The East China Sea Disputes
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African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration ISSN: 2689-5102 Volume 3, Issue 2, 2020 (pp. 79-92) www.abjournals.org THE EAST CHINA SEA DISPUTES: EXAMINING CHINA AND JAPAN’S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS Adeleke Olumide Ogunnoiki Graduate, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos State, Nigeria ABSTRACT : Territorial disputes, occasioned by colonialism in most if not all cases, remain a thorny issue in contemporary international relations. In the East China Sea (ECS), a portion of the Pacific Ocean, is a group of uninhabited islets and barren rocks which the Asian economic powers – China, Japan and Taiwan claim ownership and sovereignty over based on historical records, international legal documents and geographical fact. These islets, which China calls ‘Diaoyu Islands’ and Japan, ‘Senkaku Islands’, are close to important shipping lanes, potential hydrocarbon deposits, and good fishing areas. However, irredentism and nationalism in China, and the politics played by staunch nationalists in Japan, have from time to time led to simmering tensions between both countries. Though, China and Japan have a maritime delimitation feud over their overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), this paper solely examines the competing territorial claims of China and Japan to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the geostrategic East China Sea. For the study, the historical approach was adopted and data were garnered from secondary sources. The paper concludes that China has a rich history regarding the disputed islands. However, it has insufficient historical evidence to prove that it exercised territorial sovereignty over the islets centuries ago. For Japan, it has good historical evidence to make a case for the island’s ownership. Also, it has met the international law requirement of ‘effective occupation’ of the islets. KEYWORDS: China, Diaoyu, East China Sea, Japan, Senkaku, Treaty, War INTRODUCTION Territory, stated in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) as one of the four features of a state (see Ogunnoiki, 2018a: 118), has for decades been a source of dispute between neighbouring countries in several continents, most especially in Asia. In South Asia, the post-colonial states – India and Pakistan, infrequently clash over Kashmir, a disputed territory and flashpoint. Still on India, up North to be precise, is a border dispute with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a fellow nuclear-armed state, in the Ladakh region. Rounding South Asia, in the Indian Ocean, brings us to the geostrategic South China Sea (SCS) in South East Asia (SEA). China to date claims 80-90% of the semi-enclosed sea of approximately 1.4 million square miles (i.e. 3.5 million square kilometres) with the vague U- shaped nine-dash line (NDL). Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei equally claim to have maritime jurisdiction over almost the entire South China Sea or part of it, the geographical features and natural resources therein (see Ogunnoiki, 2018b; Ogunnoiki, 2018c). Other territorial disputes in Asia worth mentioning are: Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the Sea of Japan which Japan calls ‘Takeshima Islands’ and South 79 African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration ISSN: 2689-5102 Volume 3, Issue 2, 2020 (pp. 79-92) www.abjournals.org Korea ‘Dokdo Islands’, and Japan and Russia over a cluster of islands in the Pacific Ocean which Japan calls ‘Northern Territories’ and Russia, ‘Kuril Islands’. Not far away from the aforementioned South China Sea is the East China Sea (ECS), a section of the Pacific Ocean, with a chain of islands known decades ago as ‘Pinnacle Islands’ which China, Japan, and Taiwan, lay claim to. In total, the East China Sea has five uninhabited islets (which China calls ‘Diaoyu Islands’, Japan ‘Senkaku Islands’, and Taiwan ‘Diaoyutai Islands’) and three barren rocks that cover an area of about 7 square kilometres (Valencia 2007: 150; Drifte, 2008; Drifte, 2009: 2; Manjiao, 2011: 164; Tatsumi, 2013: 107; Tian and Chao, 2013: 27; BBC News, 2014; Bendini, 2014: 4; Chao and Tian 2014: 21; EAPASI, 2018; Sato, 2019: 52; SCMP Reporter, 2019). These economically significant islands, which are located north-east of Taiwan, east of mainland China and south-west of Japan’s southern-most prefecture, Okinawa, lie near potential oil and natural gas reserves. They are also close to prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing grounds (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.; Takenaka, 2012; BBC News, 2014). Though, China and Japan have a maritime delimitation dispute vis-à-vis their overlapping 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea (SIPRI, n.d.; Valencia 2007; Yee, 2011; Zhao, 2011; Valencia 2014; Mondré, 2015; Das, 2016), this paper strictly examines Sino-Japanese territorial claims to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Historical Background to Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute in the East China Sea The chequered history of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute in the East China Sea dates back to the 19th and 20th century. The First Sino-Japanese War was a war between China under the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) and Japan during the Meiji Period (1868-1912), over the control of Korea. The war which started on July 25, 1894, came to close on the 17th of April, 1895, with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki or what the Chinese labelled the “unequal treaty”. Vanquished China, based on the said treaty, recognised the independence of Korea and ceded the Island of Formosa (present-day Taiwan), alongside islands appertaining to it, Pescadores Islands, and Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. Though the Treaty did not mention precisely the Senkakus/Diaoyus as islands appertaining to or all the islands belonging to Formosa, victorious Japan, prior to when the Treaty was inked, formally annexed the islands after the January 14, 1895, Cabinet Decision to place sovereignty markers on the uninhabited islets (see US-China Institute n.d.; Han, 2013; Osti, 2013; Valencia 2014: 189; Chansoria, 2018a; Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). Following the Mukden Incident (a minor explosion planned by Japanese Army near Japan’s South Manchuria Railway on September 18, 1931, in order to occupy Mukden and the entire Manchuria) was the Second Sino-Japanese War which began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 07, 1937. The incident became one of the events that precipitated the Second World War (1939-1945). In 1943, the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (UK), and Republic of China (ROC) concluded the Cairo Declaration. The declaration stated that Japan shall return all territories it had “stolen” from the Qing Dynasty such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, and will be expelled from territories it took by “violence and greed”. In contrast to many other occupied islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not explicitly mentioned in the Cairo Declaration (SCIO, 2012; Osti, 2013: 5; MOFA, 2016a). In Article 8 of the July 26th, 1945, Potsdam Declaration, it was stated that “Japanese sovereignty shall be 80 African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration ISSN: 2689-5102 Volume 3, Issue 2, 2020 (pp. 79-92) www.abjournals.org limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” (MOFA, 2015). Following the defeat of the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) by the Allied Powers (mainly the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and Republic of China) in the horrendous Second World War, Japan renounced all right, title and claim to a number of territories and islands under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, popularly known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was signed at San Francisco, United States, on September 08, 1951. In line with Article 3 of the said treaty, the U.S. had administrative control over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands under the United Nations (UN) trusteeship system. Japan later took over the administration of the islands when the U.S. returned Okinawa to it via the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, concluded on the 17th of June, 1971 (see United Nations, 1952; Han, 2013; BBC News, 2014; Valencia 2014: 189-190). In the late 1960s, potential oil and gas in the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands became known (Osti, 2013). China, which claims that the Diaoyu Islands have been an inherent part of its territory since ancient times, became assertive, alongside Taiwan, over the contested islands from the early 1970s (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.; Han, 2013; BBC News, 2014; Das, 2016). Few months after the Okinawa Reversion Agreement entered into force on May 15, 1972, China and Japan began the process of normalising diplomatic relations. During the process, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly reached a ‘tacit agreement’ to discuss the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issue in the future. Again, during the official visit of Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, to Japan in 1978, he was of the view that the next generation, with the much-needed wisdom, will be in the better position to resolve the perennial territorial dispute. But in 2010, the Japanese government of the Democratic Party denied there was ever such an agreement with China to shelve the territorial dispute (Ishida, 2013; Yang, 2017). On July 14, 1996, the tensions between both countries came to a boil when the right-wing Japanese group, Nihon Seinensha (Japan Youth Federation), built a lighthouse on one of the disputed islands (Shaw, 1999: 19; Valencia, 2007: 130; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, 2012; Lunn, 2012: 4). Sino-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century: The East China Sea Territorial Dispute Decades after the normalisation of Sino-Japan relations on September 29, 1972 and the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan on August 12, 1978, seven Chinese activists successfully landed on one of the disputed islands after which they were arrested by Japanese officers on March 24, 2004 (Kahn, 2004; Wiegand, 2009: 185; Fravel, 2010: 152).