"Chindia" and ASEAN

Regional Governance Architecture FES Briefing Paper February 2006 Page 1 New Powers for Global Change? ”ChIndia” and ASEAN: About National Interests, Regional Legitimacy, and Global Challenges = e^kp=gK=dfbppj^kk= = = = “ChIndia” and ASEAN FES Briefing Paper 7 | May 2007 Page 2 1 Background∗ This is due to extremely high internal disparities in purchasing power growth. The bilateral rela- It has long been no secret that China and India, tionship between the two states is not un- as highly dynamic rising powers, are exerting strained, primarily due to long-pending territorial growing influence and shaping power in interna- conflicts. Yet each does not consider the other a tional relations. The size of their combined particular threat. populations, which make up just over one-third of the world population, together with their ro- India’s primary concern is directed at its north- bust economic achievements, have for a decade western neighbor, Pakistan, whereas China’s made these two states the gravitational center politico-security fears are aimed in an eastern di- of East- and South Asian economic relationships. rection. Moreover, while India has in recent This economic dynamic is both cause and conse- years increasingly emphasized a close relation- quence of political and social upheavals in the ship with the USA—thereby decreasing its tradi- two states. Societal change—and the economic tional cooperation with the former Soviet Union boom imbedded therein—led to increased na- and, respectively, Russia—China is attempting to tional self-confidence / self-awareness and the constrain the U.S.’s influence in Asia by cultivat- political will for a more active, representative ing alliances precisely with Russia and the re- participation in the international order. sources-rich Central Asian successor states. Yet as similar as China and India are in their ap- In conclusion, there seem to be more differences pearance as powerful states, they differ greatly than commonalities between China and India. in the structural assumptions upon which they Both states essentially see themselves, in the base their foreign power projection. The wide- global realm, as necessarily exposed to compa- spread vision of “ChIndia,” an Asian supernova rable challenges. They both feel impelled, in with global reach, does not accurately—or at their own interests, to find appropriate re- least completely—represent the current political sponses to their (sometimes overlapping) prob- reality. lems regarding the future. Although we cannot predict at present whether this search will lead For many observers, China appears primarily to to a convergence of the two regional powers or be an economic giant with political feet of clay. to a new fragmentation of East- and South Asia, The Chinese Communist Party and the centrally- it is clear that their in response to these chal- controlled state apparatus face a climactic le- lenges will be an important constellation for the gitimacy problem resulting from one-party gov- st entire region in the 21 century. In this respect ernance in a market economy system. Chinese the regional and global understanding of the domestic stability effectively depends on the role of these new great powers, as well as the CCP’s ability to solve this problem and bring un- expectations directed at them by the smaller der control the rapidly spreading centrifugal states of the region, comprise the core issue in forces it has engendered in Chinese society. The developing Asia as a robust region with a collec- Chinese situation is very different from that of tive identity. democratically-bound India, whose remarkable economic boom is largely thanks to its globally The key questions for the inter-relation between competitive service- and IT sectors. The Chinese the emerging great powers and the region of economic wonder, meanwhile, was and is pri- their geopolitical location are as follows: How do marily supported by goods manufacturing, rising countries shape their regional legitimacy which enjoys (at the moment) almost no global- and on what grounds do they claim it? Do they scale competition. Both nations indeed possess perceive themselves as regional spokesmen and attractive domestic markets, which nonetheless do they act as facilitators between the regional still offer only limited possibilities for the absorp- and global level? Do smaller countries in the re- tion of Indian or Chinese products, respectively. gion perceive the big powers as dominant actors or as benevolent hegemons? Do they benefit ∗ This Policy Brief is based on a Political Dialogue ti- from the rise, in terms of gaining greater clout tled: ‘Regional Perception of Asian Powers for on the global scene? Global Change. The Cases of India and China’ that The following paper starts with providing was held in April 2007 by the Friedrich-Ebert Stif- tung, in cooperation with the S. Rajaratnam School thoughts on these questions from the perspec- of International Studies of Nanyang Technological tives of the two large states China and India, University, in Singapore. The Author is grateful to with regard to themselves and to the region. In all Participants from the whole region whose excel- the second part, the perspectives will be lent analytical insight have made this Brief possible. switched. Thanks go also to Heather Gilmartin for her edito- rial assistance. “ChIndia” and ASEAN FES Briefing Paper 7 | May 2007 Page 3 To begin with a general observation, the rela- ing for new spaces to expand into and new tionship between the great and small powers is partnerships to develop, with a twofold goal: to overshadowed by a double contradiction. ensure a continued influx of resources and capital; and to protect its market interests in export Firstly, on certain fundamental points the self- production. However, Chinese policies also perceptions of the great powers do not corre- guard against any outside attempts at “interven- spond with the perceptions of their smaller tion in internal affairs.” These policies are di- neighbors. The asymmetry between their rected at any initiative or activity in which the strengths and potential in particular, as well as leadership sees a potential threat to its domi- their relative foreign impacts, appears responsi- nance, authority or legitimacy. China continually ble for this first contradiction. defends its status as a developing country, say- Secondly, transnational and regional problems ing it should receive further help and be allowed prove to have diverse shapes and meanings, de- certain “deficits” due to its incomplete trans- pending on how they are considered: from a formation. This rhetoric correlates directly with domestic or external perspective, from a cause- China’s own critical capital transfers to its part- oriented viewpoint, or from the standpoint of ner countries in Asia and Africa, which China those directly affected. The (still) absent social considers relevant to its own strategic interests. identity of the large and small states in East Asia Externally, China is striving to improve its reputa- consequently lacks a common regional perspec- tion and cultivate an image as a responsible tive on these problems. Thus it is indeed neces- agent and reliable actor in inter-state coopera- sary to further discuss regional attempts at glob- tion. Thus, under the not illogical premise of alization in East Asia, but any far-reaching hopes non-interference, China is moving toward multi- for a quick formation and implementation of lateral cooperation, which is more or less unmis- such globalization are still premature. takably tied to its expectations regarding its partner states. Other goals include furthering 2 What are China’s Interests? economic development and sustaining the con- While large parts of East Asia encounter China’s tinuation of its own political system. China’s tac- rise to Great Power status with abating aston- tic for cooperation, in general, includes a softer ishment and increasing apprehension, the latter exertion of power. One aspect of this tactic is to reaction seems, in China’s view, unnecessary. alert the world of the unfavorable consequences China holds that these concerns underestimate of transnational problems arising from within the corollary (internal) problems caused by its China—for example in the environmental sec- economic growth, which limit its options and tor—but at the same time to challenge its part- constrain its behavior. ner states to do their own part in solving the problems. Political non-interference and ideo- Behind conciliatory rhetoric—instead of multi- logical freedom of values are effective in creat- polar cooperation, the Chinese government now ing a suitable basis for the development of recip- speaks of multilateral integration; instead of rocal, profitable economic relations between “peaceful rise” they say “peaceful develop- China and its partners. But we must not ignore ment”—lies more than just beguiling camou- the fact that, independent of any objective, in flage over a fundamentally unchanged policy. order to develop the most profitable cooperation Dependent on steady foreign direct investment, as possible (i.e., to create a win-win situation) and facing increasing interdependence with in- China’s transition to active collaboration in East ternational economic structures, and increasingly Asia must necessarily be based on solid and dependent on resource and energy imports, long-term interests. China’s dependence on po- China has gradually transformed its once nearly litically stable

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