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Economics & Finance 2011
Economics & Finance 2011 press.princeton.edu Contents General Interest 1 Economic Theory & Research 15 Game Theory 18 Finance 19 Econometrics, Mathematical & Applied Economics 24 Innovation & Entrepreneurship 26 Political Economy, Trade & Development 27 Public Policy 30 Economic History & History of Economics 31 Economic Sociology & Related Interest 36 Economics of Education 42 Classic Textbooks 43 Index/Order Form 44 TEXT Professors who wish to consider a book from this catalog for course use may request an examination copy. For more information please visit: press.princeton.edu/class.html New Winner of the 2010 Business Book of the Year Award, Financial Times/Goldman Sachs Fault Lines How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy Raghuram G. Rajan “What caused the crisis? . There is an embarrassment of causes— especially embarrassing when you recall how few people saw where they might lead. Raghuram Rajan . was one of the few to sound an alarm before 2007. That gives his novel and sometimes surprising thesis added authority. He argues in his excellent new book that the roots of the calamity go wider and deeper still.” —Clive Crook, Financial Times Raghuram G. Rajan is the Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Profes- “Excellent . deserve[s] to sor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and be widely read.” former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. —Economist 2010. 272 pages. Cl: 978-0-691-14683-6 $26.95 | £18.95 Not for sale in India ForthcominG Blind Spots Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do about It Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. -
Econ 771.001
ECON 771: Political Economy of Race and Gender Spring 2018 Dr. Elissa Braunstein Department of Economics, Colorado State University [email protected] Office: C327 Clark Office hours: T 1:00 – 2:00 (or by appointment) Overview I define political economy as “the study of the impact of group identity and collective conflict on the organization of economic activity and its consequences.” Political economy traditions tend to focus on class as a source of identity and group conflict. In this course, we will expand that focus to incorporate other sources of group membership, giving you a broad background in economic approaches to inequality and identity based on race/ethnicity and gender. We will focus primarily on the neoclassical, Marxian political economy and feminist literatures. In addition to learning more about the relationship between group membership and economic structures, we will use the prisms of race and gender to better understand and critique various approaches to economic analysis. And while much of the literature focuses on the U.S. context, I will try to broaden the discussion as often as possible, and encourage students to do the same. I welcome students from other social science disciplines. Although we will cover some advanced material that may be difficult for those who have not completed graduate economics courses, the emphasis will be on the main points, rather than the technical detail. The syllabus includes both required readings (*starred) and supplemental readings/sections as I wanted to give you a more complete sense of the literature if you are interested in looking further into a particular topic. -
Notes and Sources for Evil Geniuses: the Unmaking of America: a Recent History
Notes and Sources for Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History Introduction xiv “If infectious greed is the virus” Kurt Andersen, “City of Schemes,” The New York Times, Oct. 6, 2002. xvi “run of pedal-to-the-medal hypercapitalism” Kurt Andersen, “American Roulette,” New York, December 22, 2006. xx “People of the same trade” Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, ed. Andrew Skinner, 1776 (London: Penguin, 1999) Book I, Chapter X. Chapter 1 4 “The discovery of America offered” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Library of America, 2012), Book One, Introductory Chapter. 4 “A new science of politics” Tocqueville, Democracy In America, Book One, Introductory Chapter. 4 “The inhabitants of the United States” Tocqueville, Democracy In America, Book One, Chapter XVIII. 5 “there was virtually no economic growth” Robert J Gordon. “Is US economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds.” Policy Insight No. 63. Centre for Economic Policy Research, September, 2012. --Thomas Piketty, “World Growth from the Antiquity (growth rate per period),” Quandl. 6 each citizen’s share of the economy Richard H. Steckel, “A History of the Standard of Living in the United States,” in EH.net (Economic History Association, 2020). --Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016), p. 98. 6 “Constant revolutionizing of production” Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), Chapter I. 7 from the early 1840s to 1860 Tomas Nonnenmacher, “History of the U.S. -
Kranton Duke University
The Devil is in the Details – Implications of Samuel Bowles’ The Moral Economy for economics and policy research October 13 2017 Rachel Kranton Duke University The Moral Economy by Samuel Bowles should be required reading by all graduate students in economics. Indeed, all economists should buy a copy and read it. The book is a stunning, critical discussion of the interplay between economic incentives and preferences. It challenges basic premises of economic theory and questions policy recommendations based on these theories. The book proposes the path forward: designing policy that combines incentives and moral appeals. And, therefore, like such as book should, The Moral Economy leaves us with much work to do. The Moral Economy concerns individual choices and economic policy, particularly microeconomic policies with goals to enhance the collective good. The book takes aim at laws, policies, and business practices that are based on the classic Homo economicus model of individual choice. The book first argues in great detail that policies that follow from the Homo economicus paradigm can backfire. While most economists would now recognize that people are not purely selfish and self-interested, The Moral Economy goes one step further. Incentives can amplify the selfishness of individuals. People might act in more self-interested ways in a system based on incentives and rewards than they would in the absence of such inducements. The Moral Economy warns economists to be especially wary of incentives because social norms, like norms of trust and honesty, are critical to economic activity. The danger is not only of incentives backfiring in a single instance; monetary incentives can generally erode ethical and moral codes and social motivations people can have towards each other. -
Connections in Transportation Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, Spring 2015
Behavior and Policy 11.478 Behavior and Policy: Connections in Transportation Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, Spring 2015 Full Reading List Part I: Behavior and Policy in a Nutshell Class 1. Cafeteria Trays and Multiple Frameworks • Etheredge (1976) The case of the unreturned cafeteria trays: An Investigation based upon theories of motivation and human behavior Class 2. Ten Instruments for Behavioral Change • Miller and Prentice (2013) Psychological Levers of Behavior Change, Chapter 17 in Eldar Shafir, The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy • Richard Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein: Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Introduction • Daniel Kahneman: Thinking, Fast and Slow, Introduction Class 3. Measurement, Tools and Technology (Emile Bruneau) • Emile Bruneau 2015 "Putting Neuroscience to Work for Peace”, Working Paper • Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kremer, M. (2007). Using randomization in development economics research: A toolkit. Handbook of development economics, 4, 3895-3962. • Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the implicit association test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of personality and social psychology, 85(2), 197. You may try the Implicit Association Test here https://implicit.harvard.edu/ • Winter Mason and Siddharth Suri (2012) Conducting Behavioural Research on Amazon’s Mech Turk, Behavior Research Method 44(1) Class 4. My Brain at the Bus Stop: EEG & Waiting • Dan Ariely and Gregory S. Berns (2010), “Neuromarketing: The Hope and Hype of Neuroimaging in Business.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience. • Li, Zelin, F. Duarte, J. Zhao, Z. Zhao (2015) My brain at the bus stop: an exploratory framework for applying EEG-based emotion detection techniques in transportation study, working paper Class 5. -
Behavioral Economics As Applied to Firms: a Primer1
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer Armstrong, Mark and Huck, Steffen University College London (UCL) January 2010 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20356/ MPRA Paper No. 20356, posted 02 Feb 2010 03:16 UTC Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer1 Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck Department of Economics University College London January 2010 Abstract We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior. 1. Introduction In recent years there has been a good deal of research investigating how poor or non-standard decision making by consumers might affect market outcomes. In much of this work, the assumption is that firms are fully rational and aim to maximize their profits (and sometimes they do this by exploiting the behavioral biases of consumers). Some of this work points to situations where there is a role for policy which protects consumers from their own failings and from exploitative firms.2 In this article we focus instead on non-standard approaches to firm behavior. Consumers are kept in the background, and are present merely to generate in some fashion a demand curve for the firms' products. -
Sendhil Mullainathan Education Fields of Interest Professional
Sendhil Mullainathan Robert C Waggoner Professor of Economics Littauer Center M-18 Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 [email protected] 617 496 2720 _____________________________________________________________________________________ Education HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA, 1993-1998 PhD in Economics Dissertation Topic: Essays in Applied Microeconomics Advisors: Drew Fudenberg, Lawrence Katz, and Andrei Shleifer CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NY, 1990-1993 B.A. in Computer Science, Economics, and Mathematics, magna cum laude Fields of Interest Behavioral Economics, Poverty, Applied Econometrics, Machine Learning Professional Affiliations HARVARD UNIVERSITY Robert C Waggoner Professor of Economics, 2015 to present. Affiliate in Computer Science, Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, July 1, 2016 to present Professor of Economics, 2004 (September) to 2015. UNVIRSITY OF CHICAGO Visiting Professor, Booth School of Business, 2016-17. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Mark Hyman Jr. Career Development Associate Professor, 2002-2004 Mark Hyman Jr. Career Development Assistant Professor, 2000-2002 Assistant Professor, 1998- 2000 SELECTED AFFILIATIONS Co - Founder and Senior Scientific Director, ideas42 Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research Founding Member, Poverty Action Lab Member, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Contributing Writer, New York Times Sendhil Mullainathan __________________________________________________________________ Books Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much, joint with Eldar Shafir, 2013. New York, NY: Times Books Policy and Choice: Public Finance through the Lens of Behavioral Economics, joint with William J Congdon and Jeffrey Kling, 2011. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press Work in Progress Machine Learning and Econometrics: Prediction, Estimation and Big Data, joint with Jann Spiess, book manuscript in preparation. “Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Experiments: A Machine Learning Approach,” joint with Jens Ludwig and Jann Spiess, in preparation. -
Gender Differences*
PERFORMANCE INCOMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS: GENDER DIFFERENCES* URI GNEEZY MURIEL NIEDERLE ALDO RUSTICHINI Eventhough the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has beena priorityin manycountries, large gender differences prevail in competitive high-rankingpositions. Suggested explanations include discrimination and dif- ferencesin preferencesand human capital. In this paper we present experimental evidencein support of anadditionalfactor: women may be lesseffective than men incompetitive environments, even if they are able to perform similarly in non- competitiveenvironments. In a laboratoryexperiment we observe, as we increase thecompetitiveness of theenvironment, a signicant increasein performancefor men,but not for women. This results in a signicant gendergap inperformance intournaments, while there is no gap whenparticipants are paid according to piecerate. This effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than insingle-sex competitive environments: this suggests that women may be ableto performin competitiveenvironments per se. I. INTRODUCTION Allocationsacross genders of high prole jobs remain largely favorableto men, and area majorfactor in thegender gap in earnings.For example, Bertrand and Hallock[2001] found that only2.5 percentof the vehighestpaid executivesin alargedata setof U.S.rmsare women (for areviewon genderdifferences in wages,see Blau and Kahn [2000]). Thenumerous attempts to explain this fact can beclassi ed intotwo broad categories.The rstexplanation restson gender differences in abilities and pref- erencesand hencein occupationalself-selection [Polachek 1981]. Thesecond class ofexplanations relatesto discrimination in the workplace,which leads todifferential treatmentof men and womenwith equal preferencesand abilities [Black and Strahan 2001; Goldin and Rouse2000; Wennerås and Wold1997]. In this paper wepropose and experimentallytest an addi- tional explanation:women may be less effective than menin competitiveenvironments. -
Blog Addition Gneezy and List
Women and the Competition Gap By Uri Gneezy and John List You think you know why less than 4% of Fortune 500 CEOs are women? Scholars have theorized for decades about the reasons why women can’t seem to make faster progress in breaking through the glass ceiling. The sad fact is that while women are doing better than men in some areas, such as higher education, men still occupy the highest ranks of society in the United States and around the world. The proportion of women in the U.S. workforce rose from 48 percent in 1970 to 64 percent in 2011,1 but today, only one in five senior management positions are held by women. Some consider these facts as an achievement, since they are the highest in U.S. history. Yet, women are still paid less than men for equivalent jobs. Even in public positions women still have not achieved parity. They still hold fewer than 17 percent of Congressional seats, and about the same percentage of corporate board seats. We’ll try to convince you that an important contributor to this gap in labor market outcomes is the different ways in which men and women react to incentives. In particular, women tend to avoid competitive settings and jobs in which salary is determined by relative rankings. But why do women and men react differently to incentives? And how important is the culture we’re born into in making us more or less competitive? We couldn’t just take for granted, in the absence of data, that women were innately less competitive than men. -
Klaus Wertenbroch, July 2021
Klaus Wertenbroch, July 2021 Klaus Wertenbroch The Novartis Chaired Professor of Management and the Environment Professor of Marketing INSEAD 1 Ayer Rajah Avenue Singapore 138676 ph.: +65 6799-5348 [email protected] ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS INSEAD (Europe Campus, France, 1999-2003, 2005-17; Asia Campus, Singapore, 2003-05, from 2017) The Novartis Chaired Professor of Management and the Environment, since 2018 Professor of Marketing, since 2007 Associate Professor of Marketing, 2001-2007 (with tenure from 2003) Assistant Professor of Marketing, 1999-2001 University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School Judith C. and William G. Bollinger Visiting Professor, 2011-2012 Visiting Professor of Marketing, 2010-2013 University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business Visiting Professor of Marketing, spring semester 2009 Yale University, Yale School of Management Assistant Professor of Marketing, 1997-1999 Duke University, The Fuqua School of Business Assistant Professor of Marketing, 1994-1997 The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business Lecturer of Behavioral Science, 1993-1994 EDUCATION The University of Chicago Ph.D. in Business Administration (Marketing and Behavioral Science; advisor: Steve Hoch), 1994 M.B.A. in Marketing and Statistics, 1994 Darmstadt University of Technology (Technische Hochschule Darmstadt), Germany M.Sc. (Diplom) in Organizational and Industrial Psychology and Labor Law, 1990 Master’s thesis research, University of Southern California (advisor: Detlof von Winterfeldt), 1989 Master’s studies, Brooklyn College and Graduate Center, City University of New York, 1985-1986 Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany B.Sc. (Vordiplom) in Psychology, 1985 Diltheyschule, humanistisches Gymnasium, Wiesbaden, Germany Abitur (grosses Latinum, Graecum), 1980 ACADEMIC HONORS AND AWARDS Invited to nominate candidates for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016 1 Klaus Wertenbroch, July 2021 Invited speaker for the 100th anniversary celebration of the first Ph.D. -
Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evi- Dence
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Price dispersion in the lab and on the Internet: Theory and evi- dence MichaelR.Baye∗ John Morgan∗∗ Price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook Bertrand competition. We show (Propositions 2 and 3) that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion. A variety of statistical tests, based on data sets from two indepen- dent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models, suggest that bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well. Evidence is also presented which suggests that the models are consistent with data from a leading Internet price comparison site. *Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana Univer- sity, Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: (812) 855-2779. E-mail: [email protected]. ** Haas School of Business and Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. Phone: (510) 642-2669. E-mail: [email protected]. We thank the Editor, the referees, and numerous seminar participants for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We are especially grateful to Dilip Abreu, Martin Dufwenberg, Glenn Ellison, Nancy Epling, Ed Glaeser, Uri Gneezy, Paul Klemperer, Dan Kovenock, David Laibson, John Maxwell, Martin Sefton, Dale Stahl, and Abdullah Yavas. The authors thank Nuffield College (University of Oxford), Trinity and Corpus Christi Colleges (University of Cambridge), University of Nottingham, The Hoover Institution, and the University of Bonn for their gracious hospitality and for providing a stimulating environment where some of this work was completed. -
Predictions and Nudges: What Behavioral Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and Vice-Versa
Book Review Predictions and Nudges: What Behavioral Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and Vice-Versa Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. Pp. 304. $26.00. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New York: HarperCollins, 2008. Pp. 280. $25.95. Anne C. Dailey* Peter Siegelman** Rationalists, wearing square hats, Think, in square rooms, Looking at the floor, Looking at the ceiling. They confine themselves To right-angled triangles. If they tried rhomboids, Cones, waving lines, ellipses- As, for example, the ellipse of the half-moon- Rationalists would wear sombreros.1 Evangeline Starr Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Connecticut School of Law. ** Roger Sherman Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. We thank Ellen Siegelman for helpful comments. 1. Wallace Stevens, Six Significant Landscapes, VI, HARMONIUM (1916). Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [21:2 The informed law and humanities reader can hardly fail to be aware that the field of economics has undergone a "behavioral revolution" over the past several decades, and that this revolution has spilled over into the legal academy. Open an economics journal these days and you are likely to find any number of articles billing themselves as "behavioral" in orientation. Similarly, law reviews are filled with articles bearing titles ranging from "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics"'2 to "Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries" 3 and "Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers.