A Defence of Separatism

A Defence of Separatism by Boyd Millar A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Boyd Millar (2010) A Defence of Separatism Boyd Millar Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2010 Abstract Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism —the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases ii where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another. iii Acknowledgements I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Bill Seager, and the other members of my thesis committee, Benj Hellie and Evan Thompson. They were all very generous with their time and I benefited immensely from their comments and advice. Thanks also to Mohan Matthen for his comments and suggestions. Finally, thanks to my wife for all her support. iv Table of Contents Thesis Abstract .......................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements................................................................................................................iv Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Moderate Separatism..............................................................................................7 1.1 Intentionality and Intentional Content............................................................................8 1.2 Phenomenal Consciousness and Phenomenal Character.................................................9 1.3 Occurrences with both Intentional Content and Phenomenal Character........................11 1.4 The Relation between Intentional Content and Phenomenal Character.........................14 1.5 Phenomenal Qualities..................................................................................................19 1.5.1 Sensory Qualities..................................................................................................20 1.5.2 Cognitive Qualities ...............................................................................................25 1.6 Two Types of Separatism ............................................................................................36 1.7 Moderate Separatism and the Alternatives ...................................................................41 Chapter 2: Same Content but Different Sensory Qualities......................................................45 2.1 The Trees Argument....................................................................................................48 2.1.1 The Visual Angle Reply........................................................................................56 2.1.2 Lycan’s Reply.......................................................................................................63 2.1.3 Byrne’s Reply.......................................................................................................70 2.2 Double Vision .............................................................................................................76 2.2.1 Double Vision as Illusion......................................................................................80 2.2.2 Tye’s Layers of Content........................................................................................85 2.2.3 Subjective Direction .............................................................................................93 2.2.4 Fregean Representationalism ................................................................................97 Chapter 3: Same Sensory Qualities but Different Content.................................................... 104 3.1 The Delta Example.................................................................................................... 106 3.1.1 The “Different Sensory Qualities” Reply ............................................................ 109 3.1.2 The “Same Intentional Content” Reply ............................................................... 114 3.2 The Mirror Example.................................................................................................. 119 3.2.1 The “Same Intentional Content” Reply ............................................................... 122 3.2.2 The “Different Sensory Qualities” Reply ............................................................ 131 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 139 References .......................................................................................................................... 147 Copyright Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ 154 v Introduction There are two basic features that plausibly define what it is to have a mind—features philosophers call intentionality and phenomenal consciousness . Briefly, to possess intentionality is to be about, or represent some object or state of affairs. For instance, my belief that snow is white represents the world to be a certain way, and the way it represents the world to be is its intentional content . For a mental occurrence to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something it’s like for the subject of that occurrence. 1 For instance, there is something it’s like for me to hear a certain note played on a piano, and what it’s like for me to hear that note is the phenomenal character of my experience. One of the most important questions in the philosophy of mind, and one that has received a great deal of attention recently, is how these two fundamental features of the mind are related. For a time, separatism—the view that intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are independent of or separate from one another—was perhaps the most widespread view of the issue in analytic philosophy. 2 For instance, the prevalence of this view explains why, in the second half of the 20 th century, intentionality and consciousness were often treated separately in debates over whether the mind could be “naturalized.” A popular view in the 1950s was that some sort of “behaviouristic analysis” could capture intentional occurrences such as beliefs and desires, but not conscious occurrences such as visual experiences and pains (instead, conscious occurrences would have to be identified with brain occurrences). 3 Later, when functionalism had become the dominant physicalist theory of the mind, a common objection was that while functionalist accounts might be able to capture 1 I will use “occurrence” throughout to cover both states and events. 2 “Separatism” is used as the name for this view by Horgan and Tienson (2002, 520), and Graham, Horgan and Tienson (2007, 468). 3 See, for example, Place (1956). 1 2 intentionality they leave out consciousness altogether. 4 In other words, for a long time it was common to think of intentionality and consciousness as distinct mental features presenting distinct challenges to physicalism and requiring distinct theoretical approaches. Separatism’s popularity began to decline during the 1990s, largely thanks to the development of a theory known as representationalism.5 According to the representationalist, intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are not distinct and separable aspects of mental occurrences; rather, being phenomenally conscious just is a matter of possessing a particular sort of intentional content.

Load more