. Belarus is the only country in Europe where the death penalty is still in place. The EEAS considers it probable that the most recent execution took place in June 2021. As the carrying out of executions
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