General Aviation Security
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General Aviation Security Status Report- November 26th, 2001 Prepared by Art Kosatka ACP-200 November 26,2001 Briefmg for ACS-1 Paul Busick SECURITY ISSUES for GENERAL AVIATION Introduction: Sec. 132(b) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act states: General Aviation Program: Within 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Transportation Security shall transmit a report on airspace and other security measures that can be deployed, as necessary, to improve general aviation security to [the Committees]. There has been an extended effort to resolve these issues by an FAA Task Force consisting of Security Policy & Planning, Security Operations, Air Traffic, Flight Standards, Airports, General Counsel, Rule making, and others. The group has met repeatedly with delegations of most of the industry alphabet groups, including NATA, NBAA, AOPA, NASAO, Maryland Dept. of ~'Viation, and representatives of the individual airports, among others, and has continuing contact with other smaller interest groups. Other Federal agencies involved in the discussions include US Secret Service and NSC representatives. While there have been several interim agreements on various segments of the proposals, implementation of several has been delayed or overtaken by such intervening events as the shut-down of airspace around nuclear sites, which also encompassed numerous GA airports nationwide. The current DRAFT Air Traffic Services strategy is found in Attachment A, which addresses the details grouped by issues, and Attachment B, which summarizes the same required activities grouped chronologically in a now outdated draft letter to the Deputy Secretary. Most issues contained therein reflect current agreement except those surrounding LEO presence at the six affected Maryland airports. The strategy document also contains several remaining TBD procedural developments by FAA security. Additional Background: For purposes of this discussion of general aviation security, the term General Aviation is described essentially as anything that does not include certificate holders under Parts 121, 129, 135, or have Part 108 security programs. This includes • FAR Part 91 operations • Airports serving non-1 08 carriers and private aircraft • Business Aviation (Mobil Oil, General Motors) • Some operations to and from small airports may or may not be included: • Certain Part 135 air taxi operations • Private aircraft and helicopters • Private pilots and owners • Flight instruction Irregular or infrequent "orphan" operations: • News and traffic reporting • Pipeline survey • Ban- 2 -ner towing • Photogrammetric survey • Sight seeing • Open air assemblies (more than lOk) • Blimps and airships • Sport or demonstration parachutes Summary: ECBandTFR: The 9/11 events caused all general aviation to remain shut down nationwide for a relatively brief period. In a few days, most US airspace was re-opened to general aviation, although FAA created Enhanced Class B (ECB) airspace around 35 major airports and Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) zones around BOS, JFK and DCA airports, with additional security constraints imposed for operations within those spaces: Flight plan file required Pre-established arrive/depart corridors Discrete transponder code No flight training above 6,000 lbs. Two way radio communications A TC clearance The TFR areas imposed for 25 NM surrounding BOS, JFK, and DCA, have since been reduced to 15NM at BOS and l8NM at JFK and DCA. These three have been the focus of the vast majority of attention and discussion in the intervening weeks; all three remain under tight constraints, with DCA the tightest, and the subject of considerable FAA debate with USSS and NSC, among others. Note: Sec. 146 of the new legislation (Attachment C) would nullify all ECB 's "and any 1 other notice issued after Sept. 1 1 h ••• " within 30 days of written request of any aircraft operator. This may have the eventual effect of superceding all task force efforts in opening all GA operations iffinal agreement cannot be reached and implemented soon, and may also have the parallel effect ofgenerating large-scale short-term FAA efforts to respond on behalf of SEC-DOT to multiple individual petitions ifFAA wishes to retain such constraints where necessary. The legislation specifies only ECBs, but it is not clear if TFRs might be included in the language " ... or any other notice issued after Sept. 1 J'h ... ". The Act is also silent on how this would apply to conflicting USSSI NSC concerns, whether USSS has an over-riding authority, and ifso, how it would be implemented. GA Industry Perspective: In general, GA aircraft and the airports that serve them are not regulated parties for security purposes. although there have been discussions suggesting some movement in that directioll,. Indeed, Section 132(b) cited above appears to anticipate continued attention to this issue by Congress. Industry bas been extremely cooperative and understanding of the need for additional security. The associations have been quite active in preparing recommended security "best practices" for all GA communities to follow although perhaps in anticipation of possibly stricter FAA regulation if self-supervision was not successful. AAAE and ATA have instituted a task force to meet in December for security at GA airports; it is not clear the extent to which other GA community will participate or endorse the effort, nor bas FAA participation been requested to date. The AOPA internet publication (Attachment F, AOPA e-Pilot) also points out that the new legislation carries no security mandates on GA at all, although it alludes to a "study on GA security" which presumably refers to the required report to Congress. It further urges pilots to take advantage of the clause offering relief within the ECB's by writing to DOT Secretary Mineta, address enclosed. There were additional constraints placed on numerous GA airports and flights when temporary measures were imposed for a 10 NM radius surrounding all US nuclear sites, which halted the general effort to open airspace to GA in mid-process. All the nuclear site restrictions have since been removed due to the lapse of credible threat information, but the re-opening process bas not been reinstated. It should be noted that one significant complaint about this type of temporary and ill defined flight restriction, aside from the presumed lack of threat, is that they are rarely identified with respect to navaid fixes, so it is extremely difficult for even the best equipped pilots to locate and avoid the "no-fly" zones except possibly for those equipped with GPS, which is by no means universal, nor were such GPS fixes provided in the NOTAM. Another universal complaint from industry is that small aircraft and their load carrying capacity are not perceived as a significant threat, nor has there been any credible threat information suggesting they should be treated as one. AOPA threatens to take the issue "to the highest government officials" if the pending plan is not quickly acted upon [Attachment F, AOPA e-Pilot]. Inconsistent Command and Control It is generally conceded that GA security to date has been pursued in a very fragmented and uncoordinated ad hoc manner, with no one office having either the mandate or the manpower to follow through. When agreement has been reached, the resulting bureaucratic clearances both in FAA and other agencies has been slow in coming, usually with changes requiring further debate, and changes in personnel requiring re orientation in previous matters. The entire process has been under way for well over a month; the current draft has been awaiting a response from the Deputy Secretary DOT for well over a week, and efforts to get on his calendar have failed. USSS has been in agreement with full release of the airspace between 18 and 25 NM at DCA for quite some time, but final clearance at DOT has not been granted. Without a clear picture of the political influences involved. or a clear delegation of authority for decision-making and approvals, most efforts have been a best-guess at what might be approveq at higher levels, and then a wait- and-see for feedback and corrections, which are slow at best. ' · Lack ofFAA authority and/or a mandate of urgency and priorities has allowed the process in this instance to be driven more at the insistence and much slower pace of USSS and NSC, rather than by FAA security concerns and demands on staff to "get GA flying". FAA security has, throughout the process, been amenable to generally less restrictive measures. Many of the proposals would have created operational constraints on ATC, but have nonetheless been quickly accommodated by A TC with workable, albeit painful short tenn alternatives [arrival and departure corridors, cut-outs for close-in airports and VFR corridor operations, shortage of discrete transponder codes, etc.) Further, there is no national plan in place for re-instituting GA security controls nationwide if another major terrorist event demanded such a move, short of another total shutdown. (Recall a similar "no-plan" condition during the Gulf War period, which resulted in the issuance of confusing and relatively ineffective guidance for the A VSEC measures, which are still in place and require updating.) Indeed, it is not yet clear whether such a one-size-fits-all plan would be appropriate for any non-specific GA-based threat, or whether there is any significant enhancement in security by restricting flight operations of GA aircraft under 12,500 lbs., although there should be ground and operational controls on larger aircraft. [See Attachment G, draft by Jan Brecht-Clark of S-60] DCATFR The largest single remaining problem is the situation surrounding DCA; its TFR encompasses 6 GA airports in the State of Maryland. Two of those airports are within approximately 8NM of DCA (and relatively near Andrews AFB), the others are closer to the periphery of the boundary. Ail have been the subject of intense push-back from USSS, and have thus remained shut down (with the exception ofEMS, LEO and military flights which operate under specific waivers).