"Greatness" Revisited: Evaluating the Performance of Early American Presidents in Terms of Cultural Dilemmas Author(s): Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, Presidential Greatness in Peace and in War (Winter, 1991), pp. 15-34 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550661 . Accessed: 13/07/2011 12:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Blackwell Publishing and Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Presidential Studies Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org "Greatness" Revisited: Evaluating The Performance of Early American Presidents in Terms of Cultural Dilemmas
RICHARD ELLIS AARON WILDAVSKY Political ScienceDepartment and Survey Research Center University of California, Berkeley
Abstract to a we A president'sability resolvecultural dilemmas provides standardby which can success "Great" we are those who judge presidential and failure. presidents, suggest, provide we solutions to culturaldilemmas. Using this criterion, find that of thefirst sixteenpresidents (from thefounding of therepublic through the Civil War), GeorgeWashington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew and Abraham Lincoln as We Jackson, qualify great presidents. also conclude that Adams and considered "near are John James Polk, commonly great" presidents, greatly overrated.
What is themark of a "great" president?Will Ronald Reagan be inducted into select not a a this class? If Great then how about Near Great president? Or will as or worse a he be remembered merely Average, still, Failure? Does he deserve a ranking higher or lower than Jimmy Carter? Lyndon Johnson? Dwight Eisenhower? Truman? Harry How does his performance compare with that of James Madison, or soon John Tyler Andrew Jackson? Journalists and academics will earnestly address themselves to our measures the question of how 39th president up against his illus trious and less than illustrious predecessors. a of has the Polling panel "experts" become accepted way of rendering history's of ear judgement presidential performance. The presidential greatness game began in nest in when Arthur 1948, Schlesinger asked fifty-five prominent historians to grade our A Near past presidents: signified Great; B, Great; C, Average; D, Below Average; and Failure. there to in E, Believing be wisdom numbers, subsequent surveys have expanded the panel of "experts" from 571 in 1970 to 953 in 1983.1 The of practice evaluating presidential performance by polling historians is a cu one. are rious Characteristically surveys conducted to obtain information about the either in the form of or respondent, preferences?which candidate party do you prefer? or beliefs about the are empirical world?how many members in the House of Represen tatives. We do not as a rule conduct to a surveys gauge the validity of claim. Why then we so to do do with respect presidential performance? The answer is that we lack criteria for we agreed upon making these judgements. If had accepted criteria,
15 STUDIES 16 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
to we surveys would be superfluous (and subject corroboration); would need only to check presidential performance against the established yardsticks. ? While these surveys have yielded interesting information about the respondents Murray and Blessing's poll, for instance, finds that American historians specializing esteem in women's history hold George Washington in much lower than the sample as a are not a to whole ?they good tool evaluate presidential performance. There is no reason to mean more think the judgement of 1000 historians valid than the esti mate a so as our com of single scholar specializing in past presidents. In far aim is to pare the performances of presidents, rather than gather information about the pollees, to energies should be directed devising appropriate criteria for evaluating performance. The original Schlesinger survey completely sidestepped the issue of criteria to be used in appraising presidential performance. The only instructions in the first poll were test in case is in that "the each performance office, omitting anything done before or one was to was after."2 How gauge the performance in office left unspecified. In the absence of such criteria, the finding that president X ranked higher than president was Y difficult to interpret. to In Presidential Greatness, Stephen Bailey attempted remedy this deficiency by identifying criteria through which presidents could be measured. He came up with forty-three yardsticks for measuring presidential greatness: achievement, administra tive capacity, appointees, blunders, eloquence, industriousness, scandals, sensitivity, a as and many more.3 If the Schlesinger survey suffered from lack of guidelines to tests the unit of comparability, the surfeit of devised by Bailey left the reader with a commendably broader view of the many facets of the presidency but equally helpless. we were no By including everything and excluding nothing better than before at evalu ating presidential performance. measures as Often the standard of presidential greatness employs such amount or of legislation passed, activity in office, number of objectives pursued. But these create a criteria pronounced bias towards activist presidents. That such criteria sneak in ideological judgements about the ends of government is indicated by Schlesinger's or conclusion that the 1962 survey showed that average mediocre presidents "believed in to negative government, in self-subordination the legislative power."4 Why should a contemporary activist view?the presidency is best that adds functions to govern ment a and/or the presidency?be standard for scholars? aware as con Though acutely of the limitations of presidential ratings presently we not a ducted, do accept the claim that "comparing eminent figures is only game," or a that "each [president] operated within unique political environment."5 By taking at aim the easy target of presidential ratings, attention is deflected away from what we a more to contend is significant defect ?the tendency wrap each president and in a to his times unique cocoon, thereby reducing the study of the presidency political as biography. The result, James MacGregor Burns correctly pointed out two decades ago, is that "We know everything about the Presidents and nothing about the Presi dency."6 It would be both ironic and unfortunate for the most well-known effort to to com compare presidencies discredit the laudable, indeed essential, goal of making parisons among administrations. The presidential greatness game remains popular pre "GREATNESS"REVISITED | 17
it Our cisely because holds up the tantalizing prospect of comparing presidencies. aim is to do just that.
Resolving Cultural Dilemmas: A Mark of Greatness All presidents face cultural dilemmas, albeit of different kinds and intensi to we a ties. Their ability resolve these dilemmas, believe, provides criterion for evalu can terms ating their performance. Our hypothesis is that presidencies be evaluated in or overcome. are of dilemmas confronted, evaded, created "Great" presidents those to who provide solutions culturally induced dilemmas. we not mean customs. are coun By political culture do national Nor cultures are as we use same tries. All those residing in America not, the term, adherents of the we a political culture. Rather analyze politics from perspective of cultural dissensus, or com i.e. the conflict between cultures ways of life.We posit the existence of three peting political cultures: hierarchical, individualist, and egalitarian.7 The type of leader ship preferred and feared, and the kinds of support given to and demands made upon we leaders, hypothesize, vary by political culture. to The individualist regime is organized maximize the scope of individual au and thus minimize need a tonomy the for authority. Individualist regimes perform delicate act are balancing between having leaders when they needed and getting rid are not. as of them when they Ideally, they give up only much autonomy as the im mediate engagement requires. Individualists dread most the leader who overstays his welcome. Adherents of individualist regimes know that from the leader flows the and its are tax hierarchy among multitudinous ranks found policemen and collectors. Not the choose not to have the other wanting one, they any longer than absolutely Groucho necessary. Following Marx, they believe that any leader strong enough to help them is too strong to be trusted. are dedicated to Egalitarians diminishing differences among people. Would-be leaders are thus in trouble before a egalitarian they start, for authority is prima-facie case of to inequality. Followership, egalitarians, implies subordination of one person to another. If themselves to they push forward, attempting lead rather than merely or convening facilitating discussion, leaders will be attacked for attempting to lord it over others. must at once Aspiring leaders therefore dissemble, persuasive about the course to follow and as were not at right self-effacing, if they leading all. in a is Exercising leadership hierarchical regime much easier. Prospective leaders are to inheres in con expected lead; authority position. The regime that guides and strains them gives consistent advice: leadership is necessary, and, therefore, should be hierarchies shore supported. Fearing disorder, up authority in every way they can. While in the are sharing credit, leaders generally absolved from blame. Differences in or that a are prestige privilege accompany positions of authority in hierarchy legitimized by the greater sacrifices required of the superior in the name of the whole. Errors are attributed to the deviance of subordinates. Because so they give much backing to hierarchies fear the leaders, however, charismatic leader who, instead of working the its through hierarchy, obeying notions of reciprocal restraints, substitutes himself for the law, thereby breaking down all previous distinctions. STUDIES 18 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
not a Cultural theory is substitute for historical analysis. The instruments of policy was a emerge in interaction with historical experience. Believing that government source to of inequality, for instance, egalitarians in the early republic sought limit to the central government's ability interfere with the natural equality generated by American conditions. After the rise of corporate capitalism and the depression of the came to was a 1930s, by contrast, egalitarians believe that the national government source potential of greater equality. Historical experience had altered their beliefs about the desirability of government action, but their objective?increased equality?remained a the same. Similarly, the Federalist alliance of individualism and hierarchy desired more active national government to counter egalitarian tendencies; in the modern era, successors a however, their Republican have wished for less interventionist govern ment a because of belief that it would engage in redistributive policies. America has been characterized by relatively strong individualism, weak hier means archy, and waxing and waning egalitarianism. This what Alexis de Tocqueville and Louis Hartz and Samuel Huntington have said it does: support for authority is relatively weak in America.8 With egalitarians rejecting authority, individuals desiring to too to escape from it, and hierarchical forces weak impose it, presidents seeking to on are a rely formal authority alone in precarious position. This anti-authority context on cultural justifies Richard Neustadt 's emphasis persuasion,9 for that iswhat must cannot on presidents do when they rely the authority inherent in their position. are National political parties, like other complex social organizations, composed more one of than political culture. The Democratic party under Andrew Jackson, an for example, constituted alliance of individualism and egalitarianism. United by to was its opposition hierarchy, this coalition virulently anti-authority. The Jackso was a nian alliance kept together by belief that minimal government intervention in individual lives would increase equality of condition. Despite their shared distrust of hierarchy, however, the individualist alliance with egalitarianism is problematic, for to individualists may find egalitarian opposition inequality constrains their prefer ence for personal gain through risk-taking. a Joint rule by individualism and hierarchy, cultural combination known in cur rent as an parlance "the establishment," is option open to those individualists who find the alliance with egalitarianism undesirable. Individualists get sufficient order to on carry bidding and bargaining, while hierarchy gains the growth and flexibility it might otherwise lack. Despite these mutual benefits, the establishment alliance too from suffers disagreements. If individualists find the egalitarian benchmark of equality of conditions constricting, they may also be frustrated by hierarchy's penchant for rules and regulations. The are a following examples drawn from larger project that applies this cultural to all on analysis presidents from Washington through Lincoln. We have focused early in so presidents part because the passions of yesteryear have cooled sufficiently that are more to these presidencies likely be treated dispassionately. Were we concerned with recent we evaluating the performance of presidents, fear that disagreement with the policies of these presidents would interfere with the purpose of evaluating and comparing presidencies. To those who doubt this proposition we remind them of the "GREATNESS"REVISITED | 19
a recent angry reaction that Carter's low ranking in greatness poll drew from Atlanta raters Mayor Andrew Young, who accused the of "insensitive elitism."10 Speaking or we not same ill of John Adams James Polk, trust, will engender the reaction.
Four Great Presidents: Washington, Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln
We propose two primary categories of cultural dilemmas. The first involves the president with some blend of egalitarian and individualist cultural propensities. All Jeffersonian and Jacksonian presidents labored, with varying degrees of success, to own square their and their followers' anti-authority principles with the exercise of executive authority. The second type is the president of hierarchical cultural propen sities. While the precise contours of the dilemma varied with the historical situation one or and configuration of cultures, all hierarchical presidents struggled, in form to another, reconcile their, and their party's, hierarchical cultural preferences with the anti-hierarchical ethos dominant in the society and polity. This conflict animated the presidencies of George Washington, John Adams and John Quincy Adams, as well as as hamstringing Whig leaders such Henry Clay andDaniel Webster who aspired to the presidency. Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson provided solutions to cul tural dilemmas of the first type, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln to the second type.
George Washington President-raters that was a agree George Washington great president. But wherein lies Washington's greatness? Stripping away the myths surrounding "the godlike Washington" has left the basis of his preeminence unclear. If, asMarcus Cunliffe con was "a not a a cludes, he good man, saint; competent soldier, not a great one; an honest not a statesman administrator, of genius," what made him "an exceptional can figure?"11 How good, competent and honest ?a characterization which well describes Carter?sum to a Jimmy up great president? The fear of an individualist we deepest political culture, have suggested, is the leader who his welcome. conscious con overstays Acutely of this fear, Washington reassured his of his desire to tinually countrymen step down immediately after he had his task. Before ar completed assigned assuming command of the Revolutionary he told the Continental that a mies, Congress he harbored "no lust for power." In letter to the of the states the governors upon disbanding of the Army, Washington insisted that he had no wish to "share in public business hereafter," longing only for "the shade of retirement."12 Both as as general and president he repeatedly declared his aversion to the glare of public life and his preference for "the shadow of my own vine and own tree."13While were my fig Washington's public pronouncements ideally suited to alleviate the was ? prevalent fears of power, it his actions twice retiring from ? the most office in the land that powerful brought him the country's highest accolades. and to By voluntarily relinquishing power, spurning offers make his leadership became the of permanent, Washington paragon individualist political leadership. "Com mitment to a political culture," Barry Schwartz argues, "showed up in the form of STUDIES 20 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
a a devotion to man." Washington's self-denying behavior made him "visible symbol" of individualist values and tendencies.14 In being good he thus became great. That was Washington revered for leaving office did not, however, guarantee support when he was in office. was was a As president, Washington's cultural dilemma that he president pri a was marily of hierarchical propensities15 in society where individualism predomi severe on nant. With limits the substance of power, Washington had to make do with aware the appearance of power. Painfully of the Revolutionary bias against central new an rule, Washington carefully nurtured the government's reputation. Before assurances nouncing federal appointments, for instance, he sought that the nominee to a would accept in order avoid the government being embarrassed by candidate refusing to serve.16 over Where he could, Washington presided bargains that would create agree ment nor overawe. among disputatious factions that he could neither control Un seemly disagreements among elites, he believed, undermined respect for authority. Washington supported Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's funding of the debt was because he persuaded by his experience under the Articles of Confederation that was to financial solvency essential gaining the respect of foreign governments and the domestic population. Rather than ask whether Hamilton's financial schemes were equitable?as Madison and Jefferson did?Washington asked whether they would con to tribute the prestige of the central government. to Washington tried enhance the government's image of competence and strength was not to by employing federal power where it merely adequate the purpose but as were overwhelming, in theWhiskey Rebellion. So anxious Hamilton andWashington to demonstrate federal authority, that the military force they gathered to put down the local rebellion rivaled the total fighting force of the entire Revolutionary army. Beneath the impressive appearance of strength lurked the government's thinly dis was not a guised weakness, for the massive military force well-trained national standing a army, but rather disorganized conglomeration of state militias. was It in the realm of foreign relations that Washington was most successful in avoiding the embarrassments that might discredit central authority. The first presi a a dent's foreign policy resolved the dilemma of hierarchical regime in nonhierarchical context a to a an by combining commitment strong central government with appreci ation for the limits of authority in America. a National defense had been compelling argument for jettisoning the Articles a of Confederation in favor of stronger central government.17 But having ceded the au thority they believed necessary to secure the nation from attack, individualists and were to egalitarians loathe further extend its influence. Hoping to minimize the need for his were to authority, Jefferson and followers driven constantly downplay the threat posed by foreign nations. Great Britain, argued William Branch Giles on the House was a a a floor, dying hierarchy "tottering under the weight of King, Court, a no a bility, priesthood, armies, navies, debts, and all the complicated machinery of op pression.18 The Federalists, in contrast, desiring to promote hierarchical relations domes tically, continually played up threats from abroad. "GREATNESS"REVISITED | 21
When Citizen Edmond Gen?t arrived in theUnited States in the spring of 1793 as a was special emissary from the newly-proclaimed Republic of France, he greeted war with enthusiastic popular applause. Having declared itself at with all European to monarchies, France hoped that sending Gen?t America would promote American cause support for the of "liberty, equality and fraternity." Republicans adopted the as to French Revolution akin their own. "The liberty of the whole earth," gushed on success Jefferson, hinged the of the French armies. Fearing that popular enthusiasm an a war on might sweep unprepared nation into holy behalf of liberty and equality, a Washington responded by issuing Proclamation of Neutrality.19 was news Popular antipathy towards the British subsequently fanned by that Britain had seized 250 unsuspecting and unarmed American ships in the West Indies. The war anx Republican press urged retaliation; seemed imminent. Federalists, though ious to avoid war with Britain, were nonetheless determined that the nation be ade quately prepared for that eventuality. Hamilton and his allies in Congress pressed for taxes increased and strengthened armed forces. But while Republicans in Congress were to a to eager adopt hard line with respect commercial restrictions against the to to British, they still refused support efforts strengthen national defense. Given to a the opposition's reluctance support build-up in national defense, was to Washington correctly perceived that involvement in European affairs likely result in a national humiliated government. Washington's Farewell Address provided a creative to this It solution dilemma. disarmed the Republican opposition by echoing the see familiar warning against "entangling alliances." Republicans could in these words an In affirmation of their isolationism. the Republican view, European struggles were to be was to avoided because power politics the road corruption, executive ag grandizement and standing armies. motivation Washington's for warning against becoming embroiled in foreign dis was new putes, however, radically different. He feared that the nation, through mis fortune or would into awar ideological fervor, be drawn that would thoroughly dis credit the new national Once government. the revolutionary "infancy" had passed and the over to people had gotten their hostility standing armies, executive power, central taxation government, and debt, then and only then, Washington believed, America to onto would be able throw itself the global scales of power and assume a in the leading position world of nations.20 In the absence of public support for peace time preparations, Washington avoided committing American military forces to ven tures that the might expose weakness beneath the carefully cultivated appearance of strength. So successful was at Washington substituting the appearance of power for the of that his was reality power successor, John Adams, left with the erroneous impres sion that the in a hierarchical president operated political system. Where Washington, was recognizing that hierarchy weak in America, carefully nurtured support for au Adams assumed that thority, support for authority inhered in position. The president, in Adams' had to announce correct view, only the decision and others would obey. His solomon-like pronouncement in early 1799 to reopen negotiations with the French, his into total as throwing party disarray, reflected his vision of the president perched PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 22 I QUARTERLY
a atop hierarchical structure, responsible for keeping the peace by arbitrating between the parts in the name of the whole. Not having consulted anyone prior to announcing no one a his decision, had stake in defending it. Long time congressional supporters of the President hurled abuse at Adams; cabinet members ran for cover, assuring friends no that they had part in the "insane" action. no own Adams' son, John Quincy Adams, was better at reconciling his hierar chical dispositions with the anti-authority bias of the political system. His presidency was a to to severely hampered by refusal exploit patronage advance his policy objec to a matter tives. Believing policy be agreed upon, and implementation of neutral as or competence, Adams viewed his subordinates above apart from politics. Conse was to even quently he unwilling dismiss those whom he considered qualified, if, as case to in the of the postmaster general John McLean, they dispensed patronage no Adams' opponents. It is coincidence that John Quincy Adams, like John Adams, a term or, for that matter, Jimmy Carter, lasted only single in the presidency. These were a un presidents hierarchs without hierarchy, i.e. hierarchically disposed leaders or to nature able unwilling make allowances for the anti-leadership of the American political system.
Thomas Jefferson With Thomas Jefferson's election in 1800, Jeffersonian Republicans (a fu sion of egalitarianism and individualism) faced the task of reconciling their deep suspi as cion of authority with the exercise of executive power. Jefferson's dilemma, Lance was an Banning phrases it, "to govern in accordance with ideology that taught that was amonster was overt power and governing wrong."21 Aware that displays of presi were to dential leadership likely raise the cry of executive usurpation, Jefferson opted a covert for leadership style. Jefferson's biographer, Dumas Malone, finds his protagonist a to always making "conscious effort avoid all appearances of dictation." The key to was not Jefferson's political leadership, continues Malone, that "he did permit his fol to as a at lowers think of him boss all."22 He led without appearing to do so, instructed to while appearing only suggest, guiding while seeming to defer. was a Jefferson's informal influence carefully concealed behind public facade of to a to deference Congress. In formal Reply notification of his election, Jefferson vowed to be the wisdom to to "guided by and patriotism of those whom it belongs express . . . to a the legislative will of the nation [and] give that will faithful execution." His to as first presidential address opened by referring Congress respectfully "the great council" of nation a to . . . the and closed with pledge "carry the legislative judgement . . . into faithful execution."23 Indeed Jefferson's decision to submit the annual mes in it in ?a sage writing rather than deliver person practice which many Republicans view as custom to ? aping the British of having the monarch speak parliament in person was to calculated underline executive subordination to the legislative branch. Despite this to formal acquiescence Congress' hegemony in policy-making, virtually all im portant legislation during Jefferson's tenure originated in the executive branch. a While Jefferson's messages politely suggested only the broad outlines of pro he to gram, swiftly followed these up with private communications legislative leaders "greatness" revisited I 23
was not to specifying the policy in detail. It unusual for Jefferson actually draft the then send to bill himself and his draft influential and sympathetic members of Con gress. Jefferson always impressed upon his congressional confidants the value of keeping his leadership of Congress hidden from public view, often asking the member to copy or and then burn return the original.24 a to Jefferson's nightly dinners provided regular opportunity build sympathy for himself and his legislative program without appearing to issue commands. The table at was these small, informal gatherings circular, in order to break down hierarchical an was rare distinctions and facilitate air of collegiality. It the dinner guest, notes historian Robert Johnstone, who could "withstand entirely the seductive force of the president's personality."25 was one Jefferson's distaste for public confrontation expressed by of his favorite maxims?"take things always by their smooth handle." Like Dwight Eisenhower, the "hidden-hand" he so not president much resembles, Jefferson would publicly chal even most lenge the abusive of opponents. When John Randolph recklessly abused and villified as to the administration, Jefferson responded, did Eisenhower McCarthy, by privately undercutting rather than publicly attacking his adversary.26 relations with his same on Jefferson's department heads displayed the emphasis conciliation and persuasion, discussion that characterized his leadership of the Repub lican party in Congress. Cabinet members were treated as peers rather than subor dinates. ever "By conversing and reasoning," claimed Jefferson, the Cabinet "scarcely ... so to as to a failed modify each other's ideas, produce unanimous result." In fact, as makes however, Johnstone clear, Jefferson "dominated their collective proceedings and insured his final act ? authority."27 By leading consensually the of leadership setting the agenda and making decisions?was disguised. "hidden-hand" Jefferson's leadership style resolved the dilemma of leadership in an anti-leadership culture for himself but had failed to educate his followers on the need for leadership. Jefferson's successors, Madison and Monroe, who lacked his skill, stature or were unable to in luck, consequently provide much the way of presidential Hidden-hand as soon was leadership. leadership, Madison discovered, particularly ill suited to a preparing for and fighting war. With the disastrous setbacks of the War of 1812 fresh in their more minds, Madison and then Monroe attempted, with success is than commonly acknowledged, to modify the dominant cultural coalition in a less direction. As the retreat virulently anti-authority post-war from Jeffersonian orthodoxy accelerated under Madison, Monroe and particularly John Quincy Adams, however, true believers issued a call for a rededication to original Jeffersonian principles.
Andrew Jackson The movement was a Jacksonian self-conscious revival of Jeffersonian polit ical culture. the central com Believing government created inequalities and suppressed to petition, Jacksonians attempted strictly limit the scope of government activity.28 The aversion to same ? Jacksonian central authority created the presidential dilemma reconciling anti-authority dispositions with the exercise of authority?that the Jeffer sonians had had to face. STUDIES 24 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
an a Jackson's greatness consisted in fusing energetic chief executive with limited name central government. Presidential activism was justified in the of limiting the even activities of hierarchical institutions, the "Monster Bank," "King Caucus," govern ment itself. Presidential powers were to be enlisted in the battle to remove the institu to tional impediments increased equality. Public participation would be increased by caucus extending the franchise, overthrowing the Senatorial system for nominating presidents, and instituting rotation in office. Terminating the privileges conferred by government upon private industry through charters and franchises would permit the unfettered operation of free enterprise and, thereby, promote equality. Since its founding, the presidency had been regarded with widespread suspicion as the institutional representation of hierarchy. Jefferson, Madison and Monroe all were sense to act a troubled by the that openly would constitute betrayal of their anti-authority ideals. By demonstrating that the executive could be used to undermine hierarchy, Jackson smashed the link in the popular mind between the presidency and hierarchy. Where Jefferson, for instance, fearing cries of executive "corruption," had carefully masked the removal of Federalists from public office, Jackson trumpeted his in removals full view of the public, elevating the principle of rotation in office to the positive good.29 as to Jackson portrayed the president mandated by the people check concentra tions of political and economic power. Rather than emboldening hierarchy, he argued, con strengthening the presidency would flatten the hierarchy by increasing popular in trol of those positions of authority. The concept of the mandated presidency provided an cover were effective under which leaders could exercise power while denying they more out was man doing anything than carrying the popular will. If the president to out a dated carry policy, he could not be exercising personal discretion and therefore was no reason to there fear "executive usurpation." Jackson insisted that he could hear not only the voice of the people in his elections but their precise words. The 1832 as election, for instance, Jackson publicly construed popular vindication of his Bank veto a to and mandate continue his financial policies.30 The more negative power of the veto, which Jackson employed frequently than all his more predecessors combined and than any other pre-Civil War president, fit well with the anti-authority Democratic political culture. The veto was exercised in the name of cor curbing power, checking the wasteful expenditures produced by the mix rupting of public and private power in the halls of Congress. Since the veto could be exercised in a it no "only negative sense," Democrats reasoned that could pose danger to as a liberty.31 Originally designed by the Federalists check upon democracy, the executive veto was now as portrayed the people's main weapon in their battle to pro mote equality by limiting government. As the most concentration visible of financial and political power within the na a tion, the national Bank provided compelling symbol around which to unite the two veto was anti-authority cultures. Jackson's message carefully crafted to fuse the individualist concern with economic competition with the egalitarian fear of inequali ties. "The rich and powerful," Jackson declared, "too often bend the acts of govern ment to their selfish purposes." Jackson acknowledged that "distinctions in society "greatness" revisited I 25
to will always exist under every just government," but when "the laws undertake add . . . to to artificial distinctions, grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, make more the rich richer and the potent powerful, the humble members of society?the farmers, mechanics, and laborers?who have neither the time nor the means of securing to a to like favors themselves, have right complain of the injustice of their govern on ment."32 By conferring exclusive privileges selected institutions, the government thwarted economic competition and opportunity, thereby fostering inequalities. If an not government would leave individuals alone, there would be increase only in liberty but also in equality. The belief that increased economic opportunity would produce greater equality of condition permitted egalitarians to unite with individu a alists, fusion of cultures nicely captured by Charles Sellers' label "egalitarian enterprise."33 By slaying the "monster Bank," however, Andrew Jackson left his Democratic successors without a visible hierarchical target around which to unite individualism and egalitarianism. Had the national Bank been retained, for instance, Martin Van Buren could have shifted blame for the depression of 1837 away from Democratic onto policies and the Bank. While both individualists and egalitarian Democrats agreed was that the hierarchical Bank noxious, they could not agree on what to do after ridding the nation of the Biddle's Bank. Individualists had objected to the powerful central bank it now to because had regulated the economy, but hoped call off the war in to bank order unleash the entrepeneurial energies of the nation. Finding that of was a destruction the "monster Bank" causing proliferation of banks and increasing speculation, the egalitarian wing of the Democratic party, in contrast, desired to ex tend the war to all banks.
James Polk hoped that territorial expansion, like Jackson's Bank war, would re unite Democratic the alliance of egalitarianism and individualism. If expansion could as promote, John O'Sullivan rhapsodized, the "universality of freedom and equality,"34 Polk was a Young Hickory (as called) could emulate Jackson's forging of cultural hy while Van Buren's torn two brid, avoiding fate of being between the political cultures. as Unfortunately for Polk, expansion became entwined with slavery, the egalitarian of the Democratic wing party pulled back from supporting it. To egalitarian Democrats, the Slave was to power analogous the Money Power?both demonstrated that "privi never restrains its ambition to rule."35 more lege By alienating the egalitarian wing, Polk's drained expansionist policies the party of the crusading idealism that had charac terized it the 1830s and the an during early 1840s, giving party increasingly southern cast. His most as a was an conspicuous failing political leader inability to grasp that, because of was more was slavery, expansion creating problems than it solving, both for the Democratic party and the nation. The failed string of cultural solutions, and hence failed presidencies, in the decade to the Civil War testifies to the to prior extraordinary impediments presidential leadership produced by slavery. Franklin Pierce tried to reestablish the Jacksonian coalition of individualism and egalitarianism, but slavery brought to the fore the hitherto sub tension merged between majority rule and the property rights of a minority. The were optimistic doctrine that liberty and equality mutually supportive, while able to soften class conflict, could not, in the end, cope with racial conflict. Millard Fillmore 26 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
hoped to hold together theWhig alliance of individualism and hierarchy, theWhig gery of William Seward and Daniel Webster, by removing slavery from the national agenda through the Compromise of 1850 and elevating national economic develop ment to the forefront of the agenda. But Fillmore's solution reproduced the cultural contradiction within Whiggery?for how could the Whig party laud economic de as velopment and celebrate industrial capitalism the highest stage of civilization without as a on eco looking upon the South's "peculiar institution" anything but blight the nomic potential of the nation? Witnessing the failure of both Pierce and Fillmore to create a to reconstitute their old cultural coalitions, James Buchanan attempted new alliance that would unite the establishment against egalitarian abolitionists. But were while individualists content to protect slave property where it already existed, the issue of the expansion of slavery into the territories forced many individualists to an repudiate establishment alliance with hierarchy.
Abraham Lincoln as as A loyal adherent of theWhig party for long it had remained in exis on tence, Lincoln resolved its dilemma of basing government weak hierarchy by a) operating in wartime where he could invoke the Commander in Chief clause, and a new was to b) creating cultural combination in which hierarchy subordinated in dividualism. were a a The Whigs cultural alliance, predominantly hierarchical, yet with strong were admixture of individualism. When economic times hard the paternalism of the party served them well. After all, Jacksonians had offered only "cupping and bleeding" to those hurt by the depression that followed the Panic of 1837.36 But, for the most too to a to resources part, Whiggery appeared restrictive nation eager exploit the a of seemingly boundless continent. Henry Clay, theWhig standard-bearer and Lin coln's political idol, lost all three presidential elections he participated in. The only successes Whigs' in presidential contests, William Henry Harrison in 1840 and Zachary on Taylor in 1848, had been dependent submerging party principles and policies in favor of popular military heroes. no was Lincoln's political ambition, that "little engine that knew rest,"37 thwarted by his identification with the Whig party. From the sobering experience of Clay's as as defeats in 1836 and 1844 well the victories of the apolitical generals in 1840 own on and 1848, Lincoln learned that his personal advancement depended creating a not war an party that could elevate only heroes but Illinois party politician to the a presidential office. Making the Whig party majority party required subordinating to in hierarchy individualism. The central figure Whiggery's metamorphosis,38 Lin a new coln was instrumental in creating Republican party in which individualism was not to tempered but led by hierarchy. He thus helped give the majority culture in in America?individualism ?the dominant place governing the nation. The Repub lican amalgam of economic individualism and social hierarchy would dominate Amer next same ican politics for the half century in the way that Jefferson and Jackson's alliance of egalitarianism and individualism had dominated the previous half century. cause The Whigs only popular had been the cry of executive usurpation. In the revisited "greatness" I 27
Whig mind, King Andrew signified the degeneration of egalitarianism into the charis were matic leader who would replace the law with his personal wishes. Thus Whigs torn to between their hierarchical inclination support central authority and their fear of the disruptive potential of presidential power. The result, inWhig doctrine, was an one not anomolous executive, who stood for while actually exercising authority. The chief executive was to enforce the laws of the land, but otherwise was confined ?no veto no within narrowly circumscribed limits power, congressional influence. to As president, Lincoln had reconcile Whig doctrine with his will to power, restora success tion of the Union, and the of the Republican party. a Were theWhigs faced only with what they considered degeneration of democ a to racy, lawless executive pandering the populace, they might have managed or, at survived. To the were least, south, however, Whigs confronted with something worse, the ultimate degeneration of hierarchical principles in the form of the master-slave Unable to its or to relationship. abide arbitrariness condone upsetting its legal status, not between Northern they floundered, split only and Southern Whigs but also (and more importantly) between the apparent necessity of giving up either their individu alistic adherence to or to free labor their hierarchical attachment patriarchy. Before Lincoln freed the slaves, he had to free his party from being immobilized by this dilemma?an immoral or an legality, through acceptance of slavery, illegal moralism through its abolition. A Lincoln outside of the Civil War is on presidency inconceivable. The firing Fort Sumter Lincoln the to recon gave opportunity avoid his predecessors' fate by ciling the dilemmas handcuffing his party. The slavery issue, which had shackled the in the now served as a means presidency previous decade, for unleashing presidential power. Lincoln from the in wrung authority Commander Chief role, the presidential to oath "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the U.S.," as well as the constitutional injunction that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faith executed." "When rebellion or invasion fully comes," reasoned Lincoln, "the people have, under the Constitution, made the commander in chief of their army and navy . . . the man who holds the and bears the . . . power responsibility of [deciding] what the Lincoln the public safety requires." began Emancipation Proclamation by invoking "the power vested in me as Commander in Chief."39 On the basis of these formal roles, Lincoln distinguished his decree, which he termed "a fit and necessary war from General measure," John Fremont's declaration of emancipation that Lincoln condemned as "simply 'dictatorship'."40 for even Support presidential authority, however, during war, was far from auto matic. Lincoln's behavior as an acute awareness president reflected of the paucity of for in America. Better support leadership than any previous president, Lincoln under stood that the given anti-authority cultural context, popular wrath was bound to shower down the national One upon government. of Lincoln's accomplishments was to set rods that would him up lightning protect from bearing the full brunt of popular anger when the Union suffered reverses. army Towards this end Lincoln skillfully used the old executive doctrine to shield torrent Whig himself from the of abuse. The necessity STUDIES 28 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
an our of exerting leadership in anti-leadership system, in opinion, explains the "pecu out liar paradox" of Lincoln's presidency first pointed by David Donald in his seminal essay, "Whig in the White House."41 contrasts use re Donald Lincoln's vigorous extra-legal of executive authority in to war non-use re gard his power with his timid, obsequious, virtual of presidential sources to a influence domestic policy. Over wide range of domestic policies, including a the introduction of the first income tax, the creation of Department of Agriculture, tariffs, banking, and land-grant colleges, Donald contends that Lincoln showed little were interest. When his proposed appointees turned down by the Senate, Lincoln to names. a thought it improper resubmit their Donald resolves the paradox of simul was taneously strong and weak chief executive by arguing that Lincoln unable to "rid himself of the political ideas with which he had been raised."42 an While not explicitly taking issue with Donald's thesis, G.S. Boritt provides interpretation of Lincoln's behavior in theWhite House that undercuts Donald's con tention that Lincoln's "political education" explains the paradox of his presidency. a a Lincoln, points out Boritt, faced Congress dominated by Republican party that was in essential agreement with Lincoln's preferred economic policies. Therefore "there was little call for Lincoln to pressure Senators and Congressmen, to use those 'certain indirect influences' on behalf of 'sound' economics." Lincoln did not have to work so was hard because Congress disposed to do much of what he would have liked with to con regard tariffs, internal improvements, finance and homestead legislation. Boritt cludes that "Lincoln thus had the pleasure of signing into law much of the program he had worked for through the better part of his political life," legislation that amounted a to what Leonard Curry has called "blueprint for modern America."43 was more Boritt also shows that Lincoln much active in domestic policy than to as as to came to he appeared Donald well contemporaries. When it the establish a to ment of national banking system, Lincoln did attempt influence Congress. He one to sent of his private secretaries influence wavering Senators, persuaded influential Senators to go to bat for him, talked the matter up in the Cabinet, and even seems on to to have cashed in patronage, all the while exclaiming New York financiers, "Money, I don't know anything about 'money'."44 was not That Lincoln the enthralled captive ofWhig doctrine that Donald por on trays is indicated by Lincoln's active involvement behalf of the Thirteenth Amend ment. Jackson-like, Lincoln informed the lame-duck session of Congress that in the recent election "the voice of the people" had been expressed in favor of the proposed rest content a amendment. He did not, however, with firmly worded message urging passage of the amendment. The president employed his considerable powers of persua as as sion and patronage to enlist conservative Republicans well wavering Democratic members to back the amendment.45 What about Lincoln's "curious failure" to control his cabinet, which Donald sees as on compelling evidence of the grip theWhig view of the presidency had Lincoln. This interpretation neglects the tremendous advantages Lincoln reaped by keeping distance between himself and the cabinet. "When Congress showed unhappiness with executive direction," points out Boritt, "the separation between the President and his "greatness" revisited I 29
to official family often diverted the legislators attacking the latter. With the Cabinet absorbing much of the fire, the White House often escaped untorched." Attorney most General Edward Bates, for example, took of the heat from the radicals for Lin not acts coln's decision to enforce congressional confiscating the property of slave owners.46 a man as an We may be excused for believing that possessed of formidable in as was on tellect this nation has produced putting his publics by his avowals of naivete or disinterest inmatters of banking, finance and foreign affairs?"you understand these things. I do not," Lincoln told Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Chase.47 Allowing to his Cabinet members think themselves superior gave Lincoln protection against a what would otherwise have been crescendo cry of usurpation. His humble posture, as a the log cabin stories and the like served shield against the pervasive anti-authority bias. From the individualist perspective, Lincoln's greatness consisted in demonstrating an a that individualist regime could cope with large-scale crises without transforma tion in its cultural identity. Lincoln's example offered hope that individualist regimes were not to an a subject "inherent and fatal weakness;" such regime could be strong to maintain its in an enough existence emergency without permanently altering in ternal social relations in a direction. hierarchical Temporary emergency leadership in times of total now not to war, they knew, did lead inexorably permanent dictatorship in peacetime. From the was hierarchical standpoint, Lincoln's leadership equally exemplary, but for different reasons. In very Woodrow Wilson's view, Lincoln's greatness lay inmoving America "from a to a divided, self-interested contractual association unified, spiritual, state."48 organic Lincoln's presidency had also recreated the alliance of a strong govern ment with a rent strong executive, previously asunder by the party battles of the 1830s and 1840s. the and By elevating prestige expanding the prerogatives of the presidential office Lincoln a on left permanent legacy which future hierarchs would try to build.
Greatness Has Its Limits If these four were presidents great in that they resolved cultural dilemmas, were not for their they perfect, solutions had limits. Washington's attempt to com for the weakness of the pensate hierarchy by stressing appearance of strong leadership was limited because those who did not share the cultural assumptions of hierarchy often found the of from to display power anywhere alarming ridiculous. Washington was in a dilemma in which a caught mode of behavior designed to compensate for authority's weakness often undermined it still further. For instance, while the ad ministration that a firm to expected response theWhiskey Rebellion in western Penn would increase for the sylvania respect central government, Republican leaders found it that the would arm at menacing government "against people their plows." Washington, had been Jefferson lamented, "dazzled by the glittering of crowns and coronets."49 Far from the impressing, administration's display of might had evoked images of op as a pressive monarchy. Building up authority without appearing George III proved difficult. As extremely Washington became increasingly identified with the hierar STUDIES 30 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
was chical Federalists during his second term, his reputation greatly tarnished; it could was once be mended only through the route it gained?by again relinquishing power. The limits of Jefferson's "hidden-hand" strategy became apparent in his embargo to on policy. Rather than publicly defend the need for individuals suffer restrictions their freedom, Jefferson presented, in the words of Leonard Levy, "an imperturbable, to severe almost sphinxlike silence the nation."50 The embargo produced economic deprivation for many segments of the public and therefore required public explanation a of the need for individual sacrifice to further collective goal. But rather than trying to as rally the country around him, Jefferson, Malone comments, "followed the general as out as policy of keeping much of sight possible."51 A leadership style, which had so a hitherto served Jefferson well, insured that the embargo would be disaster. Previous taxes or Jeffersonian policies, like cutting the Louisiana Purchase, did not call for indi to nor a viduals make material sacrifices did people need persuading that great public was to good being furthered. Well-suited achieve popular goals, Jefferson's covert style was to of leadership ill-equipped manage unpleasant tasks that required the leader to a be public educator. to over Andrew Jackson's solution of appealing directly the people the head of was to a Congress well-suited his negative policy aims. Because he did not have posi a tive legislative program that required the support of majority, he could afford to alienate Congress. The national Bank had been struck down by presidential veto, the were was deposits removed without congressional approval, and the pet bank system managed through executive fiat. But the limits of Jackson's energetic negativism be came to apparent when his successor, Martin Van Buren, responding calls for positive action during the depression that followed the panic of 1837, tried to secure the Inde pendent Treasury proposal that required congressional assent. If Van Buren was to not direct the legislative process, he could afford the provocative vetoes and the angry over battles appointments that had soured Jackson's relations with Congress.52 Even war am Abraham Lincoln's solutions had limitations. By keeping his aims so as biguous to attract the support of all three cultures, Lincoln left his successor a as to to Andrew Johnson, with lack of guidance how proceed with reconstructing on the Union. Moreover, by relying vigorously his powers as Commander in Chief and on to spending money his own, asking Congress only ratify his actions after the he made to to fact, Congress eager bring the presidency back its constitutional posi tion as soon as the war to extent ended. One wonders what Johnson's impeachment was a on judgement Lincoln's usurpations. In resolving one set of cultural dilemmas, great presidents may thus create insoluble dilemmas for their successors. Presidential greatness is thus intimately related to presidential failure.
Presidential Failure more never While presidential greatness (or, modestly, success) is guaran teed to are are never any president, there many presidents who in the running. This as we have on account an may be, indicated above, of intractable dilemma bequeathed a by "great" predecessor. Martin Van Buren, for instance, although the most adroit his not politician of day, could hold together individualists and egalitarians in the "greatness" revisited I 31
aftermath of Jackson's destruction of the national Bank. The act that helped give Jackson a his mantle of greatness ?destroying the "money power"?left Van Buren without on hierarchical enemy which to blame the ensuing financial panic and depression. an Van Buren's fate indicates that being accomplished politician is insufficient ever? to guarantee success in theWhite House. While poor politicians have rarely?if come been successful presidents, faltering presidencies have often from the ranks of accomplished politicians?James Madison, James Buchanan, Lyndon Johnson, Richard to name a not a acumen Nixon, few. If it is lack of political that barred the door to to greatness for these presidents what did? The usual response would be emphasize or personal features: Madison's indecisiveness, Buchanan's timidity, Johnson's self we loathing. Without minimizing the impact of personal characteristics, remain dis satisfied by explanations that stop here. A on focus the president's personality fares poorly when failure in the White comes on successes. House the heels of other political Take, for instance, John Quincy as must Adams, who diplomat and Secretary of State rank among the greatest this nation as was a has produced, yet president disappointment. Explanations that focus on ? us personality?psychological rigidity, compulsiveness leave wondering how such an man most inflexible, uncompromising could have been the successful diplomat of we his age. Not Adams' prickly personality, contend, but his hierarchical propensities so best explain why he could succeed spectacularly in the realm of diplomacy yet be an such ineffective president. The hierarch's forte, negotiating jurisdictions?who has the to do a right what ?and adjudicating statuses, while valuable talents for diplomat, were to ill-suited the president's competitive relationship with Congress and his posi as a tion the leader of political party. to ? Nor will it do explain the three failed presidencies prior to the Civil War Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan were ranked 24th, 26th, and ? 27th of in the 1948 terms (out 29) Schlesinger poll solely in of personal inadequacies. were All three accomplished politicians, particularly Buchanan who was one of the most men ever politically experienced to occupy the White House. Each offered a credible solution to political the cultural dilemma bequeathed in large part by the of as a expansionist policies James Polk?rated by the Schlesinger polls "Near Great." In the absence of civil to an war, slavery proved be insoluble national problem. Little wonder that Lincoln seemed to welcome the onset of war. The success pattern of pre-presidential followed by presidential failure can also be seen in the career of as a public James Madison. So successful congressional leader and he is to a as constitution-maker, considered by many scholars be flop president. The usual a ?can explanations ?personal compliancy, need for affection not explain his bold maneuvering in Congress and at the Constitutional Convention. Madison's difficulties in the we had more to presidency, contend, do with the anti-authority cultural of his followers than with propensities any features of Madison's personality. Where no one is to no no matter disposed follow, one, how psychologically healthy, can lead. in the aftermath of the War were more When, of 1812, people disposed to support authority, Madison performed ably. Will it to take closer to to do, examples home, explain the troubled presidencies STUDIES 32 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
now of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan solely as a in terms of their personal shortcomings? Is the historical reading of America a new land particularly favored by providence to be replaced by myth of Americans as an unlucky people done in by unworthy presidents? Without denying that there ismuch to criticize, there is also much that might be praised: Johnson's Great Society, mar Nixon's opening to China, Carter's Camp David Accords, Reagan's reduction of tax rates. we were as ginal Why, then, do hear only that these failed presidencies, if that is all there was? We leave the reader with the following hypothesis: reports movements of failed presidencies have risen along with egalitarian (civil rights, femi to nism, environmentalism, children's rights, and the like) because dedication reducing to differences among people leads rejection of leadership, for the very concept of leadership as as implies inequality. This proposition deserves at least much consideration that to our commonly given the claim that wonderful people mysteriously keep getting saddled with inferior presidents.
Notes
1. Arthur M. "A in to Schlesinger, Yardstick for Presidents," Paths the Present (New York: MacMillan, 1949), pp. 93-111; Gary M. Maranell, "The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the Schlesinger Polls,"Journal ofAmerican History (June 1970), pp. 104-113; Robert K. Murray andTim H. Blessing, "The Presidential Performance Study: A Progress Report "Journal ofAmerican History (December 1983), pp. 535-555. Other greatness polls conducted in the past decade include the U.S. Historical Society's 1977 survey of the heads of one hundred history departments (Robert E. DiClerico, The American President, Prentice Hall, 1979, p. 332), David L. Potter's 1981 unpublished survey of 41 historians (Murray and Blessing, p. 536), and the Chicago Tribune's 1982 survey of 49 presidential scholars "Our Best and Worst (Steve Neal, Presidents," Chicago Tribune Magazine, Jan. 10, 1982, pp. 8-13, 15, 18). 2. Thomas A. Presidential Greatness: The and theMan to Present Bailey, Image from George Washington the (New York: Appleton-Century, 1966), p. 24. Emphasis in original. 3. Ibid., pp. 262-266. 4. Arthur M. the in to Present Schlesinger, "Rating Presidents," Paths the (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 107. 5. Presidential Curtis Arthur Bailey, Greatness, p. 34; Amlund, "President-Ranking: A Criticism," Midwest Journal of Political Science (August 1964), pp. 309-315, quotation on p. 309. 6. James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership (New York: Avon, 1965), p. xi. 7. These are from the work of See Natural Ex categories adapted Mary Douglas. especially Symbols: plorations inCosmology (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970), and "Cultural Bias" in In theActive Voice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). The theory is further elaborated inMary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy inAmerica (New York: Harper & Row, 1966): Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition inAmerica York: Harcourt Brace (New Jovanovich, 1955); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise Mass.: Harvard of Disharmony (Cambridge, University Press, 1981). 9. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, 1980). 10. Arthur B. the Presidents of the United Presidential Studies Murphy, "Evaluating States," Quarterly (Winter 1984), p. 117. 11. Marcus Man and Monument Cunliffe, George Washington: (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 212. 12. to President of December in Saul K. The Washington Congress, 20,1776, Padover, ed., Washington Papers (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1955), p. 100; Circular Letter to the Governors of All the States on Disbanding the Army, June 8, 1783, in ibid., pp. 206, 213. revisited "greatness" I 33
13. See e.g. letters toArchibald Cary, June 15,1782; toRobert Stewart, August 10,1783; to Lafayette, February 1,1784; to JamesMadison, May 20,1792; toDavid Humphries, June 12, 1796; toHenry Knox, March 2, 1797; and to Oliver Wolcott, May 15, 1797; in ibid., pp. 78, 79, 83, 88, 90, on 91, 92, quotation p. 83. 14. and the of Heroic American Barry Schwartz, "George Washington Whig Conception Leadership," Review on 30. Sociological (February 1983), pp. 18-33, quotation p. to see 15. On Washington's adherence hierarchical Federalism, David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution ofAmerican Conservatism:The FederalistParty in theEra ojJeffersonianDemocracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 377-379. 16. R. Court James Perry, "Supreme Appointments, 1789-1801: Criteria, Presidential Style, and the Press of Events," journal of theEarly Republic (Winter 1986), pp. 371-410, esp. pp. 373, 397. 17. FrederickW. Marks III, "Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of the United States Constitution," Political Science Quarterly (September 1971), pp. 444-469. 18. Drew R. McCoy, The ElusiveRepublic: Political Economy inJeffersonian America (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 141. 19. Jefferson toWilliam Short, Jan. 3, 1793, cited in Gilbert Lycan, Alexander Hamilton & American Foreign Policy: A Design for Greatness (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. 134. 20. Burton Ira A Kaufman, "Washington's Farewell Address: Statement of Empire," in Kaufman, ed., Washington's FarewellAddress: The View from the 20th Century (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969), pp. 169-187. 21. a Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion:Evolution of Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 273. See also James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966), esp. p. 207. 22. Dumas Malone, Jefferson thePresident: First Term, 1801-1805 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 112; Dumas Malone, Thomas Jefferson as Political Leader (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1963), p. 34. 23. Jefferson quoted in Robert M. Johnstone, Jr., Jefferson and thePresidency: Leadership in theYoung Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 128; Malone, First Term, p. 95; Edward S. Corwin, The President:Office and Powers, 1181-1951 (New York University Press, 1957), p. 18. 24. Noble E. The Process Government Under 188-193. Cunningham, Jr., of Jefferson, chapter IX, esp. pp. 25. Johnstone, Jefferson and thePresidency, pp. 144-148. 26. Fred I.Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency:Eisenhower asLeader (New York: Basic Books, 1982). On to undercut see Dumas the President: Jefferson's attempts quietly Randolph, Malone, Jefferson Second Term, 1805-1809 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 108-109, 161-162; andNobel E. Cun ningham, Jr., The JeffersonianRepublicans inPower: Party Operations, 1801-1809 (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963) pp. 86-88. 27. and the Process Johnstone, Jefferson Presidency, pp. 86, 95-98; Cunningham, of Government, pp. 60-71, 319-320; Dumas Malone, "Presidential Leadership andNational Unity: The Jeffersonian Example," Journal of SouthernHistory (February 1969), p. 16; Jefferson, quoted in Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study inAdministrative History: 1801-1829 (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 80. 28. Richard B. Latner, The Presidencyof Andrew Jackson: White House Politics, 1829-1831 (Athens: Univer sity of Georgia Press, 1979), pp. 7-30; Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and theCourse ofAmer icanFreedom, 1822-1832 (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 12-155. 29. to Arthur no a Jackson, according Schlesinger, Jr., "ousted greater proportion of officeholders than Jefferson" (The Age ofJackson, Boston: Little, Brown, 1945, p. 47). 30. 165. See also and American Latner, Presidency of Jackson, pp. ibid., p. 50; Remini, Jackson Freedom, p. 323; andWilfred Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Vintage, 1962), p. 83. 31. John Ashworth, Agrarians' and Aristocrats': Party Political Ideology in theUnited States, 1831-1846 Humanities (New Jersey: Press, 1983), p. 35. 32. American Remini, Jackson and Freedom, pp. 367-369. 33. Charles Sellers, "Introduction" in Sellers, ed., Andrew Jackson: A Profile (New York: Hill & Wang, STUDIES 34 I PRESIDENTIAL QUARTERLY
1971), p. xvi. See alsoDaniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of theAmerican Whigs (University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 22. 34. 427. O'Sullivan coined the "Manifest Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, p. phrase Destiny." 35. Eric Foner and John Ashworth, among others, have shown that the wing of the Democratic party was most to was most to that hostile banks, corporations, monopolies and tariffs attracted the free soil cause and most likely to defect to the Republican party. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor,Free Men: The Ideology of theRepublican Party beforethe Civil War (New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1970), esp. pp. 168-169; John Ashworth, "The Democratic-Republicans before the Civil War: Political Ideology and Economic Change," Journal ofAmerican Studies (December 1986), pp. 375-390, Kinsley Bingham, quoted on p. 380. 36. Azariah Flagg toMartin Van Buren, April 10, 1837, quoted inMajor L. Wilson, The Presidency Martin Van Buren Press of 143. of (Lawrence: University Kansas, 1984), p. 37. William H. Herndon cited in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 118. 38. See Howe, Political Culture ofWhigs, chapter eleven. 39. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The ImperialPresidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 60-63. to 40. J.G. Randall, Lincoln thePresident: Springfield Gettysburg (2 vols; New York: Dodd, Mead, 1945), II, pp. 165-166. 41. David Donald, "Abraham Lincoln: Whig in theWhite House," in Norman Graebner, ed., The Enduring Lincoln (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 47. 42. Ibid., pp. 51-53, 60. 43. G.S. Boritt, Lincoln and theEconomics of theAmerican Dream (Memphis State University Press, 1978), pp. 196-197; Leonard P. Curry, Blueprintfor Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First Civil War Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). 44. Boritt, Lincoln and the American Dream, pp. 201-203. 45. Ibid., p. 299; Richard Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: Hill & Wang, 1958), p. 230; Stephen Oates, "Abraham Lincoln: Republican in theWhite House," in John L. Thomas, ed., Abraham Lincoln and theAmerican Political Tradition (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 106; J.G. Randall and Richard Current, Lincoln thePresident: Last Full Measure (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955), p. 309, Lincoln quoted on p. 308. 46. Donald, "Whig in theWhite House," p. 59; Boritt, Lincoln and theAmerican Dream, p. 228. 47. Boritt, Lincoln and the American Dream, p. 199. 48. Michael Paul Rogin, "The King's Two Bodies: Lincoln, Wilson, Nixon, and Presidential Self Sacrifice," in J. David Greenstone, ed., Public Values andPrivate Power inAmerican Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 80. 49. inDumas Jefferson quoted Malone, Jefferson and theOrdeal ofLiberty (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 188; James Thomas Flexner, George Washington: Anguish andFarewell, 1795-1799 (Boston: Little, 191. Brown, 1969), p. 50. LeonardW. Levy,Jefferson andCivil Liberties: The Darker Side (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer sity Press, 1963), p. 96. 51. Malone, Second Term, p. 576. 52. James C. Curtis, "In the Shadow of Old Hickory: The Political Travail of Martin Van Buren," Journal of theEarly American Republic (Fall 1981), pp. 258-259, 263.