Eldorado Or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe

Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe

Edited by Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe This page intentionally left blank Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe

Edited by Russell King Professor of Geography and Dean of the School of European Studies University of Sussex Gabriella Lazaridis Lecturer in Politics and Social Policy University of Dundee and Charalambos Tsardanidis Director Institute of International Economic Relations Athens First published in Great Britain 2000 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-41117-7 ISBN 978-0-333-98252-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780333982525

First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-22615-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Eldorado or fortress? : migration in Southern Europe / edited by Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis, Charalambos Tsardanidis. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-22615-2 (cloth) 1. Europe, Southern—Emigration and immigration. 2. Immigrants– –Europe, Southern. I. King, Russell, 1945– . II. Lazaridis, Gabriella. III. Tsardanides,- Charalambos G. JV7590.E42 1999 331.6'2'094091822—dc21 99–33855 CIP Selection and editorial matter © Russell King, Gabriella Lazaridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis 2000 Chapter 1 © Russell King 2000 Chapter 8 © Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 2000 Chapter 15 © Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 2000 Chapters 2–7, 9–14 © Macmillan Press Ltd 2000 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2000 978-0-333-74790-2 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10987654321 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 Contents

List of Tables viii List of Figures ix Preface and Acknowledgements xi Notes on the Contributors xiii

Part I Introduction 1 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration 1 Russell King

Part II Labour Market 2 The Participation of Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy 27 Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 3 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy 57 Rossetos Fakiolas 4 Labour Market and Immigration: Economic Opportunities for Immigrants in Portugal 79 Maria Ioannis Baganha 5 Recent Immigration to Catalonia: Economic Character and Responses 104 Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 6 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland to Greece, Spain and Italy: Anthropological Perspectives 125 Krystyna Romaniszyn

Part III Gender Relations and Social Exclusion 7 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe: Social Exclusion, Domestic Work and Prostitution in Italy 145 Giovanna Campani

v vi Contents

8 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece: Economic, Social and Spatial Exclusion 170 Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 9 ‘Racists? Us? Are You Joking?’ The Discourse of Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy 186 Anna Triandafyllidou 10 Urban Restructuring, Immigration and the Generation of Marginalized Spaces in the Lisbon Region 207 Jorge Malheiros

Part IV Questions of Policy 11 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy 233 Corrado Bonifazi 12 Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth Century: the Case of Spain 253 Joaquín Arango 13 Migration, Trade and Development: the European Union and the Maghreb Countries 277 Georges Tapinos

Part V Migration and Security 14 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean: a Complex Relationship 299 Sarah Collinson 15 The EU Mediterranean States, the Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South 321 Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra

Index 345 List of Tables

2.1 Regular, irregular and temporary jobs in Italy, 1981–95 38 2.2 Ratios between regular and informal jobs in Italy, 1981–95 39 2.3 Main immigrant nationalities holding residence permits in Italy, 31 December 1990 and 31 December 1995 42 4.1 Active population by sector of economic activity, Metropolitan Area of Lisbon and rest of mainland Portugal, 1981 and 1991 82 4.2 Legal foreign residents in Portugal, 1980–95 84 4.3 The Portuguese legalizations, 1992 and 1996: immigrants’ requests by nationality 85 4.4 Occupational distribution of foreign nationals in Portugal, average 1990–95 88 4.5 Occupational distribution of foreign nationals in Portugal, 1991 and 1994 97 4.6 Foreign working population in Portugal by area of origin, sex and type of work contract, 1992 and 1995 98 4.7 Immigrants in Portugal: type of contract for men and women, 1997 99 5.1 Estimated natural and migration increase, Catalonia, 1901–96 107 5.2 Foreign resident population by nationality, Catalonia, 1950–95 109 5.3 Total and foreign labour force by economic sector, occupation and nationality, Spain and Catalonia, 1991 111 5.4 Economic sectors with the highest volume of foreign workers, Catalonia, 1991 115 5.5 Employment characteristics of a sample of Africans in Girona province, 1995 116 5.6 Labour permits granted during the 1991–92 regularization process, Spain and Catalonia 118 7.1 Estimates of the numbers and distribution of foreign prostitutes in Italy 155 9.1 Quantitative analysis of interview texts with Greek and Italian ofﬁcials 196

vii viii List of Tables

10.1 Population growth rates in mainland Portugal and the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1940–81 211 10.2 Evolution of the population of the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1940–81 212 10.3 Foreign population in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1960 and 1981 215 10.4 Segregation indices for selected groups of foreign and internal migrants, Lisbon Metropolitan Region, 1981 218 10.5 Segregation indices for the main foreign communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Region, 1981 and 1991 225 10.6 Dissimilarity indices for the main foreigner groups in the 177 freguesias of the Lisbon region, 1991 228 13.1 Population indicators for the Maghreb countries 287 13.2 Population of Maghrebi origin in European countries, c.1980 and 1984 287 13.3 Simulations for Morocco: macro-economic results ﬁve years after free-trade implementation 290 List of Figures

1.1 Evolution of international migration trends in Southern Europe since 1950 6 10.1 Location of the ‘Cape Verdean Triangle’ in Lisbon 214 10.2 Foreigners in the municipalities of Lisbon, 1960 and 1981 216 10.3 Professional and employment characteristics of African and European immigrants in Portugal, 1995 220 10.4 The vortex of socio-spatial and ethnic segregation in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon 223 10.5 The pattern of increase of African and European immigrants in the municipalities of Lisbon, 1981–91 224 10.6 Distribution of Africans in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon by freguesia, 1991 226 10.7 Distribution of Europeans and North Americans in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon by freguesia, 1991 227

ix This page intentionally left blank Preface and Acknowledgements

This book stems from papers delivered at a conference on Migration, Security and Employment which took place on the Greek island of Santorini during 19–21 September 1997. The gathering brought together some 30 researchers from many European countries for three days of productive and stimulating discussion. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the conference themes, participants represented a rich variety of approaches: from sociology, geography, economics, demography and political science. The conference was organized by Russell King (Co-Director, Sussex Centre for Migration Research), Gabriella Lazaridis (Chair of the European Sociological Association’s Regional Network on Southern European Societies) and Charalambos Tsardanidis (Director of the Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens). The conference was part of the IIER’s and the ESA’s Regional Network’s programme of research into significant contemporary issues in Mediterranean and Southern European economies and societies. The IIER acted as the ‘host’ organizing body for the meeting, and the editors would especially like to thank Nikos Troulakis, Nelly Kambouri and Themis Smyrni, whose efforts were vital to the planning and smooth running of the event. Funding for the conference was generously provided by the NATO Office for Information and Press, the Greek Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture and the Aegean, the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad, the Greek Manpower Employment Organization and the Hellenic Tourism Organization. At the Sussex end, where most of the final editing took place, the editors are most grateful for the editorial assistance of Jenny Money, of the university’s School of European Studies. Finally, we thank the contributors for their willingness to revise their papers against a tight schedule and to accept our editorial input with such good grace.

RUSSELL KING GABRIELLA LAZARIDIS CHARALAMBOS TSARDANIDIS

xi This page intentionally left blank Notes on the Contributors

Joaquín Arango is Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense, Madrid

Maria Ioannis Baganha is Professor of Economics, University of Coimbra

Corrado Bonifazi is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Population Research, CNR, Rome

Giovanna Campani is Lecturer in the Department of Educational Sciences, University of Florence

Jordi Cardelús is Lecturer in Geography at the Autonomous University, Barcelona

Sarah Collinson is Northern Affairs Research Coordinator for ActionAid, London

Rossetos Fakiolas is Professor of Economics at the National Metsovio Polytechnic, Athens

Stefano Guerra is Researcher at the International Organization for Migration, Geneva

Russell King is Professor of Geography and Dean of the School of European Studies at the University of Sussex

Gabriella Lazaridis is Lecturer in Social Policy and Gender Studies in the Department of Politics, University of Dundee

Jorge Malheiros is Lecturer in Geography at the University of Lisbon

Enzo Mingione is Professor of Sociology, University of Padua

Àngels Pascual de Sans is Professor of Geography, Autonomous University, Barcelona

xiii xiv Notes on the Contributors

Iordannis Psimmenos is Adjunct Professor of Sociology at the Panteion University of Athens

Fabio Quassoli is Research Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Studies, University of Pavia

Krystyna Romaniszyn is Professor of Sociology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków

Miguel Solana Solana is Lecturer in Geography at the Autonomous University, Barcelona

Georges Tapinos is Professor of Demography at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris

Anna Triandafyllidou is Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute of Psychology, CNR, Rome

Charalambos Tsardanidis is Director of the Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens Part I Introduction 1 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration Russell King

Introduction

This introductory chapter will attempt to set the scene for the book as a whole by providing an overview of recent immigration to Southern Europe. Given limitations of space, this overview will be at a high level of generalization and will work towards the proposal of a ‘model’ of Southern European immigration which has distinctive features. These characteristic features are different from those witnessed by the earlier phase of South European emigration and different from the immigration into Northern Europe of the early post-war decades. Above all the character of contemporary immigration into Southern Europe reflects two things: the changing global nature of international migration; and the way in which immigrants in Southern Europe are embedded in the specific model of South European post-industrial society. Four sections follow. First I review very briefly the history of migratory flows out of, within, and into Southern Europe to demonstrate that this region has witnessed a quite remarkable migration turnaround scarcely paralleled in global migration history (at least for voluntary migrations). Secondly, I set out some of the reasons for the rapid evolution of mass immigration into Southern Europe since the early 1980s, drawing on the still limited literature which treats the region as a whole (as distinct from the now voluminous literature on migrant groups in individual countries), and paying some attention to the question of numbers. Thirdly, the chapter will attempt to set out some key features of a model of immigration into Southern Europe, related both to the characteristics of the migrants themselves and to their socio-economic integration/exclusion. Despite this attempt to generalize, it will be seen that one of the key features of this model is

3 4 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration heterogeneity – of migrant nationalities, gender relationships, employment experiences, and regional differentiation within Southern Europe. The ﬁnal section of the chapter will attempt to link some of the key points of this overview to the more expansive and detailed accounts provided in the remainder of this volume, thereby giving the reader an introduction to the structure and contents of the book.

Southern European migration history Southern Europe has had a generally intense engagement with a wide variety of types of migration. These forms of migration can be categorized according to both their typology (lifetime, temporary, seasonal, international, internal, etc.) and their geographical destination (Mediterranean, European, overseas, etc.). Moreover each can be linked to a particular regime or epoch in the development of the global economy: mercantilism, colonialism, Fordism, etc. Early migration links were mainly to the south and east within the Mediterranean ‘lake’. Jews, Lebanese, Greeks, Maltese and Corsicans were particularly migratory within the Mediterranean Basin and this type of trade-based migration is an interesting forerunner to the contemporary intra- Mediterranean migrations from the southern and eastern to the northern shores (Collinson, 1996). In succeeding centuries Spain and Portugal orchestrated colonial emigrations to Latin America: according to Wallerstein’s (1979) well-known analysis these emigrating colonials were key agents in the early development of the world capitalist economy. By the latter part of the nineteenth century emigration to the Americas was becoming a mass phenomenon for Southern Europeans and also included Italians, ﬁrst from the North of Italy, and later, after 1900, from the South. Southern Italians ﬂocking to the United States in the early decades of the twentieth century epitomized the ‘huddled masses yearning to be free’ enshrined in the Statue of Liberty. While Spanish and Portuguese continued to emigrate to South America (and the latter to the Portuguese colonies elsewhere), Greeks developed a strong migratory current to North America alongside the Italians. While some of these migrations continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Great Depression and the development of immigration control measures, notably by the United States, caused some of the massive emigrations of the early twentieth century to fade away. This was certainly the case with the ‘Great Migration’ from Southern Italy to North America which had seen an annual departure of 500,000–800,000 during the years immediately preceding and following the Great War (King, 1992). Russell King 5

Mass emigration from Southern Europe renewed itself in the 1950s and 1960s, broadening the range of destinations away from the Americas to encompass both new overseas destinations such as Australia and South Africa and, more particularly, North European countries such as France, Belgium, Switzerland and West Germany. During the early post-war years overseas destinations (USA, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Australia) held sway, although there was substantial emigration from Southern Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s (and indeed much earlier) to France, Belgium and (for Italians only) Great Britain. Another variant on the theme of post-war South European emigration was the rather different emigration patterns of Maltese and Cypriots, who migrated during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s almost entirely within the anglophone world of Britain, Canada, the United States and Australia. But the major migrations of the post-war era, quantitatively, were those which transformed Southern European peasants and rural labourers into industrial and building-site workers in Northern Europe. Hence it was that around 10 million South Europeans (Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, Yugoslavs and Turks) and North Africans (Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians) were incorporated into the labour forces of France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland over the period which ran from the early 1950s to the mid- 1970s (King, 1993). As Fielding (1993) has pointed out, these were the migrations of European Fordism: the mass provision of cheap migrant labour was the demographic component of mass production, mass consumption, mass society. It is also worth pointing out that, during this epoch, almost the whole of the Mediterranean Basin, northern and southern, functioned in the same way as a ‘reserve army of labour’ for Northern Europe’s industries and labour needs in other low-status employment sectors (Castles and Kosack, 1973). And, one further point, it is also important to note that within Southern European countries – especially Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece – there were powerful inter- regional currents of rural–urban migration developing at this time: from the Italian South to the northern Industrial Triangle, from southern Spain to Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque region, from rural Portugal to the Lisbon area, and from rural Greece to the Athens conurbation. The significance of these internal migrations for the evolution of immigration into Southern Europe will become apparent later. This very brief historical overview has shown that Southern Europe has played a major role in shaping the global map of migration through the last few centuries. South European emigration has been a vital 6 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration component in the changing international division of labour in both Europe and North and South America and in the development of the world capitalist economy through its mercantilist, colonial and Fordist periods (King, 1996). In the next section of the chapter we will see how Southern Europe’s new role in the European and global economy, and hence in the international division of labour, as well as in the changing geopolitics of international migration in Europe, led to its rapid emergence as a major theatre of immigration activity. Meanwhile, the complexity of the ‘migration turnaround’ from emigration to immigration should itself be appreciated as a background to what follows. During the 1970s, several migration flows and processes could be identified in Southern Europe. Good quantitative data are not always to hand to document these flows, but they are intuitively known from observation and various surveys. Figure 1.1 graphs the evolution of the main trends over the period 1950–2000. First, emigration was continuing, especially from the more disadvantaged regions

Figure 1.1 Evolution of international migration trends in Southern Europe since 1950 Russell King 7 such as interior northern Portugal and Southern Italy. While the halt to migrant labour recruitment promulgated by most North European countries did not affect Italians’ rights of free movement within the EEC, other migrants sought new destinations, either within Europe (witness the growth of Portuguese migration to Switzerland in the 1980s) or to the oil-rich Gulf states where there was a strong demand for middle-level technical and civil engineering workers. Nevertheless, for all South European countries, there is no doubt that gross emigration tailed off rapidly during the 1970s. Secondly, return migration played an important statistical role in the switch from net emigration to net immigration recorded by Italy, Spain and Greece in the early–mid-1970s (and by Portugal somewhat later). Return migration has often been overlooked in studies of migration, but there is no doubt that flows of returnees became important during the 1960s and 1970s, as migrants returned first from overseas destinations and then from Europe. The return phase of the migration cycle is not one which receives much attention in this book, but it is a constant if shadowy element in the migration statistics, and is not without moments of high drama, such as the sudden reflux of Portuguese African retornados in the mid-1970s or the ‘ancestral return’ of the Pontian Greeks in the 1990s. Thirdly, the establishment of more-or-less permanent emigrant communities of Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, Cypriots and Maltese in Northern Europe (and elsewhere) led to a continual shuttling back and forth of migrants between their origins and their destinations. This to-and-fro migration was conditioned by the fact that most of the emigrant communities had been developed by chain migration so that individual villages and small rural districts had spawned emigrant communities in one or a very few specific destinations. Changing transport technology (motorways, fast cars, charter flights) and the growing wealth of emigrant families has made this shuttle migration ever more intense, although much of the movement continues to escape migration statistics. Fourthly, the new trend of immigration into Southern Europe started in the 1970s and gathered momentum especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For the first time in their history, Southern European countries became a magnet for a growing quantity of immigrants who came mainly from African and Asian countries and, after 1989, from East European countries. Although numbers are hard to estimate with any degree of certainty, the size of the legal foreign population in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece roughly tripled during the decade 1981–91 (SOPEMI, 1994, pp. 27–8, 187). So, by the 1980s, 8 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration the traditional role of Southern Europe as a labour reserve had become decisively inverted. Finally, the switch from mass net emigration to net immigration recorded in the 1970s in Southern Europe corresponded to an internal migration turnaround by which rural–urban migration slowed down and, in some cases, ceased altogether. Once again the statistical basis for studying this ‘counterurbanization’ in Southern Europe is rather scarce, but most authorities are agreed that rural–urban migration faded in the more developed parts of Southern Europe in the 1970s and in other parts in the 1980s (Champion, 1989).

Explaining mass immigration into Southern Europe There is no simple explanation to account for the rapid development of immigration into Southern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. What I do here, instead, is to list a series of factors which undoubtedly have been important. It is, however, impossible to estimate the relative strength of each of these factors, not least because they have interacted in various combinations, and the nature of these combinations has varied over time, by country, and by individual migrant group or nationality. These factors are discussed more fully in the relatively small quantity of literature that has looked at Southern European immigration in its global context (Simon, 1987; Werth and Körner, 1991; King and Rybaczuk, 1993; Montanari and Cortese, 1993; Iosifides and King, 1996; King and Konjhodzic, 1996; King et al., 1997). First, there is the ‘diversion effect’: the deflection of migration currents from the major sending countries of the 1960s and early 1970s (Turkey, the Maghreb states, etc.) whose migrants found it easier to enter Southern Europe than to gain access direct to the traditional immigration countries such as France and West Germany which were policing their migration ‘frontiers’, both external and internal, with increasing vigilance. Migrants from North Africa, in particular, were familiar with Southern Europe which they had often transited en route northwards. Hence they turned Southern Europe from a transit route into a ‘waiting room’. Meanwhile Southern European countries, used to being countries of emigration (and return of their own nationals) had not yet developed any mechanisms, policies or legislation for controlling immigration. Secondly, there is geography. South European countries – especially Italy and Greece – have long coastlines, many islands, and mountainous border regions which it is not possible to ‘seal’ without their complete Russell King 9 militarization and creation of an ‘iron curtain’. Hence southern Spain, southern Italy and the Greek islands are open to clandestine arrival by boat, while the mountain frontiers with Slovenia and Albania can be crossed by migrants moving on foot. However, it would be wrong to exaggerate the importance of clandestine entries of this type. Strategic patrolling of the main access points means that, quantitatively, cross- border smuggling is not as important as is often suggested – with the exception of the massive movement of Albanians across the frontier with Greece. Instead, most migrants have entered legally, as tourists or visitors, and then simply stayed on. This reflects on the open nature of the Southern European economies: the third explanatory factor. South European economies are heavily dependent on tourism, trade and shipping, hence facilitating the entry of visitors from all parts of the world. Increasingly harsh visa regimes have slowed this type of ‘free entry’, but it remains important. Once again, geography plays a role with regard to the position of South European countries facing sea routes from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, and with respect to the role of airports like Rome, Madrid, Lisbon and Athens in the global network of air travel from Latin America, Africa and Asia. Fourthly, there is history, and specifically the role of colonialism in conditioning immigrations into Iberia from Latin America and the Portuguese colonies. Ethiopians and Somalians were among the first immigrants to settle in Italy. A somewhat analogous role has been played by the Catholic Church as a ‘connecting agency’ between destination countries like Spain and Italy and Catholic countries of the less developed world which have been sources of female migrants to work in domestic households and the nursing and care services. Fifthly, there has been the remarkable economic transformation of Southern Europe since the 1970s. Put simply, the ‘development divide’ which undoubtedly separated Northern and Southern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (and which led to the creation of the ‘migration frontier’ along the Alps and Pyrenees) has become largely obliterated by the dramatic modernization of Southern Europe over the past 25–30 years. Hence Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta now have ‘European’ or ‘near-European’ levels of income and welfare, which makes it no longer necessary for their populations to emigrate to sustain their livelihood. Instead the development gap and the migration frontier now run east–west through the Mediterranean from Istanbul to the Straits of Gibraltar, passing south of Cyprus, Crete, 10 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration

Sicily and Sardinia. This is Europe’s Rio Grande (Montanari and Cortese, 1993; King, 1998). Sixthly, there has been the specific nature of Southern European economic development, involving an expansion not of industrial employment (which was what generated the demand for labour migration into Northern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s) but of tertiary employment related to tourism and various personal services, including domestic and care work. The highly seasonal nature of Southern Europe’s leading economic sectors (intensive agriculture, fishing, tourism, construction, etc.) has led to a demand for a flexible labour force which escapes the regulated nature of unionized, formal sector employment and is available only when needed by employers. Migrant workers, operating within the informal labour market – a choice often forced on them by their ‘illegality’ in Southern Europe – provide the solution to this demand for numerical flexibility of labour. Seventhly, there is the relationship between external and internal migration, and the way in which immigrants were needed to perform the jobs that a decreasing supply of internal migrants had once performed. During the 1950s and 1960s, as we saw earlier, Southern European countries were characterized by powerful currents of internal migration as the rapidly expanding sectors (industry, construction, urban tertiary development) drew on supplies of surplus rural labour within their own countries. Much of this internal labour migration was long-distance, from Andalusia to Catalonia for instance, or from the Italian Mezzogiorno to Lombardy and Piedmont. The movement involved the transfer of mostly unskilled and poorly educated workers from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity industry and services and was fed by a still buoyant rate of demographic growth which sustained ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ (Lewis, 1958). In the 1970s these conditions changed. Labour refused to be ‘squeezed’: hence the high profits, which resulted from low wages in high-productivity work and which were reinvested for further economic growth, disappeared. In Italy the defining moment of this ‘new equilibrium’ between capital and labour was the Hot Autumn of 1969 when the mostly southern migrant industrial workers in the North went on a general strike for higher wages and better social conditions. Meanwhile rising educational standards meant that workers aspired to more ‘dignified’ jobs than factory or construction worker, or peasant farmer. The birth rate fell and rural outmigration dried up. Thus immigrants were needed to do the jobs that a restructuring industrial, service and rural economy needed and which indigenous labour was now refusing to do.1 Russell King 11

Eighthly, there is demography. The Mediterranean Basin has emerged as one of the sharpest demographic frontiers in the global map of population trends, parallel to the economic trends noted earlier. Whereas in the not-too-distant past most Mediterranean countries had moderate or high fertilities, which made the whole of the basin a demographic reservoir for migration to Northern Europe and overseas, in recent decades there has been a dramatic fertility collapse in the Southern European countries, two of which – Italy and Spain – have the lowest total fertility rates (1.2 children per woman) ever recorded in world population history. Hence the new Southern European demographic model of extra-low, post-transition fertility sets the context for the migration of labour from North Africa and eastern Mediterranean countries where fertility rates are still high (but falling). Finally, a few remarks about numbers of migrants. For the four Southern EU states, Simon (1987) estimated an immigrant population of 2 million. By 1989, the reference point for the German ISOPLAN study, the estimate had risen to 3 million (Werth and Körner, 1991). While much of the immigration from ‘Third World’ countries into Southern Europe took place during the 1980s and tended to stabilize or even to decrease during the 1990s, the exodus from Eastern Europe took place post-1990. Most dramatic has been the scale, and desperation, of emigration from Albania, which some estimates put at 400,000–500,000, mainly to Greece and Italy. This is a large total for a country of only 3.5 million. Polish emigration – to Italy, Spain and Greece – has also been quite large in scale. Hence for the mid-late 1990s we may perhaps estimate the total quantity of immigration at 3.5 million – assuming, that is, the validity of Werth and Körner’s base estimate for 1989. However, several difﬁculties surround any attempt at accuracy of estimation of these immigration trends. These include the poor statistical recording systems of Southern European countries (which are still keener to record their own emigrants and returnees than foreign immigrants), the undocumented status of large numbers of immigrants (the majority of those in Greece, signiﬁcant minorities in the other countries), the diversity of nationalities and migrant types, and the high degree of spatial mobility of migrants, both between and within countries. On the one hand the important clandestine element encourages us to push estimates upwards from 3 or even from 3.5 million. On the other hand the high degree of mobility (including return to home country) suggests that some enumerations might be based on an element of double counting and hence may have exaggerated the total. 12 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration

Towards a model of immigration into Southern Europe In this section I attempt to identify key features of recent immigration into Southern Europe and to develop them into a kind of ‘South European model’ of migration. The model depends partly on the changing nature of global international migration, with new motivations, mechanisms and processes of migration, but mainly it is developed within the context of the specific socio-economic evolution of Southern European countries in recent decades. Thus it focuses above all on the labour market characteristics introduced in the fifth, sixth and seventh points in the previous section. Furthermore, the South European model of immigration can be contrasted with the Fordist labour migration model of the decades of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s when South Europeans themselves became part of the North European industrial ‘reserve army’ (cf. Castles and Kosack, 1973; Piore, 1979; Pugliese, 1993). The first key feature is the multiplicity and heterogeneity of migrant nationalities and types. Especially in Italy and Spain, the ‘new immigrants’ comprise literally dozens of nationalities from all parts of the underdeveloped world and from Eastern Europe. This is in stark contrast to the situation which developed in North European countries in earlier decades when industrial labour migrants were drawn from a more or less homogenous set of Mediterranean Basin countries and where the migrant composition of each destination country was mainly composed of one or very few groups (Portuguese and Algerians in France, Turks and Yugoslavs in West Germany, Italians in Switzerland, Turks and Moroccans in Belgium and the Netherlands). It is true that Portugal and Greece are dominated by single nationalities (Cape Verdeans and Albanians respectively) but in Italy the biggest group, the Moroccans, accounts for less than 10 per cent of the total stock of immigrants, and 14 nationalities must be summed to reach 50 per cent of the total.2 Secondly, the recent migrations into Southern Europe are characterized by marked gender asymmetry. Some flows are overwhelmingly male, others almost exclusively female. Again, this contrasts with the earlier North European experience where the nature of labour demand (industry, construction) favoured male migration (although there were in fact substantial female migrations which tended to be overlooked – see Phizacklea (1983) for the classic study). Insofar as it is possible to generalize about the recent Southern European experience, migrations from Catholic countries such as the Philippines, Cape Verde and the Dominican Republic tend to be mainly female and oriented towards Russell King 13 domestic service employment, whereas those from Moslem countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) tend to be almost entirely male, reflecting the traditional sharply gendered nature of emigration processes in these countries. Thirdly, the regional and social origins of the immigrants have been changing. Whereas the guestworker migrations of the 1960s were mainly from rural areas of the Mediterranean Basin countries, the immigrants arriving in Southern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s came from both rural and urban origins and comprised a significant number of educated persons from the upper and middle classes of their home countries. Given the jobs that the immigrants (are forced to) perform in Southern Europe, this is a fact that is easily overlooked. It would appear that migrants from rural origins are more likely to be ‘target’ migrants (and perhaps married, but leaving their families behind) and more likely to work in the lowest-status jobs (e.g. agricultural harvesting), whereas those from more privileged urban backgrounds tend to treat migration as more of an adventure and perhaps be employed in the service economies of the major South European cities. For this latter group, emigration is only partly about earning money: it is also about ‘escape’ and accumu- lating new experiences in the Western world. This leads into the next characteristic. Fourthly, migration has in recent years become a global ‘industry’ with its own economic logic and market characteristics (Castles and Miller, 1993). Participation in the global migration market has its entry prices depending on the destination and routes chosen and controlled by migration entrepreneurs who may be legitimate travel agents, shady brokers or unscrupulous criminals. These prices, which mean that the costs of migration are borne by the migrants themselves (or their families) and not the employers or destination countries (as in the past), also imply that only the wealthy from the poor countries of the world can afford to participate, or those with the necessary contacts and sponsors. Fifthly, and also related to the last point, there is a high element of ‘illegality’ in contemporary immigration into Southern Europe and into advanced countries in general.3 This clandestine migration derives from the general increase in attempts on the part of the EU to control immigration, and from the discordance between this movement to reduce migration from poor countries and the general global economic strength of push factors (and also pull factors) favouring migration and a redistribution of labour and population. It is the ‘illegalizsation’ of migration which forces up the price of movement and creates the market 14 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration for the migration ‘business’. And it is the globalization of migration (and migration’s contribution to globalization) which draws more and more nations, including those without a previous history of international migration, into the worldwide market for moving people, with Southern Europe as a prime target. Thus far we have characterized the new immigrations into Southern Europe as made up of (i) a kaleidoscope of different nationalities, (ii) highly gender-specific flows from different countries, (iii) an increasing proportion of urban, educated persons, and (iv) high levels of clandestinity and irregularity. We have also seen how Southern European countries have evolved, in migration terms, from a region of transit en route to Northern Europe, first to a ‘waiting room’ pending a further northwards move, and then into a ‘terminus’ or desirable destination in its own right. I now try to mesh these key elements of the migration story into the specific socio-economic evolution of Southern Europe since the 1970s. A first point concerns timing. The first migration flows into Southern Europe in the early 1970s correlated with two specific processes: the need for ‘replacement labour’ to plug gaps left by excessive and uncontrolled emigration during the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. in agricultural harvesting, construction, etc. – as Nikolinakos (1973) documented for Greece); and the wider economic restructuring processes associated with the passage from Fordism to post-Fordism. The transition to post-Fordism raises the general question as to whether Southern Europe was ever ‘Fordist’ in the first place: outside of a few regions such as the industrial North of Italy (especially the Fiat empire) probably it was not, but it could not fail to be affected by the general European (and global) trends towards a more specialized type of production and a change to a more flexible pattern of labour use. To some extent, these elements were already traditionally present in Southern European economies and labour markets, most notably in the well-established informal sector (or ‘submerged economy’), so that for Southern Europe, post-Fordism involved a recovery of its pre- Fordist heritage. It is also true that the economic restructuring of post-industrial Europe, with its emphasis on service industries, leisure activities, personal services, etc. also found in Southern Europe its proto- type, for these activities had always been important in a region which (with a few exceptions such as Northern Italy, Catalonia and the Basque provinces) had never known a large-scale industrial revolution. In other words, we can identify in Southern Europe a specific variant of European capitalism, based on a late (or lacking) industrialization, a heavy reliance on agriculture and tourism, high levels of speculative urban development, Russell King 15 and, above all, a thriving and longestablished informal economy based on small-scale family enterprise (Mingione, 1995). Southern Europe is also characterized by a marked economic duality which expresses itself in various ways including the coexistence of technologically advanced and backward enterprises, the duality of a primary and secondary labour market, and a regional dualism expressed most classically in the contrast between the Italian North and South. Taking for the moment as given the structural push factors for migration operating from the countries of origin (poverty, low incomes, unemployment, rapid population growth) and the new conditions of the global migration market (illegality, costs of migration, etc.), what I wish to stress here are the many opportunities for immigrants created by the specific nature and evolution of the South European economy – an economy marked, as we have just seen, by informality, duality, flexibility, tertiarization and the dynamism of small-scale enterprise. With the increasing educational levels of indigenous young South Europeans and their consequent high aspirations for non-manual, secure, ‘decent’ jobs, there clearly arose a need for labour to fill the roles previously assigned to the more marginal groups of South European society (rural migrants, women, uneducated school-leavers) which were now disappearing from the scene. Family solidarity and support kept young educated South Europeans at home and perhaps at university rather than have them dent family prestige by taking low-status jobs. Moreover, the specific structure of the South European economies consisted of large segments of employment that were highly precarious (seasonal, part-time, characterized by high spatial mobility) such as agriculture, construction, fishing and tourism. Furthermore, in an age of global competitiveness, the technologically backward areas of the South European economy could only survive by reducing labour costs: one way was to hire cheap immigrant workers. Thus, immigrant workers were the logical answer to these many needs. Much more than the labour migrants of Northern Europe in the 1960s, the fact that immigrants funnelling into Southern Europe have high levels of clandestinity and come from countries which are extremely poor (wage differentials between origin and receiving countries of 10 or 20 times are common) makes these migrants open to a large amount of exploitation (and explains their ‘willingness’ to be exploited) in terms of below-minimum wages, lack of social security, vulnerability to abuse, etc. We find immigrants employed in six main segments of the South European labour market: in all cases doing jobs which are precarious, 16 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration low-paid, dependent, marginal and lead to multiple exploitation and social exclusion. Few of these sectors of employment have any parallel with the industrial labour migrations of Northern Europe in earlier decades. First, we find them working in agriculture, especially in those regions devoted to specialized crops demanding a high seasonal input of labour at harvesting time (tomatoes, grapes, oranges, strawberries, salad crops, etc.). This work is arduous, carried out often during the hottest times of the year (and sometimes under plastic), and is highly temporary and hence spatially mobile. Albanians are the main suppliers of this labour in Greece, Moroccans and other Africans (Ghanaians, Gambians, etc.) in Spain and Italy. Almost all are males. Accommodation is usually in barns or disused farm cottages. These workers lead an itinerant, insecure life with minimal interaction with the indigenous population. Secondly, there is construction, also an exclusively male preserve. A variety of nationalities are involved, although with considerable variation from place to place, e.g. Cape Verdeans in Lisbon; Moroccans and Poles in Madrid; Albanians, Egyptians and Poles in Athens. This too is tough outdoor work, insecure and spatially mobile. It ranges from small-scale building and repair work on domestic dwellings to large- scale civil engineering projects such as roads and airports where immigrants are hired by subcontractors to cut labour costs. Again, housing is often makeshift: cabins and caravans next to the construction site if the work is out-of-town. And wages paid are usually below the legal minimum, perhaps half or even a third of what an indigenous worker would get for the job. Thirdly, immigrant workers are becoming ever-more present in the industrial sector, usually in small manufacturing firms and artisan workshops where the work can be ‘hidden’ from official scrutiny. Often this type of work is obtained after a period of more precarious and undesirable work in the country (e.g. in agriculture or street- hawking); often too it may involve an internal migration such as from the South to the North of Italy or from Southern Spain to Catalonia. Where there is a shortage of local labour, as in Northern Italy, immigrant employment in industry may be on a relatively stable basis and with rates of pay which are not below the legal minimum. This type of more secure employment at least creates the pre- conditions for a better social integration – although rarely does this actually happen. Industrial work, too, is mainly undertaken by male immigrants. Russell King 17

Fourthly, the tourism and catering sectors have a high demand for seasonal and temporary labour. Migrants are employed as cleaners, porters, kitchen staff, waiters, etc. Both males and females are involved. Although the work is marginally more secure and long term than agricultural harvesting, it involves seasonal migration to the places which are the main locations of tourism. Like agriculture, construction and some of the industrial employment, work in hotels and restaurants is mainly operated through the informal economy where no official contracts, side benefits or welfare provisions are provided, and dismissal can occur at any time. Fifthly, there are the street-hawkers. Moroccans and Senegalese are the main nationalities involved. Others include Egyptians in Athens, and Chinese and Bangladeshis in Rome. Virtually all are males. Street- sellers represent the most visible face of mass migration from the ‘Third World’ into Southern Europe: standing on street-corners, patrolling the beaches, or wheeling carts around suburban and even country areas. Their numbers have tended to decline since the 1980s, partly as they move on to more secure employment and partly because of greater control by the police who may fine them or confiscate their goods. Although street-hawking can be quite lucrative and embodies an element of self-employment, it is also precarious, often regarded as illegal, and the hawkers are often dependent on ‘bosses’ who supply the goods and control other aspects of their lives. Although street- hawking clearly involves some interaction with local people (and tourists), it nevertheless embodies marginality and social exclusion – sometimes it is regarded as little better than begging. It is also highly mobile, as the hawkers move from town to town and then to tourist resorts for the summer. Recently groups of hawkers have taken to buying old cars to improve their mobility and effectiveness. The sixth main employment sector is domestic service. Quantitatively this is very important as it incorporates the main area of female immigrant employment and also has relatively early origins, dating back to the 1970s, if not before. Filipinas are the leading nationality in this sector, at least in Spain, Italy and Greece. Cape Verdean women are also much involved in domestic work, especially in Portugal and Italy, and there are many other nationalities involved – Latin Americans, Somalians, Ethiopians, Moroccans and recent arrivals from Eastern Europe. Domestic service is an urban occupation, tied to the main concentrations of wealthy families. Recently the fashion to employ a foreign maid has also become common among lower-middle- class households and is tied to the wish – or necessity – of married 18 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration women to enter the labour market and pursue careers. Madrid, Barcelona, Milan, Rome, Naples and Athens are where the major concentrations of domestic workers are found. Most domestics are live- in servants, but an increasing number are organizing their work on a live-out basis, paid hourly or daily: this subgroup also includes some males. Duties extend from cleaning and cooking to childminding and the care of elderly people. While much of this migration has had an element of control and has been legal (employees arriving with work permits), there is also a great deal of clandestinity involved, particularly if women change (or are forced to change) their employer. Although these workers are mainly located in urban areas, their local dispersion in individual households makes it difficult to observe their working conditions or discover the level of their exploitation or mistreatment by employers. They have some level of security and the possibility of creating stable employment, but the hours are often long and the work servile. In addition, there are various other less important areas of employment for immigrants: miscellaneous services (removal firms, assistants to plumbers, painters and decorators, nightwatchmen and security guards, petrol-pump attendants, retail assistants, repairers of domestic appliances or cars, etc.), fishing, crew members on ships, dockworkers and workers in the sex industry. Once again, many of these employment niches are nationality- and gender-specific, e.g. Tunisian fishermen in Sicily, Egyptian fishermen in Crete, Nigerian and Albanian prostitutes in Italy. From the examples given above, we can distil the main characteristics of the South European model of labour immigration. The model is based on a demand for cheap and flexible workers in the secondary and informal labour markets, where low wages are imposed on migrants because of their often illegal or semi-illegal status and the lack of opportunities in their home countries. The workers are highly concentrated in certain segments or niches of the labour market, some of which are monopolized by migrants of one specific nationality and gender. Hence, migrants are responding to the specific needs and opportunities of the Southern European economy and society, based on tertiary activities, some primary activities (agriculture, fishing, quarrying) and a vibrant underground economy. Finally there is the changing socio-demographic contest in which manual labour is increasingly rejected by indigenous workers and growing rates of female employment create a need for various kinds of domestic support. High levels of youth and female unemployment are Russell King 19 merely an indication of the strength of the dual labour market and the non-transferability of indigenous and immigrant workers, while the collapsing birth rate in Southern Europe is beginning to choke off the supply of younger workers and may lead to even more severe labour shortages in the next couple of decades. The creation of a circum- Mediterranean labour market, with migration from relatively poor high-fertility countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey) into countries with rapidly-ageing populations (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece) seems a logical solution to this economic–demographic scenario. This rather simple logic undoubtedly helps to explain the de facto existence of trans-Mediterranean migration. However this is only one dimension of the phenomenon: others include the growing desire to suppress such migration on the part of the receiving countries (or certain political and social forces within those countries), and the intermeshing of migration with a perceived security threat across the Mediterranean Sea. Hence while for ambitious migrants from poor countries Southern Europe is an eldorado where work, riches and a taste of the ‘sweet life’ may be obtained, for European and national policy- makers the objective is to defend the ‘fortress’ against what is exaggeratedly portrayed as a migrant invasion.

An overview of the book

The foregoing account has argued that there is a specific pattern of immigration to Southern Europe. Both the geographical shape of this pattern and its particular combination of migratory types and mechanisms differentiate it from earlier European migrations – the overseas settlement of Europeans in the New World, the mass migration of Mediterranean labour migrants to industrial Europe in the post- war decades, or the immigration of persons from former colonial territories in the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia. There are some points of similarity, it is true: the recent immigration to Portugal, mainly from lusophone countries which were former Portuguese colonies, has obvious parallels with African and Caribbean migration to Britain, France and the Netherlands. But the differences are greater than the similarities. The differences have much to do with the ‘newness’ of the flows into Southern Europe and hence with the fact that they have to be contextualized and conceptualized within the phenomenology of international migration during the last 20 years of the twentieth century. More specifically, as the following chapters will demonstrate, the new immigration flows to Mediterranean Europe 20 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration have to be understood within the globalization, politicization and ‘illegalization’ of migration (Castles and Miller, 1993, pp. 8–11), as well as within the Southern European model of economic and social development that I have referred to above. The rest of the chapters in this book are organized into four parts, although there is considerable diversity within these groups reflecting different disciplinary approaches, themes and geographical coverage. A more or less balanced treatment of the four Southern European countries is aimed at, as well as chapters which are comparative or treat the region as a whole. Part II deals with immigrants and the labour market. Although migration into Southern Europe is often explained by the combination of powerful push pressures from the regions of origin (poverty, unemployment, civil war, ecological crisis, etc.) and by the blocking of access to more ‘desirable’ destinations in Northern Europe and North America, it is also true that immigration into Southern European countries is stimulated by the opportunities for work in these now wealthy and diversified economies. Migration chains and media representations transmit an image of Southern Europe as a set of countries where it is relatively easy to get a job, even without a residence or work permit. The flourishing underground economy has a major role to play here, although there are complex cause and effect relationships (Reyneri, 1998). On the one hand the high level of involvement of migrants (even ‘legal’ ones) in the informal economy is often seen as an indication of an oversupply of migrants. On the other hand the informal economy existed in Southern Europe long before the recent arrival of large numbers of immigrants. Hence immigrants have not created the underground economy in the countries in question, but they have undoubtedly fed off it and contributed to its expansion. Furthermore, immigrant workers have been used in a strategic micro-economic way by individual employers to reduce labour costs and to carry out low-status work tasks which are rejected by the increasingly highly educated and status-conscious indigenous workforce (Iosifides and King, 1996). In the first part of Chapter 2 Mingione and Quassoli provide a wide- ranging theoretical discussion on the nature of the informal economy. They explore its rich diversity in the Italian context and offer a nuanced definition of the shifting boundaries between the formal and the informal sector. The second part of Chapter 2 surveys the phenomenon of migrant participation in the Italian informal economy and draws attention, once again, to the diversity of this participation which Russell King 21 varies according to migrant nationality, economic sector or subsector, and the regional setting in Italy. Different types of ‘structural linkage’ between immigrants and the Italian economy are identified, and the chapter concludes with a plea for more attention to be paid to migrants’ social networks as a way of understanding their migration projects and economic activities. The importance of networking factors is also stressed by Fakiolas in his account of unregulated immigrant labour in the Greek economy (Chapter 3). Despite the fact that Greece is far from being the richest country in Southern Europe it has proportionately the highest share of immigrant workers, who account for around one-tenth of the labour force. Most of them are undocumented and work in the informal economy. Survey research carried out by Fakiolas into the perception of the role of immigrant workers in the Greek economy finds a majority view of its usefulness with many respondents (ministerial representatives, employers, etc.) stressing its vital nature. These survey results are followed by detailed empirical data on costs, benefits and productivity of immigrant labour in Greece. An epilogue to this chapter records the latest results of Greece’s first attempt to regularize undocumented immigrants, carried out during the first half of 1998. In Portugal two regularizations have taken place, in 1992 and 1996, and Baganha in Chapter 4 uses the regularization data to gain insights into the phenomenon of irregular immigration and immigrant employment. Together with other data from employment surveys and her own primary field research, Baganha identifies both a range of migrant types (the transient, the overstayer, the explorer and the entrepreneur) and a number of occupational sectors, the most important of these being construction for males and domestic service for females. However, an important finding to emerge from this chapter is that informal work is not only the province of low-status immigrants from Portugal’s former African colonies, but also is carried out by immigrants from Brazil who enjoy a more professional status. Chapter 5, by Pascuals de Sans et al., comes to a similar conclusion concerning the impact of immigrant workers on the Catalan labour market. Moroccans and West Africans tend to pick up the lowest-status jobs around the fringes of the formal economy, while Europeans and Latin Americans are present in the upper and middle echelons of the occupational structure. The authors of Chapter 5 also point out that, unlike most other parts of Spain and Southern Europe, Catalonia has a long history of in-migration: recent immigrants from abroad 22 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration have replaced inter-war and post-war labour migration flows which originated in the poorer parts of Spain. Chapter 6 adopts a different perspective from the previous four chapters and looks comparatively at the labour market experience of one ‘sending’ group, Poles, in three South European destination countries. Romaniszyn’s chapter is also different in that it employs an anthropological approach rather than the perspective of economic sociology. Using an ‘anthropology of consumption’ approach, which is particularly appropriate for a group of migrants whose emigration is very recent and is set within the context of Poland’s newly liberated economy, Romaniszyn finds that two distinct behavioural patterns exist: ‘immediate consumption’ in the destination country, where Poles rent quite good quality accommodation and spend money on entertainment; and ‘postponed consumption’ where savings are maximized for an eventual consumption or investment project back in Poland. Part III of the volume contains four chapters on gender relations and social exclusion – always, of course, with the migration issue at the core of the analysis, and bearing in mind the ambiguous and indeed chaotic conceptualization of ‘social exclusion’ (Samers, 1998). In Chapter 7 Campani provides one of the first accounts of immigrant women in Southern Europe, focusing on domestic workers and prostitutes in Italy. Although there is a risk of essentializing ‘the maid and the prostitute’ as the only two occupational niches open to migrant women in this region, Campani demonstrates the power of women, even when working as prostitutes, to take some control over their lives and migration/work projects. This must be balanced against the tragic evidence she also presents concerning the trafficking and brutal exploitation of migrant women, especially those from Nigeria and Albania who are often trapped into a vicious cycle of prostitution, indebtedness, deceit and violence from which escape is almost impossible. Multiple exclusion is also the theme of Chapter 8 in which Lazaridis and Psimmenos explore the various dimensions – economic, social, spatial – of Albanians’ marginalized lives in Athens. In this analysis the construction of Albanian migrants’ restricted social space is seen both as a product of global-scale forces and as an expression of local economic reorganization processes of the type outlined by Fakiolas in Chapter 3. Albanians are one of the main groups which are the subject of analysis in Chapter 9. In this chapter Triandafyllidou examines the discourses of social exclusion in Greece and Italy as revealed in interview transcripts between the author and 26 public officials, trade unionists and NGO leaders. Rising xenophobic attitudes are evident as immigrants are Russell King 23 perceived to disrupt the political and cultural order of ‘the nation’; this also leads to a re-definition of national identity which has both shared and different characteristics in the two countries. In Chapter 10 Malheiros offers a more explicitly geographical analysis of how the interaction of urban restructuring processes with new influxes of immigrants leads to the generation of increasingly marginalized and segregated spaces for immigrants in the Lisbon urban region. Within this rapidly expanding metropolitan area, the socio- ethnic division of urban space is sharpened and leads especially to the marginalization of African immigrants. Europeans are also highly segregated and clustered, but this reflects their choice to live in the highest-status districts. Careful mapping from the 1981 and 1991 censuses provides some of the empirical data for this conclusion, together with tabulated segregation and dissimilarity indices. Part IV of the book concerns questions of policy. Of the three chapters in this section, two are national case studies of the evolution of migration policy in Italy and Spain. After sketching out other European policy models, Bonifazi (Chapter 11) takes us through the arduous making of an Italian policy on immigration: a path which has moved from ‘accommodation’ to ‘control’ and from ad hoc measures to a progressively more organic approach (at least in terms of stated aims – the political reality has been somewhat different). Spain, too, has been slow to come to terms with its new status as an immigration country, as Arango shows in Chapter 12. Like Italy, Spain has instituted periodic regularizations since the mid-1980s; on the other hand Spain has moved rather more decisively to satisfy the Schengen criteria, with visa requirements for Maghreb citizens established in 1991 (later extended to some Latin American countries) and border controls reinforced in 1995. Arango concludes that the Spanish government has been fairly successful in achieving a compromise between compliance with EU demands as embodied in the Schengen provisions, and Spanish public opinion which, despite some evidence of xenophobia, tends to reflect its post-Franco ideology of openness towards immigrants. In Chapter 13 Tapinos explores a wider policy arena, the current EU strategy of encouraging trade and development in the Maghreb states as a means of stemming migration pressures from these countries. While the objective of development is a worthy one in itself, Tapinos finds that trade and migration are not in practice substitutable and therefore doubts the likely success of this policy on this criterion. In any case, he maintains, one should not expect mass migration, while 24 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration in the longer term demographic trends in the Maghreb will reduce the need for emigration from this crucial area. The last two chapters of the book – Part V – deal with the wider issues of security and international relations as they are constructed around the ‘fear’ of migration. In Chapter 14 Collinson shows that security is a highly complex and multi-layered concept: security for whom? what kind of security? how should it be defined? The language of security needs to be deconstructed because of the emotiveness of the debate and its use of military terminologies of migrants constituting an ‘invading army’ laying seige to the ‘European fortress’. In Chapter 15 Tsardanidis and Guerra describe how migration has become an increasingly important element of so-called ‘low politics’ and of ‘soft security’, both at the EU and national/bilateral level; and also how it is reflected in the internalization of foreign policy issues – for instance the effect of Greek–Albanian foreign relations on the lives of Albanian migrants living in Greece. The themes covered in the chapters which follow do not exhaust the list of possible topics for analysis. Little is said, for instance, about housing, health, education, language; or about new emerging forms of multiculturalism in Southern Europe. Equally, relatively little attention is paid to the links to the home country, to remittances and development, and to how migration flows might develop in the future. This demonstrates that ‘Southern Europe and its new migrations’ (King and Black, 1997) remain a potentially fertile area for further investigation.

Notes 1. The economics of this substitutive relationship between external and internal migrant labour are explained more fully in King et al., 1997. 2. For a tabulation of the nationality data for immigrants in Italy in 1995 see the next chapter, Table 2.3. 3. I am not happy with the term ‘illegal migration’. It implies a criminalization of migrants who are often the victims (of trafﬁckers, arbitrary changes of regulations, etc.) rather than the perpetrators of crime. More acceptable terms would be ‘irregular migration’ or ‘undocumented migration’. The term ‘clandestine migration’ is also widespread. See the recent discussion in Ghosh (1998, pp. 1–9).

References Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1973) Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (1993) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: Macmillan. Russell King 25

Champion, A. G. (ed.) (1989) Counterurbanization. London: Edward Arnold. Collinson, S. (1996) Shore to Shore: the Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Fielding, A. (1993) ‘Mass migration and economic restructuring’ in King, R. (ed.) Mass Migration in Europe: the Legacy and the Future. London: Belhaven, pp. 5–18. Ghosh, B. (1998) Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Iosiﬁdes, T. and King, R. (1996) ‘Recent immigration to Southern Europe: the socio-economic and labour market contexts’, Journal of Area Studies 9, pp. 70–94. King, R. (1992) Patterns of Italian Migrant Labour: the Historical and Geographical Background. Bristol: University of Bristol, Centre for Mediterranean Studies, Occasional Paper 4. King, R. (1993) ‘European international migration 1945–90: a statistical and geographical overview’ in King, R. (ed.) Mass Migration in Europe: the Legacy and the Future. London: Belhaven, pp. 19–39. King, R. (1996) ‘Migration in a world historical perspective’ in van den Broeck, J. (ed.) The Economics of Labour Migration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 7–75. King, R. (1998) ‘The Mediterranean: Europe’s Rio Grande’ in Anderson, M. and Bort, E. (eds) The Frontiers of Europe. London: Pinter, pp. 109–34. King, R. and Black, R. (eds) (1997) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. King, R., Fielding, A. and Black, R. (1997) ‘The international migration turnaround in Southern Europe’ in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 1–25. King, R. and Konjhodzic, I. (1996) ‘Labour, employment and migration in Southern Europe’ in van Oudenaren, J. (ed.) Employment, Economic Development and Migration in Southern Europe and the Maghreb. Santa Monica: RAND, pp. 7–106. King, R. and Rybaczuk, K. (1993) ‘Southern Europe and the international division of labour: from mass emigration to mass immigration’ in King, R. (ed.) The New Geography of European Migrations. London: Belhaven, pp. 175–206. Lewis, W. A. (1958) ‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’ in Agarwal, A. N. and Singh, S. P. (eds) The Economics of Underdevelopment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 400–49. Montanari, A. and Cortese, A. (1993) ‘South to North migration in a Mediterranean perspective’ in King, R. (ed.) Mass Migration in Europe: the Legacy and the Future. London: Belhaven, pp. 212–33. Mingione, E. (1995) ‘Labour market segmentation and informal work in Southern Europe’, European Urban and Regional Studies 2, pp. 121–43. Nikolinakos, M. (1973) ‘The contradictions of capitalist development in Greece: labour shortages and emigration’, Studi Emigrazione 30, pp. 222–35. Phizacklea, A. (ed.) (1983) One Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Piore, M. J. (1979) Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pugliese, E. (1993) ‘Restructuring of the labour market and the role of Third World migrations in Europe’, Society and Space 11, pp. 513–22. 26 Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration

Reyneri, E. (1998) ‘The role of the underground economy in irregular migration to Italy: cause or effect?’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 313–31. Samers, M. (1998) ‘Immigration, “ethnic minorities” and “social exclusion” in the European Union: a critical perspective’, Geoforum 29, pp. 123–44. Simon, G. (1987) ‘Migration in Southern Europe: an overview’ in The Future of Migration. Paris: OECD, pp. 259–91. SOPEMI (1994) Trends in International Migration. Paris: OECD. Wallerstein, I. (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Werth, M. and Körner, H. (1991) ‘Immigration of citizens from third countries into the southern member states of the EEC’, Social Europe, Supplement 1/91, pp. 1–134. Part II Labour Market 2 The Participation of Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli

Introduction

This chapter analyses from a comparative socio-historical perspective the social production of boundaries between formal and informal economies and how they shape the paths of migrant involvement in the Italian economy. We start with a brief overview of debates on the informal economy and ‘ethnic business’. Then we address specifically the role played by the division between the formal and the informal economy in Italy in the economic insertion of migrants from developing countries during the last two decades. Our aim is to examine and evaluate existing explanatory models to see if – and to what extent – they provide a useful framework for understanding the specificity of the Italian case with regard both to the informal economy and to the insertion of migrants within it. Migrants and ethnic minorities played a fundamental role in the construction of highly regulated industrial economies in the post-war period before allegedly becoming a key factor in the ‘informalization’ of advanced industrial societies. In the light of the literature on vari- eties of capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mingione, 1997), four main models or patterns of relations between the state, the economy, welfare arrangements and the labour market can be identified. The American model was based on a strong dualism between the core industrial sector – characterized by vertically integrated large firms providing private welfare benefits – and a highly differentiated set of ethnic economies. The United Kingdom, Canada and Australia adopted a more interventionist model in that public welfare programmes were used to compensate for both the relative weakness of the large industrial firms and the low economic potential of immigrants and

29 30 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy ethnic minorities. The Scandinavian countries, socially homogeneous and economically peripheral, developed extensive public welfare programmes based on universal citizenship rights. The other European countries chose mixed models that reflected socio-economic situations characterized by higher percentages of jobs in agriculture and of small and family-run rural, trading and industrial firms. During the 1970s all these models were affected by profound socio- economic and demographic transformations (Arrighi, 1996; Mingione, 1997) which, taken together, formed the transition from the different models of welfare capitalism towards those of global capitalism with more complex and heterogeneous labour market and economic systems, increasing transnational flows of financial resources and information, and decreasing control over domestic economies by nation states (Sassen, 1996). De-industrialization and globalization of advanced industrial economies are generally linked to the diffusion of informal arrangements in manufacturing industry. Such arrangements include labour-intensive methods with low levels of technology; high flexibility and a proliferation of unskilled jobs; low entry barriers in terms of skills, capital and organization; and dangerous and dirty work environments (Portes, 1994). According to this hypothesis, the internationalization of the economy leads to a re-organization of economic activities (displacement of productive units, downsizing, outsourcing, expansion of service jobs). This change, together with massive migratory movements towards metropolitan areas in Western countries, is creating a large number of undocumented workers and encouraging the rise of the informal economy (Portes, 1994). The informal economy in Western countries is generally described as a growing phenomenon connected to three structural processes: globalization of the world economy; transformation of urban settings caused by the erosion of the post-Fordist system of industrial organization; and migration from underdeveloped countries. These basic processes are combined into two alternative schemas to explain the rise of the informal economy. First there is the ‘American’ version of post-industrial transformation of the economy. It involves a multiplication of market niches deriving from deregulation of state control over economic life, displacement of production, outsourcing, segmentation of the labour market and budget cuts in welfare provision. Deregulation – giving employers the opportunity of avoiding regulation of labour contracts in order to cope with increasing competition – creates a favourable climate for the growth of networks of small firms able to perform crucial functions for Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 31 larger downsizing firms. The availability of cheap and politically powerless workers in metropolitan areas as well as special entrepreneurial resources – dense and ramified social and/or ethnic networks together with specific forms of social capital (Waldinger, 1986; Waldinger et al., 1990; Light and Karageorgis, 1994) – contribute to the rise of informal economic activities. For many reasons, migrants represent the main economic actors in this growing sector. They are cut off from welfare protection, often without papers, less likely to refuse certain kinds of low-prestige jobs, and supposedly benefit from cultural resources which are not available to indigenous workers, such as enforceable trust and bounded solidarity (Portes, 1994). In this schema, post-industrial transformations are favourable to what has been termed ‘ethnic business’ (Light and Karageorgis, 1994). This argument highlights the fact that migrants can modify their structural disadvantage in labour markets through the informal sector. Migrant economic insertion is not only confined to market niches, to the role of middlemen in depleted areas, or to residual and marginal economic activities, but also includes various forms of subcontracting in technologically advanced sectors (Portes, 1994). This type of migrant insertion in economic activities may represent an organizational ‘recipe’ for competitiveness within advanced industrial societies, though limited only to some economic sectors. Then there is the case of Europe. While the underlying processes invoked to explain the rise of the informal economy are the same, the main consequences in terms of the connection between migrants and the informal sector are assumed to be different. Scholars stress the role played by downsizing in large manufacturing firms in forcing migrants out of manufacturing jobs and into the informal economy. New migrants in particular, but also in some cases old migrants, are assumed to suffer more directly from post-industrial transformations and to be more likely to lose their jobs (Blotevogel and King, 1996). Migrants are found in unskilled and low-paid jobs, have less bargaining power and, if without papers, are in no position to ask for legal protection. Migrants usually have little education, a lower level of linguistic and occupational skills and are subject to discrimination by employers. Consequently, this analysis indicates that migrants are expelled at a faster rate from the labour market than indigenous workers. They are also less competitive in the new post-Fordist labour market, so that their only chance of being employed consists of residual and menial activities in the informal economy. Many recent studies show that migrants can only become self- employed by exploiting a special social capital deriving from the ethnic 32 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy network in which they are embedded. In sum, informal arrangements are interpreted as a ‘defensive strategy’, a last resource enabling migrants to participate in economic activity. The peculiarities of the Italian case cannot be entirely explained by factors deriving from the above two formulations. First, the underground economy is a long-standing characteristic and a structural element of the Italian economy. The informal sector is a much more complex phenomenon than in other countries, involving self-employment but also large numbers of wage workers, particularly in agriculture, construction and services. ‘Irregular’ jobs are done by young people (living with their families and waiting for a more stable job), a large proportion of moonlighters with regular jobs in the formal labour market (to supplement their regular income), females (who adopt a household economic investment strategy), retired people (to supplement their pension income) and a large majority of migrants who are channelled from the very beginning into the informal sector. Our argument is that for all the aforementioned reasons migrant involvement in the informal economy in Italy is not giving rise to a new trend but, on the contrary, represents an element of continuity in the mode of national economic organization. Furthermore, we maintain that in order to understand the patterns of migrant participation in the informal sector, we need to take into account the institutional regulatory framework for migrants in Italy: the legal procedure through which immigrants obtain residence permits. By doing so, we will be able to explain how a traditional and well-established informal sector interacts with the opportunity structure and insertion strategies of both legal and illegal migrants.

Deﬁning the boundaries between formal and informal

The initial debate on the informal economy was centred on the causes and consequences of Third World underdevelopment and characterized by its normative underpinnings. Anthropological, sociological and economic approaches started from different definitions of the informal economy. The International Labour Office and other international agencies took up the concept in the 1970s to indicate a great variety of economic activities characterized by low entry barriers in terms of skill, capital, and organization. The informal economy represented the opposite image of the modern, capitalistic, highly regulated and rationalized mode of production and distribution of goods and services (Feige, 1990; Portes, 1994). In contrast, Hart (1973, 1990) and other Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 33 scholars suggested that the informal economy was made up of a new emergent set of economic relations. In this perspective, the informal economy ceased to be a residual way of organizing economic activities. Rather, it provided a way for individuals and the community to regain some of the power taken away from them by rational and bureaucratic economic organizations. After the unexpected economic boom in some developing countries, international agencies adopted the concept of informal economy as the central mechanism for promoting new economic development. As a result, the traditional association between the informal economy and poverty and economic backwardness was replaced by a prescriptive view on informality as the best economic model for achieving economic growth. The concept of informal economy began to lose this normative aspect when it was introduced into the analysis of Western economies. Scholars highlighted the historical persistence of informal arrangements in developed capitalist economies as well as the expansion of the informal, private sector in the socialist countries. In debates on the informal economy ‘informal’ was defined as being synonymous with lack of governmental control. Thus, ‘informal’ referred to all economically relevant activities that avoid state regulation, fail to observe institutional rules and/or are unprotected by the state (Portes et al., 1989; Feige, 1990). Despite corrections introduced by these scholars, the concept of informal economy still retains the notion that its role is subordinate and residual with respect to regulated markets (Mingione, 1991). Moreover, this understanding of the informal economy permeates the analyses of the role of immigration in the era of post-industrial restructuring. It could be said that, according to these views, the informal economy was ‘invented’ in the underdeveloped world and has been ‘exported’ by migrants to advanced industrial societies as a new socially embedded way of organizing economic life. In order to analyse the informal economy, we must highlight the boundaries between it and the formal economy and how different institutional frameworks interact with economic arrangements. In this chapter we use the following fourfold typology:

1. tax evasion by workers and ﬁrms within declared economic transactions subject to regulation; 2. activities and transactions forbidden in substance by criminal law; 3. permanent working activities, 25 main or secondary occupation, done outside existing legal, regulatory or contractual obligations, with the exception of criminal activities; 34 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

4. unpaid economic activities done for the direct beneﬁt of the household (domestic work, house repairs, subsistence food production, etc.).

We are aware of the potential problems of using this typology. Categories might overlap when applied to a concrete phenomenon. The problem lies in the fact that, depending on the actor considered (employer, employee, the state), any specific economic activity could be classified in more than one way. Take the production of counterfeit goods: the owner of the sweatshop where they are produced infringes the penal code and commits a crime, but those working there are just irregular workers. The question is how to classify this kind of economic activity: is it illegal, unreported or unrecorded? It is, of course, all three. These categories also fail to encompass some analytically relevant structural aspects of economic relationships in the informal economy. Tax evasion – by lawyers or business consultants, for instance – and informal professional activities – such as fake self-employment, very common among research consultants in Italy – are in different categories in this typology (1 and 3) but may have more in common than other activities classified under the same categories. Moreover, they do not make it possible to identify different degrees of exploitation and power relationships in the labour market. For instance, specialized professional services provided on an informal basis should be included in the same category as the employment of workers without papers by a sweatshop owner. Additionally, we can divide our categories further by considering, for instance, the monetary or non-monetary character of economic transactions, or the private/public source of economic provisions (Mingione, 1991, p. 80). A final problem is that the categories of the informal economy commonly used do not necessarily match the official categories on the basis of which data are collected and organized. Decoupled systems of classification generate serious problems with regard to the reliability of empirical indicators (Portes, 1994). In sum, we need to maximize the consistency between three different ways of classifying informal activities: mutually exclusive and analytical categories to identify and classify the set of phenomena; official categories used by bureaucratic organizations to define, identify and classify phenomena; and theoretically relevant categories linking analytical definitions of underground economy with economic and sociological debates. The key question is how to describe the interaction among different actors operating at different levels in the formal and informal sectors, Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 35 trying to identify the structural relationship between the formal and the informal economy and the boundaries between them. The informal economy is strongly linked to regulatory frameworks and their development is contextual with and contingent upon the existing institutional arrangements; hence what is considered part of the underground economy depends on the historical characteristics of the state regulation of economic activities (Mingione, 1997). Likewise, the distinction made between illegal and informal activities depends on each particular regulatory framework. A common example is gambling – a criminal and informal activity in some places, but legal and formal in others. Any attempt to separate criminal and informal activities is highly problematic. For example, hiring workers without papers is illegal from the point of view of the employer but not from that of those hired. How should these kinds of activities be classified and the income generated considered? The employer’s income is illegal in the sense that it derives from an activity subject to legal sanction, but that of the employed is ‘informal’ despite originating in the same economic activity. How do we distinguish between the situation of a migrant without papers and that of a ‘legal foreign resident’ who are both informally hired by the same employer? In the first case the employer infringes civil law, whereas in the second he infringes criminal law. Furthermore, what is considered ‘criminal’ depends on legal enforcement practices. Why include smuggling in the ‘illegal’ economy when every day irregular migrants can be seen selling contraband cigarettes outside the Milan Law Courts?

The Italian case: the underground economy and its different socio-economic structure

The underground economy is a common characteristic of the economies of Southern European countries. During the 1980s Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy recorded big increases in unemployment, ﬂexibility of work and informal economic activities and arrangements (Mingione, 1995). Conﬁning our attention to the most recent decades, we note that the informal arrangements as structural elements of the Italian economy involve, of course, self-employment, but at the same time self- employment is also common among wage workers, particularly in agriculture, construction and services and, above all in southern Italy, also in manufacturing industry. The presence of a large informal sector in Italy is marked by the existence of a different economic structure and territorially differentiated 36 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy labour markets, as well as by the role of the family in developing strategies of adaptation to labour market changes. In the south of the country, the informal economy has been and, despite some fundamental changes, still is associated with:

● high levels of exploitation of the labour force in agriculture and in small-scale handicraft or residual industrial production; ● very limited opportunities for ﬁnding regular jobs; ● the availability of welfare to support family income. (Mingione, 1995)

Females and more recently foreign workers do irregular and low-paid jobs in agriculture in a condition of marked subordination. In the north of Italy, by contrast, family networks and informal arrangements have provided the social and economic resources with which to adapt successfully to post-industrial restructuring. At the same time, the growth of small entrepreneurial activities has been closely connected with post-Fordist transformations of the Italian economy. Entre- preneurs are in some cases the very same workers who lost their jobs in the restructuring of industrial production in the big manufacturing plants during the 1970s and 1980s. There are also many moonlighters with formal job contracts in big firms who nevertheless also work on an irregular basis for small ones. The ‘Third Italy’ – the shorthand term that represents the model of the small and medium-sized firm concentrated in the centre and north-east of the country – has encompassed from its inception all the features generally associated with both the informal economy and ethnic business, namely strong kinship and social networks, small size of firms (in the traditional manufacturing as well as in the high-tech sector), use of undocumented workers and low levels of class conflict between employers and employees. In fact the Third Italy has many elements in common with the ‘First Italy’ – the industrial north-west. The limited welfare provision applied in both social systems encourages the role of the family both as a safety net and an economic actor. Bagnasco (1977) and Paci (1978, 1992) have highlighted the important effect of family strategies on labour supply according to age and gender. They explain why this kind of family organization has constituted a good source of informal labour (moonlighting, part-time and/or temporary informal jobs) for the multitude of micro-firms found in both the First and the Third Italy. The process of decentralization was set in motion by the bigger manufacturing firms in the north as a way of dealing with Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 37 increasing labour conflict, the growing power of the unions and the economic crises during the 1970s. The success of this decentralization strongly relied on trust in labour relations and on the presence of small firms very similar to the typical productive units in the Third Italy. Thus, this social background permitted the economic restructuring of the Fordist mode of production and partially absorbed the shock waves caused by post-industrial transformation. The Italian state has, historically, played a crucial role in segment- ing the labour market and creating a favourable environment for the rise and expansion of the informal sector. Increasing taxation and public debt to finance the Italian welfare system have had a double impact on the productive structure of the north. On one side, taxation has pushed some firms into using undocumented workers in order to cope with increasing labour costs and stronger competition. On the other, public debt has provided a good source of financing for these same firms (Mingione, 1995). Weak repression of tax evasion has consolidated the loop of increasing public spending and increasing taxation. With regard to the ‘American’ and ‘European’ models of the relationship between the informal sector and migratory flows described above, we wish to stress that all the typical post-industrial transformations in Italy have:

● relied upon pre-existing social conditions and informal arrangements; ● taken place before the inﬂow of immigrants from developing countries.

Before examining the empirical evidence on migrant insertion in the Italian economy, let us brieﬂy outline some important aspects of labour relations in the informal sector. The Italian informal economy includes the following categories:

● moonlighters interested in increasing their income through irregular jobs; ● powerless agricultural workers in the south employed in a labour market that presents a high level of exploitation, long working hours and low wages; ● young people looking for their ﬁrst jobs who are interested in temporary and irregular employment (by not being registered they hope to avoid the disadvantage of later entering the formal labour market coming from a ‘bad’ job); 38 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

● the retired (including those affected by ‘voluntary’ early retirement) integrating their incomes without losing part of their pension; ● co-operatives or companies, both in industry and services, that conceal full-time jobs under cover of ﬁctitious self-employment; ● the self-employed or small entrepreneurs who can only survive by avoiding the payment of tax and formal labour contract contributions.

Tax evasion and lack of legal protection and enforcement of contracts for employees are common characteristics of all these informal arrangements. However, the crucial issue is to distinguish between situations where each side draws advantages from informal arrangements and those where workers are exploited and cannot ﬁnd alternatives in the local labour market. Empirical indicators for the Italian economy allow us to point out some clear trends (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). ISTAT, the Central Statistics Institute, estimated that the total quantity of irregular workers (irregular and temporary jobs) remained quite stable until 1991 when there was a notable decrease from over 4 million to less than 3.6 million (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Regular, irregular and temporary jobs in Italy, 1981–95 (all data ’000)

Regular Irregular + temporary

1981 1987 1991 1995 1981 1987 1991 1995

Agriculture 2 986 2 446 2 062 1 641 1 734 1 546 1 387 1 130 self-employed 1 940 1 592 1 272 1 003 898 804 670 557 employed 1 046 854 790 638 836 742 717 573 Manufacturing 5 936 5 203 5 433 4 891 510 533 554 484 self-employed 783 728 743 700 185 184 182 166 employed 5 153 4 475 4 690 4 191 325 349 372 318 Building industry 1 840 1 651 1 723 1 635 664 634 623 622 self-employed 503 509 526 569 146 133 131 148 employed 1 337 1 142 1 197 1 066 518 501 492 474 Marketable services 7 406 8 792 9 470 9 257 1 341 1 423 1 392 1 294 self-employed 3 186 3 819 4 031 3 906 737 774 692 702 employed 4 220 4 972 5 439 5 351 604 648 700 592 Non-marketable services 3 544 3 845 4 028 3 953 63 52 52 40

Total self-employed 6 412 6 648 6 572 6178 1 966 1 895 1 675 1 573

Total employed 15 300 15 288 16 144 15 199 2 346 2 292 2 333 1 997

General total 21 712 21 936 22 716 21 377 4 312 4 187 4 008 3 570

Source: ISTAT, Contabilità Nazionale – Posizioni Lavorative. Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 39

However, the trend is largely inﬂuenced by the agricultural sector where both regular and informal jobs have decreased in number over the last few decades. At the same time, after 1987, informal arrangements have increased in percentage terms relative to both self-employment and regular workers (Table 2.2). The pattern in the other sectors is more stable. If we consider the overall period (1981–95), the building industry, manufacturing and services show only a slight numerical decrease. In percentage terms the total share of irregular jobs (Table 2.2) remained fairly constant between 1981 and 1987 (15 per cent of the total, excluding moonlighters) due to a temporary halt in the de-industrialization process, followed by a slight drop – 14 per cent in 1991 and 13 per cent in 1995. The same trend is visible in other sectors, except for the building industry and agriculture, where informal arrangements, lack of job security, and salaries below the ofﬁcial minimum wage are more deep-rooted. The extent of irregular work in agriculture is striking: in 1995 around 90 per cent of dependent jobs were in the informal sector and about 50 per cent of all irregular jobs involved self-employment. The vast majority of irregular occupations in agriculture are concentrated in the south, where both indigenous and foreign workers are often exploited

Table 2.2 Ratios between regular and informal jobs in Italy, 1981–95 (all data %)

Irregular as Irregular + temporary as proportion of regular proportion of regular

1981 1987 1991 1995 1981 1987 1991 1995

Agriculture 46.7 53.1 59.5 62.8 58.1 63.2 67.3 68.9 self-employed 26.5 32.9 36.5 41.7 46.3 50.5 52.7 55.5 employed 77.5 85.0 89.8 89.3 79.9 86.9 90.8 89.8 Manufacturing 6.0 7.5 8.1 8.3 8.6 10.2 10.2 9.9 self-employed 16.0 17.3 19.0 19.5 23.6 25.3 24.5 23.7 employed 4.6 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.3 7.8 7.9 7.6 Building industry 29.5 31.4 31.3 33.0 36.1 38.4 36.2 38.0 self-employed 24.8 21.5 21.0 20.7 29.0 26.1 24.9 26.0 employed 31.3 36.2 35.9 39.7 38.7 43.9 41.1 44.5 Marketable service 9.7 8.9 8.4 8.2 18.1 16.2 14.7 14.0 self-employed 14.4 12.7 11.5 10.8 23.1 20.3 17.2 18.0 employed 6.2 6.0 6.1 6.3 14.3 13.0 12.9 11.1 Non-marketable services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.0

Total self-employed 18.6 18.0 17.2 17.1 30.7 28.5 25.5 25.5

Total employed 10.8 10.6 10.7 10.3 15.3 15.0 14.5 13.1

General total 13.0 12.7 12.5 12.2 19.9 19.1 17.6 16.7

Source: As Table 2.1. 40 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy through the caporalato system – the illegal hiring of farm labourers for very low wages. Moreover, in the southern regions, regular employment in agriculture is often used as a cover for irregular jobs in services and industry.1

Migrant inﬂows into Italy: socio-economic trajectories

In contrast to other West European countries, but in common with other Southern European countries, Italy has only recently started to attract immigrants from developing countries. In fact, Italy participated in the post-war European economic growth as a country of emigration, ‘exporting’ workers to the industrialized economies of Northern Europe and experiencing a vast internal migratory process from the rural south to the industrial triangle in the north. Unlike other European countries, the Italian post-war economic boom was not supported by waves of labourers from abroad and big manufacturing firms did not absorb large numbers of foreign workers to take on unskilled low-paid jobs. Instead, at least in the 1950s and 1960s, Italy had its own plentiful supply of domestic surplus labour, as we saw in Chapter 1. The subsequent post-Fordist de-industrialization process has not therefore affected in particular a foreign labour force but strengthened the already existing underground economy. It is precisely during this period that Italy has become an immigrant-receiver country. Thus, immigration flows became substantial when Italy was already in the middle of the typical post-industrial transformations of Western economies and societies. This period has also witnessed the erosion of the welfare state and the conditions that allowed the expansion of social rights. The state increasingly appears unable to grant – both financially and organiza- tionally – universal rights and quality services. The state not only has to solve the fiscal problems linked to maintaining welfare programmes, but it also needs to respond to increasing demands for quality and specialized services. The main consequences of these processes can be seen in the reduction of universal programmes and the implementation of mixed systems that combine private and public coverage. The situation is rather similar to that in Northern European countries but, as we show below, ‘being on welfare’ in Italy is not a possibility available to foreign migrants. The social system migrants encounter in Italy shows a significant reduction of some of the main features that granted stability and Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 41 integration in the so-called Fordist societies. Unlike in the past, the migrants of the new wave cannot ‘benefit’ from a developing industrial economy that requires a large amount of cheap unqualified labour. Rather, migrants have to cope with a much more complex society, where before finding a job the key problem is to define one’s own occupational identity within a segmented and fragmented labour market. New migrants cannot count on sizeable and strongly rooted communities and networks of fellow citizens that once acted as a first reference point for marking out work opportunities in the economy. Some of the socialization agencies (trade unions, mass parties and social movements) that were active in the past in other migratory contexts and played a crucial role in industrial society are no longer available to mediate the process of integration. Finally, the new migrants come from countries that had no previous contact with Italy. They generally lack the basic linguistic competence that acts as a strategic resource in a society where control over information is becoming increasingly important (Quassoli and Venzo, 1997). Statistical evidence clearly reveals that in both absolute and percentage terms, migratory inflows into Italy are smaller than those that have taken place in other European countries. In spite of the very visible presence of immigration, boosted by media attention, it must be pointed out that there is a great disparity between the social alarm raised by the ‘explosion’ and ‘invasion’ of migrants and the real extent of the phenomenon, which is that they do not exceed 2 per cent of the population. In fact, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, statistics on the number of migrants and their occupations are only partially available and of a very problematic nature. We do know, however, that from its small-scale origins in the 1970s and early 1980s, the migrant inflow accelerated during the second half of the 1980s, then gradually decreased during the first half of the 1990s. Migrants came mainly from Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana and Sri Lanka during the second half of the 1980s. Most of them regularized their position thanks to the first two amnesties (1986 and 1990). In the early 1990s immigration from most African countries dropped and new arrivals from Eastern European countries, as well as from Peru, the Philippines and the Indian sub-continent, increased at a fast rate (Table 2.3). The migrants in Italy are not distributed evenly over the whole country. Initially concentrated in Rome and the southern regions, in the past few years their presence has been on the increase in the northern regions. Since 1994, at least half of migrants are found in the north, where work opportunities are greater and more diversified, including 42 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

Table 2.3 Main immigrant nationalities holding residence permits in Italy, 31 December 1990 and 31 December 1995 (countries with >10 000 in 1995)

Country of origin 1995 1990 1995 1990 no. no. % % Morocco 94 237 80 495 9.5 10.3 USA 60 607 58 707 6.1 7.5 Former Yugoslavia 51 973 30 121 5.2 3.9 Philippines 43 421 35 373 4.4 4.5 Tunisia 40 454 42 223 4.1 5.4 Germany 39 372 41 698 4.0 5.3 Albania 34 706 2 034 3.5 0.3 UK 27 694 26 927 2.8 3.4 France 27 273 24 674 2.8 3.2 Romania 24 513 7 844 2.5 1.0 Senegal 23 953 25 268 2.4 3.2 Brazil 22 053 14 555 2.2 1.9 Poland 22 022 17 201 2.2 2.2 Egypt 21 874 20 211 2.2 2.6 China 21 507 19 237 2.2 2.5 Sri Lanka 20 275 13 214 2.1 1.7 Croatia 18 944 – 1.9 – Switzerland 18 327 20 066 1.9 2.6 Spain 17 847 14 501 1.8 1.9 Somalia 17 839 9 660 1.8 1.2 Macedonia (FYROM) 15 426 – 1.6 – Greece 14 821 21 149 1.5 2.7 India 14 629 11 412 1.5 1.5 Ghana 12 550 11 655 1.3 1.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 10 224 – 1.0 – CIS 10 197 – 1.0 – Peru 10 025 5 385 1.0 0.7 All countries 991 419 781 138

Source: Caritas di Roma (1997, p. 68).

various jobs in the tertiary sector (restaurants, trade, street-selling, domestic services), employment in small and medium-sized firms in the prosperous regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia- Romagna, and temporary and seasonal work in construction and agriculture. About one-third of registered immigrants are located in central Italy, especially in Rome. In the south, despite annual variations, the number of foreign migrants was almost the same in 1995 as in 1990 (around 165,000); during the same period the number of migrants also remained quite stable in the centre (320,000); while in the north the Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 43 increase was from 300,000 to 508,000. However, since there is a particular concentration of irregularly employed migrants and those without papers in the southern regions, it is likely that here their number is significantly underestimated by official figures. Moreover, since spatial mobility seems to be an important characteristic of immigrants in Italy, the official statistics, based on the location of issue of residence permits, hardly capture this geographical dynamism.

Immigrant insertion in the Italian economy

Economic explanations of migratory flows rely on the presence of both push factors – poverty, economic deprivation, social and cultural disintegration – and pull factors – the demand for cheap unskilled labour. In this chapter, however, we wish to emphasize the interaction of these factors with actors’ strategies (subjective and cultural elements) and, more crucially, with the key role of migrant networks in migration processes. Let us begin by summarizing some common characteristics of migratory inflows into Italy. First, there is a clear ‘gender gap’ among incoming migrants. First- comers are usually males – this is particularly true for those from southern Mediterranean and some West African countries – who are later joined by their families. However, in some instances females migrate first, as in the case of migrants from Central and South America, the Philippines, Eritrea, Cape Verde and Nigeria, and then start networks that subsequently involve male migrants. Exceptionally, some migrant groups are composed from the beginning of both males and females (Caritas di Roma, 1997, pp. 98–102). The specific question of gender in migration to Italy is considered in detail by Giovanna Campani in Chapter 7 of this book. Secondly, migrants come from both urban and rural settings. The latter are generally older and less educated and tend to emigrate according to the ‘traditional’ pattern: a temporary economically motivated stay (Piore, 1983). They maintain strong ties with their country of origin, particularly through their family and fellow nationals, and develop an ‘instrumental’ approach to the job market; namely, they are more ready to accept bad jobs while minimizing any non-survival spending, thereby reproducing a well-known model of first-generation migrants. Migrants from urban settings, in contrast, are on average better educated, younger (though this is truer for some groups than for others, for example Moroccans as opposed to Senegalese), and less embedded in networks linked with the country of 44 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy origin (in this case the extent of remittances can be used as an indicator). In many cases they are much more oriented toward exploratory projects of migration and consider Italy as a transitory step towards other European countries – very typical, for example, among those from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, they are more open to interaction with Italian culture and society. Thirdly, it is worth underlining the dynamic and specifically economic links between migrants and their countries of origin. Many Moroccans, for instance, spend some months each year in their native land where they do temporary jobs or try to start up a business with the money earned in Italy. There is, in fact, a sort of continuous circular in- and out-migration between Italy and Morocco (IReR, 1994). Another typical phenomenon is trabendo, a sort of informal trade between northern and southern Mediterranean cities. This constitutes for some young people from North African countries an important part of their migration trajectory (Colombo, 1995). The last point to be stressed concerns the importance of social networks. Like any other social actor, migrants are embedded in social and communicative networks. These networks are usually described using the concepts of community, clan, family links, solidarity, enforceable trust, ethnic enclave and the like. What we wish to point out here is that the concept of network should have a much broader meaning. Networks can be considered as synonymous with social embeddedness. In particular, we do not go along with the typical assumption that the existence of strong networks – and the role they play in everyday life – is associated with certain ethnic or cultural characteristics of migrant groups. A recent study conducted in Milan (Barbesino and Quassoli, 1997) shows that migrants’ social networks are very extensive and heterogeneous. They are mainly made up of compatriots but in many cases involve migrants from other countries as well as Italians – friends, colleagues, acquaintances and people working in associations and public services. Within these networks different criteria apply to the organization of social relations and the flow of information. The country of provenance is one of the criteria but not always the most relevant. Religion, socio-economic status, age, language, etc. all play a role in defining the boundaries of the networks and the organization and circulation of information. We will come back to this point in our conclusion. As far as the importance of migrants for the Italian economy is concerned, experts tend to agree on two main points. First, immigration has become a structural characteristic of Italian society and of its labour market (Macioti and Pugliese, 1991; ISMU, 1995; Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 45

Palidda and Reyneri, 1995). The issue of immigration can no longer be considered a short-term phenomenon. In spite of legal barriers and bureaucratic difficulties, Italy offers good opportunities for economic integration, largely due to the main characteristics of the informal economy and to its expansion. Secondly, there is relatively little direct competition between foreign and indigenous workers with the exception of one particular area of high exploitation of the labour force – temporary and irregular jobs in agriculture in the south. Migrant workers are rarely substitutes for indigenous workers. More often they tend to occupy jobs that Italians do not want (Frey, 1992; ISMU, 1995, 1996; Palidda and Reyneri, 1995). In Lombardy, for example, the overall picture of immigrant integration in the labour market shows a pattern of insertion in menial jobs in sectors ranging from traditional productive ones – construction, small and medium-sized firms on the periphery of urban areas – to services. In recent years employment conditions for migrants have improved. This is shown by the drop in immigrant unemployment from 21 per cent in 1990 to 15 per cent in 1993 (official statistics base the calculation on the number of immigrants searching for a job who have work permits). The current rate is estimated to be between 10 and 15 per cent.2 The demand for labour in industry and services, both in the formal and in the informal economy, explains in part the shift of immigrants from the south to the north, in particular towards the large conurbations and the Third Italy, the areas where small and medium-sized manufacturing firms are concentrated (Palidda and Reyneri, 1995). The geographical shift to the north also reveals a new trend towards stabilization of immigrant location, though mobility within the country remains high. This means also that an increasing number of immigrants find regular and stable employment in small industries and in some public services. A comparison between the overall conditions of migrants in the south and in the north of Italy reveals different regional trends. In the south, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the conditions for integration into local society were more favourable. Being irregular or clandestine in a less regulated socio-economic context characterized by the marked presence of informal practices and arrangements was perceived as less problematic by migrants: a destiny shared with the local population. Everyday life in the metropolitan areas of the south is described as being warmer and richer in terms of social relations and solidarity; nevertheless, the pattern of relationships between Italians and migrants is not that of a truly multi-ethnic coexistence but of the 46 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy creation of closed and well-integrated migrant communities within the local societies (Perrone, 1991; Scidà and Pollini, 1993). All this, however, does not mean that economic conditions are good for migrants in the south. Labour relations are generally very one- sided, to the detriment of migrants. Every sector is characterized by a high degree of exploitation. Nevertheless, the social context has allowed migrants to reknit the social networks with which, by deciding to leave their countries, they had temporarily broken. The Tunisians who have settled in the Sicilian town of Mazzara del Vallo represent a typical case. The heterogeneity among migrants mentioned above tends to be reproduced in the various local contexts and reflected in the ways in which migrants interact with local societies. Let us consider the case of Moroccans living in Salento (Perrone, 1991). They can be neatly divided into two distinct sub-groups by age, time of migration and rural or urban provenance. On the one hand, there are the migrants of the first wave (from the rural area of Beni Mellal), who have been in Italy for many years and are well integrated in the local economy albeit in a subordinate position. They usually take jobs that no longer attract the local unemployed. Peddling is the most common occupation. They usually extend their range of operations to their homeland, giving rise to a cyclical movement that can be best described as informal trade activities between the Mediterranean shores. In this case, it is very clear that the status of migrants is determined by the formal constraints that limit the circulation of non-EU citizens. On the other hand, we have the younger generation (from the large conurbations of Rabat and Casablanca) who are more educated and less willing to adapt to a subordinate position in the local labour markets. They often end up living on the fringes of urban society between marginalization and deviance. The difficulty or even impossibility of obtaining a residence permit makes the decision to move to the north of Italy in order to benefit from better job opportunities a problematic one. Migrants usually associate the north with more bureaucracy, police control and fewer opportunities in the informal sector. Opinions about the north are however now rapidly changing, as more and more migrants discover that job opportunities in both the formal and informal sectors exist there too. This change has been helped by the increasing presence of social networks that can support the newcomers in their first contact with local society. At the same time, social life is harder in the metropolitan areas of the north and problems of maladjustment and social isolation are more common. The internal migration to the richer areas Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 47 of Italy should not be overestimated. Trajectories are less linear and predictable than in the past. In some cases we find, for instance, a dual process: there are those who first settle in the south working as peddlers, then move north to jobs in small-scale manufacturing and, finally, return to the south to start up trade activities with the money they saved. Looking more closely at immigrant employment, five types of structural linkage between formal and informal jobs can be identified as follows:

1. Migrants employed in small and medium-sized firms in the manufacturing sector (machinery, textiles, clothing, etc.) are more often found in the industrial districts of the north, the north-east and the Third Italy. Almost all immigrants working in the manufacturing sector are employed in small firms mainly because the hiring policies of big firms are oriented toward workers with previous experience. Integra- tion in the industrial sector involves males from North and Central Africa who perform unskilled jobs – either on a regular or an irregular basis – for which indigenous labour supply is limited. Empirical findings show that what is important for explaining the significant presence of migrants is the very nature of the work involved: strenuous and unskilled jobs, dangerous and unhealthy work environments, longer working hours and low wages. These characteristics are partially independent of the size of the firm (except for the largest which, as mentioned above, are not interested in employing foreign workers), the industrial sector, the degree of technological development and the temporary nature of the job (IReR, 1991). What is most relevant in accounting for the marked presence of migrants is their ‘willingness’ to accept bad jobs for longer periods of time – the main difference with regard to indigenous workers – though more complex job-seeking and career-building strategies are now emerging. In contrast to much research that stresses migrants’ readiness to accept temporary jobs as one of the most important requirements of the new labour markets and a condition that explains their greater suitability, in Italy the opposite applies: in some cases, in fact, employers actively seek migrant workers because they are available for long-term unskilled jobs. The building industry frequently employs migrants and can be regarded as a sub-type of the industrial sector considered above. Construction is the third largest sector for employing migrants with regular contracts. Unskilled labour is predominant and jobs are 48 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

often short-term and informal. As the data presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, building firms rely heavily on irregular workers and unrecorded jobs. Although in recent years this sector has suffered major setbacks (the series of trials in the wake of the corruption scandals known as tangentopoli closed down public and in some cases private construction sites), many migrants – mainly without papers and mostly from the Maghreb – worked in it without regular contracts during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Unlike the United States, where the construction industry was studied as a typical case for both informal arrangements and ethnic business (Portes, 1994), in Italy only the former are found and the ownership of firms is in the hands of Italians. 2. Seasonal jobs are typical in agriculture, especially in southern Italy, though they are also widespread in the north – for instance in market gardening and fruit harvesting in the Trentino-Alto Adige and Emilia-Romagna regions. Like the construction sector, agriculture resorted to large-scale employment of migrants during the 1980s. Moreover, agriculture is historically characterized, above all in the south, by the above-mentioned caporalato system in which a large share of irregular jobs are controlled by illegal recruiters who hire farm labourers on a temporary, even daily, basis. In recent years, this system has been extended to migrants, who are controlled by a foreign illegal recruiter. In such a context, migrants are experiencing a higher level of exploitation – lower pay, tougher jobs and longer working hours – than Italian workers. Under these circumstances, migrant and indigenous workers are employed according to the same rationale: no form of protection. The system generates internal competition, sometimes escalating to bitter conflict, between indigenous and migrant workers. 3. Trading is largely characterized by self-employment. In this sector we find various kinds of informal activities. They include street-vending (involving immigrants from Morocco, Senegal, Sri Lanka and China) as well as more ‘normalized’ but specialized forms of retail trade, often benefiting from market niches created by the very existence of immigrant communities. Catering is the special domain of the Chinese and Egyptians. Street-selling is completely irregular and has been immediately associated with the presence of migrants in Italy. It shows high territorial mobility and turnover, requires low entry and exit costs, and can also be done on a temporary basis by migrants who are permanently employed in other sectors. Migrants usually sell counterfeit brand-name Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 49

merchandise or products whose sale is controlled by a state monopoly (audio-cassettes, videotapes and cigarettes). As far as this economic activity is concerned, it is difficult to identify the boundaries between what is informal and what is criminal. Its profitability depends in any case on how severely laws prohibiting this activity are enforced. 4. Service activities encompass domestic services – employing women from Eritrea, Somalia, Latin America and the Philippines and men from India and Sri Lanka – cleaning firms and catering.3 Data on service activities are very difficult to analyse. Boundaries between self- employment and employment, as well as between regular and irregular jobs, are not easy to identify. The typical worker in a cleaning firm is a self-employed associate in a co-operative arrangement. Catering uses an increasing number of irregular temporary foreign workers, though it is also true that a relatively large and increasing proportion of migrants working in the service sector are regularized and have proper work contracts. Finally, data on housekeepers are highly unreliable; they both overemphasize the share of regular housekeepers – people who obtain a residence permit as housekeepers while actually working in the informal sector – and underestimate that of housekeepers employed without regular contracts. For a more detailed examination of the lives and migration trajectories of foreign domestic workers in Italy see Chapter 7. 5. Handicraft activities are found in specific productive sectors (for example, leather goods) and are engaged in by the Chinese both in the areas of the country where informal arrangements are historically present – the well-known Chinese ‘communities’ in Tuscany (Colombo et al., 1995) – and in some metropolitan areas (Milan and Turin). These kinds of activities can be considered as an embryonic form of ethnic entrepreneurship. Migrant self-employment in small workshops and firms has so far introduced no relevant innovations in the social organization of these economic activities. On the contrary, there is exactly the same organization as in the small firms and workshops managed by Italian entrepreneurs: workers without papers, exploitation of nuclear family members and other relatives including children, blanket tax evasion and a high dependency on the purchaser. The only peculiar characteristic of the Chinese workshop is the use of Chinese workers without papers who are deeply in debt to their employer. Employers often advance money to help newcomers make the move to Italy, thereby binding them to years of hard irregular work to pay off the debt. 50 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

Immigration laws and the institutional creation of undocumented migrants

The final step in our analysis concerns the role played by the institutional framework in the social construction of migrant insertion in the underground economy. The official history of foreign migration to Italy began in 1986, the year when the first law regulating foreign labour was passed (for more detail see Chapter 11). Prior to that year, migrants were unable to regularize their position and consequently could only find jobs in the underground economy. From the very beginning they realized that the informal sector provided the only chance of finding a job. Not surprisingly, the legal–institutional framework was the key element in shaping the opportunity structure for migrants. The first immigration law did not significantly alter the conditions for immigrant participation in the labour market in Italy. Migrants could obtain a residence permit in 1986 only if they were able to present a regular labour contract (self-employment was not permissible) or demonstrate the willingness of an employer to hire them. Otherwise they could be regularized as unemployed. In fact the majority of them (some 55 per cent) – employed permanently or temporarily in the underground economy – continued to work as workers without papers and obtained a permit as a job-seeker. This ploy was far more common in the south where there were both fewer opportunities for finding regular jobs and a large informal sector. At this point migrants learnt their second lesson: if you have a job but not a regular contract, you have no right to remain in Italy and no chance to claim ‘membership rights’ (Brubaker, 1989; Soysal, 1994) unless you declare yourself unemployed, a declaration that is often ‘inaccurate’. Many more migrants (235,000 versus 119,000) were subsequently regularized by the second amnesty, in 1990. As with the first amnesty, a large majority of the migrants who were regularized in 1990 obtained a residence permit as unemployed (about 180,000) although they were working in the informal sector. From 1991 to November 1995 (when a third amnesty took place – see Chapter 11), possession of a labour contract as a full-time housekeeper was the only way to enter Italy, except for temporary tourist and student visas. Thousands of new residence permits as housekeepers (about 15,000 a year) were given out during the same period (including an unknown number of fake ones). Housekeeping became the new way to regularize one’s legal status while remaining in work in the informal sector. As a result, the figures for unemployed foreigners and for ‘regular foreign housekeepers’ Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 51 are overestimated in official data from 1986 onwards. Many of the registered housekeepers are working in the informal sector as well as those migrants who were granted residence permits as unemployed in 1986 and 1990. Finally, we have to remember that the permits handed out in 1990 were for two years, so that many migrants were not permitted to renew them on expiry if they were unable to show they had a regular income. Few of them were actually expelled from the country or decided to leave of their own accord. Most of them simply became subjects without papers for the first, second or third time in their lives. To sum up, we can identify three main ways in which the legal framework has shaped the presence of migrants in the underground economy in Italy. First, Italian policy-makers did not worry about the increasing number of undocumented migrants in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s. The lack of political intervention – politicians would not acknowledge that Italy had become an immigration country after being for many years one of emigration – meant that no provision was made for any kind of legal entitlement to migrants already in the country. This state of affairs pushed those who decided to stay into the informal sector. That is not to say that these early migrants to Italy had no alternatives to the informal sector. However, given the characteristics of the local labour market, it was more probable that they would find employment in the informal sector, even if promptly regularized. What we wish to stress is that, from the very beginning, informal arrangements became for the majority of migrants a ‘natural’ way of insertion in the Italian economy. Secondly, there is the very restrictive nature of the legislation concerning residence permits. The requirement of renewal of legal status every two to four years conflicts with the characteristics of the Italian labour market and with the marginal and weak position of migrants within it. A comparison between Italy and other European countries shows how precarious the rights relating to residence for migrants are and how easy it is to lose them (Soysal, 1994). The second and third amnesties highlighted how large was the number of applicants who had previously been given a permit and then had it withdrawn after a short period of time. Thirdly, the combined effect of opportunities for finding jobs in the informal sector, the low level of legal enforcement – testified to by the low number of yearly expulsions – and the provision of basic services (health care, soup kitchens, etc.) by many Catholic and lay associations has allowed migrants without papers to settle in Italian society. 52 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

Let us now consider another side to the problem: the implementation of policies and the administrative procedures through which migrants can regularize their legal position and work situation.4 Policy implementation by the Italian bureaucracy leaves migrants wholly disoriented with regard to their legal status and the implications for access to labour markets and services. Great uncertainty surrounds the sphere of migrants’ citizenship rights and the kinds and amounts of resources that the public administration is supposed to provide them with. They are increasingly persuaded that in Italy there is no way they can understand regulations and their implementation, interact pro- ductively with public bureaucracy or have their rights clearly recognized. Their compatriots, foreign or Italian friends and acquaintances and their everyday contacts with the public administration repeatedly confirm this attitude. Information about bureaucratic matters is scattered, contradictory and difficult to obtain. Public offices and services are viewed as incapable of meeting in concrete terms migrants’ needs. This situation is generating increasing scepticism among migrants regarding the possibility of coping with a bureaucracy that is often incomprehensible even to Italians. Migrants often describe Italy as a country controlled by an irrational and unpredictable bureaucracy with which it is better not to come into contact. During the last amnesty many of them went through a real nightmare in trying to obtain a residence permit. Many who were without papers decided to give up the attempt almost immediately. Many others turned to lawyers, legal consultancy agencies, private associations and public offices for help. But the most important consequence is that, paradoxically, far from representing the first step toward some kind of integration, residence permits are now merely considered a document that is useful for freely crossing the Italian border. Apart from the legal provision for formal exclusion, we wish to highlight that the very functioning of the administrative and bureaucratic apparatuses gives rise to a confusing picture that blurs the distinctions between formal and informal arrangements, thereby creating the most favourable conditions for the reproduction of informal practices. To conclude this section, it can be said that state intervention interacts with the informal sector on at least three levels. First, the state defines a universalistic framework to which any economic transaction is supposed to conform – good examples are the regulations protecting employees, the criteria for access to welfare provision and the norms for paying taxes. This regulatory institutional framework shapes the opportunity structure for the demand side of informal labour. Secondly, Italian Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 53 legislation on migration provides the formal opportunities for, and constraints on, migrant insertion in the economy. As we showed above, in Italy the main way to participate in the economy is to access the underground economy. Thirdly, the administrative sphere in charge of supervising the implementation of the normative framework has to be taken into consideration. Interaction with the bureaucracy affects the extent to which migrants themselves also define the boundaries between formal and informal and work out the costs and benefits of formal and informal arrangements.

Conclusion

We conclude by underlining the relationship between social networks and the economic activity of migrants. The ways in which the relevant aspects touched on in this chapter – the socio-economic characteristics of the different local contexts in Italy, the ways in which informal arrangements have historically conditioned the Italian economy, the typical immigration trajectories and the institutional context – are perceived by migrants and influence their economic strategies are fundamentally shaped by the mediation of migrant social and communication networks. Local labour markets and bureaucratic procedures are never perceived directly by single economic actors who decide to spend time and money in seeking information with which to evaluate available opportunities and devise strategies for participation in the economy. Rather, besides playing a fundamental role in the decision to emigrate, social networks mediate interaction with public institutions and the local labour market in Italy. Many studies highlight the importance of networks for entering host countries, finding job opportunities and channelling the needs of newcomers. As far as Italy is concerned, we can add that compared to the information circulating in social networks, the role played by Italian institutions and private associations in migrant incorporation in the labour market is negligible. Moreover, migrant social networks tend to push newcomers along already mapped trajectories. Although social networks are crucial in finding jobs, they do not in fact necessarily match the distribution of different skills with that of available jobs. By reproducing well-established patterns through a positive and negative selection mechanism, networks can greatly reduce the perceived – and available – opportunities for present and future occupational careers. 54 Immigrants in the Underground Economy in Italy

Networks are mechanisms able both to activate social resources and produce shared representations of reality. In this latter sense, networks play a basic role in socially constructing the boundaries between the formal and the informal economy and in deﬁning the cognitive criteria by which labour market insertion is self-represented in migrant groups. For all these reasons we think that future research should concentrate on analysing the ways in which information on labour markets, job opportunities, and successful and unsuccessful insertion strategies is communicated and reproduced within migrant social networks. We need to penetrate the cognitive dimension of social life in order to understand how formal and informal practices are con- ceptualised and socially produced by economic actors themselves, whether we are looking at indigenous or foreign workers.

Notes 1. Here is a case in which official and analytical categories do not correspond. Most of these ‘informal’ jobs are not strictly informal. ISTAT classifies temporary labour contracts in agriculture – under 100 working days a year – as informal. At the same time, ISTAT makes an estimate of the truly informal jobs, although it is impossible on the basis of available data to distinguish between a job classified as informal but actually formal and a fully informal job. 2. The available data for immigrant employment are incomplete, heterogeneous and unreliable. The way immigrants obtain residence permits gives rise to distortions in official statistics. For example, it could be said that regular housekeeping is greatly overestimated as for many years it represented the only ploy for entering Italy legally. On the other hand, the actual number of housekeeping jobs may also be subject to underestimation since many migrants, as well as many Italians, are appointed as housekeepers on an informal basis. Data on unemployment are similarly problematic because to declare oneself unemployed was, in 1986 and in 1990, the usual way to obtain a residence permit during the first two regularization campaigns. As far as the informal sector is concerned, quantitative information can be obtained from surveys, the inspections carried out by the local agencies of the Ministry of Labour, and official data collected by ISTAT. 3. Some authorities (e.g. ISMU, 1995) define domestic services (housekeeping), street peddling and unskilled jobs in catering as a form of ‘subordinate’ integration of migrants into the economic system. At first sight, each immigrant group has its own particular features within the pattern of integration in the labour market. Nevertheless the types of jobs that migrants choose or accept are contextual and they depend on the local structure of opportunity: a good example is that of the Senegalese who work as street-sellers in the urban area of Milan and as unskilled workers in small and medium-sized firms in the nearby provinces of Brescia and Bergamo. Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli 55

4. The following remarks rely on an ethnographic study recently carried out in Milan on the relationship between migrant groups and public ofﬁces and services (Barbesino and Quassoli, 1997); for a broader context see Corrado Bonifazi’s Chapter 11 in the present book.

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Mingione, E. (1997) Sociologia della vita economica. Rome: La Nuova Italia Scientiﬁca. Paci, E. (1978) La struttura sociale italiana. Bologna: Il Mulino. Paci, E. (1992) Il mutamento della struttura sociale in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Palidda, S. and Reyneri, E. (1995) ‘Immigrazione e mercato del lavoro’ in Chiesi, A. M., Regalia, I. and Regini, M. (eds) Lavoro e relazioni industriali in Europa. Rome: La Nuova Italia Scientiﬁca, pp. 69–90. Perrone, L. (1991) ‘Immigrati nel Salento: costumi stili di vita e adattamento nel mercato del lavoro’, Politiche del Lavoro 12–13, pp. 38–64. Piore, M. (1983) Birds of Passage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portes, A. (1994) ‘The informal economy and its paradoxes’ in Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds) The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton and New York: Princeton University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 426–49. Portes, A., Castells, M. and Benton, L. (eds.) (1989) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Quassoli, F. and Venzo, C. (1997) La formazione linguistica per lavoratori stranieri: dare voce ai diritti e alle risorse. Milan: Franco Angeli. Sassen, S. (1996) Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. Scidà, G. and Pollini, G. (1993) Stranieri in città. Milan: Franco Angeli. Soysal, Y. N. (1994) Limits of Citizenship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Waldinger, R. (1986) Through the Eye of the Needle: Immigrants and Enterprise in New York’s Garment Trade. New York: New York University Press. Waldinger, R., Aldrich, H. and Ward, R. (1990) Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies. Newbury Park: Sage. 3 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy Rossetos Fakiolas

Introduction

Despite the fact that Greece is far from being the most prosperous of the Southern European economies (in fact on many indicators it is the poorest of the four Southern EU countries), it has the highest proportion of immigrant workers – 500,000 according to some estimates, accounting for more than a tenth of the labour force. This chapter takes as its main theme the interaction between these mostly illegal immigrant workers and the Greek economy and labour market. The account is structured in six parts. First, a brief overview is made of Greek external migration trends since 1945. Secondly, I will examine the speciﬁc characteristics of the Greek economy and labour market, paying particular attention to the demand and supply of unskilled labour. Thirdly, the evolution of immigration into Greece is traced through the key role of network factors. Next, the wages and productivity of immigrant workers are described, using a variety of primary and secondary data sources. In the ﬁfth section of the chapter I look at the effects of immigration on the Greek economy, including demographic and employment/unemployment effects. Sixthly, I turn to some policy considerations, which are updated in an epilogue on the very recent regularization process. Most of the analysis presented in this chapter is based on qualitative appraisals. While reference is made to the available surveys on immigrants in Greece (which are limited to certain geographical areas and themes), much of the information I present derives from the results of an examination I have made of 62 reports and letters sent to the Ministry of Labour in 1996–97. These documents were in response to the two draft presidential decrees on the regularization of undocumented

57 58 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy workers in the country, which sought a broad representation of comment. The responses came from 29 prefectures, 9 trade unions, 5 employers’ associations, 3 refugee organizations, 7 human rights groups, plus other ministries, state bodies, legal entities, ﬁrms and individuals. Additional information derives from 30 in-depth interviews taken by the author: 22 with Greeks who were concerned with immigration in their respective capacities as administrators, employers, trade unionists or academics; and 8 with immigrants and representatives of immigrant associations (for further details on this methodology see Fakiolas, 1997b).

An overview of post-war Greek migration trends

Despite limited official statistical information, three main post-war migratory movements from and to Greece can be clearly recognized (Fakiolas, 1994; Fakiolas and King, 1996). First, there was a net emigration of nearly a million Greeks during the period 1945–73. They left for economic, family and political reasons; over half of them went to European countries, especially West Germany (the destination of 450,000), and the rest mainly to the traditional immigration countries of the United States, Canada and Australia. Secondly, there was an important return migration during 1974–85, when almost half of the Greeks in Europe repatriated. Towards the end of this period, however, both emigration from and return migration to Greece reached insignificant levels and net migration moved close to zero. No significant repatriation is expected from the second- and now third-generation post-war migrants in Europe and overseas. Thirdly, and the main focus of this chapter, there has been immigration. The first post-war immigrants, arriving soon after the end of the war, were refugees and asylum-seekers from the then socialist countries in Eastern Europe; in fact, one of the first refugee camps in Europe was established at Lavrion, 60 km south-east of Athens, to host them. Later, other refugees arrived from Third World countries. Unskilled economic migrants started to arrive in the late 1960s, first as seasonal workers from Spain and later on from Egypt and South Asian countries. Agriculture, industry and domestic service were the employment sectors involved: there was a real coincidence of economic demand with what was then considered a temporary ‘guestworker’ supply. Soon, however, legal immigrants from Egypt and South Asia started to look permanent and family reunion was becoming an issue; a few thousands of these early arrivals are still in the country with their families. In the late 1970s immigrants started arriving from other Third Rossetos Fakiolas 59

World countries and from Poland to work in construction, agriculture and various services. Some came with work permits, some entered illegally, but most were ‘overstayers’ who entered as visitors and then found jobs. Up to the late 1980s their number was no more than about 50,000. The situation changed dramatically in the early 1990s, due above all to the rapid influx of immigrants from Albania. Greece quickly became transformed from a traditional emigration country into one of mass immigration from the former socialist countries and the developing world, despite about 1.3 million deportations (mainly of Albanians) since 1991. Meanwhile, since the early 1970s the number of immigrants with work permits has ranged between 24,000 and 34,000, over half of them ethnic Greeks and nationals of other EU countries, plus about 5000 recognized refugees and asylum-seekers who are allowed to find jobs. Now, immigrants comprise between 9 and 11 per cent of the registered Greek labour force of 4.4 million and over 25 per cent of wage and salary earners. Their position raises difficult questions. Should their mainly illegal status mean the denial of all rights? Should the receiving country carry some of the responsibility for their presence and their treatment, or do they stand completely outside any relationship with the state and therefore of any protection? It also needs to be appreciated that an individual migrant’s status may change over time and for many reasons: a work permit may expire or be acquired on the request of a local employer, Greek policy towards the country of origin may change, or the immigrant may acquire the status of an asylum-seeker or refugee. As in other countries, law enforcement in Greece is problematic, although it determines the effectiveness of both the external and internal controls over immigrants and would-be immigrants. Above all, there is the economic context to bear in mind: for example, which central or local Greek authority would be eager to arrest and deport immigrants who are picking fruit for export or are indispensable for keeping in operation marginal firms which also employ Greeks? The final element of this introductory overview of immigration trends is to acknowledge the nature and strength of the push factors operating from the countries of origin. These include the income and employment decline in the former socialist countries following their recent political and economic reforms, the limited progress made in the fields of economic and social development by many Third World countries, and the ethnic, political and religious conflicts in the Near and Middle East states. It is safe to predict that these push pressures for 60 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy emigration will not ease up in the years to come; neither will effective external controls on migration be applied because of the nature of Greece’s land and sea borders and the close political and socio- economic links with neighbouring countries. In addition the diversity of migrants has greatly increased to include a whole range of categories – traditional settlers and exiles, sojourners, invited experts, overstayers, illegal entrants and chain migrants.

Unskilled labour in the Greek economy

The demand for unskilled and low-skill labour in Greece is high for two main reasons. First, a large part of the output of the economy is still produced in small family ﬁrms and households which apply labour-intensive production methods, use low- and middle-level technology and utilize mostly indigenous resources. Employment in such units accounts for nearly half the total employment in the private sector and consists primarily of unskilled labour and middle-level skills acquired outside the formal school system. Secondly, the high incomes earned by capital owners, managers, business personnel and the well- trained people employed in high technology sectors generate a demand for hotel, catering, entertainment, domestic and other services, largely based on unskilled and low-skill labour. Despite the substitution of modern devices for domestic labour and the fact that much domestic work has been moving out of the household to the market (cleaning, nursing, eating, entertainment, etc.), many other factors have kept the demand for domestic work high. A listing of such factors would include the following: rising female participation in the labour force; longer periods spent by females in full-time education; limited number of kindergartens; school days ﬁnishing early, with pupils returning home for lunch and homework; increasing percentage of persons aged 70 and over; continuous enlarge- ment of the housing space; the still rather limited participation of males in housework; and the prestige considerations in many middle- class households to have a foreign domestic maid. Future demand for domestic work will remain high because the participation of Greek women in the labour force is still one of the lowest in Europe.1 Outside of the domestic sector, seasonal jobs are plentiful because employment in agriculture is still high and because seasonal employment in tourism and construction has increased.2 Meanwhile, there is a growing quantity of part-time and non-regular jobs available in maintenance, repair, cleaning and other work in services. Rossetos Fakiolas 61

Despite this persisting and growing demand, the supply of Greek unskilled and low-skill labour has decreased sharply because of rising educational attainments,3 the more generous welfare benefits available to households with above-poverty incomes, the still-strong family ties (providing support for unemployed members), the ownership of real estate and/or financial assets by most households, and the increasing opportunity cost of time spent working. The combined effect of these factors has weakened both the negative income effects of unemployment and underemployment, and also the incentives for work in low- status jobs which are now avoided by the indigenous labour force. Although wages in many low-prestige jobs are above the national average (reflecting the shortage of native labour supply), the life-long income and the derived overall satisfaction are lower. Meanwhile the indigenous supply of seasonal rural labour is inadequate because it comes from traditional sources (family members, farmers’ informal work exchanges, Roma gypsies, etc.) and its further increase is hindered by low internal geographical mobility and the need for job flexibility.4 In a historical perspective, therefore, Greece has passed in less than two decades from a country with a notable natural increase in its population and with abundant surplus labour coming from the land, to one with marked labour shortages. And for this reason (and some other cultural factors) the necessary flexibility in the labour market has not been developed to the extent it has in the more advanced European countries where do-it-yourself practices and part-time, casual and seasonal jobs done by students, housewives and pensioners are more common. Due to the serious demand–supply imbalances, most of the low-status jobs would be undertaken legally by Greek workers only at wages which would price local production out of the market. Therefore labour shortages are largely met by immigrants who are willing to be geographically mobile and to be flexible with regard to working practices and wages. The demand for their labour at wages below those of indigenous workers but well above the incomes the migrants could receive in their home countries is the main pull factor in the immigration. Because of restrictive Greek immigration policies, most immigrants are employed illegally. The large underground economy in the country facilitates their employment and is further expanded by it, as in the rest of Southern Europe (Iosifides and King, 1996). According to various estimates, the underground economy in Greece accounts for over 30 per cent of total economic activity, while between 16 and 20 per cent of the labour employed in the country is unregistered.5 62 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy

Immigrants may constitute the largest fraction of illegal labour in Greece, but they are not the primary cause of the phenomenon. The large underground economy is due to the belief of most Greeks that, due to political party interference and abuses in the spending of public money, taxation and social insurance contributions are too high compared with the quality of public services provided. According to the European Commission (1996, pp. 7–8, 17) excessive non-wage costs have created distortions against low-wage, low-skill groups which must be redressed without trading off increased wage dispersion against increased poverty. Reducing such costs would help to increase employment. High taxes and curtailments in benefits have been imposed in recent years because of slow income growth and external challenges, the latter resulting from the need to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria as early as possible. Greece hopes to join the European Monetary Union and adopt the euro by 2001, and the effort to maintain competitiveness intensifies the pressures for budgetary discipline, bureaucratic rationalization and the containment of non- wage labour costs. These pressures have caused anti-tax movements and social coalitions interested in more flexible industrial relations, providing moral support to the illegal employment of both indigenous and immigrant labour. Evidence for the situation described above comes from the limited amount of published research, such as Iosifides’ (1997) account of immigrants and the informal labour market in Athens, and a regional study of the situation in northern Greece (Lianos et al., 1996). In this latter survey, 40,000 immigrants were found to be employed (18,000 in temporary jobs), making up about 13 per cent of the total labour force and 30 per cent of the wage-earners in the area studied. Of the 62 reports sent to the Ministry of Labour (as mentioned in the introduction), 57 emphasized both the large size and the usefulness of the immigrant labour force, especially for seasonal work in agriculture. Given that, according to the Labour Ministry, less than 2000 immigrants work with permits in agriculture, the bulk of the immigrant labour on the land is illegal. In its long report dated 8 August 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture states that:

labour supply on the land is inadequate, especially during the seasonal peaks of activity, hindering timely harvesting and other jobs. The continuous reduction of the Greek farm labour force as a result of urbanization and the changing job preferences of young people causes wage increases and higher production costs which Rossetos Fakiolas 63

make agricultural output uncompetitive. The employment of immigrants has offered an economic relief to farms by stabilizing in the last three years daily wages at Drs.4000–5000 [US$16–19] plus some fringe beneﬁts and it has also contributed to match the increased seasonal demand with adequate labour supply.

In a similar vein the Association of Greek Fish Farmers in Thessaloniki say in their statement of 22 January 1997:

We employ 2000 persons and our main problem is to find adequate labour. Illegal Albanians offer valuable labour on which our production of competitive export prices depends. Any likely deportation of them would ruin our firms because very few Greeks want to do the hard work in fish farming.

And as a third example the Flower Producers in Trizinia, Peloponnese, one of the most important ﬂower-growing regions in the country, argue in their report of 9 December 1996 that:

Because of inadequate Greek labour supply, many immigrants and especially Indians are employed. The Indians have worked here for many years, are now specialized in these jobs and are indispensable. They have caused no problem whatever to the police or the local community.

However, in ﬁve letters and reports to the Ministry of Labour reservations were expressed about immigrant employment. For example, in their report of 7 February 1997, the Panhellenic Musical Association complains that:

Foreign musicians (excluding soloists) cause unemployment amongst Greek musicians which is now up to 40 per cent. Foreigners are preferred by employers because they accept lower pay and usually undertake additional jobs (as porters, cleaners, etc.), in exchange for board and lodging offered to them.

The other letters expressing reservations about immigrant employment argue their cases mainly on cultural, political and national security grounds; these views are taken up in the section on policy considerations. 64 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy

Network factors in immigration

The main actors in the migrant networks to Greece are foreign agents who undertake to organize the passage to Greece, previously arrived immigrants, relatives and friends, prospective employers, and state officials who intervene to prevent deportations or help immigrants in other ways. Networks link immigrants with their respective countries, lower the costs and risks for subsequent migrants, and assist them with housing, jobs and contacts. They may also increase the perceived benefits of migration and ‘often serve to perpetuate it even when the initial conditions prompting migration no longer exist’ (Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1996, p. 197). Equally, however, networks may relay negative information about employment conditions and local attitudes towards immigrants, and hence adversely affect the willingness of would-be migrants to migrate. The majority of the immigrants in Greece are cross-border migrants from Albania. Proximity helps them to maintain structural connections with families and communities in Albania. Although many of them are Muslims, they are not characterized by any cultural distinctiveness. With so many long-staying immigrants in the country since the early 1990s, family reunions can be considered an important network factor: a large number of invited family members (mainly females) come for employment purposes following already-established males. The same mechanism applies to other immigrants from Eastern European and Third World countries. Newcomers also comprise dependent family members, as the opening of a school in Athens for Polish children indicates. To the extent that labour in the illegal market is demand-determined (and most of it is), it is supplied on economic terms without much distinction between locals and foreigners who, for many types of low- status work, are perfect substitutes (Jahn and Straubhaar, 1999). The main controlling actors in the informal labour market are as follows. First, there are firms, especially small firms, most of which are legal yet which operate partially in unregulated markets. It is relatively easy for them to conceal part of their income because administrative controls are weak in small production firms, such as handicrafts, and practically non-existent in most maintenance and repair services. Small firms work on their own account or subcontract for larger ones which find it difficult to employ local or foreign illegals because of stricter state controls, internal bureaucratic procedures, trade union opposition and prestige considerations. Secondly, individual farmers and urban Rossetos Fakiolas 65 households employ illegal immigrants for productive and domestic work respectively. There is a growing use of domestic workers throughout Europe, but especially in Southern Europe as a substitute for poor social and welfare provisions (see Chapter 7 for more details on this). Finally, a key role is played by agents and organized gangs involved in illegal trafficking of migrants. Some of these agents are criminals who bring in foreign women (and some children) for the sex industry in Greece.6 Alongside the legal immigrants invited by their prospective employer, about one in four of the illegals have a pre-arrival employment opportunity found for them through their network connections. Indeed information about ‘black market’ work opportunities in Greece circulates widely in Albania and Bulgaria. Practically all the immigrants from the former socialist countries whom I interviewed said that, having lost their jobs in the state sector, they worked illegally in their home countries before coming to Greece. Most illegal immigrants are looking for unskilled or semi-skilled jobs for which no official certificates are needed; productivity or performance in these jobs is not affected by lack or poor knowledge of the Greek language (Markova and Sarris, 1997). As noted already, immigrants are increasingly used as replacement workers in jobs that indigenous workers vacate in favour of more lucrative employment. Their economic circumstances on arrival mean that they are initially prepared to take on any job at any wage, but when later on their opportunity cost increases they tend to become more selective. Some quickly learn the rudiments of the Greek language and move on to self-employment and subcontracting activities, often conflicting with their employment agents and former employers, according to information from regional labour inspectors. Iosifides (1997) presents interesting evidence that individuals from middle and higher income groups usually ‘organize’ informal activities for locals and immigrants alike because they dispose of more capital goods and work experience. Newly arrived immigrants are as a rule ‘dependents’ in these activities, although they can move to the status of organizer when they accumulate experience and some financial back-up. In the organized part of the illegal market work is either for firms which are entirely unregistered or with those which are registered but declare only part of their activities; in the individual black market self-employment predominates. The network connections are so strong that chain migration appears to grow fast, while many immigrants have been in Greece several times for seasonal work. Poles and Romanians use the frequent and 66 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy cheap bus services to come in for seasonal work, while an illegal daily migration takes place between the border regions of Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and northern Greece on the other, mainly for agricultural work (Lianos et al., 1996; Markova and Sarris, 1997; King et al., 1998). Every police swoop tends to consolidate both the minority communities’ mutual support and employers’ support for the immigrants.

Wages and productivity of immigrant labour

In northern Greece it was found (by Lianos et al., 1996) that unskilled illegal immigrants are paid by farmers more than both illegal skilled immigrants and legal unskilled Greeks, while observations in other countries indicate that the ‘winners’ from immigration tend to be local skilled workers and owners of capital, and the losers the unskilled native workers (Jahn and Straubhaar, 1999). Whatever the accuracy of these statements, my own observations in various parts of Greece indicate a rather diverse picture with considerable wage differences. Labour shortages push wages up, whereas an abundant supply by needy immigrants results in low wages. The lowest daily take- home pay quoted in the immigrant interviews and in the reports to the Ministry of Labour was Dr.4000–5000 plus Dr.1000–2000 in kind (meals, shelter, etc.) for agricultural work. The usual take-home pay for work in construction is Dr.7000–10,000. Cleaning women in Athens are paid Dr.1000–1500 an hour; demand for this work is high. Monthly salaries paid to live-in domestic helpers for a six-day week are about Dr.120,000, higher if the maid can speak Greek and English, and also helps with entertainment of friends and relatives at evenings and weekends. Wages of around Dr.120,000 per month are also paid to room maids, auxiliary kitchen staff, cleaners, etc. for seasonal work in hotels, and these types of workers can gain extra money from tips. The corresponding registered Greek employees would cost the employers about 50 per cent more, mainly in taxes and social insurance contributions, stricter working hours and health and safety rules, and union restrictions including demarcation practices. Foreign workers generally work longer hours and have fewer days off; often they do extra and more flexible jobs in return for food and accommodation. To quote some more specific cases, four Albanian male immigrants I interviewed in summer 1997 in hotels on three Greek islands said their take-home pay was Dr.170,000–180,000 per month, plus their keep and about Dr.20,000 in tips. This aggregate comes to about 50 per cent above Rossetos Fakiolas 67 the national average take-home wage. The interviewees were 3–5 years in the country, spoke good Greek, worked 10 or more hours per day, avoided socializing outside the hotel (for fear they would be picked up by the police), and did a wide range of jobs as required – waiting, kitchen work, portering, gardening, swimming pool maintenance, basic repair work, etc. Three were kept in employment by the hotel during the winter, guarding the premises, working in maintenance and repairs, at lower rates of pay. In their respective hotels about half of all employees were immigrant workers, mostly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The above information was cross-checked by discussions with hotel managers and local police officers. Summing up, it is obvious that immigrant earnings in pay and kind defy any broad generalization vis-à-vis net rates of pay for indigenous workers, either in the formal or informal economy. What is clear is that immigrants represent a new type of worker who attaches much more importance to earnings than to considerations of job status and prestige, and who is prepared to move and take up any job. Lack of information on immigrant unemployment rates in Greece and in their home countries, and on the amount and value of subsidized services at home, makes it difficult to assess the economic benefits the migrants derive from their emigration to Greece. Income comparisons are further rendered difficult because of currency fluctuations, not least of the drachma.7 In general the wages earned in Greece are about 4–6 times higher than those that might be earned at home in Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, etc.; however, in some respects immigrants are better off in their own countries, with subsidized housing, heating and medical care, a better social life and market gardening on small plots of land. The immigrants from Third World countries come from more heterogeneous backgrounds so it is even more difficult to generalize for them. The productivity of immigrant workers in Greece is also hard to quantify because to gain a full picture factors like language barriers, trust, different work ethics and the risks involved in employing persons with no roots in the local society must be taken into account. Hence the following remarks are based not on rigorous data but on logical inferences, employers’ views and other observations. Immigrant productivity is below that of Greeks in jobs requiring a knowledge of the Greek language and familiarity with the work and social environment (for instance, in domestic service and in work based on verbal communication with colleagues and customers), unless, of course, the individual immigrant has learnt Greek and adapted to the 68 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy new social and cultural setting. Employers declare that not infrequently migrant productivity is equal to or even higher than Greek levels in trades for which migrants have relevant training and experience, either in their own countries or acquired in Greece. For example, many Albanians bring with them a familiarity with agriculture and animal husbandry, and farming work is on offer in most parts of the Greek countryside. Immigrants can also be very efficient if they undertake jobs below their qualifications and the overall conditions of their employment are well thought out. Virtually all immigrants from the former socialist countries have at least nine years of formal education, a majority have attended professional or technical schools and a significant minority are junior college or university graduates. From the perspective of the countries of origin, this emigration constitutes a major brain drain; from the point of view of the migrants themselves the brain drain becomes a ‘brain waste’ because frequently they have to ignore their qualifications since their only option is to accept unskilled work which, nevertheless, for them is still lucrative (Rhode, 1993). On the side of the employers, the point is often made that, compared to Greek workers, many immigrants often have better work attitudes, are more systematic, and willingly work for longer hours and shift from one job to another for fear of losing their jobs.

The effects of immigration on Greece

Migration and economic growth The relatively limited research on the impact of migration on economic growth has indicated an ‘unsettled relationship’ between the two (Appleyard, 1992), and Greece is a typical example of this. The ‘great emigration’ of 1945–73 had significant measurable and intangible costs: the emigration of so many risk-taking young Greeks and the considerable number of second-generation persons who feel they are strangers both in their host and in their ‘own’ countries. This emigration was, however, associated with a high rate of annual economic growth, exceeding 6 per cent on average. It is reasonable to assume that one of the contributing factors to this rapid income growth was the large quantity of remittances, registered at US$1 billion annually during the 1960s.8 A gradual transition occurred in Greece from high unemployment to full employment and considerable economic restructuring took place. During 1974–79 average annual growth rates were still reasonably high, at about 3.5 per cent, and unemployment Rossetos Fakiolas 69 remained at a low level despite a net annual repatriation of about 15,000 persons and widespread stagnation in most other European countries. A further decline in growth rates to 1.1 per cent in the 1980s was accompanied by a rise in unemployment. In the 1990s, however, immigration increased sharply without any significant rise in unemployment, while the official growth rate of the economy edged up to exceed 1.4 per cent. Those who oppose immigration emphasize its apparent and likely costs. Their arguments run as follows. If foreign labour substitutes for indigenous labour (which does not in fact appear to be the case in Greece to any significant degree), there may be negative effects on income and welfare of the native population. Further negative effects may come about at a later stage if immigrants are granted (because many firms and production sectors now depend on their labour) basic human rights such as the right to bring in their families, in which case they would tax the social infrastructure at the expense of the indigenous population. Finally, immigrants may cause a financial drain if they remit home foreign exchange which is important for Greece, especially given the country’s chronic deficit on its current external account. For Albanians alone this remittance transfer out of Greece is put at US$400 million per year. Taken as a whole, the above alleged costs can be contextualized within the argument that the short-term interests of Greek employers seeking cheap labour are not so easily accommodated by the long-term interests of the state welfare system (Freeman, 1986). Less tangible (and also somewhat questionable) costs of immigration include a possible slowdown in the socio-economic adjustments which would promote economic development and structural reform in the long term. These effects are questionable because, in the early post-war decades in the traditional immigration countries of Europe, immigration appeared to have positive economic effects – but of course migrant workers were used in a rather different way in this Fordist era of economic growth, as Fielding (1993) has pointed out. Perhaps the most serious potential negative factor is the possibility that immigration may retard social and institutional changes favouring increased labour force participation and greater labour mobility and flexibility on the part of indigenous workers. On the whole, native unskilled labour is theoretically not in short supply. Even during peaks of demand, possibilities exist for factoring in more women, students, unemployed and casual workers. For example, many Greeks who have studied abroad are very proud of their ‘employment record’ in unskilled jobs to 70 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy

finance their studies, whereas students at home are reluctant to have similar experiences (Fakiolas, 1997a). The percentage of males ‘in education and at work’ in the 20–24 years age cohort was only 2 per cent in 1994, lower than all other European countries except Italy.9 Immigration may also slow down changes in the modernization of agriculture, and it may hamper efforts to lengthen the tourist season. At a more general level, it may weaken policies to curb the underground economy and to facilitate economic restructuring based on administrative reform and changes in social attitudes. On the other hand, there are many indications of a positive effect of immigration on Greek economic growth. Despite the hardships and risks involved,10 illegal immigrants keep coming and the vast majority succeed in finding work, albeit mostly casual, seasonal and unskilled. Although unemployment amongst immigrants may be quite high, this mainly reflects the casual nature of the work they do; certainly their employment and earnings prospects are better in Greece than in their home countries. On the same reasoning one could argue that corresponding benefits accrue to the Greeks who reveal their preferences by employing immigrants instead of using the alternatives available – to employ local labour, substitute capital and technology for labour, produce less, or employ foreign workers in their home countries by investing there. It is also clear that the immigrants in Greece make limited use of the inadequate social infrastructure, impinge minimally on schools, medical services and public housing, consume mainly goods which are produced domestically, and allow parts of the Greek labour force to move up the occupational ladder. Hence deporting a large part of the immigrants would have a major damaging impact on output because of reverse multiplier effects.

Adjustment of supply to the demand for labour An important effect of both foreign and local illegal labour has been to reduce rigidities, introduce more flexibility, broaden the artificially narrow wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour maintained by trade union and welfare policies since the 1970s, and help the necessary socio-economic adjustments in order for Greece to be able to join EMU. Back in 1989 the OECD’s SOPEMI Report emphasized that ‘we must not underestimate the fact that illegal migration to a large extent meets the need for flexibility imposed by the adjustment of employment systems to changing economic conditions’ (SOPEMI, 1989, pp. 86–7). Similarly Galbraith (1996) argues that as an economy develops it is based more and more on immigrant labour; without this Rossetos Fakiolas 71 labour serious economic distortions would take place. Illegality is not a prerequisite for labour mobility, however. In the early post-war period West European countries attained labour mobility through legal labour migration. The earlier fears on the part of the more highly developed EU countries that free movement of Greek labour would cause a mass northward migration of Greeks, and Greek worries that the country would be flooded by highly qualified persons from the north, have not been realized. Neither have the dire predictions in the press come true about the ‘invasion’ of Western Europe following the radical reforms in the socialist countries in 1989–90, in part because of tight border controls, in part because the predictions themselves were highly inflamma- tory (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994, p. 7). For Greece and Albania, however, the ‘mass migration scenario’ has come about. Greece’s labour market has absorbed a large number of wage-flexible and geographically mobile illegal immigrants, from Albania and elsewhere, and now appears to be moving towards a rather curious and paradoxical equilibrium in which high unemployment amongst the Greek work force (443,000 in 1997) rather closely matches the scale of the immigrant labour force. Nevertheless, according to repeated official pronouncements, reiterated in the tough ‘Aliens Law’ of 1991, ‘Greece is not an immigration country’.

Demographic and employment effects The demographic effect of immigration is now taken into account, partly at least, in ofﬁcial statistics and estimates of population. These show an increase in total population from 10.2 million in the census year of 1991 to 10.7 million in 1997 (Ministry of National Economy, 1997). This increase is not accounted for either by the low rate of natural increase (about 0.1 per cent per year) or by the settlement in the country of around 150,000 ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union and southern Albania. Given that the vast majority of the immigrants are of working age and without their families, they have minimal impact on other key demographic parameters such as the birth rate or the ageing of the population. The birth rate continues to fall, from 24.5 per thousand per year in 1940 to 9.9 per thousand in 1994, while the 65+ age group rose from 9 per cent of the total population in 1961 to 15 per cent in 1991 (National Statistical Service of Greece, 1996). Provisional data also appear to acknowledge the effect of immigration on the labour force by showing a substantial (approximately 72 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy

10 per cent) increase from 3.93 million in 1991 to 4.39 million in 1997 (Ministry of National Economy, 1997). Employment and unemployment are shown to have increased proportionately over the same period, the former from 3.63 million to 3.94 million and the latter from 301,900 to 443,000. No further information is available to make more detailed inferences, except that an Athens Labour Centre survey carried out in Spring 1997 showed that, while 65 per cent of illegal immigrants work more than 10 hours per day, 26 per cent are unemployed or employed in casual jobs. Empirical research in northern Greece by Lianos et al. (1996) indicated a limited substitution of foreign for indigenous labour (of the order of 5.8 per cent for illegal workers and 0.5 per cent for legal workers) and a net contribution to aggregate production. My own analysis of the comments and reports submitted to the Ministry of Labour would indicate a lower percentage of substitution for the illegals and perhaps a stronger positive income effect than suggested by Lianos et al. Future employment effects will be conditioned by the delicate relationship between immigration and economic restructuring. If immigration lessens the pressure for restructuring, unemployment in the future will increase; but if economic policy makes good use of the positive income effect of immigrant employment for proper restructuring, then more employment opportunities are likely to be created.

Policy considerations

Greece’s self-perception as a country of emigration has left it unprepared for its new role as a country of immigration. Indeed, Greece has operated the same restrictive policy on immigration for over 60 years, during which time it has been governed by a wide spectrum of political ideology (Fakiolas and King, 1996, p. 186; Lazaridis, 1996). There are hardly any foreigners employed in the public sector; in the tertiary education branch, which is a state monopoly, foreign teachers are a rarity even in the foreign language departments; and the very strict Aliens Law (Law no. 1975 of 1991) is applied in a restrictive way in naturalizing foreigners with many years residence and in granting residence permits, even to nationals of other EU countries. Although political and defence considerations continue to weigh heavily on government decisions, policy-makers realize that Greece is now the only Mediterranean EU country with no amnesty experience (but see the epilogue to this chapter). They are eager to reduce the moral and Rossetos Fakiolas 73 political cost of the non-policy of ‘tolerating’ a large number of illegal immigrant workers who apparently benefit large sections of Greek society – producers, employers, households and consumers. To this effect two bilateral agreements for seasonal workers were signed in 1996–97 with Albania and Bulgaria, but have not yet been implemented. The two draft presidential decrees for the regularization of illegal immigrants have been welcomed by the immigrants’ associations and by most sections of the Greek population. There remain, however, several controversial points under discussion, concerning mainly the time the first residence and work cards will be valid, the conditions for their renewal, the rights for inviting family members, and the position of the legal immigrants in the country. Unlike the Ministries of Agriculture and Labour, which are favourable to the scheme, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Public Order fear that residence and work permits for a large number of foreigners implies the granting of additional rights such as social insurance benefits, family reunion, educational facilities and places of prayer which are also an obligation stipulated by the Council of Europe. These reservations reflect fears about the difficult ‘integration’ of other ethnic groups, especially those who are Muslims, into the ‘traditional’ Greek society. Immigrants would turn from workers and objects of policy into political actors who would have an impact on the structure and dynamics of political institutions and would challenge the long- accepted model of national identity in Greece. Of course, these same fears are expressed by the other Southern European countries in which the majority of the immigrants are now documented (Baldwin- Edwards, 1997). The analysis of this chapter has indicated that both the push factors to emigrate and the pull and network factors which attract migrants to Greece are strong, making it difficult for demand-determined labour migration to be reduced. Increasing the barriers and costs of migration and imposing effective sanctions on illegal employment of foreigners will theoretically reduce illegal immigration, but law enforcement in establishing stringent external and internal migration controls would be costly in both financial and political terms. Meantime any progress towards regularization will tax the administrative efficiency of the country and would ultimately require much more care in handling issues of racism and xenophobia and in formulating good social policies for immigrants. Greece has no alternative but to enter the club of de facto immigrant countries. The questions are whether or not economic and social policy is ready to accept the present reality of large-scale immigration; how much 74 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy the country is equipped with current information and the financial means for making and implementing the right policy decisions; and to what extent it is prepared to reduce the number of illegal immigrants whose positive contribution to both direct production and household work is widely appreciated.

Epilogue

Coming into force on 1 January 1998, the two presidential decrees for the regularization of undocumented immigrants have fixed a five-month registration period. The documents required, to be submitted to any local office of the state employment agency, include the application on the prescribed form, four photographs and a ‘responsible declaration’ of the accuracy of the information provided (name, age, martial status, nationality, address, profession, education, time spent in Greece, previous employment record and, if currently employed, name and address of employer). Additional documents for a full registration include a passport (or identity card or other appropriate document authenticated by the Greek consulate of the country of origin), a health certificate from a state hospital or the Greek Social Insurance Foundation, a criminal record certificate from the Ministry of Justice stating any convictions, a certificate of ‘non- undesirability status’ from the Ministry of Public Order, an employment record or social security stamp book, and documentation showing the time spent in Greece. Eligible for registration are those who had arrived in Greece before 28 November 1997. The initial certificate acquired through the application allows legal stay in Greece until 31 May 1998; upon submission of the additional documents, the applicant is issued with a ‘card of provisional duration’ valid until 31 December 1998. Unregistered immigrants will be arrested and deported, while those with a contagious disease or who have been convicted by a Greek court (excluding convictions for illegal entry and employment before 1 January 1998) do not qualify for legalisation. Heavy sanctions are provided for employers who fail to declare immigrants they employ, registered or not. Social insurance contributions and taxes are due from the time the application for regularization is submitted. The registered immigrants are given two more months, June and July, to submit additional documents about their employment for the ‘green card’ or work permit. A ‘type A’ card will be for 1–3 years, the length determined by the duration of employment, the kind Rossetos Fakiolas 75 of work done, the labour market situation, the general interest of the national economy and the duration of the applicant’s stay in Greece. The card is renewable for two-year intervals, provided that the immigrant has achieved at least half the average earnings of an unskilled worker during the intervening period. For the ‘type B’ card, valid for five years, proven residence in Greece for at least five years and evidence that the applicant is financially self-supporting are necessary. Holders of this card can ask for permission to invite dependent family members into the country. Irrespective of its duration, the green card will guarantee social security equality with Greek workers, and parity of pay and employment conditions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labour is working on a bill for a more flexible naturalization policy. Up to the beginning of May 1998 about 300,000 immigrants had applied for registration, and another 75,000 are expected to by the end of the registration period. No information is available on the proportion who have submitted all the required documentation. According to the experience of regularizations in other Southern European countries, a proportion of applications will not be granted because of faulty documentation. Furthermore, in the Greek case, the criterion about ‘the general interest of the national economy’ set by the second presidential decree can be used to reject applications. It seems, therefore, that a considerable number of undocumented migrants will not be regularized and that, although reduced in scale, the problem of immigrant illegality will remain. The first months of 1998 have seen a wave of anti-immigrant protests, including some violence, caused mainly by an upsurge in crime, for which there is evidence that immigrants bear a substantial share of the responsibility. Increased criminality amongst immigrants is attributable to three main factors: a general increase of criminality in the country, reduced policing during the regularization period (with few exceptions, arrests and deportations have ceased), and the social unrest in Albania in 1997 which saw the escape of thousands of prisoners and the smuggling into Greece of a large quantity of weapons. For the first time in Greece, immigrants are involved in armed robberies and even the exchange of machine-gun fire with police. For their part, the immigrants have reacted against the wave of anti-foreigner sentiment and violence by holding two massive demon- strations in Athens, one on 14 April 1998 (the ‘Good Wednesday’ of the Greek Orthodox Easter), and the other on 1 May. Both were supported by local anti-racist groups and involved clashes with 76 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy members of the extreme-right ‘Golden Dawn’ party. The registration of migrants has undoubtedly opened up a new era in the country, with eventual outcomes which are as yet unclear.

Notes 1. According to the Greek Statistical Yearbook 1996 (National Statistical Service of Greece, 1997), females make up 38 per cent of the labour force, and have an activity (labour force participation) rate of 34 per cent. 2. Agriculture still employs about 20 per cent of the labour force, four times the EU average. About 90 per cent of the 11 million tourists visit the country during May–October and 40 per cent during July–August. Construction, which accounts for 8 per cent of total employment, also has its activity peak during the dry summer months. Figures from Statistical Yearbook 1996 and the Greek National Tourism Organization, 1997. 3. The expansion of the educational system has delayed entry to the labour market for all 12–15 year-olds and for 80 per cent of 16–18 year-olds, reducing accordingly the supply of unskilled and apprentice labour. Between 1984 and 1994 the percentage of the 15–19 age cohort ‘at work only’ decreased from 23.2 to 13.3 for males and from 13.6 to 7.3 for females. The percentage of 20–24 year-olds ‘at work only’ decreased from 60.4 in 1984 to 53.1 in 1994 (males), while the female figure stayed constant at 32.7 per cent due to increased participation in the labour force; however the percentage of 20–24 year-old females ‘in education only’ rose from 11.5 to 27.3. Data from OECD (1996, Table 5). 4. Traditional sources of seasonal labour include 396,000 unpaid family members and around 100,000 Roma who move around the country during the year (the total number of Roma in Greece is put at 300,000). An unknown, but considerable number of first- and second-generation rural- urban migrants work on family or relatives’ land during vacations and long weekends; since the 1950s over half the agricultural population has urbanized. The above figures are from Statistical Yearbooks, 1995 and 1996. Rigidities in the labour and housing markets are largely responsible for low labour mobility. For instance, most of the 700,000 persons employed in the broader public sector (one-third of all wage and salary earners) have relatively well-paid, secure and prestigious jobs, while state regulations, trade unions and social sanctions restrict dismissals and redundancies in the private sector. Rigidity in the housing market is due to the high proportion of owner-occupied houses (about 80 per cent, the highest in the EU), the limited number of dwellings to rent outside the main urban centres, and the high property transfer taxes (11 per cent of sale price, 4–5 times higher than in most other EU countries). 5. Eurostat (1995) puts the size of the informal sector in Greece at approximately 45 per cent of GDP, as against 15 per cent in Spain and Portugal. 6. According to information supplied by the immigrants I interviewed, ‘employment agencies’ charge immigrants heavy down-payments before they start off on their migration project. In some extreme cases, related mainly to the sex trade, bondage labour takes place. Women ostensibly brought in for the entertainment industry slip quickly into prostitution. Rossetos Fakiolas 77

Often their passports are withheld by their agents/pimps. The ‘services’ provided by agents to the immigrants may include a stable address in Greece for their mail, and rudimentary accommodation – often old, cramped flats with many people sharing, or even spaces in offices only for use at night. 7. Between 1993 and early 1997 the drachma–dollar parity held constant at about 240 drachmas to the dollar. By October 1997 it had slipped to 280 and a devaluation in March 1998 brought it to 320 to the dollar. 8. The annual value of remittances rose to $1.7 billion in 1998 and to $2.98 billion in 1995, when commodity exports were worth $5.8 billion. Figures from the Statistical Yearbook 1996 and 1997. 9. Corresponding figures are 26.5 per cent in Denmark, 23.4 in Holland, 14.5 in Germany and 12.1 in the UK. For Southern EU countries the figures are 6.6 in Portugal, 3.0 in Spain and 1.3 in Italy (OECD, 1996, Table 5). 10. Illegal entry to Greece is both costly and dangerous. Traffickers charge up to US$4000 per migrant, and it is estimated that more than 20 migrants lose their lives each year, drowned in the sea, lakes or rivers, or blown up by land mines in border areas. Being illegal and uninsured, they face abuse and blackmail, and tragic situations in the case of illness or accident.

References Appleyard, R. T. (1992) ‘International migration and development: an unre- solved relationship’, International Migration 30, pp. 251–66. Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1997) ‘The emerging European immigration regime: some reﬂections on implications for Southern Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies 35, pp. 497–519. Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Schain, M. A. (1994) ‘The politics of immigration: an introduction’ in Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Schain, M. A (eds) The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass, pp. 1–16. European Commission (1996) Employment in Europe 1996. Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs. Eurostat (1995) Population and Social Conditions. Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities. Fakiolas, R. (1994) ‘Migration to and from Greece during the last four decades’ in Alogoskouﬁs, A. (ed.) Essays in Honour of Constantine G. Drakatos. Athens: Papazissis Publishers, pp. 571–91. Fakiolas, R. (1997a) ‘The Greek dilemma in tertiary education: free market policies for study abroad and state monopoly at home’, Les Cahiers du SOLIS, Notes et Travaux Sociologiques 2–3, pp. 125–43. Fakiolas, R. (1997b) Recent Efforts to Regularise Undocumented Immigrants in Greece. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Working Paper 97/40/EN. Fakiolas, R. and King, R. (1996) ‘Emigration, return, immigration: a review and evaluation of Greece’s post-war experience of international migration’, International Journal of Population Geography 2, pp. 171–90. Fielding, A. J. (1993) ‘Mass migration and economic restructuring’ in King, R. (ed.) Mass Migrations in Europe: the Legacy and the Future. London: Belhaven Press, pp. 7–18. 78 Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy

Freeman, G. (1986) ‘Migration and the political economy of the welfare state’, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 526, pp. 51–63. Galbraith, J. K. (1996) The Good Society. Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin. Hamilton, N. and Chinchilla, N. S. (1996) ‘Global economic restructuring and international migration: some observations based on the Mexican and Central American experience’, International Migration 34, pp. 195–231. Iosifides, T. (1997) ‘Immigrants in the Athens labour market: a comparative survey of Albanians, Egyptians and Filipinos’ in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 26–50. Iosifides, T. and King, R. (1996) ‘Recent immigration to Southern Europe: the socio-economic and labour market contexts’, Journal of Area Studies 9, pp. 70–94. Jahn, A. E. and Straubhaar, T. (1999) ‘A survey of the economics of illegal migration’, South European Society and Politics 3, in press. King, R., Iosifides, T. and Myrivili, L. (1998) ‘A migrant’s story: from Albania to Athens’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 159–73. Lazaridis, G. (1996) ‘Immigration to Greece: a critical evaluation of Greek policy’, New Community 22, pp. 335–48. Lianos, T., Sarris, A. and Katseli, L. (1996) ‘Illegal immigration in local labour markets: the case of northern Greece’, International Migration 34, pp. 449–84. Markova, E. and Sarris, A. (1997) ‘The performance of Bulgarian illegal immigrants in the Greek labour market’, South European Society and Politics 2, pp. 57–77. Ministry of the National Economy (1997) Current Developments and Prospects for the Greek Economy. Athens: Directorate General for Economic Policy, Report 27. National Statistical Service of Greece (1997) Statistical Yearbook 1996. Athens: NSSG. OECD (1996) Beyond 2000: the New Social Policy Agenda. Paris: OECD. Rhode, B. (1993) ‘Brain drain, brain gain, brain waste: reflections on the emigration of highly educated and scientific personnel from Eastern Europe’ in King, R. (ed.) The New Geography of European Migrations. London: Belhaven Press, pp. 228–45. SOPEMI (1989) Annual Report 1989. Paris: OECD. 4 Labour Market and Immigration: Economic Opportunities for Immigrants in Portugal Maria Ioannis Baganha

Introduction

At present Europe appears to be faced with two diametrically opposed evaluations concerning the needs and opportunities for newly arrived immigrants. On the one hand, European governments are closing their borders, acting on the assumptions that the economic development model based on mass production in large industrial plants requiring a large supply of poorly qualiﬁed labour has ended, and that the new economic phase of post-industrial restructuring is (and will continue to be) based on automation and the expansion of the service sector, particularly in activities connected with information and knowledge, which require less, but much more qualiﬁed, labour. Incoming migrants, on the other hand, seem to subscribe to a quite different perspective on the economic opportunities the restructuring of the European economy opens up to them. Regardless of the general tightening of the borders, they keep on coming not only on family grounds and as asylum-seekers – the two ‘legitimate’ modes of entry for permanent stay – but also as temporary migrants and as tourists who overstay, or simply as undocumented migrants. At the same time, as previous chapters have shown, Southern European countries have become a magnet for a growing number of immigrants from Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. These two different evaluations are linked to two supposedly mutually exclusive events which are occurring simultaneously: growing unemployment and increasing immigration. In this context, Portugal is a very interesting country to analyse because it is an ‘unexpected’ case, although there are some similarities with Spain, southern Italy and

79 80 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

Greece. Portugal has the highest percentage of poor people in the EU, very low social security benefits, and the lowest-qualified active population (two-thirds with only primary education or less) – characteristics which should make the country unattractive to economic migrants coming from less-developed countries. Furthermore, Portuguese economic restructuring during the 1980s, which essentially meant a drastic reduction of the active population in agriculture and a severe deindustrialization, generated a sharp rise in unemployment which the concomi- tant expansion of the tertiary sector did little to resolve because it benefited mainly new female entrants to the labour market. Finally, Portugal remained a significant exporter of labour, a situation which would further indicate very limited employment opportunities for immigrants, particularly when we note that Portuguese emigrants go abroad to perform the same types of work that immigrants are doing in Portugal! Still, and despite the fact that Portugal exhibits all the above symptoms, there have been since the 1980s substantial inflows of immigrants, a sizeable proportion of whom remained illegally in the country, at least until the regularization of 1996. The main purpose of this chapter is to explore this paradox. The account is based on ongoing research into immigrants, immigration processes and the labour market in Portugal, and includes interview surveys with immigrants and a diversity of key informants.1 I will begin by assessing the existence and extent of the economic opportunities for immigrants in Portugal. Based on an analysis of the country’s labour market, the immigrants’ economic profiles and the Portuguese informal economy (and of the inter-linkages between these three elements), we will see that currently the Portuguese economy is in fact generating labour demands that the immigrants are satisfying – in some instances complementing, in others substituting, the domestic labour force. Thus, while the mismatch in the highest segments of the domestic labour market between the skills being demanded and those being offered is creating opportunities for highly qualified immigrants who come mainly from Europe and Brazil, the spread of informal practices in the lowest echelons of the labour market is also generating abundant work opportunities for unqualified immigrants, who come almost exclusively from Portuguese-speaking African countries.

Evolution of the Portuguese labour market, 1981–91

According to census data, Portuguese employment growth averaged only 0.6 per cent per year between 1981 and 1991. Job creation and job losses, Maria Ioannis Baganha 81 however, were strongly differentiated by gender. Male employment decreased at an average annual rate of 0.3 per cent, while female employment increased at a yearly rate of 2.4 per cent. In absolute terms, while 260,000 male jobs were lost and only 183,000 were created, female employment lost 105,000 posts and gained 438,000. Put another way, 71 per cent of extinguished jobs were male; 71 per cent of new jobs were female. And furthermore, while for males more than three-quarters of newly created jobs were in ‘commerce, restaurants and hotels’, for women job creation was much more sectorally diversified. When observing the evolution of the Portuguese labour market, it is remarkable that the substantial funds that were transferred to the country following its accession to the EEC in 1986 appear to have failed to generate significant increases in male employment, despite the fact that a large part of these funds was invested in highways, bridges and other infrastructures. Instead what the census data show is a progressive reinforcement of the trend for more and more women to enter the labour market, the share of females in total employment jumping from 32 per cent in 1981 to 40 per cent in 1991. Female participation gained weight in all economic activities, becoming particularly important in services, where women constituted 63 per cent of total employment in 1991. Given the fact that the main aim of this chapter is to assess the current economic opportunities for immigrants in Portugal, the evolution of the employment structure in the Lisbon area deserves special attention, since the majority of the economically active immigrants is constituted by males living and working in this region. Table 4.1 makes the comparison between employment trends in the Metro- politan Area of Lisbon (MAL), essentially the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal, and the rest of mainland Portugal over the decade 1981–91. Total employment in the MAL grew more slowly (at 0.4 per cent per year) than for the mainland (0.7 per cent); male employment decreased (by 0.1 per cent per year) but at a slower pace than for the mainland. Male job losses occurred overwhelmingly in manufacturing (85 per cent of all male losses). Since most of the modern sectors of the country’s industry are located in the MAL, we can suggest that the significant deindustrialization of the MAL was not compensated by any relocation of these industries to other parts of Portugal. The total number of new male jobs created during 1981–91 was about 56,000, distributed as follows: banking, finance, insurance and business services (34 per cent), commerce, restaurants and hotels (26 per cent), and community, personal and domestic services (21 per cent, but 82 ainland Portugal, 54.9 164.6 81.6 ic activity, Metropolitan Area of Lisbon and rest m 1981 and 1991 (all data ’000) 1981 1991 1981 1991 Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Rest of Mainland Portugal 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3 17.7 16.9 15.9 14.7 46.9 26.1 64.5 31.7 96.9 61.2 19.010.5 40.290.1 6.556.4 28.0 73.0 38.7 9.7 693.4 86.0 94.9 7.7 438.4 65.1 57.7 27.7 413.3 181.7 98.4 24.8 263.1 152.8 71.6 25.2 180.1 178.7 143.2 21.2 113.0 Total Males Total Males Total Males Total Males 295.3 203.2 232.8 150.4 984.0 639.0 1059.3 602.1 100.6205.8 95.9 125.7334.3 102.8 257.3 142.5 95.1 140.6 383.7119.9 417.5 488.8 154.4 72.8 408.3 312.7 768.0 139.4 417.8 751.2 355.2 83.2 399.3 453.9 893.2 240.9 333.8 162.5 294.9 188.6 1156.4 706.4 1209.0 700.3 3679.5 2421.4 3934.8 2344.3 estic services 95.6 32.7 93.0 25.9 236.3 99.8 201.1 27.3 Active population by sector of econo m inistration le 4.1 Baganha and Marques 1996; based in turn on Portuguese census data. Ta b Activity sector Personal and do m Source: Agriculture Mining Industry Electricity Construction Co mm erce Transport Finance Public ad m Services Total Selected subsectors: Restaurants, hotels Maria Ioannis Baganha 83 nearly all in public administration). Overall, the labour market of the MAL has been, if anything, less dynamic compared to the rest of the country. It has been more negatively affected by the evolution and restructuring of the Portuguese economy, and less able to generate alternative jobs for those which have been disappearing (Baganha and Marques, 1996). A more detailed analysis of the economic restructuring processes experienced by the Lisbon area is presented by Malheiros in Chapter 10. Two further comments are worth making in conclusion to this brief analysis of the evolution of the Portuguese labour market. The first concerns the educational level of the economically active population. Despite major educational progress over the past 30 years, in 1991 two- thirds of the Portuguese active population had minimal levels of education (primary schooling or less), with males significantly worse off. The problem that this situation raises is that if new job creation takes place in modern tertiary activities which are dependent on highly qualified candidates, while job losses continue to affect the poorly qualified workers, a mismatch in the Portuguese labour market is bound to happen, and is probably already taking place. The second comment has a more direct bearing on migration. The evolution of the Portuguese job market suggests a greater demand for highly qualified workers who are in deficit supply among the domestic labour force, and a minimal demand for poorly qualified immigrants. Let us now turn to the characteristics of the immigrant populations to see if their occupational profiles are in tune with labour market needs.

The foreign resident population in Portugal

Evolution and patterns of settlement, 1980–95 Table 4.2 shows the evolution of the stock of legally resident foreigners in Portugal between 1980 and 1995 by continent of origin. The aggregate grew from 58,000 in 1980 to 168,000 by 1995, the annual rate of increase accelerating from an average of 6.4 per cent during the 1980s to 9.3 per cent during 1990–95. The percentage shares of the source regions have varied only slightly over the period covered by the table: Africans have maintained a share of just below a half, the European share has fallen from 31 per cent in 1980 to 27 per cent in 1995, while the smaller South American and Asian shares have increased, the former from 11 per cent to 15 per cent, and the latter 84 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

Table 4.2 Legal foreign residents in Portugal, 1980–95

Year Total Africa N. America S. America Asia Europe 1980 58 091 27 748 4 821 6 403 1 153 17 706 1980 58 091 27 748 4 821 6 403 1 153 17 706 1982 68 153 28 903 6 855 10 481 1 663 19 924 1983 79 015 32 481 8 520 13 351 2 219 22 053 1984 89 625 37 128 9 887 15 394 2 860 23 896 1985 79 594 34 978 7 987 11 567 2 564 22 060 1986 86 982 37 829 9 047 12 629 2 958 24 040 1987 89 778 38 838 8 623 13 009 3 124 25 676 1988 94 453 40 253 8 338 14 645 3 413 27 280 1989 101 011 42 789 8 737 15 938 3 741 29 247 1990 107 767 45 255 8 993 17 376 4 154 31 410 1991 113 978 47 998 9 236 18 666 4 458 33 011 1992 122 348 52 037 9 430 19 960 4 769 34 732 1993 136 932 55 786 10 513 21 924 5 520 37 154 1994 157 073 72 630 10 739 24 815 6 322 41 819 1995 168 316 79 231 10 853 25 867 6 730 44 867

Notes: The figures for 1992 and 1993 vary from table to table in the official statistics; the figures for 1994 include the special legalization of 1992–93. Not listed in the table are the small numbers of migrants from other countries (260 in 1980, 768 in 1995); these are included in the total figures, however. Source: Estatísticas Demográficas 1980–94 (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Estatística); Relatório Estatístico 1995 (Lisbon: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras). from 2 to 4 per cent. For Europeans, over 90 per cent are from the EU, whilst for Africa over 95 per cent are from the former Portuguese colonies (henceforth referred to as PALOP – Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa) Not only did the total number of legal foreign residents in Portugal increase over the 1980–95 period, but also the pattern became more diversified, both in terms of a broader range of individual source countries and with reference to the spatial distribution of immigrants within Portugal. For analytical purposes the foreign population can be divided into the three main numerical groups: Europeans, Brazilians, and immigrants from the PALOP. Each one of these groups has a distinct socio-economic profile, as we shall see presently.

Regularization and the problem of illegal immigrants Regularizations are an important element in the statistical recording of immigrants in Portugal. Two regularizations have taken place, in 1992 and 1996, involving approximately 39,000 and 35,000 immigrants Maria Ioannis Baganha 85 respectively. Their distribution by country of origin is given in Table 4.3. Given that a legalisation campaign never succeeds in ‘capturing’ the entire migrant population, always leaving a residual, and that ofﬁcially the 1996 campaign was launched to legalize immigrants already in the country who were excluded by the 1992 campaign (or who, having been legalized during 1992–93, failed to renew their residence permits subsequently), it seems reasonable to estimate that around 25–30 per cent of immigrants (roughly 30,000–40,000 individuals) were living illegally in Portugal at some point during the recent past. Moreover the phenomenon of illegal immigration undoubtedly persists in Portugal today. Interviews with immigrants clearly reveal the perception that it is easier and safer to work in Portugal than in other European countries. Periodic regularizations are an obvious incentive to come, while the lack of effective police controls creates a favourable climate in which to live and work clandestinely. Several interviewees indicated that there are only two situations in which an illegal immigrant is at risk of being detected: travelling on a train without a valid ticket, and getting into a ﬁght in a bar or disco where police intervention results. Clearly, random controls by the police in public places and labour inspections at the place of work are infrequent and ineffective. The number of expulsions for unlawful stay averaged only 83 per year between 1986 and 1995; for an individual illegal immigrant (assuming a total of circa 35,000 such individuals) this represents an approximate 0.24 per cent chance of being expelled. To have, in any life situation, a

Table 4.3 The Portuguese legalisations, 1992 and 1996: immigrants’ requests by nationality

1992 1996 From all PALOP 28 345 23 403 Angola 12 525 9 258 Cape Verde 6 778 6 872 Guinea-Bissau 6 877 5 308 Mozambique 757 416 São Tomé Principe 1 408 1 549 Brazil 5 346 2 330 China 1 352 1 608 Senegal 1 397 Pakistan 1 745 Total 39 166 35 082

Source: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras. 86 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal more than 99 per cent chance of achieving a desired outcome is certainly to be considered a favourable situation. My enquiries into the phenomenon of illegal immigration in Portugal suggest the following fourfold typology:

● The transient. For this type of migrant Portugal is simply the gateway to another destination. Specific examples are Chinese en route to Germany or the United States, Romanians en route to North America, and Bulgarians en route to Spain. Often, complex trafficking networks are involved; large payments are made for con- voluted journeys, false passports, etc. ● The overstayer. This is the most common type of illegal immigrant and accounts for the majority of cases from the PALOP. This type of immigrant enters Portugal with a short-term visa and just stays. Mainly from a rural origin with a very low educational background, the male overstayer will be incorporated into the building sector, supported by existing contacts in the chain migration process. Females get employment in domestic service. Migrants from Cape Verde are prevalent. The major places of settlement in Portugal are the shanty-towns of Lisbon and Oporto, but since the mid-1980s other towns such as Faro and Braga have also attracted overstayers. ● The uprooted explorer. This type also uses the mechanism of over- staying but is of different background and motivation. Most are young males from Angola. Of urban origin (mainly from Luanda) and of good education (many are ex-university students), they leave Angola for political reasons and to escape military service. Despite their education, their illegal situation in Portugal confines them to the building industry but some members of this group get involved in deviant behaviour. ● The entrepreneur. This type consists mainly of immigrants from China entering Portugal using the assistance of an organized web of contacts and traffickers. From an urban background, often well- educated and middle-class, their objective is to succeed economically and to set up in business in the restaurant trade; however, this takes time and the first few years may be spent paying off the migration debt.

Occupation and skill status It is well known that labour migration has traditionally tended to create highly concentrated immigrant communities in and around Maria Ioannis Baganha 87 major cities where industrial jobs and low-grade service activities are taken up by immigrant workers. Highly qualified migration also tends to be aimed at major cities where the demand for high-skill expertise is usually concentrated, although their residential patterns within these urban areas are totally different to those of the low-skill immigrants, as Malheiros’ maps of Lisbon in Chapter 10 clearly demonstrate. Other types of migration, such as the so-called ‘sun belt’ movement of retired Europeans, tend to involve areas where the weather, leisure and health facilities are most suited to their specific needs – in the Algarve, for instance. At an aggregate level, 64 per cent of legally resident immigrants in Portugal are concentrated in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon where, in 1991, they accounted for approximately 5 per cent of the resident population. However, when the data are disaggregated by the three main subgroups (migrants from the PALOP, Europe and Brazil), we find different patterns of settlement reflecting different migratory types and projects. Brazilians and Europeans are less concentrated in the MAL (42 and 53 per cent respectively) whereas for the PALOP migrants the proportions range from 71 per cent (Guinea-Bissau) to 90 per cent (São Tomé). Regarding employment status, the aggregate data tell us that the foreign population has an almost identical proportion of wage-earners (76 per cent) to the domestic population (75 per cent). Again, however, the immigrant data need to be disaggregated to make sense of them.2 In this case, we find that 45 per cent of the economically active Europeans are in the ‘employer’ and ‘self-employed’ categories, compared to 33 per cent of Brazilians and to 25 per cent of the domestic population. The PALOP figures are much lower, ranging from 1 per cent for Cape Verdeans to 16 per cent for citizens of Mozambique. Thus the Portuguese population presents a distribution of employment status which is intermediate between that exhibited by Europeans and Brazilians on the one hand, and the PALOP immigrants on the other. Further light can be shed on these contrasts by an examination of the sectoral occupational structure of the various immigrant groups. Table 4.4 sets out the percentage distribution of the various foreign groups across the occupational categories recorded in the Portuguese statistics; the data represent averages calculated for the six years 1990–95. Both Brazilians and Europeans have an extremely skewed occupational distribution towards professional, technical and managerial jobs (codes 0/1 and 2 in the Table 4.4): 51 per cent for Brazilians and 56 per cent for Europeans. The corresponding figure for the 88 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

Table 4.4 Occupational distribution of foreign nationals in Portugal, average 1990–95 (%)

Occupational codes Total active National origin 0/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/8/9 population 1995

Brazil 46.3 4.7 8.2 10.3 4.6 0.9 25.0 9 618 Europe 41.0 15.0 4.9 11.8 4.8 1.7 20.8 23 782 Angola 11.6 0.4 3.9 3.6 11.7 0.8 68.0 7 990 Cape Verde 1.5 0.1 3.4 0.6 4.8 0.5 89.1 21 849 Guinea-Bissau 8.7 0.3 2.7 1.9 5.0 1.9 79.5 7 023 Mozambique 13.6 3.3 8.6 24.8 5.0 0.2 44.5 1 899 São Tomé 13.4 0.4 6.9 2.8 14.3 0.5 61.7 1 906 All foreigners 24.7 6.4 4.5 8.0 5.5 1.5 49.4 84 383

Occupational codes: 0/1 Professional, scientiﬁc and technical occupations 2 Executive and managerial occupations 3 Clerical workers 4 Sales workers and vendors 5 Safety, protection, personal and domestic workers 6 Farming, ﬁshing and hunting 7/8/9 Miners, industrial workers, workers in transport and similar concerns, construction. Source: Relatório Anual, 1990–95 (Lisbon: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras).

domestic population was approximately 28 per cent.3 By contrast, the large Cape Verdean community recorded only 1.6 per cent in these categories. Instead the Cape Verdeans, and other PALOP nationals, are greatly over-represented in blue-collar occupations (codes 7/8/9 – miners, industrial, transport and construction workers). One further feature stands out: the percentage of employed persons from Mozambique with occupations connected to trade (code 4, 25 per cent) is well above the Portuguese average, a statistic which ties in with the high value noted earlier for Mozambicans in the employer and self- employed categories (16 per cent). These high percentages are partially accounted for by the presence of persons of Indian origin who are heavily involved in trading activities in Portugal (as they had been in Mozambique); for further details see Freitas and Castro (1993) and Malheiros (1996, 1997). Summing up the picture portrayed by the data in Table 4.4, it appears that the occupational structure of the immigrants, compared to the Portuguese population, is biased both towards the top (Brazilian and European groups) and towards the bottom (PALOP groups) of the ladder. This finding, while logical in one sense, is puzzling on a number of accounts. First, it is surprising that a growing inflow of foreigners in the economically active age cohorts is occurring, since Maria Ioannis Baganha 89 not only does Portugal have growing unemployment but also the country has been consistently exporting labour for the past ten years (Baganha, 1994; Baganha and Peixoto, 1996). Secondly, immigrants (and especially those from the PALOP) are concentrated in those occupational sectors (industry, mining, construction) which appear to be declining or stagnant in employment terms. And thirdly, the greatest area of attraction for immigrant settlement is the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, whose regional labour market evolution does not appear to show any favourable tendencies in those activities where the absorption of foreign labour is known to take place, namely manufacturing, construction, and domestic and personal services. In fact the 1981–91 intercensal analysis (Table 4.1) showed a change in precisely the opposite direction, with a very significant loss of industrial jobs, a stagnant situation in the building sector, and a clear reduction in domestic services, side by side with a buoyant creation of female jobs in the tertiary sector in activities connected with leisure, social and community services. While the most high-level tertiary activities – banking, finance and business services – are increasing considerably, which could in part explain the growing inflow from Europe and Brazil, the remaining migrant inflow from the PALOP does not seem to be promoted by the recent evolution of the Lisbon and Portuguese labour markets. The implication of all this is that many of the PALOP immigrants must be working outside the formal economy, and probably substituting indigenous labour. Furthermore, as we have seen, around 25–30 per cent of the immigrant population was at some point before 1996 residing illegally in the country. Since access to the formal economy is dependent on a social security number and a valid residence permit, neither of which illegal immigrants possess, these migrants (and probably a good proportion of the legally resident Africans and Asians) must have been catering for themselves in the informal sector.

The informal market in Portugal

During the 1970s and early 1980s two competing definitions of informal economy appeared, as pointed out by Mingione and Quassoli in Chapter 2. The first, adopted by the International Labour Office, mainly identified the informal economy with urban poverty and underemployment. The second definition saw the informal economy as ‘the irruption of real market forces in an economy strait-jacketed by state regulation’ (Portes, 1994, p. 427). 90 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

These competing notions of informal economy were developed to try to explain the economic realities and the behaviour of economic actors considered to be typical of underdeveloped societies. While it was acknowledged that the industrial world was not totally free from economic informality, here the informal economy was considered insignificant and merely a residual heritage of pre-modern economic behaviour. This interpretation changed in the 1980s when both macro- and micro- economic analyses, as well as several case studies, demonstrated that the informal economy was by no means insignificant in the industrialized world. It was shown that, far from being a relic of past forms of labour organization, production and distribution, the informal sector was an expanding segment of the economy encompassing both traditional and modern economic activities. In this new vein, Feige (1990, p. 990) defined the informal economy as covering ‘those actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are denied their protection’. Castells and Portes (1989, p. 12) defined it as ‘all income-earning activities that are not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are regulated’. As Feige (1990, pp. 990–2) further elaborated, this segment of the economy generates a fraction of the national income that evades or circumvents tax codes and is not registered by national accounting systems because the economic actors involved do not comply with the established reporting requirements of governmental statistical agencies. These are the conceptual- izations of informal economy that I shall adhere to in the remainder of this chapter. Clearly, the existence and scope of economic informality depend on what is defined as informal by the appropriate state agencies such as the tax office and the statistical bureau. In this sense the informal economy is a politically constructed reality; but once this reality comes into being it becomes a social phenomenon that can be characterized from different perspectives such as those of the employer, employee or other economic agent. Again, this point was elaborated on by Mingione and Quassoli in Chapter 2. For present purposes, I will centre attention on the various employment openings being generated in the Portuguese informal economy. The most detailed work on the Portuguese informal labour market is contained in a report by Faustino Miguelez Lobo (1990) for the European Commission. Lobo describes five case studies that may be taken to constitute the main types of irregular work in Portugal: Maria Ioannis Baganha 91

● clandestine employment of minors ● home work in the north of the country ● informal work in the construction sector ● informal work in agriculture ● informal work in the service sector

I will now summarize these and other types of informal labour, and then discuss immigrants’ opportunities for insertion into the various sectors of activity.

Clandestine employment of minors The clandestine employment of children has been a continuous national problem, one that successive governments have failed to eliminate. The problem appears to be worse in Portugal than any other West European country. Although the available evidence does indicate a decline of this kind of labour (9.7 per cent of minors aged 10–14 years of age were recorded as employed in 1983, dropping to 4.4 per cent in 1989),4 the fact that the government felt obliged to create a National Commission for the Combating of Child Labour as recently as September 1996 is a recognition of the continued existence of the problem. Child labour is most prevalent in small-scale traditional manufacturing industries, especially footwear, garments and textiles, in the northern part of Portugal, particularly in the district of Braga. The main causes behind the persistence of the phenomenon can be grouped under three headings: on the side of the families the key factors are poverty, a backward mentality and distrust in the utility of formal schooling; on the part of the employer, low economic and cultural standards are key attributes; and on the side of the authorities there is a lack of surveillance and commitment (Ferreira de Almeida et al., 1994). Recently it seems that the phenomenon is becoming more hidden as child labour becomes displaced from the factory and the workshop to the minor’s home.5 This ‘submersion’ will make the practice harder to identify and eradicate.

Home work in Northern Portugal As noted in the previous subsection, northern Portugal, and especially the Braga district, is where the traditional small-scale industries of garments, textiles and footwear are most widespread. They are deeply embedded in an economic and social structure where farming and 92 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal industry are mixed and where numerous opportunities for informal work exist. In this region, two mechanisms of informality can be observed:

● a combination of partly agricultural and partly industrial work where one of these activities is not declared; ● domestic combined with home-based industrial work, done on a piece-work basis, usually by married women with or without minors as family helpers.

Although estimates of the scale of unreported work and income in labour-intensive industry vary (see, for example, Figueiredo et al., 1985, p. 84; Lobo, 1990, p. 4), there is no doubt that the combined textile/garment/footwear sector, overwhelmingly structured in small enterprises and scattered over the countryside of northern Portugal, offers a fertile setting for informality. The handing down of skills and practices across the generations makes it difficult for outsiders such as immigrants to enter this sector. In sum, what we have in this case is a relatively closed market where all those involved have something to gain from its preservation. Employers and firms have access to a skilled, flexible and relatively inexpensive labour force for the production of quality items; workers mix agricultural work with factory or at-home industrial work and ensure the maintenance of the traditional systems of household and social relations; and the state, not wishing to disrupt the social peace nor to diminish the competitive advantages promoted by the mixed formal–informal system for export-oriented products, refrains from interfering (Lobo, 1990, p. 4).

Informal work in the construction sector The construction sector is an important part of the Portuguese economy, responsible in 1996 for nearly one-third of the country’s inward investment, generating 7.5 per cent of total employment and accounting for 5.3 per cent of national GDP.6 It is also a sector known to involve a very large share of informal work. According to data from various sources,7 undeclared workers in construction numbered 178,000 in 1981 (51 per cent of total construction workers), falling only slightly to 150,000 (45 per cent) in 1991. Lobo (1990, p. 7) considers that informal work in construction attracts different types of labour according to the level of industrialization of the region where the activity takes place. In the less industrialized parts of Maria Ioannis Baganha 93 the country, where trade union control is weaker, informal work in construction is mainly done by part-time farm workers who seek to supplement their agricultural incomes. In the more urbanized and industrialized areas, informal construction work is carried out by persons working in other industrial sectors who do building work in their free time either as self-employed individuals or as paid helpers to friends and relatives. In fact, Lobo’s description covers only a small part of what is happening in construction, particularly after 1986. Portugal’s membership of the European Community has had two major impacts on this sector. First, it has allowed Portuguese construction firms to subcontract their labour force within the EU space-economy. Particularly since German reunification and the building boom there, this strategy has taken abroad several thousand Portuguese construction workers each year, reducing the domestic labour force in this sector.8 Secondly, EU membership has brought very substantial funds to Portugal, a sizeable proportion of which has been invested in infrastructures and public buildings, increasing the demand for construction labour. It is not difficult to see how these two processes have opened up opportunities for incoming or recently arrived illegal immigrants, above all in the MAL where much construction activity is located and where, in addition, the bulk of the low-skilled PALOP immigrants are concentrated. Employers’ interests in hiring or subcontracting informal labour are obvious: lower wages and no social security costs. Illegal immigrants enter into this kind of informal work because it is easy to find and is a way of earning an income almost from the moment they arrive in Portugal, thanks also to information given to them by other members of their community. A 1986 survey of the Cape Verdean population in Portugal found that two-thirds of the men interviewed were engaged in the building sector, and that 26 per cent of them worked without any kind of contract (de França, 1992, p. 130). Our own research, conducted in 1997, indicates a significant worsening of the contractual situation in the construction industry: 74 per cent of the immigrant workers surveyed had no contract, 13 per cent had fixed-term contracts, only 3.7 per cent had permanent contracts, and 9.3 per cent were independent (i.e. self employed).9 Clearly, construction is the sector of employment where the incorporation of low-skilled immigrants, including most of the male illegals, is most actively taking place. This situation will continue as long as government resources and commitment remain insufficient to control the use of unregulated labour in this sector, and as long as public and 94 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal private investment in construction remains high. In fact some of the biggest sites for the hiring of irregular immigrant labour have been recently initiated major public works – the Belém Cultural Centre, Expo 98 and the new bridge over the Tagus river. Hence the common view expressed by many – key informants and illegal immigrants alike – that ‘the government will maintain them [the illegal immigrants] until the public constructions are done’, is a cynical but probably realistic assessment of a situation in which the Portuguese government is by no means an innocent bystander.

Informal work in agriculture Most informal work in agriculture is done as part-time farming, of which two common forms can be recognized (Lobo, 1990, p. 8):

● people who continue to cultivate their land to generate income in spite of the fact that they receive old-age or disability pensions; this category also includes returned emigrants and emigrants working abroad who return periodically; ● people who have two activities, one in agriculture and the other in industry, construction or the service sector.

Quantification of informal and part-time work in agriculture is very hard. Cabral (1991, pp. 185–8) estimates that 55 per cent of rural households in north-west Portugal are involved in pluri-activity, which also implies informality. In this area the predominance of small-sized family plots (usually under 20 hectares) prevents economic strategies based only on agricultural production; the spread of industries and urbanization into these rural districts, plus increased mobility of household members (who now have access to cars, motorcycles, etc.), allows part-time farmers to travel to other work in the vicinity. Meanwhile, all over Portugal, the extension of social security benefits to the rural population has provided a minimum of social security as a platform to pursue diversified strategies to generate income and ‘defensive savings’ (Cabral, 1983).

Informal work in the service sector Opportunities for informal activities in the service sector are greatest in the most developed and urbanized areas, notably the Lisbon and Oporto metropolitan regions. Once again, Lobo (1990, p. 10) distinguishes two main types: Maria Ioannis Baganha 95

● skilled males who carry out, usually on a self-employed basis, repair and maintenance work to domestic appliances, automobiles, etc.; ● informal work in catering, retailing and other small businesses (such as hairdressing) usually carried out by younger and poorly qualiﬁed females.

Other types of informal work Several other forms of irregular work can be recognized which are not covered by the case studies of Lobo. It is important to appreciate that informality characterizes all levels of the occupational hierarchy and not just manual activities. In professional activities such as law, accountancy, medicine and teaching, concentrated mainly in towns and cities, a substantial amount of unreported activity is considered to exist, and moreover the number of persons involved is thought to be increasing. Typical examples are the large numbers of schoolteachers who give private lessons in their homes, and the professors at state universities who have ‘second jobs’ at private universities or in research and consultancy activities. Another traditionally important informal sector activity is domestic service – cleaning, ironing, cooking, etc. Often the domestic service worker is a young single female or a married woman covered by the social security of one of her parents or her husband. Immigrant women from the PALOP countries are also much involved in domestic work, often under very weak contractual arrangements (de França, 1992, pp. 130–3).

The Portuguese informal economy: some conclusions and hypotheses The evidence presented above supports three main conclusions. The first is that the informal economy is spread all over the country and touches all socio-economic groups. To some extent the informal economy exists ‘because it always has’ – because it helps to bridge the gap between expectations and reality. As long as informal activities carry no stigma, and as long as the state remains tolerant (in some cases it is even actively complicent), the informal sector will remain an important and integral part of the national economy. The second conclusion is that the informal economy is patterned geographically. In the major cities ample opportunities exist for informality, the nature of the activity varying according to the individual’s position in the socio-economic structure. Professionals have plenty of lucrative opportunities for extra and undeclared income in 96 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal tutoring, legal advice, health, accountancy, business and consulting. For younger and less qualified workers the opportunities are mainly in domestic service, construction, retailing and personal services; the economic rewards are naturally lower, but still worth the effort. In the northern and central regions, the traditional strategies are, for men, combining farming with another activity in industry, construction or commerce; for women, the combination of farm or domestic work with factory or home-based piece-work in the footwear, textile or garment trades. In the south of Portugal the main opportunities for informality are in the food and beverage industry, construction and above all, tourism (de Sousa Lobo, 1985; Lobo, 1990). The final conclusion, more speculative, is to posit the following hypotheses concerning immigrants’ incorporation in the Portuguese informal economy:

● Europeans working in the informal economy would be most likely to be found in business, insurance and ﬁnancial services. ● Brazilians would also be found in these same areas, and in the retail, restaurant and hotel trades. ● PALOP citizens working in the informal economy will be overwhelmingly concentrated in construction (males) and personal and domestic services (females). ● Informal work in some economic sectors that, in other Southern European countries, does tend to be carried out by immigrants (such as agriculture and labour-intensive export industries) has, in Portugal, so far been closed to foreigners. As long as informality in these sectors depends on and nurtures a complex web of social relations, we should expect newly-arrived immigrants to have few chances of entering such closed labour markets.

Immigrants’ incorporation into the informal labour market We can try to verify these hypotheses by considering the results of the ﬁrst legalization which took place between 12 October 1992 and 5 March 1993, at the end of which 39,166 immigrants applied for a residence permit. Table 4.3 showed that the majority of those who applied – 72 per cent – were from the PALOP states, but this should not hide the fact that the fourth largest national group to be legalized were the Brazilians, nor the ﬁnding that Chinese and Senegalese receiving a permit were more numerous than Mozambicans. Interestingly, the largest group to apply were the Angolans, not the Cape Verdeans, the nationality most commonly associated with illegal immigration to Maria Ioannis Baganha 97

Portugal. All this confirms what was said earlier about the increasing diversity of the immigrant population in Portugal. Aside from the nationality totals in Table 4.3, the Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) collected no specific employment data on those who apply for a residence permit. An alternative, indirect, method of assessing immigrants’ incorporation into the Portuguese economy (formal and informal) in the early 1990s is to compare SEF’s employment records for 1991 (the year before the regularisation started) with those for 1994 (the year after it ended). This comparison is made in Table 4.5, which uses the same data-base and employment codes as Table 4.4.10 The reasoning behind making this comparison is as follows. Being illegal, these immigrants were, if employed, working overwhelmingly in the informal economy before 1992. After legalization it is possible that a sizeable number entered the formal economy, but we assume that they did so in the same sector of economic activity that they were already in. Particularly in the case of immigrants from the PALOP, such a supposition is in accordance with all the survey evidence on these nationalities in Portugal, which show their limited occupational mobility and confinement to a narrow set of economic activities (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.5 Occupational distribution of foreign nationals in Portugal, 1991 and 1994

Occupational codes Total active National origin 0/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/8/9 population

Brazil 1991 2 487 257 471 444 148 65 1 490 5 362 1994 4 076 399 685 1 065 515 67 2 057 8 864 Angola 1991 347 15 123 84 164 21 1 053 3 931 1994 541 15 172 195 791 38 4 838 6 596 Cape Verde 1991 223 12 630 70 433 83 15 492 16 943 1994 335 15 646 152 1 414 120 17 892 20 574 Guinea-Bissau 1991 298 12 92 48 49 70 1 778 2 347 1994 408 13 121 106 378 82 4 928 6 036 Mozambique 1991 213 56 145 403 60 3 729 1 609 1994 249 59 154 444 117 5 803 1 831 São Tomé 1991 138 5 78 17 44 6 537 825 1994 199 6 90 58 355 6 1 025 1 739

Note: For occupational codes and source see Table 4.4. 98 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

The main results to emerge from the analysis of Table 4.5 are:

● for Brazilians the main expansion took place in occupations related to commercial activities, restaurants and hotels (represented mainly under codes 0/1 and 4); ● for immigrants from Angola and Guinea-Bissau the most noticeable increase took place in manual occupations (codes 7/8/9); ● for the immigrants from Cape Verde and São Tomé the insertion took place mainly in personal and domestic services (code 5); ● ﬁnally, there is a marked increase in the number of wage-earners for both Brazilian and PALOP immigrants.

As mentioned above, we do not know, from this source, who left and who remained in the informal economy; what is clear is that the already remarkable concentration of immigrants in economic branches where informality is high was accentuated as a result of the legalized immigrants entering the SEF registers. A further angle of insight into immigrants’ working conditions can be gained from unpublished annual employment survey data on the types of contract held by immigrant employees (Table 4.6). This data should be treated with caution because of its poor coverage of the target population.11 Nevertheless the following conclusions can be tentatively drawn.

Table 4.6 Foreign working population in Portugal by area of origin, sex and type of work contract, 1992 and 1995 (’000)

1992 1995 Type of work contract PALOP Others Total PALOP Others Total MALES Permanent 5.0 7.0 12.0 5.3 8.0 13.3 Non-permanent 2.9 2.5 5.4 4.0 1.8 5.9 Total 7.9 9.5 17.4 9.4 9.8 19.2 FEMALES Permanent 3.5 3.1 6.5 6.8 3.7 10.5 Non-permanent 1.5 0.6 2.2 2.9 0.6 3.5 Total 5.0 3.7 8.7 9.7 4.4 14.0 TOTAL Permanent 8.5 10.0 18.5 12.1 11.7 23.8 Non-permanent 4.4 3.1 7.5 6.9 2.5 9.4 Total 12.9 13.2 26.1 19.0 14.2 33.2

Source: Inquérito ao Emprego, 1992 and 1995 (Lisbon: INE). Maria Ioannis Baganha 99

PALOP immigrants have a markedly lower job security than the ‘other’ immigrants (mainly Brazilians and Europeans): this is true for both males and females and for both years. In 1995, for example, 36 per cent of PALOP workers had non-permanent contracts, compared to 18 per cent of other immigrants. Comparison of the data for 1992 and 1995 shows that whilst the proportion of PALOP workers with insecure contracts increased form 34 to 36 per cent, for other immigrants the situation improved, from 24 to 18 per cent. Hence while the Brazilian and European employees converge with the Portuguese domestic pattern (11 per cent non-permanent contracts in 1995), the PALOP trends are in the opposite direction, indicating increasing insecurity. Finally, a gender dimension is also evident from Table 4.6, with PALOP females showing a greater tendency than PALOP males to achieve better contract security (see also de França, 1992). This is backed up by other ofﬁcial employment survey data not shown in Table 4.6, which record 94 per cent of PALOP females registered with social security compared to 70 per cent of males (1995). More recent (1997) survey data on the contractual situation of immigrant men and women in Portugal also clearly demonstrate greater precariousness for males (Table 4.7).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented material drawn from a range of sources and based on a variety of statistical indicators which, considered individually, only partly cover the phenomena we are interested in – immigration, employment, and the informal economy. Taken together, however, these sources and indicators do help us to understand the main inter-linkages between the above phenomena.

Table 4.7 Immigrants in Portugal: type of contract for men and women, 1997 (%)

Type of contract Men Women Permanent 20.4 33.9 Fixed-term, temporary 28.7 32.1 Independent 1.8 10.7 No contract 47.2 21.4 Total 100.0 100.0

Source: GEOIDEIA survey. 100 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

What we have found out, from the standpoint of the Portuguese economy, can be summarized as follows. At present the Portuguese economy is generating opportunities for the economic incorporation of immigrants both at the top and at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Immigrants’ incorporation in the lowest segments of the labour market may be directly linked to the fact that the Portuguese economy is in a process marked simultaneously by growing informality and, in some sectors, by a growing substitution of the domestic labour force by immigrants. However, this substitution is not taking place in all sectors of the informal economy, or in all parts of the country. Immigrant workers have not succeeded in penetrating the rather closed social and economic environment of rural and northern Portugal, and hence have not been incorporated into agricultural labour nor into many branches of industry. The main sectors of incorporation, as we have seen, have been construction, domestic service, and other personal services. In addition, we have detected a widespread acceptance of economic informality, and an incapacity or unwillingness of the state to control informal activities. Several indicators point to the conclusion that PALOP immigrants are over-represented in the informal economy, and on average exhibit a pattern of employment relations which reflect greater precariousness than the working conditions of either the domestic population or the immigrant groups from Europe and Brazil. As to the near-term future, current evidence gives reasonable grounds for forecasting the continuation of two main trends. Since enduring skill shortages in the labour market are anticipated, economic opportunities in the highly skilled segments of employment will continue to be open to legal incoming migrants, and these vacancies are most likely to be filled by highly educated Brazilians and Europeans. Secondly, since further significant growth is expected in building and construction through the late 1990s, illegal immigration from the PALOP region will continue to increase, further enlarging the Portuguese informal economy.

Notes 1. This chapter is based on results of the Portuguese part of a collaborative research project on migrants’ insertion into the informal economy co-ordinated by Emilio Reyneri and funded by the EU under the TSER Programme, grant ERBSOE2.CT95.3005. Results of the ﬁrst phase of this Portuguese research have been published in a recent paper (Baganha, 1998). The present chapter includes a summary of this paper, plus some results from the second phase of the research, namely the ﬁeld survey carried out Maria Ioannis Baganha 101

in 1997. This survey was based on direct interviews with 51 immigrants who applied for the ‘extraordinary regularization’ of 1996, and with 33 key informants connected in various ways to the phenomenon of immigration in Portugal. This chapter also includes some results from a questionnaire survey that was administered in 1997 to a representative sample of immigrants active in the Portuguese labour market – the so-called GEOIDEIA survey. The GEOIDEIA sample survey was part of a study on the impact of the current inward and outward migratory flows on the Portuguese labour market. This study was carried out by Maria Baganha, João Ferrão and Jorge Malheiros for the Observatório do Emprego et Formação Profissional (see Baganha et al., 1998). 2. These data are based on the Relatório Anual, 1990–95, of the Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras; the domestic population’s data are drawn from the annual Employment Surveys for 1992–95: see Inquérito ao Emprego 1992–95 (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Estatística). 3. This comparison with the Portuguese population cannot be made rigorously because the occupational categories used in the national employment surveys do not match exactly those used in Table 4.4 which are collected by a different body, the Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras. 4. Until 1987 much of the clandestine employment of minors could be attributed to the difference which existed between the minimum age for terminating compulsory education (12) and the legal minimum working age (14). From 1987 this difference ceased to exist as the minimum school- leaving age was raised to 14. However, 1989 was the last year that the Employment Survey included information on employment of minors, although in 1992 the Ministry of Work and Social Security estimated the number of working children to be 15,000. 5. See, for example, press reports in Público, 23 August 1993, 1 June 1995, 12 September 1996 and 12 December 1996. 6. Figures from Relatório da Associação de Empresas de Construção Civil e Obras Públicas, quoted in Expresso, 24 May 1997. 7. The Portuguese censuses of 1981 and 1991, lists published by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, and Figueiredo et al. (1985, p. 84). 8. According to data from the Federal German Labour Institute, there were 21,500 Portuguese ‘service contract labourers’ in Germany in November 1997, 15 per cent of the total number of such workers, 145,000. The Portuguese were the second group after the Poles, and were followed by the Irish and the British. However the Portuguese Embassy and the Caritas agency estimate that at least another 15,000 are at present working clandestinely for Portuguese employers in Germany. 9. The source of this is the GEOIDEIA sample survey referred to in note 1. 10. Europeans are excluded from Table 4.5 since they were not involved significantly in the legalization process of 1992. 11. SEF registers record 67,700 foreign wage-earners in Portugal in 1995, with 32,600 from PALOP, yet the employment survey figures register less than half (28,400 and 15,600 respectively); hence the data on Table 4.6 involves large potential sampling errors of 10–25 per cent and more on all figures below about 5000. 102 Labour Market and Immigration in Portugal

References Baganha, M. I. (1994) ‘As correntes migratórias Portuguesas no século XX e o seu impacto na economia nacional’, Análise Social 29, pp. 959–90. Baganha, M. I. (1998) ‘Immigrant involvement in the informal economy: the Portuguese case’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 367–85. Baganha, M. I. and Marques, M. M. (1996) ‘Lisbon: social differentiation and the formation of labour markets’ in Telhado Pereira, P. and Mata, E. (eds) Urban Dominance and Labour Market Differentiation of a European City: Lisbon 1890–1990. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, pp. 75–122. Baganha, M. I. and Peixoto, J. (1996) ‘O estudo das migrações nacionais: ponto de intersecção disciplinar’ in Carvalho, J. M. et al. (eds) Entre a Economia e a Sociologia. Lisbon: Celta, pp. 233–9. Baganha, M. I., Ferrão, J. and Malheiros, J. (coordinators) (1998) Os Movimentos Migratórios Externos e a sua Incidência no Mercado de Trabalho em Portugal. Relatório Final. Lisbon: Observatório do Emprego e Formação Profissional (unpublished report). Cabral, M. (1983) ‘A economia subterrânea vem ao de cima: estratégias da população rural perante a industrialização e a urbanização’, Análise Social 19, pp. 199–234. Cabral, M. (1991) ‘Pluri-activité et stratégies paysannes d’abandon de l’agriculture: deux exemples’ in Godelier, M. (ed.) Transitions et Subordinations au Capitalisme. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, pp. 179–204. Castells, M. and Portes, A. (1989) ‘World underneath: the origins, dynamics and effects of the informal economy’ in Castells, M., Portes, A. and Benton, L. (eds) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 11–37. de França. L. (1992) A Comunidade Cabo Verdiana em Portugal. Lisbon: IED. de Sousa Lobo, I. (1985) ‘Estrutura social e produtiva e propensão à subterranei- dade no Portugal de hoje’, Análise Social 21, pp. 527–62. Feige, E. L. (1990) ‘Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: the new institutional economies approach’, World Development 18, pp. 989–1002. Ferreira de Almeida, J., Alves, N. and Casanova, J. L. (1994) Exclusão Social: Factores e Tipos de Pobreza em Portugal. Oeiras: Celta. Figueiredo, A. M., Neves, A. O., Oliveira, H, Rodrigues, M. J. and Ribeiro da Silva, N. (1985) A Economia Subterânea e o Exercício da Política Económica e Social em Portugal. Lisbon: Instituto Damião de Góis. Freitas, M. J. and Castro, P. (1993) ‘Vale do areeiro reflexões acerca de uma realidade multiétnica’ in Estruturas Sociais e Desenvolvimento: Actas do II Congresso Portugês de Sociologia. Lisbon: Fragmentos, vol.1, pp. 960–81. Lobo, F. M. (1990) ‘Irregular work in Portugal’ in Barthelemy, P., Miguelez, F., Mingione, E., Pahl, R. and Wenig, A. (eds) Underground Economy and Irregular Forms of Employment: ‘Travail au Noir’. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Malheiros, J. (1996) Imigrantes na Região de Lisboa. Lisbon: Edições Colibri. Maria Ioannis Baganha 103

Malheiros, J. (1997) ‘Indians in Lisbon: ethnic entrepreneurship and the migration process’ in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 93–112. Portes, A. (1994) ‘The informal sector and its paradoxes’ in Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds) The Handbook of Economic Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 426–49. 5 Recent Immigration to Catalonia: Economic Character and Responses Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana

Introduction

This chapter presents an account of the various facets of migration and mobility among the population of a small but significant European region, Catalonia.1 We start with a brief description of the population, economy and culture of Catalonia, in order to provide an appropriate historical and geographical context for the main theme of the chapter: recent immigration and employment. One particular historical trend will be stressed: the tradition of Catalonia being an immigration region for flows from other parts of Spain. Hence, in one sense, recent foreign immigration is not ‘new’, but merely the continuation of an already established migration trend, but with different origins. Also relevant in the Catalan context are immigration flows from other parts of Europe. Rather like the case of Portugal described in the previous chapter, the impact of recent foreign immigration in Spain is polarized at the top and especially at the bottom of the labour market; comparisons will also be made with the employment situation of immigrants in Spain as a whole. The final part of the chapter will examine some social and political issues surrounding recent immigration and settlement, noting how these are too often distorted in media discussion which also fails to bring out the complexity and variety of migration trajectories of arrival, settlement, mobility and return.

Catalonia within Spain

Catalonia is situated in the north-east part of the Iberian peninsula, bordering France and facing the Mediterranean. It is an ‘historical

104 Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 105 nation’ which at present belongs to the Spanish state and since 1979 has the juridical status of an autonomous region. The population is slightly over 6 million, around half of whom are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. There are four provinces: Barcelona in the centre, Girona to the north, Tarragona to the south, and Lleida in the interior of the region. In recent history, Catalonia has been a dynamic region, both from an economic and a cultural point of view. Catalonia and the Basque country were the two main industrial regions of Spain. The economic crisis of the 1970s, with its emphasis on industrial decline and restructuring, had a great impact on these two regions precisely because they were traditional strongholds of industry. Now there is a recovery of industrial activity in Catalonia, but tourism and service activities have largely taken over as the most important economic sectors. The distribution of gross added value in the economy in 1995 was 1.4 per cent in agriculture, 31.1 per cent in manufacturing, 7.5 per cent in construction, and 60.0 per cent in services, including tourism. One common feature of all sectors is the predominance of small-sized companies and units, although there is an increasing penetration of foreign-owned capital. The characteristics of the Catalan population are not markedly different from those of other European countries at the same socio- economic level. One notable feature is the very low fertility rate, among the lowest in the world. Another is high unemployment. In Spain as a whole there has been a gap, historically, between the growth of the labour force and the capacity to create jobs to satisfy that increase (Cardelús and Pascual, 1979; Recio, 1996). Until the early 1980s, emigration was the normal way to reduce the pressure on the labour market. When this possibility disappeared, the unemployment rate rose to levels which, by European standards, were very high – 20 per cent and more. Catalonia’s unemployment rate has usually been lower than the Spanish figure, and that is the case now, but at the height of the economic crisis it was above the national level. One of the unique features of Catalonia is its culture. In spite of the fact that it belongs to the Spanish state, we can speak of a Catalan society with its own history and a strong sense of a specific identity. The most obvious sign of this is the language, Catalan, which also means its own literature as well as the population’s own social perception and historical project.2 Throughout history, the maintenance of the identity of Catalonia has generated important tensions with the Spanish and French states. Besides the political tensions, there is now a 106 Recent Immigration to Catalonia growing outside pressure, in the form of the diffusion of international cultural patterns, which also tends to dilute the power of non- hegemonic cultures such as the Catalan one. There are also some peculiarities with regard to Catalan migration patterns. On the one hand, Catalonia took part in the great Spanish migration flows to the Americas at the beginning of the twentieth century and to Europe in the 1960s. On the other hand, we find two important phases in the twentieth century of a mass migration to Catalonia from other regions of Spain; the pattern, timing, and character of these internal migrations will be dealt with further in the next section. From a political and cultural point of view, however, we can note here that most of this population transfer, involving hundreds of thousands of people, took place in periods of dictatorship, under a centralist regime, when the political culture was clearly against the pluralistic reality of Spain. In fact, while the Catalan culture and language were persecuted, those of the migrants moving to Catalonia were protected by the Spanish state. Meanwhile, the migration flow from Catalonia to the rest of the country was much lower.

Migration patterns in Catalonia

The data in Table 5.1 show the natural increase and the migration balance of the Catalan population from the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1990s. There are two periods of rapid growth, both related to massive in-migration. The first, from 1916 to 1930, was due mainly to the expansion of manufacturing and the building of some important infrastructures in Barcelona. The origins of this first migration inflow were mainly in the areas which were closer to Catalonia in geographic and, in some cases, in cultural terms – País Valencià, Aragón, Murcia and Almería.3 The migration increase from 1916 to 1930 is estimated to be well in excess of half a million people, with an average net inflow of 35,000 per year. The second period of in-migration occurred with the recovery of the Catalan and Spanish economies after the Civil War (1936–39) and in parallel with the expansion of the European economies during the 1950s and 1960s, ending with the first oil crisis. The volume of migration was greater than in the first wave, and the regional origins were more diversified, including large numbers of longer-distance migrants from Andalusia, Extremadura, Galicia and Castile. Between 1950 and 1975 the net migration increase is estimated to be around 1.4 million people, an average of more than 55,000 per year. Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 107

Table 5.1 Estimated natural and migration increase, Catalonia, 1901–96

Five-year periods Total Natural Migration Migration increase increase increase increase as % of total increase 1901–05 58 160 42 564 15 596 26.8 1906–10 60 326 42 253 18 073 30.0 1911–15 55 181 33 489 21 692 39.3 1916–20 204 670 2 062 202 608 99.0 1921–25 166 922 59 569 107 353 64.3 1926–30 279 651 64 925 214 726 76.8 1931–35 99 062 49 177 49 885 50.4 1936–40 620 –59 318 59 938 – 1941–45 182 280 21 406 160 874 88.3 1946–50 167 059 71 215 95 844 57.4 1951–55 293 871 93 994 199 877 68.0 1956–60 391 595 151 598 239 997 61.3 1961–65 567 628 213 466 354 162 62.4 1966–70 629 160 262 880 366 280 58.2 1971–75 540 224 308 393 231 831 42.9 1976–81 297 554 262 182 35 372 11.9 1981–86 22 224 117 364 –95 140 – 1986–91 80 856 45 834 35 022 43.3 1991–96 30 546 14 046 16 500 54.0

Note: After 1981, the ﬁve-year periods are adjusted in accordance with United Nations guidelines. Sources: For 1901–70 Cabré and Pujadas (1989, p. 85); for 1971–91 Ajenjo et al. (1993, p. 49); for 1991–96 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, census and population registers.

Undoubtedly, the migration inflows up to 1975 portrayed in Table 5.1 are largely explained by flows from the rest of Spain, resulting in the incorporation of large numbers of people from other Spanish regions (and cultures) into Catalan society. Such immigrations have had an absolutely central role in accounting for Catalonia’s demographic history, both in terms of the simple addition of population and in their effects on natural increase (Cabré and Pujadas, 1989). However, this power of attraction of the growing Catalan economy also acted upon the arrival and presence of a small but significant foreign inflow in the pre-1975 period, which has to be considered, in statistical terms, alongside a largely unquantified emigration abroad. The data on the foreign population, presented in more detail later on, show a steady increase in numbers, linked mainly to Catalonia’s ongoing industrialization process and the growing presence of 108 Recent Immigration to Catalonia foreign companies and multinationals in the economy. This inflow had a basically European origin: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were some of the main countries with a significant presence of people working and living in Catalonia. We use the word ‘significant’ because, although the numbers of European immigrants were small, their importance derives from their position of control, technical advice and social influence within the Catalan economy. The economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s, together with the political transition into the post-Franco era, caused a major disruption in the process of Spanish economic development (Salmon, 1995). As noted before, the consequences of this recession were particularly keenly felt in regions, like Catalonia, with a strong industrial base. As a result the Catalan migration flows were strongly affected. A reduction in in-migration from other Spanish regions was accompanied by a rapid increase in out-migration, a part of which was return migration to the earlier migrant source regions: Andalusia, Extremadura, Galicia and Castile (Pujadas and García Coll, 1995; García Coll and Puyol, 1997). At the same time, both the origin and destination of the internal flows became more diversified, in accordance with the consolidation of a unitary Spanish labour market (Cardelús and Pascual, 1979). An increase in the already high number of professionals, managers and technicians in the migration exchanges with the rest of Spain can also be noted. But despite the fluctuations of the migration inflows and outflows since the 1980s, the net migration rate has fluctuated around zero since then. Historically, this is a rather unusual situation in the evolution of Catalan demographic patterns over the twentieth century. Meanwhile, the immigration of persons from abroad has increased since the 1980s, linked mainly to Catalonia’s economic recovery. Part of this influx has been due to the return of Spaniards who had emigrated to Western Europe in preceding decades, but the continued growth in the immigration of foreigners has become increasingly important. Actually, we consider that the major change is not so much the growth in the scale of foreign immigration as its increasing diversification in terms of origin and occupational characteristics (Solana and Pascual de Sans, 1995). So, although the absolute number of European immigrants has grown, the European percentage has fallen, especially during the two regularizations undertaken by the Spanish government in 1985–86 and 1991–92, which mainly registered non-European immigrants. Table 5.2 shows the broad evolution of source regions for Catalan immigration, 1950–95, and the major impact of 1992, when the second regularization 109 isión (Madrid: Co m e Extranjería d ístico (Madrid: INE) various years; for 1992 and 1995 Anuario Esta d Foreign resident population by nationality, Catalonia, 1950–95 e España d 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1992 1995 le 5.2 no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % ístico 15 671 100 15 692 100 32 264 100 38 366 100 45 146 100 72 291 100 106 809 100 Ta b erica 2 493 15.9 3 093 19.7 7 356 22.8 9 037 23.6 11 308 25.0 14 570 20.2 23 963 22.4 Anuario Esta d inisterial de Extranjería). erica 218 1.4 243 1.5 1 284 4.0 1 334 3.5 1 672 3.7 1 779 2.5 2 195 2.1 Inter m AsiaAfricaOceaniaOthers (stateless)Total Sources : For 1950–90 1 238 7.9 588 88 16 3.7 0 0.6 0.1 0.0 328 258 12 1.6 1.0 0.1 9 202 0.1 902 386 0.5 2.8 1.2 1 498 69 182 3.9 0.2 895 0.4 2 792 2.3 116 6.2 1 825 31 0.3 6 452 4.0 0.0 23 372 8.9 148 32.3 0.3 9 896 36 408 27 34.1 9.3 0.0 129 0.2 162 0.2 Central and South A m EuropeNorth A m 11 618 74.1 11 489 73.2 21 939 68.0 25 284 65.9 27 219 60.3 25 958 35.9 36 353 34.0 110 Recent Immigration to Catalonia data appear, as regards African immigrants, most of whom come from Morocco. Sharp increases are also recorded over the period 1985–95 for immigrants from Latin American and Asian countries. The existence of a previous colonial relationship and the maintenance of certain cultural and linguistic ties might be related to the fact that nationals from Latin American states, Morocco, Equatorial Guinea and the Philippines chose Spain as their destination, as was pointed out in Chapter 1. In this sense, Catalonia is not seen by these immigrants as a different society. The total number of foreigners in Catalonia reached 106,809 in 1995, 1.8 per cent of the region’s population. Roughly one-third came from Europe (compared to two-thirds in 1980 and three-quarters in 1950), one-third from Africa (always less than 4 per cent before 1985), a fifth from Central and South America (this proportion has remained remarkably stable since 1960), and nearly one-tenth from Asia (steady relative growth throughout the period covered by Table 5.2). These figures and proportions refer only to registered foreigners. The presence of a significant quantity of immigrants without papers, especially from certain countries, obviously changes the picture somewhat. Never- theless, we consider that the percentage of ‘illegal’ immigrants in Spain and Catalonia is probably not very different from those levels recorded in Portugal and Italy.

Foreign immigration: origin and economic activity

Immigration is the focus of attention for a large amount of research and media analysis in Catalonia and in Spain. The fact that much of this attention focuses on some specific groups defined largely by their origin (Africans and other Third World immigrants) or their position on the labour market (unskilled workers, especially ‘illegals’), contributes greatly to the formation of a distorted picture of the overall situation of foreign workers in the Spanish and Catalan labour markets. In the account which follows we will analyse the broad spectrum of foreign immigration and its occupational characteristics. The first part of this analysis is built around the detailed data presented for Catalonia in Table 5.3. Data in this table were obtained from two main sources: work permit statistics from the annual series Estadística de Permisos de Trabajo,4 and data on employment of foreigners recorded in the census produced by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). As so often happens with statistics on immigrants, there are important differences in the figures yielded by these two sources. Taking 1991 (the year of the last Spanish census), the 111 5 024 0.2 86 616 3.4 56 398 2.2 240 0.6 ic sector, occupation and nationality, Spain Catalonia, 1991 force in Spain force in Catalonia force in Catalonia Foreign labour Foreign labour Total labour no. % no. % no. % 6 976 4.11 458 1 521 0.9 4.1 14 25919 28951 57516 081 8.3 11.3 30.2 9.4 2 823 3 199 8 748 4 669 7.6 8.6 23.6 12.6 410 753 341 932 276 922 16.1 13.4 10.8 32 418 19.0 10 623 28.7 1 060 464 41.5 171 033 100 37 048 100 2 553 979 100 anagerial workers Total and foreign labour force by econo m le 5.3 ic sector Ta b inistrative and m Clerical and related workers Sales workers Services workers Agricultural and related workers Production and related workers Workers not classifiable by occupation AgricultureManufacturingConstructionServicesNon-classifiedOccupation Professional, technical and related workersAd m 28 977 16.9 20 984 15 289 5 225 18 218 12.3 1 654 8.9 114 888 14.1 10.7 6 622 67.2 1.0 4 432 6 047 315 870 17.9 19 596 12.0 16.3 12.4 351 950 850 52.9 87 787 214 438 0.9 37.2 1 300 904 3.4 8.4 50.9 – – Econo m 112 e d lació e Po b d Cens – – 5521 0.1 0.1 657 1.8 ) cont’ d ( (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1992); le 5.3 Ta b force in Spain force in Catalonia force in Catalonia Foreign labour Foreign labour Total labour 222 0.1 251 0.1 no. % no. % no. % 4 9548 662 2.9 5.1 5 704 15.4 30 148 17.6 3 573 9.6 46 47910 079 27.2 5.919 083 7 961 1 235 11.2 21.5 3.3 171 033 100 37 048 100 2 553 979 100 os a Extranjeros. 1991 d i ajo Conce d e Tra b e Permisos d d erica ística erica erica 1991 , vols 12 and 13 (Barcelona: Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, 1994). Esta d Nationality EuropeUE Rest of Europe AfricaNorth A m South A m Asia Oceania 56 558 33.1 51 155 9 196 29.9 24.8 16 842 45.5 Others (stateless) Sources : Central A m Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 113 work permit statistics give a larger number of foreign workers than those registered by the census (37,048 as against 28,561). In helping to explain this difference, we must remember that 1991–92 corresponded to the second regularization of undocumented workers. More than 108,000 work permits were allocated in Spain in this regularization, including nearly a third of them in Catalonia. Consequently the 1991 work permit statistic (referring to the end of the year) gives a rather more approximate picture of a fast-changing scene, compared to the census which was undertaken some months before and therefore probably reflected the fact that a large number of undocumented immigrants avoided giving details to the INE administrators. Hence Table 5.3 uses the census for the total labour force statistics and the work permit data for the foreign labour force. The analysis is held at 1991 in order to preserve this com- parability, and also because there are no data on the volume and characteristics of EU workers after 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty came into effect. The main characteristics to be stressed from Table 5.3 are as follows. The 37,048 foreign workers recorded by the work permit statistics for Catalonia represent 22 per cent of the national total of 171,033. On the basis of these data, legalized immigrant workers make up only 1.5 per cent of the total Catalan work force, even lower in Spain as a whole (1.1 per cent).5 If we were to double the number of workers to take into account the significant number of undocumented workers (an excessive overcompensation, to be sure), the share rises to 3 per cent for Catalonia and just over 2 per cent for Spain. Clearly these crude calculations hide the very marked differences that it is possible to find at the level of individual employment sectors and specific districts; we shall pick up this point later. Considering the distribution by area of origin (lower part of Table 5.3), two groups stand out: Europeans (25 per cent) and Africans (46 per cent). Europeans were the dominant group in Catalonia until the 1991–92 regularization. In Spain as a whole, there is a higher proportion of European immigrant workers (33 per cent) than Africans (30 per cent). In Catalonia about 80 per cent of the African immigrants with permits are from Morocco; the other main communities are from Gambia and Senegal. The main body of Table 5.3 concerns foreign workers’ employment profiles, by economic sector and occupation, with comparisons between immigrant workers in Catalonia and in Spain, set also against the distribution of employment for the entire labour force of Catalonia. As Pugliese (1993, 1995) has noted, all over Europe but especially in the 114 Recent Immigration to Catalonia south, changes in the labour market are modifying the situation of foreign workers. A large number of the new immigrants fill vacancies in the service sector, often concentrating in specific niches, some of them very marginal from an economic point of view. Many of these immigrant groups are suffering a worsening of their labour market conditions not only due to the character of the jobs they do (cleaning, domestic service, restaurant and hotel work, etc.) but also because of the wider-scale casualization and precariousness which are changing the working lives of large sections of the broader population. Like other parts of Spain, the Catalan labour market has been experiencing a deep transformation from its previous situation as a very protected one, especially in terms of job security. Certain groups with a weak social position are quite vulnerable in these new circumstances ( Recio, 1991, 1996; Fernandez and Toharia, 1993). Of course, in these groups we find immigrant as well as non-immigrant populations, and internal migrants too. Our main concern here is foreigners. Regarding sector of economic activity, the main group of foreign workers have a job within the broadly defined service sector – 53 per cent in Catalonia, even higher in Spain as a whole, 67 per cent. In fact a comparison of the foreign labour force in Catalonia and Spain reveals a rather broader spread of employment types in the former area, with significant percentages of immigrant workers in agriculture (12 per cent), industry (18 per cent) and construction (16 per cent). This may indicate a more diversified and developed structure of the Catalan economy, compared to the national one, and perhaps too a social situation in which immigrants are more favourably integrated into a broader range of labour market sectors (Mendoza, 1997). Nevertheless, comparisons between the immigrant workforce and the Catalan labour force are also instructive: whilst foreign and domestic workers have a more or less equal participation in the service sector (both just over 50 per cent), foreigners are half as likely to be employed in industry, twice as likely to be employed in construction and four times as likely to work in agriculture. The apparent parity between the foreign and Catalan labour forces in the service sector is misleading, however. Above all, foreigners are concentrated in those branches of the service sector which are low in status and where, partly due to an increase in labour demand, there are difficulties in getting native workers to fill the vacancies. As Table 5.4 shows, these branches include hotels and restaurants, domestic service and retail and wholesale trade. These are intensive activities as regards their demand for labour, most of which is unskilled. As with the construction and agricultural sectors, the mechanisation or exportation Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 115

Table 5.4 Economic sectors with the highest volume of foreign workers, Catalonia, 1991

Foreign labour force Percentage of this foreign labour force over no. % the total labour force Construction 6 047 16.3 2.4 Hotels and restaurants 4 058 11.0 3.4 Domestic service 4 044 10.9 7.5 Agriculture 3 534 9.5 4.1 Business services 2 315 6.2 3.0 Retail trade 2 051 5.5 1.0 Wholesale trade 1 706 4.6 2.0 Education and research 1 595 4.3 1.4 Other 11 698 31.6 0.8 Total 37 048 100

Sources: Censo de 1991 (Madrid: INE, 1995); foreign work permit data provided by the Ministerio de Trabajo.

(in the sense of foreign relocation) of their productive processes is almost impossible to achieve. Table 5.4 also allows us to point out other activities in the service sector with a significant immigrant presence in the Catalan labour market: business services and education and research. These foreign skilled workers are mainly from EU countries. Further evidence for this dual structure of the foreign workforce is given by the middle section of Table 5.3, where the occupational classification of the workforce is set out in seven categories. Although it is impossible to demarcate a clear boundary between skilled and unskilled, the general picture is clear: the majority of foreign workers find a job in the unskilled segments of the labour market, but there is also an over- representation of foreigners in the two highest skill categories – professional, technical and related, and managerial and administrative personnel.6 Elsewhere, there is an under-representation in clerical, sales and production workers (which can be regarded as middle-ranking in terms of skill, status and pay), and a marked over-representation in agriculture and personal and domestic services. A specific example of the dynamics of incorporation of African immigrants into the Catalan labour market is Mendoza’s (1997) interview survey of 151 Moroccan, Gambian and Senegalese male workers in the province of Girona. Some of the key elements of Mendoza’s findings are set out in Table 5.5. As regards current employment, the figures show a fairly broad sectoral distribution, which indicates that immigrants work 116 Recent Immigration to Catalonia in the same economic activities as the local labour force. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn from the data on first employment in Spain, where almost half the interviewees worked in farming. This indicates that many immigrants from Africa start off by getting temporary or seasonal work in farming, often in the south of Spain, before later moving to a better job in another sector. Such an inter- sectoral move might be accompanied by a geographical move to a more developed part of Spain such as Catalonia, where a wider range of jobs for immigrants is on offer. Regarding the skill level of the current job, Table 5.5 shows that the majority of African immigrants are employed in unskilled jobs in all economic sectors, and that this low status is reinforced by a weak contractual position. Summing up, Mendoza (1997, p. 72) concludes that, despite their broad sectoral distribution, African immigrants are found almost exclusively in unskilled or low-skilled jobs in the secondary labour market. While this finding confirms the relevance of dual labour market theory for a study of immigrant insertion into the Catalan labour market, it also reflects to a great extent the trends to casualization which are evident across all those sectors occupied by the immigrants. Some competition with the local labour force may be present in the industrial sector but in most cases Africans pick up jobs which are rejected by local workers. Moreover, Africans are forced to work under conditions of low pay, insecurity and sometimes abuse

Table 5.5 Employment characteristics of a sample of Africans in Girona province, 1995

Agriculture Industry Construction Services Total Current job 47 24 21 59 151 First job in Spain 74 6 22 49 151 Skill level of current job: skilled 5 5 1 12 23 unskilled 42 19 20 47 128 Type of contract of current job: none 17 2 3 12 34 temporary 24 18 14 35 91 permanent 6 4 4 9 23 self-employed 0 0 0 3 3

Source: Mendoza (1997, pp. 65–7). Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 117 from employers which would not be tolerated by the majority of indigenous labour force. No indication is given in Mendoza’s study of whether the African immigrants he surveyed were legal or illegal: the implication is that they were all in possession of work permits although this is never explicitly stated. From other studies, however, we know that in Spain and Catalonia, as in other parts of Southern Europe, there is a considerable involvement of ‘irregular’ immigrant workers in the informal labour market. Of course, legalized immigrant workers can also work in the informal sector; the Portuguese material presented by Baganha (see Chapter 4 of this book) suggests this is widespread. Given the detailed analysis already made by Mingione and Quassoli on the nature and conceptualization of the informal sector in Chapter 2, here we will limit ourselves to some brief comments on the Catalan case. As elsewhere, lack of data is an obvious problem: only detailed field surveys can yield good information on the characteristics and impact of foreign workers in the informal economy (Cohen, 1995). One potentially useful source of data, as Baganha showed for Portugal, is provided by the regularization records. Table 5.6 summarizes some key features of former undocumented migrants who were given work permits under the last Spanish regularization in 1991–92. Although often criticized, this regularization gave a work permit and a residence permit to 32,648 former illegal immigrants in Catalonia, a figure which represents 30 per cent of the number of permits allocated in the whole of Spain – 108,321. This percentage is higher than the proportion of work permits granted each year in Catalonia, or to the share of foreign workers in Catalonia with respect to Spain as a whole – both about 20 per cent. This discrepancy, brought out by the 1991–92 regularization, could indicate a greater incidence of informal labour market practices in Catalonia, perhaps due to its economic structure with a heavy concentration of foreign illegals in agriculture,7 construction and hotels (see Table 5.6). Other important characteristics evident from the table are the dominance of African and Latin American nationals in the numbers regularized (accounting for nearly 90 per cent in Catalonia), and further confirmation of the main labour market areas as discussed above: agriculture, construction and services.

Social impact of migration

So far we have mainly concentrated on the demographic and economic impact of different types of migration into Catalonia, paying particular 118 Recent Immigration to Catalonia

Table 5.6 Labour permits granted during the 1991–92 regularization process, Spain and Catalonia

Spain Catalonia no. % no. % Total 108 321 100 32 648 100 Nationality Europe 8187 7.6 819 2.5 EU 2 525 2.3 340 1.0 Rest of Europe 5 662 5.2 479 1.5 Africa 59 995 55.4 21 530 65.9 Canada, USA, Mexico 1 576 1.5 358 1.1 Central and South America 28 489 26.3 7 337 22.5 Asia 9 902 9.1 2 522 7.7 Oceania 88 0.1 26 0.1 Stateless persons 84 0.1 16 0.0 Economic sector Agriculture 18 493 17.1 5 629 17.2 Manufacturing 8 103 7.5 3 690 11.3 Construction 16 548 15.3 7 658 23.5 Services 64 218 59.3 15 267 46.8 Not adequately deﬁned 959 0.9 404 1.2 Occupation Professional, technical and related workers 8 444 7.8 2 295 7.0 Administrative and managerial workers 340 0.3 76 0.2 Clerical and related workers 3 888 3.6 806 2.5 Sales workers 9 493 8.8 1 854 5.7 Services workers 39 419 36.4 9 334 28.6 Agricultural and related workers 20 157 18.6 6 304 19.3 Production and related workers 26 020 24.0 11 768 36.0 Workers not classiﬁable by occupation 560 0.5 211 0.6

Source: Estadística de Permisos de Trabajo Concedidos a Extranjeros, 1991 (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1993).

attention to the role of foreign workers in the Catalan labour market. Evidence exists that in very recent years inter-regional migratory movements have faded somewhat and have moved into an approximate balance of in-migration and out-migration. The migratory exchanges between Catalonia and the rest of Spain are now more or less integrated within the context of normal inter-regional relations within a state. For Catalonia they reflect first the strong ties with other parts of Spain inherited from migration networks established in the past, and second the consequences of a centralized political and economic Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 119 structure that still exists despite the establishment of the ‘autonomous communities’ in the late 1970s. In migration terms, this means the coexistence of two-directional flows with the former sending regions together with flows of civil servants and other related professionals. The case of migration trends between Catalonia and foreign countries is somewhat different. First it seems that the perception of these trends by various elements of Catalan society does not bear close relation to the real social and quantitative incidence of foreign immigration, nor to its heterogeneous character. As we have seen, there is a foreign resident population and a more or less temporary migration composed both of European citizens and of citizens of other developed and developing countries. Amongst the different migrant groups we can identify are:

● the ‘return’ of the descendants of past emigrations from Catalonia or Spain who may have taken foreign nationality (e.g. French or Latin American) but who have kept in touch via the operation of migration networks; ● ‘institutional movers’: migrants who move within political institutions or companies acting at international level; ● retired foreigners, long-staying ‘residential tourists’, etc.; ● the movement of scientists, professors, students, sportspeople and artists; ● the migration of unskilled and low-skilled foreign workers.

Foreign immigration has had a treatment in the mass media that we can only define as sensationalistic. Great attention is paid to the immigration of Third World people, and especially to those placed in the worst situation; insufficient attention is given to the overall low proportionate numbers of immigrants, and to the cultural barriers and real social problems that some groups have to face. Another question is this: people often consider only the process of immigration, and forget that foreign persons not only enter Spain or Catalonia but also leave. It is precisely this double movement that allows certain people the choice to stay or return. The scholarly approach to the question of migration in Spain is not completely independent of that by the media. Also in the academic environment, most attention is paid to the most ‘striking’ questions and aspects of the ‘new’ phenomenon of immigration. But much of the analysis is very descriptive, trapped in the difficulties of getting data and embroiled in shedding light on questions of supposed political urgency. 120 Recent Immigration to Catalonia

Often, the basic concepts are not properly defined and there is confusion between demographic, geographic, social, economic and legal perspectives and criteria (Pascual de Sans, 1993). Probably the most sensitive confusion is the one that is often made between geographical origin, social class and social integration. Other confusions arise between the fact of migration and the fact of having migrated; between flows and stocks; and between real and potential immigration. As a result, a real understanding of the dynamic game between mobility and settlement is difficult. In the political arena, Catalonia does not have the chance to manage autonomously immigration from abroad. Spanish state policies in relation to work and residence permits are the only ones currently in force. Catalonia has no legal boundaries with other Spanish regions, and foreign citizens can arrive freely. And, of course, international frontiers within Europe are being dismantled. Yet Catalan political parties are very coy in expressing their opinions about these issues; they seldom state explicit proposals in relation to migration policy. Despite the alarmist tone fomented by the media debate on immigration, which has often succeeded in promoting or exacerbating the real issues rather than presenting or ameliorating them, foreign immigration in Catalonia is in reality too small in scale and too diverse to pose serious problems of articulation within Catalan society – especially in a Catalan society which is used to receiving and incorpo- rating people with another culture and language. Nevertheless there are some real issues to be dealt with. The first in most people’s minds would probably be the social exclusion of immigrants, above all of those from Africa; this question is related above all to bad housing and poor working conditions rather than to the fact of being a ‘stranger’. But another could be the lack of integration of international professionals, technicians, research and teaching staff, tourists and so on. Yet another key issue is the role of international mafias whose power is growing in the trafficking of immigrants, and in their capacity to affect migrants’ lives.

Concluding perspectives

The challenges posed by the phenomenon of immigration in Catalonia are not very different from the situation of so many other European countries. Nevertheless there are some distinctive Catalan features which we can synthesise as follows: Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 121

● the speciﬁc character of Catalan society, which constitutes a particular ‘country’ (país) inside the Spanish state; ● the relatively small number of foreign people, especially when expressed as a share of the total population and labour force of Catalonia; ● the recent heritage of an unusually important immigration coming from other regions of Spain – ‘foreigners’ to the Catalan society but not from abroad; ● the high rate of unemployment, a persistent phenomenon in Spain as well as Catalonia.

The immigration of previous decades to Catalonia is undoubtedly an interesting precedent (Cabré Pla and Domingo Valls, 1993). Of course, conditions then and now are not the same, and this has two effects. On the one hand, the migration flows are much lower and now pluridirectional compared to before. Meanwhile the democratic context allows Catalan society a certain degree of self-management, including the free expression of its own culture and language. On the other hand, accessibility to jobs is not as easy now as it was in those earlier decades of mass internal migration, and there has been an increase in the precariousness of employment as well. This results in fewer possibilities for upward socio-occupational mobility for individuals and families, greater economic inequality and hence growing social polarization. In short the crisis of the Catalan social and economic model is far from being resolved (Recio, 1991). In this situation, what can be expected for the near future? One of the most important questions in relation to immigration flows is how to avoid in Catalonia some of the problems that other European countries have already experienced. Drawing lessons is always interesting and potentially valuable, but we must appreciate that things may not happen in Catalan society in a way that mechanically follows what occurred elsewhere. Socio-economic circumstances are different in time and space, and the international relations that different European countries have had with their colonies, and with the developing world in general, are not the same. Historical experience is different, and the present conjuncture is different from before. The world has never been composed of closed societies, and neither is it now. The difficulty of forecasting international migration is well known: it depends on a variety of circumstances in the origin and destination countries, as well as on the international economic and 122 Recent Immigration to Catalonia political situation. However, immigrants will continue to arrive in Catalonia, and a certain amount of emigration will also continue to take place. But probably they will come in a more gradual and moderate way than happened with the in-movements from other regions of Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, or compared to the mass migration from Spain to France or to Germany at the same time, or compared to the overall mass migrations into Europe (King, 1997). This gradual arrival makes it possible to deal with present and future situations better than before, in spite of labour market changes and the casualization of work. And in any case it may be that the real problems in the future will come from a more general social crisis and not directly from immigration. Nevertheless, some specific aspects related to immigration have to be underlined. These are, for example, the phenomenon of immigrant trafficking which acts in the transport and entry of often desperate people coming from poor countries; or the real risk of worker exploitation, more likely in the case of those who are in clandestine or otherwise precarious situations. The capacity of these groups to react and defend themselves is very weak, by definition. Now, however, immigrant interests are more and more defended by specific associations; a fight for social rights is substituted by an ‘ethnic’ rights campaign. This may be a suitable reaction to the particular problems of foreign immigrants, but it brings with it the risk of consolidation of their particular confined status. In the case of foreign immigration to Catalonia, the flexibilization of entry and the liberalization of granting permits would assist the smooth insertion of immigrant workers in economic activities where their labour is in demand – as was the case in the past with internal migration and as is the case now with EU foreign workers. Moreover these same policies would also improve the quality of immigrants’ lives and their incorporation within Catalan society, not to mention relations with the countries of origin (Livi Bacci, 1997). Such policies also require parallel interventions in housing and urban policies, and a better regulation of the labour market to prevent exploitation and irregularity (Pascual de Sans, 1993). In the management of immigration Catalonia is deeply dependent on the Spanish state, which at the same time is dependent on European migration policies. These questions are picked up by Joaquín Arango in Chapter 12. But Catalan society also has the possibility of acting in a decisive way. This means, inter alia, trying to break the stereotypes about foreign immigrants which are too deeply embedded; to construct Àngels Pascual de Sans, Jordi Cardelús and Miguel Solana Solana 123 a society where people can live (or stay for a while), respect their past yet also build a special common project; and to avoid, above all, the social divisions onto which, unfortunately, ethnic divisions are all too easily mapped. Here the role of the media is very important, as are the social scientists who provide the ‘information’ needed by social agents and associations working with immigrants.

Notes 1. This chapter has been elaborated within the research group on ‘Mobility and migration in Europe’ at the Department of Geography, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. We wish to thank Ricard Morén i Alegret for his comments on the first draft. 2. Catalan is also spoken in other areas, mainly País Valencià, the Balearic Islands and Andorra. 3. This excludes, of course, any reference to the important internal migrations within Catalonia. For a century or more, these have been focused above all on one destination, Barcelona, plus some movements to other cities and the coast in general. 4. These data are in turn divided into two parts: the number of work permits granted each year by the Ministerio de Trabajo, and an estimate of the total quantity of foreign workers in the labour market. 5. It is worth mentioning that these figures do not include, by definition, the large number of retired foreigners living in tourist and residential complexes along the Mediterranean coast and in the Balearic and Canary Islands. 6. Even the data collected by the 1995 work permits survey indicate a significant presence of skilled workers (despite the fact, already noted, that EU workers disappeared from these records in 1992). Highly skilled workers accounted for 13 per cent of the permits, and another 14 per cent were for skilled workers. Because of our explicit wish to work with data which represent all immigrant origins, we have based most of our analysis in this chapter on the 1991 records. 7. Mainly as temporary and seasonal agricultural workers in intensive agricultural areas like Maresme (Barcelona), Empordà (Girona) and Segrià (Lleida).

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Cohen, A. (1995) ‘Algunas reflexiones a propósito de la inmigración magrebí en España’, Ería 38, pp. 287–302. Fernández, F. and Toharia, L. (1993) ‘Labour market structure’ in Montanari, A. (ed.) Labour Market Structure and Development in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, pp. 63–82. García Coll, A. and Puyol, R. (1997) ‘Las migraciones interiores en España’ in Puyol, R. (ed.) Dinámica de la Población en España. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, pp. 167–216. King, R. (1997) ‘Restructuring and socio-spatial mobility in Europe: the role of international migrants’ in Blotevogel, H. H. and Fielding, A. J. (eds) People, Jobs and Mobility in the New Europe. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 91–119. Livi Bacci, M. (1997) ‘The population of the Mediterranean in historical perspective’ in Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development. (Palma de Mallorca, 15–17 October 1996). Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, pp. 21–40. Mendoza, C. (1997) ‘Foreign labour immigration in high-unemployment Spain: the role of African-born workers in the Girona labour market’, in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 51–74. Pascual de Sans, A. (1993) ‘L’immigrazione extraeuropea in Spagna: con- siderazioni preliminari’ in Delle Donne, M., Melotti, U. and Petilli, S. (eds) Immigrazione in Europa. Solidarietà e conflitto. Rome: Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza, pp. 157–64. Pugliese, E. (1993) ‘Restructuring of the labour market and the role of Third World migrations in Europe’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 11, pp. 513–22. Pugliese, E. (1995) ‘New international migrations and the European Fortress’ in Hadjimichalis, C. and Sadler, D. (eds) Europe at the Margins: New Mosaics of Inequality. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 51–68. Pujadus, I. and García Coll, A. (1995) ‘Migraciones interiores en España: tendencias recientes y perspectivas de futuro (1971–2001)’, Revista de Geografía 3, monographic issue. Recio, A. (1991) ‘La segmentación del mercado de trabajo en España’ in Miguélez, F. and Prieto, C. (eds) Las relaciones laborales en España. Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 97–115. Recio, A. (1996) ‘Mercado de trabajo en España: comentarios a la reforma’ in La Roca, F. and Sánchez, A. (eds) Economía crítica. Trabajo y medio ambiente. Valencia: Universitat de València, pp. 93–126. Salmon, K. (1995) The Modern Spanish Economy. London: Pinter. Solana Solana, A. M. and Pascual de Sans, A. (1995) ‘Mercado de trabajo e inmigración extranjera en Cataluña: situación actual y principales tendencias’ in Habitar, vivir, prever. Actas del V congreso de la población española. Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, pp. 527–38. 6 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland to Greece, Spain and Italy: Anthropological Perspectives Krystyna Romaniszyn

Introduction

Labour migrations are nothing new in Europe; they have accompanied its history for the past century and more. The only change has been in the regions of origin and destination. The general cessation of foreign labour recruitment in Western European countries since 1974, the European unification process, the re-patterning of economic development, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc have undoubtedly been the key factors to account for the recent alterations of labour migratory movements on the continent. As we saw in Chapter 1, the Mediterranean flank of Europe has witnessed some of the biggest migratory changes. The former out-migration countries of Southern Europe have now become the destination of professional and managerial people from Northern EU countries and of so-called ‘illegals’ originating from North Africa and Eastern Europe. Immigration policies are the primary cause of illegal immigrations, since illegal immigrants are those who do not possess the necessary permits or no longer meet the conditions imposed upon them by national legislation. The connection between changing entry policies and illegal immigration is well illustrated in the European experience, especially over the past two decades. During the economic boom years of the 1960s when most EEC countries recruited or encouraged the entry of foreign workers, illegal migration was not an issue given the ease with which permits could be obtained. The situation has, however, definitely changed since immigration controls started to be tightened up after 1974. From the point of view of those involved, individual

125 126 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland action taken by the undocumented all over the world in response to restrictive immigration laws introduced by various countries demonstrates creativity and the fact that migrants have never been just passive actors of the world’s economy and politics. Unknowingly perhaps, they follow the libertarian or neo-liberal point of view, demonstrating that the absence of permission to migrate constitutes a major limitation to an individual’s human rights. This chapter is in three main parts. It begins by outlining some theoretical frameworks for contextualizing the three cases of contemporary clandestine migration from Poland to Greece, Italy and Spain. Next follows a presentation of these cases, and ﬁnally I offer a discussion on the usefulness of anthropological perspectives on consumption for the explanation of the Polish labour migration phenomenon.

Theoretical context

The complexity of the phenomenon of labour migration (and the subset of it defined as illegal) demands a theoretical approach provided by more than just one perspective. This assumption justifies the application of theories exploring subjective agents and objective mechanisms of labour migrations for explanation of the cases under study. Several juxtaposed perspectives are adopted, not in an attempt to seek reconciliation between them, but because each discloses and explains one dimension of this complex phenomenon. The neoclassical ‘push-pull’ model – which represents functional perspectives – focuses on the agency dimension in migrations. Labelled as ‘individualistic’ and criticized for possessing a limited ability to predict the origin of flows and changes of migrations, it indisputably allows for an interpretation of individual decision-making. Its emphasis on migratory movements as a result of rational calculations cannot simply be rejected as invalid or ignored. Indeed, the decision to migrate to Greece, Italy or Spain in order to undertake a paying job does entail calculation, although the ‘calculation’ may be based on poor information or even deceit (as in the case of trafficking). The migration decision, however, may not be entirely, or at all, an individualistic one. In some instances it is collectively made by members of the household who select those who move and those who remain behind. Polish workers migrate in search of a paid job as a source of additional family income, a source of funds for an individual’s own future investment or consumption, or as the sole source of livelihood for the Polish unemployed. These are the Krystyna Romaniszyn 127 basic push factors. Driven by a desire and/or the need to seek a job in the specified Mediterranean countries, some migrate for seasonal work, supplementing income earned in Poland; others who had quit their job, or who never had a job in the home country, work in the target countries longer, even for several years. The demand for cheap labour on the Greek, Italian and Spanish informal or parallel labour markets,1 and the relatively higher wages available there compared to Poland are the main pull factors. Complementary to neoclassical perspectives which refer essentially to the causes of labour migration are structural approaches which, in general, explain the persistence of the phenomenon. Some advocates of these approaches point out that, in contrast to the assertion of neoclassical theories of migration, international labour movements are primarily social in nature rather than the outcome of economic decisions governed by the law of supply and demand (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p. 612). Nevertheless, these authors also note that, ‘self-initiated or spontaneous labour flows are more recent phenomena. They arise out of a change taking place in peripheral societies’ consumption patterns which reflect more and more those being diffused from the advanced countries’ (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p. 608). As I will argue later on, growing consumption aspirations add to the persistence of the labour migration flows from Poland to the Mediterranean region. A micro-structural perspective centres around the notions of migrant networks and chain migration. Following others, Portes and Böröcz (1989) point out that networks constructed by the movement and contact of people across space are at the core of the micro-structures which sustain migration over time. The concept of migrant networks – as in principle bounded by neither space nor time – is important to the understanding of household, family, and kin migration dynamics. Complementary to the migrant network is the chain migration notion. Most definitions characterize chain migration as a process in which migrants move to destinations which they already know and where they have established contacts, or which they have heard of indirectly through relatives or friends. The chain migration concept describes a situation in which an individual migrant sends for family, kin or members of a community, thereby combining individual and family/household migration in longitudinal perspective. Chain migration may occur as a result of the family reunification process or it develops along with networks which support the inflow. Informa- tion and hiring networks develop among immigrants who then open recruitment channels which reduce the migration costs for 128 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland newcomers and thus facilitate labour and other migrations. Chain migration was even named ‘an iron law of immigrant expansion via the all-too-permissive system of legal entry into the country’ (Goering, 1989, p. 798). These notions and observations on networks and chains undoubtedly apply to the cases under study. The flows of Polish labour migrants are patterned by chain migration which happens despite the always present threat of their expulsion from the destination countries. In the case of migration from Poland to Greece, links with home towns or villages are maintained in a number of ways: journeys are made back home, relatives are invited for short visits, children are brought for shorter or longer stays, partners join each other, and so on. In Athens, the development of a specific social network further facilitates chain migration, aiding the successful adaptation of newcomers; however, no formal organization of the Polish undocumented there was encountered during my research (Romaniszyn, 1996). A macro-structural perspective in migration studies is represented by a number of theories. Authors who attempt to reconcile the functionalist and structuralist perspectives view migrant networks as just one representation of various links characteristic of ‘migration systems’ (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987; Boyd, 1989). One advocate of this approach, Hans Buechler, seems to identify it with modern anthropological studies on migration which aim at creating a balance between system and agency orientations (see Buechler and Buechler, 1987, p. 1). In his view, these anthropological studies take into account both migrants’ creativity and the various systems (international, inter- regional, inter-community) which constrain agents, thereby providing a welcome counterbalance to other structural approaches, such as world systems theory. On the whole, migration systems theories call attention to the geographical places linked by the flows and counterflows of people (agents), and by economic and political relations between countries and areas (structures). They point to the links between sending and receiving countries as fundamental for the understanding of migration flows, their size, direction, and persistence. Some authors specify that labour flows arise out of prior or present contacts between societies: ‘in general the emergence of regular labour outflows of stable size and known destination requires the prior penetration by institutions of the stronger nation into those of the weaker sending ones’ (Portes and Böröcz, 1989, p. 608). Labour migration flows from Poland to the Southern European countries seem to contradict this historically prescribed pattern. They are all illegal Krystyna Romaniszyn 129 labour migrations regulated by no bilateral agreement, and they are not an aftermath of previous legal recruitments and employment, as is the case with some other recent illegal migrations to developed Western European countries, such as those from Morocco and Turkey. The Polish flows are, however, partly a consequence of a prior political or ‘Solidarity’ emigration from Poland to Greece, Italy and Spain which in each case marked a new migration route for a new category of migrants. I shall return to this point later. International migrations are also viewed as conditioned by the following structural factors: bilateral agreements regarding labour migration, foreign investment patterns, and devolution and change in local – particularly agrarian – economies (Boyd, 1989). The inflows of Polish undocumented workers into Greece, Italy and Spain occur despite the lack of any bilateral agreement. At least to some extent, their persistence over time may be attributed to the recent economic changes which have deeply and painfully affected some economic sectors in Poland, among them the agricultural sector. It seems that migration from Polish rural areas and villages has risen dramatically in recent years. On the other hand, greater foreign investment in Poland, and a trade policy more favourable towards the country’s goods, could have a positive effect on the labour market at home, thereby causing a decrease in migration from Poland. Yet another macro-structural perspective which provides a broader context for the analysis of migration flows sees them as part of worldwide flows of goods, money, services and information. These patterns of spatial mobility are said to be characteristic of ‘post-organized capitalism’ (Lash and Urry, 1994). The characteristic feature of post- organised capitalism’s migration patterns is that immigrants head for the major cities of contemporary advanced societies where they become concentrated in manufacturing, retailing, and consumer services (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 172). Meanwhile, the consumption needs of the dominant classes of the receiving societies, who are concentrated in the capital cities, create new positions for migrants. Hence it is no surprise to find that the Polish workers migrate to, and concentrate in greatest number in, the capital cities of the three Mediterranean immigration countries – Athens, Rome and Madrid – and their job opportunities there stem from the rising consumption needs and horizons of the expanding middle classes in these countries. This focus on Poles as ‘metropolitan migrants’ is not the whole story, however, for Polish migrants can also be observed in Greece in rural and touristic areas, picking fruit, working in hotels, etc. 130 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland

Finally, the world systems perspective provides a contextual explanation of the migration phenomenon, for it renders scholars sensitive to links between the levels of communication and transportation and the migration potential from sending countries (Miller and Denemark, 1993). Certainly, the relatively cheap coach transportation system between many cities and towns in Poland and the major cities of Greece, Italy and Spain, together with easy access to detailed information about jobs and wages available there, and the imbalance in economic development between peripheral regions in Poland which supply economic migrants and the places of destination in the receiving countries, are all factors which amplify the Polish migration flows. To sum up this part of the chapter, labour migration from Poland to Greece, Italy and Spain – a result of agency and structural determinants – shares various characteristics with other contemporary flows of labour migrants. On the micro-level these migrations result from individual’s or household members’ rational decisions made in response to objective push and pull factors. Furthermore, the flows are encouraged by migrant networks, and especially the pattern of chain migration development; in all three cases migrants are heading mainly for a capital city. These flows are influenced by structural factors such as recent economic changes in the home country, the level of foreign investment and trade policies; they are further amplified by communication and transportation systems. At the same time, the Polish migration flows also possess their own peculiarities inconsistent with typical labour migration characteristics, namely, they are not the aftermath of prior penetration by institutions of the receiving country (on the contrary, they result from penetration of the receiving country by a political emigration from Poland); and they are not influenced by the kind of bilateral agreement that is often viewed as one of the key structural factors which shape migration flows.

Clandestine labour migration from Poland to Greece, Italy and Spain

Methodology This study is the result of ﬁeldwork carried out in Greece (1993), Italy (1994) and Spain (1995), mainly in the three capital cities. As will be apparent in the account which follows, the main ﬁeldwork was in Greece (three months); shorter visits were made to Rome and Madrid.2 Krystyna Romaniszyn 131

Various data-gathering techniques were employed in order to allow a multi-dimensional analysis with cross-checking of information. The Greek research involved in-depth interviewing, participant observation of undocumented Polish immigrants in the places where they concentrate and where various services are offered to them (the ‘Polish’ church, tavern, shop, travel agent and school/kindergarten), an examination of Catholic parish marriage records, and the reading of two Polish language weeklies issued in Athens. The Italian ﬁeldwork embraced interviews at the Polish consulate in Rome, a mini-survey carried out among 60 Polish undocumented in the Italian capital, and a literature and documentation search. Similarly in Madrid, interviews were carried out with the Polish consul and available documentation was consulted.

General characteristics of the migratory flows Economic migration to Greece, Italy and Spain – until recently, labour- exporting countries themselves – is a symptom and effect of broader migration pattern changes. Not long ago all of them were European emigration countries sending a substantial proportion of their labour force to the same Western European and overseas states.3 Recently this migration pattern has undergone fundamental changes: Greece, Italy and Spain are now considered as basically immigration countries receiving considerable flows of foreign workers, legal and undocumented, while Poland provides an example of both an emigration and an immigration country. In fact, the recent emigration of Poles was not an entirely new, post- Iron Curtain exodus. Despite restrictions imposed by the communist regime, emigration from Poland during the post-war decades was quite considerable. In the years 1956–60, 380,000 persons emigrated (Latuch, 1980); another 450,000 left during the 1960s and 1970s. A much larger exodus took place during the 1980s when 1.0–1.2 million persons left (Korcelli, 1994), significantly slowing the rate of Polish population growth. Immigration, on the other hand, is a new phenomenon in Poland and includes both legal and illegal labour migration. In both categories, persons from the former USSR dominate. For example in 1992, 1271 Ukrainian, 1032 Russian and 982 Belorussian citizens were granted work permits; together they constituted 43.3 per cent of all foreign workers. In recent years, Poland has also been receiving a growing, yet still unknown, number of illegal immigrants originating from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Asian countries, smuggled 132 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland mainly through the Ukraine and Belorussia. They are heading for Germany, but many of them end up in Polish refugee camps where most apply for asylum. Greece’s switch from a labour-exporting to a labour-importing country was accompanied by significant changes in the country’s labour market, as we saw from Chapter 3. In the 1970s the government adopted a limited policy of labour importation from Africa and Asia; by 1990, 0.6 per cent of the Greek population originated from the Third World. With full membership in the European Common Market (1981), a new institutional framework for the Greek labour market was set, allowing free labour mobility among the member countries. The recent immigration from Central and Eastern Europe marks yet another stage in Greek labour market developments. Various estimates claim the total number of migrants, mostly now originating from Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Egypt and the Philippines, to be between 350,000 and 500,000 persons (see Chapter 3). Labour migration into Greece occurs despite quite high unemployment in the country and a continuous process, lasting for many years, of significant transfer of labour from the agriculture sector to urban centres and tourist cities (McLean Petras and Kousis, 1988, p. 592). Spain, like other former out-migration countries of the Mediterranean region, has also begun to receive immigrants in recent years – in this case from the Maghreb, Central Africa (Senegal, Gambia), Latin America and the Philippines (Rocha-Trindade, 1993, p. 278). New migration currents from Central and Eastern Europe have also reached the Iberian Peninsula; it seems, however, that these numbers are relatively small. Aside from the push factors mentioned earlier, the onset of immigration flows was encouraged by the creation of new jobs and by the generally good prospects for development in Spain. This is a major consequence of the county’s entry into the European Union and its subsequent receipt of substantial Structural Funds designed to correct the imbalances in development of partner states. Spain, like Greece, receives labour migration flows despite the country’s high unemployment rate and regional chronic underdevelopment which itself generates considerable out-migration from regions like Andalusia and Extremadura. Italy started to become an immigration country in the late 1970s as a result of both economic development and the decline in the supply of low-skill labour due to improved educational qualifications and the sharply falling birth rate. Jointly these factors opened up job opportunities, often in the most menial sectors of employment, for foreign workers employed legally and illegally. They come from North Krystyna Romaniszyn 133 and Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and, latterly, from Eastern Europe. By 1995 the number of legally resident foreigners in the country approached 1 million.

Development of new migration routes In more than a hundred years of Polish migration history, routes have inevitably gone in western directions. Thus the question arises about the factors which caused the creation of the new, southern migration axis. The migration route from Poland to Greece was marked out by political emigration initiated after martial law was imposed in Poland in December 1981 (Romaniszyn, 1996, p. 321). Facilities provided for political immigrants were quickly utilized also by persons who left Poland basically for economic reasons.4 In effect, political migrants have played the role of pioneers for the labour migration which soon followed. A similar mechanism applies to the cases of economic migration from Poland to two other Southern European countries, Italy and Spain: they also followed the mid-1980s political exodus from Poland. After liberalization of the Spanish policy for refugees in 1987, Poles who declared themselves to be politically persecuted in their home country were offered shelter and pocket money along with the right to stay legally in the country until their emigration to the overseas countries of destination, most often the USA and Canada, could take place. In Spain they were soon joined by chiefly economic migrants. Similarly, migration from Poland to Italy on a large scale had started in the late 1980s (Cies´lin´ska, 1995, p. 35). According to a Polish source, based on information obtained from the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the years 1986–88 only 24 persons legally emigrated from Poland to Spain, and the figures for legal emigration to Italy and Greece were respectively 334 and 337 persons (Kurcz and Podkan´ski, 1991, p. 59). These numbers are relatively low when compared with migrants deemed ‘illegal’ according to the Polish authorities of that time, of whom 24,067 emigrated to Italy and 17,714 to Greece (Kurcz and Podkan´ski, 1991, p. 64).5 The Polish government defined as ‘illegal’ those immigrants who applied for a so-called tourist passport and did not return after the time declared for their visit abroad. Until 1989 Poles who asserted themselves to be political refugees were allowed to stay in Spain, Greece and Italy legally; they were placed in refugee camps, and expected to apply for overseas visas for onward emigration. These migrants were mostly young people who wanted to escape the oppression and absurdity of ‘real socialism’, and this is the reason why political incentives often merged with economic ones. Fundamental 134 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland changes initiated in Poland after 1989 prompted some of them to abandon their idea of overseas emigration and instead to prolong their stay in their first-asylum Mediterranean country, or return to Poland, or to become involved in to-and-fro or ‘pendulum’ labour migration, permitted by new regulations allowing non-visa travel between Poland and the Southern EU states. The three basic periods of migration from Poland to Italy distinguished by Cies´lin´ska (1995, p. 39) seem to apply equally well to the two other cases: the ‘Solidarity’ wave of 1981–86; the refugee–economic wave of 1987–88; and the more extensive labour migration which began after 1989. As a result of this sequence, Polish labourers entered the Greek, Italian and Spanish labour markets after 1989 mainly as undocumented workers. Their ‘undocumented status’ has been tolerated as long as they are not involved in criminal activity, though such cases sometimes do occur. In Spain, crimes committed against compatriots include black- mailing and illegal, paid recruitment for work; those directed against the host society include car robbery and document forgery (Nalewajko, 1998). Annually, some 1000–2000 Poles are expelled from Spain due to being charged with a crime. In Greece, the number of those expelled is relatively low and crimes are almost always directed against fellow Poles. According to the Greek Ministry of Public Order, during 1987–91 only 1985 Polish undocumented were made to leave Greece.6 On the other hand, the common forms of exploiting the Polish undocumented immigrants in the three countries under discussion include rates of pay lower than pre-arranged, later than agreed-upon payments, and/or harsh working conditions.

Numbers of Polish undocumented immigrants in Greece, Italy and Spain Lack of valid data makes it impossible to establish the exact number of undocumented Poles in the specified countries. The spatial mobility of these migrants, as well as the unrecorded influx of seasonal workers from Poland, add to the difficulty of fixing their number. As a result only crude estimates exist. In Greece, the existing estimates differ greatly; some claim that in 1993 there were approximately 100,000 Polish undocumented workers (Petrinioti, 1993), while others have stated that there were 30,000 in the country in the same year (Panoi, 1993). Certainly, the number of Poles legally settled in Greece is not high. Both the Greek Ministry of Public Order and the Polish Statistical Office state that around 13,000–15,000 Poles lived in this country in the early 1990s. According to Italian estimates, Polish illegal labour migrants compose Krystyna Romaniszyn 135 some 80 per cent of the Poles who live in the country (Cies´lin´ska, 1995, p. 36); in 1990 there were as many as 17,000 Poles legally settled in Italy; by 1996 further entrants and regularisations had increased the number to 27,375 (Caritas di Roma, 1997, p. 68). As for Spain, the Polish consulate in Madrid estimates that in 1996 some 10,000 Poles were legally staying while the figure for the Polish undocumented there oscillated between 8000 and 20,000 persons (Nalewajko, 1998).

Migration incentives As the neoclassical theory of migration states, there are clear push and pull factors for the above migration flows. The Polish undocumented in Greece, Italy and Spain take advantage of job opportunities in these countries’ parallel economies, attracted by the wages available there. For them, jobs abroad, even illegal and lower-paid ones, are still more profitable than work in their home town or village. Economic factors which push these workers from Poland to (among other places) South European countries are lack of work, of one’s own flat, and of life opportunities. These problems are especially acute in the peripheral regions of south-eastern and eastern Poland.7 Indeed, the Polish undocumented migrants who seek paid jobs in Italy, Greece and Spain generally originate from the small towns or villages of these very regions. It has been possible to establish that some migrants to both Greece and Spain come from exactly the same places in Poland: Mielec and Nowa De¸ba in south-eastern, and Bielawa in south-western Poland (Nalewajko, 1998; Romaniszyn, 1996). The above finding demonstrates the emergence of specific ‘migration regions’ which supply workers on a regular basis to foreign labour markets. It also indicates that in these regions a migration culture has developed which manifests itself in a widespread acceptance of migration for earning money. Being a valued pattern of behaviour, it may well turn into a local social norm. In addition, it indicates the formation of migration networks and chain migration from the specified places to Greece and Spain. Moreover, typical of post-organized capitalism’s migration patterns, the Polish undocumented mainly head for the capital or larger cities in the host countries. In Spain they concentrate in Madrid and its immediate surroundings; some go to Toledo, Avila, Valencia or Barcelona. In Italy they stay in Rome, the nearby town of Latina, and Capua near Naples. In Greece they live mainly in Athens; smaller numbers go to Kalamata, Thessaloniki, other towns and rural and touristic areas. 136 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland

Job opportunities The prime concern of undocumented workers is to earn as much as possible in the shortest possible time. In the host countries they undertake the best-paying job they can find in the parallel economy, thus contributing to its further development. Because these workers are unregistered and their exact number remains unknown, it is impossible to estimate the relative proportions of men and women or of workers in the different job categories. Nevertheless, there are some indications which allow for cautious generalizations. In Greece the Polish undocumented fill two occupational niches: construction for men, and domestic service for women (Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). To some extent this job ‘distribution’ is due to the development of chain migration as relatives, friends and neighbours are recruited for work and recommended to Greek employers. In other cases, jobs are simply ‘transferred’ between persons returning to and newcomers coming from Poland.8 In effect, a chain of migrants arrives to carry out certain jobs in the Greek parallel economy which would not have happened without the co-operation of Greek employers. Indeed, the peculiarity of this chain migration lies in the fact that it is heading exclusively for the underground economy and this is probably why it does not lead to the monopolization of a chosen economic niche or to the formation of a highly visible ‘ethnic economic enclave’ (Werbner, 1987), as is the rule for typical chain migrations. In addition to the two occupational specializations mentioned above, there is a good deal of seasonal work carried out by undocumented Poles in hotels, restaurants and agriculture. My fieldwork shows that similar patterns have been established in the two other receiving countries. In Spain, Polish women as a rule undertake domestic services, while the range of jobs in which male workers are employed is wider. They undertake jobs in small Spanish and emerging Polish construction firms; they also work as loaders in shopping malls or wholesale firms, or as deliverers, mainly of gas bottles. Very few Polish immigrants are employed in Spanish agriculture or the tourist industry, however (Nalewajko, 1998). A similar model has been detected in Italy where Polish women work as domestic servants or baby-sitters and men are employed in construction firms (Cies´lin´ska, 1995, p. 36). The phenomenon of the creation of new occupational positions by the immigrants themselves has been noticed in literature (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 173). For instance, in Spain this is represented by the establishment of Polish construction firms, which is also occurring among the Poles in Athens. However, in both these cases, it is unusual Krystyna Romaniszyn 137 that job-creation activity has been successfully undertaken by the undocumented. Athens, the site of probably the greatest concentration of Polish workers in Southern Europe, provides room for such economic behaviour which is exploited by a handful of enterprising Poles. The economic initiative displayed by them, resulting in job creation, consists of selling various services to compatriots. Among the offerings are teaching – in the Polish primary school and kindergartens or in private English courses; child care – in private, home kindergartens; hairdressing – in private home-studios; home equipment mending; and video taping – most often of wedding receptions, the number of which is now quite considerable. The study carried out in Greece led to the conclusion that the Polish undocumented were largely employed and worked within Greek families in small family firms (Romaniszyn, 1996). Men are employed in family firms in the private sector of the Greek economy, while women work in Greek middle-class families, often with small children or elderly people, employed as domestics, baby-sitters or nurses. In agriculture and in the service industry, where other job opportunities for the undocumented exist, they are also employed on family farms, or in family-run hotels and restaurants. This employment of Polish undocumented workers within Greek families and/or family businesses is the most characteristic feature of their insertion into the labour market in Greece. On the whole, the jobs undertaken by the Polish undocumented in all three of these Mediterranean countries are not much below their formal qualifications, since basically they are primary or vocational school graduates. The only exceptions are seasonal migrants, among whom are many students of secondary and higher schools. However, in general Poles are perceived as much better educated. This may be due to the fact that the Polish workers often quickly learn the basics of the host country’s language which helps them to communicate, to find and keep a job, and to adjust to the society. In Spain there is a particularly positive stereotype of Polish migrants, who are perceived as industrious, intelligent, and reliable workers. Besides that, the fact that they are white European Catholics further brings them closer to their Spanish hosts. Indeed, the Poles who advertise their availability for employment in local newspapers stress their nationality on purpose (Nalewajko, 1998), which serves as a clear indicator of their good standing in Spanish society. In Greek society, the stereotype of the Poles also seems to be positive; however, among East Europeans, the Russians are more liked and welcomed because of religious and historical links, whereas the 138 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland

Albanians have become increasingly vilified and negatively stereotyped (see Chapter 8; also Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). The work experience of the Polish undocumented in all three countries seems to be on the whole good, which is confirmed by their constant inflow. Despite occasional tensions or cases of exploitation by a deceptive employer, it seems that rather friendly relations prevail. Nevertheless, the jobs undertaken in the host countries are valued above all with reference to the material profits they bring, and to the consumption they allow.

Consumption theories: a new perspective for labour migration studies

My argument in this final section of the chapter is that an important basis for the explanation of labour migration – largely overlooked by migration theoreticians – is provided by emerging perspectives on the notion of consumption. There are different dimensions of consumption evident in existing theoretical approaches, each of which is worthy of consideration as a potential explanatory factor for labour migration. For instance, Douglas and Isherwood (1979) view consumers not merely as passive actors responding to the social environments which affect their individual savings and consumption, but as those who really exercise a free choice in this area. Individual consumption ‘starts where the market ends’ and the use of goods ‘is beyond commerce and free within law’ (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979, pp. 56–7). However, consumption is also stimulated by a ‘spread-of-infection’ rule which implies that people buy what they see their friends buying. This reveals a social dimension of the phenomenon – namely that consumption is a social affair which serves the making and maintaining of social relationships. This is the point of view explicitly adopted by Appadurai (1986) for whom consumption is social, rational and active, and not private, atomic or passive; which implies that consumption is a means of communication, or, as Bourdieu says, consumption is a stage in the process of communication (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 2). Appadurai further asserts that consumption is socially or culturally controlled: ‘modern consumers are the victims of the velocity of fashion as surely as primitive consumers are the victims of the stability of sumptuary law’ (Appadurai, 1986, p. 32). The notion of pressure to consume as being typical for modern societies is also emphasized by other scholars. ‘The sense that one has no choice not to consume is a Krystyna Romaniszyn 139 version of the feeling that one has no choice not to make a choice’, comments Marilyn Strathern for whom ‘prescriptive consumerism dictates that there is no choice but to always exercise choice’ (1990, pp. 6–7). From this perspective commodities, especially luxury goods, are viewed as incarnated signs – demand for which is left to the play of the marketplace and fashion (Appadurai, 1986, p. 38). Also for Miller, modern culture produces goods largely as symbols of wealth and fashion (Miller, 1987, p. 189). Being in this sense symbolic, these goods are, at the same time, pure commodities to be purchased, provided there are funds to do so, and labour migration is one means to access such funds. Consumption objects obtain their social meaning (for instance as symbols of wealth) from a cultural milieu; consumption expresses culture, and generates it. As Douglas and Isherwood (1979, p. 57) put it, referring to culture in its general sense, ‘consumption is the very arena in which culture is fought over and licked into shape’. In the cases discussed in this chapter, the consumption styles adopted become that part of a migrant’s way of life which is perceived by the host society, and by which migrants express their ethnic culture. Thus, consumption and consumer goods are needed for presenting oneself within a group and within the outside world: ‘within the available time and space the individual uses consumption to say something about himself, his family, his locality, whether in town or country, on vacation or at home’ (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979, p. 68). Summarizing, consumption appears as a meaningful and powerful social activity which serves the making and maintaining of social relationships and networks. It results from individual choices, but is socially and culturally controlled as goods, apart from their utility, convey symbolic information about consumers. All in all, consumption plays an important role in defining the self and creating social relationships and may be viewed as a search for an adequate objectification of oneself in a given social milieu. Such arguments on the individual, social and cultural dimensions of consumption presented here provide yet another valuable theoretical context for the analysis of labour migration, both in general and for the cases discussed in this chapter. Thus the question arises: In what way may they add to a better understanding of the migration phenomenon? First, consumption theories allow for further development of the idea already present in the literature on migration of ‘the culture of migration’ (Gmelch, 1987; Rocha-Trindade, 1993). The establishment 140 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland of local, distinctive standards of consumption along with a strong consumption pressure ‘puts into motion’ those who are not able to meet these standards. This creates the migration drive. In effect, a new and valued pattern of behaviour emerges in the origin society which is migration for earning money. Subsequently, a new social norm is established which compels persons to migrate. These processes, related to consumption, actively shape a local culture of migration, so that labour migration may even be treated as a rite of passage, one means by which people make their transition to adulthood and social prestige (Gmelch, 1987, p. 266). Secondly, consumption theories allow for a deeper understanding of migration incentives. Driven by economic necessity, labour migrants nevertheless adopt different strategies with respect to ‘the mode of spending’ their savings which can be explained with reference to consumption choices and obligations. Some labour migrants devote a considerable part of their earnings to immediate consumption, whereas others tend to economize, even at the expense of their immediate needs. At this stage it is important to introduce a proposed differentiation between immediate and postponed consumption. This distinction certainly applies well to the consumption choices of Polish migrant labourers, but may also have more general value. Immediate consumption takes place in the host country and may be judged by migrants’ housing, means of entertainment and, more generally, by their way of life – as observed during fieldwork. Postponed consumption takes place in the home town or village upon the migrants’ return or, in the meantime, by use of the migrants’ remittances. It serves to raise the migrants’ and their families’ standard of living, and to tighten social relationships with peer groups or neighbours due to the sharing of goods or an invitation to share in the consumption. This may take the form of gifts and party-giving, money-lending, and so on. For its part, postponed consumption sets or effectively adds to the shape of the local standards of consumption which, in turn, may compel others to migrate in search of funds to meet these newly established consumption levels and therefore, social requirements. Thus, postponed consumption plays a key role in the development of the culture of migration. Fieldwork carried out in Greece revealed some of the immediate consumption choices made by the Polish undocumented immigrants in Athens. Their identifiable residential locality is the Kypseli district in the centre of the city where accommodation prices are moderate. Poles rent flats, apartments and walk-out basements. The strategy employed sometimes is to rent a bigger apartment and share it with Krystyna Romaniszyn 141 others, so that each person or couple has a room of their own. The different choices made with regard to accommodation reveal migrants’ preferences on when and how much is to be spent on immediate consumption. The same is also true in the case of spending on entertainment and various available services. The existence and prosperity of several Greek taverns and discos expressis verbis inviting Polish guests, of shops offering Polish goods, and of Greek travel agencies offering Saturday and Sunday tours with Polish-speaking guides confirm that there are Polish workers who do not economize on immediate consumption. One of their objectives, hence, is clearly to enjoy their stay in a host country which, to use one of the interviewees’ expressions, is viewed as ‘warm and nice’. Those driven by the desire to save as much as possible do economize during their stay in Greece, planning to compensate for their present hard labour with deferred consumption back in the home country. Their postponed consumption back in the home town or village in Poland is to a great extent influenced by consumption standards adopted by their peer group, and in some migratory regions, by the pressure to share consumption goods with kin, friends and neighbours. On the other hand, an objective factor which influences the consumption choices of labour migrants is the level of underdevelopment in their home region. If there is a permanent structural obstacle to investment, consumption may be the only and best alternative for those who come back with some funds. In some places in Poland migrant workers find themselves in a situation similar to that which Greek returned migrants have found in some Greek areas: ‘the uneven regional development and stunted industrial growth which pushed these workers abroad are also responsible for the narrowly limited employment options which they face once they repatriate’ (McLean Petras and Kousis, 1988, p. 586). The same situation in some Polish areas of out-migration compels those who return to spend their funds on consumption rather than invest them, for instance in a family firm or farm. In fact, in such a structural setting, building one’s own house, which is quite a common practice among Polish repatriates, may be the best and safest investment. Hence, the structural context of economic underdevelopment presents a kind of trap for returnees, compelling them to use their funds for consumption which is in fact regarded as investment. Other important factors which influence investment–consumption choices are inflation and exchange rates. Generally in the 1990s, due to current inflation and exchange rates, remittances are too low to allow for significant investment back in Poland such as in establishing a new firm or in farm modernization. 142 Clandestine Labour Migration from Poland

Finally, it may be assumed that work performed by the Polish migrants does not have much, if any, value or meaning in itself; all its meaning stems from the immediate and/or expected consumption it allows. This implies that, in regard to self-identity, work performed in Greece, Italy or Spain has but little significance. There are, however, exceptions. Two informants working in Greece as construction workers with private family firms stressed and valued the fact that they are given complicated tasks which require their creativity and independent thinking. In their case, job satisfaction adds to the consumption satisfaction their earnings provide; in most other cases job satisfaction is probably superseded by consumption satisfaction. For all involved, labour migration means a temporary downward social mobility with regard to legal status. For those who accept jobs below their formal training level it also means downward mobility with regard to employment. There is also some temporary economic deprivation for those who have chosen postponed consumption. In the long run, migrant entrepreneurship is an avenue for economic and social ascent back in the home country, but this option tends to be difficult for immigrants who have an ‘illegal’ status. For the majority of Polish workers in Southern Europe, at least for the time being, the attrac- tiveness of paid work undertaken abroad amounts to the consumption satisfaction – be it postponed or immediate – that it allows.

Notes 1. I use the terms ‘parallel’ or ‘informal’ economy more or less interchangeably. Although these terms have been given different definitions and inter- pretations by different scholars, I have chosen an interpretation which seems to be most representative and ‘neutral’, avoiding conveying negative judgements. For more detailed discussion of the informal economy in the Southern European context see Chapter 2 of the present book. 2. The three fieldwork studies were not strictly co-ordinated on a comparable basis and hence their findings are not entirely comparable. 3. Just a few figures to back up this point: between 1955 and 1977 more than 1.2 million persons left Greece, equivalent to 13 per cent of the Greek population (Lianos, 1993, p. 249); emigration from Spain was also considerable, legal emigration to Europe alone was over 890,000 during the decade 1962–72 (Rocha-Trindade, 1993, p. 265); while Italy has ‘exported’ more than 26 million Italians during the century between 1861 and 1961 (Rosoli, 1993, p. 281). 4. It should be mentioned that the repatriation of some 5000 Greeks from Poland in the late 1970s might also have triggered subsequent labour migration. The repatriates were mostly the children of Greeks granted asylum in Poland during 1948–56. After repatriation they maintained links with their Polish friends who may thus have been encouraged subsequently to emigrate to Greece. Krystyna Romaniszyn 143

5. The number of Polish citizens who ‘illegally’ emigrated to Spain in this period is not specified. 6. I do not have access to any information regarding the deportation of undocumented Poles in Italy. 7. In many individual cases, the wish to escape some kind of family crisis also acts as a ‘mute’ push factor. 8. In Greece, the practice of ‘inheriting’ a job from a relative or friend – a prime result of chain migration – is accompanied by two other ways of getting a job developed among the Polish undocumented. They are the buying or exchanging of jobs; more precisely, the object of transactions between these compatriots is information about a vacant position. In Athens, women may also buy information regarding domestic jobs from a few Greek labour offices – in 1993, the price was 10,000 drachmas, the equivalent of some US$40 (as a rule, the money is paid in advance). Another practice of exchanging jobs, often a male job for a domestic one or vice versa, is adopted especially when a partner is brought to Greece. These practices prove how much a paid job in Greece, or rather its financial rewards, are valued by these workers.

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Latuch, M. (1980) Socio-economic Demography. Warsaw: PWN. (in Polish). Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Economies of Signs and Space. London: Sage Publications. Lazaridis, G. and Romaniszyn, K. (1998) ‘Albanian and Polish undocumented workers in Greece: a comparative analysis’, Journal of European Social Policy 8, pp. 5–22. Lianos, T. (1993) ‘Greece: waning of the labour migration’ in Kubat, D. (ed.) The Politics of Migration Policies. New York: Center for Migration Studies, pp. 249–61. McLean Petras, E. and Kousis, M. (1988) ‘Returning migrant characteristics and labour market demand in Greece’, International Migration Review 22, pp. 586–608. Miller, D. (1987) Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Miller, M. and Denemark, R. (1993) Migration and World Politics: A Critical Case for Theory and Policy. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Nalewajko, M. (1998) ‘New Polish migration to Spain’, Migration and Society 3, Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science, in press (in Polish). Petrinioti, X. (1993) Immigration into Greece. Athens: Odysseas. Panoi, A. (1993) ‘Immigration into Greece’, Kathemerini, 2 December, p. 8 (in Greek). Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. (1989) ‘Contemporary immigration: theoretical perspectives on its determinants and modes of incorporation’, International Migration Review 23, pp. 606–30. Rocha-Trindade, M. (1993) ‘Portugal and Spain: culture of migration’ in Kubat, D. (ed.) The Politics of Migration Policies. New York: Center for Migration Studies, pp. 262–80. Romaniszyn, K. (1996) ‘The invisible community: undocumented Polish workers in Athens’, New Community 22, pp. 321–33. Rosoli, G. (1993) ‘Italy: emergent immigration policy’ in Kubat, D. (ed.) The Politics of Migration Policies. New York: Center for Migration Studies, pp. 281–306. Strathern, M. (1990) ‘Enterprising kinship: consumer choice and the new reproductive technologies’, Cambridge Anthropology 14, pp. 1–12. Werbner, P. (1987) ‘Enclave economies and family ﬁrms: Pakistani traders in a British city’ in Eades, J. (ed.) Migrants, Workers and the Social Order. London: Tavistock, pp. 213–33. Part III Gender Relations and Social Exclusion 7 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe: Social Exclusion, Domestic Work and Prostitution in Italy Giovanna Campani

Introduction

The feminization of migration flows is an important trend in contemporary international migration. Women are playing an increasingly important role in all types of migration in all regions of the world (Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 8). Female migration is part of a global change in migratory phenomena affecting both the sending and the receiving countries. In the sending countries, ‘emigration is one aspect of the social crisis which accompanies integration into the world market and modernisation’ (Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 3). In addition, urbanization in these countries deeply modifies lifestyles and gender roles. In the receiving countries – and nowhere is this more true than in Southern Europe – changes in the labour market and the production system have affected the demand for labour, which is growing in the tertiary sector and reduced in the industrial sector. At the same time, the informal economy is growing and developing. In this new economic landscape, the demand for female labour in the tertiary sector, including services to private persons, has increased. Hence the feminization of migration into Southern Europe corresponds rather precisely to this increase in demand for workers to fill ‘female’ jobs. This chapter analyses the condition of immigrant women in Southern Europe based on recent research in Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain.1 It tries in particular to document and understand their vulnerability, for which it is necessary to focus on their situation in the labour market, on the phenomenon of trafficking, and on the actions of immigrant women in their networks and families.

147 148 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe

Immigrant women coming to Southern Europe are mainly workers. Family reunification is at an early stage and the available data show that, even when they enter for family reunion, i.e. following their husbands, women soon begin to work (Caritas di Roma, 1997, pp. 151–5). But they begin to work in a strongly gendered labour market which narrows their opportunities considerably: domestic work and the sex trade are two key sectors which will be explored later in this chapter. The development of the sex trade as a global industry has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the trafficking of women which, as we shall see in the case of Southern Europe, is linked to networks involving specific ethnic groups. The sexual exploitation of immigrant women forced into prostitution represents the highest degree of vulnerability, as well as a brutal combination of sexism and racism. Domestic service also means discrimination and exclusion, but my field research demonstrates also the capacity of immigrant women to cope with such conditions in order to succeed in their individual and family migratory projects. Immigrant women can use their role as money-earners to achieve a different position within their families and hence modify gender roles. In the case of several groups, notably the Filipinas and Cape Verdeans, women are the clear majority in their respective national communities: this often means a female-dominated associative life. But the point also needs to be made that immigrant women’s trajectories are very varied and cannot be reduced to simplified stereotypes or generalizations: there are many complex articulations between their positions in the labour market and in the family, both in Southern Europe and in their home countries.

What representations for immigrant women in Southern Europe?

For many years, the dominant representations in Europe have privileged men as the main actors and decision-makers of migration, largely through their participation in paid work in the industrial countries and their supposed leading role in the integration process. As the critique of Phizacklea (1983) has shown, women have been made invisible in the migration process because their mobility was regarded as secondary and family-bound, their participation in the labour market was thought to be marginal, and their role in the integration process was subordinated to men and to social workers. Such a representation corresponded to a type of migration which was mainly concerned with the organized state recruitment of temporary migrant workers (mainly from Southern Giovanna Campani 149

Europe) for the industrial and construction sectors in Northern Europe. Such a policy considered immigrants as a male labour force without women or children. This model of temporary labour migration functioned only for a short time and in any case failed to prevent the stable settlement of immigrant groups (Castles et al., 1984), particularly after the ‘recruitment-stop’ of the mid-1970s left family reunion as the only legitimate channel for non-EEC citizens to get into Europe. A consequence of the stabilization process was a rapid increase in the number of female immigrants, most of whom arrived through family reunification laws which continued to be ‘entirely constructed around the ideology of the patriarchal nuclear family’ (Women, Immigration and Nationality Group, 1985, p. 2). After the establishment of more or less permanent immigrant communities, migration researchers began to focus on immigrant women and on their role as key actors in the dynamics of integration. Nevertheless, the representations of these women continued to be stereotyped and to use the ‘tradition–modernity’ dichotomy as the main conceptual tool for documenting the passage from the traditional, passive migrant woman to the immigrant seeking a Western model of life. More recently, this over-simplistic linear model has been challenged. Feminist research showed that so-called sexual roles changed from one culture to another and therefore could not be produced by the ‘natural and universal’ difference of sex (Moore, 1988). Further, the critique by black feminism of white feminism’s essentialized, almost ‘naturalized’ model of women, and the inter- connection of race, gender and class (as well as of racism and sexism), have encouraged a much more subtle and complex appreciation of the relationship between migration, social change and gender roles, and have led to the abandonment of the model of Western culture as the only possible context for the emancipation of immigrant women (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). In the last decade, the image has changed yet again. The feminization of international migration, linked to the corresponding increase in demand for female workers on the global labour market, has led to new research approaches which are being followed particularly in the new immigration countries of Southern Europe. Now, migration takes place less and less through official recruitment policies. The flows are no longer attracted by an overall quantitative imbalance in the employment markets of the receiving countries, but rather by sectoral imbalances related to the segmentation of the labour market, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2. This is clearly the case in Southern Europe where, 150 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe despite the high rate of unemployment among indigenous workers, there are specific labour market areas where there is a high demand for immigrant workers, and especially for female employees. In this new migratory setting, women migrate more and more alone, for work purposes, taking migration decisions both individually and in the context of their families. However, the realities of Southern Europe’s segmented and gendered labour market forces a large majority of them into a narrow range of ‘female’ jobs – as maids, nurses, ‘entertainers’, etc. Domestic help and the sex trade absorb a large share of the new female migratory flows, and these two sectors are the focus for the rest of this chapter.

Domestic work

In Southern Europe, migration and gender cannot be analysed according to the conceptual frame which inspired family reunion laws: a dominant role for men in the labour market and in integration processes; a subordinate position for women inside the family. In the case of Italy, the ﬁrst immigrants (in the 1960s and 1970s) were female domestic servants from the Philippines and Cape Verde; both in Italy and Spain, some national groups are comprised mainly of women. The most recent Italian data for those in possession of ‘permits to stay’ show that in 1996, 67 per cent of Filipinos in Italy were female, 66 per cent of Poles, 70 per cent of Peruvians, 71 per cent of Brazilians, 85 per cent of persons from the Dominican Republic, 66 per cent of Somalians, 74 per cent of Colombians, 71 per cent of Ethiopians, 85 per cent of Cape Verdeans, etc. (Caritas di Roma, 1997, p. 102, listing the groups in decreasing order of size). As we saw in Chapter 1, one of the key reasons for the high demand for domestic helpers in Southern Europe is the increasing rates of professional activity and mobility among Southern European women themselves, combined with the deﬁcit in social services to support working women. The Italian sociologist Enrico Pugliese reinforces this point, and then adds another important element:

On the one hand, the recourse to maids is a necessity, forced by the lack of social services in our country: families with just one parent or with both parents working are forced to look for this type of service. On the other hand, the preference for the archaic type of relationship with the maid, available all day long, expresses a certain type of mentality – the wish to reafﬁrm old habits which, Giovanna Campani 151

with the civil development of our country since the 1960s, seemed largely to have been left behind. (Pugliese, 1991, p. 57)

Although Pugliese was referring speciﬁcally to the Italian case, these points can be equally applied to other Southern European countries. This archaic relationship of master–servant can also be interpreted as the product of an over-rapid and incomplete ‘modernization’, without the progressive interiorization of the values of what one might term the ‘social-democratic’ model of the industrial or post-industrial society. Hence, it is not by chance that live-in domestic workers have practically disappeared in Sweden or Denmark, whereas the South European small and middle bourgeoisie, with their recently acquired high living standards, consider the maid as a new sort of status symbol. Paradoxically, this mentality combines old with new: it corresponds with the new ideologies of the free market, privatization and individualism, whose gloriﬁcation serves to obscure servility. The present policies of reining back on state expenditure and of privatizing public services have curtailed the development of social support for children and old people. They have indirectly encouraged the private development of these services to South European households, particularly those containing economically active women. Thus the recourse to immigrant maids by the women of the ‘rich world’ of Southern Europe (and elsewhere, of course) poses fundamental questions about the relationships between gender, race and class. In particular:

● Are women of rich countries who enjoy the possibility of having an interesting professional life by employing foreign domestic help contributing to the oppression of women from poor countries? ● Does the present phase of welfare cuts and market forces bring about a polarization between the increasing numbers of ‘white’ women in professional careers and ‘ethnic’ women in service? ● Does migration necessarily mean ‘progress’ from the ‘rural archaism’ of sending societies, with its patriarchy and oppression, to ‘emancipation’ in ‘the West’ (Tienda and Booth, 1991)? ● What, therefore, are the real gains for the immigrant domestic helpers of Southern Europe?

Answers to these questions are inevitably complex, and must be contextualized according to the specific origins of the women, since 152 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe migrant maids are of several different national origins. Moreover women of some national origins are more ‘migratory’ than others, and more specialized than others in services to private households. Some of the key nationalities are women from the Philippines, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Mauritius and El Salvador. The Cape Verde Islands have a long tradition of exporting maids to the rich families of Italy, dating back to the 1960s; the Catholic Church, especially the Capucin Fathers, played an important role in channelling this migration (Andall, 1998). Eritrea, an ex-Italian colony, was also one of the first countries to send migrant maids to Italy. The civil war in Eritrea later provoked a flow of refugees who found jobs as maids, partly helped by their co-nationals who were already settled in Italy. A more recent flow of Somalian women, most of whom have also found work as maids, resulted from the tragic events of a civil war in another of Africa’s strife-torn countries. Significant numbers of domestic helpers also come from Latin American countries; for Italy El Salvador has been a traditional source since the 1970s, while Peruvians have become more important in recent years. In Italy data from INPS, the National Institute for Social Security, indicate 220,000 non-Italian maids in 1989; these data are only for legally registered domestic workers. The female-dominated national groups who have become specialized in exporting domestic workers – chiefly those from the Philippines and Cape Verde but also from Eritrea and Somalia – are those who are reported to be ‘better integrated’ and to give ‘less problems’, according to the common but probably superficial view. Because maids are perceived as necessary in Italian society, they are rarely the object of overt racist acts, although, as noted above, the notion of ‘possession’ of an ‘exotic’ foreign maid does contain a strong element of racial stereotyping. Moreover, their confinement to the condition of ‘live-in’ servant can last many years and prevents any trajectory of promotion. Some domestic workers, however, are able to move out and establish a grouping of other domestic helpers to rent an apartment. Particularly for those who are live-in domestics, networks of friends are very important. Domestic workers who have left their families in their home countries are generally supported by a ‘friendship group’ composed of female family members (sisters, cousins, aunts) and of friends, usually from the same village. The friendship group meets two or three times a week during the maids’ free time; typical meeting- places are a square, a railway station, an association, a church or a Giovanna Campani 153 mosque. The key role of friendship groups in the social life of maids can hardly be over-stressed (Campani, 1995; Andall, 1998). Friendship groups often represent family migratory chains composed and directed solely by women; they constitute a basis for mutual solidarity and for the improvement of life conditions in the receiving country; and they provide the possibility for a group of domestic workers to club together and rent an apartment. Furthermore the development of migrant associations where women are members and leaders, and the types of roles and initiatives taken by these female community leaders, represent an interesting and relatively new phenomenon which certainly deserves further study. The influence on the family of origin seems to vary according to ethnic group. As far as the Somalian women are concerned, it still seems quite limited. The Filipino case is different: here women acquire through their migration an important role in all family decision- making processes, notably with regard to how remittances are used. My research shows that, especially for this national group, migration seems to have reinforced the status of the women, thanks above all to the availability of money. Of course, individual cases vary but in general we can begin to observe a process whereby migrant women eclipse the authority of the father or grandfather of the family. This new autonomy is some compensation for the separation involved in migration, particularly for women who are separated from their husbands and children. Another interesting set of trends concerns family reunion. Family reunification in Italy is extremely rare for the Cape Verdeans; husbands and menfolk migrate to other countries such as Portugal or the Netherlands or work as sailors on Dutch or German ships (Andall, 1998, p. 137). It is still quite limited for the Filipino community, which is still more than two-thirds female (Cape Verde is 85 per cent). These percentages are surprisingly high given the relatively long-established nature of the migration link to Italy from these two countries; on the other hand the high female proportions reflect the well-developed occupational specialisation of these two nationalities in the labour market segment of domestic service and the self-reinforcing role of women as ‘leaders’ in the migration process – Chell (1997), for example, describes how some Filipina domestic workers return home after a few years to make way for their daughters’ migration to Italy. A further difficulty with female-sponsored family reunion is the shortage of male employment in the big cities where the women work. An example of this difficulty is given by the uneasiness expressed by 154 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe

Somalian men: in this community the women work as domestic cleaners or live-in maids, whilst the men are often unemployed, spending their days discussing the situation in their home country (see also Chell, 1997). Overall, despite the fact that 39 per cent of immigrant women living in Italy are married, it seems that the process of family reuniﬁcation where the women call for their husbands (who, according to Italian law, have to wait one year before getting a work permit) is less common than in male-dominated groups.2

Migration, trafﬁcking and the sex trade

The final and longest section of the chapter is dedicated to the questions of trafficking and sexual exploitation of immigrant women. The treatment of these issues is more extended because of the lack of existing published research. What follows is based on Italian field research carried out in 1996. This research involved 50 girls, prostitutes and former prostitutes, of various nationalities (Nigerians, Albanians, Ukrainians, Serbians, Hungarians, Colombians, Peruvians), plus 18 ‘expert witnesses’ – social workers, police officers, journalists, lawyers, etc. A first question concerns numbers. Despite its widespread nature and social visibility, prostitution is not covered by official surveys and as a result the dimensions of the phenomenon are virtually unknown. What I present here is the first quantitative and qualitative reconnais- sance. Further difficulties of estimation arise because of the geographical dispersion of prostitution, the high geographical mobility of the women involved, and their often irregular legal status. The estimates set out in Table 7.1 are drawn up on the basis of a whole series of conversations, consultations, discussions and seminars with persons involved in the trade, either directly or as key informants, in the areas of greatest concentration. I stress that the estimates are only indicative, but they have been cross-checked and are generally the average of the various estimates given by knowledgeable informants. The wide range of estimates partly reflects this inevitable approxima- tion in the methodology, and partly the seasonal nature of the phenomenon, especially in places like Rome and Rimini. This micro- census of the main areas has been extrapolated to the other areas of the country on a proportionate basis (that is, based on the hypothesis that the distribution of foreign prostitutes is not dissimilar from the distribution of the foreign population as a whole) in order to arrive at Giovanna Campani 155

Table 7.1 Estimates of the numbers and distribution of foreign prostitutes in Italy

Regions and towns Minimum Maximum Lombardy 3 500 4 500 Milan 2 000 2 500 Brescia 800 1 000 Piedmont 1 200 1 800 Turin 700 900 Veneto 800 1 200 Venice 500 800 Vicenza 150 200 Emilia-Romagna 1 200 1 800 Bologna 500 800 Rimini 400 600 Ravenna 200 400 Latium 4 000 5 000 Rome 3 000 3 500 Latina 500 700 Campania 1 500 2 000 Naples 1 000 1 200 Caserta 300 500 Abruzzo 600 800 Teramo 200 300 Other regions 6 000 8 000 Regional summary North 8 100 11 300 Centre 5 600 7 000 South 5 100 6 800 Total Italy 18 800 25 100

an overall national estimate which, as Table 7.1 shows, is of the order of 19,000–25,000. Lombardy and Latium, and their respective cities Milan and Rome, are the areas of major concentration of prostitutes; these two regions contain nearly 40 per cent of the total. The third largest cluster is to be found in the region of Campania, mostly in the city of Naples and its surroundings, for instance Baia Domizia along the northern coast and inland to Caserta. Many northern cities each contain several hundred foreign prostitutes: Venice, Bologna, Rimini, Brescia, Turin, etc. Elsewhere – from a strictly numerical point of view – the phenomenon of foreign prostitution seems to be more restricted, conﬁned mainly to the provincial capitals. 156 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe

Types of geographical mobility It was noted above that one of the characteristics of prostitutes which makes their enumeration difﬁcult is their high degree of geographical mobility. Although some groups remain anchored to their habitual ‘residence’, others move from one area to another on the basis of their expectation of work possibilities. Some groups move regularly from their place of habitual domicile to the areas in which they work, perhaps on a weekly or monthly basis. Others move in a more complex and rotational manner; in these cases periods of three or four months or even a year can pass before the girls return to their habitual residence, often punctuated by brief periods of settlement in intermediate locations according to the dictates of the organisation which they are a part of. To be more systematic, we can recognise two typologies, one on the basis of the type of geographical mobility and the other according to the type of organisation involved. Regarding geographical area and the duration of the move, we can identify four types:

● daily commuting from one municipality or province to another, between the domicile and the place of work; ● forms of longer-distance and longer-duration commuting involving transfers of a week or a fortnight and the occupation of temporary lodgings away from the normal residential base; ● forms of movement ranging across longer distances (inter-regional or even international) involving a temporary change of domicile for one or a few months, for example to areas with a heavy concentration of seasonal tourists; ● more complex long-term transfers (six months to a year) of an inter- regional or international scale which do not presuppose an habitual residence but are characterized by a kind of rotation from one geographical area to another, mixed with stable periods during which one or more of the types of mobility listed above may be used.

These mobility types are combined with one of the three following types of logistical organization:

● First, there are transfers of a spontaneous and individual (or small group) nature, where the means of transport is selected and organized by the women themselves. The choice of the location for the activity, the deﬁnition of tariffs, and the decision on how the proceeds acquired through the services rendered are used, are all Giovanna Campani 157

individual. In essence the women have, and maintain, considerable decisional autonomy over all the technical and organizational aspects involved in exercising their trade. ● Secondly, logistical support for the activities of prostitution is organized by a third party, with the girls’ basic consent. This often involves organizational practices which often centre around an affective or sentimental relationship between the parties involved, with no evident coercive subordination. Decisions concerning moves, types of activity, etc. appear to be taken in common. ● Finally, we can recognize forms of logistical support organized by third parties on a clearly coercive basis involving violence, or the threat of violence via psycho-physical subjection. The organizers are almost always identifiable with the so-called ‘protectors’ of women, people who often belong to groups connected directly or indirectly to forms of organized criminality, such as the trafficking of women. The protectors determine and manage most aspects of how the prostitutes exercise their work – where they go, how the services are carried out, the type and quality of living conditions, tariffs applied, and the final division of the proceeds. These decisions and relationships are based on the girls’ fear and the constant threat of retaliation, not only against the girls themselves but also against their families (this is especially striking in the case of Nigerian and Albanian girls).

Taken as a whole these organizational and mobility transfers are found transversally within each nationality even though, as I shall show later on, the accent on one type or another varies according to nationality and to the type of engagement in the sex trade.

Timing of arrival Interview data enable a reconstruction of the principal historical phases of arrival. Basically this picture is one of a series of small waves stretching back over the last decade, but following the main entrance and establishment of Italy’s immigrant communities during the 1970s and 1980s. The first wave occurred in 1989–90 and was triggered by three events: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent liberalization of migration frontiers in Eastern Europe; the start of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the consequent formation of flows of displaced persons; and the passing of Law 39/90, better known as the Martelli Law, which offered the chance for illegal immigrants to regularise their situation in Italy and 158 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe which also had the effect of attracting a sudden influx of new arrivals. During this first wave it is hard to identify the specific national groups within which the main concentrations of prostitutes were operating. The Poles stand out to some extent, and the Brazilians. However at this time ‘Polish’ was a term also indiscriminately applied to other women migrating out of Eastern Europe, including Russians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Hungarians and Slovenians. During this rather chaotic period many contingents of immigrants, both men and women, were entering Italy in an irregular and often illegal manner. The numbers are hard to quantify, but some were ‘organized’ by mixed agencies of Italians and foreigners engaged in smuggling and trafficking migrants. These agencies had transnational ramifications and large sums of money were earned through the various phases of the migrants’ transfer – an activity which still continues apace throughout Southern Europe. Other women arrived as a result of individual journeys, often using short-term tourist visas. Most of the arrivals from different countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America followed either the ‘individual’ or ‘agency’ route, not only in the early 1990s but subsequently too. The second wave, during 1991–92, was more clearly defined from the point of view of countries of origin and consisted mainly of Nigerian and to a lesser extent Colombian and Peruvian girls. They generally entered the country with tourist visas and when these expired they remained on an illegal basis. Probably – from what can be gathered from interviews – this second contingent included groups of women who had been subjected to trafficking, in other words who had been deliberately recruited and then tricked and forced into prostitution. The third wave was also clearly defined from the point of view of the principal nationality, consisting mainly of Albanian girls entering during 1993–94. These women entered the country more or less illegally and originated from the main cities in Albania, often arriving with male relatives or boy-friends. Here too the presence of an initial trickery – especially on the part of unscrupulous ‘friends’ – played a decisive role in pushing them into prostitution. The fourth wave (1995–96) was characterized by the arrival of women – both Nigerian and Albanian – who were aware of the fact that once they arrived in Italy they would have to prostitute themselves in order to pay the debt incurred at the moment of departure. However, they were unaware of the conditions of aggressive and violent exploitation they would be subjected to and from which they cannot escape; this determines the protraction of the relationship of Giovanna Campani 159 subordination which binds them to their protectors. During this phase there has also been a change in the girls’ place of origin: apparently they no longer come from the large urban centres (as in previous waves) but from rural areas and inland villages. This makes one suspect an adjustment of the traffickers’ recruitment strategies because their duplicitous tactics were becoming too well known in the cities.

Age, family status, education and previous employment The girls’ ages vary according to their nationality. The youngest are the Nigerian and Albanian girls, most of whom were aged 14–18 on entry, including therefore large numbers of minors. The women from Eastern Europe and Latin America are, on the whole, older and within the age band 24–30 years. The testimonies collected indicate that most of the women engaged in prostitution are unmarried. This facilitates the use of enticement strategies whereby women can be tricked by the promise of advantageous marriages abroad and of artistic or professional careers. In this category of gullibility we mainly find the younger Albanian and Nigerian girls, but also some women from Eastern Europe and the Andean region. Naturally the organization of the migration abroad involves an element of collaboration between the interested parties, otherwise we would be dealing with straight abduction. Only a minority of prostitutes have a different family status: married, cohabiting, separated, divorced, widowed. This minority mainly concerns Latin American women, followed by small numbers from Poland, the former Soviet Union, Bosnia and Slovenia. Within these groups we also find the presence of some children, either in Italy or back in the country of origin. The presence of children is the cause of grave concern for the girls, since they can become the object of blackmail on the part of the traffickers. The option of family reunion through official channels is not compatible with the profession they practise for legal reunion requires a work contract and documentation of the mother’s income. This complication leads the mothers involved to seek reunion through irregular channels, thus increasing their subordination to traffickers and ‘protectors’. The data collected on education show that the majority of foreign prostitutes have at least eight years of education, corresponding to the Italian primary and middle school stages. The second largest group have attended school for 13 years, that is until the end of high school in the Italian system. Then, at the end of the distribution, there are smaller numbers who have, on the one hand, either no or very minimal 160 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe schooling, and on the other, those with university and other tertiary qualifications. Although different levels of education are present in different nationalities we do find some differentiation by country of origin as well as correlations with other variables such as age and urban/rural origin. The principal situations are as follows. Among the Nigerians there is a significant share of girls who have never attended school. This applies in particular to teenage girls who arrived in the most recent wave and who come from rural areas of southern and north-eastern Nigeria. Among those who arrived earlier, in the early 1990s, in particular those from Lagos and Ibadan, higher levels of schooling predominate, up to middle school but rarely above. Albanian girls generally have higher levels of education, although here too the educational background is falling with the switch from urban to rural origins. Among the older Albanians, those in their twenties, high levels of schooling, including some with university training, are characteristic, whereas the younger ones have secondary and high school education. Finally, the Latin American and East European girls (excluding the Albanians, that is) have a rather similar educational profile: they have similar ages, similar urban backgrounds, and medium-high or high levels of education, with some graduates. These groups are also rather more autonomous in the way they organise their working lives. The Peruvians are somewhat of an exception, having lower levels of schooling. Information on the prostitutes’ working lives before they left their home countries is rather sparse; hence I cannot construct a very complete typology. Of course, many of the younger migrants will have left more or less straight from school or college – the case for several Albanians, Bosnians and Slovenians. Otherwise we can note former farm workers amongst the Poles and East Europeans, and dressmakers and waitresses among the Colombians. While many had had working experience in nightclubs, bars and discotheques, relatively few had been prostitutes in their own countries.

Living and working conditions of prostitutes Reconstruction of prostitutes’ living and working conditions in Italy reveals, once again, a complex and dynamic picture. As we shall see, signiﬁcant differences appear to exist between the different nationalities, while factors like age, educational background, length of time in the country and type of migration (individual or trafﬁcked) are also Giovanna Campani 161 relevant. More systematically, key variables in constructing typologies of experience seem to be the following:

● the existence (or not) of an experience of prostitution before arrival in Italy, the amount of deceit and coercion involved in the migration, the amount of debt contracted and the mode of repayment; ● the duration of time elapsed since the ﬁrst entry to Italy and the different phases of experience since then, either as a strengthening of subordinate relations (to the detriment of the prostitute) or as a progressive process of relief from bondage (to the advantage of the woman in question); ● the amount and types of autonomy that the women are able to acquire during the course of their work, either by mutual agreement with collaborators and organizers or by a more open conﬂict with the protector.

These three sets of processes and relations can be correlated to some extent with the way in which the prostitution is conducted: as call girls from private apartments, as hidden prostitution in public or private places (the case of ‘hostesses’, ‘dancers’, etc.), or as street prostitutes in the open. I will deal with each of these in turn. Call girls have significant autonomy with respect to logistical aspects of their work: they choose where to live and to work, fix the fees, and handle administrative chores such as residence permit and health matters. Their relationship with their protector, if they have one, is usually friendly or at least non-conflictual. Most of the women practising prostitution in this way (apart from Italian citizens) are Polish, Russian, Colombian and Argentinian; to a lesser degree Brazilian, Hungarian, Romanian and Filipina. To some extent, they can be regarded as ‘professionals’: some practised this form of prostitution before they emigrated while others have acquired experience in Italy. Especially for the older and longer-established call girls, they live independently in one flat, using another for their work; this latter location may be shared with other call girls with whom expenses for rent and maintenance are also shared. In most cases living and working conditions do not appear to be particularly harsh. Women prostituting themselves in this way have low social visibility and are therefore not easily quantifiable. Subgroups can be identified qualitatively according to physical attributes (age, charm, appearance, etc.), location of the apartment (in a residential district or close to railway stations), type of work (use of prophylactics, etc.), fees 162 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe

(which vary according to the above factors) and the stage in the migratory and life project reached by the individual woman. Hidden prostitution, by which prostitution is carried out ‘protected’ by another socially accepted profession, manifests itself in several ways. The major categories are hostesses and dancers in private or public clubs, beauticians, masseuses, escorts, strippers and porn actresses. Living conditions are comparable to those of call girls, and this comparison also applies to the fact that many women exercised the ‘open’ profession in their country of origin – indeed work permits are rather easily granted to show professionals. The main difference for women engaged in hidden prostitution lies in the nature of the client relationship: call girls usually do autonomous work and the customer is in direct contact with the prostitute; by contrast for hostesses, dancers, escorts, etc. agents or club managers act as mediators between the two parties. Together with women who were fully conscious of what they would be doing in Italy, there are also ‘trafficked women’ who have been intentionally deceived by promises of artistic careers as dancers or actresses. In these cases living and working conditions are of a dual nature: on the one hand the professional and artistic life in a public environment such as a bar or night-club; and on the other hand a life based on abuse and violence in a more secluded environment. Apart from Italian citizens, most of the women practising hidden prostitution are of East European origin, plus Brazilians and Colombians and smaller numbers of Filipinas. It seems that Polish, Ukrainian, Hungarian and Romanian girls are more involved in the world of actresses and strippers, whereas the girls from Brazil and Colombia are more integrated in dancer and show circuits. Girls from the Philippines are mainly to be found in places with NATO bases such as Verona, Livorno (Leghorn) and Naples, where they work as hostesses and singers. The practice of street prostitution is very different from the above two types. Various informants estimate that 75–80 per cent of trafficked women belong to this type. Very often there is a direct correlation between living and working conditions and some form of subordination: first to the protector, and secondly to organized groups of criminals, usually of the same nationality as the prostitute or Italians with specific transnational connections. Street-walkers are often forced to practice their trade openly in order to pay back a debt contracted with the agencies that organized their migration. The women concerned can be either conscious (completely or partially) of their future activities, or coerced to prostitute themselves by violent means. Debts are contracted with the protector prior to emigration since the Giovanna Campani 163 organizations responsible for the transport have to be paid upon boarding the ship or plane; the protector then has to be reimbursed during the first months in Italy. Prostitution then becomes, under the protector’s violent pressure, the promptest way to settle the debt; but this sets off a long-lasting and unpredictable mechanism of dependency and exploitation. In the vast majority of cases protectors either keep the girl’s passport and residence permit, or threaten her or her family with violence. Nigerians and Albanians predominate in this type of ‘open’ prostitution.

Autonomy and dependence: national group differences With time, some women, who had been deceived into prostitution at the beginning, manage to regain more control over their lives, even while working as street prostitutes. This is mainly due to the fact that such women – who are usually from Latin America and Eastern Europe – are older, more mature, and thus more capable of negotiating more successfully with their protectors. From the interviews, it emerged that women who have re-asserted their decision-making power face three alternatives: to give up prostitution; to practice it in full autonomy; or to establish a new relationship whereby their protector becomes a partner or a friend, in which case decisions are made by mutual consent. In contrast to the national groups mentioned above, Albanian and Nigerian girls continue to be subjected to the power and abuse of their protectors. This negative relationship is related to a series of factors: the younger age of these girls who are often teenagers when they arrive in Italy; their ignorance of the violence to which they will be subjected and of the criminal nature of the organizations into which they become embedded; and the difficulties they experience in releasing themselves from the grip of their protectors. As a result these girls become hopelessly entangled in the dynamics of reinforcement of both the existential and the objective living conditions associated with trafficking and prostitution: a vicious circle determined by their mode of migration and entry to the country, the exercise of violence and fear, the unfair distribution of the proceeds of their work, and their inability to file charges against their abusers or to plan other practical solutions to their situation of total dependency and exploitation. Although Albanian and Nigerian prostitutes share the above conditions, there are also some important differences between the two national groups, particularly as regards the mechanisms of migration and trafficking. For the Albanian girls the first contacts are made via 164 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe friendship networks (even though these groups are partly composed of criminals) or by individuals (relatives, boy-friends or ‘pretend’ boy- friends pursuing their own goals). In a few cases actual kidnappings take place. Migration routes follow the standard pattern for Albanian clandestine migration to Italy: travel by road to the point of embarka- tion on the Albanian coast, ‘fishing-boats’ to the limit of territorial waters, and then small craft to land on the Italian Adriatic coast, usually in Apulia. Some migrants take the landward route north from Albania to cross at the Trieste border or even further north. The total cost of the journey is 3–5 million lire (£1000–£1700), according to the route taken and the expected difficulties, for instance whether entry is in a lorry with false bottom, via mountain paths (both of which can be considered as illegal or ‘smuggled’ entry), or ‘legally’ with a tourist visa, false EU passport or forged humanitarian visa. Interviews with Albanian informants reveal that there is usually a direct relationship between the girl who is brought into Italy and compelled to go into prostitution and her protector(s). The latter are often young criminal men attracted by the prospect of earning easy money even at the cost of profiting from girls who were friends, classmates or neighbours in their home town or village. This is a form of amateur crime in that the protectors belong to small independent groups; however some signs are emerging of a more organized development, with income derived from prostitution starting to be invested in the drugs trade, in particular the purchase and then resale of heroin by protectors and their accomplices. The Nigerian circuit of prostitution is rather different and has some unique features. Girls are contacted in the bidonvilles (suburban shanty- towns) surrounding big cities such as Lagos and Benin, or in rural areas of south and east Nigeria. As I noted above, in many cases the girls involved have little or no education and are already suffering a clear form of marginalization before they are lured into migration. Once the girls who can be deceived into migration are identified, they are approached by an ‘agent’ who does not exist in the other national groups. This personage, a woman generally called Madam (or Maman- Loa meaning ‘priestess’), acts as go-between for the organization preparing the migration and the girls who are interested in emigrating. A strong link is established between the girls and the Maman, even after migration and during the stay in Italy; money is sent back to the Maman in order to clear the migration debt or to be forwarded to the girl’s family. According to Nigerian girls’ frequent and emphatic testimonies, voodoo practices are also involved. The Maman subjects Giovanna Campani 165 the girls to ‘contracts’ and initiation rites which create bonds based on psychological subordination. These bonds remain after migration to Italy, since in voodoo practice transgressions can be punished even at a distance by the sending of evil spirits. In addition the girls will be supervised by another Maman in Italy who co-ordinates their activities and collects their profits, each Maman controlling about 10–15 girls. This control is reinforced by the fear of violence, including beatings by male ‘protectors’ in Italy. The structure described above suggests that the organization of the exploitation of Nigerian girls is entrusted at a first level to women (the Maman in Nigeria and the Maman in Italy), and at a second level to men who are linked to organized criminal gangs, again with branches in both countries. Three types of control are exerted:

● A first type revolves around the Maman living in the country of origin. This control group is composed of members who arrange for the girl’s migration but who then blackmail them by threatening their parents and relatives (beatings, fires, destruction of vegetable gardens, etc.). The Maman collects a part of the profits earned by the girls on the street in Italy; a small share of this is given to the girl’s family, a much larger one remains with the organization. ● A second control mechanism focuses on the Maman in Italy. Here she acts as an intermediary between the girls who depend on her and the group of (male) protectors. The males, who are usually involved also in other criminal activities, maintain a certain distance and do not appear unless there are external threats to the activity from rival groups. The Maman in Italy collects the profits, pays the local protectors, leaves a small part for the girls’ living expenses, and sends the bulk of the money to her referent, the Maman in Nigeria. ● The third level of the structure is composed by the messengers who communicate between Italy and Nigeria and whose main role is to bring the money back to the home country for allocation by the local Maman. These messengers are a further drain on the share of the money that remains for the girls and their families. The majority of the money circulates back to the criminal groups who orchestrate the trafficking and who recycle the money in other criminal activities, notably drugs.

The strength and complexity of this structure of control and exploitation make it extremely difﬁcult for Nigerian girls involved in 166 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe prostitution in Italy to develop their own autonomy and to escape the vicious circle in which they are virtual prisoners. In practice the repayment of their debt, around 15 million lire, takes much longer than the six months they are initially told it will take. Even after three or four years most Nigerian prostitutes are still in debt. They feel themselves psychologically bound on the basis of the commitments taken during their ritual practices, accepting the continual delays and the monetary sanctions imposed on them by the Maman for supposed deﬁciencies in their behaviour, which increases their debt.

Conclusions

By paying close attention to two occupational groups of women, domestic workers and prostitutes, and by drawing on detailed field investigations, mainly in Italy, this chapter has attempted to shed light on important questions of the female migratory experience in Southern Europe. Obviously, prostitution represents extreme expressions of social exclusion, vulnerability, racism, exploitation and violence. A vital component of this tragic situation is the trafficking of migrant women; action against this deceitful trade needs to be taken both in the destination and in the home countries. In terms of the key questions of social exclusion, vulnerability and the personal balance of gains and losses, the experience of domestic workers in Southern Europe is less clear-cut. First, immigrant women operating in this and in related sectors (hospitals, care institutions, etc.) have been able to take some advantage from the restructuring of South European labour markets with their evolving reliance on tertiary activities and on a flexible labour resource. However these new opportunities, especially those for the employment of immigrant women, are sharply constrained, both by the nature of the work (servile, casual, poorly paid, etc.), and by enduring ideologies of racism and sexism (Wallerstein and Balibar, 1990). On the other hand, these negative images and structures have been partly challenged by the actions of immigrant women themselves who, as we have seen, succeed in forming associations and becoming leaders. The relative success of the Filipino, Cape Verdean and Eritrean communities in achieving some integration into the Italian socio-economic fabric has been noted, and is the result mainly of the women’s action. In the case of maids from the Philippines, the fact of earning more money than their husbands or family members left behind, who are essentially supported by them, can provoke changes in gender roles whereby the immigrant woman is able to ‘direct’ choices and decisions from abroad. In this case Giovanna Campani 167 migration becomes part of the process of structural transformation of the developing countries; it is both triggered by the ‘social crisis’ of the developing countries, and contributes to a remaking of these societies, including changes in gender relations (Tienda and Booth, 1991). A further question concerns the role of female migrants, especially those of the domestic worker type, in the remaking of Southern European societies. Are sexism and racism combined, as Wallerstein and Balibar (1990) suggest, to maintain one part of the population in a subordinate role in the job market? This polarization, with immigrant women formed as a new underclass serving the needs of the service class of the indigenous population (Morris, 1994), must be considered as an important element in trying to understand the attitudes of migrant women regarding their own ‘emancipation’ or their perception of the desirability of the ‘Western family model’.3 Finally, the point needs to be made that, in Southern Europe, both women and men suffer from social exclusion and vulnerability; the gender division does not necessarily correspond to the hierarchy of gains and losses from migration. Both men and women are involved in migratory trajectories geared above all to survival, and both are on the borders between inclusion and exclusion. What this chapter has tried to do is to show that migrant women are by no means passive in their behaviour. While it is true that in many of the cases where immigrant women have been forced into prostitution their room for manoeuvre is very limited, in other instances women are the leaders in the integration process. This is particularly the case where they are able to mobilize their social and migration networks and build on an established tradition of mobility.

Notes 1. My research on immigrant women in Italy has been going on since 1988 and has looked at three main groups: domestic helpers, from the Philippines, Cape Verde, Eritrea and Somalia; Maghrebi women who have mostly arrived through family reunification; and prostitutes and victims of trafficking, mainly Nigerians and Albanians. Research on the Spanish case also involves different typologies of immigrant women, including domestic helpers and housewives from the Maghreb, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines and Gambia. For some results on various aspects of this research see Campani (1989, 1990, 1992, 1995). 2. During the period 1990–92, 14,389 immigrants in Italy applied for family reunification. The Ministry of the Interior, which evaluates such requests, only pronounced judgement on 9041 cases, of which 8740 were given a positive reply. Over a third of the applications were from Moroccans and Tunisians; Filipinos were the third group, with 14 per cent. North African 168 Immigrant Women in Southern Europe

requests were nearly all for male-led family reunion, and Filipino requests were mainly for female-led reunion. The geographical distribution of these demands reﬂects different labour market conditions in the three main regions of the country: North, Centre (dominated by Rome) and the South. Whereas 57 per cent of demands were from immigrants living in the North, 26 per cent were from the Centre and only 17 per cent from the South. The North has a disproportionate amount of male immigrants from North Africa working in heavy, dirty but often reasonably secure jobs in industry: here the Maghrebi migrants are reproducing the male-led reunion model which has been dominant in the industrial regions of Northern Europe. In the Centre, with Filipino (and other) domestic and service sector workers so numerous, the female-led model predominates. Few demands come from the South, where living and working conditions are much more precarious and where there is thought to be a far higher percentage of undocumented immigrants. 3. In my research on Islamic women in Italy, I have often found women rediscovering Islamic values as a reaction to the Western emancipatory model (which means oppression for Third World women). Some of the women interviewed had dreamt of the Western way of life in their country of origin but, once in Italy, having experienced the living and working conditions of migrant women, they turned again to the Islamic tradition.

References Andall, J. (1998) ‘Catholic and state constructions of domestic workers: the case of Cape Verdean women in Rome in the 1970s’ in Koser, K. and Lutz, H. (eds) The New Migration in Europe: Social Constructions and Social Realities. London: Macmillan, pp. 124–42. Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N. (1992) Racialised Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle. London: Routledge. Campani, G. (1989) ‘Du Tiers Monde à l’Italie: une nouvelle migration féminine’, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 5, pp. 29–50. Campani, G. (1990) ‘Donne immigrate’ in Cocchi, C. (ed.) Straníeri in Italia. Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo, pp. 3–16. Campani, G. (1992) ‘Donne e educazione interculturale’ in Giusti, M., Guerrieri, G. and Tassinari, G. (eds) Scuola e società multiculturale. Florence: La Nuova Italia, pp. 113–26. Campani, G. (1995) ‘Women migrants: from marginal subjects to social actors’ in Cohen, R. (ed.) The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 546–50. Caritas di Roma (1997) Immigrazione Dossier Statistico ‘97. Rome: Anterem. Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (1993) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: Macmillan. Castles, S., Booth, H. and Wallace, T. (1984) Here For Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities. London: Pluto Press. Chell, V. (1997) ‘Gender-selective migration: Somalian and Filipina women in Rome’ in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 75–92. Giovanna Campani 169

Moore, H. L. (1988) Feminism and Anthropology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Morris, L. (1994) Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship. London: Routledge. Phizacklea, A. (ed.) (1983) One Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pugliese, E. (1991) ‘Emigrazione e immigrazione’ in Macioti, M. I. and Pugliese, E. (eds) Gli immigrati in Italia. Bari: Laterza, pp. 5–89. Tienda, M. and Booth, K. (1991) ‘Gender, migration and social change’, International Sociology 6, pp. 51–72. Wallerstein, I. and Balibar, E. (1990) Race, Nation et Classe: Les Identités Ambigues. Paris: La Découverte. Women, Immigration and Nationality Group (1985) Worlds Apart: Women Under Immigration and Nationality Law. London: Pluto Press. 8 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece: Economic, Social and Spatial Exclusion Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos

Introduction

The subject of this chapter is the construction of Albanian migrants’ social space in Greece. This social space is conceptualized as the product of both global and local economic restructuring which, in this part of the Balkan region, has resulted in the juxtaposition of two countries which have very similar historical, but different contemporary economic and political trajectories. In Chapter 3 Fakiolas documented in some detail the characteristics of the Greek labour market, identifying the types of work and economic function of Albanian (and other) migrants in Greece. The approach which we offer here is complementary to Fakiolas’ analysis; we concentrate on the socio-spatial nexus within which Albanians’ labour activity is formulated. Based on extensive ﬁeldwork experience with Albanian migrants in Greece since the early 1990s, we present material on Albanians’ social, economic and political exclusion, and on how the processes responsible for such exclusion are articulated both within the wider realm of global integration and within the local context of labour market fragmentation. Our analysis is structured as follows. First, we outline an analytical framework for the study of globalization and labour migration which we regard as particularly apposite to the case of Albanian migration to Greece. Aside from the global–local framework, key concepts contained in our theoretical analysis include the notion of space as a power container that shapes both the material and the socio-cultural relations of migrants and the host population, and the conceptualisation of the lifeworld of the migrants as a response to the repressive economic

170 Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 171 conditions with which they are faced. Next, we give a few facts and ﬁgures about the evolution of Albanian emigration to Greece in the 1990s, drawing attention to the differential experience of, and reaction to, ethnic-Greek Albanians and ‘other’ Albanians. The main empirical material of the chapter then follows, with two sections on residential processes and on work and social exclusion. This empirical analysis enables us to explore the multi-dimensional nature of exclusion suffered by Albanian immigrants in Greece, who inhabit periphractic spaces fenced off in various physical and symbolic ways from contact with (let alone integration with) Greek society.

Globalization and labour migration: an analytical frame for the Albanian case

Central to our discussion of globalization, labour market processes and international migration is an approach that concentrates on the social spaces and social embeddedness (or, in the Albanian case, ‘disembed- dedness’) of the new undocumented migrant population. In following this approach, the economic and political realms of labour organization and migration are used as catalysts to decipher migrants’ roles in society expressed in material, cultural and symbolic ways. Global- ization and labour migration are therefore not seen as simple geographical linkages or flows that bind people from different societies together; instead the issue is addressed as a ‘power container’ which, through integrationist and deregulatory labour policies, shapes the material and cultural relations of migrants both within the migrant community and in the host society (Psimmenos, 1997). These relations are harnessed to serve not only economic but also ideological and moral interests, as we shall see later. Such an approach reminds us of the need to move away from any economically centred, politically essentialist ideal about migration as a spaceless, voiceless issue. For this reason, this chapter will attempt to articulate economics, politics, sociology and geography together, showing how Albanian migrants are caught in the spatial frontiers of the global–local nexus of labour reorganization. Our analysis will give equal importance to both the objective (material) as well as the perceptual (by migrants) realities of those spatial frontiers. The perceptual angle is concerned with migrants’ images of everyday life and their attempt to try to understand their own life experiences and to create for themselves a sense of purpose in a rather 172 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece strange and fragmenting environment (Denzin, 1991). The migrant voice is not only reflective of alienation, homelessness, poverty – the ‘ragged edges of economic realities’, but also articulates fear, anger and the politics of everyday life (Lefebvre, 1991). In this sense the migrant’s confrontation with both the material object of working activity and its conceptual configuration in the migrant’s lifeworld is seen as part of a dynamic process that is open, antagonistic (towards the host population and other migratory groups) and productive of ‘contestatory possibilities based on juxtaposition, withdrawal and dislocation’ (Natter and Jones, 1997, p. 155). Finally, in examining migrants’ lifeworlds, one is bound to privilege space as central to the discussion of migration. This is the case because of the interrelatedness between the reconfiguration of the global organization of labour and the local embeddedness of migrants’ production and cultural representation. Following Dear (1997) and Lefebvre (1991), migrants’ activities can be seen to take place within a ‘trifaceted institutional space: a space that is first global; a space, secondly, that is fragmented, separating, disjunctive, a space that locates specificities, places or localities, both in order to control them and in order to make them negotiable; and a space, finally, that is hierarchical, ranging from the lowliest places to the noblest’ (Dear, 1997, p. 67).

Integration and migrant labour

The global integration of economic activity has produced a new ideological framework for the control of labour (Marcussen and Torp, 1982). Through the principles of harmonization and liberalization of national economies, labour control is turned into a pool of power exchanges that renders work flexible, complementary and transferable. Now, international migration is not merely a product of push and pull factors operating from the countries of origin and destination, but is intimately bound up with integrationist mechanisms that unify the ‘labouring spaces’ across the globe. The worldwide expansion of the service sector in national economies is another global process which has a powerful impact on the contemporary character of international migration. The above trends are particularly relevant to an understanding of recent migration flows from the ex-socialist countries into Southern Europe, and above all to the case of undocumented migrants from Albania in Greece. Here, apart from regional and ethno-historical linkages that act as push factors, one also recognizes the significant role played by global labour economics in the transfer and social Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 173 categorization of these workers. Groups which were traditionally protected in Albania, such as students and children, now seem to live on the margins of Albanian society and to fall victim to clandestine labour markets and even trafficking in their home country. As a consequence, they experience a loss of economic citizenship which is only compounded further if they migrate (or are forced to migrate). Thus one could argue that migration as a political experience today signifies not so much the triumph of economic liberalism in East and West, but rather the shrinking of workers’ ability to intervene in and shape economic decision-making. The migrant is transformed into an ‘experimental agent’ who, unable to control his/her economic environment, becomes part of a globalized unification process ‘free’ of community, union or skill constraints. In other words, migration is the political experience of both the shrinking of social rights and of the modification of labour into a power container that functions according to world market necessities. It is this understanding that turns whole regions (the ex-socialist countries in general and Albania in particular) and specific groups (undocumented Albanians in Greece) into a large migratory pool of cheap and even slave-like labour. Thus, to para- phrase Castles and Miller (1993, p. 264), global migration today results not only in the intermingling and cohabitation of people from different physical and cultural settings, but also of people who have experienced the loss of their economic citizenship, and in particular their ability to intervene in their local settings. On the other hand, following Appadurai (1990), labour migration can be conceptualized as a movement of people who are part of a global ideological chain that consumes and is actively involved in seeking the new life-style that the market economy has created. The Western economy is visualized as not only an eldorado of economic resources but also as an escape into a lifeworld that links the migrant to the global cosmos of politics and economics. Experiencing this lifeworld theoretically permits the migrant to become part of the circulation of images, information and ‘communities’ (e.g. the European Union) outside of which one is ‘excluded’ and relegated to the spaces that lie outside the ‘pool of new possibilities’.

Deregulation of labour and migration

The global process of deregulation has produced a flexible working place. The migrant labourer, as the human interface between the global level and the enterprise, is often reported to perform the most tedious, 174 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece unskilled and precarious jobs in European societies; certainly this is the case for illegal migrant workers in Greece (Lazaridis, 1996; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). The demand by national economies for further flexibility of working practices seems to lead to the establishment of new categories of workers who are not defined by the nature or location of their work but by their temporariness, mobility and transferability. Beck (1992) and Gallie et al. (1993) find significant positive relationships, first between deregulation and loss of workers’ ability to intervene in their economic space, and second between the flexibilization of the work place and the employment of immigrant workers. Castles and Miller (1993, p. 178) offer further insights:

signiﬁcant immigrant labour market segmentation is … evident in industrial democracies. Traditional gender divisions, which concentrated women in low-paid and low-status work, have been overlaid and reinforced by new divisions affecting immigrant workers of both sexes. As migration is globalised there are widening gaps both between immigrants and non-immigrants, and among different immigrant categories. Future trends in the labour market will favour highly-skilled immigration but the pool of aspiring low-skilled immigrants is enormous and will expand exponentially in the coming years.

These contributions seem to accentuate the influence of structural parameters on the concentration of undocumented migrant workers in certain sectors of the economy. Other authors, however, have examined flexibility not only in a structural–economic sense but also as part of a political and behavioural analysis. In this analysis, flexibility appears both as a strategy to reduce production costs and as a lever to break up the collective identity of workers and increase their surveillance by employers; this duality of flexibility is further extended to include areas that are external to the workplace, such as welfare benefits, citizenship status and political participation. Examining flexibility in relation to migration, Lash and Urry (1994) develop a sociological discourse on the labour deregulation process that connects production techniques to the politics of labour control, and job-related to non-work practices of migrant workers. In this sense deregulation and flexibility are examined in a global–local spatial framework that encompasses not only homo faber (man as worker) but also the political and ideological power exchanges and control mechanisms that are reproducing the social spaces migrants occupy. Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 175

Migrant ﬂows from Albania to Greece

Today, and since the early 1990s, Albanians constitute the largest group of undocumented migrants in Greece. Estimates of their number vary considerably according to different sources: for example in 1996 the Ministry of Public Order gave a figure of 200,000 undocumented Albanians in Greece, whereas Fakiolas (in Chapter 3 of this book) indicates at least 300,000, equivalent to one-tenth of the Albanian population.1 The sudden exodus of such a significant fraction of the Albanian population to Greece (and to Italy) was the most dramatic example of post-Iron Curtain mass migration (King, 1998, pp. 299–301). Whilst the drama of this migration is usually written about from the ‘outside’ perspective of the West, the significance of mass emigration for Albania itself can hardly be overstated. Under the old regime of autarchy emigration ‘was demonised as one of the fruits of a capitalist system incapable of guaranteeing its labour force full employment and capable only of shunting its workers from marginal areas to the centres of capital accumulation where labour power could be exploited to the full’ (King et al., 1998, p. 161). Now, Albania’s role seems to be that of a supplier of cheap, almost slave-like labour for neighbouring rich countries, above all Greece where, apart from geographical proximity, there has been a history of cultural and human exchanges.2 Although in the early 1990s there was an invitation from the Greek government addressed to the ethnic-Greek Albanians of southern Albania for a renewal of cultural contacts, the influx of so many tens of thousands of ethnic-Greek and ‘other’ Albanians found the Greek authorities woefully unprepared for the scale and suddenness of the immigration. In particular, there was a lack of administrative expertise, and there were no appropriate legislative and social policy measures in place. Instead, reactive and repressive measures were introduced which reflected EU pressures for Greece to ‘seal off’ the ‘soft underbelly’ of Fortress Europe. Three policies can be mentioned, but their effectiveness has been limited. First, attempts were made to control illegal movement across the Greek– Albanian border by increasing police and military patrols. Secondly, mass deportations of Albanians living illegally in Greece were organised: between 1991 and 1995 around 1 million Albanians were repatriated (Droukas, 1998, p. 353).3 Third, the introduction of Law 1975 of 1991 made illegal entry and work without a permit criminal offences with penalties of up to five years imprisonment (Lazaridis, 1996). The question of the regularization of illegal immigrants has only recently been addressed, starting in 1998; details of this initiative are 176 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece provided by Fakiolas in his epilogue to Chapter 3. What is interesting for our analysis is that initially the Greek government tried to exclude Albanians from the new regulations concerning the issue of temporary residence cards to foreigners. Two sets of reasons help to explain this attempt at exclusion. The first is the background of political tension between the Albanian and Greek authorites over the Greek-Orthodox minority living in southern Albania in the territory called by the Greeks Northern Epirus.4 The second issue is the alleged criminality of Albanian migrants, which has become a major theme in Greek everyday discussion and media discourse. The wide use of labels and denigrating stereotypes has contributed to the emergence of an image of the ‘Albanian criminal’ (Droukas, 1998, p. 357). Such stereotypes fuel discrimination, prejudice and racism which in turn are manifested in a number of ways ranging from derogatory language to residential segregation, as we shall see below.

Residential spaces and social exclusion

Analysing the social construction of migrants’ spaces in Greece, and especially in Athens, one is inevitably confronted with issues related to human diversity, the racialisation of boundaries and the politics of labour recruitment and exploitation. Our analysis of migrants’ residential organization is not directed towards a precise mapping of migrants’ location but reflects images, stories and the politics of continuous marginalisation. We see residential spaces as forms of power relationships. These relationships are constituted between different migrant groups and the local citizens and reflect both structural factors and the everyday meanings migrants attach to their residential spaces. Following the theoretical framework outlined earlier, the structural factors are rooted in the institutional mechanisms of globalization as well as in local policies towards migrants, whereas the everyday meanings derive from migrant responses to the structural factors and from cultural networking of migrants. Our account is mainly focused on Albanians in Athens, and uses some quotes from interviews to represent the ‘migrant voice’. Throughout most of the 1990s the vast majority of Albanian migrants residing in the Greek capital have been lodged in the run- down parts of the city centre in residential spaces that have a history of accommodating marginal groups. During the 1920s and 1930s these districts hosted poor internal migrants and refugees. During the 1950s many low-class hotels were renovated for occupation by American military personnel, and after their evacuation the accommodation was Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 177 turned into ‘first shelters’ for refugees, administered by the United Nations and the Catholic Church. The main refugee groups were Greek Cypriots after 1974 and Kurds from Iraq during the 1980s. During the 1990s the low-grade hotels and hostels, by now degraded and semi- derelict, were made available as temporary housing for undocumented migrants from Albania and elsewhere. For Albanians especially, the centre of Athens became a meeting point for migrants using their village-of-origin networks to find both accommodation and work. Low-status and precarious employment were available in the nearby metal workshops, in the building industry, in housing repair activities, and in cleaning and domestic work. Some migrants became involved in the sex trade which was concentrated in this part of Athens. Hence the centre of Athens has functioned as a place of collective cultural identification for the Albanians, and as an ‘exit space’ from the public gaze and (for a time) from the gaze of law enforcement agencies. The situation has changed over time, however. During the first wave of Albanian migration into Athens (1991–93), a process of ghettoization was under way (Lazaridis, 1996). The old city centre was transformed into a residential space and labour market for migrants from Albania and some countries of the Middle East, such as Iraq and Egypt. Even up to 1997, low-class hotels, derelict housing and public spaces (parks, squares, the underground stations) were used as ‘escape places’ and as network spaces for employment and support (Psimmenos, 1995, 1998). Negative images of Albanians made it difficult for them to live in any area that was not characterised by social impoverishment – by poorly maintained, cramped and badly ventilated accommodation, and by relatively high criminality, especially drug-dealing and prostitution. Put simply, no one would rent a flat to an Albanian. In the words of one Albanian woman interviewed: ‘No-one is willing to rent a flat to me. We are poor and roofless; as soon as they realise that I am an Albanian, they either put the phone down or ask me to leave.’ Today, however, things are changing fast, since most of the old- established migrant spaces have been abandoned, mainly due to police raids. As a hotel manager put it:

Albanians are continuously being chased by the police and usually they are wandering around until late at night trying to ﬁnd a place to sleep. There is one hotel that usually accommodates them but they have to leave early in the morning for fear of a police raid ... I 178 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece

usually ask for a passport and I am not compelled to allow any Albanians in ... During 1991–94 any hotel in this area was ﬁlled with at least 400 Albanians. (Chtouris and Psimmenos, 1998)

Hence there is a new wave of criminalization of the Albanian undocumented population through almost daily police raids on the immigrants’ places of accommodation. These raids have recently become so intense that in June 1998 migrants demonstrated for the first time, holding a rally in the centre of Athens to ask the government to grant them the right to have a place to stay. The signficance of this renewed spatial exclusion lies not only in Albanians’ access to accommodation (where, curiously, increased exclusion implies spatial dispersion) but also in the destruction of Albanians’ ability to establish and maintain networks of consumption and ethnic communication. Although in the past there were numerous raids by the police, hotels were often used as safe places for storing durable goods such as domestic appliances, clothes and toys, as well as unofficial job centres and communications nodes which functioned as network links between the village in Albania and the city in Greece. Furthermore, migrants’ transformation of a number of public places like cinemas, coffee shops, public parks and subways into places and alleys for safe communication allowed migrants to survive and function in a racialized city and to respond to strategies of forced exclusion. Now this system of defensible space is breaking down under the weight of police pressure. As a result, many Albanians and members of other migrant groups are forced to try to access the private residential market. Once more, however, through the alleged criminality of Albanians, the police have started a new campaign to criminalize the right of this group to collective private accommodation. Flats rented by groups of Albanians are now raided by the police under the allegation that such groups constitute criminal or mafia gangs. The removal of migrants can also be seen as part of a wider strategy to regenerate the centre of Athens. The view of migrants as ‘polluters of the city’ reflects the new stratification politics of urban centres, in which the migrant is ‘swept under the carpet’ in an attempt to create a city without any visible signs of the migrant presence, yet which relies on migrant labour for its functioning.5 Hence new boundaries of invisibility are set, while the exclusion and criminalization of migration and poverty leads dangerously towards the development of contemporary cities like Athens as cities of apartheid (cf. Bauman, 1998, p. 86). Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 179

Finally, stigmatization is not just the product of binary relationships between Albanians and Greeks but also is expressed among contesting subgroups such as Albanians and ethnic-Greek Albanians, or ﬁrst arrivals and late-comers. For example ‘true’ Albanians living in poor lodgings in the city centre are often seen as uncivilised and prone to criminality by ethnic-Greek Albanians residing elsewhere in the city. As one ethnic-Greek Albanian woman who works as a domestic cleaner put it, ‘They are not like us; they are uncivilised, barbarians, they steal, lie and cheat.’ Ethnic-Greek Albanians tend to live outside the central area in areas like Ambelokipi and Kalithea where they are able to achieve some mixing with the local people.

Work and social exclusion

Although there are various ways in which undocumented migrants enter the Greek job market (Iosifides, 1997), most Albanians find employment through their social and village networks which are now quite well established. Nevertheless the information transmitted by these networks tends to underestimate the difficulties, since migrants try to justify their choices to those remaining at home. So the image of Greece conveyed by migratory chains is of a country where making a living is not that difficult. As described in more detail by Fakiolas in Chapter 3, the employment opportunities available to Albanian immigrants in Greece are largely confined to the underground economy where working conditions and wages are well below accepted national or European thresholds. This remains the case even though the majority of Albanian workers are skilled and have some kind of technical training or other qualification (Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). However, because of their illegal status, even those with high levels of educational attainment find themselves performing menial, short-term jobs with limited prospects for social and professional advancement. A further layer of discrimination derives from the tendency for Albanians to be paid lower rates of remuneration than other immigrants because of the alleged ‘risk’ of employing an Albanian as opposed to a Pole or Filipino, etc. This seems to be particularly the case for Albanian domestic workers who sometimes get only half the wage received by a Filipina doing the same job (Lazaridis, 1995). On occasions, Albanian workers are not paid at all, as they become victims of blackmail by employers who threaten to report them to the police. On the other hand, over time, some migrants do become more selective as they learn their way around the various labour 180 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece market options, pick up the language, and move on to somewhat better job opportunities. Albanians tend to concentrate in specific branches of activity in Greece (Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). Men in cities work in the construction industry, as painters and decorators and in transportation and removal services. Outside of Athens and a few other big cities they work as seasonal farm hands and in the (equally seasonal) tourist industry. Albanian women, on the other hand, are concentrated above all in the domestic service sector, and also in the sex trade, paralleling the experience of Albanian women in Italy described by Campani in the previous chapter. In the next few paragraphs we will briefly describe these gender- and sector-specific occupational experiences, drawing out mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization that operate within the work environment. Construction is the main sector of employment for Albanian men living in urban areas in Greece. The elaborate specialization of different jobs within this sector makes the job market highly segmented. Iosifides (1997) argues that the Greek construction sector can be differentiated into two subsectors offering different types of employment to migrants. In ‘household construction’ Albanians are directly employed by the household head to carry out the building and repair of individual dwellings. In the case of large-scale public works Albanians are hired by contractors and subcontractors as part of a general flexibilization of labour supply to big projects. In both cases Albanians are paid around half the wages that would be paid to Greek workers, even though the former have acquired a reputation of working ‘as hard as slaves’. In a study carried out on Corfu by Lazaridis (1996), it became apparent that Corfiot men resented the fact that employers preferred Albanian building workers because of savings made in labour costs. In rural areas Albanians, mainly males, are employed as seasonal workers during peaks of economic activity – picking fruit and vegetables, for example. They are usually hired by the day and receive some of their payment in kind in the form of meals and accommodation. However their lodgings – in old barracks, barns, derelict cottages, etc. – reflects their parallel relegation to the most marginal and rejected housing spaces in cities, as described earlier. In tourist areas Albanians are found working in hotels and restaurants. Here there is some competition with native Greeks and also discrimination to the disadvantage of Albanian workers, who receive lower wages and less job security. As one Albanian man working in a restaurant in Crete told us, ‘I am not allowed to keep tips. I give all tips to the Greek men.’ Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 181

Domestic service is the largest employer of female migrant labour in Greece. This is an occupation which is found mainly in large urban centres like Athens and Thessaloniki where demand is high due to rising levels of female employment, changes in family structure and lack of adequate childcare provision. The work consists of cleaning, cooking, baby-sitting and care of the elderly. Most Albanian women doing this work are employed on an hourly basis, which distinguishes them from other migrant women such as the Filipinas who are mostly live-in servants and have work permits (which, however, tie them to one employer). Although the working situation of Filipinas is far from unproblematic (see Iosifides, 1997), the Albanians, by comparison, are paid less, have no social security or entitlement to paid holidays, are required to do the most menial and degrading tasks, and are more likely to be exposed to somatic and psychological abuse by their employers, who frequently express their clear preference for Filipina women who are ‘more trustworthy’ (Lazaridis, 1995). Albanian women usually work to supplement their husband’s income; any children are usually left behind in Albania because of the inability of non-EU citizens (and illegal migrants) to qualify for the limited Greek childcare facilities. Naturally, this situation is a source of great anxiety for Albanian parents. Also there is the sex trade. The trafficking of women from Albania to Greece for sexual exploitation is naturally shrouded in secrecy, being undocumented and illegal. It involves under-age Albanian girls, some as young as 12 years of age, and is facilitated by the development of agencies and networks linking origin and destination and responsible for recruitment and transportation. While some (mainly adult) women migrate specifically to work in the sex industry, others are recruited as ‘entertainers’ or ‘models’ and then forced into prostitution by unscrupulous agents and ‘friends’. Working conditions in this sector are notoriously worse than in any other branch of migrant activity, and frequently involve violence and subjugation to male dominance. Among the hierarchy of different nationalities and different types of sexual service, Albanians in Greece are at the bottom of the sex industry ladder, often steoeotyped as dirty, uneducated and cheap (Lazaridis, 1998). As in Italy (see Chapter 7), Albanian girls work as street prostitutes and in cheap brothels; they are confined to the least remunerated and most risky activities in the trade. As prostitution is regarded in Albania as a criminal act, as well as a terrible loss of honour and source of shame for the family, Albanian prostitutes in Greece are forced to live between two worlds, neither of which is prepared to 182 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece accept them. This prohibits an obvious exit route from prostitution, a ‘labouring space’ that represents a trap. Meanwhile, prostitution rings continue to procure young adolescents, including boys, from Albania to work in the brothels and sex clubs of Athens (Psimmenos, 1995, p. 172). To summarize, it seems that Albanians play a key role in the Greek informal economy in many sectors of activity. Their illegal status renders them vulnerable to exploitation and their labour power is paid for at well below the official market rate. This, in turn, enables marginal firms to survive; whatever threat the migrants are portrayed as posing to the Greek national identity and social order (see Chapter 9), this does not deter Greek employers from hiring Albanian workers. Moreover, having no citizenship and no voting rights, these people are excluded from virtually every space and dimension of social life controlled by Greek society. They constitute an ‘undocumented underclass’ (Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998) – a part of what Cohen (1994, p. 167) calls an underprivileged ‘helot’ class that is emerging in the new Europe.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have offered a brief exposé of the new life of Albanian migrants in Greece as this is constituted inside and around the social spaces the migrants occupy. Concentrating our analysis on the socially constructed spaces, we have emphasized both the material and the social exclusion experienced by Albanian migrants. In the case of material exclusion, our focus has centred on some of the main structural conditions, such as labour market structures and residential morphology, that shape migrants’ position and power relations within Greek society. Regarding social exclusion, we have concentrated on the processes of social marginalization and the migrants’ responses. Articulating these multiple forms of exclusion together has enabled us to compose a synthetic understanding of Albanian migrants in Greece that challenges binary perspectives and essentialist categorizations between the migrants and the host population. Instead, we have presented the notion of social spaces as power containers open to both social control mechanisms and migrants’ responses which continually reshape and shift the boundaries of social exclusion. Within this dynamic context we have shown how the emerging local dimensions of political and economic reorganization have constructed ways through which the marginalization of Albanians is being produced and Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 183 reproduced in both a material and a symbolic manner. External and global forces have been important too. The collapse of the Albanian economy, accompanied by a rapid increase in poverty and unemployment, together with an increase in information flows and network- building have pushed the Albanians into functioning as a new slave-like casual labour force which is now at the core of the survival of informal economic activities in Greece. Albanian migrants exist at the margins of Greek society; they are ephemeral, transferable and highly vulnerable to exploitation. Their inability to pursue alternatives to their present work conditions, whether in construction, agriculture, domestic work or the sex industry, renders them almost powerless to escape from the multiple forms of exploitation and marginalization they suffer in Greece. From the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, we have seen how the performance of work by Albanian migrants is developing into an atomized, self-enclosed exercise in which the migrant, above all the undocumented migrant, is separated from others (especially local Greeks) and relates to the production system in a temporary and unfixed manner. On the other hand, the fragmentation of labouring activity habituates the migrant worker to the work environment through the control of the migrant’s moral space, sense of belonging/ exclusion and identity formation. One example of this is the reintroduction of the apprentice–master relationship. However, unlike the traditional psychogios system (the boy that served many years ago as an apprentice guided by his employer), the Albanian migrant exists in a system of multiple patrons, shifting moral identities and temporary settings according to work tasks and employers (Psimmenos, 1998). Employers’ ethnic categorization of Albanian labourers into the somewhat more desirable ethnic-Greek Albanians and the ‘other’ Albanians was referred to above, but must also be set against more favourable perceptions of other immigrant groups such as Poles, Filipinos and Egyptians (Iosifides, 1997; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998). Finally, to return to Appadurai (1990), the new deregulatory environment of migration surrounds migrants with cultural perspectives on work and citizenship that reflect migrants’ experience of surveillance, control, patronage and exclusion. Migrants are confined to periphractic spaces6 surrounded by multiple barriers and disjunctures with mainstream Greek society: no citizenship rights; hounded by the police and the media; under-rewarded for their labour; banished to residential spaces shunned by all other sectors of the population; racialized, criminalized, stereotyped and rejected. The usual reference to Albanian 184 Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece undocumented workers in Greece denotes not only an economic and social status (the lowest) but also a group of people defined by what they are not and what they cannot be as well as by their capacity to provide services that only migrants would perform. Such is the powerful and multi-dimensional nature of their exclusion.

Notes 1. As Droukas (1998, p. 351) points out, this inconsistency of estimates arises partly from the mobility and illegal status of the immigrants but also from the fact that six different ministries as well as other official and unofficial sources come up with different estimates. See also Lazaridis and Romaniszyn (1998). 2. Two periods can be identified. The first one dates back to the Ottoman Empire when there was a movement of labour and capital between different regions in the area. Second, during the inter-war years there were exchanges of population based on ethnic identity, and conflicts based on religious identity and territorial claims. 3. This number suggests that many Albanians were deported more than once, through a cycle of deportation and re-entry. 4. This is a complex issue which there is no space to go into here. Estimates of the number of ethnic Greeks in southern Albania vary widely. The Greeks accuse the Albanian government of policies favouring ‘ethnic cleansing’ in this area, while the Albanian authorities are suspicious of Greek territorial claims. For a balanced discussion see Hall (1994). 5. In addition to the Albanians, other groups affected by recent policies of migrant exclusion include the Roma and Pomaks (Muslim Slavs). 6. This term derives from the Greek word meaning to fence off a piece of land.

References Appadurai, A. (1990) ‘Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy’, in Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global Culture. London: Sage, pp. 295–311. Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalisation: the Human Consequences. Cambridge: Polity. Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (1993) The Age of Migration. London: Macmillan. Chtouris, S. and Psimmenos, I. (1998) Muslim Voices. Brussels and Manchester: Targeted Socio-Economic Research Project Report. Cohen, R. (1994) Frontiers of Identity: the British and Others. London: Longman. Dear, M. (1997) ‘Postmodern identities’ in Benko, G. and Strothmayer, U. (eds) Space and Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 41–72. Denzin, K. (1991) Images of Postmodern Society. London: Sage. Droukas, E. (1998) ‘Albanians in the Greek informal economy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 347–65. Gallie, D., Marsh, C. and Vogler, C. (eds) (1993) Social Change and the Experience of Unemployment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, D. R. (1994) Albania and the Albanians. London: Pinter. Iosiﬁdes, T. (1997) ‘Immigrants in the Athens labour market: a comparative survey of Albanians, Egyptians and Filipinos’ in King, R. and Black, R. (eds) Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos 185

Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 26–50. King, R. (1998) ‘Post-oil crisis, post-communism: new geographies of European migration’ in Pinder, D. (ed.) The New Europe: Economy, Society and Environment. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 281–304. King, R., Iosiﬁdes, T. and Myrivili, L. (1998) ‘A migrant’s story: from Albania to Athens’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 159–75. Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Economies of Signs and Space. Oxford: Blackwell. Lazaridis, G. (1995) ‘Immigrant women in Greece: the case of domestic labourers from Albania and the Philippines’ in European Forum for Leftist Women (ed.) Nationalism, Racism, Gender. Salonica: Paratiritis, pp. 47–75. Lazaridis, G. (1996) ‘Immigration to Greece: a critical evaluation of Greek policy’, New Community 22, pp. 335–48. Lazaridis, G. (1998) Of Prostitutes and Pimps: Trafﬁcking of Women from Ex-Socialist Countries to Greece. Brussels: Daphnie Project Report for the European Commission. Lazaridis, G. and Romaniszyn, K. (1998) ‘Albanian and Polish undocumented workers in Greece: a comparative analysis’, Journal of European Social Policy 8, pp. 5–22. Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. Marcussen, H. and Torp, J. (1982) Internationalization of Capital: Prospects for the Third World. London: Zed Press. Natter, W. and Jones, J. P. (1997) ‘Identity, space and other uncertainties’ in Benko, G. and Strothmayer, U. (eds) Space and Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 141–62. Psimmenos, I. (1995) Migration from the Balkan States: Social Exclusion in Athens. Athens: Glory Books-Papazisis (in Greek). Psimmenos, I. (1997) Globalisation and Employee Participation. Aldershot: Ashgate. Psimmenos, I. (1998) ‘Producing spaces of social exclusion’ in Kasimati, K. (ed.) Social Exclusion: the Greek Experience. Athens: Gutenberg, pp. 221–75 (in Greek). 9 ‘Racists? Us? Are You Joking?’ The Discourse of Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy Anna Triandafyllidou

Introduction

The revival of ethno-nationalisms1 both within and outside Europe and the dramatic increase of immigration flows from the Third World and Central and Eastern Europe towards EU countries, have swept into their influence the Mediterranean countries including the two countries examined in this chapter, Italy and Greece. Since the late 1980s, these two countries have become hosts of large numbers of immigrants from Albania, Poland and Romania, and also from African and Asian countries; other chapters in this book provide details on the scale and character of these movements (see especially Chapters 2 and 3). The sudden transformation of Italy and Greece from emigration to immigration countries has raised social, economic and legal issues which neither the Italian nor the Greek administration were ready to tackle (Pugliese, 1996). In Italy, the problem has to date been confronted mainly through temporary administrative measures and special regularization programmes (in 1986, 1990 and 1996) concerning illegal immigrants who had already settled in the country (see Chapter 11; also Vasta, 1993; Veugelers, 1994; Woods, 1992). A comprehensive immigration law defining not only control policies but also the rights and duties of immigrants in relation to the Italian state was eventually brought to Parliament in 1997 and enacted as Law No. 40 in March 1998; again for details on this see Bonifazi’s account in Chapter 11. In Greece, the first immigration bill introduced in 1991 (Law No. 1975) aimed mainly at controlling the inflow of immigrants and responded to the need for Greece to be seen to be imposing a stricter regime of migration control in

186 Anna Triandafyllidou 187 line with the Schengen Accords (Lazaridis, 1996, pp. 341–2; Triandafyllidou, 1996). Recently, however, the Greek government has decided to proceed to the regularization of illegal immigrants who arrived in the country before June 1997. Two presidential decrees were issued in November 1997 which determine the conditions and procedures required: progress on this regularization exercise is reported at the end of Fakiolas’ account in Chapter 3. The rapid increase in the number of immigrants hosted legally or illegally in the two countries has caused reactions among the domestic populations. Anxiety about the possible negative consequences of immigration on unemployment and fear that the distinctiveness of the national culture and identity might be blurred because of the influx of large numbers of foreigners, have led to significant changes in public opinion with regard to foreigners and/or immigrants in both countries.2 Unfortunately, neither the Mediterranean tradition of hospitality, nor the previous experience of Greeks and Italians themselves as immigrants, have prevented the rise of xenophobic attitudes and behaviour. This study aims at investigating the relationship between national identity and the development of xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants in the two countries. My hypothesis is that the massive presence of immigrants, designated as ‘Others’, in the national territory activates a process of re-definition of national identity. Immigrants disrupt the political and cultural order of the nation. They represent a threat to its ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’. Therefore, they have to be kept ‘outside’, if not physically at least symbolically. Thus, a process of re-definition of national identity starts taking place (Triandafyllidou, 1998), which is reflected in the political and media discourse. New emphasis is drawn on ethnic and cultural features which differentiate Others from Us and exclude Them from Our society. Italy and Greece have been chosen as case-studies for two reasons. First, because both countries have recently, and quite suddenly, been transformed from emigration societies to host countries. Moreover, they were both ill-prepared to face such a political and administrative challenge and their governments, initially, tried to deal with the situation through temporary measures. Secondly, the Italian and Greek national identities differ significantly, the former being more of a civic nature, the latter having predominantly ethnic features. This provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis with regard to different types of national identities and investigate which features are more readily used to discriminate against immigrants and exclude them from the host society. 188 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the main features of Greek and Italian national identities will be analysed and their civic or ethnic character will be highlighted. Secondly, the political discourse related to the issue of immigration will be investigated through the analysis of interviews conducted with state ofﬁcials, trade unionists and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, who have dealt with the issue of immigration in each country. Thirdly, the results of the two case-studies will be compared and discussed.

National identity and diversity

Smith’s (1991, p. 14) working definition of the nation as ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’ shows the complexity and multi-dimensionality of national identity. In all its forms and expressions, however, national identity is about ‘Us’ and ‘Them’; it creates boundaries which distinguish the ingroup, the national community, from those outside, the foreigners. Besides, the notion of the Other is inherent in the nationalist doctrine itself. For the nationalist (or simply for every individual that recognizes her/himself as a member of a national community) the existence of her/his own nation presupposes the existence of other nations too. Besides, the course of nationalism never ran smooth. Most of the nations existing today had to fight to secure their survival and achieve their independence. For most national communities, there have been and there probably still are Others, other nations and/or states, from which the community tried to liberate and/or differentiate itself. Furthermore, nationalism as a theory of political organization requires that ethnic and cultural boundaries coincide with political ones (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Boundaries between political units are supposed to define the borderlines between different ethnic communities. Nonetheless, the term nation-state is in most cases a misnomer. It usually denotes a multi- ethnic state in which a given national group is politically, culturally and numerically dominant and, therefore, tends to think of the state as its political extension. This situation involves a great potentiality for conflict on the part of minority groups. Moreover, ethnic and cultural diversity is often a result of migrations. Host countries are faced with the necessity of dealing with these ‘Others within’ whose presence challenges the political and cultural Anna Triandafyllidou 189 order of the nation. The co-existence of different nations or ethnic groups within the same territory requires the identity of each group to be constantly reproduced and re-affirmed for the sense of belonging to the group to survive. It requires the constant re-definition of the We that must be distinguished from a They that is geographically close. Not surprisingly, such processes are put into motion when the foreigners found within the national community are immigrants, socially visible and economically weak (Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou, 1994). The need to deal with the Other within thus leads to a re-definition of the national identity of the host society. According to my hypothesis, a process of re-defining the national identity along exclusionary lines is activated by the presence of immigrants. This happens because they are perceived to threaten the ‘way of life’ of the ingroup and, thus, part of what is its members’ sense of self (Cohen, 1985). Since the national community is primarily ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1991), its reality lies in its members’ perception of the vitality of their culture and their common belonging. Immigrants who do not share the cultural and identity codes of the nation pose a threat to it, although the nature and strength of this threat will vary according to the perceived cultural distance and behavioural characteristics attributed by the host society to different immigrant groups – issues which will be touched upon later.

Ethnic and civic nations

Nations are distinguished with reference to their primarily ethnic or civic character (cf. Smith, 1986, 1991). The main elements constitutive of an ethnic nation are the belief that its members are ancestrally related, a common set of cultural traditions and collective memories and a link to a specific historical territory: the nation’s homeland. Civic nations in contrast are based on a common political culture and a legal system that assigns equal rights and duties to all members, a common economy with a single division of labour and a territory that is the geopolitical basis of the community. Each national identity includes both ethnic and civic features (Smith, 1991, p. 13). In other words, the distinction should be understood as a continuum. Thus, I shall define ethnic nations as those in which ethnic features are prevalent, while civic ones are those in which civic and territorial elements play the most important part in defining who belongs to the community and who is a foreigner. 190 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

Greek identity: ethnic traditions and civic consciousness Not surprisingly, Greek national identity encompasses both ethnic and civic characteristics. Even though early Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century was marked by the influence of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, ever since the first decades of the existence of the independent Greek state the nation has been defined with reference to common ancestry, culture and language (Kitromilides, 1983, 1990, pp. 25–33; Veremis, 1983). Greek national consciousness was ‘constructed’ throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the nation’s irredenta, namely the regions inhabited by Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox populations that had not been included in the Greek state at the moment of its creation. The Great Idea (Megali Idea), namely the cultural, political and ultimately military project of claiming the irredenta3 and integrating them into the Greek state, represented the political expression of the ethnically, religiously and culturally–linguistically defined Greek nation. It also played a significant part in unifying a traditional and internally divided society and transforming it into a nation-state. Moreover, Greece thus became the national centre, the political and cultural basis for the Greek populations living in the Near and Middle East as well as in the Balkans (Kitromilides, 1983). The ethnic character of the Greek nation was confirmed through the resolution of the question of the eterochthones, ethnic Greeks born outside the territory which later became the independent Greek kingdom, who were accepted on an equal footing as autochthones, those born within the national territory (Clogg, 1992, p. 48). The Western institutions transplanted into the new-born Greek state, as well as the Greek Enlightenment movement, although alien to the traditional, rural and deeply religious Greek society of the early nineteenth century, marked a continuity between classical and modern Greece. The ancient glorious past was thus incorporated into the Greek nation as its genealogical and cultural cradle. However, the construction of the national identity was completed only through the integration of the Byzantine period into the historic trajectory of the Greeks. The ‘invention’ of such a united and unique community started with the work of the Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos (Veremis, 1983, pp. 60–1) and was continued throughout the nineteenth century through educational and cultural policies. The unity of the nation was thus extended both in time and space. Furthermore, the integration of the Byzantine past into the national consciousness led to the gradual identification of the flock with the ethnos, the nation. Even though this Anna Triandafyllidou 191 identification was problematic (Kitromilides, 1990, pp. 51–9), the separation of the Greek church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833 confirmed the close link between members of the nation and the faithful. In spite of the ethnic origins of Greek nationalism, the construction of a common legal and political system within the new state, the existence of a national economy and, most importantly, of a national army, the improvement of mobility within the national territory and also the creation of a common public education system significantly influenced the nature of Greek national identity, adding to it a set of territorial and civic features. Nonetheless, the path towards national integration proved particularly difficult because the limited economic and military forces of the Greek state could not meet the disproportionate ambitions of its government. Moreover, the regime of conditional sovereignty that had been imposed on Greece by the foreign powers further undermined the prestige and legitimacy of the state as the political agent of the nation (Diamandouros, 1983). The military defeat in 1897 and the bankruptcy of the Greek state not only shattered the dreams of national grandeur but also led to the substitution for the nation-state by the nation-without-state which symbolized the unity and uniqueness of the Greeks. This ethno- genealogical view of the nation has been constantly renovated throughout the twentieth century and Greekness has been fetishized (Tsoukalas, 1993) as an amalgamate of genealogical and environmental elements in which only people born Greeks can participate. The scale and wide-ranging nature of the Greek diaspora adds a further layer of meaning to this ideology. In conclusion, the markers of the Greek nation are genealogical, linguistic, religious and cultural. The exclusionary character of this perspective shows that foreigners such as immigrants cannot be accepted as members of the national community or its state.

Italians: the Risorgimento and beyond Italianness – italianità – was initially developed in the Renaissance period as a cultural concept. Only in the nineteenth century was it transformed into a political project which became reality with the unification of Italy in 1860. Ever since the creation of the independent Italian state, the nation has been conceptualized as a community of people living in a territory and sharing a common set of political and cultural traditions. Thus, the national community has been primarily defined with reference to a specific territory and a particular political culture (Rusconi, 1993). 192 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

Moreover, the Roman tradition, the Risorgimento (the unification movement) and the fascist legacy have been integrated into a common national past. The blend of these traditions and historical memories has been identified as the ‘Italian ideology’ (Veneziani, 1994), which supposedly characterizes the Italian nation. The so-called ‘Italian ideology’ is of an ambiguous, revolutionary– conservative nature (Veneziani, 1994), that is intimately linked to the tradition of trasformismo. The ideology and practice of trasformismo, born in the first decades of the Italian state, has survived and has become a dominant trend in Italian society and politics. The term was coined in 1880 to account for the fact that the old political parties of the right and left wing abandoned their ideological struggle and became ‘amalgams of one-time opponents’ (Duggan, 1994, p. 161). The term expresses, in other words, the subordination of principles to short-term interests. Indeed, this practice has been consolidated throughout this century as a common political strategy peculiar to the Italian people. The second element that characterises Italian identity is regionalism, both as a political–administrative reality and as a civic tradition including cultural and linguistic traits. Italy is characterized by internal diversity: it is made up of a plurality of territorial units with their own separate histories. The division between North and South is not a mere matter of geography that can be attributed to environmental differences or to supposed ethno-biological features which distinguish northern from southern Italians. The origins of this division lie in the past, in the different economic, social and political experiences that each region has had (Putnam et al., 1993). The significance of regionalism for the concept of Italian identity is obvious if one considers that more than a century after the unification of the country, regional identities and socio-economic realities continue to threaten the national unity, as the Northern League movement has demonstrated. The key to understanding this problem lies, first, in the relatively late formation of the Italian nation-state and second, in the fact that unification was imposed from above by a small elite, influenced by the political and cultural ideals of the French Revolution and German Romanticism (Bollati, 1983; Duggan, 1994). The unification process was experienced by a large part of the population at best as a civil war and at worst as a war of conquest of the central and southern parts of Italy by the Piedmontese; it was certainly not a war of national liberation (Duggan, 1994, p. 133). Besides, the policies of the new state were not successful in inculcating a feeling of Anna Triandafyllidou 193 national belonging among the rural populations of either the North or the South. The failure to integrate regional diversity into the nation- state may also be attributed to the fact that territorial identities have been neglected for a long time. The creation of a centralized state left little room for local or regional politics. Furthermore, the state administration and institutions introduced after unification, instead of fostering the homogenization of regional politics, succumbed to the pre-existing traditions and socio-economic realities (Putnam et al., 1993, p. 145). The civic conception of the Italian nation has also been influenced by fascism. Its influence is not direct, however. It does not derive from its political and cultural legacy, even though some scholars suggest that such a legacy persists in many sectors of public life (Veneziani, 1994, pp. 259–60). It comes rather from its opposite movement, namely anti-fascism. The reconstruction of the national identity after the collapse of Mussolini’s regime has been dominated by a strong element of negation (Rusconi, 1993, p. 16): instead of elaborating and integrating the fascist experience as part of the historical trajectory of the nation, the anti-fascist movement has simply denied it. The foundation myth of the new Italian Republic was based on the movement of Resistance against the fascists and the German occupation (1943–45). Nonetheless, the symbolic value of the Resistance as a national liberation struggle has been contested by many. In fact, the movement was divided into minority groupings which fought not only for liberation but also, and perhaps mainly, with the objective of imposing their own socio-economic model for the reconstruction of the new Italian state (Rusconi, 1993). Thus, the Resistance was from its very beginning intertwined with party politics and failed to provide for the symbol of national unity. However, civic traditions in Italy are complemented by an ethno- cultural profile, a ‘national character’ which refers to a specific con- stellation of personality features that supposedly characterize Italians. The origins of this myth can be found in the Risorgimento and in its conflictual relationship with industrialization and modernization. The intellectual movement of the Risorgimento sought to reintegrate the artisan and peasant populations ‘from above’. A new humanist culture was created through the exaltation of the rural ethic in the works of Manzoni, Cuoco and others. According to some scholars (Bollati, 1983, p. 101; Duggan, 1994), this idealization of life in the countryside – the myth of the Italian peasant developed by Cuoco and his praise of the system of ‘patriarchal cultivation’ as a guarantee for public morality 194 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy and political stability – was merely an ideological disguise for the economic activity that was prevalent in Italy at the time and also a strategy for opposing the advent of industrialism. Moreover, the emphasis put by intellectuals on humanism as the main feature of Italian identity led to an ethno-cultural view of the nation. Italianness was conceived as a set of personality traits that can be summarised in three words: Italiani brava gente ‘Italians good people’ (Campani, 1993). These traits, detached from the history and the political culture of the nation, have been related to the idea of an Italian race. This ethnic–racial conception is considered by some scholars (Veneziani, 1995) as the background of the territorial and civic community. Such statements create an ambiguity as to whether the Italian nation has a primarily ethnic or civic character. Religion and language have only a marginal role in the definition of Italianness. Even though religion plays an important (though now declining) part in the everyday life of Italians, it is not closely linked with feelings of belonging to the nation. This is probably due to the universalistic dogma and policies of the Catholic church which are by definition in contrast with any nationalist ideology. The Italian language, on the other hand, developed in the region of Tuscany and later imposed by the state as the national language, has never been able to eradicate totally the local linguistic traditions manifested in the form of dialects.4 In conclusion, civic and territorial elements are prevalent in the conception of the Italian nation. Moreover, the plurality of cultural/ linguistic traditions and political practices that exist within the Italian state makes people aware of diversity. However, Italian identity draws also upon the idea of a cultural community shaped by its unique historical experiences and closed to outsiders. Thus, it may be hypothesized that Italians, given their political culture and civic consciousness, might be tolerant and ‘open’ towards immigrants. At the same time, there is a latent ethnic–racial view of the Italian nation that is potentially xenophobic.

The political discourse on immigration

The second section of this study concerns the analysis of interviews conducted with 26 public officials, NGO representatives and trade unionists in Athens and Rome during the period May–July 1996.5 The analysis of these interviews aims at highlighting the political discourse on immigration in the two countries. It examines the opinions and Anna Triandafyllidou 195 attitudes of the people who have to deal with the issue on a daily basis. Their views, of course, are not representative of the nation as a whole. However, they have been selected as a suitable target population because they are often involved in public discourse on immigration and may influence the policy agenda. My concern in this section will be to study the ways in which the interviewees used features of the Greek or Italian national identity to define immigrants as ‘different’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ and thus contrast them to the domestic population. Furthermore, their uses of exclusionary definitions of the nation will be highlighted.

Methodological background Interview texts were coded using a scheme which included three identifying categories (i.e. record number, name of interviewee, date of interview) and seven national identity dimensions in conformity with Smith’s definition (1991): ethnic origins, cultural traditions, territory (the nation’s homeland), language, religion, civic traditions and national character, namely a set of idiosyncratic features that supposedly characterize the members of a nation and are derived from their common origins. In addition, the texts have been analysed qualitatively following the tradition of discourse analysis. In other words, the study examines the activities that are performed in interview talk, in particular the ways in which the interviewees seek to exclude immigrants from the host society and, at the same time, formulate a new definition of their own national identity (Silverman, 1993, pp. 120–1). The analysis concentrated on the surface structure of the text, namely the language codes (words or segments of phrases) which express its meaning and the hypercodes which suggest the interpretative frames through which the text has to be understood (van Dijk, 1985, 1987, 1993). In other words, the hypercodes are the linguistic or rhetoric devices used to introduce specific national identity dimensions as the appropriate frames for interpreting the discourse on immigration.

The case of Greece As Table 9.1 shows, from a quantitative point of view, ethno-cultural dimensions (ethnicity, culture, religion, language and national character) are clearly prevalent in the discourse on immigration, even though issues related to Greek law and political culture (civic values) are far from being neglected. The qualitative analysis of the interview texts, however, shows that language and religion, despite being important features of Greek national 196 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

Table 9.1 Quantitative analysis of interview texts with Greek an Italian ofﬁcials

% mentions Greek Italian Ethnicity 25 23 National character 8 7 Culture 17 20 Religion 15 9 Language 12 5 Territory 4 11 Civic values 19 25

Source: Author’s analysis. identity, remain relatively marginal within the political discourse on immigration. Linguistic concerns focus on the practical necessity for foreigners to learn Greek. Indeed, they are strongly encouraged to do so. Language is also mentioned as one of the elements that links Pontian Greeks to Greece (even though many of them only speak Russian) because their language is considered to be a Greek dialect.6 Religion is rarely used to distinguish between different groups of immigrants. The difficulty for Greeks in understanding some Islamic beliefs and customs, or the importance of religion and the church for Catholic Poles, are mentioned by some of the interviewees without, however, emphasizing a contrast between Them and Us. There are two factors that can explain the limited importance of these two elements: first, the fact that a large number of the immigrants are of the Christian faith;7 and secondly, the fact that their illegal condition prevents them from expressing their religion publicly. The territorial dimension of the nation seems also to be of secondary importance even though concerns regarding the control of the national borders, the Greek–Albanian border in particular, are expressed by some of the individuals interviewed. More specifically, attention is drawn to the ‘permeability’ of the national borders which makes their control extremely difficult (NGO 3).8 Moreover, fears with regard to the ghettoization of some urban areas are expressed. Overall, however, immigrants are perceived neither to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation nor to undermine its sovereignty. Three elements are dominant in the responses of the people interviewed: ethnicity (related also to the national character dimension), culture and civic values. Ethnic origin is important in two ways. First, it draws the line between Greeks and foreigners. Greeks are distinguished Anna Triandafyllidou 197 not only from foreigners but also from Pontian Greeks and Vorioepirotes – Albanian citizens of Greek descent (Adm. 1, Adm. 3). Immigrants are generally identified with reference to their ethnicity. Moreover, their nationality is linked to a presumed national character. In other words, they are attributed certain personality features because they come from a specific country. Thus, according to some of the people interviewed, Poles have ‘a different attitude’ (TU 3), ‘they impose themselves’ (TU 2), Iraqis ‘are adaptive’ (NGO 1), Albanians are ‘disruptive and violent’ (NGO 1) and Pontian Greeks ‘are weird’ (Adm. 1). Furthermore, placing the emphasis on the fact that immigrants are foreigners provides a justification for treating them as ‘Gastarbeiters’ (Adm. 3), who will stay in Greece only for a short period of time and who may not therefore acquire political rights (TU 1). Secondly, ethnicity serves to distinguish between immigrants of Greek origin and Others. Thus, Pontian Greeks are recognised as refugees or simply as ‘Greeks who return to their homeland’ and who ‘have an historical right to Greek citizenship’ (Triandafyllidou, 1996). Vorioepirotes, Albanian citizens of Greek ethnic origin and of the Christian Orthodox religion, are treated ‘almost as Greeks’ (TU 4). However, the distinctions between Pontian Greeks, Vorioepirotes and Others are not always straightforward. With regard to Pontian Greeks, nationality is defined on the basis of ethnic descent, language, common historical memories and/or links with historical homelands and culture (Adm. 1, NGO 2, TU 4). Moreover, their Greekness is derived from their ‘Greek consciousness’ (TU 3). Although most of these elements characterise Vorioepirotes as well, their Greekness is put under question or they are treated as ‘guestworkers’ (Adm. 3). Nonetheless, the ethnic view of nationality is ultimately dominant. As one employee of the Ministry of Labour argues, ‘Each state has the discretion of treating the people of the same ethnicity in a different way [than Others], if it wishes to do so’ (Adm. 3). To sum up, the claims raised by certain groups of immigrants regarding their Greek origins make people reflect on the definition of Greekness. Overall, however, the general tendency is to emphasize the difference between Us-Greeks and Them-immigrants. In other words, ethnicity is used as the major distinction between the nation and Others. The cultural dimension of nationality is the second most important feature related to the discourse on immigration. It is pointed out that immigrants are culturally different and that each nation has a specific cultural outlook that characterizes its members. Thus, Eastern Europeans, and more particularly Russians, supposedly bring with 198 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy them their corrupted mores which may ‘have general consequences for our society, our youth, our young women, these people little by little will change the culture that the Greek woman had, which she had until a few years ago’ (TU 1, emphasis added). Albanians, on the other hand, have a ‘Mafia tradition’ in their culture (TU 3). Poles, in contrast, are praised for their high level of education and professional training (TU 3, TU 4); see also Romaniszyn’s comments on this in Chapter 6. Overall, the different cultural backgrounds of immigrants are seen as a source of trouble. Foreign cultures are linked mostly with pejorative features, such as corruption or immorality. Some interviewees fear that such features may ‘contaminate’ the national culture. Pontian Greeks, for instance, who are Greek citizens, are expected to fully assimilate to the Greek lifestyle and culture (Adm. 1). The third dimension around which the debate on immigration is organized concerns civic traditions. It is worth noting that civic culture is not a core element of Greek identity. However, it plays an important part in the discourse. On the one hand, the debate concentrates on the principle of law and order. The majority of the interviewees agree that the state should make a stronger effort to control immigration and impose order. However, at the same time it is pointed out first, that the existing laws are too severe to be applicable (NGO 3) and secondly, that illegality constitutes part of Greek political culture and that in this sense immigration makes no exception to the rule (TU 3). In conclusion, the importance of a proper institutional framework for controlling immigration, and the role of the state in this respect, are emphasized (Adm. 3, NGO 3). This emphasis may be contrasted to the Greek tradition of ‘free rider’ behaviour (Tsoukalas, 1995) and to the mistrust that characterizes the relationship between the Greek state and its citizens. Or it seems that the presence of illegal immigrants in the country reinforces a civic conception of national identity, concentrating on social order (rather than solidarity).

The Italian case-study As with Greece, three dimensions prevail in the political discourse on immigration in Italy (see Table 9.1): civic traditions, ethnicity and culture. With reference to civic culture, the humanist tradition is emphasized: ‘I [interviewee] accept you [immigrant] for what you are’ (Adm. 2, Adm. 4). Within this frame of mind, as one interviewee (Adm. 2) points out, the terms ‘racism’ or ‘tolerance’ have no meaning. Moreover, the idea of multiculturalism is defined as a social value that should be cherished (Adm. 2, NGO 3, TU 2) and promoted through Anna Triandafyllidou 199 education, information and sensitization of public opinion (NGO 1, NGO 2, NGO 3). Besides, a number of interviewees make the point that Italy has already demonstrated its culture of acceptance (NGO 1) and solidarity (NGO 3) through the work of non-governmental and charity organizations as well as through the legal provisions made by the state to regularize illegal immigrants. The humanist spirit of such views is, however, complemented by the belief that social order should be respected by all, Italians and immigrants alike (Adm. 3, TU 1). This ‘law and order’ discursive frame leads to two lines of thought. On the one hand, according to some interviewees, the illegal condition of many immigrants lends itself to criminal activities (Adm. 3). On the other hand, there is a need for more effective state intervention to control immigration through bilateral agreements, inter-governmental cooperation and planning of the migratory flows. In other words, the idea of a common political–legal culture that binds the nation together is used here to favour the acceptance of immigrants and their integration in the host society (to the extent of course that they abide by the rule of law). The importance of this presumed Italian culture of legality seems dubious, however, if we look at the main features of the Italian identity, which include the tradition of trasformismo, which I have described earlier in this chapter, and the art of arrangiarsi (making the best of any given situation). As many interviewees point out (Adm. 1, NGO 3, TU 3), in Italy there is more of a tendency to cope with problems through provisional measures than through making long-term plans and sound laws. Nevertheless, despite the lack of respect that Italians themselves show for the law and the inconsistent policy practices of the state, the failure of immigrants to comply with the law is presented as the reason for their rejection from Italian society. Even though ethnicity plays a secondary part in the definition of Italian identity, it occupies a salient position in the political discourse on immigration. The first and most obvious element of ethnic discrimination is the fact that immigrants are distinguished in terms of their nationality (Adm. 2, Adm. 3, NGO 2, NGO 3, TU 3), which is also linked to some social features, capacities or habits. They are contrasted to Italians when encounters between immigrants and the domestic population are described (TU 2, TU 3) and with reference to employment opportunities (TU 1, TU 3). Furthermore, references to ethnicity provide for a subtle means for justifying discrimination and racism against immigrants. The lack of a spirit of solidarity is called nationalism: 200 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

Young people are worried [about unemployment] and then there is some kind of nationalism. There is the idea: ﬁrst I think about my problems and then I deal with those of others NGO 1

While racist attitudes are justiﬁed as ethnocentrism:

The attitude of a person who does not know something is that of denying it. However, when s/he has to face it, it is difﬁcult that curiosity prevails, ﬁrst comes mistrust and then a feeling of superiority. But this is the ethnocentric projection of the people. All peoples have this ethnocentric attitude NGO 1

Overall, although references to ethnicity as a feature that distinguishes Italians from immigrants are frequent, ethnic origin does not seem to pose a problem for the acceptance and integration of the latter. It is rather used as an interpretative frame which justifies the spreading of racism and xenophobia among Italians, despite their supposed natural kindness. Culture is the third most important dimension used to distinguish between Us and Them. Emphasis is put on the difficulties of communication between the domestic population and the immigrants because of their different cultural traditions (Adm. 2, NGO 1, TU 2). However, the misunderstandings and mistrust that may arise from cultural differences or prejudice are defined as a cultural problem – not an ethnic one – and the problem can be dealt with through information and education (Adm. 2). According to one of the interviewees, the problem mainly arises with Italian families of a poor educational background: ‘The foreigner becomes a problem with the poor families, the families that are culturally and economically poor, because for them the foreigner represents the Other, who steals their jobs and their social position’ (Adm. 2). It is also emphasized that many immigrants wish to learn more about the Italian culture (Adm. 1) and also that they should do so. Immigrants are encouraged to assimilate Italian habits and way of life (Adm. 4, TU 2, TU 3). On the other hand, mistrust towards immigrants is often attributed to ignorance and popular stereotypes about the culture of foreigners, their lifestyle and habits (NGO 2). Nonetheless, too much difference is deemed to create problems (Adm. 3, NGO 2). Some immigrants hold values that are incompatible Anna Triandafyllidou 201 with the Italian society: ‘If a child has stolen a wallet, it is not because s/he is a thief, but because culturally, there are many influences from the culture of the adults, and the child is in some sense obliged to make these part of her/his own culture’ (NGO 2). Thus, immigrants who do not comply with the law are not to blame individually; the problem arises from their cultural background. At first glance, such an interpretation seems to do justice to immigrants and explains their difficulties in adapting to the Italian lifestyle. Indirectly, however, it undermines the possibility for them to be accepted as members of the host society. Finally, contrary to what was expected, Italians’ own experience of living together (despite cultural or linguistic differences) is not used as an example in dealing with foreigners. On the other hand, regional differences are seen as a positive element because they provide for different opportunities and mechanisms for the foreigner to become assimilated (TU 2). The other four dimensions included in the analysis, namely territory, religion, language and national character, play a marginal role in the Italian discourse on immigration. Religious differences do not seem to bother the Italian interviewees, who seem to be generally in favour of the respect of religion as a universal human feature, regardless of its different modes of expression (Adm. 1, Adm. 2). Language is mostly seen as a practical problem: immigrants need to learn Italian in order to get a job but language competence is not a formal requirement for them to get a residence or work permit (Adm. 2, Adm. 5). References to the territory are rare, although the control of the national borders puzzles some of the people interviewed (Adm. 1, TU 2). In conclusion, the question is raised as to whether Italians are indeed brava gente, as they used to consider themselves, or whether they have become racists.

Conclusions

The aim of this study has been to contrast and compare the process of boundary creation and exclusion of immigrants in Italy and Greece. More specifically, the chapter has investigated the ways in which the presence of the immigrant as a foreigner within the national territory leads to the re-definition of the national identity in a more exclusionary way than before. As pointed out in the introduction, Greece and Italy have both been recently transformed from emigration to immigration societies. Being located at the south-eastern borders of the EU, they are often seen by prospective immigrants as a 202 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy suitable point of entrance to the territory of the Union. The two countries have followed broadly similar strategies in dealing with the issue of immigration: initially they ignored the problem, later they sought to tackle it through provisional measures, and only recently have their governments considered the need for comprehensive legislation to deal with both control and integration in a long-term perspective. Moreover, Italy and Greece offer an interesting set for comparison because of the differences in their national identities. Italy is closer to a civic model of nationalism based on common civic traditions and historical experiences, while Greece offers a typical example of ethnic nationalism based on language, culture and genealogy. The political discourse on immigration in the two countries has been studied through the analysis of interviews conducted with three sets of representatives dealing with the issue. The findings of the research indicate that the presence of immigrants leads to a more exclusionary definition of the nation which in turn aims at demonstrating that immigrants cannot be accepted as members of the host society. More specifically, the results of the analysis show that religion, territory, language and national character are rarely used as dimensions for the exclusion of immigrants from the host society. In contrast, the elements emphasized to raise the boundary between Us and Them are ethnicity, culture and civic values. With regard to culture, the pattern is similar in both countries: cultural difference is rarely seen as a good thing. More often than not immigrant cultures are linked to negative features such as dishonesty, criminal tendencies, inability to adapt or poor educational background. Besides, immigrants are expected to assimilate to the host society’s culture. With regard to ethnicity and civic values, the findings are more complex. In the Greek case-study, ethnicity is the most important dimension for distinguishing immigrants from the domestic population. Moreover, there is a distinction between immigrants of Greek descent, who are granted a wide range of privileges, and Others, complete foreigners. This result is in line with my analysis of Greek identity and the importance that is given to ethnic origin in Greece. However, at the same time, special emphasis is put on the civic values that characterize Greek society and, in particular, the respect of law and social order. The fact that immigrants do not share such values or fail to abide by the law is pointed out as proof that they cannot be accepted in the host country. Thus, a presumed Greek culture of ‘law and order’ is created, where previously there was a good deal of Anna Triandafyllidou 203 mistrust and discontent between the citizens and the state and where ‘free rider’ behaviour prevailed. In other words, civic traditions are (re-)invented as a new dimension of Greek identity which excludes illegal immigrants. Not surprisingly, civic values constitute the element that prevails in the Italian discourse on immigration: immigrants are required to comply with Italian laws and civic traditions if they are to be accepted in Italian society. However, the texts analysed reflect also the contradictory nature of Italian civic culture which combines the humanist tradition of solidarity with a desire for a more efficient administration and stricter control. Moreover, contrary to what happens in Greece, the problematic nature of the relationship between Italian citizens and their state and the inconsistent and inefficient policy practices of the latter are intertwined with the issue of illegal immigration. On the other hand, and contrary to what was expected given the marginal role that ethnicity plays in the definition of Italian identity, ethnic origin is emphasized as an important feature that differentiates immigrants from the domestic population. More specifically, it is suggested that a certain level of ethnic discrimination is ‘natural’ and can be accepted as an expression of nationalist or ethnocentric attitudes which, after all, are common to all peoples (sic). Thus, the civic character of Italianness is complemented by presumed genealogical ties despite the country’s regional diversity. In both cases, new features are introduced to each country’s national identity in order to justify the exclusion of immigrants. Greece redis- covers its civic traditions and Italy its common ancestry. In other words, the process activated in both cases is the same: immigrants must be kept outside the host society, if not physically then at least symbolically. Thus, their rights, if any, remain limited because they are not members of Our society. Racists? Us? You must be joking.

Notes 1. The term ‘ethno-nationalism’ is used as a shorthand expression to refer to the revival of both ethnic and national identities. 2. See, for example, recent Eurobarometer reports, no. 47(2), 1997, on ‘Young Europeans’ and issue 48, pp. 68–72. Speciﬁcally on Italy see Woods (1992), Campani (1993), Calavita (1994), and on Greece Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou (1994), Psimmenos (1995), Triandafyllidou and Mikrakis (1995). 3. The irredenta included all territories inhabited by ethnic Greeks, ethnicity (which for Greeks is co-terminous with nationality) being deﬁned in terms of language, culture and religion. The irredenta extended to the north and included Macedonia, Thrace and further northern regions up to the Danube. 204 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

To the east the irredentist claims referred to territories of the Ottoman Empire, notably the Aegean Islands, Crete, Cyprus and parts of Asia Minor and Anatolia (see Kitromilides, 1990, pp. 43–5). 4. Some of these dialects, notably Friulano and Sardo, spoken respectively in the regions of Friuli (north-east Italy) and Sardinia, have the status of separate languages. In addition, German is spoken in the Alto Adige and Slovene in several villages on the Italian side of the border with Slovenia. 5. This empirical research was supported financially and administratively by the British Journal of Sociology, while the writing up of the research was completed during my Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellorship at the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche in Rome, funded by the European Commission’s Training and Mobility of Researchers Programme. During the fieldwork I interviewed 14 persons in Athens and 12 in Rome. For reasons of confidentiality I cannot reveal either their names or the precise organizations or ministries they represent. 6. The term Pontian Greeks refers to people of Greek descent coming from the region of Pontos in north-east Turkey who, for political or economic reasons, had emigrated during the 1930s and after the Second World War to the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan. Pontian Greeks have started returning to Greece, which they consider as their ‘homeland’ after the collapse of communism and the dismantling of the Soviet Union. 7. The Albanians, who are the major group of immigrants in Greece, are a special case. Some are Orthodox Christians from southern Albania (and are of Greek ethnicity); others are notionally Moslem. However it should be remembered that, under the regime of Enver Hoxha, religion was proscribed and Albania became an ‘atheist state’. 8. The following abbreviations are used in the text to categorize the interviewees: Adm. = national administrative official; NGO = representative of a non-governmental organization; TU = trade unionist. Names are withheld for reasons of confidentiality. For the same reason I do not specify which organization, ministry, etc. the interviewee represents. I acknowledge that this poses some interpretation difficulty: for instance a right-wing official from the Ministry of Public Order will not have the same views as a ‘leftist’ from the Ministry of Education.

References Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Bollati, G. (1983) L’Italiano. Il carattere nazionale come storia e come invenzione. Turin: Einaudi. Calavita, K. (1994) ‘Italy and the new immigration’ in Cornelius, W. A., Martin, P. and Holliﬁeld, J. F. (eds) Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 303–30. Campani, G. (1993) ‘Immigration and racism in Southern Europe: the Italian case’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, pp. 507–35. Clogg, R. (1992) A Concise History of Modern Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, A. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of Community. London: Routledge. Anna Triandafyllidou 205

Diamandouros, N. (1983) ‘Hellenism and Greekness’ in Tsaousis, D. (ed.) Hellenism and Greekness: Ideological and Biographical Axes of Modern Greek Society. Athens: Estia, pp. 51–8 (in Greek). Duggan, C. (1994) A Concise History of Italy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Kitromilides, P. (1983) ‘The Greek state as a national centre’ in Tsaousis, D. (ed.) Hellenism and Greekness: Ideological and Biographical Axes of Modern Greek Society. Athens: Estia, pp. 143–64 (in Greek). Kitromilides, P. (1990) ‘Imagined communities and the origins of the national question in the Balkans’ in Blinkhorn, M. and Veremis, T. (eds) Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality. Athens: Eliamep, pp. 23–64. Lazaridis, G. (1996) ‘Immigration to Greece: a critical evaluation of Greek policy’, New Community 22, pp. 335–48 Mikrakis, A. and Triandafyllidou, A. (1994) ‘Greece: the others within’, Social Science Information 33, pp. 787–805. Psimmenos, I. (1995) Immigration from the Balkans: Social Exclusion in Athens. Athens: Glory Books-Papazisis (in Greek). Pugliese, E. (1996) ‘Italy between emigration and immigration and the problems of citizenship’ in Cesarani, D. and Fulbrook, M. (eds) Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 106–24. Putnam, R. with Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rusconi, G. E. (1993) Se cessiamo di essere una nazione. Bologna: Il Mulino. Silverman, D. (1993) Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction. London: Sage. Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. London: Penguin Books. Triandafyllidou, A. (1996) ‘Greek migration policy: a critical note’, Synthesis: Review of Modern Greek Studies 1, pp. 15–22. Triandafyllidou, A (1998) ‘National identity and the Other’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, pp. 593–612. Triandafyllidou, A. and Mikrakis, A. (1995) ‘Greece: a ghost wanders through the capital’ in Baumgartl, B. and Favell, A. (eds) New Xenophobia in Europe. London: Kluwer Law International, pp. 164–79. Tsoukalas, C. (1993) ‘Greek national identity in an integrated Europe and a changing world order’ in Psomiades, H. and Thomadakis, S. (eds) Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order. New York: Pella, pp. 37–78. Tsoukalas, C. (1995) ‘Free riders in Wonderland; or of Greeks in Greece’ in Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. (eds) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-ﬁrst Century. Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp. 191–222. van Dijk, A. T. (ed.) (1985) Handbook of Discourse Analysis (4 vols). New York: Academic Press. van Dijk, A. T. (1987) Communicating Racism. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. van Dijk, A. T. (1993) ‘Principles of critical discourse analysis’, Discourse and Society 4, pp. 249–83. Vasta, E. (1993) ‘Rights and racism in a new country of immigration: the Italian case’ in Wrench, J. and Solomos, J. (eds) Racism and Migration in Western Europe. Oxford: Berg, pp. 83–98. 206 Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy

Veneziani, M. (1994) La rivoluzione conservatrice in Italia: genesi e sviluppo della ideologia italiana ﬁno ai nostri giorni. Varese: Sugarco. Veneziani, M. (1995) Sinistra e destra: risposta a Norberto Bobbio. Florence: Valecchi. Veremis, T. (1983) ‘State and nation in Greece: 1821–1912’ in Tsaousis, D. (ed.) Hellenism and Greekness: Ideological and Biographical Axes of Modern Greek Society. Athens: Estia, pp. 59–68 (in Greek). Veugelers, J. (1994) ‘Recent immigration politics in Italy: a short story’ in Baldwin- Edwards, M. and Schain, M. (eds) The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe. London: Frank Cass, pp. 33–49. Woods, D. (1992) ‘The immigration question in Italy’ in Hellman, S. and Pasquino, G. (eds) Italian Politics: A Review, vol. 7. London: Pinter, pp. 186–98. 10 Urban Restructuring, Immigration and the Generation of Marginalized Spaces in the Lisbon Region Jorge Malheiros

Introduction

This chapter explores the relationship between the processes of restructuring in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon (MRL) and changes in the location of immigrant communities, paying particular attention to the evolution of segregation patterns.1 The basic hypothesis underlying the analysis is that urban transformation processes, strongly supported by foreign capital, contribute to a sharpening of the socio-ethnic division of space and lead especially to the marginalization of African immigrants. The main body of my account is organized in four parts. First, I will provide an overview of the linked processes of urban restructuring and spatial segregation, noting how little work has been done on this interrelationship in Southern Europe. The second section of the chapter will brieﬂy survey the metropolitanization of Lisbon during the 1960s and 1970s, establishing the links between migration and the evolution of employment and housing markets. The third part will present a synthesis of the major elements of the region’s contemporary economic and urban restructuring. The ﬁnal section will focus on the changes in the socio- ethnic spatial patterns in the MRL, paying particular attention to the question of ethnic segregation. The basis for this analysis is information gathered in the Portuguese censuses of 1981 and 1991, with mapping at two spatial levels – the 16 metropolitan municipalities or concelhos and, for a limited number of variables, the 177 freguesias, the smallest administrative unit in the country.

207 208 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Urban restructuring and spatial segregation

Over the past 20 years West European cities have witnessed a profound economic restructuring which has generated visible impacts in the organization of urban space and in the socio-ethnic composition of the population. Urban economic restructuring can be clearly identified both through the reorganization of the entrepreneurial system and in the restructuring of labour markets. The well-known passage from Fordism to flexible accumulation involved the erosion of the industrial mass- production system and enabled the development of flexible strategies in labour processes and working contracts, notably the growth of temporary and subcontracted work. This economic restructuring has gone hand in hand with deep social changes, producing new forms of urban poverty and social marginality (Mingione, 1995). Labour market flexibility opened the door to employment precariousness and unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, due to the mismatch between traditional skills and training on the one hand, and the nature of the new professional jobs on the other. Furthermore, deindustrialization and the development of the service economy led to a polarization of wages, increasing the differences between the incomes of unskilled workers and those of highly qualified professionals (Sassen, 1996; Hamnett, 1995). These processes uncover new situations of urban poverty, both absolute and relative, limiting the access of large sections of the population to basic consumption goods like housing and transport and, in a broader sense, preventing them from participating in the ‘big game’ of consumption. As we shall see in our Lisbon case-study, the consumption of certain products and places acts as a strong social identifier and is invested with a high level of symbolism. However, poverty associated with economic privation is only one of the dimensions of marginality. The concept of marginality is also associated with situations of ‘negative distance’ in relation to certain accepted patterns and norms, not only in the economic field but also in the socio-cultural and political realms. Despite an overall trend towards tolerance and an openness to difference, Western societies still adopt attitudes of discrimination towards certain groups of people who do not follow the standardised patterns and who are considered as a threat to ‘mainstream’ society. Drug addicts, homosexuals and, frequently, Third World immigrants are a few examples of these categories. In fact, if territorial changes in the organization of big cities are the visible effect of these above-mentioned processes of restructuring, immigrant communities correspond to the population sector most Jorge Malheiros 209 affected, in a negative sense, by the processes of social polarization and socio-spatial segregation. In recent years several studies have documented the increase in the scale and number of problems experienced by migrant communities living in the cities of the developed world. The first evidence points to the level of unemployment among foreigners, frequently much higher than the unemployment experienced by nationals – see, for example, the well-documented cases of France (Tripier, 1990) and Germany (Ulrich, 1994). The disproportionate presence of foreign workers with low levels of qualification in the industrial sectors that were most strongly affected by restructuring processes and mass redundancies largely explains this phenomenon (Blotevogel and King, 1996). At the same time, the availability of surpluses of unskilled foreign workers on urban labour markets contributes to downward pressures on wage levels in industry and construction. Labour market vulnerability interacts with other disadvantages experienced by migrant groups such as limited purchasing power, restricted access to housing and absence of information about the institutional mechanisms of the host society (legal rights, social security benefits, etc.). From a geographical point of view, the result is a general tendency towards the reinforcement of spatial segregation among immigrant communities living in metropolitan areas, as demonstrated by Kesteloot (1995) for Brussels, Petsimeris (1995) for London and Pacione (1996) for Vienna. In addition to these dimensions of vulnerability, spatial segregation processes are driven by the migrants’ own strategies of concentration. The development of networks of solidarity among minority groups living in foreign societies is a feature shared by almost all immigrant communities. But this increase in spatial segregation is also the product of massive planning initiatives that aim to produce restructured and vibrant cities that can fight for ‘a place in the sun’ in the very competitive global and European urban networks. Strategic planning, public–private partnership, major investments in reclaiming derelict industrial sites or in the promotion of mega-events like the Olympic Games or the International Expos are processes which change the image of cities and have the potential to attract large quantities of entrepreneurs, capital and tourists. If the public authorities justify the policies in terms of the requirements of modernization and employment-creation, they also require major public investment which is thereby diverted from a more direct social application (Salgueiro et al., 1997). Often, the socio-spatial results of these big urban operations correspond to processes of social 210 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon expulsion. The populations that are economically weak, including ethnic minority groups, are compelled to leave the refurbished areas and seek another place to live in the metropolitan area. Given the economic vulnerability of these groups, their options will be confined to areas of urban space which are degraded and with poor environmental conditions. What we are witnessing, then, is a rapid process of invasion-succession, partially supported by public capital and the planning process, leading to the replacement of low-income social groups by white-collar professionals and their families who are anxious to move to these revalorised sectors of urban space. Turning now to Southern Europe, the first thing to note is the relative paucity of research on the relationship between urban restructuring on the one hand and immigration and ethnic segregation on the other. Two kinds of literature exist but the links have yet to be made between the two. For instance, processes of urban restructuring have been analysed by Leontidou (1990) mainly for Athens, by Salgueiro (1994) for Lisbon and by Tello and Martinez (1994) for Barcelona. Meanwhile, the shift from emigration to immigration that took place in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece has been studied by, among others, King and Black (1997) and King and Konjhodzic (1995). And yet, what is particularly significant about the South European case is that the relatively recent phenomenon of immigration coincides with the aforementioned large-scale urban restructuring operations. Partly due to this, segregation based on ethnicity is probably less marked than has been the case in the cities of the more developed countries of Europe (Leontidou, 1990). However, an increasing trend towards ethnic segregation can be expected, due not only to the continued growth in the numbers of immigrants but also to the bi-polar composition of this foreign population, made up firstly of well- qualified professionals coming from Europe and North America and secondly of Third World migrants who are increasingly substituting local workers in the casualized sectors of the labour market and in the so-called 3D jobs – those which are dirty, dangerous and demanding. Other chapters of this book have already called attention to the dual nature of recent migration streams into Portugal (Baganha, Chapter 4) and Catalonia (Pascual de Sans et al., Chapter 5), and the same phenomenon has also been demonstrated by Malheiros (1996) for Lisbon and Gozálvez Pérez (1996) for Spain. Another aspect of the dynamics of urban transformation occurring in Southern Europe is the high proportion of foreign capital involved. Especially since the late 1980s, European Union funding has supported Jorge Malheiros 211 the building of major infrastructures (roads, bridges, airports etc.) in Portugal and Greece. In Spain and Portugal there has been a rapid internationalization of the real estate market (Salgueiro et al., 1997). This action of foreign capital on the production of urban space also contributes to the processes of spatial segregation. The booming construction industry leads to the import of foreign labour either in an organized fashion or on a spontaneous and clandestine basis. Such recently arrived labour tends to cluster in the few pockets of cheap and available accommodation. On the other hand, the tertiarization and upgrading of central urban areas leads to an increase in housing prices; as a result the housing market becomes more selective as more wealthy residents move in to the renovated parts of the city centres.

Lisbon in the 1960s and 1970s: migration and urban growth

Despite the existence of an initial impulse in the suburban growth of Lisbon in the 1920s (Fonseca, 1990), authors who have researched the urban geography of the city are unanimous in tracing the origins of the demographic boom of the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon to the 1950s (Salgueiro, 1992). Although the MRL’s population growth in the 1950s was marginally below that registered in the previous decade, the relative growth of the MRL compared to demographic growth in the rest of mainland Portugal sharply increased, as Table 10.1 shows. Table 10.2 gives the absolute ﬁgures for the number of inhabitants in the MRL between 1940 and 1981, and shows the decrease in the relative weight of the city of Lisbon within the MRL due to suburban expansion, especially on the north side of the urban area. The process of metropolitan growth continued at a very high rate until the early 1980s,

Table 10.1 Population growth rates in mainland Portugal and the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1940–81 (%)

Mainland Portugal MRL 1940–50 9.7 18.7 1950–60 4.7 16.8 1960–70 –2.2 20.0 1970–81 15.2 38.2

Source: Censuses of Population. 212 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Table 10.2 Evolution of the population of the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1940–81

Year Total population MRL as % Weight of of MRL national total Lisbon in MRL 1940 1 060 312 14.7 65.5 1950 1 258 672 15.9 62.2 1960 1 470 243 17.7 54.6 1970 1 764 446 21.7 42.5 1981 2 438 377 26.1 33.1

Source: Censuses of Population.

although different factors conditioned this evolution before and after 1974, the year of the Portuguese Revolution. Before the mid-1970s Lisbon’s demographic growth was largely driven by the arrival of tens of thousands of internal migrants coming from rural regions, particularly from Alentejo and from central regions like Beira Interior. After 1945 the development of capitalist methods of agricultural production diminished the need for farm labour. This, combined with a continuing high rural birth rate, accelerated the rural exodus, which reached its highest values during the 1960s. Two major destinations absorbed the majority of this young labour force leaving rural Portugal: the Lisbon region and France. The migration flow to Lisbon was also shaped by the political and economic policies pushed forward by the Salazar government. By the mid-1950s manufacturing was established as a privileged sector of the Portuguese economy. With its links to finance capital, benefiting from legal protection and with very favourable internal conditions (low taxes and wages, high levels of social and political control) and external developments (participation in EFTA, increase in foreign investment and demand), Portuguese industry became a leading sector. Together with receipts from tourism and a high inflow of remittances from emigrants, manufacturing growth was a major factor behind the outstanding economic performance of the nation in the 1960s and early 1970s (Barreto, 1996). From a geographical point of view, the strategies that supported this economic development privileged Lisbon and its surroundings. Capital of the Portuguese Empire, with an excellent natural harbour and the main national airport, Lisbon was the natural recipient for the expanding activities in manufacturing and in the service Jorge Malheiros 213 sector. Entrepreneurs wanted to be close to the highly centralized political power, and to have access to the country’s main market of consumers. However, the mass arrival of internal migrants in the 1950s and 1960s brought two interrelated problems: the increase in demand for low-cost housing, and pressure from employers to hold down wages, since low labour costs were the most competitive element of the Portuguese production system. To respond to these problems, especially the first one, the national and local authorities adopted three strategies which, as we shall see later, also had relevance for the location of immigrant groups from overseas. These strategies were:

● freezing of property rents in the municipalities of Lisbon and Oporto, together with control over evictions; ● building the ﬁrst large-scale projects of social housing in the late 1950s; and ● non-control of slums and clandestine housing (built without housing permits in areas lacking infrastructure) which spread both within Lisbon and around the northern periphery of the urban area.

The changes introduced by the 1974 Revolution did not fundamentally interrupt the demographic processes of increasing population concentration in the MRL. In fact, the sudden arrival of more than half a million people from the ex-colonies between 1974 and 1976 put further pressure on the housing market, especially in the MRL where more than half of these new incomers chose to live. As a result the social housing programme was maintained and there was also a boost in clandestine housing (Fonseca, 1990). Furthermore, political disorganization and the left-wing principles of the Portuguese governments of the mid-1970s prevented the repression of the bairros clandestinos and enabled the extension of the fixed rents policy to the rest of the country. The rent law was eventually modified in the mid-1980s, but annual property rent yields are still very modest, except in situations involving a change of tenants, major repairs and, obviously, new houses. The three housing strategies listed above had a significant impact on the spatial organization of the metropolitan area. Given that capitalistic property development leads to urban segregation, it is possible to state that the social segregation (and future ethnic segregation) of Lisbon is very much conditioned by the capitalistic development of the city and its environs in the 1960s and 1970s (Sagueiro, 1983). Meanwhile, rent 214 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon rigidity contributed to a low level of housing mobility in the MRL. On the one hand, tenants tend to profit from the low, frozen rents and do not move. On the other hand the market for newer houses to rent becomes both restricted and expensive, leading many families to follow the option of buying their own flats and houses, often with a great economic effort to do so. Linking these housing processes to the successive migration waves that arrived in the MRL, it can be seen that the first internal migrants found residence in the inner city (Fonseca, 1990). Some lived in rented rooms and later moved to the low-quality bairros clandestinos further out (Salgueiro, 1983). However a good number continued to live in the inner city and tended to deflect the next waves of internal migrants as well as later arrivals of foreign workers to poor suburban neighbourhoods. Until the 1960s the labour needs of the MRL were completely supplied by the internal market. However, during this decade, emigration (mainly to France) and the colonial wars (which necessitated heavy conscription) started to create shortages of young adult males, and some unskilled workers from Cape Verde were brought in to work in construction (Fonseca, 1990; Saint-Maurice, 1997). A residential concentration of Cape Verdeans emerged just to the west of the old city centre. This district – the ‘Cape Verdean Triangle’ (Figure 10.1) –

Figure 10.1 Location of the ‘Cape Verdean Triangle’ in Lisbon Jorge Malheiros 215 contains the symbolically named street Poço dos Negros.2 The continuing over-representation of Cape Verdean and other African people in this area, even 30 years later, confirms the inertia of residential mobility in inner Lisbon and the strength of social networking mechanisms among the migrant communities. Even among the internal migrants from the various regions of Portugal, spatial clustering persists in specific areas. Among all migrant groups, housing market rigidity associated with the development of affective ties within neighbourhoods reinforces spatial immobility and limits the processes of socio-spatial reorganization in the MRL. Although the early arrival of Cape Verdeans in Lisbon is well-known, they do not feature at this time in the statistics on foreigners because they were ‘citizens of the empire’ and therefore classified as Portuguese before 1974. As Table 10.3 shows, in 1960 foreigners accounted for only 1 per cent of the population of the MRL; 84 per cent of the foreigners were Europeans (Spaniards being the largest group) and, among non-Europeans, only Brazilians were a sizeable contingent. This pattern of foreign population points to a predominance of middle-class and high-status immigrants and reflects three main migration groups: the counter-migration of Portuguese-origin Brazilians to Portugal; population movements between the neighbouring Iberian states; and the settlement of wealthy retired people and professionals from Northern Europe, many of whom had worked in the diplomatic services and in foreign enterprises established in Portugal. More than two-thirds of economically active foreign residents in Portugal at this time were in the commercial and service sectors.

Table 10.3 Foreign population in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon, 1960 and 1981

1960 1981 Foreigners as % of total population in MRL 1.0 1.8 Foreigners in MRL as % of national total of foreigners 55.2 44.5 Share of foreigners in Lisbon as % of foreigners in MRL 72.8 33.5 Share of foreigners in Cascais as % of foreigners in MRL 12.4 10.0 Percentage shares of foreigners in MRL: Europeans 84.2 28.2 Brazilians 7.9 5.2 Other Americans 6.0 3.9 Africans (in 1960 does not include Portuguese colonies) 0.9 60.5

Source: Population Census 1960, 1981. 216 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Figure 10.2 Foreigners in the municipalities of Lisbon, 1960 and 1981

Geographically these high-status foreigners were highly concentrated in the city of Lisbon and in the western municipalities of Oeiras and especially Cascais (see Figure 10.2b). Protected by early urban plans, these western areas were already associated with high-class housing and high land prices. They had good environmental resources, being close to the beaches of the Linha do Estoril3 and to the Serra de Sintra, as well as an established social image, having been associated with residences of some of the European bourgeoisie and nobility. The composition of the foreign population and its spatial distribution within the Lisbon region underwent a major change in the years 1974–76. The sudden and rather disorganized decolonization process which took place in the wake of the 1974 Revolution created an inﬂux of African migrants from the former Portuguese colonies who arrived at the same time as the retornados – people of Portuguese origin returning from the newly liberated colonies. The shift in the composition of the foreign population living in the MRL is well illustrated in Table 10.3. Jorge Malheiros 217

The massive arrival of African immigrants led to important changes in the location patterns of foreigners within the MRL. The new immigrants were compelled to settle, not in the overcrowded city centre, but in more suburban municipalities (Figure 10.2c). This pattern of settlement was facilitated by the development of a parallel housing market involving the transfer of clandestine and shanty dwellings from the internal migrants to the newcomers from Africa. Housing control was not very strict at this time and the expansion of clandestine areas also took place due to new construction. Beside this concentration in slums, the new foreign arrivals also showed a tendency towards over-representation in suburban districts where there was a good supply of legal low-cost ﬂats in the late 1970s: Vale da Amoreira in the municipality of Moita, Amora in Seixal, or Cidade Nova and S. António dos Cavaleiros in Loures are good examples of this process. Hence, during the second half of the 1970s, the socio-spatial segregation of Lisbon incorporated an ethnic dimension. Europeans kept their over-representation in the favoured areas of the west side facing the Tagus estuary and the sea (Figure 10.2d) while Africans, who became numerically dominant amongst the foreigners in the MRL, concentrated in the shanty-towns of the urban fringe and in more restricted pockets of the inner suburbs. The vigour of networking mechanisms amongst foreign immigrant communities reinforced this trend towards spatial clustering. Table 10.4 shows the situation of the different migrant groups living in the MRL in 1981: their absolute numbers and segregation indices.4 In general the degree of spatial segregation registered by foreigners is higher than that recorded by internal migrants from the various regions of Portugal. In addition, the level of internal social homogene- ity inside each group of migrants also contributes to the degree of clustering. This is borne out by the Angolans, who are the immigrant group with the highest levels of social heterogeneity and who exhibit an index of segregation which is below that of all the regional groups of internal migrants. Also to be noted from Table 10.4 is the fact that high-status groups like the UK nationals have higher levels of segregation than the immigrants from Africa and Brazil. To brieﬂy conclude this part of the account, we may say that the power of segregation mechanisms and of social and ethnic patterns of spatial organization inherited from the 1960s and 1970s was so strong that it acted as a major conditioning framework for the segregation trends in the MRL in the 1980s and after – the subject of the next section. 218 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Table 10.4 Segregation indices for selected groups of foreign and internal migrants, Lisbon Metropolitan Region, 1981

Population Segregation indices Foreign immigrants : Cape Verde 16.814 25.2 Angola 5 966 11.1 Brazil 2 337 18.8 Spain 4 905 33.7 UK 1 359 40.9 EEC (12) 11 078 27.8 Africa 27 237 18.1 North America 1 181 30.2 Internal migrants: Algarve 58 842 18.4 Alentejo (South) 224 695 18.6 Leiria, Santarém (Centre) 141 389 11.9 Coimbra, Aveiro (Littoral-Centre) 91 735 13.4 Castelo Branco, Guarda, Viseu (Interior Centre) 254 064 14.0 Oporto, Braga, Viana do Castelo (Littoral North) 97 541 12.3 Bragança, Vila Real (Interior North) 73 060 12.7 Azores 7 355 13.2 Madeira 9 899 11.3 Natives of Lisbon Metropolitan Area 1 304 502 6.2

Lisbon in the 1980s and 1990s: urban restructuring and ethnic segregation

Elements of economic restructuring The mid-1980s marked a new era for Portugal, characterized by the consolidation of the democratic state and by deep economic transformations based on two policy trends, liberalism and openness to the exterior. One of the key processes of this ‘new economic order’ in Portugal has been the privatization of the companies that were national- ized during the ‘hot years’ of the revolution, and of some public services like health and college education. Progressive changes in labour market regulations and practices led to an increase in vulnerability and precariousness for large sections of the workforce, as was pointed out by Baganha in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, the formal entry of Portugal into the EEC in January 1986 has boosted the internationalization of the Portuguese economy. Profiting from this new external context, and from internal political stability (a liberal government holding absolute parliamentary majority), Portugal has become a new and attractive Jorge Malheiros 219 market. Foreign direct investment saw very significant growth during the late 1980s and early 1990s and trade with European partners increased strongly. In addition, millions of ecu of EU structural funds have been feeding the Portuguese economy, with a particular impact on the construction and public works sectors. The impact of these economic processes and restructuring trends has been most strongly felt in the Lisbon region. For instance, more than four-fifths of FDI during 1991–94 was concentrated in the Lisbon–Tagus Valley region. Lisbon’s potential for attracting investment is fairly obvious. Although somewhat peripheral within a European context, it contains the most important public and private decision-making agents, it has important overseas links with Africa and the Americas, and not least, it possesses an attractive natural setting and historical atmosphere. Finally, it is a low-cost city by European standards, including a very favourable cost/quality ratio for qualified labour (Ferrão and Domingues, 1994; Salgueiro et al., 1997). The growing presence of foreign enterprises in the service sector (more than half of the foreign investment in the Lisbon region is in banking, insurance and real estate) has contributed to a large-scale transfer of white-collar professionals from the main investor countries, swelling the number of high-status immigrants in the MRL (see Figure 10.3). Another feature of the urban economy is the dynamic performance of the construction sector. The strong demand generated both by private agents (banks, shopping centres, etc.) and by the public sector (several mega-projects like the Tagus Bridge, the Expo 98 precinct, the train link between Lisbon and the south bank) has resulted in an average productive increase of around 10 per cent per year over the last few years. The total number of construction enterprises increased from 2704 in 1986 to 4867 in 1993, with most of this increase being of small units. This situation points to the development of subcontracting strategies in a very complex and segmented sector where the fluctuation in the demand for labour and the pressure to prevent wage increases have contributed to the development of clandestine economic activity (again, see Chapter 4 for more on this in the Portuguese context). Because construction work tends to be demanding and dangerous and mainly unskilled, the presence of African immigrant workers in this sector is very high (see Figure 10.3). Other factors too are connected to this ethnic work specialisation. The increase in education and training levels among the Portuguese population during the 1970s and 1980s5 created a mismatch between the supply and demand for construction labour. Furthermore, the transfer of Portuguese construction labour to 220 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Figure 10.3 Professional and employment characteristics of African and European immigrants in Portugal, 1995

other European countries such as Belgium and Germany, where Portuguese construction firms have been able to win contracts within the unified European market, has aggravated the domestic mismatch. If construction is the best example of a sector with a high level of demand for unskilled male workers coming mainly from Africa, services like domestic and industrial cleaning fulfil an analogous role for female workers from the same origin (Figure 10.3). Hence the internationalization of the urban service economy, favouring the presence of highly qualified immigrants from Europe and the Americas, and the high level of demand in sectors like construction, which relies increasingly on unskilled African workers, explain the dual composition of the foreign population in Portugal. This dual composition is simultaneously ethnic and social because Jorge Malheiros 221 geographic origin is correlated closely with socio-professional status and qualifications. Moreover, the trend towards the polarization of wage levels in all sectors in the MRL between 1986 and the present time aggravates the process of socio-ethnic polarization (Salgueiro et al., 1997).

Urban restructuring To the elements of economic restructuring considered in the preceding subsection we must add the salient aspects of Lisbon’s dynamic urban restructuring process. Since the mid-1980s, Lisbon’s metropolitan region has been experiencing a continuing process of urban renewal. This is clearly visible in the revamping of the transport and road system, in some major interventions to rehabilitate old quarters of the inner city, and in the dramatic change in the urban landscape of a part of eastern Lisbon due to the effects of the Expo 98 project. These operations, based on mixtures of national and foreign capital, have generated new spatial inequalities within the MRL. First, the change in the geography of accessibility stresses the dichotomy between the ‘positive spaces’ close to the new transport infrastructures and the marginal spaces that are poorly served. It is true that these transport investments could be said to have a positive social effect by lowering commuting times from the suburban areas inhabited by lower- and middle-status groups. However, the main thrust of transport policy has been directed at road improvement and, therefore, at individual private transport. Since poor families, including immigrants, have limited access to cars, ‘mobility injustice’ increases. Secondly, urban renewal around the city centre and in the Expo district has regenerated these areas. However, housing renewal, better infrastructures and a new image lead to an increase in land and housing prices. This transition process leads to a replacement of the lower-income groups by higher-status professionals and business people who can afford the increased property prices. In addition to these renovated areas, the traditional high-class zones in the western sector of Lisbon and along the coast have maintained their capacity for reproducing high-quality images and socio-economic standards. At the other end of the housing market ladder, less favoured groups of the population continue to be concentrated in large social housing complexes and in the clandestine housing sector. Despite the greater degree of control exercised by municipalities towards the clandestine construction of dwellings since the early 1980s, this parallel housing 222 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon market has continued to function, especially for low-status immigrants. Where eradication of shanty towns has taken place, population relocation has mainly been to the large complexes of social housing. Although such transfers result in some improvement in housing conditions, their geographical effects have not been very positive. Spatial clustering and segregation of immigrant groups are maintained by this policy, while important ties of identity with former neighbourhoods are broken. As much housing research has shown, people want to improve their dwellings but they usually do not want to move to new places (Guerra, 1994; Quedas, 1994). A clear duality in housing types and in residential districts of the MRL is evident. The middle and upper classes (including European and American immigrants) live in high-grade condominiums, in rehabilitated flats close to the city centre and in new detached villas in the smart suburbs. People of African origin continue to inhabit the ‘problem areas’ of the MRL: neighbourhoods of clandestine houses, unfinished buildings which have been squatted, and low-grade social housing. The presence of African immigrants in these types of housing has increased in the 1980s and 1990s.6 Figure 10.4 is an attempt to summarize the various processes that contribute to the potential increase in the degree of social and ethnic segregation in the Lisbon region. Starting from the background elements inherited from the 1960s and 1970s, the twin processes of economic restructuring and spatial reconfiguring lead to a polarized socio-ethnic structure and to a spatial reorganization that adds new elements of inequality to the former model of spatial segregation. The hypothesized result, a potential increase in ethnic spatial segregation, will be examined in the last part of the chapter. Ethnic segregation in the metropolitan region of Lisbon Figure 10.5 shows the changing distribution of Europeans and Africans in the municipalities of the MRL between 1981 and 1991 and gives a preliminary idea about the probable increase in segregation levels. The municipalities where the proportion of Europeans among the total population increased are Oeiras and Cascais (along the Linha do Estoril) on the north bank and, on the south side, municipalities like Sesimbra and Palmela which are zones where high-class suburban expansion took place in the 1980s. In the case of Palmela the establishment of the Ford–Volkswagen car plant certainly added to the attractions of this area for population and employment. Jorge Malheiros 223

Figure 10.4 The vortex of socio-spatial and ethnic segregation in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon 224 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Figure 10.5 The pattern of increase of African and European immigrants in the municipalities of Lisbon, 1981–91

Regarding Africans, their relative weight increased in concelhos where the least favoured quarters were still expanding. Examples of the districts where the African or PALOP nationals7 increased include zones of illegal housing (Prior Velho and S. Julião do Tojal in Loures) and the large social housing projects such as Vale da Amoreira in Moita or ICESA in Vialonga. The increase in Cascais should not be considered as a surprise. Although this concelho has very good socio-economic characteristics as a whole, there are pockets of slum and clandestine housing, for instance Marianas in Carcavelos. On the other hand, the concelhos with the highest level of concentration of Africans in 1981 – Amadora and Oeiras (Figure 10.2c) – did not increase their weighting during 1981–91. This can be explained by the early establishment of the ‘African quarters’ in these municipalities, leading to many naturalizations. In reality, the number of ethnic Africans did not decrease but, once naturalized, the census records them as Portuguese citizens. Table 10.5 shows that the segregation indices of virtually all the major national groups living in the MRL increased between 1981 and 1991. The table conﬁrms the earlier remarks made about the high segregation levels of Europeans and US citizens (Table 10.4). The highest values registered by the African communities are for the people from São Tomé (the smallest PALOP group) and from Guinea-Bissau (the group with the fastest growth over the period 1980–95 and with the highest proportion of unskilled workers, 80 per cent). These polarized segregation indices lead to a distinction between active and passive segregation. Although all immigrant groups except the Santomese and North Americans are experiencing increasing Jorge Malheiros 225

Table 10.5 Segregation indices for the main foreign communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Region, 1981 and 1991

Segregation index 1981 1991 EEC (12) 27.8 30.5 France 15.4 19.5 Germany 25.2 27.1 Spain 33.7 36.6 UK 40.9 41.2 Africa (total) 18.1 21.4 Cape Verde 25.2 27.5 Angola 11.1 14.5 Mozambique 11.8 22.5 Guinea-Bissau 16.1 31.0 São Tomé 35.6 30.2 Brazil 18.8 24.2 North America 30.2 29.3 Portuguese nationals 14.2 17.4

segregation, European and North American segregation results from a more active process of clustering. Whilst on the one hand these groups’ access to information and their high wage levels amplify the range of residential choices, in practice their ability to overcome the constraints that face other groups leads them to cluster rather tightly in high-status areas. For the Africans, their inability to control the powerful external constraints on their living arrangements (low income, irregular nature of work, clandestine status, prejudice, etc.) means that they are the passive victims of segregation. Information from the 1991 Census enables a much more ﬁne-grained spatial analysis of the distribution of foreigners among the 177 freguesias of the MRL. Figures 10.6 and 10.7 show in a more detailed way the contrasting spatial distribution of the Europeans and North Americans on the one hand, and the African immigrants on the other. These maps are based on location quotients which measure the relative weighting of the immigrant group in each spatial unit.8 For the Africans, Figure 10.6 shows a rather dense scattering of over-representation in several slum areas on both the north and south banks.9 Europeans and North Americans have their main concentrations in the western riverside and coastal freguesias, in a belt starting in Belém in Lisbon and stretching to Colares in the municipality of Sintra. High-status immigrants are also over-represented in some areas of Lisbon’s inner city, especially on the western side; here 226 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Figure 10.6 Distribution of Africans in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon by freguesia, 1991 the Lapa-S. Mamede area has been a place for wealthy foreign residents since the eighteenth century. Further gentriﬁcation has taken place in more recent decades, attracting European and American business people. An additional element of understanding the organization of ‘ethnic space’ in the MRL is contributed by an analysis of dissimilarity indices. Jorge Malheiros 227

Figure 10.7 Distribution of Europeans and North Americans in the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon by freguesia, 1991

This index ranges from 0, total similarity between the two groups, to 100, total dissimilarity of spatial distributions. The results are presented in Table 10.6. The highest similarities in spatial distribution (i.e. the lowest dissimilarity indices) are recorded by groups that share similar socio-economic and cultural features. For instance the Portuguese have 228 57.9 é Brazil 45.3 46.4 bique S. To m 47.6 44.0 52.0 49.1 46.4 34.0 52.7 of the Lisbon region, 1991 34.2 37.6 36.0 35.3 39.9 freguesias 62.3 68.5 66.7 64.6 73.2 38.9 44.8 42.9 53.0 57.8 49.1 59.3 32.1 32.9 50.2 48.0 56.6 59.8 54.5 61.7 30.7 43.6 35.2 31.7 51.7 58.1 60.7 56.3 65.8 30.9 ain foreigner groups in the 177 ans Spaniards French UK Angola Cape V. Guinea-B. Moza m er EEC 12 Ger m ilarity indices for the m Dissi m Africans N. A m le 10.6 Ta b é bicans ericans 27.2 28.6 41.0 38.6 35.2 47.7 56.6 55.2 52.4 60.9 26.6 ans Spaniards UK Angolans Cape Verdeans Guinea-Bissau Moza m São To m French PortugueseAfricansN. A m EEC 12 35.0Ger m 41.5 37.8 50.4 43.2 51.7 39.5 54.0 30.8 56.1 52.3 29.4 47.6 24.5 43.8 63.8 21.0 24.3 48.5 16.6 23.4 32.9 35.7 36.5 47.5 48.2 55.9 38.0 31.3 57.3 27.7 45.6 52.3 62.5 21.4 Brazilians Jorge Malheiros 229 greatest similarity with the French (with whom there are some cultural similarities and a history of contact through Portuguese emigration), the Brazilians (linguistic afﬁnity and an early colony of Portugal) and the Angolans (several worked for the Portuguese colonial administration and have some Portuguese ancestry). By the same logic the different African communities register low dissimilarity indices amongst themselves, and the distributions of British, Germans and North Americans are quite similar, but very different from the Africans’ settlement patterns. The spatial pattern of French and Spaniards, similar to each other, is quite different to both the Anglo-German and the African groups, suggesting the relevance of cultural factors in the grouping of the various immigrant groups.

Conclusion

Over the past 20 years ethnicity has become one of the key dimensions of socio-spatial differentiation within the Lisbon Metropolitan Region. However, ethnic features interact closely with socio-economic variation, so that ethnic segregation is essentially socio-economic segregation. As far as the MRL is concerned, the power of housing market mechanisms and the socio-ethnic patterns inherited from the 1960s and 1970s were so strong that they continued to shape the emerging patterns of the 1980s, when more immigrants arrived in Portugal and when powerful processes of urban economic restructuring accentuated socio-ethnic segregation. The dual pattern of immigrant settlement, with Europeans in the best areas of the MRL and Africans in the most marginal urban spaces with the worst housing conditions, has become more marked over the 1981–91 period, according to the analysis presented in this chapter. Eventual trends towards a more fragmented urban space, where socio-ethnic clusters are less in evidence, have yet to be detected. Inertia of patterns inherited from the past and the capacity of the high-status areas to maintain their status are partially responsible for this situation. As far as the important urban renewal projects are concerned, their socio-ethnic effects do not seem to be very visible, at least at the scales of analysis made here. Perhaps greater hope can be placed on the recently established Programa Especial de Realojamento which aims to remove all shanty dwellings from the metropolitan region by 2001. This plan tries to develop a new approach, increasing the possibilities of choice and creating a pattern 230 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon of more dispersed but also localised rehousing projects. This may have the effect of reducing segregation in the way that shanty clearance followed by large-scale transfer to social housing projects did not.

Notes 1. This chapter was written within the framework of a research project on ‘Internationalisation, Economic Restructuring and the Production of Marginalised Spaces in the Lisbon Region’ coordinated by Teresa Salgueiro at the Centre for Geographical Studies, University of Lisbon. See Salgueiro et al. (1997) for a fuller account of the background and results of this research. 2. The name, meaning ‘negroes’ pit’, was associated with a sixteenth-century burial ground for the African slaves of the city. 3. The Linha do Estoril corresponds to the strip of beach resorts and coastal residential areas that has developed to the west of Lisbon in the municipalities of Oeiras and Cascais. Estoril, in the municipality of Cascais, is the biggest of these resort towns, but others have developed along the coastal rail line, the linha do comboio, that runs through the area. 4. The segregation index varies between 0 (perfectly even distribution) and 100 (extreme segregation). I use here the technique elaborated and described by Petsimeris (1995). 5. Between 1981 and 1991 illiteracy among the economically active population decreased from 11.5 to 4.1 per cent, while the proportion with university education grew from 1.7 per cent to 5.6 per cent. It is important to note that the percentage of people with medium and high levels of education reaches its maximum in the MRL. 6. Although the number of Africans registered in the 1981 and 1991 censuses remained static (27,237 and 27,117 respectively), this does not mean that there was no increase. The census data ignore Africans who have obtained Portuguese nationality and clandestine immigrants. 7. PALOP stands for Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – African countries with Portuguese as their official language. 8. Hence a location quotient (LQ) of greater than 1 represents over-concentration in the particular freguesia, whereas a score of less than 1 means under- representation, down to zero, complete absence. A value of exactly 1 means the relative weight in the freguesia is exactly the same as in the MRL as a whole. 9. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the percentage of shanty dwellings and the percentage of African population for the 177 freguesias of the MRL is + 0.565.

References Barreto, A. (1996) ‘Três décadas de mundança social’ in Barreto, A. (ed.) A Situaçao Social em Portugal, 1960–1995. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, pp. 35–60. Jorge Malheiros 231

Blotevogel, H. H. and King, R. (1996) ‘European economic restructing: demographic responses and feedbacks’, European Urban and Regional Studies 3, pp. 133–59. Ferrão, J. and Domingues, A. (1994) ‘Portugal: as condições territoriais de um processo de terciarização vulnerável’, Finisterra 57, pp. 5–42. Fonseca, L. (1990) População e Território: do País à Area Metropolitana. Lisbon: Memórias do Centro de Estudos Geográficos 14. Gozálvez Pérez, V. (1996) ‘L’immigration étrangère en Espagne, 1985–1994’, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 12, pp. 11–38. Guerra, I. (1994) ‘As pessoas não são coisas que se ponham em gavetas’, Sociedade e Território 20, pp. 11–16. Hamnett, C. (1995) ‘Les changements socio-économiques à Londres: croissance des catégories tertiaires qualifiées ou polarisation?’ Sociétés Contemporaines 22–23, pp. 15–32. Kesteloot, C. (1995) ‘The creation of socio-spatial marginalisation in Brussels: a tale of flexibility, geographical competition and guestworker neighbourhoods’ in Sadler, D. and Hadjimichalis, C. (eds) Europe at the Margins: New Mosaics of Inequality. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 69–86. King, R. and Black, R. (eds) (1997) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. King, R. and Konjhodzic, I. (1995) Labour, Employment and Migration in Southern Europe. Brighton: University of Sussex Research Papers in Geography 19. Leontidou, L. (1990) The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Changes and Urban Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Malheiros, J. (1996) Imigrantes na Região de Lisboa: os anos de mundança. Lisbon: Colibri. Mingione, E. (1995) ‘New aspects of marginality in Europe’ in Sadler, D. and Hadjimichalis, C. (eds) Europe at the Margins: New Mosaics of Inequality. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 15–32. Pacione, M. (1996) ‘Ethnic segregation in the European city’, Geography 81, pp. 120–32. Petsimeris, P. (1995) ‘Une méthode pour l’analyse de la division ethnique et sociale de l’espace intra-métropolitain du Grand Londres’, L’Espace Géographique 1995–2, pp. 139–54. Quedas, M. J. (1994) ‘Expectativas habitacionais e coexistência espacial de grupos étnicos: inquérito à população mal alojada do concelho de Loures’, Sociedade e Território 20, pp. 155–62. Salgueiro, T. B. (1983) Mercado de Habitação e Estrutura Urbana na Area Suburbana de Lisboa. Lisbon: Separata do Boletim Cultural de Assembleia Distrital de Lisboa 89 (2). Salgueiro, T. B. (1992) A Cidade em Portugal: Uma Geografia Urbana. Lisbon: Afrontamento. Salgueiro, T. B. (1994) ‘Novos produtos imobiliários e reestruturação urbana’, Finisterra 57, pp. 79–101. Salgueiro, T. B. et al. (1997) Internacionalição, Reestruturação Económica e Produção de Novas Marginalidades na Região de Lisboa. Lisbon: DGOTDU Project Report. Saint-Maurice, A. (1997) Identidades Reconstruídas: Cabo-Verdianos em Portugal. Oeiras: Celta. 232 Urban Restructuring and Immigration in Lisbon

Sassen, S. (1996) “New employment regimes in cities: the impact on immigration workers”, New Community, 22(4), pp. 579–594. Tello, R. and Martinez, S. (1994) ‘Terciarização e encarecimento do alojamento em Barcelona’, Finisterra 57, pp. 5–42. Tripier, M. (1990) L’immigration dans la classe ouvrière en France. Paris: L’Harmattan. Ulrich, R. (1994) ‘The impact of foreigners on the public purse’ in Spencer, S. (ed.) Immigration as an Economic Asset: the German Experience. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, pp. 65–91. Part IV Questions of Policy 11 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy Corrado Bonifazi

Introduction

The profound changes in international migration trends over the past 20 years have led to a particularly interesting policy situation in the Southern European countries which have been newly targeted by immigration (King and Rybaczuk, 1993). This chapter offers an assessment of the political response of one of these countries towards a phenomenon which is basically still new for them, in the light of the past experience of the countries of North–Central Europe which have been traditional targets for immigration. But such an analysis is of interest not only to the countries of Southern Europe, which could take advantage of past experience in identifying the proper instruments for intervention, but also for the countries with a longer history of immigration. The latter have the opportunity of studying the effects and problems – triggered by the new types of international migration ﬂows – which are particularly obvious in the new immigration countries of Southern Europe. This chapter is devoted to the Italian situation and starts with an attempt to identify some of the characteristics of the major reference models of migration policies in Europe. I then go on to attempt to survey the basic features of Italian migration policy as it has developed over recent years, and conclude with an analysis of some of the major problems in the Italian situation which, in fact, potentially concern all the European countries affected by immigration.

Italy within the context of migration policy in Europe

In the legislation of Western European countries, migration policy, in the sense of a set of rules governing the entry of foreigners and their rights

235 236 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy and duties with respect to the national community, is a typical product of the twentieth century. As a matter of fact, ‘within Europe up to the First World War (with the exception of Tsarist Russia) travel was not controlled: people could go to other countries and work without passports or permits, though they might be deported if they were poor, sick or had committed some criminal offence’ (Stalker, 1994, p. 138). Rules to regulate and control immigration were only enacted during the First World War; these measures were maintained and in some cases made stricter in the 1930s (Hammar, 1985). In post-war Europe, migration flows were basically left to the free play of production factors, and international migration was considered to be the most economically advantageous means to address the geographical disequilibria between labour supply and demand (King, 1993). Hence, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a mainly liberal policy regarding border controls. In subsequent decades, the transformation of immigration from a temporary phenomenon into a permanent, structural one led to a radical reversal of policy trends, with greater concern for the control of flows and the management of the growth of immigrant communities. Up to the second half of the 1970s, except for a few limited situations, migration policy was a secondary aspect in the political debate of most European countries; the management of the phenomenon tended to be through administrative measures rather than political decisions. The more or less tacit point of agreement between the political parties was that the deciding criterion was the national interest. ‘When a country’s political parties agree that decisions on immigration policy should be based on this criterion, they effectively de-politicise the issue. It is in this way abandoned to the control of the administrative agencies, employers’ interest and organised pressure groups’ (Hammar, 1985, p. 281). Hammar also stresses how in many European countries the ‘migration stop’ policies of 1973–75, which represented a decisive change in the history of international migration in Europe, consisted simply of administrative measures taken without any public or parliamentary debate. Since then the situation has changed completely in all the European countries (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994). Migration policy has become a major factor in political debate and public opinion is increasingly sensitive towards the problem (Pugliese, 1995). We are facing a radical change of scenario, also because migration policy has become one of the main areas in which developed societies express their anxieties and worries about the negative effects of the processes of globalization of the economy. It is no longer just a technical or political problem requiring a point of balance and compromise between the various Corrado Bonifazi 237 requirements and interests in society, but rather a situation of having to face a much deeper fear, shared by governments and people alike, regarding the capacity for achieving and identifying responses which can maintain the current widespread economic well-being of European countries (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1995). It is obviously much harder and more complex to face this fear than to ensure the functioning of the labour market with the use of foreign manpower, or to balance the need for control with the desire not to dilute the democratic and liberal nature of our society, or to reconcile solidarity towards refugees with the real availability of resources. These problems have no easy solution, but will become even harder to solve if they become a focus of social differences and conflicts with quite different origins and with quite a different extent (Taguieff and Weil, 1990). The solution to such a wider-scale debate seems to imply a redefinition of the very concept of citizenship (Rusconi, 1989); that is, all those rules, regulations and ideologies of inclusion and exclusion from the political community which form the basis of modern nation-states. In this widespread uncertainty which has characterized the European political scene, there has been a growth of extreme right-wing movements in many countries from both the political and electoral viewpoints; these movements have mainly stressed opposition to immigration and have sought to defend the notion of national identity, seen as a static, unchanging factor. The models on which many countries had based their perception of immigration and its role in the national community appear to have undergone a profound crisis for different and often contrasting reasons, and have undergone major changes. None of the approaches adopted up to now seems to provide a generally adequate response which is suited to current problems. Things are even more uncertain due to the fact that the various countries have widely differing situations; although the social and economic framework involves increasing interdependence, the countries actually comply with rules which are the result of specific historical situations, hard to modify because they are closely linked with peculiar processes leading to the formation of national identity. In many respects, France and Germany represent the two extremes. In the case of France, political unification was the first factor on the basis of national identity, while cultural unification came after- wards. Consequently, political inclusion has implied cultural assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike. ‘The universalist, inclusive theory and practice of citizenship have depended on confidence in the assimilatory workings of schools, the 238 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy army, the church, the unions, and political parties – confidence that has waned markedly in recent years’ (Brubaker, 1989, p. 8). In the German situation, however, national identity has been based on cultural, linguistic and ethnic factors which developed before the setting up of an actual national community; this led to the development of an idea of citizenship based on blood ties, and therefore highly exclusive towards newly arrived immigrants. The framework for the management of migration processes is therefore based on the guestworker model which restricts immigration to a purely economic function. The immigrant is seen solely as a production factor, temporarily present in the country, with preservation of ethnic and cultural identity being seen not from the pluralistic viewpoint but rather in relation to irreducible diversity and the impossibility of any integration (Melotti, 1992). Both the more inclusive French model open to the granting of citizenship and the much more closed, exclusive German model seem to be undergoing a crisis. In fact, ‘the French tradition of assimilation finds few defenders today: the multiculturalist Left and immigrant organisa- tions argue that immigrants should not be assimilated, the exclusionary Right that they (the North Africans in particular) cannot be assimilated’ (Brubaker, 1989, p. 8; italics in original). On the other side of the Rhine, the presence of nearly 7 million immigrants with a Turkish community of nearly 2 million has not been enough to induce recognition that Germany really is an immigration country and to bring about a change in the legal framework, especially to take into account the fact that a second (and even third) generation has been born and raised in Germany (Cohn Bendit and Schmid, 1994).1 These are not the only two situations in the European scenario. In the United Kingdom, for example, the imperial model for citizenship has governed immigration flows from the former colonies; this is typical of the large multiracial empires in which identification with the state does not depend on the existence of a single political or cultural community but rather on being subject to the same power (Castles and Miller, 1993). It was immigration which drew attention to the practical problems of maintaining this type of citizenship, so that the development of British immigration policy has involved a gradual redefinition of the contours of the national community (Rex, 1990; Collinson, 1993). This has led to the development of a special approach to the problem based on a model of ethnic relations which is nearer to the North American type than to that of other European countries. The basic models are yet again different in Sweden and the Netherlands, with a greater impact of the Corrado Bonifazi 239 multicultural approach, taking into account the defence of ethnic differences within a legal framework designed to guarantee immigrants the real possibility of inclusion in the national political community. While the migration phenomenon is becoming increasingly global and multinational in its essence and extension, the political response has not yet adjusted to this. Hence government and international policy-makers have yet to undertake suitable forms of international and regional co-operation and collaboration which are indispensable for solving this truly transnational problem (Tapinos, 1990; Cagiano de Azevedo, 1992; Straubhaar and Zimmermann, 1993). Moreover, in Europe, immigration has never played a decisive role in the construction of the national identity, not even in France where in 1986 nearly one-fifth of the total population was composed of immigrants or their descendants (Tribalat et al., 1991). This has deprived political debate of an important factor of compensation which exists, for example, in the United States, where even in the right-wing parties support for immigration, seen as a basic aspect of the making of the nation (Balibar, 1990; Livi Bacci, 1991), is expressed. The European panorama is therefore characterized by a highly complex situation; the existence of a supra-national body like the European Union has had basically limited effects, because with regard to immigration the partners cannot overcome the rigid limits set by so-called intergovernmental co-operation which requires laborious procedures to decide what to do and how to do it, leading in the best circumstances to decisions which are not legally very binding, such as conventions, or to legally vague affirmations such as joint positions, recommendations and the like (Bolaffi, 1996, p. 57). If the negative consequences of this limited co-operation are obvious, it is also true that the reluctance of some governments to assign a more active role in migration policy to community bodies is based on the very complexity of the problems behind the phenomenon and the difficult choices which therefore have to be made. As Brubaker (1989) observes, the point is not to freeze national identity or consider it to be completely outdated in the name of a multicultural pluralism which has yet to be explained and defined, but rather to provide a new interpretation of the nation-state in the light of the extensive economic, political and demographic changes which have occurred in recent years, including this process within a broader definition of European citizenship and the resulting membership of a supra-national body in the advanced stages of completion. 240 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy

The arduous making of an Italian model

The new European immigration countries of these last decades of the twentieth century have to face more problems than the ones which have preceded them because the current international scenario is unfavourable for international migration. In Italy, as we saw in Chapter 2, the initial immigration flows in the 1970s and early 1980s met with a legislation gap, so that one of the most frequently cited causes for the start of immigration flows to Italy was that there were insufficient rules and controls at a time when the traditional European countries of arrival were implementing increasingly strict entry policies. The legislation gap, common to all the Southern European countries which at that time became countries of immigration, therefore strongly attracted migration streams which previously had their natural outlet in North–Central Europe. Legislation covered only the stay of foreign citizens in the country and the expulsion and prohibition of entry at the border, wholly ignoring all the other aspects of the phenomenon such as employment. These rules, issued during the Fascist period, reflected an authoritarian ideology, with strong, discretionary control over foreigners by the administrative authorities. Up to 1986, the only response to the gaps in legislation which soon became obvious due to foreign immigration consisted of ministerial circulars on specific aspects in order to deal with the most serious problems. ‘On the whole, the result was a set of rules providing few guarantees to foreigners and which not only seemed ineffective in discouraging illegal employment but actually encouraged unlawful situations’ (Adinolfi, 1992, p. 14). In 1986 the first comprehensive immigration law was introduced into Italian legislation. It had the merit of decreeing the same equal rights for non-EC workers and their families as for Italian workers, recognizing the right and procedures for family reunion and laying down principles for labour-market access and planning for non-EC employed workers. The most practical aspect of the law was an amnesty for foreign workers with an irregular status. The initial expiry date, planned after three months, was subsequently extended to the end of September 1988, enabling approximately 119,000 foreigners to become legalized. On 30 December 1989, just over a year after the expiry of the last extension of the amnesty provided under the previous law, a new decree law was issued, enacted as Law No. 39/1990. This second law was aimed at providing more stable and effective rules, intervening in areas showing the most obvious lack of regulations and Corrado Bonifazi 241 dealing with three major problems: the status of refugees, with the abolition of the geographical limitations; reforms concerning entry, stay and prohibition of entry at the border; and a new amnesty, leading to the legalisation of 235,000 immigrants. This time, however, the decree law was formulated in a much more difficult political situation and its formal enactment occurred at the eleventh hour, with the Republican and MSI (neo-Fascist) political parties voting against it (Adinolfi, 1992). In late 1989 and early 1990, the immigration problem became a major factor in Italian politics for the first time, coming to the widespread attention of public opinion. In August 1989 at Villa Literno, north of Naples, a young South African immigrant was murdered during an attempted robbery; the murder made a deep impression on public opinion, and the funeral, broadcast live on television, ‘was a political and media event, with the presence of many members of parliament and the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers’ (Balbo and Manconi, 1992, p. 24). During the debate in parliament on the approval of the new law, there was conflict between a broadly based group supporting the measures and the Republican Party and Italian Social Movement (MSI) which opposed the law with recourse to obstructionist tactics. The first National Immigration Conference was held in Rome in June 1990, with over 2000 delegates and representatives of approximately 250 immigrants’ associations. The conference reflected the same disagreements which had occurred in the debate in parliament (Tassello, 1990). This conference ‘could be said to represent everything and its opposite’; on the one hand, it was ‘an act of courage and far-sightedness to recognise the transformation of Italy into a country of immigration, and to attempt to search for feasible paths for social harmony and active integration between Italians and immigrants’ (Tassello, 1990, p. 146). However, the experience of the subsequent months showed that more was needed than a new law and good intentions to ensure transition from an emergency situation to an ordinary one. The key was the dramatic Albanian exodus. The first Albanian refugees landed on the south Italian coast in July 1990; ‘but more than a landing it was a triumph. The people of Brindisi turned out to meet the hundreds of Albanians who, with the communist regime in power, had faced death by taking refuge in the foreign embassies in Tirana. There were mayors and prefects, members of parliament and cardinals’.2 However, in the meantime there was less public discussion on immigration; the failure to solve the real problems posed by immigration such as jobs, housing and the relationship with the 242 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy

‘locals’, plus government failures and inefficiency, had slowly diminished the climate of tolerance which had been created in the previous months. Between March and August 1991, the Albanian immigration problem reappeared dramatically, triggering concern among politicians and public opinion, with several waves of Albanian refugees landing on the Italian coast. March saw the arrival of 25,000 people, welcomed with a spirit of solidarity by the local inhabitants of Apulia and with inefficiency by the administration: these delays scandalized the mass media and public opinion. Nevertheless, the dramatic nature of the event highlighted and reinforced a significant change in the overall attitudes of Italian society towards immigration. The press gradually shifted its attention from accommodation to control and the means to halt a migration pressure described as unstoppable and increasingly threatening. As further waves of Albanian ‘boat people’ bore down on the Apulian coast later in the summer of 1991, immigration came increasingly to be described as a ‘threat’, ‘an invading and attacking army’, ‘a problem to alleviate and a pressure to stop’; Italy became ‘a fortress to defend’; immigrants were identified as ‘illegals’, ‘irregulars’, ‘unlawful persons’, ‘people without documents’ (ter Wal, 1991). The political reaction soon followed suit, with the mainstream parties being increasingly reluctant to allow the groups which had decisively opposed the immigration measures to gain ground. Opinion polls also showed that in 1991 openness and tolerance had given way to fear and a desire for exclusion (Bonifazi, 1996). In the years following the dramatic events of 1991 the situation continued to be basically contradictory, with a constant, difficult balance between day-to-day life and an emergency, and with swings from one aspect to the other in political and public opinion concerning the migration issue. On the one hand, immigration continued in a slow, complex process of integration in Italian society: there have been more immigrants’ children in schools; more steady, regular jobs for migrants in industry and services; the local management of immigration has, despite the inevitable difficulties, shown positive, important results; and contact with immigrants – at work and in everyday life – has become something acceptable and ordinary for more and more Italians. On the other hand, Italy is still trying to overcome an emergency-based approach to migration management. In this it reflects a problem being faced by all the developed countries, especially in Europe, with regard to an overall solution for the problems arising from immigration in a situation where globalization of the economy Corrado Bonifazi 243 with the resulting changes in industrial structures has made economic and occupational perspectives increasingly uncertain. In the first half of the 1990s developments in the political arena and in the legislative field regarding migration were characterized by ‘the issuing of contrasting and counterproductive rules, sometimes based on openly contradictory principles, leading to muddled statutory provisions and ministerial instructions which sometimes violate the constitution’ (Bonetti, 1996, p. 178). The process involving the formulation of the decree law issued by the Dini government on 18 November 1995, which took place under the threat by the separatist Northern League Party to overturn the government, highlights the problems involved in enacting Italian migration policy and the importance of this topic on the political scene. Principles and pragmatism have not yet been reconciled in legislation, and government initiative is subject to contrasting pressure, also because a strongly intransigent position in the suppression of illegal immigration is considered by many parties to be a useful means of acquiring voter consensus. This situation applies not only in Italy, but involves more or less all the developed countries experiencing immigration; anti-immigrant illiberalism, as it has been defined, is widespread in the migration policies of Western countries. Based on the virtually complete politicization of the problem and on the potential of parties on the Right and Centre–Right to acquire votes from anti-immigrant policies, it has been strengthened by the fact that the Left has abandoned its traditional liberal policy in this area, so that the political debate is one- sided (Messina, 1990). In the Italian case, the situation is made all the worse with the political crisis which had prevented the governments from making a clear choice, as well as by the general and often- criticized discrepancy between the written law and practice, which has been especially harmful in an area where the authorities should play a role of reassuring society. The Dini decree, after being renewed five times (twice by the Prodi government, which made some amendments to the original text), finally expired in November 1996 without obtaining the parliamentary approval required for its enactment as a law. It was replaced by a bill consisting of only one article, approved in December 1996, designed to safeguard the position of those who had submitted a request for amnesty within the deadline of 31 March 1996. This provided for the legalisation of 246,000 immigrants. The overall regulation of the problem was postponed to a more complete law, approved by parliament in 1998. 244 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy

The change from emergency decrees to more ordinary parliamentary procedures is undoubtedly a positive step regarding the methods used. It has shown that immigration can be dealt with by ordinary methods without necessarily having to adopt an emergency-oriented approach. With regard to the results achieved, however, it is still hard to make an overall assessment. First of all, given the fact that some major aspects of the new law (No. 40 of 12 March 1998) are to be implemented by special regulations which the government has to issue within six months of the law coming into force (regulations which should provide a concrete, operational framework to implement the law), it is too early to express an opinion. Furthermore, since the law deals with virtually all the aspects of immigration (including the procedures for formulating migration policy, entry rules, rules for the admission and possible expulsion of foreigners, rules on employment and family reunions, integration policy, measures to counter discrimination against immigrants), it is highly complex. The government’s original draft bill, which attempted to make a compromise between the various viewpoints in the coalition, underwent considerable amendment after parliamentary debate. As a consequence, more liberal measures regarding immigrant integration in Italian society and family reunion policy alternate with a more rigid approach in other areas.

Italian or European problems?

The Italian case shows that it is not easy for a new country of immigration to create its own model of migration policy. The development of legislation, discussed in the previous section, shows that the emergency-oriented approach and the lack of clear, precise political decisions to guide administrative and government measures have been the main features of the process over recent years. The authorities have basically just muddled along, ‘with a secret hope that the problem will be solved by itself, [confirming] in the case of immigration, too, the importance of those sectors of Italian political culture which, in order to avoid awkward and difficult decisions, take the road of delay and least resistance, typical of so-called weak governments’ (Bolaffi, 1996, p. 32). In any case, weakness has characterized the entire Italian political framework over recent years, with the disappearance of practically all the parties which had governed the country over the previous 40 years and the start-up of a difficult transition stage for politics and institutions which must be considered as far from complete. It is therefore Corrado Bonifazi 245 unsurprising, in such a delicate sector as immigration, that delaying tactics have prevailed, aimed more at controlling contingencies than at implementing wider-ranging measures. This ‘Italian model’ – assuming that this strategy can be called a model – has therefore developed almost spontaneously over recent years, with numerous attempts to find a balance between various sources of pressure, internal and external, rather than being the synthesis of an independent, mature political decision- making process. On some occasions, the bizarre workings of Italian politics led to the need to reconcile opposing stances, as in the case of the decree issued by the Dini government in 1995; the text was agreed with a variety of political parties ranging from the Northern League, one of whose representatives had just proposed keeping files of non-EC nationals with their footprints, to the left-wing and centre parties (Democratic Party of the Left, the Greens and the Popular Party) which were sympathetic to the positions of secular and Catholic volunteer groups and associations supporting the defence of immigrants. Only the experience of the coming months will be able to tell us how far this newly approved measure will represent a step forward. In any case, the main principles of the new law do not seem to differ much from the previous ones; it is more a way to rationalize and fill in the gaps left by previous legislation, than a radical change in the substance of the Italian migration policy. In fact, up to now, trends in the development of Italian regulations have not differed much from those observed in other European Union countries. The main concern has been to curb illegal immigration through the control and regulation of entry and residence by foreigners, especially those whose place of origin and characteristics make them more liable to join the ranks of the illegal immigrants. Legal entry has, in fact, been allowed only for specific categories (refugees, family members of legal immigrants, workers with qualifications not available on the domestic market). Legal immigrants have been granted civil and social rights but no political rights, being excluded from voting or standing in elections. At least in theory, an attempt has been made to favour immigrant integration. In the remainder of this chapter, rather than attempting a global examination of the new law, I make some observations on three issues that are crucial for Italian and European migration policies: the control of illegal migration, the criteria for deciding the size and characteristics of any new regular immigration flows, and the law concerning naturalization. 246 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy

Control of illegal migration The curb on illegal immigration is one of the key points on which politicians, public opinion and the new law have focused their attention; there have been continual complaints about lack of efficiency in border controls and the absence of proper rules and facilities for implementing expulsion orders (Bolaffi, 1996). In this regard, there is no doubt that for years the other European countries (excepting Greece) have had more effective means than Italy; however, illegal immigration has not been eliminated, and its world-wide extent should lead people to question seriously whether such an enormous social process can be halted by repressive measures. In order to overcome this problem, Western governments are currently trying to develop new containment strategies, not based exclusively on stricter border controls but rather on handling the problem together with other countries. This aspect has so far been applied above all in dealing with refugees and political asylum-seekers, notably through the use of temporary protection measures, on-site assistance or help in nearby areas, as has occurred in the former Yugoslavia, and with the introduction of the ‘safe country’ principle by which political migrants are obliged to remain in or return to the first safe country of transit (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1995). With regard to these measures, it has often – and rightly – been stressed that this could be an easy way out for the developed countries, which could pass on the responsibility for refugees to countries which are weaker, both politically and economically. However, these rules could also be a new, more effective way to deal with the problem, especially if implemented with the primary aim of guaranteeing the safety of individuals and the respect of human rights in areas torn by conflict, and, thanks to the lower local aid costs, providing protection to more civilians, with the advantage of not triggering rejection by the local population. Similarly, this approach to intervention – as stated in the new law – could also be used in the limitation of illegal entry of persons who are not political refugees. Agreements with the main migration source countries could lead to the reduction of illegal immigration, especially if these accords are extended to other aspects of bilateral relationships and accompanied by a wise development co-operation policy. European immigration policy could find initial application in this respect. Illegal immigration affects not only border regions or ‘front- line’ countries, which are often not the final destination of the migrant influx, but actually concerns the entire Community area, so that general agreements between the European Union and the nearest migration source countries would lead to positive results for the South Corrado Bonifazi 247

European countries. Until now, Italy has been one of the strongest supporters of the proposal to widen the jurisdiction of the European Union with regard to immigration. Efforts in this direction were especially signiﬁcant between 1990 and 1992 (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1996), and the Prodi government tried to pursue this policy further. Up to now, pressure from other Member States has involved demands that Italy impose stricter controls, with frequent criticism of the amnesty measures, especially because of the expectations these create among potential immigrants. Now it is time for the immigration ﬂows in the Mediterranean Basin to be interpreted and faced by the European Union in the light of a wider-scale interest and not simply assigned to the countries which are most directly involved (Cagliano de Azevedo, 1995).

The question of quotas for new immigration Another essential factor of migration policy concerns the criteria and procedures used to decide the quotas for the issue of new immigration permits. In Italy, the 1990 law left the option to allow immigration flows if domestic labour market conditions were suitable, a point which differed from many European countries. In practice, however, the decrees regarding planned immigration flows, when in force, were not limited to workers; rather they dealt with the identification of all the categories of people allowed to enter Italy legally, thus demonstrating just how difficult it was to make quantitative estimates for the requirements of an increasingly complex, fragmented labour market in which production (and employment) levels tend increasingly to reflect immediate, short-term needs. Moreover, there is an underlying trend towards the reduction of regulations and government control in the labour market. The best approach seems to be frequent periodical reviews in order to identify procedures to ensure the achievement of the various goals of migration policy and, above all, procedures which can actually be implemented. An important point is to keep the various channels of entry separate, in order to ensure legal immigrants the right to family reunion, laying down procedures for humanitarian entry, and finding ways to respond to the requirements of the labour market, especially for seasonal labour. Under these circumstances it should be recalled that excessively rigid rules regarding the renewal of residence permits, the possibility to enter again and to change the reasons for the stay – once they are lawfully present in the country – are not only uselessly oppressive but also counter-productive from the practical viewpoint. Past experience of European labour migration has shown that one of the 248 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy main results of this type of measure is to make the flows less flexible, reducing their temporary nature and, in practice, making it more advantageous for immigrants to choose permanent settlement instead of a stay for defined, limited reasons and periods; in the medium and long term, the effects are therefore opposite to those intended. There are interesting new aspects in the law in this regard, although the overall framework for regulating the inflow for employment purposes does not seem to be very different from the previous one which has been shown to have drawbacks. Moreover, the overall size of quotas of entry for work purposes is related to entry for family reunion and temporary protection, so that there is overlapping in the three channels which should ideally be kept totally separate.

Naturalization and citizenship Granting of citizenship in the country of arrival is one of the final outcomes of the migration process. Becoming citizens means the end of the immigrants’ ‘legal distinction’ and therefore, from many points of view, the possibility of differentiating them with respect to the ‘locals’ (with the positive and negative effects that may stem from this). It definitely leads to the acquisition of political rights, and therefore to a full participation in the life of the community to which people have migrated (Sgritta, 1993). We have seen previously how the procedures for the acquisition of citizenship represent the result of a complex political, cultural and ideological process, linked with the formation of the nation- state in each country. These rules contain not only the criteria for inclusion in the political community but also the imprinting of each country’s migration policy. In Italy, the new rules on citizenship replacing Law No. 555 of 1912 were introduced in February 1992 with Law No. 91. The rules are inspired by an ethnic concept of citizenship, since the criterion for acquisition by birth is that of ius sanguinis (blood right), according to which, in order to be citizens, people have to be the children of citizens. On the other hand, the acquisition of citizenship by ius soli (place of birth) is wholly marginal under this new law, and designed to prevent statelessness. In the other cases, acquisition is not automatic, but involves a more or less discretionary assessment by the administrative authorities (Bonetti, 1993, pp. 431–2). It is significant that this law, on which all the political parties agreed (Bolaffi, 1996), came into force less than two years after the National Conference on Immigration, in which many speakers highlighted the birth of a new, multicultural Italy. While the political debate seemed to take into account the new trends in migration flows, Corrado Bonifazi 249 even more than some other countries with a much greater level of immigration, little was actually done in practice for the concrete management of immigration in the field of naturalization. Indeed the law showed how, in the 1990s, Italy still wanted to consider itself as a country of emigrants rather than immigrants; this reflects an idea deeply rooted in Italian culture. Fascist rhetoric, despite the regime’s own political opposition to emigration, felt the need to put emigrants, ennobled as ‘transmigrators’, together with Italy’s saints, poets, artists and navigators, as features of the national identity. National identity is a matter which deserves more explicit and in- depth consideration than has been forthcoming up to now, especially when seen in the context of the political responses to foreign immigration. If ‘introduction of ius soli, to replace or to flank ius sanguinis, could be a hypothesis to take into consideration’, as the Minister for Social Affairs proposed,3 this should take place in the framework of an overall review of the idea of citizenship and belonging that has developed in Italy, taking into account the deep, often unconscious links between these pillars of the national community and immigration management.

Conclusion

In order to conclude, it can be said that Italy’s problems are not very different from those affecting countries which had long been targets for immigration. ‘Advanced industrial societies must resist the tempta- tion to retreat in the face of immigration’s challenge and to retrench behind increasingly restrictive, and ultimately undemocratic, controls. As is becoming apparent, unilateral actions and fortress mentalities misread the complexities of the migration system while denying receiving societies an essential ingredient for their own economic success and social enrichment’ (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1995, p. 31). According to these authors, the main elements on which migration policy should be based are balanced measures in accordance with the country’s history and culture, periodically reviewed and updated in the light of the results achieved, and a serious commitment to prevent a demagogic anti-immigrant line from monopolising the creation of public opinion. These measures may be difficult to achieve, but they are well within the realm of realistic possibility in the advanced democratic world (Papademetriou and Hamilton, 1995, p. 31). It is on these bases, challenging but not impossible, that Italian 250 European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy migration policy should be developed, facing up to problems similar to those of neighbouring European countries, with the awareness that no intervention in such a complex field can solve all the problems. What is needed is a pragmatic attitude involving the constant review of the measures applied and a readiness to make the necessary changes; plus the capacity to exploit the experience of other countries while taking into account the particular nature of the Italian situation so that original solutions and measures can be enacted. In this regard, I believe that the Italian situation involves a serious lack of statistical information. Unfortunately, this aspect has not been adequately considered in the new law. The objective assessment of the results of government measures appears to be difficult if the official sources do not even agree on the number of sojourn permits. The lack of information is a serious handicap, also because the politicians seem to have little or no interest in this respect. Yet a modest allocation of resources would provide Italy with high-quality statistical data on immigration, with an obvious, significant impact on all levels of the decision-making process.

Notes 1. Recently this situation was modiﬁed by the new citizenship law approved by the German Parliament. The law grants to ‘foreign’ children born in Germany the right to dual nationality until the age of 23, when they must choose which citizenship to keep. 2. See I. Gurakuqi, ‘Rabbia e paura da costa a costa’, Il Manifesto, 11 May 1995. 3. See the intervento by L. Turco in Convegno Ufﬁcio del Ministro per la solidarietà sociale ‘Immigrati stranieri o nuovi cittadini?’, Turin, 8–9 November 1996, p. 7.

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Introduction

The addition of the Southern European countries of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece to the relatively small pool of immigrant receiving societies constitutes one of the most salient novelties of the contemporary global international migration scene. With minor differences of timing among the four, the transition from labour-exporting to labour-importing countries has taken place in the last quarter of the twentieth century, following by a signiﬁcant time-lag the larger-scale mass immigrations of labour to the countries of North–West Europe, which occupied the third quarter of the century. Nearly forty years ago, economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, in his seminal analysis of historical patterns of industrialisation, pointed out that the experience of late-comers is bound to be markedly different from that of early-starters, if only because of the inﬂuence that the experience of the forerunners exerts on those that follow. Not only is the pace usually quicker – there is often an advantage in catching up – but the structures of production and industrial organisation are different, as is the intellectual climate which surrounds the process (Gerschenkron, 1962). Industrialisation and immigration are admittedly very different in nature, but mutatis mutandis the distinction between early-starters and late-comers may provide a useful perspective to understand the immigration experience of the latter in Europe, especially as far as the adoption of policies is concerned. Of course, historical precedence is by

253 254 Spain as a Country of Immigration no means the only source of differences. Experiences would most likely differ in any case, not only because the economies and societies of Southern Europe are structurally different than those of the North (as we saw in Chapter 1), but also because their formative years as immigration countries occur at a time in which international migration flows are structurally different from what they were 25 years before. Further differentiating elements relate to the social climate in which immigration takes place, the cognitive understanding of the dynamics and effects of the migratory processes under way, the orientation of policies and the timing of their adoption. In the case of Europe, the influence of the early-starters’ experience over that of the late-comers is very much reinforced by the common belonging to a supranational structure. However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to compare the different immigration experiences of the North-Western and the Southern European countries; nor does it aim at a general analysis of the ways in which the former have conditioned the latter. Rather, I limit myself to describing and interpreting the experience of one of them, Spain, and how it is becoming a country of immigration at the end of the twentieth century. The first half of the chapter sets out the typological, demographic and occupational characteristics of Spain’s ‘new immigrants’. In the second half, I examine the evolution of policy, starting with the Ley de Extranjería of 1985, and moving through the regularisation and quota measures of the 1990s, before concluding with an evaluation of the limited steps taken so far towards integration policies.

A recent migration transition

After nearly one hundred years of continued, if somewhat intermit- tent, outmigration – first to the Americas, then to Northern Europe – Spain has now been transformed into a country of immigration. This transition is very recent indeed: the bulk of it has happened only since the mid-1980s, and at the end of the century it is only completing the first phase of the immigration cycle. It is true that significant communities of foreigners were to be found in Spain before that date. In the 1960s and 1970s it received an inflow of some tens of thousands of Europeans, most of them retirees who had chosen it as their place of residence on account of its warm climate, amenities and low cost of living (see Rodríguez et al., 1998). There were a few thousand African workers as well, mostly from Joaquín Arango 255

Morocco (López, 1996). Since the mid-1970s Spain became home to Latin American citizens who sought refuge from the military dictator- ships of the southern cone. Yet, until the mid-1980s, Spain could hardly be seen as an immigration country. In the early years of that decade, the number of resident foreigners did not exceed 200,000 – two-thirds of them from Europe – and annual flows were of the order of 10,000 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 1996). Certainly, outmigration flows were dying out, but the most important flows during the late 1970s and early 1980s were those of returning migrants. Immigration was still in its infancy. This picture changed drastically around 1985. In the 15 years which have elapsed since then, the number of immigrants has trebled or quadrupled; annual flows have become regular and substantial; the proportion of Africans, Latin Americans and Asians has increased markedly – replacing Europeans as the most significant component of the foreign population; and immigration has become a matter of considerable interest for public opinion as well as an area of public policy. Moreover, it has been especially in the 1990s that this new immigration phase has taken shape, and the major policy measures have been adopted only recently, as we shall see later in this chapter. The fact that no scholarly enquiry on immigration was conducted before 1986–87 (Colectivo IOE, 1987) and that the first surveys about Spaniards’ attitudes towards immigrants took place only around 1990 are a further indication of the newness of the phenomenon. Against this background, it is not surprising that migration policies are still in the making and constantly evolving.

A rapidly growing but still limited volume of immigrants

Estimating the size of the immigrant population in Spain is far from easy. The essential data derive from the register of residence permits of the Ministry of the Interior, which is a legal document, not a statistical source. Much the same can be said of the register of work permits held by the Ministry of Labour. Unfortunately, the population census and demographic sources in general are of limited use for this purpose, suffering from severe under-enumeration and early obsolescence. To start with the baseline of migration magnitudes, the official number of legal immigrants in Spain at the end of 1997 stood at 610,000. The equivalent figure at the end of 1993 was 430,000, and 500,000 at the end of 1995, implying an increase of 40 per cent in four years and 20 per cent in two. Two salient features stand out from this 256 Spain as a Country of Immigration initial observation: the number of immigrants is still relatively modest but it seems to be increasing rapidly. The first has a positive influence on policy orientation at the present; the second might hinder its continuation in the future. In the words of a very recent report of an ad hoc parliamentary committee appointed to study the situation of immigrants and refugees in Spain, ‘the proportion of immigrants living in Spain … yields figures which are very different from those to be found in surrounding countries, making it possible therefore to face the future of migration without the pressures that certain European regions are undergoing’.1 The figures on residence permits published by the Ministry of the Interior are clearly defective, as they omit certain categories, but they can be easily corrected. Holders of temporary permits, i.e. of less than one year, and of provisional cards are not included. Asylum-seekers and foreign students are also left aside, as are residents of Moroccan stock in Ceuta and Melilla who do not have Spanish nationality. These omissions have been estimated at around 10 per cent of registered permit holders (Colectivo IOE, 1996, pp. 8, 31). Therefore, the number of foreigners legally residing in Spain might amount to around 675,000. Out of a population of nearly 40 million, this figure is still low: around 1.7 per cent, a low proportion if compared with those that prevail in mainstream European receiving countries, mostly in the range from 5 to 10 per cent. The number of immigrants in Spain would be somewhat higher if it referred to the foreign-born rather than to foreigners. Adding the nearly 110,000 naturalizations that have taken place since 1975 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 1996), and supposing that all of them are alive and living in Spain, the total number would be around 800,000, raising the proportion of foreigners to about 2 per cent of the total population of the country. Obviously, in order to obtain the total number of foreigners and foreign-born living in Spain, illegal immigrants and unregistered Europeans should be added, but such an operation cannot be done with any degree of accurate estimation. Also it would not make much logical sense, since it would entail adding in two largely unknown magnitudes and two entirely heterogeneous groups.

Dual origins: economic migrants and residential tourists

If immigrants in Spain are not yet very numerous, they are extremely diverse as regards their national origin. There are 20 countries with Joaquín Arango 257 more than 5000 legal immigrants in Spain. The foremost country of origin is Morocco, followed – on purely numerical grounds – by five European Union countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, France and Italy), three from Latin America (Argentina, Peru and the Dominican Republic), and the USA. In addition, there is also a sizeable presence of Dutch, Filipinos, Chinese, Colombians, Chileans, Cubans, Poles, Romanians, Algerians, Senegalese, Gambians, Cape Verdians, Equatorial Guineans, Indians and Pakistanis. Obviously, such diversity bears the mark of the birth-date of immigration in Spain, and can be regarded as a sort of ‘period effect’. The diverse spread of origin countries has been recognized as a characteristic trait of the Southern European immigration model (King and Black, 1997). Within this diversity, two markedly different groups have to be distinguished from the start when examining Spanish immigration: nationals of other European Union countries, and nationals of less- developed countries and economies in transition.2 Indeed, another peculiarity of the Spanish case – shared to a varying extent with the rest of Southern Europe – is the high number of fellow Europeans, mostly retired, who have chosen it as their place of permanent residence (Williams et al., 1997). Europeans still represent one-half of the total number of legal foreigners registered in Spain. The number of those who may be in fact living in the country without registering may be much higher, although it is extremely difficult to estimate (Betty and Cahill, 1998, p. 87). Their precise characterization is no less difficult, but there is no doubt that their overall socio-demographic and socio-occupational composition is markedly different from that of immigrants coming from other world regions. The 1991 census makes this clear, despite under-enumeration, and therefore makes the distinction between the two immigrant groups imperative. Although nationals of other EU countries are technically migrants, their relevance when discussing matters of immigration is incomparably smaller: they are not the object of any public policy, there is no interest in limiting their inflow or number, and they are not really considered part of the ‘issue’ of immigration. In fact, some official agencies refer to them as ‘residential tourists’ (Betty and Cahill, 1998, p. 87). Partly because of this, they have attracted scant attention, and no sustained investigation of their fiscal and financial balance with the host country has been attempted. The fact that, since 1992, European Union citizens do not require work permits to enter the Spanish labour market constitutes an additional obstacle to creating knowledge about them. 258 Spain as a Country of Immigration

It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the bulk of public attention has been directed to immigrants coming from Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe, who can be defined mostly as ‘primarily economic immigrants’. As far as origins are concerned, three groups can be roughly identified among them: one- third comes from Africa, another third from Latin America, and the rest from Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. In socio-economic terms, although not in legal and political ones, Portuguese migrants could be included in this last third (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 1996). Among African immigrants, Moroccans constitute the largest national group, followed at a very long distance by Algerians, Senegalese, Gambians, Cape Verdians and Equatorial Guineans. Taken as a whole, Africans tend to show the highest levels of labour instability, unemployment and uprootedness. Most of them have arrived in recent years and find themselves in the initial stages of the migratory cycle. The African group also stands out as the segment of Spanish immigration which has shown the fastest increase in recent years. Latin Americans, the second major component of economic immigration in Spain, are an extremely heterogeneous group. Although they come from practically all countries in the continent, two main subgroups can be identified for analytical purposes. First, there are migrants from the southern cone: Argentinians, Chileans, and Uruguayans. Many of them arrived long ago, in the 1970s or early 1980s, as de facto political refugees. As a rule, they are highly qualified and well integrated in the host society. A sizeable proportion of them are no longer counted as foreigners, having acquired Spanish citizenship. The second subgroup differs from the first in many respects, starting with area of origin, which in this case is Central America and the Andean countries. Immigrants from these areas have generally arrived in recent years, typically from Peru and the Dominican Republic, responding to economic motivations. The proportion of irregulars is higher among them, and their average qualifications lower. They suffer from higher rates of labour instability and unemployment, and their living and working conditions are usually worse than those of the first subgroup. Many of them, especially Dominican women, find employment in domestic service. The groups which have shown a clear tendency to increase their share in the flows in recent years include North Africans, Pakistanis, Chinese, Dominicans, Peruvians and Eastern Europeans, while the share represented by West Europeans is clearly on the decline. Joaquín Arango 259

Irregular migrants

The preceding ﬁgures refer to legal residents. Although there is general agreement that they make up the bulk of the immigrant population presently living in Spain, there is also, no doubt, a sizeable proportion of migrants who are in illegal or irregular conditions. Their number is, of course, unknown. No estimates deserving the name have been made since the beginning of the present decade. The matter remains shrouded in mystery. There are reasons to think that illegal migrants cannot be too many, but there are also reasons to think that they cannot be few. In any event, there is general agreement among experts that their number is nowadays likely to be considerably smaller than it was at the beginning of the 1990s, when the ﬁgure – which will be discussed below – probably hovered between 150,000 and 200,000. The likely reduction since then has been due to the combination of repeated regularization processes, both declared and undeclared, and the strengthening of admission controls. Indeed, formal regularizations have taken place in 1991 – followed by a rather unsuccessful attempt directed at migrants’ relatives in 1992 – and 1996. Additionally, in 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998 labour entry quotas (contingentes) of around 20,000–30,000 workers per year, established by the government since 1993, have de facto legalized the status of migrants already present on Spanish soil. As for the reinforcement or strengthening of controls, in 1991 visa requirements for Maghrebi citizens were established, an obligation that was later extended to such Latin American countries as Peru and the Dominican Republic. As of 1995 border controls were reinforced to implement the provisions contained in the Schengen Agreement. The number of deportations and entry refusals has tended to increase through the 1990s (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 1996). Additionally, in 1994, measures were adopted to expedite the repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers (Sagarra, 1995). All these reasons have contributed to alleviate previous anxieties about the number of irregular migrants, which is no longer perceived as out of control. Probably nothing has been as instrumental in allaying fears as the institution of annual labour quotas. Indeed, although the number of annual applicants for work permits allotted under this scheme always surpasses the established quota, the ratio appears manageable. Many of those who are not included are referred to the following year’s quota. The fact that not all irregular migrants are eligible, and that the number of those who do not apply is unknown, does not detract too much from the impression of control the contingente provides. 260 Spain as a Country of Immigration

The only semi-official figure of irregulars that has been recently suggested – between 50,000 and 65,000 in 1996 (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigación, 1996) – should be seen more as a guess than as an estimate, and seems much too low. Of those, between 25,000 and 30,000 might be supervened irregulars, that is, people who had a legal status at some point in the past and then lost it, possibly due to legal rigidities. A number of them might have regained legal status as a result of the 1996 regularization process, specifically directed at former permit-holders. As for the rest, many of them may have resulted from the 35,000 or so asylum-seekers whose claims were rejected between 1991 and 1996. The rest are persons who crossed borders illegally or who entered the country on tourist or student visas and overstayed. The size of this group is, obviously, unknown. Nevertheless there are reasons, admittedly of an impressionistic nature, that cast doubt on the preceding picture, and point towards a larger volume of illegal migrants. For some years now, hardly a day goes by without the media carrying news about immigrants spotted trying to reach the Spanish coastline, or arrested upon setting foot on it, or when crossing the Iberian peninsula towards other countries. From time to time, networks for the smuggling of migrants are dismantled by the police, and pockets of irregular workers pinpointed. The criminal traffic of migrant women to be exploited in prostitution rings seems to be intense. Assessing the numbers of migrants who gain illegal entry through these channels is impossible, but it would be unwise to underestimate them. Reports of smuggling schemes and operations are too frequent for us to minimize the importance of such clandestine means of access. The most tragic epitome of this clandestine migrant traffic, and understandably the one that attracts the most attention, are the pateras, or small boats which brave the often rough waters and currents of the Straits of Gibraltar, often capsizing and causing the death of their occupants. The figure of 300 casualties off the southern coast of Spain in 1998 as a result of these dangerous crossings has been recently put forth by the media. And yet the fact that illegal entries may be numerous does not translate necessarily into a large stock of illegal migrants. On the one hand, not all of them have Spain as their final destination. Not a few seem to be heading for other countries in Europe, especially France and Italy, as instances of lorries stopped by the police have revealed. Of course, the relative proportions involved are unknown. On the other hand, limited job opportunities in a tight labour market may dis- suade migrants, both legal and especially illegal, after a certain time Joaquín Arango 261 and induce them to leave the country. This line of explanation would contribute to reconciling the frequency of illegal entries with other pieces of evidence which point to a moderate volume of irregular migrants, but it is exceedingly difficult to prove, since most departures go unrecorded. Additionally, neither the volume of legal migrants nor that of illegals should be regarded as basically stable in Spain. The line that separates legality from illegality, as far as the status of immigrants is concerned, is one that in present-day Spain can be crossed both ways. While opportunities are recurrently provided for illegal migrants to regularize their situation, losing it once acquired is not difficult, especially after joblessness or the expiry of job permits. The high proportion of short- term contracts in the Spanish labour market, and the close links that tie residence and work permits, contribute to frequent sliding into illegality when the redundant migrant decides to stay on. Asylum request has not been an important means of legal entry in Spain. As in other European countries, the number of annual requests tended to increase rapidly in the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, passing from 2300 in 1985 to 8600 in 1990 and peaking in 1993 at 12,600. Since then, the number of requests has declined markedly, to the point that in 1995 it was less than half that of 1993.

Socio-demographic proﬁle

The socio-demographic profile of immigrants in Spain is still little- known, as the sources which provide the largest coverage tend to be rather opaque as far as personal characteristics are concerned. Until very recently, the data published by the Ministry of the Interior gave only aggregate numbers by province and type of permit. Census data offer a more complete picture, but the last one (1991) is rather obsolete, and its coverage of the immigrant population is flawed. Leaving aside nationals of countries of the European Union and from other developed countries, the profile of the immigrant population originating in developing countries conforms very closely to the pattern characteristic of early stages of the migration cycle, with a clear predominance of the young and single. Over 50 per cent of those enumerated in the 1991 Census – and probably a higher proportion among those not included – were young adults; the corresponding proportions of children and elderly were relatively small. As for marital status, two-thirds of those who benefited from the 1991 regularization 262 Spain as a Country of Immigration process were single; among those married, the spouse tended to stay in the country of origin (Aragón Bombín and Chozas, 1993). The small number of foreign children attending primary or secondary public schools – free and open to all, regardless of legal status – tends to corroborate the preceding picture. In 1992–93 only 30,000 foreign students were registered in schools of those levels, according to data published by the Ministry of Education (Colectivo IOE, 1996). Another indirect confirmation comes from the very high activity rates exhibited by immigrants from developing countries – 70 per cent on average in 1995, and over 90 per cent in the case of a few national groups (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 1996). Yet a slow process of family reunion seems to be taking place in recent years, which reveals itself in the fact that the number of residence permits has increased faster than the number of work permits (Colectivo IOE, 1996, p. 18). A second trait which stands out when examining the socio- demographic characteristics of migrants in Spain is a marked gender asymmetry in several national groups, a bias that Spanish immigration seems to share with that of other Southern European countries (King, Chapter 1 of this book). Women constitute a strong majority among migrants from the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Peru, Equatorial Guinea and Cape Verde, while the opposite is the case among most Africans and Central and Eastern Europeans.

A limited and disadvantaged presence in the labour market

Data limitations hinder a thorough knowledge of the position that immigrants occupy in the Spanish labour market (see also Chapter 5 on this). The most relevant source, the register of work permits published by the Ministry of Labour, gives information on flows, i.e. permits granted and renewed during each year, but not on stocks. An additional difficulty stems from the fact that this source now includes few citizens of the European Union, who since 1992 do not need a permit to work. Therefore the information it provides refers to migrant workers from outside the EU, but they happen to be the most interesting ones from the viewpoint of immigration and policy. At the end of 1997, Moroccans constituted the most numerous national group among immigrants with work permits, accounting for over one-third of the total number – and probably a higher proportion of those without permits. Five other national groups – Peruvians, Dominicans, Filipinos, Chinese and Argentinians – made up almost Joaquín Arango 263 another third. The remaining third was divided among more than 30 nationalities. As for occupation, two-thirds of immigrant workers find employment in the service sector, especially in domestic service and the hotel and restaurant business. The number of those who engage in street- vending is hard to estimate, as they only need a municipal permit. The remaining third take jobs in agriculture (especially intensive farming and fruit-harvesting), construction, and, least of all, manufacturing. Many agricultural labourers are temporary, although they may be employed all year long, following a regionally changing labour calendar. Some of them are part of a ‘floating migrant population’ that rotates from agriculture to the service sector and to the construction industry, with interspersed passages in their countries of origin (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 1996). The presence of migrants in other sectors of the economy is very limited, owing, most likely, to high unemployment rates among Spanish workers, combined with legal or unlawful practices of job discrimination. And the labour market niches filled by migrant workers are relatively small. It can be said, therefore, that while there is structural demand for migrant labour in Spain, it happens in a rather limited measure. Segmentation in the labour market often follows nationality lines, frequently compounded by differences along gender lines. Labour recruitment through networks contributes to explaining the segmentation according to nationality and makes for its perpetuation (Martínez Veiga, 1997). Their insertion in different niches notwithstanding, a common trait unifies the employment situation of most immigrants, and this is the fact that they either take jobs which are deemed undesirable by Spaniards or they take jobs under conditions that would be unappealling to natives. Domestic services and certain agricultural chores belong in the first category; the building industry, mining, and in general short- term or dangerous occupations, in the second. Very often, jobs in the informal sector of the economy belong in both categories. Obviously, the latter constitutes by definition an area of darkness: neither the extent of the informal sector nor the volume of foreign employment in it are known. Experts tend to think that the former is not as large in Spain as is often claimed, and that the proportion of immigrants in it must be substantial. As a rule, immigrants take jobs disregarded by the native workforce, jobs that tend to be less stable, less skilled, less protected, and less paid, in a secondary, less regulated labour market (Solé, 1995). As a result, 264 Spain as a Country of Immigration migrant workers are usually complementary or substitutive of native workers, rather than in direct competition with them. A forceful case has recently been made against this idea, on the basis that the Spanish labour situation does not always fulfill the criteria put forth by Piore (1979) for the definition of segmented labour markets (Martínez Veiga, 1998). Yet, it does not matter much whether the Spanish state of things conforms or not to the canonic tenets posited by the theory of labour market segmentation or dual markets; what matters is the fact that a large proportion of immigrants in Spain habitually find employment in areas of the labour market and in specific occupations that native workers shun. It has recently been estimated that 85 per cent of immigrant workers coming from developing countries are occupied in low- skilled, poorly paid and low prestige jobs, constituting what has been termed a ‘services proletariat’; and only 11 per cent hold skilled jobs (Izquierdo, 1997a). At the end of 1995, slightly over one-third of them held long-term work permits; one-quarter held permits with a duration of less than a year; the rest were intermediate, heading towards stability. In summary, immigrant workers comprise a small proportion of the Spanish workforce – very likely not more than 2 per cent; they tend to be substitutive rather than in full-frontal competition with native workers; and they take unappealling and often unstable jobs. All this makes for few or low-level tensions in the labour market, but hinders the stable insertion of migrants in society. With this background in mind, we now shift our attention, in the rest of this chapter, to the evolution of policy.

The early adoption of basic legislation

The history of immigration policies in Spain is very short: barely 15 years. Yet two markedly different phases should be clearly differentiated in this span of time. The ﬁrst covers the second half of the 1980s, initiated by the adoption of the basic legislation that has constituted the legal framework in which immigration has developed until the present. The second phase starts in 1991 and comprises a series of measures that gradually give shape to something akin to an immigration policy, although still in the making. In fact, the legal framework set up in the mid-1980s was not part of an immigration policy deserving that name. This notwithstanding, the relevance and inﬂuence of these key laws are beyond any doubt. Joaquín Arango 265

Indeed, a peculiar feature of the Spanish experience – and one that attests to the powerful influence of the historical context – stems from the fact that, contrary to the European experience, in Spain immigration legislation almost preceded immigration. In other words, basic legislation – namely an Asylum and Refuge Law (1984) and a Foreigners’ Bill (Ley de Extranjería, 1985) – was in place before immigration had started to become important and to attract the interest of both public institutions and public opinion. Rather than as a response to a rising concern, these laws can be seen as part of a general programme of administrative modernisation (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). Indeed, they saw the light as a development of the 1978 Constitution. In the case of the 1984 Asylum and Refuge Law, it can be surmised that only internal reasons were at play. At the time of its adoption, the spiralling increase in asylum requests that took place throughout Western Europe in the second half of the 1980s had not started, and liberal legislation on asylum was still the rule in most countries. On the other hand, the Ley Orgánica sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros, popularly referred to as Ley de Extranjería, can also be seen as a legal and political prerequisite to Spain’s entry into the EC, which took place in January 1986. According to Wayne Cornelius (1994, pp. 345, 362), the Ley de Extranjería was almost entirely the result of external pressure associated with Spain’s entry into the European Economic Community, which required adherence to EC legislation restricting immigration from non-EC countries. In short, Spain’s European neighbours were worried about the laxity of Spanish immigration controls. The 1985 law was indeed a foreigners’ bill, rather than a law on immigration. This is not surprising, since the latter practically did not exist at the time of its drafting. Yet the law has left its mark on the subsequent development of immigration in the course of the ensuing decade and a half. The law is very limited in scope, focusing above all on administrative issues such as entry, residence and work permits, and repatriation, and disregarding other issues such as integration, political participation, nationality, family reunion and social rights (Aragón Bombín, 1996). This limited scope and restrictive orientation finds explanation above all in the historical context and circumstances in which the law was conceived: a Europe that had been erecting migration barriers since the mid-1970s and a Spain bent on joining it. That context made any different course of action practically unthinkable. The basic aim was the establishment of a framework to clarify and regulate the legal 266 Spain as a Country of Immigration condition of foreigners, and to provide public bodies with legal instruments to enforce such a framework; the tactic was to secure the control of entry and stay of foreigners so that they did not constitute a problem in the eyes of Europe. The law did not aim at regulating immigration, which hardly existed at the time, nor to provide a framework for the incorporation of migrants into society. In this light, it is hardly surprising that the viewpoint of the Ministry of the Interior presided over its drafting. The regulation of some foreigners’ rights and legal guarantees was later appealed by the Ombudsman and considered contrary to the Constitution and amended by the Constitutional Court. Yet, as far as the development of immigration is concerned, more influential than the law’s narrow definition of migrants’ civil rights has been the restrictive regulation it imposes over the presence of foreign workers in the labour market. The guiding principle is the preference recognized to natives in the filling of vacancies. Indeed, a stated aim of the law was protecting the domestic labour market against the growing presence of foreign job-seekers, given Spain’s high unemployement rate (Ministerio del Interior, 1990). In practical terms, given the difficulty of proving that no Spaniard is available to fill a vacancy before a work permit can be issued to a foreigner, this provision has led to the irregular hiring of immigrants (Cornelius, 1994). Certainly, the law did not envisage the permanent insertion of immigrants in society, nor did it facilitate it. Not surprisingly, the law has been widely criticized since its very inception. Legal specialists have described it as polémica (Borrás, 1995, p. 15). Its time seems to be coming to an end at last. At the time of writing, at the end of 1998, the Spanish Parliament is debating a bill that will most likely imply its thorough revision. A follow-up to the Ley de Extranjería was a first regularization process. Ill-publicized and received with distrust, only 44,000 immigrants benefited from it. Its effects did not last very long. It was estimated that after two years the majority had relapsed into illegality (Izquierdo, 1991).

The gradual unfolding of immigration policies during the 1990s

The second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s witnessed the arrival of immigrants in much larger numbers and from more diverse origins than before, attracted by a vigorously expanding Joaquín Arango 267 economy. It soon became clear that the number of migrants in irregular condition was swelling, and that both the concern about controlling the informal employment of immigrants and the interest of getting a better knowledge of it increased concomitantly. A gradual awareness spread about the fact that many migrants were coming to stay. Officials realized that Spain was becoming a country of immigration, and that a true policy of immigration was needed (Aragón Bombín, 1996). The second half of the 1980s also witnessed the gradual surfacing of a stance towards immigration which was very different from the ‘police approach’ which had presided over the adoption of the Ley de Extranjería. The extent and strength of this new orientation, openly sympathetic to migrants and clearly favourable to widening their rights, stem in large part from the political and civic culture which developed in Spain during the years of transition to democracy, and which is characterized by a wide espousal of the universalistic and progressive values associated with democracy (Arango, 1994). The historical memory of a society which had been one of emigration for a large part of its recent past may have been an additional factor. As well as several very active NGOs and major trade unions, who expressed unswerving support for migrants, this new sensitivity was represented in decision-making circles by the officers in charge of the General Directorate for Migrations, heir of the old Instituto Español de Emigración. This orientation aimed at a more comprehensive regulation of immigration, adding an interest in integration and co-operation with sending countries to the overriding concern for control of flows. Yet this orientation would not reach public embodiment until the beginning of the new decade. The first manifestation of a new official stand towards immigration was the Parliamentary Declaration of March 1991, entitled ‘Foreigners in Spain: Policy Guidelines’, which established criteria for the development of a comprehensive immigration policy. The Declaration was preceded by a Memorandum submitted by the government (Ministerio del Interior, 1990) which contained the guidelines which were later unanimously endorsed by Parliament. The 1991 Declaration not only had a high symbolic value but constituted the starting point of a series of measures that would gradually alter the previous stance and pave the way for something approaching an immigration policy deserving that name.3 As a token, it stated that Spain was an ‘immigration country’ – despite the fact that it was so to a much more limited extent than other European countries that shun that status. It also stated that ‘migrant workers should be 268 Spain as a Country of Immigration admitted [to the country] to the extent that the labour market demands and society can integrate’, a proposition (despite obvious flaws) which implies a different frame of mind from that which had hitherto prevailed. The first thrust of the programme that followed was concerned with a better control of immigration, a policy orientation reinforced later by Spain’s ratification of the Schengen agreement in 1993. Measures included extending the visa requirement to nationals of more countries, strengthening border controls, expediting expulsions – but only as an unavoidable last resort, and measures to fight illegal employment, such as employers’ sanctions and increased surveillance by labour inspectors. But this policy thrust also encompassed efforts towards streamlining the procedures for issuing visas and labour and residence permits, and improving the procedures for hiring foreign workers. This initial policy phase was completed in 1994, when the rather liberal Ley de Asilo y Refugio was amended to bring it in line with the treaties of Schengen and Dublin, and to curtail the rapidly increasing trend in asylum requests registered since 1988. As a result, a more restrictive concept of asylum was adopted (Sagarra, 1995, p. 44), much as other European countries were doing at the time. A second policy thrust aimed at bringing into the open the mass of irregular workers who had accumulated during the preceding years, and to regularize them. Several enquiries were commissioned to ascertain the number of immigrants who were in an irregular condition. Results were widely divergent, ranging from a reassuringly low estimate of 80,000 to more worrisome ones of 260,000 and even 300,000. In 1991 the second regularization process in the history of Spanish immigration was launched, this time directed only to workers. As a result, 109,000 foreign workers were rescued from irregularity, out of nearly 140,000 applicants. Contrary to the previous one, the 1991 call was well announced and even attracted new candidates from abroad, especially from Morocco, who were not present in Spain (Ramírez, 1998). If these candidates who were not irregular workers at the start of the process are discounted from the 140,000 applicants, and the unknown number of family members who were not eligible added to that figure, and if it is further assumed that most irregular workers tried to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them, a reasonable guess can be made that the number of illegal migrant workers in Spain at the beginning of 1991 was not much above 150,000. If all this is true, then the 1991 regularization process legalized two-thirds of them. Joaquín Arango 269

With the 1991 regularization, the real profile of inmigrants in Spain showed up for the first time. The number of work permits jumped from 85,000 to 190,000 in one year. The nationality mix started to resemble the one that prevails nowadays. And an entirely novel feature was the emergence of a sizeable proportion of working women, many of them independent and unaccompanied by relatives (Ramírez, 1998). Unfortunately, the set of measures that had been envisaged to allow the subsequent regularization of family members in 1992 and 1993 was marred by administrative restrictiveness (Martínez, 1995). As a result, only 6500 relatives participated in the operation; many more opted for a de facto reunification. In the government’s design, the legalization process would mark a fresh start, setting the counter to zero. New mechanisms of migration control, including the reduction of administrative inefficiency, would curtail clandestine flows and illegal stays in the future. But all this was not enough: for the first time it was recognized that control did not suffice. The labour market demands foreign workers, and not only to fill interstices or on a temporary basis. Something else had to be put in place if the recruitment through irregular channels of the migrant workers that the economy requires was to be prevented. To channel such demand in an orderly and legal manner – to ‘programme the flows’ (in the bureaucratic parlance invented at the time) – the government would establish every year a labour entry quota, el contingente, according, supposedly, to the unsatisfied demand observed in different sectors of the economy. The quota would, moreover, specify the sectors of activity and the nationalities to which it would be directed. In these ways the new quota scheme, which at first aroused some distrust among Spain’s European partners, would, it was hoped, put an end to the chronic mismatch between work permits and unfilled vacancies. But things seem to have worked out quite differently almost from the very beginning. It is doubtful that the identification of unfilled vacancies was ever done in the elaborate way that was planned. The numbers involved should have been larger than those actually adopted, and their distribution should have encompassed more sectors of employment. The fact that the annual number of work permits allotted under the quota scheme has tended to show little variation through time suggests that political considerations have been at play in the determination of the yearly quota and its distribution by different types of labour permits, nationalities, and sectors of activity. The way that the quota policy has been implemented has made it impossible to achieve its stated goal 270 Spain as a Country of Immigration of channelling flows and avoiding the hiring of irregular migrants. The fact that it has been restricted to a couple of sectors of activity – basically seasonal work in agriculture and employment in domestic service – and to a few nationalities, has left aside other areas of the economy and many candidates for employment who have pursued other avenues to obtain work. In reality, the quota has operated since 1994 (after a failed first attempt at hiring workers abroad) mainly as a procedure for a continuous, if partial, regularization; as an undeclared mechanism to keep the number of illegal workers under control. Indeed, it has been recently estimated that ‘nine of every ten workers who have benefited from the quota were already irregularly employed in Spain, and only one has entered under its provisions’ (Izquierdo, 1997b, p. 47). Yet this departure from its stated function does not completely detract from its usefulness, for it has at least performed the latent function of reducing the need for further formal regularizations and of alleviating concerns stemming from the increase in the stock of irregular migrants. As for the second axis of immigration policies as proclaimed in the 1991 Declaration, namely the integration of immigrants in the host society, a ‘Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants’ was adopted at the end of 1994. Its preamble recognized that up to then official attention had concentrated on fighting irregularity and controlling flows. The time had come to develop a positive companion policy to the hitherto pre-eminent concern. However, it has to be said that the Plan is basically a statement of principles and intentions, rather than an effective catalogue of practical measures. Its stated goals are very general indeed: preventing discrimination, promoting harmonious coexistence based on democratic values and tolerance, promoting the legal status and social stability of migrants, suppressing barriers that stand in the path of integration, combating the exploitation of foreign workers, and mobilizing society against racism and xenophobia. Without going into much detail, it specifies guidelines pertaining to migrants’ participation in social and political life (particularly at the local level); support for migrants’ associations and facilitation of family life; access to employment, vocational training, language, literacy and schooling programmes; access to housing, social services and subsidies; maintenance and respect of migrants’ national cultures; and promoting information about naturalization. The main instruments for the implementation of these guidelines were the ‘Permanent Observatory of Immigration’ and a participatory Forum for Integration, both of which Joaquín Arango 271 were created subsequently. Apparently, the Plan drew inspiration from a document on inter-ethnic relations issued by the Council of Europe in 1991 (Danese, 1998, p. 724). An important step in the drive to improve migrants’ legal status and social stability took place in February 1996, when the rules governing work permits were modified to extend their duration and to ease access to indefinite permits, which should result in better labour market insertion and improved chances for social integration. As a corollary, in 1996 a new regularization process took place, albeit a limited one. The aim of this process was not the traditional one of bringing illegal migrants into the open, but rather to extend backwards the benefits of the new, more favourable regime to migrants who had been holders of expired permits in the past, and to their relatives. The more positive orientation towards immigration which started in the early 1990s seems to be intensifying in the second half of the decade. One indication of this is the fact that a significant share of the responsibilities for migration traditionally managed by the Ministry of Labour have been recently transferred to the Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales (National Agency for Social Services), which has added the term Migraciones to its name. Even more important than these organizational changes is the leading role that the Spanish Parliament is taking in the promotion of immigrants’ integration. Two motions approved in 1996 and 1997 urge the government to assign more resources to the agencies responsible for integration, to ‘promote a comprehensive immigration policy based upon the will to integrate these new citizens’, and to ‘put forth policies based upon social integration, solidarity, harmonious living together and equality’. Furthermore, Parliament has invited proposals to modify the 1985 Ley de Extranjería. This call has indeed been heeded, and by the end of 1998 Parliament was debating a substantial reform of the 1985 law. Moreover, in July 1998 the Spanish Parliament endorsed the recommendations of a Parliamentary committee appointed in 1996 to study the situation of immigrants and refugees in Spain. The proposals put forward by the committee include, inter alia, the drafting of a national bill on integration, the appointment of a Junior Minister to co-ordinate official responsibilities on immigration and to oversee the development of policy, the legalization of irregular migrants, improving the efficiency of the labour quota, harsh measures to fight the trafficking of migrants, and measures to increase the protection granted to refugees and to correct restrictive biases in the evaluation of 272 Spain as a Country of Immigration asylum demands.4 The committee’s report constitutes the most comprehensive (and generally favourable to migrants) compendium of measures ever proposed in Spain. The extent to which it will translate into effective policy and change entrenched bureaucratic practices remains to be seen.

Difﬁculties and limitations of integration policies

Reality is as yet far from these intentions. Integration policies are still in their early stages, not far beyond the mere reception of newcomers and the standard provision of basic social services, except perhaps in a few municipalities and a couple of regions. Immigrants are entitled to make use of public services, especially health and education, regardless of their legal status, as well as social protection. Access to the latter may occasionally be contingent upon legal residence, for example to receive public subsidies (Borrás, 1995). In the provision of assistance and social services to immigrants, ‘third sector’ organizations – trade unions, NGOs, immigrants’ associations – tend to play an outstanding role, often subsidized by public funds. Their contribution is especially relevant in assisting migrants in an irregular condition. Public powers often entrust non-governmental organizations with delicate tasks, such as the social insertion of legalized irregular migrants who have entered Spain through Ceuta or Melilla. They often act as the government’s flexible arm. Migrants’ associations are also subsidized by the public purse, both at the national and at the European level (Danese, 1998). The development of specific integration policies encounters considerable hurdles in Spain, both at the supply and at the demand side. Administrative dispersion, lack of experience, insufficient social infrastructures, and a limited welfare state hinder the provision of services. On the other hand, the demand for integration policies seems for the moment to be relatively limited, in part as a result of the unstable character of a large part of the migrant population, still in a first stage of the migration cycle. Indeed, designing policies for a highly mobile, floating, largely unsettled population, composed to a large extent of people without a family, is not an easy matter. The high degree of precariousness in the labour market and the rigidities of labour legislation contribute to the perpetuation of such characteristics and slow down stable insertion. Obstacles to family reunion do not facilitate integration either (Martínez, 1995). The integration of single migrants or of those who do not have their family with them is made difficult Joaquín Arango 273 by laws that require economic stability and possession of adequate housing to obtain access to legal residence (Colectivo IOE, 1996, p. 28). In this light, gender asymmetry, which often entails strong links with the country of origin and a limited relationship with the host society, represents an additional impediment to integration.

Conclusions

Spain’s transition from labour-exporting to labour-importing is very recent. Even though a certain number of foreigners, mostly European retirees, had chosen it as their place of residence since the 1960s, the conversion to a country of immigration has taken place only since the 1980s, and the rate of increase seems to have accelerated in the 1990s. Yet the proportion that immigrants make, both of the total population and of the labour force, is still very low by European standards. Economic immigrants from a number of countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe constitute nowadays the majority of immigrants, and the segment which attracts the most attention from the media, politicians and the general public. The socio-demographic composition of economic immigration attests to the recentness of the phenomenon in Spain, with a high proportion of single or unaccompanied young adults – although there are signs in recent years that point towards an intensiﬁcation of the process of family reunion. These characteristics contribute to a considerable degree of instability of the immigrant population, which does not facilitate their permanent insertion and integration in society. As a rule, migrants take unappealing jobs, shunned by Spaniards, in a few sectors or niches of a highly segmented labour market. The high degree of precariousness which characterizes such jobs, with generally short contracts (Huntoon, 1998), does not contribute to migrants’ stability. Until the mid-1990s, legislation has not favoured permanent settlement and integration. On the other hand, the fact that most migrants do not compete with native workers, coupled with their limited degree of residential settlement, make for an immigration model of very limited tension and friction. Finally, the fact that immigration remains of limited volume – which stems more from the limited labour demand than from any success of control efforts in a country with the locational and physical characteristics of Spain – has contributed to allay former fears, as has the institution of labour quotas since 1993. As a result, immigration does not rank very high among social and political issues in Spain. 274 Spain as a Country of Immigration

This low-intensity, low-tension model of immigration has facilitated the evolution of policies which initially seemed only concerned with controlling the entry and stay of foreigners. Contrary to most historical experiences elsewhere, in Spain the adoption of policies – in the form of basic legislation – took place before immigration had become a significant public issue. The influence of the European context – determined by the previous immigration experiences of other European countries, and reinforced by the coincidence of the beginnings of immigration in Spain with its accession to EC membership in the mid- 1980s – was paramount in the early adoption of immigration policy and its restrictionist orientation. The wider European dimension has continued to be relevant throughout this period, sustained by the high priority accorded by Spanish governments to EU membership. Yet the initial emphasis on control was never construed as an imposition of the EC, but seen as part of the national interest as well. Notwithstanding this, since the early 1990s a different stance, more favourable to migrants’ stability and concerned with their integration in society, has been asserting itself, alongside the initial restrictionist orientation. As a result, a dual sensitivity has presided in the gradual development of integration policies deserving that name in recent years. Several factors have facilitated the development of an attitude which is less concerned with ‘foreigners’ and more sympathetic towards immigrants, an orientation more attuned to the prevailing political culture of present-day Spain and which enjoys wide support in civil society. They include the development of immigration itself, which has shown that many immigrants were keen to stay in the country and have become permanent members of society; the realization that in the Spanish economy there is structural demand for foreign labour; an increasing realization that immigration flows are manageable; the absence of deep tensions in the labour market and in society, and of any significant political cleavage on the matter; and a gradual feeling of partial autonomy vis-à-vis Europe in the development of policies which do not run contrary to the general consensus. All this has resulted in policies which facilitate a more stable insertion of migrants in the labour market and in a greater concern for their integration in society. Nevertheless, these trends are still very incipient and face considerable obstacles.

Notes 1. Congreso de los Diputados, Boletín Oﬁcial de las Cortes Generales, 308, 15 July 1998, p. 17. 2. This key point is also forcibly made by Pascual de Sans et al. in Chapter 5 of this volume. Joaquín Arango 275

3. No doubt controlling immigration flows and fighting illegal employment continued to be in the forefront of attention, and no less than five of the eight guidelines contained in the Declaration were directly or indirectly aimed at such goals (Arango, 1992). Indeed, it met with the criticism of vocal segments of civil society for perpetuating the prevailing obsession with controlling flows. Yet, seen in retrospect, the 1991 Declaration marks the beginning of a new phase, characterized by a new language and an altogether different attitude towards immigration. 4. Congreso de los Diputados, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 308, 15 July 1998, p. 17.

References Aragón Bombín, R. (1996) ‘Diez años de política de inmigración: implicaciones de las distintas áreas de gestión: educación, cultura, salud, vivienda, empleo y servicios sociales’, Migraciones 0, pp. 45–60. Aragón Bombín, R. and Chozas, J. (1993) La regularización de los inmigrantes durante 1991–92. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Arango, J. (1992) ‘Los dilemas de las políticas de inmigración en Europa’, Cuenta y Razón 73–74, pp. 46–54. Arango, J. (1994) ‘Los españoles y la política 1982–1994’, in García-Atance, S. (ed.) Historias de una década: Sistema financiero y economía española 1984–1994. Madrid: AB Asesores, pp. 61–80. Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1997) ‘The emerging EU immigration regime: some reflections on its implications for southern Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies 33, pp. 497–519. Betty, C. and Cahill, M. (1998) ‘Consideraciones sociales y sanitarias sobre los inmigrantes británicos mayores en España, en particular los de la Costa del Sol’, Migraciones 3, pp. 83–115. Borrás, A. (ed.) (1995) Diez años de la Ley de Extranjería: balance y perspectivas. Barcelona: Fundación Paulino Torras Domènech. Colectivo IOE (1987) ‘Los inmigrantes en España’, Documentación Social, Cáritas Española 66. Colectivo IOE (1996) Situación de la población extranjera en España. Un balance a partir de fuentes secundarias. Madrid: Fundación Ortega y Gasset. Cornelius, W. A. (1994) ‘Spain: the uneasy transition from labor exporter to labor importer’, in Cornelius, W. A., Martin, P. L. and Hollifield, J. F. (eds) Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 331–69. Danese, G. (1998) ‘Transnational collective action in Europe: the case of migrants in Italy and Spain’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, pp. 715–34. Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Huntoon, L. (1998) ‘Immigration to Spain: implications for a unified European Union immigration policy’, International Migration Review 32, pp. 423–50. Izquierdo, A. (1991) ‘La inmigración ilegal en España (Análisis de la operación extraordinaria de regularización 1985–86)’, Revista de Economía y Sociología del Trabajo 11, pp. 18–38. Izquierdo, A. (1997a) La inmigración inesperada. Madrid: Editorial Trotta. 276 Spain as a Country of Immigration

Izquierdo, A. (1997b) ‘As inmigracións en España (1995–1996). Fluxos, tendencias e procedencias’, Estudios Migratorios 4, pp. 41–58. King, R. and Black, R. (eds) (1997) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. López, B. (1996) ‘La evolución cronológica del asentamiento de los marroquíes en España’, in López, B. (ed.), Atlas de la inmigración magrebí en España. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma Ediciones, pp. 68–71. Martínez, A. (1995) ‘La reuniﬁcación familiar’, in Borrás, A. (ed.) Diez años de la Ley de Extranjería: balance y perspectivas. Barcelona: Fundación Paulino Torras Domènech, pp. 196–208. Martínez Veiga, U. (1997) La integración social de los inmigrantes extranjeros en España. Madrid: Editorial Trotta. Martínez Veiga, U. (1998) ‘La competición en el mercado de trabajo entre inmigrantes y nativos’, Migraciones 3, pp. 9–30. Ministerio del Interior (1990) Líneas básicas para una política española de extranjería: comunicación del Gobierno al Congreso de los Diputados. Madrid: Ministerio del Interior. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (1996) Anuario de Migraciones 1996. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración (1996) Los inmigrantes económicos en España. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración (1998) Indicadores de la inmigración y el asilo en España. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Piore, M. J. (1979) Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ramírez, A. (1998) Migraciones, género e Islam. Mujeres marroquíes en España. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional. Rodríguez, V., Fernández-Mayoralas, G. and Rojo, F. (1998) ‘European retirees on the Costa del Sol: a cross-national comparison’, International Journal of Population Geography 4, pp. 183–200. Sagarra, E. (1995) ‘Nueva regulación de la condición de refugiado y el derecho de asilo en España’, in Borrás, A. (ed.) Diez años de la Ley de Extranjería: balance y perspectivas. Barcelona: Fundación Paulino Torras Domènech, pp. 38–47. Solé, C. (1995) Discriminación racial en el mercado de trabajo. Madrid: Consejo Económico y Social. Williams, A. M., King. R. and Warnes, A. M. (1997) ‘A place in the sun: international retirement migration from Northern to Southern Europe’, European Urban and Regional Studies 4, pp. 115–34. 13 Migration, Trade and Development: the European Union and the Maghreb Countries Georges Tapinos

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the relevance and feasibility of the free trade alternative to trans-Mediterranean migration. Such a policy, widely promoted by the European Union, and especially by the Southern EU countries which feel themselves most affected by both the real and the perceived migrations from North Africa, is seen as a vehicle to increase economic integration between the EU and its southern partners, more speciﬁcally the Maghreb states. The chapter is part of an ongoing research project on migration, trade and development and expands on a series of recent contributions (see Tapinos, 1993; 1994; 1997; Tapinos et al., 1994; Cogneau and Tapinos, 1995).1 The present contribution poses, and attempts to answer with some appropriate empirical evidence, three key questions:

● What does economic theory predict with regard to international migration? ● What does the experience of European economic integration suggest? ● What can be expected from the recently signed trade agreements?

Before I treat these questions directly, the next section sets the scene by examining some of the political concerns and economic responses surrounding the ‘new view’ of the relationships between the EU and the so-called ‘third countries’ (i.e. non-EU states).

277 278 Migration, Trade and Development

Economic relations and migration between the European Union and third countries: the new view

Following two decades of signiﬁcant labour immigration, the restrictive policies introduced by the Western European countries in 1973–74 soon appeared insufﬁcient in view of the on-going and even increasing economic differentials between countries of the European Union and their eastern and southern neighbours. Consequently, in the aftermath of the closing of the borders, a two-tier strategy was conceived which sought to supplement the existing control measures with a policy aiming at identifying the ‘root causes’ of emigration. This ‘new view’ rests on four sets of assumptions:

● economic conditions are determinant factors in the propensity to move; ● development, by increasing employment and income, reduces the incentive to move abroad; ● a free market economy is the most efﬁcient way to meet the development goals; ● an open economy, through trade and capital ﬂows, decreases wage differentials.

The new international division of labour, as it was called in the late 1970s, which divided labour processes between rich countries (with high labour costs) and poor countries (with low labour costs), failed to fulfil the hopes of both sets of countries – which casts some doubts upon the current proposals which view free trade agreements as an alternative to migration. However, things have since changed, and new trends in developed as well as in developing countries could bring, on the whole, more credibility to the free trade strategy. First, on the European side, the closing of the borders to external migration – initially thought of as a short-term response to cyclical economic changes – now appears, with the passage of time, to be a permanent element of the immigration regime of these countries. In fact, the closing of the borders to labour migration did not put an end to the migration process; on the contrary, it strengthened family reunion and decreased the propensity to return. This changed, in a very significant way, the characteristics of the foreign populations: on the one hand a reduction in differentials by age, sex, household structure, labour participation rates and sectoral distribution as compared with natives; and on the other hand a deep change in ethnic composition evidenced Georges Tapinos 279 by a strong increase in the share of non-EU nationals. Moreover the persistence, beyond expectations, of the economic crisis in European countries, brought strong support from governments and public opinion for the reinforcement of control of new entries. Also, the idea of a kind of quid pro quo, whereby firms which imported immigrant labour would be those to invest and transfer their activity to the migrant-sending countries, with the immigrant workers returning home to be hired by these firms, has been abandoned. Finally, and most important, the new economic policies of the developing countries, based on internal liberalization and trade openness, in contrast with the situation in the late 1970s, when state control and import substitution policies were prevailing, are now in line with the European countries’ approach. These positive aspects are somewhat mitigated on the European side by the fear of losing jobs through delocalization, and on the developing countries’ side by the loss, as a consequence of the globalization of the world economy, of the advantages they were getting through bilateral relationships with European countries. With these new economic perspectives in mind, I now turn to the question of international migration and its relationships with trade and development theory within the context of European integration.

International migration, economic theory and the European experience

International migration and economic theory The expectations concerning the implications of economic changes on international migration can be approached from three theoretical perspectives: the theory of international trade, the theory of regional economic integration, and development theory and migration processes. Let us examine each of these in turn. The role of international migration in the theory of international trade is clear but also ambiguous and paradoxical (Tapinos, 1974). The classical theory of international trade rests upon the hypothesis of international immobility of labour. Considering countries with similar factor endowments, the opening to trade induces a tendency towards equalization of factor rewards, closing the wage and labour cost gaps. This in turn reduces migration incentives, in as much as income differentials are a critical determinant of mobility – indeed the only 280 Migration, Trade and Development one in this theoretical framework. International migration, when it is considered under this theoretical stance, is seen as a mere factor movement, ignoring what might be specific, in particular the fact that the activity of the migrant cannot be dissociated from his or her physical move, and the extent to which migrants and entrepreneurs respond to market mechanisms and policy regulations.2 The current approach to free trade as a substitute for international migration is anything but new. However, the context and meaning of this alternative have radically changed. Free trade accompanied by internal mobility of factors was originally envisaged as a more desirable form of mobility and a more realistic means of specialization than international migration. It is now supposed to preclude migration – irregular migration as far as the United States is concerned, any form of labour migration in the case of Europe. It is in this context that, in the US as in Europe, the development of the countries of origin through free trade has been presented as an inescapable alternative to the renewal of migration. The implications and impacts of regional economic integration on labour depend upon the degree of integration, its institutional arrangements and its dynamics. Mobility, of persons in general and labour in particular, is a means as well as an aim of economic integration. Mobility is affected by the integration process in two ways. First, we can observe the relationship directly in as much as legal impediments to factor mobility are removed, and to the extent that these legal restrictions were a barrier to migration. Second, there are indirect effects, as follows. On the one hand integration, and more specifically free trade, has an impact on the determinants of the decision-making process of international mobility – by reducing wage differentials, increasing growth and employment, reducing moving costs, and increasing information. On the other hand, integration affects the location of activities through the theory of regional economics. In a simplified way one can distinguish three polar cases. In a free trade zone, lifting the barriers to the circulation of products has the effect of reducing factor return differentials between nations. As a consequence, to the extent that migration is due to wage differentials, free trade will diminish the incentive to move for those individuals living in the countries involved. However, for countries outside the free trade region, the external tariff constitutes an incentive to substitute factor movements for products and thus should induce more immigration from third countries. A common market adds to free trade and the free movement of factors, including labour. The lifting of institutional obstacles – though not ‘cultural’ ones such as language and Georges Tapinos 281 way of life – should increase intra-regional mobility in as much as institutional barriers were restraining people from moving. Conversely, the already-mentioned dampening effect of free trade should diminish the incentive to move. Assessing the impact depends upon the relative weight and the timing of these processes. To a certain extent, institutional changes, such as removing legal restrictions to international migration for citizens of the member countries, could have an immediate impact on mobility; conversely, in most instances market adjustments might be more responsive than institutional changes. A monetary union has supposedly strong and different implications for factor mobility.3 As in a free trade area, adjustments can take place through changes in product prices, but precluding exchange-rate adjustments and national monetary policies,4 a monetary union makes even more necessary the mobility of factors, and in particular labour (Mundell, 1961; Eichengreen, 1993). It implies and induces factor mobility and/or relocation of firms.5 Finally, migration processes and development theory, suggest that the first stages of development foster emigration (Tapinos, 1974). As opposed to the neo-classical approach which relates migration to expected income differentials, taking into account the cost of the move, migration within a development framework is the result of structural changes in the economy. Indeed the emergence of the development process, with the shift from agriculture to construction, industry and services, implies labour mobility which could end up in international migration. Besides, the increase in monetary income allows individuals to cope with the cost of migration. All these are elements which finally lead to an increase in the propensity to move. To the extent that there exists in parallel a labour demand in the more developed countries, migration will increase. The expectation along these lines is thus a positive association between development and emigration. The timing of nineteenth-century European emigration overseas and the emigration from the Southern European countries in the 1960s illustrates this relationship: in both cases emigration correlated in the emergence of development processes in the regions of origin. Summing up, it is tempting to take a syncretic stand, assuming that in the short run development would promote emigration, whereas in the long run, as a result of better living conditions and convergence in factor rewards, migration flows would dampen. This is a highly relevant distinction, to the extent that short term and long term are more than abstract notions and can be given some 282 Migration, Trade and Development quantitative measure. In the next subsection we look in a bit more detail at the historical evidence.

International migration and the European community: the historical experience The free movement of people inside the EEC was considered by the founding member states as a major economic and political means of integration,6 though at that time migration policies remained a national prerogative and were not part of the Commission’s responsibilities. In order to assess the European experience, the timing of economic integration has to be taken into account. In the EEC case, free trade preceded free circulation of labour by a number of years – more or less ten for the original EEC countries.7 The extent to which the process of economic integration has affected intra- and extra-European migration can be inferred from the following three observations. European countries have evidenced a sharp increase in trade. Mokhtari and Rassekh (1989) show that, for 16 OECD countries (including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK), the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to the gross domestic product (GDP) of a given country has increased over the 1964–84 period. Moreover, the share of intra-European trade in the total trade of the EEC countries has increased significantly, and is much higher than extra-EEC trade. The proportion of goods and services – defined as the average of imports and exports as a percentage share of GDP – originating from EEC countries and consumed in other EEC countries increased from 6 per cent in 1960 to 14 per cent in 1985, as opposed to a much more modest 9 to 12 per cent increase for extra- EEC countries (Molle, 1990). Secondly, labour cost differentials have been reduced. Taking the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of annual aggregate data for five of the six EEC founding states (excluding Luxembourg) over the period between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, it appears that on the whole a convergence process has taken place (Tovias, 1982). However this trend seems to have started before the creation of the EEC, a fact attributed by Tovias to the initiation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and to entrepreneurs’ anticipation of future events after the Messina conference of 1955. Besides, the converging trends were reversed after 1968, and the range of differentials has further widened with the inclusion of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Disparities in income per head decreased among regions from the outset of the EEC until the first oil shock, then the situation is more mixed due to the factors Georges Tapinos 283 mentioned above. Absolute differentials remain high, the scale going from one to five or one to ten according to the methods of calculation – exchange rate versus purchasing power parity (Molle, 1990). Thirdly, international migration between EEC countries has levelled off, while international migration from non-EEC countries has increased. The proportion of EEC nationals living in other member countries amounted to less than 2 per cent of the population in 1985, the same proportion as in 1960. Now, member-country nationals represent about 40 per cent of foreigners in the EU. A rough estimate of these differential trends is provided by the changes between 1975 and 1990 of the share of the major EEC and non-EEC national groups in France and Germany. It appears that Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese, who accounted for nearly half of the total foreign population in France in 1975, now represent 31 per cent of the total; conversely the share of Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks has increased from 3.1 to 23.1 per cent, whereas that of Algerians decreased slightly from 20.6 to 17.2 per cent. The same phenomenon is to be seen in Germany. The share of Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks decreased from 33.4 to 20.6 per cent over the period 1975–90, whereas that of the Turks increased from 26.5 to 31.9 per cent.

The European experience: trade and differential factor returns Are the above observations in line with the predictions of economic theory? A test of the theory should verify firstly that the reduction in income and labour cost differentials is the direct consequence of trade openness, and secondly that the reduction in income differentials is the main determinant of the reduction in intra-European migration flows. More specifically, a conclusive test of the factor price equalization model (see Gremmen, 1985) would imply that:

● for given capital/labour endowments, the higher the trade openness and the greater the involvement in trade, the smaller the international wage differential; ● the higher the openness of trade, the less signiﬁcant the capital/ labour endowments, as opposed to an autarkic situation where the capital–labour ratio determines the wage rate; ● the smaller the wage differential, the smaller the migration ﬂows.

That trade openness has contributed to the narrowing of wage and labour cost differentials is well documented, although the extent to which this has been the case is more debatable. Thus, Gremmen (1985) measures the 284 Migration, Trade and Development elasticity of wage differential between two given countries with respect to trade involvement defined by the sum of the shares in countries A and B of imports from each other, relative to the respective national products. The test is conducted with two sets of data: on the one hand the founding EEC countries (with the exception of Luxembourg) over the 1959–79 period; on the other hand a cross-section sample of 27 countries for the year 1976. In both cases, the expected negative signs of the elasticity are verified. Trade involvement is indeed inversely related to the wage differential. However, the share of the wage differential explained by trade involvement is rather small. A stronger conclusion in favour of the factor price equalisation theorem is achieved by Mokhtari and Rassekh (1989). The geographical scope – 16 OECD countries – is broader than the EEC; nonetheless the conclusion remains significant for our purpose. Making sure that some of the assumptions of the model are verified, in particular the convergence in production technology and the fact that the trade increase can be related to trade liberalization, Mokhtari and Rassekh reach the conclusion that the decline in the coefficient of variation of wages is explained by the expansion of trade and by the decrease in the coefficient of variation of capital–labour ratios: ‘regression analysis supports the view that trade openness has been the most significant factor influencing wage variations’. These results do not discard the possibility of alternative explanations to the convergence process. The decline in differentials could have been the effect of increased migration, though this clearly cannot been seen as a determinant factor, in view of the timing and magnitude of migration flows with respect to trade. There is also evidence to suggest that capital flows and in particular structural funds might have had a much stronger impact than the pure trade effect. Besides, even in the absence of trade, a neo-classical growth model, with decreasing returns on capital, predicts that countries with different initial income levels should experience a convergence process: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) verify such a convergence in their analysis of 73 European regions over the period 1950–85.

European integration and international migration An attempt to test for the implications of the Heckscher–Ohlin perspective for migration flows is provided by Molle and Van Mourik (1989).8 They relate the proportion of foreigners of a given nationality in the total labour force of a given immigration country – as observed in 1980 – to a series of variables, inter alia: the wage differential between country of origin and country of activity, an index of trade intensity Georges Tapinos 285 between the two countries, and the differential between the bank discount rates. The immigration countries include Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden; the emigration countries are Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The fact that trade appears to be positively related with migration suggests, according to the authors, that the flows of goods and of labour are not substitutes, which contradicts the Heckscher–Ohlin theory. It thus follows, according to Molle and Van Mourik (1989), that ‘if the further liberalisation of trade does indeed encourage migration, the free movement of labour in the extended EEC might result in large flows of migrant workers’. Here again, no test has been provided to assess the comparative pre- dictive value of the model against other approaches. An alternative crude approach would be to assume the dominance of exogenous factors – for instance an emigration flow pushed by external factors and independent of the growth requirements of the immigration countries. Theoretically, such a flow would end up in a crowding-out effect, substituting non-EEC workers for EEC workers. This is a questionable hypothesis, at least up to the mid-1980s. Econometric studies show that the impact of foreign immigration on the employment and wages of natives is extremely limited (Tapinos and de Rugy, 1994). However, the studies surveyed follow a comparative static approach which leaves open the question of the effect of migration on the growth process. Another approach refers to the effect of unemployment. If, on the one hand, the probability of migration is higher for a currently unemployed person than for an employed one, but on the other hand, the higher the aggregate level of unemployment, the lower the propensity to move (assuming that the higher the average unemployment rate, the lower the probability of finding a new job: Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989), then it could well be that a strong increase in the unemployment rate – as it happened from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s – would have reduced international mobility. In any case, as we have already noted, the implementation of a common market has not led to an increase in intra-EEC mobility. Conversely it has been accompanied (whatever the analytical links) by an increase in extra-EEC immigration, leading to more ethnic heterogeneity. Considering the future, there is no reason to believe that, as far as unskilled labour migration is concerned, major changes have to be expected. This guess is reinforced by the convergence of demographic and labour supply trends among EEC countries including Southern Europe. However, the possibility of an increase in the migration of 286 Migration, Trade and Development qualified workers, self-employed persons, or intra-firm labour mobility, whose determinants are more specific, remains high. The question remains, however, as to how much one can draw from the European experience of the 1960s and 1970s to predict the impact of the free trade agreements and of the extension of the European Union on migration flows. We will now consider the Mediterranean region and more specifically the economic relations between Europe and the Maghreb.9

Impact of the free trade agreements

The trade agreements with Tunisia and Morocco are evidently a reﬂection of the EU states’ deep concern about the fear of increased migration.They are at the same time part of a genuine effort on both sides to build a new partnership. In this part of the chapter I review recent demographic and economic trends in the region before presenting the results of a case study on Morocco. I then discuss in a concluding paragraph the relevance and the feasibility of the trade alternative for the Maghreb countries, in comparison with the EU integration process.

Demographic and economic trends in the Maghreb All three Maghreb countries are at an advanced stage of demographic transition, more advanced in fact than is generally thought. From the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, crude death rates and infant mortality rates declined by two-thirds, life expectancy increased by 20 years and the total fertility rate was halved from approximately 6–7 children to around 3 (2.9 in Tunisia, 3.3 in Morocco and 3.6 in Algeria). Table 13.1 shows these and other key demographic trends for the three countries. It is remarkable that fertility declined in all three countries, in contrast with the Mashreq countries (Libya, Egypt etc.).10 Presently the demographic differentials are narrower between the Maghreb and Europe than between the Maghreb and other Arab countries. There remains for the next 10 to 15 years to come, however, a strong potential increase in labour supply as a consequence of the young age structure due to past high fertility. What about international migration flows and potentials? Migration played a very significant role in the market adjustments of the 1970s, much less so in the recent period; absolute numbers still remain significant, especially for Morocco, but emigration rates have decreased sharply. There have been different adjustment patterns in migration Georges Tapinos 287

Table 13.1 Population indicators for the Maghreb countries

Morocco Tunisia Algeria Population (’000) 1950 8 953 3 530 8 753 1995 27 028 8 896 27 939 Total Fertility rate 1990–95 (average) 3.75 3.15 3.85 1995 3.3 2.9 3.6 Life expectancy 1990–95 (average) 63.3 67.8 67.1 Population growth rate 1990–95 (annual %) 2.10 1.92 2.27

Source: United Nations ‘medium projection’ hypothesis data.

flows to the 1973–74 closing of the European borders, suggesting different migration potentials (Table 13.2). In the case of Morocco, the consolidation of family reunion in the traditional labour immigration countries (France and Belgium) was accompanied by the emergence of new flows towards the southern countries of the European Union (Italy and Spain). A similar pattern is evidenced for Tunisia, but on a much smaller scale: a slight increase in family reunion migration to France and Belgium, new flows of workers towards Italy. The case of Algeria is totally different. Here migration was, until very recently, in a strict bilateral relationship with France. The closing of the borders did not induce any flow diverging effect; only in the last two or three years are new trends towards Germany in evidence. In all three cases there has

Table 13.2 Population of Maghrebi origin in European countries, c.1980 and 1994 (’000)

Moroccans Tunisians Algerians Total Host country c.1980 1994 c.1980 1994 c.1980 1994 c.1980 1994

France 431.0 522.7 190.2 206.3 805.0 614.2 1 426.0 1 393.2 Belgium 110.2 144.0 6.9 5.7 10.9 10.0 127.2 159.7 Netherlands 93.1 161.1 2.6 2.3 – 1.0 95.7 164.4 Germany 39.4 82.4 24.1 27.4 5.0 19.1 68.5 128.9 Italy 2.6 92.6 4.4 41.1 – – 7.0 133.7 Spain 3.6 63.9 – 0.4 – 3.2 3.6 67.5 Total 679.9 1 167.7 227.2 283.2 820.9 647.5 1 728.0 2 047.4

Notes: France 1982, Germany 1981, Italy 1985. Sources: SOPEMI (1997); Tapinos et al. (1994). 288 Migration, Trade and Development been no diversification of migration flows beyond Europe. In that respect emigration from the Maghreb is in contrast with other Arab countries, which experience emigration to the North American region. Looking at the future, in the absence of free trade, there remain significant migration potentials, especially in Morocco. This does not mean that ‘mass’ migration flows should necessarily be expected, however. The situation of Algeria is more problematic; in this country the possibility of a mass migration, resulting from political and social unrest, cannot be discounted. Significant economic changes have also taken place, as already mentioned. Morocco and Tunisia adopted new economic policies departing from the import substitution and public intervention strategies of the past. They had already gone a long way towards trade openness when the free trade agreements with the European Union were signed. In both cases, free trade is a political move as much as an economic strategy.

Moroccan case study As a ﬁrst step to explore the issue, a study was conducted on the Moroccan economy to assess the effect of free trade on employment and income, and consequently on the propensity to move (Tapinos et al., 1994; Cogneau and Tapinos 1995). The study is based on a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for the Moroccan economy (Bourguignon et al., 1991). We start with a brief review of the characteristics of the Moroccan economy and the assumptions of the model, followed by the policy simulations and the main results. Morocco is a mainly agricultural country with strong rural–urban differences and imperfect markets, especially for labour. Although a strong increase in the share of manufactured exports has occurred in recent years, the comparative advantages of the country are to be found in agriculture and not so much in textiles, whose inputs make use of a large import component. Three factors are decisive in explaining the outcome of the model. The costs of production are relatively high, not only labour costs but also energy and transport costs and interest rates. Secondly, import duties represent 26 per cent of state revenues. And ﬁnally, there is a strong asymmetry in trade between the European Union and Morocco: Moroccan goods have free access to European Union markets with the important exception of some agricultural and textile products, whereas Morocco still applies tariffs (though at a much lower rate than before) to European products. Georges Tapinos 289

The CGE model is based on a 1980 social accounting matrix, partly updated to 1990; a similar model has been used by the World Bank which allows for some comparisons (Rutherford et al., 1994). The dissagregation by type of household is an important feature of the model, well suited to capture distributive effects. Conversely, the model does not dissagregate trade by regions, which precludes taking into account trade diversion effects and does not allow an assessment of the specific impact of a free trade agreement with the European Union as opposed to generalised free trade.11 However, this does not represent a strong limitation for our purpose in view of the dominant share of the European Union in the exports and imports of Morocco. Some assumptions that have been made depart from a pure neo-classical price allocation model like the one used by the World Bank: we assume a given level of unemployment, immobility of capital between sectors and partial indexation of wages. The new features introduced by the model are related to the fiscal system and to five-year dynamics. The scope of the exercise is to compare the results of a simulation in the absence of free trade – the reference run – with a free trade strategy under three different policy implementation options. The first simulation assumes free trade without any accompanying measures, the second makes for a 75 per cent increase in indirect taxation, the third pattern adds to the previous one an increase in labour-intensive exports. The simulations are run on a five-year horizon, extended to 12 years assuming stable coefficients. Table 13.3 presents a synthesis of the results of the three simulations. The basic mechanisms of the model can be summarised as follows. First of all, free trade means a loss in taxes (26 per cent), and an increase in agricultural export prices (8 per cent), but only 20 per cent of agricultural exports are being affected by free trade. On the one hand, the loss in taxes reduces government receipts and thus increases the budget deficit which will have to be compensated by increased taxation, mainly in indirect taxes. On the other hand, taking into account the initial asymmetry in the degree of trade openness and the relative elasticities of exports and imports (trade openness increasing imports more than exports), free trade will lead to a trade deficit and this deficit will widen. This in turn will depreciate the currency and require a devaluation. In other words, structural adjustment has prepared the path to free trade; in turn free trade has to be accompanied by an adjustment which will have strong implications.12 In that respect the crucial issue is the fiscal transition. The necessary increase in taxation might lead to a shift of 290 Migration, Trade and Development

Table 13.3 Simulations for Morocco: macro-economic results ﬁve years after free-trade implementation

Macro-economic result Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 GDP (% change) 0.2 –0.1 2.1 Unemployment (% change) –8.6 –0.4 3.4 Investment (% change) –20.4 5.1 20.6 Exports (% change) 5.3 9.5 8.7 Imports (% change) 11.7 7.9 13.8 Real exchange rate (% change) 0.0 3.6 1.8 Budget/GDP –6.2 0.5 0.5 Current balance/GDP –3.3 –0.7 –0.7 Public debt/GDP 1.5 0.4 0.4 Inequality (Theil index) 5.1 –8.0 –4.2 Poverty index –1.7 –0.2 –2.2

Notes: Budget, current balance and public debt are differences in percentage points of GDP; poverty index is percentage of households below the poverty line (differences in percentage points). Source: Cogneau and Tapinos (1995). activities towards the informal sector, which in turn will diminish the economy’s contributive capacity to taxes. The results show a modest impact on growth, mainly due to the nature of the comparative advantages and a ‘respecialization’ in agricultural production, a reallocation that is a drain on the urbanization process. The distributive effects are mixed. On the whole there is a decrease in inequality, though only a very modest decrease in the poverty index and in unemployment. The winners are those whose activities are related to the agricultural sector, mainly large farmers and to a smaller extent wage-earners in agriculture, and also those in the urban informal sector. The losers are the more qualiﬁed urban workers in the modern sector and capital-owners. At this stage of the research, we are not in a position to measure the impact on emigration, which would involve a modelling of the migration decision process. However, we can suggest instead an a contrario argument: that is, if we assume that migration is related among other factors to income differentials and employment, for trade to have an impact on emigration, it should modify these parameters in a signiﬁcant way. Which is not the case. Considering on the one hand the higher risk of poverty, a higher unemployment rate and a lower income for the modern sector wage-earners, and on the other the improvement of economic conditions in agriculture and the informal Georges Tapinos 291 sector, we are tempted to conclude that in the framework and the time horizon of the model – 5–12 years – the potential for migration is not affected by the free trade agreement.

An alternative to migration? These results are at variance with the expectations of governments on both side of the Mediterranean: the European ones which like to view trade, investment and aid as a way to strengthen their restrictive immigration policies; and the Maghrebi ones which have put all their faith in the liberal credo of privatisation and openness. To a large extent, they depart also from the European integration experience which evidenced a reduction of intra-EEC migration concurrently with a convergence process and trade openness. In a somewhat similar context, NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Association of the USA, Canada and Mexico) reflects the same kind of expectations which appear to be supported by simulation exercises. The purpose of this section is to disentangle between three types of reason that might allow for the discrepancy between the conventional wisdom and our results: the shortcomings of economic theory; the extent to which free trade might induce foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid; and the institutional aspects of the agreements, that is their scope and extent. Analysis of these theoretical and practical shortcomings might then shed light on policy choices, which are set out in the conclusion to this chapter. A first set of shortcomings relates to the theory of international trade which ignores or down-plays a series of elements which might be decisive in the expected outcome. First of all, the theory is timeless, or rather it is set in a comparative static framework. Not being a dynamic theory, it ignores the transition process to equilibrium and, being timeless, it does not say anything about the time necessary to reach convergence – a point which has only been recently addressed in the ‘convergence literature’ (Evans, 1997). It remains the case in reality, however, that for potential migrants, expectations on the length of time required to have their situation improved as a result of free trade is a crucial element in the decision to migrate. Secondly, by considering people as a mere factor of production, the theory ignores the decision-making process. Probably, the most important distinction between the trade versus migration strategy is the fact that in the latter case the individual decides for himself and his family, whereas in the former case, he or she has to trust the goodwill and efficiency of the government. Finally, there is the distributive aspect. To the extent that unskilled immigrants are detrimental to the less qualified and poorest 292 Migration, Trade and Development groups in the receiving society, and this being in fact the rationale for control policies, the assessment of free trade as an alternative to migration, for the developed country, should take into account the indirect effect on employment of increased labour-intensive specialization in less-developed countries as a consequence of the absence of emigration. Here it could be argued that the modest impact of the trade effect is easily explained by the short time horizon of the simulations, and the ‘respecialization’ in agriculture by the failure to take into account alternative policies aiming at the acquisition of other comparative advantages. It could be further argued that, in the long run, an alternative strategy based on human capital accumulation through formal education, on-the-job training and entrepreneurship could shift the comparative advantage and allow for a more favourable insertion in the international economic system. This is probably a sound strategy, but clearly a very long-run one. Next we have the question of the capital flows induced by free trade. The hope of the Maghreb countries (following Mexico) is that a free trade agreement will increase foreign investment in the region, and that their agreement to allow better conditions for European exports will induce the European Union to increase its aid. Are such expectations meaningful? To start with, let us recall some order of magnitude of what is at stake. Using a simple accounting approach, consider the current balance of payments. Taking into account the relative weight of the different items, can investment and aid be considered as a realistic alternative to migration? Again this approach ignores the economic mechanisms involved. In the present situation, for Tunisia and Morocco, remittances and tourism are the main sources of foreign receipts. Assuming that free trade would not have a specific impact one way or the other on tourism, and recalling that free trade does not significantly affect the balance of trade in the next decade, if remittances were to decline – and in the long run to disappear – there is a long way to go to compensate the loss with investment and aid. Tourism represents 15 per cent of foreign receipts for Morocco and 20 per cent for Tunisia. Remittances amount to 25 and 10 per cent respectively. Conversely, for Morocco public transfers are only 2 per cent of foreign receipts. Is there any reason to think that investment and aid would increase in a significant way? To answer, we have to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan situation in relation to the determinants of foreign investment and aid. On the positive side, we can mention the proximity to Europe and, to some extent, political stability. On Georges Tapinos 293 the negative side, the current concern in Europe – even if unfounded – about the loss of employment resulting from relocation of activities; the small size of the Moroccan economy and the failure of all attempts to create an integrated Union du Maghreb Arabe; the recent trends in FDI, showing the preference of developed countries’ investors to invest in other developed countries; and the fact that market size appears to get more consideration than the traditional advantages related to subcontracting practices: all these factors work against the achievement of a significant impact in Morocco of foreign aid and investment. In any case, there is a great difference with the US/Mexican case, as well as with the experience of European integration. In this latter case, a reduction in the risk element is about to have a significant impact on private and public investment (Cogneau et al., 1996). Similar arguments can be made concerning aid. Besides, trade, aid and investment are not additive. Germany would be prepared to have greater trade openness and to favour private investments but not to increase aid. France would certainly not accept the dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy but would probably be more favourable to increased aid. The third element to consider when trying to assess the expected outcome is the institutional setting which defines in particular the scope and the extent of the agreement. Indeed what is at stake is not so much the existence of an agreement, but the specific arrangements it includes, and how much it leans towards free trade versus trans-Mediterranean regional integration. First of all, the free trade framework that has been agreed upon, which leaves aside agricultural products which constitute the very specific comparative advantage of Morocco and other Maghreb countries, limits to a considerable extent the scope of a free trade agreement. As all free trade simulations have been done on the assumption that agricultural products are included, this means that even our results are too optimistic. Besides, as we have seen in the EU experience, whether the convergence between Portugal, Greece and Southern Italy on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other, has been the result of trade or structural funds is a crucial point. If the pure effect of trade is modest and investment and aid are determinant, then what is to be expected from a common market area cannot be anticipated from a simple free trade area. In this respect there is a strong difference with the past European experience – which explains why Morocco asked to join the Union. All these factors point to the institutional changes required. Should we expect that the dynamics 294 Migration, Trade and Development of a free trade agreement would endogenously induce these changes? Conversely, could it be the case that free trade favours corruption and loosens the pressure for change?

Conclusions and policy implications

Summing up, five key points can be made about migration, trade and development in the crucial region of the Western Mediterranean Basin. In the 1960s and 1970s international migration was a determinant factor of economic and social integration between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean and certainly an element contributing to the stability of the region. Can one expect as much from free trade, and, if so, over what time horizon? The comparison between the EU experience and the expectations of a Euro-Maghreb free trade area suggest that positive effects are likely to be related to the institutional setting rather than to the trade effect per se. Secondly, trade openness, capital flows and aid are not about to decrease emigration propensities over the next 5–10 years. However, taking into account recent demographic and emigration trends in the Maghreb countries, one should not expect mass migration. In any case, trade openness will imply fiscal and institutional reform. Thirdly, the root causes of emigration are to be found in the receiving as well as in the sending countries. It is paradoxical to explain past emigration by the interaction of supply and demand conditions and then to consider only supply factors when looking at root causes of migration. The labour market conditions and more specifically the development of the informal sector in Southern European countries should be as much an area of focus. Several chapters earlier in this book have provided just such a critical focus. Fourthly, although migration and development are analytically linked, as far as policies are concerned, ‘controlling’ migration and fostering development should be thought of as independent strategies. Development is an objective per se, independently of its consequences on emigration. Also, there is a political risk of a backlash in earmarking aid and investment to decrease emigration. Finally, a distinction should be made on ethical and practical grounds between settlement and circulation. The right to circulate, aller et venir, is a basic human right which should not be denied in order to avoid settlement; it is also a practical requirement when free trade and family ties require the crossing of borders. Of course, in Georges Tapinos 295 allowing for circulation in a situation where there are restrictions on immigration and strong ‘push-pressures’ to emigrate, there is a risk of inducing illegal migration; notwithstanding this, on the whole the balance between immediate effects and long-run political losses is highly uneven.

Notes 1. I acknowledge the help of the European Commission (DG1) and the OECD in the preparation of this chapter. 2. The paradox is no less when theory is confronted with facts. International migration constituted a major element in the integration of the Atlantic economy during the nineteenth century, contributing to the narrowing of factor returns. Similarly, migration played a key role in the growth of the European economies in the postwar period up to the mid-1970s, enhancing integration between countries of origin and destination. 3. The constitutions of the old German Empire or the United States of America are cases in point which are rather different from the EU, where the choice of a common currency is agreed upon by politically independent states. 4. Moreover in the European Union there are also constraints on fiscal policy, Maastricht Treaty provisions requiring the restriction of public debts to a given ratio. 5. Thus in the USA there is more interstate labour mobility than there is international migration within Europe; and between the American states economic adjustment depends more on labour market mobility than changes in the location of firms. 6. Free movement of labour was achieved for the EEC as a whole (except Luxembourg) on 1 January 1992. Free circulation does not apply to non-EU residents in EU countries, however. 7. When timing is taken into account the specificity of the EU (which allows for the free movement of labour) as compared to the North American Free Trade Agreement (which does not) becomes less distinct. 8. According to the Heckscher–Ohlin theory, countries which have more labour in relation to capital than others will initially have low wages and will therefore export labour-intensive goods; but free trade will raise wages in such countries and lower them in capital-intensive countries. 9. Compared to the Maghreb countries, the case of the Central and East European countries differs in significant respects. First, the economic transition of the eastern countries has been more brutal. Other differences include less open economies, weaker links to the EU, industrial development along autarkic lines, no experience of market operations, no tradition of emigration (and hence no migration networks), and a better quality of labour. 10. Even in the absence of a population control policy in the case of Algeria. 11. The regional distribution of trade in the World Bank model allows this comparison. 12. Rather similar results have been found for Tunisia (Kebadjian, 1995). 296 Migration, Trade and Development

References Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992) ‘Convergence’, Journal of Political Economy 100, pp. 223–51. Bourguignon, F., de Melo, J. and Suwa, A. (1991) ‘Modeling the effects of adjustment programs on income distribution’, World Development 19, pp. 1527–44. Cogneau, D. and Tapinos, G. (1995) ‘Libre-échange, répartition du revenu et migrations au Maroc’, Revue d’Economie du Développement 31, pp. 27–52. Cogneau, D., Dumont, J.-C. and Izzo, P. (1996) Intégration régionale, investisse- ments directs et migration dans l’espace euro-méditerranéen: enseignement d’un modèle d’équilibre général calculable. Paris: OCDE, DEELSA/ELSA/MI(96)30. Eichengreen, B. (1993) ‘Labor markets and European monetary uniﬁcation’ in Masson, P. and Taylor, M. (eds) Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–62. Evans, P. (1997) ‘How fast do economies converge?’, Review of Economics and Statistics 79, pp. 219–25. Gremmen, H. J. (1985) ‘Testing the factor price equalization theorem in the EC: an alternative approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 23, pp. 277–88. Kerabdjian, G. (1995) ‘Le libre-échange euro-maghrébin: une évaluation macro- économique’, Revue Tiers Monde 36, pp. 748–70. Mokhtari, M. and Rassekhf, F. (1989) ‘The tendency towards factor price equalization among OECD countries’, Review of Economics and Statistics 71, pp. 635–42. Molle, W. (1990) The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy. Aldershot: Gower Molle, W. and Van Mourik, A. (1989) ‘A static explanatory model of international labour migration to and in Western Europe’ in Thirlwall, G. (ed.) European Factor Mobility: Trends and Consequences. Basingtoke and London: Macmillan, pp. 30–52. Mundell, R. A. (1961) ‘A theory of optimum currency areas’, American Economic Review 51, pp. 657–64. Pissarides, C. and Wadsworth, J. (1989) ‘Unemployment and the inter-regional mobility of labour’, The Economic Journal 99, pp. 739–55. Rutherford, T. F., Rutstrom, E. E. and Tarr, D. (1994) ‘L’accord de libre-échange entre le Maroc et la CEE: une évaluation quantitative’, Revue d’Economie du Développement 30, pp. 97–133. SOPEMI (1997) Trends in International Migration, Annual Report 1996. Paris: OECD. Tapinos, G. (1974) L’Economie des Migrations Internationales. Paris: Armand Colin, Les Presses de FNSP. Tapinos, G. (1993) ‘Can international co-operation be an alternative to the emigration of workers?’ in The Changing Course of International Migration. Paris: OECD, pp. 175–82. Tapinos, G. (1994) ‘Regional economic integration and its effects on employment and migration’ in Migration and Development, New Partnership for Cooperation. Paris: OECD, pp. 213–28. Tapinos, G. (1997) ‘Development, cooperation and international migration. The European Union and the Maghreb’ in Mediterranean Conference on Population, Migration and Development. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 5–46. Georges Tapinos 297

Tapinos, G. and de Rugy, A. (1994) ‘The macro-economic impact of immigration. Review of the literature published since the mid 1970’s’ in SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration. Annual Report 1993. Paris: OECD, pp. 157–77. Tapinos, G., Cogneau, D., Lacroix, P. and de Rugy, A. (1994) Libre-échange et Migration Internationale au Maghreb. Rapport pour la Commission de la Communauté Européenne. Paris: FNSP, Service d’étude de l’activité économique. Tovias, A. (1982) ‘Testing factor price equalization in the EEC’, Journal of Common Market Studies 20, pp. 375–88. Part V Migration and Security 14 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean: a Complex Relationship Sarah Collinson

Introduction

In June 1991, The Economist carried an article warning that ‘exploding populations plus stagnant economies’ would ‘force more and more North Africans to get to Europe by fair means or foul’.1 A spectre appeared to loom of a Western Europe under siege from its poorer and less stable neighbours. Attention began to focus ever more sharply on the apparent threat of massive ‘south–north’ migration into Western Europe from the Third World, particularly from the Maghreb, with sen- sationalist newspaper headlines warning of an impending ‘migrant invasion’. The rise of Islamic militancy and the outbreak of civil war in Algeria only added to these fears, particularly in Southern Europe. In January 1994, The Financial Times carried an article which warned that:

developments [in Algeria] threaten Europe on several levels. Civil war invariably produces large ﬂows of refugees, many of whom in this case would be bound to cross the Mediterranean. Their arrival would exacerbate racial tensions. The war could spread to North African communities in Europe. Islamic militants … might resort to terrorism not only against Europeans in Algeria, but against targets in Europe itself… [A]n Algeria racked by civil war … would be likely to stagnate economically. Europe could face more and more poor and angry people on its very doorstep.2

In many respects, these fears reﬂected the changed geopolitical landscape of the early 1990s, marked by a new climate of uncertainty and insecurity in Western Europe, and a correspondingly broadened

301 302 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean security agenda. A range of so-called ‘soft’ security issues, including migration, came to catch the attention of policy-makers and institutions whose focus had hitherto been conﬁned largely to military concerns. In 1991 a report on security in the Mediterranean prepared by the Western European Union warned that:

Europe can no longer view its security solely in terms of the establishment of peace on the continent of Europe; it must also bear in mind that its relations with its southern neighbours also concern its security and involve risks which at ﬁrst sight are probably not of a military nature but affect its internal stability and the conduct of its economy and, if allowed to develop, might in the long run jeopardise what now seems to have been acquired in terms of peace (Western European Union, 1991, p. 233).

Migration and security

Much of the anxiety linked with migration may be considered unfounded or, at least, disproportional to the actual or direct ‘threats’ that it poses. Nevertheless, the fact that it has come to be perceived as a security issue means that it merits some attention as such. As Robert Jervis (1976) has observed, policy-makers are guided as much by the perception of threat as by the threat itself. At the same time, it is wise to advise caution because of the risk that ‘the analysis of migration as a security problem will contribute to the (re)production of the security drama’ (Huysmans, 1995, pp. 68–9) – which, of course, may create more problems than it solves. Either way, migration has the propensity to feature prominently in connection with a variety of broader security issues because it dovetails closely with a number of deepening concerns about the wider regional and global economic, political and strategic environment in which European governments and societies will have to operate in coming decades. Whether in relation to the stark economic inequalities that divide the North from the South, to the global escalation in inter-ethnic conflicts and civil wars, to population growth, desertification, environmental degradation and the propensity for state collapse in the Third World, or to the processes of liberalization in trade and capital flows, anxieties easily focus on the migration-related impacts or ramifications of such developments. It would seem, indeed, that in the minds of many of the politicians, policy-makers and members of the public in Western Sarah Collinson 303

Europe, the most tangible way that stability and prosperity at home are threatened by poverty, instability and turbulence abroad is through the movement of populations. That migration figures in connection with such a range of broader concerns suggests that we are not talking about a single issue. Indeed ‘migration’ denotes many kinds of human movement associated with a variety of forces and motivations with very different causes and consequences. This is obvious if one contrasts, for instance, the ‘economic’ migration of highly skilled and managerial workers with the catastrophic refugee displacement witnessed in the former Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the term ‘security’ has lost some of its precision in recent years as it has come to be used in a wider variety of political and economic contexts, denoting a great range of different challenges, risks, tensions and threats at different levels and of different orders, many of which are more perceived than real. As Pierre Hassner has argued, as the concept of security has come to include a wider range of issues connected with the well-being of society (in addition to more traditional ideas of state security), ‘individual, social and national insecurity, the preoccupation with law and order, jobs and the nation are … combined into one complex syndrome in which external threats and internal doubts are hard to disentangle’ (Hassner, 1991, p. 152; see also Waever, 1993). There is therefore a danger that any discussion of migration as a security issue will become suffused with even greater imprecision by virtue of bringing two concepts together which, at the start, already lack clear definition. The discussion which follows, therefore, must not be treated as an exhaustive analysis, but simply as a starting point for further reflection. Different ‘sectors’ of security are differentiated to help structure the discussion; following Buzan (1983, pp. 26–8), I distinguish between political, ‘societal’, economic and military security questions.3 In each case, my aim is to clarify and/or question some of the apparent or possible security concerns raised by the migration issue in the Mediterranean and Southern European contexts.

Migration and ‘economic security’: the sending countries

The concept of ‘economic security’ is somewhat ambiguous, perhaps even more so than the notion of economic stability, since the idea of economic security is more easily extended to include factors that could inhibit economic prosperity in some way (in the sense that less 304 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean prosperity = less security), in addition to factors that might cause identifiable economic problems or observable instability. For the purposes of this discussion, the concept of economic security is restricted to that of economic stability/instability. This is in keeping with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty defining the Western European Union’s competence outside the territory of its member states. The Brussels Treaty includes the statement that:

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability. (Jacomet, 1995, p. 8; emphasis added)

One of the ﬁrst questions to ask in this context is that of whose economic stability we are concerned with. Reports and discussions on the migration issue often include some reference to economic instability in the sending countries, since this appears to lie at the root of most unwanted ‘economic’ migration. In an opinion published by the European Community’s Economic and Social Committee in 1992, for instance, it was noted that ‘Europe cannot afford to allow the Mediterranean basin to be marginalized, since the ensuing economic decline there could be damaging to Europe on the environmental, political and security fronts, as well as economically … and socially’ (European Communities, Economic and Social Committee, 1992, p. 5). So while much of the popular and political concern with immigration in Southern Europe has focused on its actual or perceived impact on the receiving economy (on jobs, welfare budgets and housing, for example, whether locally or nationally), the economic stability of the sending countries has also become a familiar and – in many respects – more pressing concern for policy-makers and observers from all sides of the Mediterranean in a number of different fora where emphasis in discussions and policy initiatives has been placed on the need to address the migration issue by tackling its ‘root causes’. This is not the place to embark on a full discussion of the issues and problems raised by the ‘root cause’ question, but it is worth noting that one of the principal stumbling-blocks to any substantial progress in this policy area has been the straightforward conﬂict of interests that has inevitably been raised by any efforts to balance the overall economic interests of the ‘migrant-sending’ states, in the Maghreb for instance, with those of the ‘migrant-receiving’ states, particularly in Sarah Collinson 305

Southern Europe. Thus any attempt to discuss the link between migration and the sending countries’ economic stability in anything more than rhetorical terms has always faced a potentially insurmountable hurdle because of the reluctance on the part of the South European governments to concede any substantial ground on the issue of agricultural exports. A relaxation of EU restrictions on agricultural imports from the Maghreb could contribute to the economic stability of the Maghreb countries (as Tapinos notes in Chapter 13) and help to reduce some of the economic and political tensions and problems that are commonly identiﬁed as ‘migration pressures’, but there would be a cost for the Southern European economies which, so far, no government has been willing to countenance. Thus, despite concern with the structural economic causes of unwanted ‘economic’ migration and a real preoccupation about wider and longer-term economic and political stability on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, European policy-makers, including those in Brussels, have so far not been able to progress very far on this point. It is worth noting, of course, that the potential economic costs to Southern Europe associated with a dismantling of Common Agricultural Policy-related agricultural import restrictions appear more tangible and immediate than the migration-related and other costs that could be associated with the maintenance of the status quo. When asked by a House of Lords Select Committee, in early 1995, whether the European Commission might be willing to exert more pressure on the southern member states to relax their stance on agricultural imports, the head of the Commission’s North Africa unit replied that ‘in election years or when the government is sitting uncomfortably it is clearly not the right moment to start providing many more concessions to a foreign country’. Thus, because of the extreme sensitivity of the issue, the Commission ‘opted not for shock treatment but for the extremely slow progressive approach’.4

Migration and ‘economic security’: the receiving countries

Even if we focus our attention only on the impacts of immigration on the receiving economy, it is important to appreciate that an apparent cost or loss to one person, business, industry or region may be another’s gain. This is one reason why it has proved so difficult to reach any clear conclusions or agreement as to whether the economic impacts of migration are likely to prove positive or negative in the contemporary West European context, today or in the future. Another 306 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean reason for this uncertainty, of course, is that the processes and consequences of each migration flow are highly context-specific. Much also depends on the particular factors and variables that the researcher chooses to include in the analysis. In 1994, Borjas concluded that ‘A fair appraisal of the literature … suggests that we still do not fully understand how immigrants affect the employment opportunities of natives in local labour markets; nor do we understand the dynamic process through which natives respond to these supply shocks and re-establish labour market equilibrium.’ On balance, the existing research seems to suggest that, in most cases and at a very general level, immigrant workers, whether entering legally or illegally, usually have, at worst, a neutral impact on the receiving state’s economy, irrespective of demographic or structural demands. Indeed, there seems to be little correlation between immigration and unemployment levels (see, for example, Spencer, 1994). Throughout the world and throughout history, high levels of economic migration have tended to be associated with economic vibrancy in the receiving locality or country. But it must be accepted that worker immigration can cause some local and/or sectoral displacement of indigenous employment and dampening of wages, and it might aggravate distortions in the labour market or wider economy. One can point, for instance, to the association of migration with the informal economy, or to its potential to retard technological and other developments in certain sectors by providing a source of cheap and exploitable labour that would not be provided so readily by the indigenous labour pool. Some of these issues were teased out in Chapters 2 and 3. Nevertheless, given that worker migration into the EU tends to be relatively sensitive to demand in the labour market (at least where partially successful immigration controls are in place), there would seem to be little basis for suggesting that undocumented ‘economic’ immigration, even at higher levels than witnessed today, would be likely to have such a serious impact on the receiving economies that their overall economic stability would be threatened, at least not in the foreseeable future. In the case of Southern Europe, the clearest evidence that ostensibly ‘unwanted’ and undocumented worker immigration represents, at present, more of a boon than a threat to economic stability is provided by the fact that governments concerned (excepting France, perhaps) have not done more to try to prevent it over recent years. The Italian government’s comparatively relaxed approach to the issue is illustrated, for instance, by its delayed response to pressure from other Schengen and EU member states to tighten up Sarah Collinson 307 its rules on the apprehension and expulsion of undocumented migrants (for more details, see Bonifazi’s account in Chapter 11). The successive regularization programmes pursued by all the Southern EU member states also suggest that the issue of undocumented worker immigration might be more a social and political than an economic problem for the countries concerned.5

Migration, ‘societal security’ and political security

The concept of ‘societal security’, as developed, among others, by Ole Waever (1993), appears even more problematic than that of ‘economic security’. In developing the concept, Waever gives almost exclusive priority to the issue of cultural identity. He writes that societal security ‘is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms’ and ‘concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’. Therefore, ‘it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’. This can be best understood, he argues, ‘by studying the processes whereby a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis, and what behaviour this triggers’ (Waever, 1993, p. 23). It must first be acknowledged that to talk in such terms might, without careful qualification, veer dangerously close to the concepts, language and justifications that underpin the anti-immigrant propaganda of extreme right-wing movements in Europe. Moreover, without wanting to step into the complex debates that surround the issues of ethnicity and nationalism, one is immediately faced in this context with the question of what exactly is meant by ‘society’ or ‘communities’ in contemporary Europe. Waever writes that ‘In security analysis, “society” mostly comes out as “nations” or other ethno-political communities modelled on the nation-idea – whether this be at the level of Europe, nation or national minorities’ (Waever, 1993, p. 27). Therefore, ‘The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society.’ This threat works on the ‘societal’ level, he argues, ‘when the incoming population is of a different cultural or ethnic stock from those already resident’ (Waever, 1993, p. 45). There is not the space here to discuss all the problems raised by this argument, but it is worth noting that many questions that might be 308 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean asked arise from the extent to which Waever prioritizes a communi- tarian view of identity politics in contemporary Europe. A more cosmopolitan view would probably consider the xenophobic claims of extreme right-wing movements to be more ‘threatening’ in a ‘societal’ sense than the skin-colour and religious observances of resident immigrant or minority groups. One must question whether those who embrace multicultural values are any less representative of their societies or communities than those who hang on to more monolithic and exclusionary ideas of the ‘national identity’. This is not to discount the importance of identity politics in the schema of security questions that might be raised by the migration issue. Indeed, questions of identity lie at the heart of most of what is politically interesting and challenging about migration. The problem, however, comes when one tries to identify the objective ‘threats’ that could be posed by migration in this context. Waever’s attempt to separate off the concept of ‘societal security’ from that of ‘political security’ (by which he means ‘the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy’) is therefore open to question (Waever, 1993, p. 24). The fundamental security of societies, and certainly that of West European societies, is still intimately bound up with the function of government and wider processes of governance at a variety of levels. It therefore doesn’t seem plausible or helpful to try to separate the two if the aim is to identify ‘objective’ security ‘threats’. What can give ‘societal’ identity politics a security rationale beyond that concerning the security and concerns of the individuals involved is exactly its interaction with issues of political governance, including state governance. Yet this is precisely the link that Waever seems determined to downplay. It is therefore much more difficult to take issue with Rogers Brubaker where he argues that:

For the foreseeable future … the nation-state and national citizenship will remain very much – perhaps too much – with us… [T]hroughout Western Europe nationhood has been revived as a political theme, and nativism as a political program, in response to the unprecedented immigration of the last thirty years. (Brubaker, 1996, p. 172; emphasis added; see also Brubaker, 1992, pp. 184–9, 243–4)

Indeed, in security terms, the real problem for domestic stability in Southern Europe, as elsewhere, may not lie with an objective risk of Sarah Collinson 309 ever-increasing influxes of foreigners so much as with the domestic political ramifications of popular perceptions of such a threat, however unfounded these perceptions may be in objective terms. Particularly at a national level, the problem is all the greater for the fact that the immigration issue so easily – and so often – serves as a surrogate for deeper economic, political and social anxieties within the country in question. Hence, of course, the common association of immigration with a range of social ills, such as crime, drugs and terrorism (Collinson, 1993). It must therefore be acknowledged that increasing exposure to the forces of the competitive international or ‘global’ economy over the next two decades could accelerate an already visible polarization of West European societies and intensify a widespread and growing sense of insecurity among national populations which is linked to a range of internal and external economic and political factors or processes, including unemployment and the decline of the welfare state. It is in such conditions that there is the greatest potential both for the further economic, social and political marginalization of immigrant minorities, and for more generalized tendencies among sections of the wider public to fixate upon immigration, or immigrant minorities, as a perceived threat to social, cultural and political cohesion and economic well-being. In such conditions, therefore, national politics and society will be that much more vulnerable to the distortions and upheavals caused by xenophobic and racist forces in society. In the Mediterranean context, the Gulf War also served to entrench anti-Arab and anti-Islamic attitudes in Western Europe, and these found much of their expression in growing antipathy, hostility and – at times – overt violence towards Arab immigrant minorities. Indeed, to many observers, it seemed that the old east- west ideological frontier had come to be replaced by a north-south cultural and religious divide running through the Mediterranean (Huntington, 1993). If not managed effectively and responsibly by the mainstream political parties, such tendencies could damage West European politics and society by accelerating internal political and social fragmentation (thereby eroding government authority) and by limiting governments’ and other actors’ ability to maintain an open stance towards the regional and global economy upon which the region’s economic and political future depends. Such tensions have not been restricted to the northern side of the Mediterranean. Remy Leveau, for instance, has suggested that the introduction of visa requirements and visa charges in Southern Europe in the early 1990s served to exacerbate what he has termed the 310 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean

‘fascination-frustration’ complex within Maghreb societies, particularly among the young (Leveau, 1994, p. 68). They, in particular, are drawn towards European culture and lifestyles through the consumption of Western goods, ﬁlms and European television channels (beamed free of charge into their homes), but are at the same time excluded by stark differences in incomes and opportunities and by a barrage of visa and other controls which not only prevent their access to Western Europe, but also deﬁne them as unwelcome and unwanted. The Moroccan political scientist Abdelkrim Belguendouz has argued that the introduction of visas, their discretionary issue and the hostile reception maintained at European consulates in the Maghreb – with their ‘queues of living shame’ – represent ‘a long descent towards the hell of humilia- tion’ (Belguendouz, 1992, p. 177). Opposition parties and unions in Morocco have similarly described the new regulations as racist, com- plaining that ‘requests for visas are going to be refused … causing us problems even when visiting our families’.6 Leveau (1994) suggests that the implicit messages received in the Maghreb from the heavy-handed application of European immigration controls might have reinforced anti-Western sentiment which, in turn, plays into the hands of Islamic extremists. In this way, strict immigration controls, or, at least, immigration controls enforced with a lack of political prudence, have added to the domestic political challenges faced by these societies. On both sides of the Mediterranean, however, migration is probably best seen as a contributory symptom, not the underlying cause, of most of the domestic political problems or processes in which it seems to play a part. Moreover, on the European side, the issue is not simply one of immigration as such, since West European societies, including those of Southern Europe, have become irreversibly multicultural. As is most evident in France, resident ethnic minorities are as likely to provide a focus for extreme right-wing agitation as new immigrants. The crucial issue, therefore, is that of immigrant and minority integration and the maintenance of wider social, economic and political cohesion, and of how these problems are to be managed politically in the future.

Migration and ‘political security’ in inter-regional relations in the West Mediterranean

Relations between France and Algeria during the first half of the 1990s illustrated how the more politicized the immigration issue became at the domestic level among EU member states, the more it was set to impact Sarah Collinson 311 on political and thus, potentially, security relations of the more traditional kind between states. In the case of France, for example, the perceived links between migration and radical Islam proved central to the government’s responses to the crisis in Algeria after 1992. Fears in the government, among much of the public and in French media were two-fold on this front. First, there was concern about the potential impact of the civil war on the Algerian immigrant minority, whether in terms of a radicalization of the Islamic presence in France, fuelled both by the Islamist movements in Algeria and by frustration within immigrant communities caused by their marginalization in French society; or in terms of a spread of violence into France through the direct involvement of members of the Algerian minority in the terror campaigns of the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) and other Algerian paramilitary groups (as became a reality in 1995). Secondly, and equally importantly, the government feared a massive inflow of refugees in the event of the Islamists seizing power in Algeria.7 The degree to which French policy has been driven by these domestic concerns was demonstrated most clearly in the summer of 1994, when – amid a crackdown on the Algerian immigrant population following the killing of five French nationals in a bomb attack on the French consulate in Algiers – the Interior Minister Charles Pasqua encroached on the territory of the Foreign Minister with statements positing open support for the ruling regime in Algeria as the only policy to prevent the Islamists taking power, thereby discounting dialogue as a possible route to a resolution of the conflict.8 The hard- line approach spearheaded by Pasqua was only toned down after the hijacking of the Air France Airbus in December 1994 – a shift that, in January 1995, appeared to prompt Paris towards a qualified endorsement of the Sant ‘Egidio ‘programme for peace’ talks in Rome, which involved all the main Algerian opposition parties, including the FIS.9 Meanwhile, the French government took measures to prevent a large- scale inflow of asylum-seekers from Algeria, irrespective of the eventual outcome of the war. In September 1994, for instance, the Foreign Ministry announced that it would cease issuing visas within Algeria, and that, henceforth, visa applications from Algerian nationals would have to be sent by post to an issuing centre in Nantes.10 More generally, renewed sensitivity to the migration issue among publics and governments throughout Western Europe opened the way for the issue to be played upon by governments and other institutions as they jostled to define and influence the economic and geopolitical order (or ‘disorder’) taking shape in the wake of the 1989 revolutions 312 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean and the reunification of Germany. France and the Southern EC member states (especially Spain and Italy) shared a particular concern that the reorientation of the EC towards central and eastern Europe (led by Germany) should not marginalise their efforts to protect their interests in, and secure stability on, the Community’s ‘southern flank’, especially in the Maghreb. In this context, the migration issue not only represented one of the threats from which the southern member states were concerned to protect themselves, but also presented itself as a useful bargaining tool which they could use to put pressure on Germany and other member states with less of an immediate interest in North Africa, to expand and improve the Community’s policies towards the Maghreb and the Mediterranean more generally.11 The case was a straightforward one: that unless the Community did more to improve growth prospects in the Maghreb, then (in the context of a single market with no internal frontier controls) all the member states would suffer from increased levels of immigration.12 This was an argument that the Maghreb governments were not slow in adopting for themselves at a time when they were deeply concerned about the effects of the geopolitical changes in Europe on the future of their own commercial and financial relations with the Community. In his address to the European Parliament in June 1993, for example, Tunisia’s President Ben Ali elaborated his appeal to the EC and its member states ‘to preserve and promote … the reciprocal interests of the two parties’ with a warning that only radical measures would solve the problem of emigration: ‘the most efficient means of managing this phenomenon’, he argued, ‘consists in improved support of development efforts in the countries of origin, so as to create employment, intensify and diversify investments and … ease the [process of] economic and industrial restructuring’.13 The dearth of fundamentally common interests in the migration issue between the Maghreb and Southern European partners, its complexity and the sensitivities that it invoked on each side ultimately made it an uncomfortable topic for focused discussion between the two sides of the Mediterranean, whether it be in terms of the social and cultural aspects of the question or of longer-term management concerns. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was highlighted as a subject for discussion reflected a clouding of the dependency and security relationships that had characterized relations between the Maghreb and Western Europe since independence and before. During the early 1990s, the migration issue created – or at least reinforced – a new realization that the future security of Western Europe rested upon Sarah Collinson 313 the maintenance of political and economic stability on its southern and eastern peripheries.

Migration and military security concerns

Under normal conditions of immigration and emigration, it is politically very difficult for liberal democratic states to exert more than partial control over their borders because the draconian measures that would be required for more complete control would inevitably encroach on the civil liberties of the population as a whole. Yet, as demonstrated by Italy’s response to the exoduses from Albania in 1990, 1991 and 1997 and by the international community’s response to the refugee flows in the former Yugoslavia, all Western governments possess the political, institutional and military capability to exert a relatively high level of control over population movements if this is deemed necessary, whether this be aimed at deterring or reversing the movement, or simply containing it. The resort to more draconian measures might extend to a naval blockade, the military reinforcement of land borders and the establishment of ‘holding’ camps. What appears crucial for shaping the nature of the response and its degree of militarization is the feeling that a particular migration flow represents an emergency, which in turn is linked not only to the magnitude of the flow but also to its suddenness. Thus, for example, large numbers of Albanians arriving individually or in small groups on a gradual basis was never treated as a national emergency, whereas the recent (1997) exodus caused by the sudden political breakdown in Albania was treated as a first-order emergency and led to a naval operation on the part of the Italian navy and military intervention within Albania itself. Because most sudden and large-scale movements of population tend to be politically or economically forced in some way (‘refugee-type’ migration), it is these kinds of movements which are most likely to elicit emergency responses on the part of receiving governments which may include some kind of military action or, at least, the involvement of armed forces. Why such sudden large-scale movements might invoke this kind of response is explained not only by the immediate logistical challenges that they pose in terms of finding shelter, food etc. for the refugees or migrants, but also by the fact that large surprise movements of population resemble, in many ways, a surprise military attack: the territorial borders of the country in question – a traditional hallmark of sovereignty – appear challenged, and so action must be taken to re-establish control. 314 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean

In the West European context, lack of action in such circumstances would seriously undermine the credibility of both the government and defence forces. That is not to assume, however, that the objective security of the society is likely to be threatened by sudden influxes of refugees. Indeed, countries throughout the world, including some of the poorest, have demonstrated an ability to cope with mass refugee influxes of enormous proportions without this causing political, social or economic collapse in the host state or society. The security of a government, however, may depend very directly on its ability to respond credibly to such crises. Thus, if economic and/or political conditions in the Maghreb were to deteriorate to the point of generating a sudden movement of emigrants or refugees northwards across the Mediterranean at some point in the future, the Southern EU member states would be very likely to opt for a naval operation designed to deflect and/or contain the flow. Moreover, any sudden refugee-type movement from one state in the Maghreb could face one or more of its neighbouring states with a substantial and destabilising inflow of refugees, which could, in turn, necessitate a response from European military establishments, aimed either at administering short-term emergency relief or at assisting in the establishment of longer-term humanitarian programmes, such as the creation of refugee camps. However, it should be noted that the types of conflict which might occur in the Maghreb in the future would most likely arise as social/political or ideological order conflicts which, so long as they did not deteriorate into outright or ‘total’ civil (or inter-state) war, would be less likely to generate sudden and massive population displacements than violent inter-ethnic conflict of the kind witnessed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In terms of immediacy it is, of course, the refugee displacements in the former Yugoslavia that have figured most prominently on the EU’s security agenda since the early 1990s. While international interventions in the region have had a strong humanitarian component, they have been aimed as much – if not more – at containing the population displacement as they have at securing relief and protection for the victims of violence and human rights abuse. As the refugee flows have been generated as a consequence of deliberate political and military strategy in the conflict, the interest in containment stemmed both from the concern to avoid facilitating further displacement by evacuating target populations from the conflict zones, and from an overarching concern to keep refugee flows into Western Europe to a minimum. Sarah Collinson 315

Efforts to contain the population displacements in the former Yugoslavia and Albania through ‘preventive’ and ‘protective’ programmes within the conflict zone have represented a new (albeit uncertain) departure in refugee policy, with a shift in activities from the relatively stable conditions in the countries of potential asylum to the far more turbulent situation in the country or region of origin, where humanitarian efforts to protect displaced and vulnerable populations are linked to the political efforts of the international community to bring the conflict to an end. In such conditions, preventive and protective efforts become intertwined with the political and military aspects of peacekeeping/peacemaking and conflict resolution. It is therefore one of the ironies of the emerging refugee policy ‘regime’ in Western Europe – predicated on a concern to minimize inflows of refugees and thereby protect domestic stability – that the Southern and other EU member states have been that much more willing to involve themselves in protracted conflicts taking place outside their borders, with all the military security implications that this entails. While the interventions in former Yugoslavia and Albania do not set any clear precedents for future action, it is likely that any refugee crisis on the southern and eastern borders of the EU which threatened a sudden and large-scale population flow into one or more EU member states would be likely to provoke some kind of emergency political and/or military response.

Terrorism, trafﬁcking and organized crime: any links with migration?

The August 1994 Marrakech hotel bombing in Morocco and the terrorist attacks in France, both linked to the civil war in Algeria, seemed to lend credence to the connection of migration with the issue of terrorism (see Collinson, 1996, pp. 53–4). These attacks, it seemed, would not have been so easy to mobilize if it had not been for the ability of terror groups based in Algeria to establish support networks among the Arab community in France. On a more general level, there is no question that immigrants often continue to involve themselves in conflicts and other political processes taking place in their countries of origin, and that this involvement can, in turn, affect relations between host and ‘sending’ states. In certain cases this could expose receiving states in some way – occasionally through terrorist activity – to conflicts taking place in refugees’ and other migrants’ countries of 316 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean origin. As demonstrated by the Franco-Algerian case, this exposure is likely to be particularly marked if the political instability or conflict in the country of origin is overlaid with close political links or broader political tensions between that country and the receiving state concerned. Yet, in the Mediterranean context, it must be stressed that such problems, if they arise, are likely to relate principally to existing minority groups whose members, increasingly, can no longer be considered migrants. Moreover, any potential or apparent link between past immigration and terrorist activity will always be highly context-specific, and thus as varied and unpredictable as the broader political developments of which they form a part. One must be careful not to exaggerate the potential role of immigrant (or emigrant) groups in a possible escalation in international terrorism, since, irrespective of whether they are host to sizeable immigrant populations, all EU member states are likely to become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks by simple virtue of the increased international mobility and strengthened international communication networks that are emerging as a central hallmark of the emerging global economy. A more tangible and perhaps more worrying link can be made between migration and organized crime in the Mediterranean region and further afield. This link is posited on the basis of growing evidence that organized criminal networks have become increasingly involved in – and are taking control of – the human trafficking which has escalated in the face of the stricter immigration policies and more stringent immigration controls introduced by the EU member states over recent years. The greatest threats and the greatest misfortunes caused by this trafficking are to the migrants and would-be migrants involved, many of whom have risked and lost everything, even their lives, in their desperate attempts to reach Western Europe. But, beyond this human tragedy, there is also a broader security concern at issue, since human trafficking appears to have developed as an important complement to drug and other forms of trafficking in recent years, and therefore as a growing source of income for organized crime syndicates operating across Europe and the Mediterranean.14

Conclusion

In many respects, the migration issue has developed as a simultaneous reflection and component of the geopolitical transformations taking Sarah Collinson 317 place in Europe and the Mediterranean and other surrounding regions in the aftermath of the Cold War. For example, the mass exodus which accompanied the collapse of the Berlin Wall not only reflected the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, but itself forced the pace of that disintegration. The population displacements caused by the conflict in the Balkans not only reflect the demise of the former Yugoslavia but will also represent an integral component of the political configuration emerging in its place. The free movement of persons within the Schengen area and European Union is designed not only as a symbol of regional economic and political integration but also as an essential component of a functioning single market. And in the changing context of relations between West, Central and Eastern Europe, international migration – whether of refugees or voluntary migrants – not only reflects the breakdown of the previous east–west division of the continent and the emergence of a new, more dynamic, geopolitical configuration but also itself is playing a part in shaping that new configuration. As the history of population movements in the Mediterranean region has demonstrated, human migration must be treated as among the most important ‘transnational’ phenomena because it has the power, over time, to fundamentally alter the way in which states and societies relate to one another. The Mediterranean will continue to experience movements of economic and family migrants and asylum-seekers. Much of this migration will prove beneficial in economic, social, cultural and political terms for both sending and receiving states in the region, or at least for particular sectors of their economies and societies. Indeed, an overly restrictive stance on the part of receiving states in the region could prove damaging on a number of fronts, not least because the openness to trade and capital flows that will be required of the economies of the region in future years will almost certainly necessitate at least a partial openness to the movements of people. The political sensitivity of migration makes it an important issue to examine from the point of view of political and security relations and processes in the Mediterranean region, but also a difficult and, in many respects, uncomfortable one. There is always a danger that presenting or discussing immigration and related issues in terms of national security may only encourage – or at least legitimize – xenophobic and racist sentiments which, in the longer term, are likely to do little for the region’s prosperity and security. It is therefore vitally important that, wherever possible, discussion should move from the general to the specific in this context. If there might be security issues raised by 318 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean migration and related processes in the Mediterranean region, we need to ask what specific types of security problems (or opportunities) might specific types of migration flow in particular political contexts pose, today or in the future. My analysis here has moved a small step in this direction, by working with a partially disaggregated – if not altogether very clear – concept of ‘security’. An important question which has remained implicit but central throughout the discussion concerns that of the threshold which distinguishes matters of political interest or importance from matters of security. The location of this threshold is, it would seem, a highly subjective matter and almost entirely context-specific. Therefore any general discussion on these issues is likely to be dogged by the constant worry that by including or excluding mention of (or by choosing to emphasize or downplay the importance of) a particular aspect of the issue, one might be over-exaggerating or overlooking a potential security problem raised by the issue. Nevertheless, as suggested in the introduction, if the issue, or a certain aspect of it, is widely perceived as a security concern, this in itself should warrant an examination and discussion of the issue as such. What cannot be doubted is that, in their various guises, refugee and migration issues have become matters of highest domestic and foreign policy concern in the Mediterranean region, in Europe and further afield, and are likely to remain so for many years to come.

Notes 1. The Economist, 1 June 1991. 2. ‘Southern front’, The Financial Times, 28 January 1994. 3. Note that the report on security in the Mediterranean submitted to the Western European Union in 1991 adopted a similar classiﬁcation of security issues, highlighting demographic, economic, cultural, political and military security in the region (Western European Union, 1991, pp. 237–43). 4. Evidence of Mr Eric Van der Linden to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 17 January 1995. See House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Relations Between the EU and the Maghreb Countries, Session 1994–95, 11th Report. London: HMSO, 1995, paragraph 206, p. 74. 5. It is interesting to note the results of a recent survey concerned with the economic impacts of undocumented immigration in four provinces of northern Greece: 72 per cent of farmers questioned in the survey regarded the presence of undocumented immgrants as negative from a social and political point of view, but the overwhelming majority said that they would employ undocumented immigrants again (94 per cent). The authors therefore conclude that ‘despite the potential social tensions associated with the presence of illegal immigrants, their low cost and contribution Sarah Collinson 319

to production and regional income make them acceptable to producers and other residents’. See Lianos et al., 1996, p. 462) 6. See the article ‘Madrid impose des visas au Maghrébins’, in Libération, 15 May 1991. 7. Cf. the report of a television interview with François Mitterrand on 14 July 1994 in Le Monde, 16 July 1994; cited by Roberts (1995, p. 249, fn). As argued by Roberts, divisions within the Islamist movement in Algeria and the strength of the Algerian army suggest that French fears of an Islamist take-over were largely unfounded. 8. During a television interview with France 2 on 4 August 1994, Pasqua stated that ‘the idea that a moderate Islamist regime might emerge is a foolish one’; the choice is either to support the regime or see ‘the coming to power of the fundamentalists’. See also the article ‘Pasqua: il n’y a pas de troisième voie’ in Le Figaro, 5 August 1994. Note that Pasqua is reported to have close personal links with the ruling junta in Algeria; under General de Gaulle in 1959, Pasqua set up the paramilitary group Service d’Action Civique in Algeria, and has maintained close links with Algeria ever since. 9. For a critical appraisal of the French position at this time, see Roberts (1995, pp. 263–5). 10. See ‘Flash France’, Migrations Société 6(36), p. 97. 11. See, for example, the comments of the Spanish ambassador to the UK, Alberto Aza Arias, in his evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities on 7 February 1995: House of Lords, 1995 (Evidence), p. 112, paragraphs 306–7. 12. See the article ‘The Naples Summit: G7 aid urged to halt North African Exodus’, Independent, 9 July 1994. 13. Address to the European Parliament, 22 June 1993. 14. For information relating to human trafﬁcking in the European context, see Migration News Sheet, various issues; also the recent book by Ghosh (1998).

Bibliography Belguendouz, A. (1992) ‘L’émigration, élément de rupture ou facteur de partenariat entre le Maghreb et l’Europe des douze?’ and ‘Les Maghrébins en Europe: une question de droits de l’homme’, Annales du Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques, Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Sociales de l’Université Mohamed V, 4–5. Borjas, G. J. (1994) ‘The economics of immigration’, Journal of Economic Literature 32, pp. 1667–1717. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Brubaker, R. (1996) ‘Civic and ethnic nations in France and Germany’ in Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. (eds) Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168–73 Buzan, B. (1983) People, States and Fear. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Collinson, S. (1993) Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Wyndham Place Trust. 320 Migration and Security in the Mediterranean

Collinson, S. (1996) Shore to Shore: The Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. European Communities, Economic and Social Committee (1992) Opinion on Economic Cooperation with the Maghreb Countries. Luxembourg: Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities (ESC Opinions and Reports CES(92)1041). Ghosh, B. (1998) Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration. The Hague: Nijhoff. Hassner, P. (1991) ‘Culture and society’, The International Spectator 26, pp. 136–53. Huntington, S. (1993) ‘The clash of civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72(3), pp. 22–49. Huysmans, J. (1995) ‘Migrants as a security problem: dangers of “securitizing” societal issues’ in Miles, R. and Thranhardt, D. (eds) Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion. London: Pinter, pp. 53–72. Jacomet, A. (1995) Regional and State Security Challenges in the Mediterranean: the WEU’s Response. Reading: University of Reading Discussion Papers in European and International Social Science Research, 57. Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Leveau, R. (1994) ‘Migrations et coopération en Méditerranée’ in Bourrinet, J. (ed.) La Méditerranée: Espace de Coopération. Paris: Economica, pp. 65–70. Lianos, T., Sarris, A. H. and Katseli, L.T. (1996) ‘Illegal immigration and local labour markets: the case of Northern Greece’, International Migration 34, pp. 449–84. Roberts, H. (1995) ‘Algeria’s ruinous impasse and the honourable way out’, International Affairs 71, pp. 247–67. Spencer, S. (ed.) (1994) Strangers and Citizens. A Positive Approach to Migrants and Refugees. London: Rivers Oram Press. Waever, O. (1993) ‘Societal security: the concept’ in Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. and Lemaitre, P. (eds) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter, pp. 17–40. Western European Union (1991) ‘European and threats outside Europe – the organisation of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East’ in Proceedings, Thirty-Seventh Ordinary Session: Part 1 (Assembly Documents). Paris: WEU. 15 The EU Mediterranean States, the Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra

Introduction

It has recently been fashionable to ask whether the Mediterranean Sea constitutes a bridge or a barrier between the two shores. On 27 February 1995 the United States’ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Joseph Kruzel, stated:

Today the real threat to European security comes not from the northern region, where much of the Alliance’s attention is now focused, but in the south, where existing conﬂicts and potential for catastrophe are pervasive … For NATO, the Mediterranean, rather than the Elbe, has become the front line for a variety of security issues ranging from the spread to extremism and uncontrolled migration to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (de Rato, 1995, p. 7).

This quote sums up why so much attention has been given during the last few years to the potential threats to the Southern European countries (SECs) from states in the southern Mediterranean (Lorca, 1996). More systematically, four main factors of Southern Mediterranean instability have a negative security impact on SECs:

1 The consequences deriving from the political instability prevailing in the area of North Africa and the Middle East. This increasing instability means that there is the risk that states on the southern shore of the Mediterranean may disintegrate and collapse, with serious consequences for Europe and more particularly for the SECs.

321 322 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

2 The accumulation of vast quantities of conventional and non- conventional armaments by many states are the hard security issues which drive the SECs to increase their military capabilities in order to become able to participate in peace-keeping and peace-enforcing multilateral operations. 3 The existence of many conflicts in the region generates a set of ready-made contexts for wider security crises. 4 The strong demographic contrast that exists within the basin between north and south, as well as the slow economic growth and high unemployment which prevail in Southern Mediterranean countries, encourage massive immigration to SECs. The migratory flows resulting from an eventual political and economic collapse would have a further destabilising effect on Southern European societies which are already facing difficulties as they struggle to emerge from economic crisis (Biad, 1994, p. 42).

The ﬁrst section of this chapter will attempt to set out in greater detail these challenges and security dilemmas which the South European countries are confronting in dealing with the risks coming from the South, and will discuss how real these threats are. The second section is devoted to an analysis of migration as a national security concern to the SECs, and the third section will examine the speciﬁc implications of migration for the foreign policy of SECs.

The threats from the South

The question of political stability Few states in the Southern Mediterranean area are genuine nation- states. There is neither a common and unique culture coincident with the territorial limits of most states, nor the tacit acceptance by populations of their ruling elites (Joffé, 1993, p. 42). In almost all parts of the southern Mediterranean area there are important countries whose integrity and internal cohesion are highly jeopardized. Serious economic and social tensions impede the formation of democratic political structures. The processes of political decision-making are frequently dominated by monopoly or quasi-monopoly parties. Adequate participation of the people, expectancy of peaceful change in governance through fair elections, the rule of law and respect for human rights are still far from the norm, making such states prone to change by violent means and raising concern in Europe about their long-term stability (Pace, 1996, pp. 47–8). Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 323

A political vacuum arises also from the inability of poorly legitimised regimes (as in Algeria or even in Turkey) to broaden political participation and consensus and stop religious extremism by integrating Islam. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements in some Southern Mediterranean countries like Egypt, Algeria and the Palestinian Territories could certainly have possible effects on the stability and security of the SECs. Those effects can be identiﬁed as:

● The risk of terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean member-states of the EU, as was painfully experienced in France in summer 1995. ● The risk of a mass exodus of people fleeing a civil war or a government take-over by an Islamic movement. It is doubtful, though, that the coming to power of an Islamist movement in any North African state would provoke emigration on a dramatically large scale. What it probably would cause would be the flight, not so much of the poor and desperate, but of the wealthy, Westernized intelligentsia, who are likely to feel that they and their way of life would be the most prominent casualties of Islamist rule (Willis, 1996, p. 21). ● The adoption of foreign policy directed against the interests of the West and most particularly against the vital interests of the EU Mediterranean countries. ● Besides its potential to reinforce existing regional tensions and eventually lead to South–South conflicts, an Islamic regime might deny access to energy resources – though such a scenario is improbable since even an Islamist regime would rely on energy exports at least as much as Europe relies on energy imports.

The central question, however, from the point of view of the SECs’ security is the fact that current governments deny pluralism and are unable to integrate opposition forces to some form of national consensus. This is the real factor from which instability springs and, therefore, the factor which affects European security and has consequently to shape SECs’ policies. For the Southern European states, which are obviously the neighbouring countries to this unstable area, the following dilemma exists. Should they support regimes which, although pro-Western and secularist, are using undemocratic methods and consistently violate basic human rights? Should democracy be encouraged even if it seems likely to bring to power Islamic parties that at most pay lip service to democracy? (Mortimer, 1994, p. 114). Will a policy of strong and blind anti-Islamist support to Southern Mediterranean governments achieve 324 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South stability? Will any real threat emerge if Islamic-orientated movements take power in some of these countries? There is no stability now in Algeria despite the fact that undemocratic methods were used to surpress the Islamic movement. The solution for the SECs does not consist in exporting the model of Western democracy but in strengthening civil societies and replacing cultural confrontation with understanding. It would certainly be against the best of European tradition to try to foster its own security by shoring up regimes that do not speak for their own people. It is the surest way, not only of delaying democratic transition in these societies, but of securing the enduring mistrust of such societies. In these circumstances local dictators could attempt to divert attention from domestic difﬁculties by pursuing an aggressive external policy against neighbouring states (Winrow, 1996, p. 49). Southern European interests are in no sense threatened by Islam as a religion, nor even by Islam as a focus for political opposition to regimes suffering from a lack of competence or legitimacy. Therefore, unless and until the democratic deﬁcit in the South Mediterranean countries and more particularly in the Arab world is overcome and until people come to feel they have a role in the decisions of government, the region will be plagued by instability (Cogan,1997, p. 238).

Proliferation of weapons There is at least one security challenge faced by all the region’s nations – the escalation of conventional and non-conventional arms races. The region continues to undergo an alarming accumulation of conventional weaponry and of non-conventional arms. The amounts of weaponry acquired in the southern and eastern regions and the growing importance of armies in the area are particularly impressive, if compared with the ﬁgures for the countries to the north of the Mediterranean (Kemp, 1991). The most urgent security concern for the Mediterranean region is undoubtly the threat posed by the slow but certain spread of weapons of mass destruction to states whose leaders may have different inhibitions against using them than those with which we became familiar in the Cold War. In this sense there are two types of proliferation threats facing the region: the development of indigenous military programmes designed to either build the launchers or develop the warheads to deliver chemical, nuclear, or biological payloads over substantial distances with increasing accuracy; and the acquisition from outside suppliers of ballistic missiles and the technology required to adapt them for regional use. Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 325

In an area with so much potential for conﬂict and instability, the dangers of arms proliferation are obvious. For a number of reasons – among them the atmosphere of crisis that has hung for some time now over many parts of the Mediterranean, the instability of certain regimes, the role of the armed forces in government, or simply national prestige – many states, despite their often scarce resources, have consistently allocated big budgets during the past 40 or 50 years to maintain large defence establishments. Recently much attention has been given to the potential military threat to NATO’s Mediterranean ﬂank from states in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East that have acquired ballistic missiles. These missiles could become weapons of mass destruction if they were equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads.1 There is little likelihood that pending regional arms control proposals will get a sympathetic hearing in the region, largely because of a growing belief that arms control is unlikely to increase regional security. New generations of weapon technology will be far more attractive than regimes designed to control them (Snyder, 1996, pp. 172–3).

Regional conflicts As a result of the issues sketched out above, the Mediterranean region is one of the major conflict regions in world politics. It should also not be forgotten that some of the growing conflicts in the Mediterranean region directly involve the SECs. The following typology of conflicts exists in the Mediterranean region (Weidenfield and Janning, 1993, pp. 244–6): First, there are conflicts of dominance. Both wars in the Gulf are visible signs of conflicts of dominance in the Arab world that have repercussions beyond the Arab region. In North Africa, too, claims of political leadership have led to conflicts both below and above the war threshold. The conflicts between Algeria and Libya as well as between Libya and Egypt largely took a non-violent course. Secondly, territorial conflicts proliferate. Because of the absence of unequivocally drawn border lines in the Mediterranean region, any ethnic, political or economic conflict may, at any time, also erupt as a territorial conflict. Hardly any of the states in the region exist within historically developed borders that nobody questions. The most important territorial conflict is the denial of Israel’s borders in con- junction with the question concerning the organization of the Palestinians’ state. The second ‘big’ territorial issue is the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus since 1974. 326 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

Thirdly, there are ethnic conflicts. The strong growth of ethnically mixed populations in territorially based states accelerates the increase in conflicts of distribution. The civil war in Lebanon and the Kurdish guerrilla war in south-east Turkey are obvious examples. Fourthly, conflicts over resources have arisen from the uneven distribution of raw materials like oil and water. The history of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region is characterized by long- running conflicts over the access to water. With limited drainage basin areas and dry summers, the Mediterranean is, in general, an area of water shortage (notable exceptions are France and Turkey). Its reliable availability is of increasing importance; failure to guarantee this has serious economic, political and social implications. The rapid population growth, producing the necessary quantities of food, urbanization and industrialization, demand ever larger quantities of key raw materials such as water and energy resources. Fifthly, there are internal conflicts. For the future, SECs should be prepared for an increasing number of internal conflicts within the Mediterranean region. The interaction between different problem situations and the external pressure caused by the various supra- national conflict scenarios points towards an increase of social and political conflicts . Particularly since the Second Gulf War, many European Mediterranean countries have shown a willingness to formulate security policies with a strong emphasis on the modernization and reorganization of forces to facilitate their participation in the multinational, out-of-area operations of NATO. On the other hand, the possibility of an expansion of NATO’s area of responsibility would certainly not be perceived in the same way in the southern rim of the Mediterranean as it is in Central Europe: it would be widely condemned as exacerbating rather than alleviating insecurity, at least by major political sectors in all countries (de Vasconcelos, 1993, p. 73). As Anderson and Fenech (1994, p. 20) have noted, any attempt to impose stability on the region or to take care of the security of one side by creating defences against the other (e.g. by recasting NATO into an organization for the defence of Europe from its non-European neighbours) is not likely to bridge the divisions which exist within the region. Consequently, SECs risk being alienated from the Southern Mediterranean, especially Arab, countries if their close relationship with the United States and NATO would lead them to support, even reluctantly, out-of-area operations (Fahmy, 1996, p. 71). Security and stability in the Mediterranean will depend on the SECs’ ability to promote, and possibly maintain, a Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 327 new and flexible balance of power acceptable to all or most of the southern-periphery nations.

The worsening of economic and social conditions The fourth factor or challenge for the SECs is made up of the worsening economic and demographic problems which the southern Mediterranean countries face. These include spiralling inflation, inadequate export-earning, increasing foreign debts, high unemployment, decreasing food self-sufficiency and a general deterioration of the environment due to the effects of urbanization, marine pollution and desertification (Haas, 1990; Joffé, 1996a). Furthermore, foreign investors have largely ignored the south Mediterranean states in the last 20 years; the region has scarcely benefited from the soaring global level of foreign direct investment since 1990, being perceived as unattractive both politically and economically. The investment climate has been at best mediocre, if not unsatisfactory; markets have been tiny and any opportunities for rapid development have not offered enough. Falling prosperity is evident. It is reflected in the falling GNP per capita ratios, as economic growth continues to be generally positive but inadequate in keeping up with demographic and social changes. Agricultural production, also, is insufficient to feed the population, while industrialization is often domestically oriented and unsuccessful by market standards. A dependence on financial and technical aid from the outside exists for all the EU’s neighbouring states in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, trade is very important, as we saw in Chapter 13. The Mediterranean countries that are non-members of the EU constitute the third largest market of the EU. The EU in its turn is by far the most important buyer of products from the region. Furthermore it is the Southern Mediterranean which is economically dependent on the EU, but the latter may be tempted to give little priority to the Southern Mediterranean, directing resources to other areas such as Eastern Europe, in which case the severe development problems already facing the Southern Mediterranean states would be further aggravated, leading to a situation of continuing and worsening instability (Niblock, 1996, p. 119). The demographic question is also very serious. In 1950 two-thirds of the region’s population lived on the northern side; by the year 2025, two-thirds will live in the south. According to some estimates, the population of the Arab countries is likely to go up by 90 per cent from 328 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

1990–2025 as against a rise of only 6 per cent in European countries. The population of the Maghreb is expected to increase by 55 per cent over the 1990–2010 period, rising from 58 million to 90 million. The population of the Mashreq will rise by 61 per cent, from 83 million to 134 million (Niblock, 1996, p. 128). Based on this demographic development at least 800,000 new jobs will be required annually on the southern edge of the Mediterranean in order to maintain today’s level of employment (Joffé, 1996b, p. 189). In synthesis, past and future economic failure in the poorer countries of the Southern Mediterranean is linked to the demands on resources made by expanding populations. The fear is that, unless these demands are met, Europe faces the danger of uncontrolled and expanding immigration, the security dimensions of which are the subject of the next part of our analysis.

International migration as a national security concern

The prospect of increased migration from the southern to the northern shore of the Mediterranean is frequently referred to by European Commission officials, politicians and academics as a ‘threat’, a ‘population bomb’ or a ‘time bomb’ (Lister, 1997, p. 101). Traditionally, economic migrants from the Mediterranean Basin have gravitated toward the larger industrial economies in Western Europe. With increasing prosperity, however, the countries of Southern Europe have emerged as significant destinations in themselves, and as conduits for migration, as was pointed out in Chapter 1. Migration, like terrorism and religious tensions, is a consequence of profound socio-economic and cultural unrest, and requires as much attention as do more conventional military challenges. The migration question has potentially enormous consequences for relations between North and South as well as for European security because it is not simply about economics or the cost of subsidising stability across the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, ‘immigration issues continued to be linked closely by European states to the “soft security” issues of terrorism and drug-trafficking. Few saw these security issues as those appropriate to NATO’ (Edwards and Philippart, 1997, p. 472). Especially for the Southern EU member states, the immigration pressures are being further exacerbated by political instability, economic failure, and rapid growth of the population in the sending countries. Within the receiving countries, there are only limited employment opportunities, and in the current economic circum- Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 329 stances, accompanied in some cases by an increase in immigration from East European countries (notably the Albanians in Greece and Italy), it is argued that foreign nationals, who are often ill-suited to the needs and lifestyles of modern industrial society, cannot be allowed to enter without appropriate preparation for their reception, settlement and eventual repatriation (Chesnais, 1993). The shift, therefore, during the 1980s, from the status of emigration to one of immigration carried new challenges for Italy, Spain, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. These countries suddenly realized that new issues appeared on their political agenda, and immigration began to be perceived as a threat to their economic, social and political stability. Migration to Europe from the South has also had a pronounced effect on debates about national identity and national security, with potentially important implications for SECs. Ultimately, the question is about culture and a growing, if unfortunate, perception of a ‘new cold war’ between North and South, rich and poor, Islam and the West. The following paragraphs will deal with the real and/or perceived multi-dimensional impact of international migration on the national security of these Southern European countries which are still relatively new to the phenomenon of immigration.

Immigration as a threat to national identity A large influx or stock of migrants wishing to maintain their cultural, linguistic and religious traditions can easily be perceived as a threat to the national identity of receiving societies. In this respect, Barry Buzan remarks that ‘migration threatens communal identity and culture by directly altering the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the population’ (Buzan, 1991, p. 447). According to some scholars (e.g. Waxman, 1997), the issues of immigration and identity now appear at the top of the European security agenda at the end of the twentieth century. Moreover, one might expect that the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity in Western European countries (including the SECs) would strengthen in the future, since migration pressures in Southern Mediterranean countries and other developing countries do not show any signs of abating. Among the ‘new’ immigrant communities in Southern Europe, a lot of immigrants maintain strong links with the culture of their countries of origin and do not wish to abandon their linguistic, religious and cultural practices. As far as the Mediterranean region is concerned, Nadji Safir notes that the issue of a ‘clash’ with local populations, who may feel threatened in terms of their culture and identity, lies at the core of the 330 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South perception of international migration as a security problem for receiving countries. In fact, one of the ideas shaping governmental perception of immigration on the northern rim of the Mediterranean Sea is that immigrants coming from the South are likely to settle in a permanent way, thus setting in train the longer-term problem of cohabitation and religious identity (Safir, 1993, p. 85).

Immigration as a threat to economic well-being In immigration countries, both in Northern and Southern Europe, immigrants may be perceived as a burden on the welfare system and social services. They may be considered as competitors in the labour market by the local population, or be accused of driving down wages and impeding the restructuring process toward a capital-intensive economy. In periods of economic recession, shrinking public budgets and high unemployment, the local population tends to become more hostile to the granting of services and other kinds of support to immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. In Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, immigrants are attracted by the existence of a large underground economy, as several of the early chapters in this book have shown. Immigrants – both ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ – represent a low-cost and ﬂexible source of labour power, taking up jobs shunned by local workers. In recent years, due to the rising number of clandestine immigrants, the debate about the com- plementarity or competition between irregular immigrants and local workers in the labour market has developed in SECs. Even if evaluations on this subject are difﬁcult to establish, direct competition between local manpower and immigrants appears to be reduced in European countries, including in SECs, due to the highly segmented nature of their labour markets (King and Rybaczuk, 1993, p. 181). However, immigrants are increasingly portrayed by public opinion in SECs as a threat to their societies’ economic well-being. According to surveys carried out in Italy and Spain at the beginning of the 1990s, unemployment was mentioned as the main disadvantage ‘caused’ by immigrants (Cornelius, 1994, p. 358). In Greece, trade unions have underlined the existence of some competition between clandestine immigrants and local workers on the labour market (for more detail, refer back to Chapter 3). This is especially true for low-skilled local workers employed in the parallel economy, but also for workers of the construction sector, whose status is becoming more and more precarious with the massive arrival of clandestine immigrants working for lower wages (Pteroudis, 1996, pp. 177–9). Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 331

Immigration as a threat to public order In industrialised countries, uncontrolled migration is increasingly perceived as a threat to public order. Public opinion, the media, some political parties and police officials often associate irregular migrants with various criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, thefts, armed aggression or even terrorism against both the receiving country and the country of origin. While this feeling of insecurity may be based on real facts, the overall impact of immigration on the crime rate and the internal security of receiving countries tends to be overestimated. As Miller notes, ‘Europeans and Americans should worry more about violence perpetrated against alien residents and immigrant-origin populations’ (Miller, 1997, p. 264). Problems of public order are at the core of political discussions about immigration in Southern Europe and exert an important influence over governmental policies. Faced with an influx of thousands of Albanians in March 1997, the Italian government took emergency measures designed to shorten their period of stay and to send back those judged dangerous for its public security. In Southern Italy, the ‘organized criminality’ of groups like the Mafia and its various regional expressions (the Camorra in Naples, n’drangheta in Calabria) use immigrants, especially Tunisians, Moroccans and Nigerians, for their criminal activities (Campani, 1993, p. 264). The influx of Albanian clandestine immigrants into Greece has provoked social problems, especially in the large urban centres and in the border zones: Albanians’ extreme poverty, their lack of familiarity with capitalist models of consumption and the activities of criminal networks explain the allegedly high and rising crime rate among Albanian immigrants.2 In Spain, the impact of foreigners on the crime rate is more limited, even if an upward trend is reported by officials. Often these violations of the law include petty thefts and other ‘economic survival crimes’. In spite of this, according to surveys made at the beginning of the 1990s, Spaniards see a strong relationship between immigration and crime, especially street crime and drug traffic (Cornelius, 1994, pp. 366–7).

Immigration and xenophobia as threats to political stability The intensiﬁcation of anti-foreign sentiments, xenophobia and racism is one of the major social trends affecting European societies since the beginning of the 1980s. Intolerance and xenophobia against foreigners are increasing in the new immigration countries of Southern Europe, especially among the working-class local population, even if such attitudes and behaviours have not yet reached the same level as in 332 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

Western Europe’s traditional countries of immigration. Documented incidents against immigrants occurred during the 1990s in Milan, Rome, Genoa and Florence, as well as in the southern cities of Naples and Foggia. The high levels of tolerance for immigration in Spain should not hide an increase of hostility towards immigrants, particularly North Africans, with an increase in acts of violence against immigrants in Madrid and Barcelona indicating an emergent trend of intolerance among some segments of the Spanish population. Recently, the perception of foreigners sharply deteriorated in Greece, where an alarming increase in xenophobic and racist attitudes has been recorded among working-class Greeks, especially towards Albanians (Black, 1994, p. 153). Extreme right-wing parties, such as the Front National in France or the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, have not established themselves in the new immigration countries of Southern Europe. However, right-wing political parties exploiting public hostility against immigration have achieved an electoral breakthrough in Italy since the beginning of the 1990s. The populist Lega Nord and the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale are now represented in the country’s political institutions, both at the local and at the national levels. They exert a strong inﬂuence on governmental attitudes on immigration.

Migrant trafficking as a threat to national sovereignty Migrant trafficking has recently been declared by some countries as a security threat. By accelerating and amplifying the phenomenon of irregular migration, traffickers of migrants undermine governmental rules of entry, asylum and immigration procedures. An estimated 15 to 30 per cent of illegal migrants and 20 to 40 per cent of asylum-seekers arriving in Western Europe in 1993 are believed to have benefited from the services of traffickers. Without their intervention, the size of irregular movements would be significantly smaller (IOM, 1995). In the 1990s, Southern Europe became a major ‘pole of attraction’ for migrant traffickers, both as a transit area and as a destination region. Every month, human smugglers help thousands of irregular migrants (coming from Asia, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East) to enter the European continent. Irregular migrants are taken from Morocco to Spain across the Strait of Gibraltar. Others try to enter the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. Several clandestine immigrants cross the long and porous border between Spain and Portugal. Italy is faced with an important influx of ‘trafficked migrants’ coming from Albania or, via this country, from Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 333

Turkey, China and the former Yugoslavia. Smuggling is becoming one of the most profitable activities for the armed gangs in southern Albania. The Sicilian Mafia seems to be involved in human trafficking, especially of North African migrants coming from Tunisia and going to France, Germany or Switzerland via Italy (IOM, 1995). Migrants are also smuggled into Greece, mainly from Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria and FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Turkey is becoming a major transit country for Iranians, Iraqis, Pakistanis, South-Asians and African irregular migrants desperately wanting to enter Western Europe. In recent years Italy, Spain and Greece have increased coast- guard patrols and have mobilised their armies in order to restore effective control at their borders against the inflows of clandestine immigrants transported by human smugglers.

Foreign policy implications of international migration

In this part of the chapter we will deal with the impact of international migration, especially irregular migration, on the formulation of SECs’ foreign policy towards countries of origin and the Mediterranean region as a whole. In fact, ﬂows and stocks of migrants do not have an impact only on SECs’ national security, but also have important implications for their foreign policy. These are reﬂected in the appearance of bilateral or wider tensions in the Mediterranean region, as well as in the negotiation and conclusion of various international co-operation schemes aimed at reducing these tensions.

Migrant stocks and host country foreign policy Political instability in countries of origin can spill over to countries hosting migrant communities, thus having an impact on the latter’s public order and foreign policy towards the country of origin. Immigrants and refugees usually maintain personal links with their homelands. They can support political parties, factions or ethnic groups in their country of origin through representation, political lobbying or, more directly, through recruitment and the sending of funds and of arms. In many instances, they exert political pressure on the receiving country’s government in order to redirect its foreign policy towards their country of origin. Immigrants and refugees may try to convince the host country to support their cause against the home country regime, for instance through diplomatic pressure, thus raising the prospects for bilateral tensions. The Federal Republic of Germany has been repeatedly criticized by the Turkish authorities for 334 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South failing to prevent hostile political activities and armed attacks by Kurdish immigrants against Turkish interests. The wave of terrorist attacks launched by Algerian extremists on the French territory have illustrated the possible disruptive effects of the spillover of domestic conflicts on the receiving countries’ public order and bilateral relations with countries of origin. Even if SECs have not been directly affected by Islamic fundamentalism, they are aware of the potential domestic risks involved in an eventual establishment of fundamentalist regimes on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, especially in Algeria, as we noted earlier.3 Even if immigrants do not exert a direct political pressure, their presence itself can influence the receiving country’s foreign policy towards the country of origin. For instance, Spain’s prime concern in relation to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla is to avoid conflict in these territories, since tensions between Christian and Muslim communities may lead to a nationalist mobilisation in Morocco in support of Muslims. This could consequently affect the Moroccan immigrant community in Spain and damage bilateral relations with the North African state (Gillespie, 1996, p. 199).

Irregular migration flows, migrant trafficking and international security Frequently, irregular migration flows and migrant trafficking are a source of inter-state tensions. They can also bring about additional instability in already strained bilateral relations. Destination countries can blame countries of origin or transit countries for not taking concrete actions aimed at preventing clandestine departures and at cracking down on human smugglers. During the 1990s, irregular migration in the Mediterranean region has often resulted in bilateral tensions between countries of destination, countries of origin and transit countries. Already tense relations between Greece and Turkey have been further burdened by a series of incidents involving irregular immigrants transiting from Turkey into Western Europe via Greece. According to Athens officials, more than 20,000 illegal immigrants entered Greece from Turkey between 1993 and 1995. Therefore, irregular migration and migrant trafficking seem likely to further burden bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, already strained by the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and minority rights in Western Thrace and Istanbul. Occasional tensions on irregular migration and human trafficking have also broken out between Italy and Albania, as well as between Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 335

Spain and Morocco. On several occasions, the Spanish government called upon the Moroccan authorities to take measures aimed at ﬁghting illegal migration and cracking down on smuggling rings helping immigrants to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco has also been accused by Spain of not respecting the readmission provision of the 1992 bilateral agreement. According to a recent study published by the International Labour Organization, the combined effect of a strong migratory potential in the Maghreb countries and the increasingly restrictive admission policies in Western Europe will lead to a conﬂict of interests between countries of immigration and countries of emigration around the Mediterranean Sea. On the one hand, immigration countries adopt increasingly restrictive admission and work policies, leaving illegal immigration as the only solution. On the other hand, emigration countries, faced with sustained demographic growth and increasing unemployment, may prefer not to prevent irregular emigration. This situation is likely to get worse in the next few years, with a potential disruptive impact on the stability of bilateral and regional relations (Giubilaro, 1997, p. 4).

Migration as a foreign policy instrument Irregular emigration and refugee flows can also be used by the country of origin as trump cards in interstate negotiations, in order to force destination countries to make political, commercial, economic or strategic concessions. As Gil Loescher puts it, ‘by pleading an inability to control the population outflow, or by demonstrating a willingness to manipulate it, the sending state is in a position to extract foreign policy and strategic concessions from the receiving state’ (Loescher, 1995, p. 559). For example, irregular migration and human trafficking have been linked by the Albanian government to requests for financial aid addressed to the Italian government and, via Italy, to the European Union. Moreover, receiving countries can choose to put the country of origin under pressure, for instance through the expulsion of irregular immigrants or by requesting them to sign re-admission agreements. The leverage exercised by destination countries should not be underestimated, for emigration is considered by many origin countries as an essential economic resource. Labour migration can greatly contribute to the country of origin’s development and economic well-being through workers’ remittances and the relief of pressure on the local labour market. The reverse of the coin is that ‘sending countries may become 336 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South vulnerable to the economic performance of those countries in which many of their citizens live and work’ (Salt et al., 1994, p. 189). The situation of Albanian irregular migrants in Greece illustrates this point. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many Albanians have emigrated clandestinely to Greece. Their remittances, evaluated by the World Bank at $265 million in 1994 (other sources give higher estimates – see the discussion by Fakiolas in Chapter 3), are of vital importance for the Albanian economy. Clandestine migration between Albania and Greece has become one of the most salient aspects of their bilateral relations. The Greek government has linked the regularization of Albanian clandestine immigrants to the respect, by the Tirana authorities, of the rights of the Greek minority living in southern Albania. The Greek authorities have thus deported hundreds of thousands of Albanian clandestine immigrants when incidents involving the Greek minority in Albania occurred, thus putting important economic and social pressure on the Albanian government. However, in spite of these tensions, the massive presence of clandestine Albanian workers in Greece has on the whole contributed to an intensification of diplomatic contacts between the Greek and Albanian authorities.

International migration and regional cooperation Immigration not only influences bilateral relations between the receiving country and the country of origin; it can also have implications for the former’s regional foreign policy. Since the beginning of the 1980s, concerns about massive migration flows from the south side of the Mediterranean have been of prominent importance in the regional foreign policy agenda of SECs. As a concrete example, concerns about South–North migration were at the core of the development of a Spanish Mediterranean policy under the socialist governments. As Richard Gillespie remarks, the Mediterranean became a priority in Spanish foreign policy, since it was seen as inextricably linked to Spain’s ambitions within Europe. In fact, it is an area in which Spain ‘could operate as a first division European country, and by so doing facilitate its eventual ascent into the lead group of EU countries’ (Gillespie, 1996, p. 195). Since the end of the Cold War, fearing that political and economic instability in the Maghreb could trigger important northward migration flows, Spain, Italy and France have repeatedly tried to involve the European Union in more active and consistent policies towards North African countries. Therefore, the 1990s saw the promotion of various Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 337 multilateral initiatives coming from the SECs, aiming at establishing a regional cooperation framework in the Mediterranean, in order to deal with the new security challenges of the region (international migration, demographic growth, social and political instability, environmental degradation, arms proliferation). Within this security context, the SECs have developed two kinds of policies: the first adopts the multilateral/ comprehensive/global cooperation approach, and the second the subregional cooperation approach. The global approach assumes the inter-dependence not only of all countries in the Mediterranean but also of the Mediterranean countries on the one hand and non-Mediterranean actors on the other. Global approaches logically lead to advocating a process which involves many countries cooperating in many fields (Tsardanidis, 1997, p. 53). Over the past few years, more and more initiatives have been springing up, aimed at promoting global co-operation between the countries of the Mediterranean region with a view to finding remedies for the many causes of instability in that area. Many of these initiatives were proposed by the Mediterranean member states of the EU. With the exception of the EU’s long-standing Mediterranean Policy however, none of them has proved particularly successful. Both the Italian and Spanish Foreign Ministers have admitted, for example, that there was an ‘element of utopia’ in their Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) scheme (for more details see Tsardanidis, 1997). Nor did the initiative of Malta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido de Marco, for the creation of a Council of the Mediterranean (based on the Council of Europe model) prove very realistic. The most important initiative of a global nature now being implemented in the Mediterranean is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Provisions concerning migration were referred to in the first part of the Final Declaration (Political and Security Partnership) and to the third one (Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs) of the well-known Barcelona Conference of November 1995. The fact was acknowledged that current population trends in the Southern Mediterranean states represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off, and the partners decided to strengthen their common efforts to reduce migratory pressure (Potemkina, 1998, p. 167). From a security perspective the most interesting aspect of the Euro- Mediterranean process is its attempt to create a global political dynamic at the Mediterranean level. Unlike the NATO and WEU dialogues, which remain a set of bilateral discussions,4 the Euro- 338 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

Mediterranean Partnership brings together, in a single forum, almost all the Mediterranean countries. All the southern members of the EU have supported the Euro-Mediterranean partnership scheme.5 Top of the agenda at the Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Malta in April 1997 was the endorsement of a security charter that will lay the founda- tions for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area. However, the Malta Declaration indicates that very little headway has been registered in moving ahead with implementing such aspirations. For some analysts it is perhaps better to be less ambitious and try to set up mechanisms which promote security and cooperation on a smaller scale (Calleya, 1997). In the short term, for example, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership states may introduce some confidence-building measures that will enable them to manage and contain the large number of security challenges (Spencer, 1997, pp. 40–5). The second policy thrust is the subregional cooperation approach. A distinctive aspect of the stance of the SECs towards the Mediterranean countries in the past has been an interest in promoting regional cooperation and integration. While economic and also democratic reforms are on the agenda in most countries in the south Mediterranean region, subregional co-operation efforts and projects for north–south co-operation are becoming more numerous. So far, however, rather little has been done in practice in these directions, although two serious initiatives deserve further attention – the Forum of Ten (5+5) and the Mediterranean Forum. The ‘5+5’ dialogue was launched in 1990. Based on the global and indivisible nature of security in the Mediterranean, it sets out to develop cooperation between five countries north of the Mediterranean (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and five countries south of it (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania). Although it made a more promising start than the CSCM plan, the 5+5 dialogue very soon ground to a halt owing to the deep divisions between its participants.4 Thus, at the start of 1992, the 5+5 initiative was placed on the back burner (Coustiliere, 1992). The Mediterranean Forum was initiated by Egypt as a means of seeking reassurance against the threat it perceived in the region’s strategic evolution. The consequences of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the implications of the 1990–91 Gulf War and Egypt’s exclusion from the 5+5 dialogue were all perceived by Cairo as constituting a threat to the country’s tradional leadership in the Mediterranean. Thus, Egypt floated the idea of organising a ‘Forum for Dialogue and Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 339

Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ as a counterpart to the process of cooperation that had begun in the western part of the region, but with a much closer security focus – terrorism linked to fundamentalism, and the dangers of civil wars (El-Sayed Selim, 1997). Consolidated by French co-sponsorship and having received the support of Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, the plan was officially launched by a ministerial meeting in Alexandria in July 1994, and has succeeded in retaining some of its vitality – unlike the 5+5 Forum. The Mediterranean Forum has two main features: first, it places emphasis on problems of ‘security’; and second it claims to be potentially open, out of concern for compatibility not only with the CSCM idea but also with the European Union’s Mediterranean policy. It is obvious that if the Mediterranean Forum (and more generally the regional approach) limits its objectives to serve the narrow national interests of its member states and especially those of Egypt and France, then sooner or later it will lose its impetus. If, on the other hand, in the framework of the Mediterranean Forum, the SECs resume a role in mediating between the countries south of the Mediterranean and the EU, then the Forum could function smoothly and successfully. Further- more, the possibility is not to be excluded that, sooner or later, the activities of the Forum may converge into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In the end, the Forum might ‘specialise’ in a specific sector, for example that of culture (Bin, 1997, p. 10). Therefore, while the ‘global’ strategy like the one which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership envisages is an essential priority, the ‘subregional’ approach is also very valuable, especially for security purposes.5 Neverthless, the real problem with these subregional cooperation initiatives, as George Joffé points out, is that they lack credibility as far as the Southern Mediterranean states are concerned because there is another security player in the region. This is the United States which, after all, controls the Middle East peace process and has refused to consider genuine partnership in this respect with Europe (Joffé, 1997, p. 18).

Conclusions

At present it is clear that there is not a direct military threat to the Mediterranean EU member states from any of the states south of the Mediterranean. The military capabilities and the political intentions that would warrant even the perception of such a threat do not exist in any of these states. There are, however, risks and challenges that should be given due attention. The challenges are multifaceted and 340 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South involve political and economic as well as military matters. From a Southern European point of view, these new security challenges, such as mass migration, can be as disconcerting as the proliferation of conventional and unconventional arms in the region. Such complex security threats cannot be segmented into separate military and non- military solutions. Rather, they must be faced by a sophisticated approach that recognises this deep-seated complexity. In the past ten years, immigration has become an issue of ‘high politics’ in SECs: it has been increasingly perceived by governments and by some segments of the population as an economic, social, cultural and political threat. Furthermore, international migration has become prominent in SECs’ foreign policy, both at the bilateral and regional levels. Therefore, policy responses to the security challenges posed by population movements in the Mediterranean region, as well as in other parts of the world, should aim at preventing mass population displacements and at stemming irregular migration flows. At the same time, a more carefully considered management of those migration flows that are allowed to exist should aim to highlight the benefits which migration can bring to sending and receiving countries, as well as to the migrants themselves. Whether the Southern European states will succeed in building a strong relationship with the Southern Mediterranean countries on the migration issue depends on four factors. The first is the extent to which the growing economic gap between the north and the south of the Mediterranean can be narrowed. The Euro–Mediterranean partnership is aimed directly at that objective. The SECs recognise a common interest of fostering a stronger EU presence in the Mediterranean and, more generally, in the south of the NATO area, on economic as well as on political and military grounds. In this case they are evolving a South European solidarity to try to direct EU and other European policies towards a renewed and stronger alliance with the south Mediterranean countries. The second factor is the extent to which regional and global cooperation schemes such as the Forum of Ten, the Mediterranean Forum, and the CSCM will succeed – whether, in other words, the promotion of cooperation and integration is in fact a viable way of alleviating the existing rivalries and whether on both rims of the Mediterranean enough political will exists. Should the current trend towards regional- isation continue over the coming years, then the Mediterranean security structure will increasingly have to rely on mutually reinforcing co-operation from several institutions. There are two key requirements Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stefano Guerra 341 for such a scenario to become a reality. First, the Middle East peace process has to overcome its current problems and has to move forward both on the bilateral and multilateral tracks. Secondly, the Barcelona security agenda should be implemented successfully. The third factor is the extent to which the SECs will manage to coordinate their Mediterranean policy not only within the framework of the EU but also outside of it. At the EU level the SECs have demonstrated that they are increasingly prepared to pool their diplomatic efforts to help lobby for more economic assistance to the Mediterranean area. But at the same time, the subgrouping level seems to be following an independent bilateral approach. The fourth factor is the extent to which the governments of EU Mediterranean countries will lend their support to movements, associations, parties and the press inside the South Mediterranean countries which defend pluralism and human rights. These NGOs should be given outside support in order to facilitate their efforts for the creation of a civil society (Kienle, 1998, p. 66). The formulation of a civil society is the key to political and economic liberalisation in the Mediterranean countries and is considered as an antidote to anti-democratic and authoritarian modes of governance.

Notes 1. However, progress in military security cooperation will be slow as long as Israel is not prepared to take some tangible steps towards joining the Non- Proliferation Treary and as long as some Arab states see an intrinsic link between conventional armaments and nuclear armaments, both in terms of security and of arms control (Tanner, 1997, p. 25). 2. The impact of the Albanian immigrants on the crime rate should be considered in the light of the Greek socio-political context. Indeed one could express surprise that Albanians’ rates of recorded criminality are not higher given their living conditions and the negative interaction with Greek society. 3. During the 1990s, some attempts have been carried on, under the auspices of France, to coordinate the efforts of the interior ministers of Southern European and North African states in fighting terrorism, arms and drug trafficking. 4. Beside co-operation in the field of ‘soft security’ (organized crime, terrorism and drugs, etc.), the pursuit of the principles on which peace and stability are predicated within the framework of the Mediterranean Partnership means that it will concentrate on attempting to develop and reinforce a Mediterranean framework for crisis management, in particular a capacity for preventive diplomacy and crisis prevention. 5. The basic weakness of the 5+5 Forum is that it integrates two completely differing regional subgroupings into a single institutional framework without 342 Migration Issue and the ‘Threat’ from the South

ﬁrst correcting the lack of unity in the perceptions of the countries involved as to what constitutes their interests. Other divisions were: the conﬂict between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara; the international isolation of Libya, suspected of acts of terrorism; the repercussions of the Gulf War and the divisions it created in the Arab world, including in the Maghreb countries; the development of the internal crisis in Algeria after 1991; the differences between the North African partners over whether to adopt a global approach or a more selective economic approach; the risk of isolating Egypt, which was not a party to the process. 6. Of course, in addition to the global and the subregional co-operation approaches there is a third option for the SECs of dealing with the ‘threat’ coming from the South: the adoption of an individualistic or even atavistic attitude. France, Italy and Greece tend quite often to pay close attention to their bilateral links with each of the South Mediterranean countries or to follow a different policy from the other EU Mediterranean states. Even within the general EU framework of co-operation and assistance, South European states feel that they sometimes need to act in a somewhat autonomous way. This helps explain the occasional competitive picture between France and Spain in the area (Calleya, 1997, p. 132).

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Africa, Portuguese colonies Bangladeshis, in Italy 17 see PALOP borders, clandestine arrivals Africans 8–9 in Portugal 220, 222, 224–6, Brazilians 230(n6) in Portugal 87, 96, 98, 100 in Spain 110, 113, 115–17, prostitutes in Italy 161, 258 162 agricultural sector Bulgarians, in Portugal 86 Greece 62–3 immigrant labour 16 Cape Verdeans Italy 39–40, 48 domestic service 17 Portugal 94 in Italy 17, 150, 152, 153 Albanians in Portugal 12, 16, 17, 86, 87, emigration 11, 175, 313–15 88, 93, 98, 214–15 employment in Greece 16, in Spain 258 179–82 capitalism 6, 29–32 in global labour economy Catalonia 172–3 Africans 110, 113, 115–17 in Greece 12, 22–3, 59, 64, labour market 21–2, 111–17 71, 175–84, 197–8, 331, migration patterns 106–10, 336, 341(n2) 121–3 in Italy 241–2, 331 nationality of immigrants migration routes 9, 164 109–10, 112, 113 prostitutes in Greece 181–2 regularization 113 prostitutes in Italy 158–60, service sector 114–15 163–4 social impacts 117–20 refugees 313–15 within Spain 104–6 religion 204(n7) catering, immigrant labour 17 residential exclusion in Greece Catholic countries, female 176–9 emigrants 12 Algeria chain migration 7, 127–8, 136, France relationship 310–11, 179 315–16, 319(n7, 8) child labour, Portugal 91, security issues 301, 311 101(n4) Algerians child prostitutes emigration to Europe 286–8 Albanians 181 in Spain 258 Italy 159 Angolans, in Portugal 96, 98 Chileans, in Spain 258 Argentinians, in Spain 258 Chinese asylum seekers, Spain 260, in Italy 17, 48, 49 261 in Portugal 86, 96 Athens, residential spaces cities, spatial exclusion 208–11 176–9 civic nationality 189, 202–3

345 346 Index clandestine migration 8–9, economic security 13–14, 125–6, 332–3 emigration 303–5 Europe 246–7 immigration threat to 305–7, from Poland 130–8 330 security issues 334–5 educational levels of immigrants Colombians, prostitutes in Italy 13 158, 161, 162 in Italy 159–60 colonialism, migration factor 4, in Portugal 83 9 Egyptians, in Greece 16, 17 common market 280 El Salvadoreans, in Italy 152 conflicts, security issues 325–7 emigration construction industry colonial 4 Greece 180 economic security 303–5 immigrant labour 16 entrepreneurs Italy 47–8 Italy 36 Portugal 92–4, 219–20 Portugal 86 consumption theories, labour Equatorial Guineans, in Spain migration 138–42 258 counter-urbanization 8 Eritreans, in Italy 49, 152 criminalization, Albanians in ethnic nationality 189 Greece 177–9 ethnic segregation, Lisbon cultural identity, migration as 222–30 threat to 307–10 ethno-nationalism 186 Euro–Mediterranean Partnership demographic trends 11 337–8, 339, 340 deregulation, labour migration Europe 173–4 illegal migration 246–7 development, emigration migration policy 235–9, relationship 281 244–50 development divide 9 post-industrial economy diversion effect 8 31–2 domestic service European Economic Community Greece 60, 181 (EEC), trade/migration immigrant labour 17–18, relationship 282–6 150–4 European Monetary Union, Italy 49, 150–4, 166–7 Greece 62 Portugal 95 European Union (EU), economic Dominican Republic, migrants to relationships 278–9 Spain 258, 259 dualism 15, 29 family networks, Italy 36, 153–4, 167–8(n2) Eastern Europe, emigration 11 Filipinas Eastern Europeans, prostitutes in Greece 17, 181 161, 162 in Italy 17, 49, 150, 152, 153, economic development, Southern 166 Europe 9–10 prostitutes in Italy 161, economic restructuring 162 cities 208–11 in Spain 17, 110 Lisbon 218–21 Fordism 5, 14 Index 347 foreign policy, migration impacts network factors 64–6 333–9 Polish immigrants 128, 129, Forum of Ten (5+5) 338, 340, 130–8, 140–2 341–2(n5) political discourse 195–8 France productivity of immigrants Algeria relationship 310–11, 67–8 315–16, 319(n7, 8) regularization 21, 74–5 immigration policy 237–8 seasonal labour 60, 61, 76(n2, free trade, migration relationship 4), 180 279–95 sex industry 65, 76–7(n6), 177, 180, 181–2 Gambians, in Spain 258 social exclusion of Albanians gender balance 12–13 176–82 Portugal 99 Turkey relationship 334 Spain 262 unskilled labour 60–3 Germany wages 66–7 immigration policy 238 guestworkers, Greece 58 Portuguese immigrants 93, Guinea Bissau, migrants in 101(n8) Portugal 86, 87, 98, 224 Ghanaians, in Italy 41 ghettoization, Athens 177 Heckscher–Ohlin theory 284–5, global capitalism 30 295(n8) globalization of migration home work, Portugal 91–2 13–14, 171–3, 337 Greece illegal immigration see agricultural sector 62–3 clandestine migration Albanians 12, 22–3, 59, 64, illegality, definition 35 71, 175–84, 197–8, 331, immigration 336, 341(n2) growth of 7–8 construction industry 180 political discourse 194–203 consumption theories 140–2 immigration policy demographic effects 71–2 Europe 235–9, 244–50 domestic service 60, 181 Greece 72–5, 175–6, 186–7 economic growth 68–70 Italy 23, 50–3, 186, 240–50, employment 72, 136–7, 306–7 143(n8) Spain 23, 264–74 illegal immigrants 64–6, Indians, in Italy 49 77(n10), 318–19(n5) industrial economies, immigration policy 72–5, informalization 29–30 175–6, 186–7 industrial sector indigenous labour force 61, immigrant labour 16 76(n3) Italy 47 informal economy 21, 136, informal economy 179–82 development of 29–32 irredenta 190, 203–4(n3) formal economy boundary labour market 70–1 32–5, 47–9 migration trends 58–60, 132 Greece 21, 136, 179–82 national identity 190–1, Italy 20–1, 32, 35–40, 47–9 202–3 migration factor 10, 14, 31–2 348 Index informal economy continued regional trends 45–7 Portugal 21, 89–99 regularization 50–1, 248–9 Spain 117, 136 ‘Third Italy’ 36–7, 45 international migration 279–86 trabendo 44 international relations, migration welfare state 40 issues 310–13 women immigrants 22, 150–4 Islamic fundamentalism 323–4, 334 labour market Islamic women 168(n3) Catalonia 21–2 Italy cities 209 agricultural sector 39–40, 48 Greece 70–1 Albanians 158–60, 163–4, immigrant employment 241–2, 331 15–19, 306–7, 330 caporalato system 40, 48 informal 10, 14, 20 Chinese communities 49 Portugal 21, 80–3 citizenship 248–9 Spain 262–4 construction industry 47–8 labour migration 5–6, 10, 15, domestic service 49, 150–4, 125–30 166–7 consumption theories 138–42 educational levels 159–60 deregulation 173–4 emigration 4 globalization 171–3 employment of immigrants Latin America, colonial migration 45–9, 54(n2) 4 formal/informal linkage 47–9 Latin Americans gender gap 43 in Italy 49 illegal immigration 246–7 in Spain 258 immigration flows 40–3, lifeworld of migrants 170, 172, 132–3 173 immigration policy 23, 50–3, Lisbon 186, 240–50, 306–7 Cape Verdeans 16, 214–15 industrial sector 47 colonial immigrants 216–17 informal economy 20–1, 32, construction sector 219–20 35–40, 47–9 employment trends 81–3, 89 internal migration 10 housing 213–14, 217, 221–2 links with country of origin socio-ethnic segregation 23, 43–4 216–18, 222–30 Martelli Law 157–8 urban growth (1960s and national identity 191–4, 203 1970s) 211–17 nationalities of immigrants urban restructuring (1980s and 41, 42, 152, 158 1990s) 218–30 networks 36, 44, 53–4, 153–4, 167–8(n2) macro-structural perspective numbers of jobs 38–9 128–9 Polish immigrants 129, Maghreb countries 130–8, 158 economic security 304–5 political discourse 198–201 migrants from 23–4, 286–8, post-Fordism 36, 40 301–2, 310, 312 prostitutes 22, 154–67 trade/migration relationship quotas for immigrants 247–8 286–95, 305 Index 349

Mediterranean Forum 339, 340 numbers of migrants 11 Metropolitan Region of Lisbon Spain 255–6, 268 (MRL) see Lisbon micro-structural perspective organized crime, migration links 127–8 316, 331 migration history of 4–8 Países Africanos de Língua Oﬁcial international 279–86 Portuguesa see PALOP model of 12–19 PALOP, migrants in Portugal reasons for 8–11 84, 86, 87–9, 93, 96, 98–9, turnaround 6–8, 253–4 100, 216–17, 222, 224–6 migration policy see Peruvians immigration policy in Italy 152, 158 migration routes, Albanians 9, in Spain 258, 259 164 Philippines, emigrants see migration systems theories 128 Filipinas military security, migration issues Poland 313–15 clandestine migration 130–8 model of immigration 12–19 emigration 11, 22, 126–7, monetary union 281 128–9 Moroccans migration routes 133–4 emigration to Europe 286–8 migration trends 131–2 in Italy 12, 16, 41, 44, 46, 48 Poles in Spain 16, 110, 258, 262 in Greece 16, 128, 129, Morocco 130–8, 140–2, 198 Spain relationship 335 in Italy 158 trade/migration relationship prostitutes 161, 162 288–91 political discourse, immigration Moslem countries, male 194–203 emigrants 13 political security Mozambicans, in Portugal 88 migration issues 310–13 MRL see Lisbon southern Mediterranean 322–4 national identity 187, 188–9 Pontian Greeks 7, 196, 197, Greece 190–1, 202–3 198, 204(n6) Italy 191–4, 203 Portugal migrants as threat to 307–10, Africans 84, 86, 87–9, 93, 96, 329–30 98–9, 100, 216–17, 222, nationalities of immigrants 12 224–6, 230(n6) Netherlands, immigration policy agricultural sector 94 238–9 child labour 91, 101(n4) network factors 21, 44, 53–4, construction sector 92–4, 127 219–20 Greece 64–6 educational levels 83, 219, Italy 152–3 230(n5) Nigerians, prostitutes in Italy home work 91–2 18, 158–60, 163–6 illegal immigrants 85–6 Northern Europe, migration from informal economy 21, 89–99 South 5 internal migration 212–13 350 Index

Portugal continued Schengen Agreement 23, 187, labour market 21, 80–3 259, 268 legal immigrants 83–4 seasonal labour 16–17 migration paradox 79–80 Greece 60, 61, 76(n2, 4), 180 occupations of immigrants Italy 48 86–9, 97–8 security issues regularizations 21, 84–5, 96–7 Algeria 301, 311 returnees 7 conflicts 325–7 service sector 94–5 economic security 303–7 see also Lisbon migration relationship 24, post-Fordism 14, 29–32, 208 301–18, 328–33 Italy 36, 40 military security 313–15 post-industrial transformations political security 310–13 30–2 societal security 307–10 Italy 36–7 threats from the South 321–7, post-organised capitalism 129 339–41 prostitutes weapons proliferation 324–5 control of 163–6 segregation indices, Lisbon 217, Greece 65, 76–7(n6), 181–2 218, 230(n4) Italy 22, 154–67 self-employment, Italy 48, 49 living conditions 160–3 Senegalese public order, immigration as in Italy 41, 48, 54(n3) threat to 331 in Portugal 96 push factors 59–60 in Spain 258 push–pull factors 15 service sector Polish migrants 126–7, 135 Catalonia 114–15 Italy 49 quotas, immigrants 247–8, Portugal 94–5 269–70 sex industry Greece 65, 76–7(n6), 177, racism 200, 331–2 180, 181–2 refugees 313–15, 333–4 Italy 154–67 regularization shuttle migration 7 Greece 21, 74–5 smuggling 8–9 Italy 50–1, 248–9 social exclusion 22–3, 167 Portugal 21, 84–5, 96–7 Albanians in Greece 176–84 Spain 113, 117, 118, 259, social networks, Italy 36, 44, 268–9 53–4 residential exclusion, Albanians social origins of immigrants 13 in Athens 176–9 social space 170, 172 residential tourists, Spain 257 societal security 307–10 return migration 7 socio-ethnic segregation, Roma gypsies 61, 76(n4) Lisbon 23, 216–18, Romanians, in Portugal 86 222–30 rural–urban migration 5–6, 8, Somalians, in Italy 49, 152 212–13 Southern Europe immigration model 12–19 São Tomé, migrants in Portugal immigration reasons 8–11 224 migration history 4–8 Index 351 southern Mediterranean tourism conflicts 325–7 immigrant labour 17 economic conditions 327–8 migration factor 9 political security 322–4 trade, migration relationship 4, weapons proliferation 324–5, 279–86 341(n1) trafficking Spain migration links 316, 332–3 European immigrants 257 security issues 334–5 foreign policy 336 of women 162–3, 164–6, illegal immigrants 259–61 181 immigrant labour force Tunisians 111–12 emigration to Europe 286–8 immigration policy 23, in Italy 41, 46 264–74 Turkey, Greece relationship informal economy 117, 136 334 integration policies 272–3 labour market 262–4 United Kingdom, immigration migration flows 132, 254–6 policy 238 Morocco relationship 335 United States nationality of immigrants immigrants in Lisbon 224–9 112, 256–8 migration 4 number of immigrants 255–6, urban restructuring 208–11 268 Lisbon 221–2 Polish migrants 129, 130–8 Uruguayans, in Spain 258 quotas for immigrants 269–70 wage differentials, Europe regularization 113, 117, 118, 283–5 259, 268–9 wages, Greece 66–7 residential tourists 257 weapons proliferation, Southern socio-demography of Mediterranean 324–5, immigrants 261–2 341(n1) see also Catalonia welfare capitalism 30 spatial exclusion women Albanians in Greece 176–9 domestic service 17–18, cities 208–11 150–4, 166–7 Lisbon 216–18 Islamic 168(n3) Sri Lankans, in Italy 41, 48, 49 migration trends 147–50 street-hawkers prostitution 22, 65, 76–7(n6), immigrant labour 17 154–67, 181–2 Italy 48–9 trafficking of 162–3, 164–6, subregional cooperation 338–9 181 Sweden, immigration policy world systems perspective 130 238–9 xenophobia 187, 200, 308, 309, tax evasion 33, 34, 37 331–2 terrorism migration links 315–16 Yugoslavia, refugees from threats from 323 313–15