Philosophy of Mind

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

What are minds? What is the nature of thought, consciousness and sensory experience? Can these phenomena be explained in purely physical terms? Are there good reasons to think that our minds are in some way separate from our bodies? If so, how can our minds have effects in the physical world? In this course we will examine and evaluate some of the answers that philosophers have given to questions such as these.

Introductory and Background Reading: This short piece provides an overview of many of the topics we will be discussing:

 Louise Antony, ‘The Mental and the Physical’ in R. Le Poidevin, The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (Routledge, 2009)

These introductory textbooks contain chapters on most of the topics we will be covering:

 Tim Crane, Elements of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2001)  John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (Third Edition, Routledge, 2013)  Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Third Edition, Westview Press, 2010)

Lectures: The lectures for this module will be held in **, on Wednesdays from 6 - 7 pm in the Autumn Term. The lecturer is Dr. Sarah Patterson ([email protected]).

Seminars: The seminars for this module will be held on Wednesdays from 7 - 8 pm in the Autumn Term. They will be led by the lecturer and by **.

Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion. One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not worry if you have not fully understood it in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in the seminar discussion. There is also ‘additional reading’ listed that will deepen your understanding and help you to get the most out of the module. You are especially advised to cover the additional reading for those topics on which you are planning to write.

Essays (BA): This module is assessed by one essay of around 3,000 words. For details concerning submission of the essay, including deadlines, see the BA Handbook. Prior to this assessed essay, you may also write up to two essays during the course, taken from the titles below, and receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can be useful practice for your eventual assessed essay. You should submit the first such essay by the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last seminar of term. [Notes: (1) You are always welcome to submit an essay earlier than these dates; (2) the seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay more than once.]

Essay (MA): This module is assessed by one essay of around 3,500 words. For details concerning submission of the essay, including deadlines, see the MA Handbook.

1 Moodle: Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at http://moodle.bbk.ac.uk. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.

Schedule of Topics and Readings

Many of the readings for this course appear in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David Chalmers (OUP, 2002) (referred to as ‘Chalmers’ below).

Week 1 The Mental and the Physical

Seminar Reading:  Tim Crane, ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental’ in O’Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1998)

Additional Reading:  Jaegwon Kim, ‘Is There a “Mark of the Mental”?’ in his Philosophy of Mind, Ch. 1  Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Ch. 1 (Princeton University Press, 1979)  John Cottingham, ‘Intentionality or Phenomenology? Descartes and the Objects of Thought’ in Crane and Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem (Routledge, 2000)  Barbara Montero, ‘The Body Problem’ Nous (1999) 33: 183-200

Week 2 Mind-Brain Identity Theory

Seminar Reading:  J.J.C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’ Phil. Rev. (1959) 68: 141-56 (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  U.T. Place, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ Brit. J. Psych. 47: 44-50 (in Chalmers)  Herbert Feigl, excerpt from ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’ (in Chalmers)  David Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’ J. Phil. (1966) 63: 17-25 (available via Birkbeck elibrary)

Week 3 Functionalism

Seminar Reading:  Hilary Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (Third Edition, Routledge, 2013), Ch. 6  David Armstrong, ‘The Causal Theory of the Mind’ (in Chalmers)  Ned Block, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’ (in Chalmers)

2  Martine Nida-Rümelin, ‘Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?’ (in Chalmers)  Janet Levin, ‘Functionalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/

Week 4 Phenomenal Consciousness

Seminar Reading:  Ned Block, ‘Concepts of Consciousness’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ (in Chalmers)  Kathleen V. Wilkes, ‘Is Consciousness Important?’ Brit. J. Phil. Sci. (1984) 35: 223- 43  Kathleen Akins, ‘A Bat Without Qualities?’ in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.) Consciousness (Blackwell, 1993) (available from Akins’ website)  Daniel Dennett, ‘Quining Qualia’ (in Chalmers)

Week 5 The Modal and Knowledge Arguments

Seminar Reading:  Frank Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Saul Kripke, excerpt from Naming and Necessity (in Chalmers)  Christopher Hill, excerpt from ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem’ (in Chalmers)  Grover Maxwell, excerpt from ‘Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity’ (in Chalmers)  Karen Bennett, ‘Why I am not a Dualist’

READING WEEK

Week 6 Responses to the Modal and Knowledge Arguments

Seminar Reading:  Brian Loar, ‘Phenomenal States’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Joseph Levine, ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’ (in Chalmers)  David Lewis, ‘What Experience Teaches’ (in Chalmers)  Martine Nida-Rümelin, ‘Qualia: The Knowledge Argument’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/  Daniel Stoljar, ‘Two Conceptions of the Physical’ (in Chalmers)

Week 7 Mental Causation

Seminar Reading:  Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Many Problems of Mental Causation’ (in Chalmers)

3 Additional Reading:  Stephen Yablo, ‘Mental Causation’ (in Chalmers)  Karen Bennett, ‘Exclusion Again’ in J. Hohwy and and J. Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced (OUP, 2008) (eBook available via Birkbeck Library)  Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir and Tim Crane, ‘There is No Exclusion Problem’ in S. Gibb, E.J. Lowe and R. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology (OUP, 2013) (eBook available via Birkbeck Library)  D. Robb and J. Heil, ‘Mental Causation’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/

Week 8 Naturalising Mental Content

Seminar Reading:  Fred Dretske, ‘A Recipe for Thought’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Jerry Fodor, ‘A Theory of Content, I: The Problem’ in his A Theory of Content and Other Essays (MIT Press, 1990)  Ruth Millikan, ‘Biosemantics’ (in Chalmers)  Karen Neander, ‘Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning’ Phil. Studs. (1995) 79: 109-41

Week 9 Externalism about Mental Content

Seminar Reading:  Hilary Putnam, ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’ (in Chalmers)  Frances Egan, ‘Wide Content’ in A. Beckermann, B. McLaughlin and S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (OUP, 2009)  Katalin Farkas, ‘What is Externalism?’ Phil. Studs. (2003) 112: 187-208  Andy Clark and David Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’ (in Chalmers)

Week 10 The Intentional and the Phenomenal

Seminar Reading:  Terence Horgan and John Tienson, ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’ (in Chalmers)

Additional Reading:  Michelle Montague, ‘Recent Work on Intentionality’ Analysis (2010) 70: 765-82  Maja Spener, ‘Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology’ in T. Bayne and M. Maontague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology (OUP, 2011)(eBook available via Birkbeck Library)  Amy Kind, ‘Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Content’ Philosophy Compass (2010) 5: 902-13