Article Land-Use Planning Methodology and Middle-Ground Planning Theories

Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos 1,2 1 Department of Urban and Regional Planning and Development, School of Architecture, Faculty of Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 54124 Thessaloniki, Greece; [email protected]; Tel.: (+30)-2310-995-484 2 Academy of Athens, Panepistimiou 28, 10679 Athens, Greece



Received: 27 August 2018; Accepted: 17 September 2018; Published: 19 September 2018


Abstract: This paper argues that a monolithic land-use planning “grand narrative” is not sufficiently flexible, but that the fragmentation into innumerable “small narratives” goes against any sense of the existence of an established domain of knowledge. Its aim is to explore the epistemological possibility for “middle ground” theories. The methodology adopted for this purpose is to take as a standard reference the methodological components of comprehensive/procedural planning and to measure against them the methodologies proposed by a corpus of other major land-use planning approaches. The outcome of this comparison is that for more than half a century, planning theories in the field of urban and regional planning have been revolving incessantly around the methodological components of the comprehensive model, which seem, at least at the present stage of our knowledge, to be the universal nucleus of the land-use planning enterprise. This paper indicates on this basis the prerequisites for the construction of middle-ground land-use planning theories and how we can pass from the formal contextual variants to real life contexts through the original articulation of planning theory with input from the findings of the actual planning systems.

Keywords: land-use planning theory; land-use planning methodology; middle-ground theory; urban and regional planning systems; positivism; postmodern/semiotic approaches to planning

1. Introduction As is well known, after the dominance of the physical planning and design approach, closely related to architecture and engineering, in the first half of the previous century, a genuine paradigm shift occurred in the 1960s with the first land-use planning theory in the full sense of the word, procedural planning theory. It was not, however, long-lived, at least not theoretically. Although it had some less prominent competitors at the time, the strongest criticisms against it date from what Simin Davoudi and John Pendlebury consider the third of the five phases they distinguish in the evolution of the planning discipline, the fragmentation phase, which they locate in the 1970s and 1980s. During this phase, the introduction of competing social theories into planning and changes in its established principles challenged its coherence and introduced “a sea change in intellectual ... terms” [1] (pp. 625, 629). Whether or not one agrees with Davoudi and Pendlebury, who see the next two phases as a difficult march towards maturity, it is incontestable that there has been a proliferation of planning theories during the last three decades—see also [2] (pp. 36, 38). Nigel Taylor sees comprehensive planning as part of the first of the three major shifts he identifies in urban planning theory since 1945: from physical planning to systems and rational planning; from the latter to the view of planning as a political process; and from these modernist forms of planning theory to postmodern planning. While in 1998 [3] (pp. 159) he stated that comprehensive planning is a literal Kuhnian paradigm shift (the discontinuity position), he retreated from this position in 1999 [4]

Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93; doi:10.3390/urbansci2030093 www.mdpi.com/journal/urbansci Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 2 of 23

(pp. 331–333, 341), now arguing that it represents a rupture with a long historical tradition but is not actually a paradigm shift (the continuity position), because it did not replace urban design. Although I lean towards the first position (since I do not consider urban design as belonging to planning but to architecture), the fact is that Taylor uses criteria which belong to the level of the paradigm, that is, to a legitimate but highly abstract level, which results in a rather orderly image. On a lower level, the image today is kaleidoscopic. In the mosaic formed by competing land-use planning theories, a marked tendency is discernible: from the “grand narrative” of “classical” procedural planning theory, we have arrived at a set of “small narratives” (see on these terms [5], mainly sections 10 and 14), advanced, for example, by the influential trend of collaborative planning. In the sciences, methodology is second to theory, because, while it allows us to move from theory towards application, it is considered as a direct by-product of theory. On the contrary, in applied domains such as land-use planning, in spite of the connection of methodology to theory, the emphasis is on methodology, since these fields aim to be operational and achieve real-world efficiency, which involves a looser connection to theory. This primacy of methodology is recognised by Andreas Faludi, who proposes to replace the term “planning theory” with “planning methodology”, which he compares to scientific methodology [6] (pp. 12, 19, 23, 84, 115). Given that a universal monolithic theory is generally considered too inflexible, but the fragmentation into innumerable purely local rethinking exercises goes against any sense of the existence of an established domain of knowledge, the aim of the present paper is to explore the epistemological possibility for theories of the “middle ground”. It has no ambition to formulate a specific middle-ground theory, nor does the author believe that only one such theory is possible. Instead, it will try to identify the prerequisites for any middle-ground theory, which should rely heavily on the methodological level. For reasons that will become clear in the course of the discussion, the strategy adopted is to take as a standard reference the methodological components of comprehensive planning and measure against them the methodologies proposed by a corpus consisting of the other major theoretical land-use planning approaches. The paper will start with the “classical” approach of comprehensive-systemic planning (see, for example, [2] (pp. 49–50), as well as the equally “classical” rational planning (see, for example, [7] (pp. 24–25, 27). It will then continue with a corpus of other approaches which recur systematically in land-use planning bibliography, namely: the action-centred approach; the implementation approach; the incremental approach (which actually refers to economic planning, but is widely discussed in the bibliography); the pragmatic approach, into which Allmendinger [2] (p. 141) integrates the incremental approach while conceding that the latter is pragmatic “in the ordinary sense of the word”; the neo-liberal approach; advocacy planning; collaborative planning; and postmodern theorising on planning. It does not include in this set approaches such as the Marxist, which are analytical and do not involve planning methodology, nor urban design approaches, due to their architectural orientation.

2. Land-Use Planning Theories and Methodologies

2.1. The “Classical” References In order to make a systematic comparison of these planning approaches primarily with comprehensive but also with rational planning, we should specify the elements to be compared and thus we will need to recall briefly the methodological nodes of the whole set of these theories. This is the only way to achieve an analytical and convincing demonstration. Since methodology is always part of a wider theoretical perspective, the general lines of the latter will also be recalled. This revisiting of our recent past combines research interest with a useful pedagogical aim, because our recent fashion of pursuing the latest theoretical trends obscures achievements of the past. The paper will start with a standard reference, comprehensive planning. J. Brian McLoughlin drew his planning theory from the fields of general ecology and human ecology, general systems theory and cybernetics, operational research and decision- making theory, Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 3 of 23 Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 23 anddynamic founded system it on which location does theory. not Space,literally for represent him, is an the ecosystem real world and but may is determined be simulated by as the a complex aim for dynamicwhich it will system be used. which The does general not systemic literally representelements of the space real as world a human but ecosystem is determined are four, by the ordered aim forinto which two pairs: it will that be of used. the components, The general systemicnamely located elements activities of space and as the a human spaces in ecosystem which they are occur, four, orderedwhich are into the two physical pairs: that vehicles of the components,of the activiti namelyes; and located that activitiesof their connections, and the spaces namely in which human they occur,communications which are the between physical activities vehicles and of thetheir activities; channels, and the that physical of their vehicles connections, of communication namely human [8] communications(pp. 17, 22–29, 34, between 58–70, 75, activities 77–79, 81, and 126). their channels, the physical vehicles of communication [8] (pp. 17,McLoughlin 22–29, 34, 58–70,conceptualises 75, 77–79, planning 81, 126). as a process referring to a human ecosystem. It consists of the followingMcLoughlin stages conceptualises (Figure 1—For planning a quite as si amilar process figure, referring see Muller to a human [9] (pp. ecosystem. 141–142): It consists of the following stages (Figure1—For a quite similar figure, see Muller [9] (pp. 141–142):

Figure 1. The components of the comprehensive land-use planning model, according to McLoughlin [8], inFigure a diagrammatic 1. The components form. Dark of the circles: comprehensive the model’s land-use components planning presented model, on according a methodological to McLoughlin axis. Below[8], in thea diagrammatic axis: contextual form. factors. Dark circles: the model’s components presented on a methodological axis. Below the axis: contextual factors. Stage 0: decision to intervene. This stage is not clearly distinguished from the next one by McLoughlinStage 0: [8decision] (p. 96). to intervene. However, This the decisionstage is tonot intervene clearly distinguished is a distinct andfrom significant the next stepone inby theMcLoughlin planning process.[8] (p. 96). It may However, be preceded the decision by a feasibility to intervene report. is a It distinct defines theand orientation significant ofstep the in next the stageplanning (what process. is to be It sought). may be preceded It encompasses by a feasibility certain goals report. and It thusdefines has the a political orientation character. of the next stage (whatStage is to a: be scanning sought). of theIt encompasses environment. certain This refers goals to and the planningthus has a survey political and character. aims at the description of McLoughlin’sStage a: scanning general of the systemic environment elements. This ofrefers space to the presented planning above survey through and aims the at use the of description a limited numberof McLoughlin’s of variables. general Also atsystemic this stage, elements individual of sp orace group presented needs, above based through on values, the are use recorded of a limited with thenumber help ofof publicvariables. participation Also at this [8 stage,] (pp. 95–103,individual 126–129). or group needs, based on values, are recorded with the helpStage of b: public formulation participation of goals. [8] This (pp. is the95–103, main 126–129). policy stage and includes the formulation of broad goals,Stage more b: specific formulation objectives of goals that. This must is the be fulfilledmain policy in order stage to and reach includes the goals, theand formulation sub-objectives of broad or precisegoals, more programmes specific ofobjectives action, accompaniedthat must be fulfilled by their in costs, order which to reach help the to clarifygoals, and the goals.sub-objectives This set isor organisedprecise programmes in hierarchical of action, order, fromaccompanied goals to objectivesby their costs, to programmes which help ofto action.clarify the goals. This set is organisedThe level in hierarchical of sub-objectives order, coincides from goal withs to theobjectives precise to planning programmes programme, of action. on paper, of land-use intervention.The level Goals of sub-objectives and objectives coincides involve, accordingwith the precise to McLoughlin, planning the programme direct opinion, on paper, of formal of land- and informaluse intervention. groups and Goals the and general objectives public, involve, as well acco as informationrding to McLoughlin, from other the sources direct suchopinion as theof formal mass mediaand informal and public groups statements and the of general representative public, groups,as well but,as information for him, the from essential other dialogue sources takessuch placeas the betweenmass media the plannerand public and statements the client of politicians representative and may groups, involve but, morefor him, than the one essential turn of dialogue negotiations takes betweenplace between them. Thisthe policyplanner stage and takesthe client the form politic of policyians and variables, may involve with different more than values one that turn may of correspondnegotiations not between only to them. actual This decisions, policy butstage also takes to working the form hypotheses; of policy variables, that is, at with this different stage different values (written)that may scenarios correspond may not be only tried to [8 actual] (pp. 97–99,decisions, 106–107, but also 120–124, to working 233–234). hypotheses; This and that the previousis, at this stage stage aredifferent the only (written) ones in scenarios which McLoughlin may be tried foresees [8] (pp. participation. 97–99, 106–107, 120–124, 233–234). This and the previousStage stage c: formulation are the only of possible ones in courses which ofMcLoughlin action. This foresees is the formulation participation. of alternative scenarios of land-useStage c: plans, formulation which of aim possible at the courses realisation of action of the. This policy is the scenarios. formulation It consists of alternative of two scenarios operations of involvingland-use theplans, projection which aim into at the the future, realisation according of the to the policy selected scenarios. planning It consists horizons, of of: two operations involving(a) Individually, the projection the into four the elements future, according of the urban to the system, selected through planning the horizons, specific of: sub-elements they include(a) Individually, (c.i), a projection the four elements which depends of the urban on the system, interrelated through projections the specific of sub-elements population andthey economicinclude (c.i), data. a projection which depends on the interrelated projections of population and economic data. (b) Comprehensively, based on a holistic model of the land-use system, the system as a whole (c.ii), stratified according to ranked sub-models and providing the support for the plans—That is, the Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 4 of 23

Urban(b) Sci. Comprehensively, 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW based on a holistic model of the land-use system, the system as a whole4 (c.ii), of 23 stratified according to ranked sub-models and providing the support for the plans—That is, the design design aspect of planning, on maps, which has already started with the previous operation (c.i)— aspect of planning, on maps, which has already started with the previous operation (c.i)—Figure2. Figure 2. Unfortunately, there is no terminology to distinguish between planning as one part of the Unfortunately, there is no terminology to distinguish between planning as one part of the whole whole process (the other part being design), and planning as the total process (including both process (the other part being design), and planning as the total process (including both planning and planning and design). Different (mapped) scenarios are examined, which result from the design). Different (mapped) scenarios are examined, which result from the transformation of the transformation of the states of the model in time, to which correspond different trajectories of the states of the model in time, to which correspond different trajectories of the model, each scenario and model, each scenario and trajectory following from a specific set of policy variables [8] (pp. 87–88, 99, trajectory following from a specific set of policy variables [8] (pp. 87–88, 99, 108, 166, 174, 211–216, 108, 166, 174, 211–216, 220–221, 231, 291–292). The discussion by McLoughlin revolves exclusively 220–221, 231, 291–292). The discussion by McLoughlin revolves exclusively around planning and its around planning and its logic, but the projection of the programme onto space, i.e., the design aspect, logic, but the projection of the programme onto space, i.e., the design aspect, is far from linear, because is far from linear, because it involves a large number of possible spatial combinations, together with it involves a large number of possible spatial combinations, together with the idiomatic logic of design; the idiomatic logic of design; this last aspect is missing from McLoughlin’s proposal. this last aspect is missing from McLoughlin’s proposal.

Figure 2. The articulation of planning as part of the whole planning process with design as the end processFigure of2. planning,The articulation presented of planning on the methodological as part of the whole axis of planning comprehensive process planning. with design as the end process of planning, presented on the methodological axis of comprehensive planning. Stage d: comparison and evaluation of alternatives. The first step is the approximate evaluation of generalStage plans. d: comparison Then follow and successiveevaluation of specialisations alternatives. The of first the plansstep is and the moreapproximate detailed evaluation evaluations. of Thegeneral evaluation plans. takesThen follow into consideration successive specialisation the means available,s of the theplans costs and and more benefits detailed of eachevaluations. plan and The as farevaluation as possible takes its impact.into consideration In order to proceedthe means to available, evaluation, the according costs and to benefits McLoughlin, of each the plan entities and toas befar evaluatedas possible and its quantitativeimpact. In order indicators to proceed for their to eval evaluationuation, according must be defined, to McLoughlin, and must the follow entities directly to be fromevaluated the goals and and quantitative objectives. indicators Given that for the their evaluation evaluation concerns must differentbe defined, planning and must horizons, follow changes directly infrom needs the and goals preferences and objectives. must be takenGiven into that account. the evaluation The evaluation concerns is carried differe outnt planning by “the planner horizons, on behalfchanges of society”in needs [and8] (pp. preferences 95, 100). must be taken into account. The evaluation is carried out by “the plannerIf we on summarise behalf of soci theety” value [8] judgements (pp. 95, 100). involved in these five stages, we may get a clear image of the valueIf we factor summarise involved the in value McLoughlin’s judgements methodology. involved in The these goals five of stages, stage (b) we manifestly may get a render clear image more specificof the value the very factor broad involved and usually in McLoughlin’s unarticulated methodology. goals of stage The (0) goals and, of in stage the best (b) manifestly case, incorporate render themore values specific of the the social very context broad asand derived usually from unarticulated stages (a) and goals (b). of Finally, stage the(0) evaluationand, in the in best stage case, (d) isincorporate a function the of indicators values of the depending social context on the as goals derived and from objectives stages of (a) stage and (b). Finally, We see thatthe evaluation there is a diffusionin stage (d) of theis a substantivefunction of indicators value (i.e., depending ideological, on semiotic) the goals factor and throughoutobjectives of the stage planning (b). We process. see that thereStage is a diffusion e: taking of of the action substantive. This stage value requires (i.e., ideological, a control semiotic) mechanism, factor according throughout to McLoughlin. the planning Duringprocess. implementation, changes are proposed and their impact should be assessed in order to check if they deflectStage e: the taking system of action from its. This planned stage course, requires an actiona control effected mechanism, through according the operations to McLoughlin. in stage (c). TogetherDuring implementation, with implementation, changes or asare a proposed next stage, and McLoughlin their impact considers should be necessary assessed a in lesser order or to greater check reviewif they ofdeflect the plan the system and its controlfrom its mechanisms, planned course, effected an action through effected adaptations through in the a continuousoperations controlin stage process.(c). Together The reviewwith implementation, becomes necessary, or as accordinga next stage, to him,McLoughlin because considers of new proposals necessary or a political,lesser or socialgreater and review economic of the changes,plan and whichits control generate mechanis newms, needs effected and through desires, andadaptations involves in the a continuous return to stagecontrol (b)—and process. periodically The review to stagebecomes (0)—that necessary, is, a feedback according operation to him, [8 ]because (pp. 88, 89,of 101–103,new proposals 279, 295). or political, social and economic changes, which generate new needs and desires, and involves the return to stage (b)—and periodically to stage (0)—that is, a feedback operation [8] (pp. 88, 89, 101– 103, 279, 295). Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 5 of 23 Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 23

ThisThis is is McLoughlin’s McLoughlin’s procedural procedural systemic systemic and and comprehensive comprehensive planning, planning, with itswith circular, its circular, or rather or spiral,rather process.spiral, process. He misses He misses the appearance the appearance of complex of complex feedback feedback mechanisms mechanisms in the in interior the interior of the of process,the process, with with the exception the exception of the of return the return from from stage stage (e) to (e) (b). to (b). AnAn important important theoreticaltheoretical clarificationclarification should should be be made, made, which which is is crucial crucial for for the the comparison comparison of the of theother other planning planning proposals proposals with with McLoughlin’s. McLoughlin’s. McLoughlin’s McLoughlin’s stages stages are technical are technical and belong and belong to an tointernal an internal process process realised realised by a by specific, a specific, and andhetero heterogeneous,geneous, team team of experts. of experts. These These stages stages are arethe thecomponentscomponents of theof theland-use land-use planning planning methodology methodology (on (onthe theaxis axisof Figu of Figurere 1) and1) and are areoperations, operations, sub- sub-processesprocesses forming forming a more a more or less or less closed closed set. set. This This is the is the essence essence of ofland-use land-use planning planning methodology methodology as assuch, such, which which ends ends in in a aland-use land-use proposal, proposal, in in spite spite of of the simultaneous use ofof otherother kindskinds ofof data data (such (such asas transport, transport, economic, economic, demographic, demographic, environmental, environmental, etc., data). etc., Ondata). this axis,On this a continuous axis, a interactioncontinuous evolvesinteraction between evolves the between planner the and planner his/her and employer. his/her employer. However, inHowever, the real in world, the real this world, set does this not set operatedoes not in aoperate vacuum, in buta vacuum, within a widerbut within complex a wi economic,der complex social, economic, institutional social, and institutional environmental and contextenvironmental(below the context axis of(below Figure the1), whichaxis of provides Figure 1), inputs which of provides different degreesinputs of of different importance degrees to the of componentsimportance to in the the components form of guidance in the orform restrictions. of guidance McLoughlin’s or restrictions. main McLoughlin’s orientation main is towards orientation the components,is towards the not components, towards this not context, towards which, this while contex nott, which, ignored, while has onlynot ignored, a weak presence has only relative a weak topresence component relative (a) and to component a stronger one(a) and relative a stronger to component one relative (b) through to component the appeal (b) through to individual the appeal and groupto individual values; thisand input,group however values; this is far input, from however decisive, is according far from todecisive, McLoughlin’s according approach, to McLoughlin’s because theapproach, decision because on how the to handledecision it restson how with to thehandle planner it rests and with the politicians.the planner and the politicians. TheThe otherother “classical”“classical” approach approach is is Faludi’s Faludi’s rational rational planning. planning. FaludiFaludi criticisescriticises McLoughlin’sMcLoughlin’s approachapproach asas aa theorytheoryin inplanning planningbecause becauseof ofits itsfoundation foundation ininlocation location theory,theory, but but recognizes recognizesthe the convergenceconvergence ofof their their two two approaches approaches [ 10[10]] (p. (p. 3). 3). ForFor Faludi,Faludi, “procedural”“procedural” theoriestheories areare theoriestheories ofof planning,planning, concern concern the the form form of theof th planninge planning process process and and the operationsthe operations of the of planner the planner and are and the are object the ofobject planning of planning theory. Hetheory. opposes He opposes them to “substantive”them to “substantive” theories, whichtheories, are, which for him, are, theories for him, in theories planning in andplanning refer toand the refer content to the of content planning of planning and the fieldsand the that fields are that of interest are of interest to the planner.to the planner. Faludi Faludi also differentiatesalso differentiates between between normative normative planning planning theory, theory referring, referring to the to rational the rational process process of planners, of planners, and empiricaland empirical planning planning theory, theory, referring referring to the to organisation the organisation and procedures and procedures concerning concerning planning planning [10] (pp.[10] 1–4), (pp. [111–4),] (pp. [11] 3–8), (pp. [6 ]3–8), (Preface). [6] (Preface). It is implied It is that implied procedural that procedural theories of planningtheories of are planning identical are to normativeidentical planningto normative theory. planning theory. FaludiFaludi emphasisesemphasises thethe administrativeadministrative systemsystem ofof planning,planning, thethe “planning “planning environment”,environment”, andand considersconsiders it it as as part part of aof wider a wider network network of services. of services. According According to Faludi, to hisFaludi, critical-rationalist his critical-rationalist planning theoryplanning (later theory planning (later methodology)planning meth encompassesodology) encompasses the rationale the “ofrationaleplanning “of as planning a rational as processa rational of thoughtprocess andof thought action ”and and action the” construction and the construction of a model of ofa model planning of planning agencies; agencies; the latter the operate latter withinoperate awithin multi-dimensional a multi-dimensional social (in social the wide(in the sense) wide “environment”.sense) “environment”. Faludi Faludi makes makes reference reference to the sameto the componentssame components of planning of planning methodology methodology as McLoughlin as McLoughlin (Figure (Figure3), but he3), givesbut he more gives emphasis more emphasis to the feedbackto the feedback relationships relationships between componentsbetween components [6,11] (pp. [6,11] 4, 19, 105–106).(pp. 4, 19, The 105–106). three-level The hierarchy three-level of McLoughlinhierarchy of isMcLoughlin maintained is as maintained goals–objectives–targets, as goals–objectives–targets, but Faludi conceives but Faludi of aconceives greater elasticity of a greater in thiselasticity pyramidal in this scheme, pyramidal because scheme, he also because adds bottom-uphe also adds influences. bottom-up influences.

Figure 3. The elements of rational land-use planning, according to Faludi [6,10,11], in diagrammatic Figure 3. The elements of rational land-use planning, according to Faludi [6,10,11], in diagrammatic form, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. White circle: coincidence with form, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. White circle: coincidence with McLoughlin’s component. Gray circle: lack of the corresponding McLoughlin component. Below the McLoughlin’s component. Gray circle: lack of the corresponding McLoughlin component. Below the axis: contextual factors. axis: contextual factors. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 23

Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 6 of 23 The role of the planner is, according to Faludi, that of an analyst of the risks involved in the decisions of politicians, whence the need for a close and continuous collaboration between them. Also,The throughout role of the the planner planning is, accordingprocess the to planner Faludi, thatmust of participate an analyst in of public the risks discussions involved inon thethe decisionsalternative of politicians,plans with whencethe interested the need communi for a closety, and which continuous is heterogeneous collaboration and between consists them. of Also,collaborating, throughout but the also planning conflicting, process groups the plannerthat may must attach participate a greater in or public lesser discussions importance on to thethe alternativeproposal and plans should with be the attributed interested different community, weights which according is heterogeneous to their political and consists influence. of collaborating, The planner butmust also be conflicting, able to communicate groups that the may plans attach in a greaternon-technical or lesser language importance and to“conveying the proposal meaning and should … is a bedistinct attributed problem different in implementing weights according planning to their prop politicalosals” (here influence. Faludi The reports planner that must the beAmerican able to communicatetransport planners the plans envisage in a non-technical a specialist languagerole of “c andommunicator” “conveying inmeaning their field).... is aFaludi distinct is problemagainst the in implementinguse of persuasion planning and proposals”argues for (here a “collaborative Faludi reports process”, that the which American “involves transport seeing planners the objects envisage of acontrol specialist as subjects role of “communicator”in their own right, in with their the field). ability Faludi to pa isrticipate against in the the use formulation of persuasion of programmes” and argues forand a envisages “collaborative “anprocess”, arena in which which people “involves could seeing interact the and objects form of collective control as views”.subjects Thisin theirprocess own is, right,for him, with open-ended; the ability toit participateis a process in of the building formulation consensus of programmes”, but also involves and envisagesconflicts, and “an arenaimposesin whichnew and people radical could demands interact on and democratic form collective institutions views”. [11] (pp. This 236–237, process 261–262, is, for him, 270, open-ended; 274, 281, 283, it 288– is a process290; 1986, of building106–107, consensus109; as we, butshall also see involveslater, the conflicts,terms I have and italicized imposes in new the and above radical paragraph demands belong on democraticto the nucleusinstitutions of Healey’s [11] (pp. collaborative 236–237, 261–262, planning). 270, 274, 281, 283, 288–290; 1986, 106–107, 109; as we shall seeComparing later, the Faludi’s terms I haverationale italicized with in McLoughlin’s the above paragraph comprehensive belong toplanning, the nucleus we ofsee Healey’s that it collaborativeappeals to the planning). same general logic and components, but also introduces two important new dimensions.Comparing The Faludi’s first is rationalethe clearer with presence McLoughlin’s of feedback comprehensive relationships planning, between we the see methodological that it appeals tocomponents. the same general The logicsecond and components,is the insertion but also of introducesthese components two important within new a dimensions. context, which The first is isunderrepresented the clearer presence in ofMcLoughlin. feedback relationships It is a double between context, the both methodological a strong institutional components. context The second and a isclearly the insertion present of social these componentscontext, represented within a context, by public which participation is underrepresented and foreshadowing in McLoughlin. the It later is a doublecollaborative context, planning. both a strong institutional context and a clearly present social context, represented by public participation and foreshadowing the later collaborative planning. 2.2. Other Modern and Related Approaches to Land-Use Planning 2.2. Other Modern and Related Approaches to Land-Use Planning 2.2.1. The Liberal Theories 2.2.1. The Liberal Theories In the following I shall try to test the relevance of McLoughlin’s systemic components for land- use planningIn the following methodology I shall try through to test a the systematic relevance comp of McLoughlin’sarison of the systemic other approaches components included for land-use in the planningselected corpus methodology with the through comprehensive a systematic approach. comparison The approaches of the other discussed approaches below included should innot the be selectedseen as corpusan exhaustive with the comprehensivelist of possible approach. planning The approaches, approaches although discussed I belowfeel they should are not fairly be seenrepresentative as an exhaustive of the listfield. of possible planning approaches, although I feel they are fairly representative of theJohn field. Friedmann’s action-centred model opposes the orientation of McLaughlin towards the decision-makingJohn Friedmann’s process. action-centred From his early model writings, opposes Friedmann the orientation advocates of McLaughlin a shift from towards rational the decision-makingdecisions to action. process. He believes From his that, early when writings, planning Friedmann and action advocates are unified a shift into from one rational operation, decisions “it is toextremely action. He difficult believes empirically” that, when planning to conceptually and action distinguish are unified intomethodological one operation, phases: “it is extremely what is difficultconsidered empirically” as phases to is conceptually not prior to distinguishaction, but part methodological of it [12] (pp. phases: 311–312)—Figure what is considered 4. as phases is not prior to action, but part of it [12] (pp. 311–312)—Figure4.

Figure 4. The exclusive emphasis on implementation, according to Friedmann’s [12] action-centred land-use planning model, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. Gray circle: Figure 4. The exclusive emphasis on implementation, according to Friedmann’s [12] action-centred lack of the corresponding McLoughlin component. Dark circle: the central component. land-use planning model, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. Gray circle: lack of the corresponding McLoughlin component. Dark circle: the central component. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 7 of 23

Taylor agrees with him on the matter of the importance of rational action and also criticises the stages of the rational process for their linearity. In contrast to Friedmann, he considers it crucial to be able to conceptually distinguish between the different components of the rational process, provided their interrelations are not omitted [3] (pp. 113–118)—provided, that is, that the feedback between components is taken into account. Friedmann’s action-planning model marks the emergence of implementation theory [13] (pp. 359, 368). While for Friedmann McLoughlin’s components are valid, but indistinguishable and absorbed by implementation, other implementation theorists dispense with them altogether. Their argument is that practical action implies the rejection of planning policy and plans and the exclusive focusing on action, with the result that there is no path from policy to implementation and thus the latter cannot be considered as putting policy into effect—A view they have in common with the action-centred model. Against this view, Taylor argues—rightly in my opinion—that even if policy is adjusted to implementation, “implementation involves, unavoidably, ‘putting policy ... into effect’” [3] (pp. 114, 119–122). Charles E. Lindblom’s disjointed incremental planning dates from the end of the 1950s. While his aim is not land-use planning, his approach nevertheless represents a global planning theory. To the “root method”, which later became the comprehensive-rational, i.e., procedural view, Lindblom opposes his “branch method” of “successive limited comparisons”, based on the following assumptions: (a) Policy making consists in close successive approximations to desired objectives, which change with each reconsideration. (b) Quick consecutive steps avoid big leaps, which demand predictions beyond our knowledge, and allow predictions based on the knowledge of previous similar steps, testing of the previous predictions, transition to the next step if the decision was successful, and the quick correction of a previous error. (c) Alternative policies under examination must arbitrarily exclude important policies, be limited in number, and differ little between them and from actual policies. (d) The comparison between alternative policies and their impact must be empirical and not systematic. A good policy is that which is accepted by administrators, even if they disagree about the values it represents or are not able to explain what it is good for. (e) Values cannot be posed before policy making, because it is not possible to identify them independently from it and they cannot be ranked. (f) Similar policies involve similar combinations of values. For each policy, a main value and a limited set of accompanying values must be selected, ignoring even important values and their rankings. (g) This method of policy making follows current practice, which goes by stages and without leaps. The knowledge following from successive comparisons in time marginalises or even eliminates the need for theory, which is useful only for knowledge of a more general level [14]. Lindblom’s approach has the advantage of realism, simplicity and flexibility, but also many drawbacks. Epistemologically, it adopts empiricism and the empirical methodology of trial and error, both of which fail to realise that experience is never independent from an underlying theory; moreover, this worldview does not leave any space for important changes [15] (pp. 220–229). Politically, it is conservative, because it considers policies as the outcome of collaborating individuals; socially, it has an individualistic view of action and society; and economically, it follows from the free-competition view of the economy and its adaptive realism amounts to the liberal subordination to the market [11] (pp. 153–154), [15] (pp. 220). It not only impedes important changes, but also hinders us from seeing tendencies to change and conceiving broader directions, at the same moment leading to bureaucratic and uninventive decisions. Figure5 shows the methodological components of the incremental approach, on the basis of the preceding discussion, mapped against the background of McLoughlin’s proposal. The components Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 8 of 23

Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 23 that make sense only as applied to space are missing, as may be expected from a political approach, and thussense, the but components many of (c)the and other (d) ofcomponents the figure must of co bemprehensive interpreted in planning a non-spatial, are in non-land-use, fact exploited sense, by butincremental many of theplanning. other componentsThere are two of major comprehensive components, planning policyare making in fact and exploited implementation, by incremental and a planning.contextual There element are is two taken major into components,account; this, policyhoweve makingr, is not andFaludi’s implementation, institutional and and social a contextual context, elementbut the market, is taken regulating into account; the this,whole however, process isas notthe Faludi’scontext of institutional implementation. and social Faludi, context, in his contrast but the market,of incremental regulating and the rational-comprehensive whole process as the context planni ofng, implementation. attributes their Faludi,differences in his to contrast different of incrementalconceptions and of the rational-comprehensive bureaucratic planning planning, system and attributes concludes their that differences the former to is different faithful conceptions to planning ofpractice the bureaucratic but should planning not be preferred, system and while concludes the latter that theis a formerreliable is and faithful desirable to planning ideal which practice is butnot shouldunrealistic not be[11] preferred, (pp. 153–168). while the latter is a reliable and desirable ideal which is not unrealistic [11] (pp. 153–168).

Figure 5. The elements of incremental economic planning, according to Lindblom [14], in diagrammatic form,Figure with 5. theThe comprehensive elements of model’sincrementa componentsl economic in the planning, background. accord Whiteing circle:to Lindblom coincidence [14], with in McLoughlin’sdiagrammatic component. form, with Graythe comprehensive circle: lack of the model’ correspondings components McLoughlin in the background. component. White Dark circle:circle: thecoincidence central component, with McLoughlin’s also included component. in McLoughlin’s Gray circle: components. lack of Below the corresponding the axis: contextual McLoughlin factors. component. Dark circle: the central component, also included in McLoughlin’s components. Below Two other approaches within the same liberal tradition may usefully be mentioned. The first the axis: contextual factors. is the pragmatic approach, originating in the U.S. and limited mainly to that country. It is foundedTwo on other the philosophyapproaches ofwithin pragmatism, the same which liberal adopts tradition an may empiricist usefully epistemology be mentioned. and The is hostile first is tothe general pragmatic theory, approach, limiting originating itself to empiricalin the U.S. data and limited without mainly any search to that for country. deeper It interpretativeis founded on causes;the philosophy it rejects of any pragmatism, “absolute” which (that is, adopts theoretical) an empiricist truth,embraces epistemology liberal and ideology is hostile and to focusesgeneral ontheory, the actionslimiting ofitself a community.to empirical data One without of the any main search representatives for deeper interpretative of this approach causes; is it Philiprejects Harrisonany “absolute”[16] (p. (that 158), is, [ 2theoretical)] (pp. 128–133, truth, 139, embraces 146). Theliberal pragmatic ideology and approach focuses is on very the actions similar of to a Lindblom’s,community. formulated One of the aboutmain arepresentatives quarter of a century of this ago. approach A new developmentis Philip Harrison of pragmatism, [16] (p. 158), linguistic [2] (pp. pragmatism128–133, 139, (which 146). The is not pragmatic embraced approach by all pragmatists),is very similar has to Lindblom’s, assimilated formulated the postmodern about views a quarter on languageof a century and ago. communication A new development and in the of field pragmatism of planning, linguistic tends to bepragmatism a mixture of(which pragmatic is not ideas embraced with collaborativeby all pragmatists), and postmodern has assimilated planning. the Therepostmode is thern belief views that on the language inevitable and conflicts communication of opinions and can in bethe solved field of through planning discourse tends to (“conversation”), be a mixture of a pragmatic view aligned ideas with with mainstream collaborative pragmatism and postmodern (see [16] (pp.planning. 159–160, There 170), is [the2] (pp. belief 129, that 133, the 140). inevitable conflicts of opinions can be solved through discourse (“conversation”),The main difference a view betweenaligned with pragmatic mainstream and incremental pragmatism planning (see [16] lies (pp. with 159–160, the issue 170), of values,[2] (pp. because129, 133, pragmatism 140). gives them a position of preponderance and relates them to specific communities with theirThe main own difference norms. Thebetween primary pragmatic concern and of incremen pragmatismtal planning is ethical lies deliberation, with the issue based of values, on a purposefulbecause pragmatism and future-oriented gives them human a position judgement, of preponderance and social solidarity and betweenrelates them the members to specific of thecommunities community with in viewtheir own of social norms. action; The primary it is believed concern that of thispragmatism process is ethical only possible deliberation, within based the pluralisticon a purposeful context and of liberal future-oriented democracy. human The drawback judgement, of such and asocial view solidarity is that it ignores between the the distribution members ofof powerthe community within communities. in view of social This action; is an issue it is beli thateved acquired that this central process importance is only possible after the within work the of Michelpluralistic Foucault context and of then liberal entered democracy. the pragmatic The drawback problematic. of such It wasa view later is recognisedthat it ignores even the by distribution Lindblom himselfof power and within takes thecommunities. form of a utopian This is wishan issue in Harrison’s that acquired pragmatic central planning importance as “a after concern the withwork the of productiveMichel Foucault use of power”and then [16 ]entered (pp. 158, the 161, pragmatic 162, 166–170), problematic. [2] (pp. 129–141),It was late [17r] recognised (pp. 118, 119). even by LindblomSocial actionhimself is, and for pragmatism,takes the form inseparable of a utopian from wish values. in ValuesHarrison’s and socialpragmatic action, planning together as with “a theconcern consequences with the ofproductive such action, use constitute of power” the [16] nucleus (pp. of158, pragmatism, 161, 162, 166–170), a conceptualisation [2] (pp. 129–141), opposed [17] to general(pp. 118, principles 119). and the priority of methodology. Contrary to procedural planning, for pragmatic Social action is, for pragmatism, inseparable from values. Values and social action, together with the consequences of such action, constitute the nucleus of pragmatism, a conceptualisation opposed Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 23

to general principles and the priority of methodology. Contrary to procedural planning, for Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 9 of 23 pragmatic planning the ends are not established a priori, but take form from the integration of people into the world and the possibilities offered by specific situations; there is an interaction between planningexperience the and ends situation. are not established a priori, but take form from the integration of people into the worldThe and major the possibilities pragmatist ideas offered (as by presented specific situations;by Charles thereHock isbased an interaction on the views between of Thomas experience Harper andand situation. Stan Stein) may be grouped into two unequal groups. The first group, by far the richer, focuses on knowledgeThe major pragmatistand values ideas and is (as composed presented of by tw Charleso unequal Hock sub-groups. based on the The views first of sub-group, Thomas Harper again andmuch Stan richer, Stein) refers may beto grouped general intoprinciples two unequal about groups.the relativity The first and group, freedom by far of the knowledge richer, focuses and onthe knowledgerelativity of and truth, values as well and as is composedto more specific of two planning unequal sub-groups.ideas about Thethe synthesis first sub-group, of different again views. much richer,The second refers tosub-group general principlesincludes just about one the idea, relativity the importance and freedom of community of knowledge for and the theindividual. relativity The of truth,first group as well touches as to more upon specific matters planning of methodology, ideas about thearguing synthesis against of differentthe analytical views. approach The second to sub-groupdynamic systems, includes such just oneas those idea, thethat importance constitute ofthe community object of planning, for the individual. and for a The trial-and-error first group touchesapproach upon [17] matters (p. 121). of methodology, arguing against the analytical approach to dynamic systems, such asMethodology, those that constitute rejected—together the object ofwith planning, grand theo andry—by for a trial-and-error pragmatic planning, approach is [replaced17] (p. 121). by an “attitude”Methodology, towards rejected—together planning, to use Harrison’s with grand term. theory—by Harrison pragmatic develops planning, this attitude is replaced in 12 points, by an “attitude”more oriented towards to planning planning, than to use the Harrison’s above ideas, term. which Harrison I would develops arrange this into attitude three in groups. 12 points, The more first orientedcalls on tous planning to adopt than for planning the above an ideas, approach which Ithat would is creative, arrange intoas against three groups. a scientistic The first and calls dogmatic on us toapproach—in adopt for planning other words, an approach it calls thatfor ad is creative,hoc improvisations, as against a i.e., scientistic small narratives. and dogmatic The approach—insecond relates otherto values words, and it callsencourages for ad hoc us improvisations,to adopt open i.e.,goal smalls, corresponding narratives. The to secondthe norms relates of tothe values interested and encouragescommunity us (part to adoptof which open are goals, the norms corresponding of the communi to thety norms of planners), of the interestedor even diverging community from(part them ofif whichrequired are by the specific norms situations, of the community as well as of contributing planners), or to even building diverging and extending from them social if required solidarity by specificwhile respecting situations, difference—a as well as contributing point of tooverlapping, building and as extendingwe shall see, social with solidarity collaborative while respecting planning. difference—aFinally, the third point group of overlapping, actually has a as methodologic we shall see,al with character collaborative and advocates planning. integrating Finally, the the lessons third groupof experience, actually hasadapting a methodological to the specificity character of andsituation, advocates relating integrating ideas to the action lessons intelligently of experience, and adaptingexperimentally to the specificityand being oforiented situation, towards relating outcom ideases to and action consequences. intelligently “Instrumental and experimentally reasoning” and beingis not orientedrejected, towardsbut is given outcomes a vague and place consequences. within the “planning “Instrumental processes” reasoning” [16] (pp. is not 160–161, rejected, 163, but 166– is given167, 169, a vague 170), place[17] (pp. within 119, the122, “planning 127). processes” [16] (pp. 160–161, 163, 166–167, 169, 170), [17] (pp. 119,As in 122, the 127). case of incremental planning, the central components of pragmatic planning are policy making,As in now the casefounded of incremental on values, planning, and implementation, the central components with its conseq of pragmaticuences (Figure planning 6); are there policy is a making,linear connection now founded between on values,the two, and since implementation, there is a direction with from its consequencespolicy, through (Figure the means6); there of action, is a linearto implementation. connection between The context the two, surrounding since there implementa is a directiontion from is no policy, longer through specifically the means the market, of action, but toan implementation. unspecified “situation”; The context this as surrounding such does not implementation exclude the market, is no longerbut the specifically emphasis is the on market,another butcontextual an unspecified factor, “situation”;the one offering this as the such value-inpu does not excludet, namely the community. market, but theThe emphasis lack of McLoughlin’s is on another contextualstage 0 in Figure factor, 6—not the one to offering mention the the value-input, great number namely of other community. things missing—should The lack of McLoughlin’s not come as a stagesurprise, 0 in Figurebecause,6—not as Hoch to mention [17] (p. the127) great explains, number “Instead of other of thingsknowing missing—should first what to do notandcome how to as do a surprise,it, the pragmatist because, asemphasizes Hoch [17] contextual (p. 127) explains, inquiry” “Instead (my italics). of knowing first what to do and how to do it, the pragmatist emphasizes contextual inquiry” (my italics).

Figure 6. The elements of pragmatic land-use planning, according to Harrison [16], in diagrammatic

form, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. Gray circle: lack of the correspondingFigure 6. The elements McLoughlin of pragmatic component. land-use Dark planning, circle: acco therding central to component,Harrison [16], also in diagrammatic included in McLoughlin’sform, with the components. comprehensive Below model’s the axis: components contextual factors. in the background. Gray circle: lack of the corresponding McLoughlin component. Dark circle: the central component, also included in TheMcLoughlin’s second liberal components. approach Below comes the axis: from contextual the neo-liberal factors. political movement of the New Right, which emerged in the 1970s. This approach downgrades planning altogether, as an aspect of a social Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 23

The second liberal approach comes from the neo-liberal political movement of the New Right, Urbanwhich Sci. emerged2018, 2, 93 in the 1970s. This approach downgrades planning altogether, as an aspect of a10 social of 23 democracy which it considers to be excessively interventionist and ineffective in decision making. State urban and regional planning ends up, according to it, working counter to the market, which is democracymore efficient. which The it neo-liberal considers tostrategy be excessively aims at th interventioniste reworking of and the ineffective relationship in between decision the making. state Stateand the urban market, and regionalbased on planning faith in the ends virtues up, according of the market to it, and working the need counter to limit to the state market, power which and the is moreplanning efficient. institutions, The neo-liberal but also to strategy reinforce aims the at role the of reworking the state in of introducing the relationship marketing between principles the state in andplanning the market, [18] (p. based 105). on faith in the virtues of the market and the need to limit state power and the planningFrom institutions, this logic follow but also two to tendencies: reinforce the a rolemild of position, the state accepting in introducing a limited marketing planning, principles provided in planningit supports [18 the] (p. market, 105). and a strong position that demands the rejection of planning and leaving the marketFrom totally this logicfree followfrom constraints. two tendencies: The Thatcherit a mild position,e period accepting in Britain a limited is an example planning, of provided the first ittendency supports and the certainly market, belongs and a strong to operational position thatland-use demands planning the rejectiontheories, ofbut planning also reminds and leaving us that thethe marketlatter may totally originate free from either constraints. from planning The Thatcherite theorists, periodwith their in Britain inescapable is an example implicit ofor theexplicit first tendencypolitical ideology, and certainly or from belongs politicians, to operational directly land-use specifying planning their general theories, political but also ideology reminds in us planning that the latterterms, may so that originate they eitherformulate from a planning planning theorists, policy ra withther theirthan inescapablea planning implicittheory, oras explicitis the case political with ideology,Thatcherism. or from politicians, directly specifying their general political ideology in planning terms, so thatThe they Thatcherite formulate alteration a planning of policy the established rather than pla a planningnning system theory, as assuch is the wa cases not with very Thatcherism. radical, but neverthelessThe Thatcherite led to a series alteration of changes, of the mainly established of an planninginstitutional system nature as and such all wasaiming not to very support radical, the butmarket—thus nevertheless converging led to a seriesas incremental of changes, planni mainlyng—such of an institutional as the simplification nature and allof aimingplanning to supportregulations, the market—thus new instructions converging concerning as incremental the operation planning—such of the planning as thesystem simplification and a widening of planning of the regulations,category of development new instructions proposals concerning not requiring the operation planning of the permission planning system [3] (pp. and 130–1390, a widening [2] (pp. of the90, category105, 117–120)). of development It is clear proposalsthat this planning not requiring policy planning was totally permission uninterested [3] (pp. in planning 130–1390, theory, [2] (pp. and 90, 105,neo-liberal 117–120)). planning It is clear has thatbeen this in practice planning an policy amalgamation was totally of uninterestedprevious planning in planning tendencies theory, under and neo-liberalthe neo-liberal planning umbrella has been ideology. in practice The an fact amalgamation is that the ofneo-liberal previous planningplanning tendencies ideas, such under as city the neo-liberalmarketing umbrellaand the Urban ideology. Development The fact is Projects that the aiming neo-liberal at the planning creation ideas, or radical such renewal as city marketing of certain andurban the areas, Urban were Development universalised Projects (Baeton aiming 2018: at 105, the 109–110). creation orNeo-liberal radical renewal planning of certainessentially urban revolves areas, werearound universalised practical matters (Baeton concerning 2018: 105, implemen 109–110).tation, Neo-liberal whence planningthe poverty essentially of Figure revolves 7. around practical matters concerning implementation, whence the poverty of Figure7.

Figure 7. The exclusive emphasis on implementation, according to neo-liberal land-use planning models, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. Gray circle: lack of Figure 7. The exclusive emphasis on implementation, according to neo-liberal land-use planning the corresponding McLoughlin component. Dark circle: the central component. Below the axis: models, with the comprehensive model’s components in the background. Gray circle: lack of the contextual factors. corresponding McLoughlin component. Dark circle: the central component. Below the axis: contextual Thefactors. incremental, pragmatic and neo-liberal approaches are politically liberal planning theories, and all three of them, together with implementation theory, are methodologically action planning The incremental, pragmatic and neo-liberal approaches are politically liberal planning theories, theories. The pragmatic approach is the only one among them with the political and sociological and all three of them, together with implementation theory, are methodologically action planning characteristic of addressing the interested community, thus setting the stage for democratic theories. The pragmatic approach is the only one among them with the political and sociological participation. This is the privileged context of participatory planning theories, which I shall discuss characteristic of addressing the interested community, thus setting the stage for democratic below after advocacy planning and collaborative planning. participation. This is the privileged context of participatory planning theories, which I shall discuss 2.2.2.below The after Participatory advocacy planning Planning and Theories collaborative planning.

Advocacy planning appeared in the U.S. in the early 1960s and in its initial form shares with incremental and pragmatic planning (which it preceded by about 20 years) the emphasis on policy and implementation, while accepting stages like those of comprehensive planning; it supported a stable Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 11 of 23

2.2.2. The Participatory Planning Theories Advocacy planning appeared in the U.S. in the early 1960s and in its initial form shares with incremental and pragmatic planning (which it preceded by about 20 years) the emphasis on policy Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 11 of 23 and implementation, while accepting stages like those of comprehensive planning; it supported a stable planning methodology with similar distinct steps, as well as the formulation of alternative planningscenarios methodology and their assessment. with similar However, distinct it steps, focuse asd wellon the as couple the formulation policy–implementation, of alternative scenarios in which andspecial their emphasis assessment. was However,on the political it focused component, on the coupleconsidered policy–implementation, to be composed of values in which (for speciala quite emphasissimilar analysis, was on thesee political[9] (pp. component,137–138). The considered main divergence to be composed from comprehensive of values (for planning a quite similar is the analysis,conception see [of9] (pp.the 137–138).decision-making The main subject, divergence beca fromuse comprehensivefor advocacy planning, planning isvalues the conception should ofbe theformulated decision-making not only subject,by the planner, because but for mainly advocacy by the planning, clients, values in the sense should not be only formulated of the immediate not only byclient, the planner,the employer, but mainly but also by the ul clients,timate in clients, the sense the notpeople only affected of theimmediate by the plan, client, with the employer,awareness butthat also there the can ultimate be disagreements clients, the be peopletween affectedthem [19]. by Thus, the plan, the componen with the awarenesst of policy making that there is marked can be disagreementsby the context betweenof public them participation. [19]. Thus, the component of policy making is marked by the context of publicSoon participation. this socio-political position became the nucleus of advocacy planning, as we may observe fromSoon the thisdevelopment socio-political of the position thought became of Paul the nucleusDavidoff, of advocacywho is mainly planning, preoccupied as we may with observe the fromevaluation the development of the plans, of thebecause thought they of Paultoo appeal Davidoff, to the who value is mainly system. preoccupied Simultaneously, with the he evaluation seems to ofconsider the plans, that because two more they of toowhat appeal I have to called the value the components system. Simultaneously, of the comprehensive he seems approach, to consider namely that twosurvey more and of forecasting, what I have are called necessary the components parts of the of planning the comprehensive process (Figure approach, 8). Davidoff’s namely survey democratic and forecasting,advocacy or are plural necessary planning parts ofis thefounded planning on processpolitical (Figure and social8). Davidoff’s values coming democratic from advocacy the public or pluralinvolved, planning the planning is founded agency on political and the and planner. social valuesHowever, coming the substantive from the public alternative involved, proposals the planning must agencycome from and thethe planner.interest group However, and—in the substantive opposition alternativeto comprehensive proposals planning—not must come from follow the from interest the groupplanner’s and—in technical opposition choices. to comprehensiveThe planner must planning—not convince when follow need fromed the planner’sclient agency technical and also choices. help Thethe plannerinterest mustgroup convince to clarify when its neededideas. Davidoff the client agencyargues andthat alsothe helpprofessional the interest planner group may to clarify oppose its ideas.official Davidoff plans and argues defend that alternative the professional plans proposed planner may by interest oppose groups, official plansas well and as personally defend alternative prepare plansminority proposed plans for by low-income interest groups, people. as wellThus, as for personally Davidoff preparethe alternative minority plans plans do fornot low-incomederive from people.the planner, Thus, as for prescribed Davidoff theby the alternative “‘rational’ plans theories do not of derive planning”. from The the planner,planner asmay prescribed be a technician, by the “‘rational’but he/she theories is mainly of planning”.an advocate, The a legal planner person may involved be a technician, in political but dialogue, he/she is a mainly profile an determined advocate, aby legal the personadversary involved nature in of political advocacy dialogue, planning a profile [20] (pp. determined 277, 279–287, by the 291). adversary nature of advocacy planning [20] (pp. 277, 279–287, 291).

Figure 8. The elements of advocacy land-use planning, according to Davidoff [20], in diagrammatic form,Figure with 8. The the comprehensiveelements of advocacy model’s land-use components planning, in the according background. to Davidoff White circle: [20], coincidence in diagrammatic with McLoughlin’sform, with the component. comprehensive Gray model’s circle: lack components of the corresponding in the background. McLoughlin White component. circle: coincidence Dark circle: with theMcLoughlin’s central component, component. also Gray included circle: in lack McLoughlin’s of the corresponding components. McLoughlin Below the axis:component. contextual Dark factors. circle: the central component, also included in McLoughlin’s components. Below the axis: contextual factors. Taylor points out that the implementation approach brought to the foreground the importance of the planner’s interpersonal skills of communication and negotiation, with an emphasis on the Taylor points out that the implementation approach brought to the foreground the importance first term and an appeal to Jürgen Habermas’s socio-philosophical theory, and this conceptualisation of the planner’s interpersonal skills of communication and negotiation, with an emphasis on the first led to communicative planning theory, which emerged in the end of the 1980s [3] (pp. 122–125). term and an appeal to Jürgen Habermas’s socio-philosophical theory, and this conceptualisation led We should mention that there is also a third position. Buunk and van der Weide [21] adopt the view of to communicative planning theory, which emerged in the end of the 1980s [3] (pp. 122–125). We a “substantive” rationality, as against both “technical-instrumental” rationality and “communicative” should mention that there is also a third position. Buunk and van der Weide [21] adopt the view of a rationality, which seeks to identify peoples’ underlying values with the help of “discursive” (i.e., “substantive” rationality, as against both “technical-instrumental” rationality and “communicative” discourse) analysis based on a limited corpus of relevant documents and interviews. In a discussion of communicative planning, we should not forget Faludi’s collaborative process. It is here that Patsy Healey’s collaborative planning belongs. Allmendinger [2] (pp. 33, 196, 239) considers collaborative planning post-positivist or neo-modernist; we should add that it has strong Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 12 of 23 postmodern influences. It overlaps to an important degree with advocacy and pragmatic planning on the issues of democratic planning, citizens’ participation and the centrality of values. Healey writes that the influences on her work came from urban institutional sociology and regional economic geography, policy theory as related to the dynamics of the governance of spatial change, urban political economy, phenomenology, social anthropology and planning theory. Her interest is focused on the institutionalist analysis of the micro-scale of social and economic networks, in opposition, as she states, to the macro-scale of political economy; this micro-scale is characterised by cultural diversity, different ways of seeing the world and thinking about social relations, and different values and interests. She wants to formulate normative principles for a communicative practice in public space, based on citizens’ participation and aiming at a strategic consensus-building. For Healey, the strategic process of spatial planning is an interpretative process, of an inclusionary nature and on the basis of participatory discursive democracy. She notes that this approach may today be seen as too radical and idealistic, but urges planning theorists and practitioners to embrace it with its “utopian edge” [22] (for example, pp. 5, 57, 71, 237, 316; [23] pp. 238–239, 252). In the context of her institutionalist approach, Healey conceptualises planning as a case of collaborative governance consisting of two interconnected levels: the “hard infrastructure” of the abstract systems of formal institutions, political, administrative and legal, based on rules, rights, duties, competences and resources, and the “soft infrastructure” of informal relations and relation-building within the political communities of stakeholders; hence the combination of the technical knowledge of experts and governance agencies with the moral values and emotive appreciation of the stakeholders. The first level of the above is the planning system, the second the planning practices, and they correspond, for Healey, to Anthony Giddens’s structure and agency respectively. Healey’s planning methodology (because she does formulate one, in spite of her rhetoric) evolves within this general context, but succumbs from the very start to a major fallacy by reversing the synchronic (in the wide sense) structural influence between the two levels. The five key parameters for the restructuring of the “hard” infrastructure of the local institutional level come, according to Healey, from below, since its aim is simply to support the processes of the soft level. Thus, she holds the utopian view that the hard level can be transformed voluntarily—In non-revolutionary situations into a “structure of challenges” constraining and modifying the centres of power (cf. Figure9—[ 22] (for example, pp. xiii, 34, 45–49, 72–73, 86, 199–200, 231–232, 238, 240, 286–289). But here she misinterprets Giddens, on whom she is supposedly based, who states exactly the opposite, because he explicitly differentiates between three rhythms of temporality, from the immediate interaction between actors of everyday life to the “long-term reproduction of institutions across the generations”, institutions “which ‘stretch’ over long time-space distances” [24] (pp. 28, 53). For Giddens, then, institutions have a relative structural stability and are not shaken by local dynamics (which in the case of land-use planning are limited in scope, although frequent). Healey tries to avoid both the linearity of the comprehensive model and the term “methodology” and wants planning to revolve around a set of “questions” to be answered; these questions are answered within the context of “sub-processes” [22] (pp. 268–282, 310, 320, 325–326), [23] (pp. 242–252). The issues attached to these “questions”, somewhat rearranged, are presented below: Question 0: opening of the strategy-making process. This is undertaken by initiators/activators generally belonging to the institutional level. This is the initial given of the planning practice and is considered by Healey as the first step; she integrates it into the following question as the next step. Question a: constitution of the arena. The major task of the initiators is, according to Healey, to define two issues. The first issue is the determination of the community of stakeholders. It is composed of different “discourse communities” and it is not limited to the people in the interested spatial community, but extends beyond it to all people concerned with the (expected) topic of discussion. The second issue is the definition of the arenas in which the public discussion will take place. Question b: definition of the context and style of discourse. This sub-process is, according to Healey, the necessary condition for policy-making and the whole planning process. It corresponds to the issues Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 13 of 23 of what will be discussed and how. The umbrella of the issues to be discussed concerns spatial and environmental planning of neighbourhoods, towns, urban regions and regions [22] (pp. 5, 57, 61, 83). This position has a double drawback. First, it is not easy to conceptualise an arena at the scale of the “urban region”, let alone at the regional scale. Second, “spatial” is too wide a term, since it does not define land uses specifically (there is, for example, a spatial economic planning or the ecological planning of natural systems). This is the reason why I insist on using the no longer fashionable term of “land-use” planning. I see the 2004 inclination of the British Labour government towards the use of the term “spatial” planning as leading to confusion in respect to the field and the actual possibilities of urban and regional planning. The environment also is either too general a concept, or, if taken in its strict sense as the natural environment, would refer to an object quite different from (social) land uses—cf. [25] (pp. 97–99). Healey’s planning wants to be all-encompassing, since she considers that the relational webs targeted can be extended to encompass the natural world and defines planning as interrelating economic, social and environmental issues [22] (pp. for example 5, 28, 58, 69, 82, 235–236). I do not doubt that these issues are important for land-use planning, but this kind of imperialistic (on the part of land-use planners) and confused approach obliterates the specificity of land-use planning and its demarcation from other forms of planning, such as economic or social planning. Healey compares the issue of what will be discussed in this sub-process to the survey stage of the planning tradition. However, this is a misunderstanding, because, once the object of planning (what will be discussed) is settled, the survey that follows is primarily a technical operation of gathering data and not the product of further open discussions. Of course, this technical part is advantageously complemented by the expression of views, values and needs on the part of the stakeholders. For Healey, the same sub-process involves an open handling of issues and of the manner in which they are discussed. As for the manner of discussion, Healey refers to the style, process and spatial organisation of the discussion, the need for the different “languages” (i.e., frames of thought) to be comprehensible and the need to respect the personality, not only of present but also of absent people. Healey gives special weight to the meaning of the issues for different people, and believes (echoing Husserl’s phenomenology) that it is possible for them to free themselves from acquired assumptions. Her reference to the use of deconstruction for the revelation of hidden values is excessive empirically, given the huge work needed to accomplish such a task for great numbers of people, and not useful theoretically, since Jacques Derrida never gave any precise instructions for textual analysis. Discourse analysis, also referred to by Healey [23] (pp. 240, 247), is indeed a possible method for textual analysis, but anyone who has worked with similar linguistic and semiotic methods is aware that the volume of information to be processed must necessarily be limited; on the contrary, the systematic analysis of the chaotic material coming from the arena, if it is possible to record it with some accuracy, would need much more time than planning itself. Question c: sorting and organisation of the arguments. The aim of this question is to mobilise the participants to fully conceive the meaning of the issues discussed and to express their values. This process is orchestrated by the experts, in their role as “facilitators”, who thus undertake a double role, their other role being that of “common” participants expressing their spontaneous point of view. The expected outcome of this process of “expert facilitation” is that it will lead to the revelation of common lines of thought. Strangely, there is no special reference to urban or regional planners, and the technical language is considered to be only one among the many “languages” used, ignoring its different composition as a function of the issue to be dealt with. Tore Sager [26] (pp. 95, 96), arrives at a similar conclusion when he observes that the change from rational to communicative planning is a change from expert planning supplemented by participation to participatory planning supplemented by the technical-economic expert and that it is not clear how communicative planners can use their technical-economic knowledge. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 14 of 23

Question (c) is composed of two parts: (c.i) which overlaps with (b), and (c.ii) the further development of (c.i) and (b) through the facilitators. Question d: creation of a policy discourse. This discourse is a new system of meaning, resulting from the elaboration of all the discourses heard in the arena, which gives meaning to problems and actions and is embodied within a strategy for action. It interacts with the previous process and in another variant Healey incorporates (c) into (d), considering that there is logically a development from (c.i) to (c.ii) to the end step of (d). The aim of this question is the achievement of a strategic consensus about the major planning issues, a Habermasian idea central to Healey’s proposal, which has been repeatedly criticized—See, for example, [26] (p. 101). This consensual proposal takes the form of a “storyline” which was selected gradually among a set of storylines about possible alternative actions developed in the course of the discursive collaborative process. Such a consensus, which, as she states, is not easy to construct or maintain, should be formally sanctioned. Healey believes that a new cultural community is created around this new storyline. Question e: criticism and maintaining of consensus. According to Healey, there should be a way to challenge the consensus and, thus, there is a need to determine the formal terms for that. On the other hand, actual changes and inevitable reinterpretations of the meaning of policy occur, which is why the agreed policy must be the object of a continuous “reflexive critique”, which Healey compares to the monitoring of “rationalist methodology”. Her reflexive critique is not limited to the assessment of the implications, for the policy to follow, of any kind of change partially influencing the selected storyline, but extends to the problematics of whether the policy discourse still makes sense in view of the possibility that a new storyline has emerged; this is close to the sense of McLoughlin’s “review”. There has been a large front of both enthusiastic approval and criticism of collaborative planning (see f.ex. [27] (pp. 4–15), but neither one deals with my aim, methodology. Healey emphasises that the planning process is location-specific, must each time be invented locally and cannot be formulated in a specific process model, thus giving the impression that she adopts the model of small narratives. She maintains that her list of sub-processes is not really a methodology, but rather a set of guiding questions. However, they bring to the surface the components of the “grand narrative” of comprehensive planning (Figure9). The validity of this last observation is shown by her admission that rational planning brought important innovations which any alternative approaches “would do well to safeguard” and that her “approach in some respects ... revisits” it. The same view is expressed by Sager, who considers communicative planning in general as a revision and extension of instrumental rationality, which, for him, is a strong protection against the relativity of postmodernism [26] (p. 93). In fact, collaborative planning is an ad hoc mixture of postmodern small narratives and the classical modernist grand narrative—see also [3] (p. 153). The presence of the comprehensive model in collaborative planning is also demonstrated by Healey’s criticism that the sub-processes she proposes must be considered “interactively, often in parallel rather than sequentially”—[22] (pp. 251–52, 268–69, 282; [23] (pp. 251–253), because this is a criticism of the procedural model, whose components are implied. Healey is right in pointing out the feedback nature between the planning sub-processes, but she overstates the lack of linearity in her own proposal, which is not straightforward but inescapably present. In general terms, Healey starts with the initial decision to intervene (question 0)—which clearly could not be found in the middle or at the end of the planning process; then she adds something missing from comprehensive planning, the constitution of the arena (a); she continues with the planning survey as understood by her, adding the communicational dimension (b)—necessarily the survey must precede policy; she extends (b) into the next question (c) and the latter constitutes a further development of the issues under discussion, which aims at their understanding—this is a given prerequisite and part of policy-making, that is, of her next question (d); in the context of (d), alternative scenarios are examined, before the selection of the final proposal—by definition, the proposal cannot come before the formulation of alternative scenarios; finally, monitoring and review follow—which have no sense if there is no proposal. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 23

proposal—by definition, the proposal cannot come before the formulation of alternative scenarios; finally, monitoring and review follow—which have no sense if there is no proposal. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 15 of 23

Figure 9. The sub-processes of collaborative spatial planning, according to Healey [22,23], inFigure diagrammatic 9. The sub-processes form, with the comprehensiveof collaborative model’s spatial componentsplanning, according in the background. to Healey White [22,23], circle: in coincidencediagrammatic with form, McLoughlin’s with the comprehensive component. model’ Gray circle:s components lack of thein the corresponding background. McLoughlinWhite circle: component.coincidence Dark with circle: McLoughlin’s the central component. component, alsoGray included circle: lack in McLoughlin’s of the corresponding components. McLoughlin Below the axis:component. contextual Dark factors. circle: the central component, also included in McLoughlin’s components. Below the axis: contextual factors. 2.3. The Postmodern Approaches to Land-Use Planning 2.3. 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This analytical because approach,their “planning intended analytics” to guide proposes planning to deal practice with towards genealogies democratic of planning social cases change, in different transforms contexts. the plannerThis analytical into a “researcher”, approach, intended to use their to termguide [28 plan] (pp.ning 44, practice 51, 53, 59, towards 61). democratic social change, transformsPower isthe indeed planner an into important a “researcher”, factor, but to limiting use their the term discussion [28] (pp. to 44,a priori51, 53,issues 59, 61). obscures other majorPower planning is indeed issues, an varying important from factor, one case but to limiting another. the Also, discussion planning to studiesa priori areissues a useful obscures material other formajor analysis, planning but issues, a theory varying is not constructedfrom one case inductively, to another. because Also, planning it presupposes studies are established a useful material explicit principles.for analysis, The but planner a theory should is not indeed constructed be a researcher, inductively, but because he/she it is presupposes not only a theorist established and his/her explicit aimprinciples. should alsoThe beplanner to go beyondshould theinde texted tobe the a researcher, material world but he/she (whatever is not its epistemologicalonly a theorist and definition) his/her andaim acquire, should asalso in anybe profession,to go beyond his/her the owntext practicalto the material experience. world Besides (whatever these comments its epistemological on theory, nodefinition) comments and on methodologyacquire, as in can any be made,profession, because his/her Flyvbjerg own and practical Richardson experience. do not proposeBesides any.these commentsIt is certainly on theory, not no the comments planning perspectiveon methodology that Robertcan be A.made, Beauregard because Flyvbjerg serves when and he Richardson criticises modernistdo not propose planning any. on the basis of postmodern cultural criticism and semiotic terminology. As he states,It postmodernism is certainly not rejectsthe planning grand narratives perspective and that general Robert social A. Beauregard theories, abandons serves when critical he discourse criticises inmodernist favour of planning the ironic on comment, the basis and of adoptspostmodern multiple cultural discourses. criticism All theseand semiotic positions, terminology. according to As him, he questionstates, postmodernism planning theory, rejects which isgrand just anarratives “master narrative”, and general offering social a singletheories, planning abandons process critical and adiscourse single master in favour plan. Toof thisthe singleironic planningcomment, process and adopts he opposes multiple the discourses. existence of All many these “narratives” positions, linkedaccording to the to variety him, question of interested planni communities.ng theory, which is just a “master narrative”, offering a single Beauregard translates the above planning concepts into semiotic terms as “plot” and “text” respectively, equivalent to Healey’s “questions” and “storyline”. This is all we are told about planning Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 16 of 23 itself. On the other hand, Beauregard does not neglect the material social conditions surrounding a plan and also argues for a partial reconstruction of modernist planning, linked to postmodern ideas, which would conserve the positive elements of modernist planning, such as its reformatory character and mediating function within the state, emphasising the prerequisite of a democratic context [29] (pp. 109, 112, 120–121). Here, we have a statement of principles but no planning theory, even less methodology. Mark Oranje accurately identifies what I considered an overemphasis on meaning with his description of the postmodern attitude to planning: the planning proposal becomes a planning “text”, the texts are “stories/narratives” produced by the rules of specific “language games”, the planners are persuasive future-oriented “storytellers” and the “reader”-researcher of the planning texts is a “textual” analyst, seeking out the hidden rules and meanings of the language game and its players. Oranje thinks that textual analysis may be useful, but also that in respect to planning theory there is the danger that the continuous penetration into textual analysis will end up as intertextual references from text to text, instead of referring to the material world. He also disagrees with the fragmentation of planning theory into a multiplicity of small narratives, which are attached to the local, unique and different and neglect similarities, and instead argues in favour of mixed theories [30] (pp. 178, 181–182). As is the case with Beauregard, Oranje is looking for a synthesis between modernist and postmodernist planning—Beauregard embracing the semiotic terminology, Oranje distancing himself from it, indeed for a middle-ground theory, but, like Beauregard, he remains on the level of a statement of principles. As we see from the above, the semiotic orientation of the postmodern approaches implies a strong textual view of planning which is highly restrictive. This is not to deny the usefulness of a theoretically sound semiotic view of planning, but one related and limited to the cultural/ideological sphere incorporated into the production of a plan, without transforming the whole planning process into a semiotic discourse. When the planning text as such, and not the actual planning process and implementation, becomes the object of (a semiotic) analysis, a fallacy emerges. Like any other object, a text may be viewed from different perspectives and one, but only one, of these is the semiotic perspective. Each perspective, when consistent, as it should be, provides information only about its own field of relevance and the same manifestly holds for the semiotic point of view. A biological, an astronomical or an engineering text may be the object of semiotic analysis, but such an analysis does not involve any discussion of the specifics of biology, astronomy or engineering (what in semiotics is called the “referent”). It is a kind of literary approach, concentrating on the text as text and totally indifferent to the material referent. As a result, and considering the dismissal of coherent approaches (as well as the experimental and amateurish use of postmodern theorising by planners), it does not come as a surprise that the postmodern theorising on planning fails to offer any useful methodological directives. Allmendinger notes, correctly, that it is unclear what postmodern planning is, but he nevertheless feels that postmodern theory offers a powerful critique of planning. He also believes in the possibility of a postmodern theory and practice of planning free from what he calls the extreme version of postmodernism, and thus the principles for planning that he states presuppose the invention of a non-extreme version of postmodernism, a very heavy task indeed to be undertaken by a planner [2] (pp. 180–181, 184–185, 237, 238–239).It is difficult to identify the divergences between these principles and collaborative planning, since both have a touch of a late May ’68 manifesto. In respect to methodology, Allmendinger’s main emphasis is given to a utopian democratic functioning of the planning context, i.e., a radical grassroots democracy, as opposed to representative democracy, which is seen as connected to the control of decision-makers, while the planning processes “need to be invented and agreed anew”, something which echoes the postmodern choice of non-theory and, hence, non-methodology. Note here that the view concerning the singularity of the planning process for each case (which is a direct transfer of the Lyotardian concept of small narratives) is closely akin to the traditional Anglo-Saxon empiricist idiographic position (also persistent in Anglo-Saxon human geography). Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 17 of 23

This lack of interest in methodology seems to be widespread today in the land-use planning field; we observe it in approaches very different from the ones discussed above, such as the “just city” approach, inspired by political economy. In the views of Susan S. Fainstein, for example, a theoretical conception is not lacking, but it concerns general social, political and economic matters, while planning is identified with the achievement of the qualities of a selected target city, in her case Amsterdam. The city is described as an empirical list of positive features, without any spatial theory interrelating them, and planning methodology is not part of the rationale of the author [31] (pp. 466–471).

3. The Ghost of the Procedural Model and the Middle-Ground Theory The search for the prerequisites of a middle-ground theory, which needs to rely strongly on a middle-ground methodology, was founded on a double assessment: the inflexibility of an ossified “grand narrative” and the paralysing effects of a practice consisting exclusively of “small narratives” constantly reinvented. The comparisons made above between planning theories demonstrates the structural importance of procedural planning. Reference to it, and thus direct or indirect reference to McLoughlin, is the rule for the modern approaches to planning examined, neo-liberal planning excepted. In the case of incremental planning, the reference has an oppositional character although it involves very similar components. Pragmatic planning accepts theoretically the procedural approach as part of a broader context. Advocacy and collaborative planning integrate it operationally within a broader context. In other words, almost all planning approaches revolve around the components of procedural planning. Healey looks back to it, in spite of her own very different view, and Allmendinger ascertains its continuing strong influence and argues, as does Healey, that we must not reject it as a tool internal to planning, even if we reject it in its pure form [2] (pp. 49–50, 60), a point of major importance, as we shall see. As we know, the comprehensive-rational approach was subject to acute criticism starting from the 80’s. It was accused of being representative of the optimism of the Enlightenment and modernity, positivist, over-generalised and ahistorical, technocratic and based on instrumental rationality, bureaucratic, apolitical and socially insensitive because it leaves the responsibility for decision-making with the politician and the planner, linear and silent on matters of implementation—see [2] (pp. 32–33, 85, 90, 93, 96–97, 148), [3] (pp. 60, 74, 77–78, 95–96, 113–14), [32] (pp. 1, 3, 4). These criticisms are not unjustified, up to a point, but, in rejecting the problematic parts of procedural planning, they risk rejecting its capital contribution to the operational aspect of land-use planning theory. This fact leads us to revisit the criticisms addressed to the procedural model referred to above: (a) Yes, comprehensive planning, and in general procedural planning, is the product of modernity and positivism. In the postmodern era, there has been a fierce criticism against positivism and formalism, whish challenges positivism as a whole. This kind of certainty presupposes a superior standpoint from which to pronounce it. Adherents of postmodernism think that they have found such an external and superior standpoint, but it is in fact only different and its supposed superiority (accompanied by a suspicion of evolutionism) is just a matter of confrontation between epistemological paradigms. We should note that there is a close historical kinship between postmodernism and modernism: postmodernism is the Americanised form of post-structuralism, which in turn is the direct non-positivist descendant of positivist structuralism, turned into postmodernism by a reinterpretation of the German philosophical tradition of Romanticism—for a discussion of post-structuralism as “neo-structuralism”, see [33] (pp. 7–30). Beyond a certain point, the wholesale criticism of positivism ceases to be sound and becomes ideological, because postmodernism is on principle against scientific thought. There is no sense in dismissing positivism as a whole, when it is the dominant paradigm in the positive sciences and strongly present in any quantitative approach in the social sciences. It offers tools at more specific levels than general principles that cannot be found in any other paradigm. (b) Comprehensive planning is indeed over-generalised and appears to be ahistorical, because it has the rigidity of any ideal model, with the optimism accompanying such constructs. On the Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 18 of 23 other hand, the fact that it has proved to be theoretically and practically useful in a persistent manner indicates that it is not throughout an abstract and utopian model. (c) The labels “technocratic” and “bureaucratic” have a whiff of the post-May’68 negative view of instrumental rationality. It has been argued that the rationality in planning did not follow from rationalist philosophy, but from Herbert A. Simon’s behavioural model and Talcott Parsons’s rational action theory [9] (p. 135). Planning combines rationality with socially sensitive matters and thus the criticism should refer only to its misplaced use for such matters. The reasoned participation of instrumental rationality in planning theory is generally not rejected—see also [4] (pp. 327–328, 340, 341)—and thus this criticism is also only partly correct. (d) The criticism that the comprehensive model is apolitical and socially insensitive, related to the point above, is careless and once more only partly valid. McLoughlin focuses on the dialogue between planners and politicians, but he is also well aware of the importance of formal and informal public opinion, although he does not elaborate on this, and Healey’s proposal is extremely close to Faludi’s collaborative conception of rational planning. Thus, these criticisms are only very partly true. They are also unfair when compared to the “city survey–social spirit and individuality of the city–town planning scheme (plan)” model of Patrick Geddes—[34] (mainly chapters XVI and XVII). This “survey–analysis–plan” model, based on evolutionary biology but closely comparable to the architectural model of a different origin, was the standard methodology of land-use planning from 1920 to 1960, though during those decades there were proposals suggesting many of the principles of procedural planning—cf. [9] 126–127, 129. The criticism does not stand, because the marked component of the procedural model is precisely policy making. (e) The accusation of linearity is also careless. It is bibliographically unsound, since some feedback mechanisms are present in McLoughlin’s proposal and are even more present in Faludi’s. Such criticism may be due to a combination of the lack of systematic analysis with rhetoric, as is the case with Healey. But more importantly, it obscures a logical fact of crucial importance for planning. Taylor’s view about the importance of distinguishing the components offered by the rational process, without identifying them with stages linearly connected, was referred to above. This is true from a certain important point of view, because it describes what happens during the planning process. The same author replies, as we saw, to Friedmann’s view that there is no linear connection from policy to implementation by arguing for its inevitable linearity. This logical position, however, throws another light on his criticism of stages, because it indicates that, whatever the feedback dynamics between components during the planning process, its final coherence cannot but be acquired linearly in a general sense. The idea of stages is not wrong, but partial—see also [35] (pp. 12–13). (f) The criticism that the model lacks interest in implementation needs clarification. If it concerns the analysis of the sub-components composing it or of the possible types of real contexts of implementation, it is justified. If, on the other hand, it refers to a methodological lack, it is not justified, because McLoughlin foresees both changes during implementation and the assessment of their impact, and further directly relates his model with the revolutionary concept of a kind of circularity of the planning process by requiring periodic reviews. To conclude, there does not seem to be any structural methodological problem with the procedural model and comprehensive planning. For almost half a century, planning theories in the field of urban and regional planning (and elsewhere) have been revolving incessantly around the methodological components of the comprehensive model. No theory has added any component during this period, while a number of them have left out one or more components. This reference to a common substratum does not come as a surprise if we think of planning practice. The exclusive postmodern focus on difference as a general guiding principle is an abstract epistemological decision, obscuring the factor of similarity. The methodological components of comprehensive planning seem to be, at least at the present stage of our knowledge, the universal nucleus of the land-use planning enterprise. In a similar vein, John Muller has stated that: “the attack on the theoretical premises of planning procedure seems unlikely to be sufficiently convincing to overturn the rational method applecart” [9] (p. 151). Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 19 of 23

Up to now each of the comparisons made were between a certain planning approach and the comprehensive model. It seems useful (and thanks are due to one of the reviewers for this suggestion) to indicate the components of all the approaches studied in a single table (Table1), so that general comparisons can be made between all models. These comparisons corroborate the conclusion above.

Table 1. The planning components activated by the approaches of the corpus. +: used component. ++: emphasised component.

Components Spatial Decision Survey Policy Forecasting Scenarios Evaluation Implementation Model Approach Comprehensive + + + + + + + + Rational + + + + + + + Action-centred ++ Incremental ++ + + + ++ Pragmatic ++ ++ Neo-liberal ++ Advocacy + ++ + + + + Collaborative + + ++ + + +

This paper does not mean to imply that comprehensive planning should be adopted tale quale, nor that it does not present structural problems. They are easily discernible: it presupposes a simulation of urban (and regional) space which is far beyond our present knowledge of urban dynamics and was even more so in McLoughlin’s time; it integrates within one and the same model a transport planning sub-model, which is once more over-optimistic, as proved by the independent development of transport planning models; it is time-consuming and thus delays the preparation of the plan. Nor does this argument mean that other approaches have made no contribution to planning theory. They very rightly call attention to the importance of the context social, institutional, economic in which any form of planning occurs. However, the analysis here shows that their contribution lies only in the elaboration of contextual elements: the social context, present in McLoughlin and emphasised by Faludi, but becoming central in pragmatic, advocacy and collaborative planning; the institutional context, central to Faludi, very important although finally undermined in collaborative planning and targeted for reformation by it and the neo-liberal New Right; the economic context, central to incremental planning and the neo-liberal approach. The type of context(s) selected, its weight and the nature of its relationship to the components depend on the theory adopted. The components of comprehensive planning appear in almost all cases, which shows that they present a remarkable flexibility and can be integrated within greatly diverging theoretical approaches. It is not only a matter of components. Comprehensive planning also offers a model for any planning theory, and I do not refer here to its content, but to its completeness. A complete theory presupposes the existence of four consecutive levels, each one flexibly deriving from its superior level: an epistemological level (the level of the paradigm), which in the case of comprehensive planning is positivism; a theoretical level; a methodological level actualising theory in practice through concrete operations; and a technical level through which these operations are realised. Comprehensive planning covers extensively all these levels and they are all necessary if we intend to do land-use planning theory, not criticism, philosophy or literary studies. Contrary to comprehensive planning, the other theories start with general theoretical statements or empirically and sometimes descend to methodological matters, but do not offer any concrete techniques. In their successive publications, they continue to recycle the same material without ever being able to take the form of a systematic whole. It is striking that much of the energy invested in planning approaches has been focused on the elaboration of a theoretical context, while methodology is weakly represented and techniques are not mentioned at all. We may now envisage the main lines of a middle-ground theory of urban and regional land-use planning. The standard prerequisites for it—without in any way underestimating the substantive scientific grounding theory and the axiological factors orienting the planning output—are presented below: Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 20 of 23

(a) Any middle-ground theory of land-use planning is theoretically complete only when it elaborates systematically all four of the above levels: epistemology, theory, methodology and techniques. (b) Starting from whichever theoretical basis has been selected as adequate, a land-use planning theory extends systematically and analytically to methodology. The latter is summarised by the logic of the diagrams presented above. They reveal a fact escaping all planning theories. Planning methodology as a whole follows from the articulation of two registers having different functions: the first is illustrated by the axis including the structural components of planning as formulated by McLoughlin, while the second is the context within which these components evolve, including a set of contextual elements (social participation, institutions, the market). The function of the first register are the technical operations of the planner, which take place within the four walls of the planning office, in conjunction with the actions of the decision-making apparatus (the set covered by the structural components), while the function of the second is to provide input for the first register, that is, constraints and values coming from the external environment, the context (see e). The technical part of planning relies on the structural components, but it is guided by the values formulated by both the technical operations and the context. (c) Any middle-ground theory must necessarily include a third register involved in land-use planning: the articulation of other types of planning, such as transport, economic, demographic or environmental (ecological) planning, with the structural components. In this case, these types act as a framework providing another kind of input, this time of a technical nature, to the components of planning, an operation also taking place within the planning office – see [36] (pp. 11–12). The framework of land-use planning does not involve the complete planning product of these other types of planning, but only those of their planning elements that are operationally useful for land-use planning. The latter is just one of the different types of planning, each one of which has its own “epistemic object”, to use the expression of Ernest R. Alexander [37] (pp. 93–95, 99, 100 n. 10). (d) The operations involved within each component and sub-component, which both belong to the technical level—with their possible variations—are explicit and analytical, because without them planning theory is unable to pass to practice. McLoughlin is extremely analytical on this matter, but it is conspicuously lacking in the other proposals. It is very frustrating, for example, not to find any guidelines for carrying out the component of the survey of the planned area, or to be informed about the need to consider alternative scenarios without any technical discussion of the manner of their formulation and assessment. (e) Any middle-ground theory must make the components of the planning process and their internal sub-components—many, but not all, of which have been systematically investigated by comprehensive planning—a function of possible formal contexts, in the form of contextual scenarios linked to existing socio-economic, cultural, political, institutional and legal settings [37] (p. 97). That is, the context not only poses constraints and offers values, but also has an impact on the structural components. In this manner, the middle-ground theory will have the flexibility of choosing each time as a guide one of the models established by the contextual formal scenarios, with as a result the adaptation of the general theory to the national or local context. This implies that: (i) the specific nature—as opposed to the umbrella nature given by the general theory of the components and their internal sub-components is identified and (ii) the umbrella feedbacks between components and between sub-components of the general theory will be specified for each specific case—although it is not probable that there will be significant variation in this matter. Points (a) to (c) above are of a general theoretical nature and context-independent; point (d) shows a certain context-sensitivity; and point (e) displays the context-sensitive part of planning. This last point does not deny the possibility of a general theory, provided the latter formulates theoretical formal contexts and their impact on the components and their interrelations, that is, provided such a theory builds from the beginning and in abstracto its formal contexts. Urban Sci. 2018, 2, 93 21 of 23

The normal course to validate a theory is for it to be applied in practice and thus checked and also adjusted to the empirical data. But this is not necessarily the case with land-use planning theory. The reason is that there is already another planning theory, although oddly it has been kept separate from planning theory stricto sensu, which is in a position to provide ready-made contextual scenarios, although on a general level. They may replace the scenarios that planning theory would tentatively construct as formal, by providing already tested, real-life empirical scenarios cf. [37] (p. 99). This theory is none other than the one that follows from the study of actual urban and regional planning systems. An interesting typology of these planning systems has been formulated by Newman and Thornley. They argue that the variety of legal mechanisms between countries influences their approaches to urban planning and the variety of administrative systems influences the application of the plans, and thus they choose as relevant variables for their planning typology national legal and administrative systems [38] (pp. 27–42, 71–75). Their study was preceded by the European Union (EU) project for the Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies and followed by an intensive interest in the construction of a typology for planning systems through large-scale comparisons. Different, but not radically different, typologies have been proposed. The work on the compendium showed that planning systems are fundamentally adapted to the historical traditions of different countries and we understand that these systems are essentially planning cultures, deriving from the wider societal and cultural context. This work resulted in the identification of four different non-exclusive planning traditions, based not only on the variables of the legal family and the distribution of power between central and local government, but also on five additional variables [39] (pp. 1544, 1546, 1549, 1550–1553, 1555); [40] (p. 4). We may now better understand the structure of a middle-ground theory. Its fundamental structure follows from points (a) to (c), and partially (d), which, pace postmodern theorising, constitute a “grand narrative”. This theoretical construction is relativised by two factors: first, by the grounding in a theoretical basis specifically selected in each case, and second by the formulation of a limited number of model contextual settings. These two factors bypass the impasse of “small narratives”, contributing to realistic “middle-ground narratives”, not anchored to an infinity of conjunctural contexts but deriving as variants from a general “grand narrative”. It follows that there may be more than one middle-ground theory answering the above requirements. But at least they will all respond in a holistic manner to the actual interests of land-use planning, and it will be possible to compare them and assess their usefulness. Perhaps the suggestions above can also provide some clues for the persistent problem of the land-use planning curriculum. I believe, and hope, that the perspective I propose opens a vast field for future research in the field of planning theory.

Funding: This research has received no external funding. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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