The Political Impact of Technical Expertise Author(S): Dorothy Nelkin Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol

The Political Impact of Technical Expertise Author(s): Dorothy Nelkin Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 1975), pp. 35-54 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284554 . Accessed: 20/10/2014 20:36

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This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SocialStudies of Science, 5 (1975), 35-54 The PoliticalImpact of TechnicalExpertise

Dorothy Nelkin

Technologiesof speedand power- airports,power generating facilities, highways,dams - are oftena focus of bitteropposition. As these technologiesbecome increasinglycontroversial, scientists, whose expertiseforms the basis of technicaldecisions, find themselves involved in publicdisputes. This 'public'role of sciencehas generatedconcern bothwithin the profession and beyond;for a scientist'sinvolvement in controversialissues may violatethe normsof scientificresearch, but have considerableimpact on the politicalprocess. As scientistsare calledupon to addressa widerrange of controversial policy questions,l 'problemsof politicalchoice [may] becomeburied in debateamong expertsover highly technical alternatives'.2 This paperwill discusssome of the implicationsof the increasing involvementof scientistsin controversialareas. What is the role of expertsin public disputes?How are theyused by variousparties to a controversy,and how do scientistsbehave once involved? Finally, what is theirimpact on thepolitical dynamics of suchdisputes?

Author's address: Department of Urban Planning and Development, Cornell University,614 Clark Hall, Ithaca, New York 14850, USA. 1 See discussion of the increased demands for expert decision-makingin Garry Brewer,Politicians, Bureaucratsand the Consultant (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Also, Dean Schooler, Jr.,(in Science, Scientistsand Public Policy [London and New York: The Free Press, 1971]) suggeststhat in the past, scientificinfluence has concentratedin governmententrepreneurial areas such as space exploration,or in policy areas defined in termsof national security.The participationand influenceof scientistshas traditionallybeen ratherminimal in policy areas withredistributive implications, e.g. social policy,transportation, and other issues subject to social conflictand competingpolitical interests.As the public seeks technical solutions to social problems,and as scientiststhemselves become engagedin controversialpublic issues,this pattern is changing. 2 Harvey Brooks, 'ScientificConcepts and CulturalChange', Daedalus, 94 (Winter1965), 68. 35

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THE ROLE OF EXPERTS

Scientistsplay an ambivalentrole in controversialpolicy areas. They are bothindispensible and suspect.Their technical knowledge is widely regardedas a sourceof power.

The capacity of science to authorizeand certifyfacts and picturesof reality [is] a potentsource of politicalinfluence.3

Yet expertsare resentedand feared.While the relianceon expertsis growing,we see a revivalof Jacksonianhostility toward expertise, and of the beliefthat common sense is an adequatesubstitute for technical knowledge.4 The authorityof expertiserests on assumptionsabout scientific rationality;interpretations and predictionsmade by scientistsare judged to be rationalbecause they are based on 'objective' data gatheredthrough rational procedures, and evaluatedby the scientific communitythrough a rigorouscontrol process. Science, therefore, is widelyregarded as a meansby whichto de-politicizepublic issues. The increasinguse of expertiseis often associatedwith the 'end of ideology';politics, it is claimed,will become less important as scientists areable to defineconstraints and provide rational policy choices.5 Policy makersfind that it is efficientand comfortableto define decisionsas technicalrather than political. Technical decisions are made by definingobjectives, considering available knowledge, and analyzing the most effectiveways of reachingthese objectives.Debate over technicalalternatives need not weighconflicting interests, but only the relativeeffectiveness of variousapproaches for resolving an immediate problem.Thus, scientificknowledge is used as a 'rational'basis for substantiveplanning, and as a meansof defendingthe legitimacyof specificdecisions. Indeed, the viabilityof bureaucraciesdepend so

3 Yaron Ezrahi, 'The Political Resources of American Science', Science Studies, 1 (1971), 121. See also Don K. Price, Governmentand Science (New York: New York UniversityPress, 1954). 4 For a discussionof the historicaltradition of resentmentof experts-inthe United States see RichardHofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in AmericanLife (New York: Knopf, 1962). 5 See Robert Lane, 'The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society', American Sociological Review, 31 (October 1966), 649-62, and Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960).

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PoliticalImpact of TechnicalExpertise 37 much on the controland monopolyof knowledgein a specificarea, that this may become a dominantobjective.6 Recent technological disputes,however, suggest that access to knowledgeand expertisehas itselfbecome a sourceof conflict,as variousgroups realize its growing implicationsfor political choice. The past decade has been remarkablefor the developmentof 'advocacypolitics';7 consumer advocates, planning advocates, health care advocatesand environmentaladvocates have mobilizedaround diverseissues. Key slogansare 'accountability','participation', and 'demystification'.These groups share common concernswith the 'misuseof expertise',the 'political use' of scientistsand professionals, and the implicationsof expertdecision making for public action. Table 1 presentssome statements of theseconcerns by variousgroups: radical scientistswho have organizedto develop 'science for the people'; consumeradvocates concerned with corporate accountability; advocacy plannerswho assistcommunities in expressingtheir local needs; and environmentalists and health professionalswho demand 'demystificationof medicine'. Their criticismreflects a dilemma.The complexityof public decisionsseems to requirehighly specialized and esotericknowledge, and thosewho controlthis knowledge have considerablepower. Yet democraticideology suggests that people must be able to influence policydecisions that affect their lives. This dilemmahas provokeda numberof proposalsfor better distribution of technicalinformation; expertise,it is argued,is a politicalresource and mustbe availableto communitiesas well as to corporations,utilities or developers.8The

6 See discussionin Michel Crozier, The Stalled Society (New York: Viking Press, 1973), Chapter 3. A vividexample of the'importanceof this tendencyto monopolize knowledge occurred duringthe 'energycrisis' with the realization that the large oil companies had nearlyexclusive knowledge on the state of oil reserves. 7 I am using this term to describe a phenomenon that Orion White and Gideon Sjoberg call 'mobilization politics', in 'The EmergingNew Politics in America',M. D. Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (eds.), Politics in the Post Welfare State (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1972), 23. 8 Note forexample the systemof 'scientificadvocacy' proposedby JohnW. Gofman and ArthurR. Tamplin,Poisoned Power (Emmaus,Penn.: Rodale Press, 1971). A similarsystem is suggestedby Donald Geesaman and Dean Abrahamson in 'Forensic Science - A Proposal', Science and Public Affairs(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists),29 (March 1973), 17. Thomas Reiner has proposed a system of communitytechnical services in 'The Planner as a Value Technician: Two Classes of Utopian Constructsand Their Impact on Planning',in H. Wentworth

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This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 40 DorothyNelkin increasingimportance of technicalinformation has also prompted analysesof the behaviourof scientistsas theyare divertedto applied and controversialwork. For example, Allan Mazur suggeststhat the political (i.e. non-scientific)context of controversiescrucially affects the activities of scientists,the way theypresent their findings, and thustheir ultimate influenceon decisions.Despite normsof politicalneutrality, claims Mazur,scientists behave just like anyoneelse when they engagein disputes;their views polarize and as a resultthe value of scientific advice becomes questionable.Thus, disputes among experts may become a major source of confusionfor policy makers and for the public.9 Guy Benveniste,focusing on the use of scientistsby policy makers,suggests that 'technical' decisions are basicallymade on politicalor economicgrounds. Expertise is soughtas a means of supportingparticular policy programmes; the selection of data and their interpretationare thusrelated to policygoals.' 0 Similarly,King and Melansonargue that when knowledge is employedin theresolution of publicproblems, it is shaped,manipulated, and frequentlydistorted by thedynamics of thepolicy arena.1 1 These analysesemphasize the politicizationof expertise.Details of two recentdisputes in which'experts' were used by both project developersand critics provide an opportunityto develop these arguments,and thento explorethe impactof expertson the political process.One of the disputesconcerns the sitingof an 830 megawatt nuclearpower plant on CayugaLake in upstateNew York; the other is the proposedconstruction of a new runwayat Logan International Airportin East Boston,Massachusetts. The powerplant siting controversy began in June1967, whenthe New York State Electric and Gas Company (NYSE&G) first

Eldridge (ed.), TamingMegalopolis, 1 (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Based on systemssimilar to legal advocacy and expert witness in the courts, such proposals are intendedto make technicaladvice more widelyavailable to citizens' groups - usually throughprovision of public funds to underwritethe cost of expertise. 9 Allan Mazur, 'Disputes Between Experts', Minerva, 11 (April 1973), 243-62. 10 Guy Benveniste,The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley,Calif.: Glendessary Press, 1972). See also Leonard Rubin, 'Politics and Information in the Anti-PovertyPrograms', Policy Studies Journal,2 (Spring1974), 190-5. 1 1 Lauriston R. King and Philip Melanson,'Knowledge and Politics',Public Policy, 20 (Winter1972), 82-101.

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PoliticalImpact of TechnicalExpertise 41 announcedits intentionto build Bell Station."2 Groupsof scientists and citizens,concerned with the thermalpollution of CayugaLake, organizedthemselves to opposethe plant, and demandedthat NYSE&G considerdesign alternatives that would minimize the damage to thelake caused by waste heat. They forced the utilityto postpone its applicationfor a constructionpermit, and to contractfor additional researchon the environmentalimpact of the plant.In March1973, followingconsultants' recommendations, NYSE&G announceda power stationplan that was essentiallythe same as its earliercontroversial design.The company,however, was nowarmed with data from one and a halfmillion dollars' worth of environmentalresearch supporting its claimthat the heat fromBell Stationwould not damagethe lake. Yet once morethere was concertedand well-informedpublic opposition, thistime focused on radiationhazards. Four months later the company was forcedto abandonits plan. The proposednew 9200-footrunway at LoganAirport was part of a majorexpansion plan thathad been a sourceof bitterconflict in East Bostonfor many years.1 3 Locatedonly two milesfrom the centreof downtownBoston in an Italianworking-class community, this modern convenientairport is a source of extremeirritation, fear, and communitydisruption. The expansionpolicies of the Massachusetts Port Authority(Massport) have been opposed,not only by airport neighboursbut also by Boston'scity government and by stateofficials concernedwith the developmentof a balancedtransportation system. Here,as in the CayugaLake powerplant siting debate, knowledge was used as a resourceboth by Massport,seeking justification for its expansionplans, and by thoseopposed to suchplans. Massport's staff was backed by consultantswho claimedthat without expansion the airportwould reach saturationby 1974, and that the new runway wouldcause no environmentaldamage. The opponents,primarily from the adjacent working-classneighbourhood of East Boston, used technicaladvice providedby the city of Boston.Following pressure fromthe governoras well as fromthe mayor,Massport eventually

12 For a historyand analysisof thiscontroversy see DorothyNelkin, Nuclear Power and its Critics(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1971); 'Scientistsin an EnvironmentalControversy', Science Studies, 1 (1971), 245-61; and 'The Role of Experts in a Nuclear Siting Controversy',Science and Public Affairs,30 (November1974), 29-36. 1 3 Documentationof this conflictcan be foundin DorothyNelkin, Jetport: The Boston Airport Controversy(New Brunswick,N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974).

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 42 DorothyNelkin deletedthe proposedrunway from the master plan forfuture airport development. Whilethis paper will focus on similaritiesin the dynamicsof these two disputes,it is necessaryfirst to point out importantdifferences. The communityopposed to the powerplant was a collegetown; the dispute was a middle-classenvironmental conflict, sustained by expertisefrom scientists in a nearbyuniversity who also livedin the area. In contrast,the oppositionto theairport came primarily from a working-classneighbourhood dependent on expertiseprovided by governmentofficials who, for political and economicreasons, chose to opposethe airport development plans. The technicalaspects of the two disputeswere also quitedifferent. The powerplant issue was embeddedin a setof vague uncertainties and intangiblefears about radiation;airport expansion posed the concrete and directthreat of increasednoise and land purchase. The mainarea of technicalconflict in the formercase was thepotential environmental impactof the new powerplant and the expertsinvolved were mostly scientistsand engineers.In thelatter case thecontroversial issue was the validityof projections- whetherthe runway was reallynecessary at all - and the disputeinvolved economists and lawyers as wellas engineers. Despitesuch differences, the two cases have a greatdeal in common: the use of expertise,the styleof technicaldebate, and the impactof expertson thepolitical dynamics of the dispute are remarkably similar.

THE USE OF EXPERTISE

Oppositionto both the powerplant and the airportdeveloped in several stages. The developers(utility manager, airport manager) contractedfor detailedplans on the constructionof theirproposed facility.As theyapplied for the necessary permits, affected groups tried to influencethe decision.The developerin eachcase arguedthat plans, based on theirconsultants' predictions of futuredemands and technical imperativesconcerning the location and designof the facility,were definitive,except perhapsfor minoradjustments necessary to meet federalstandards. In the powerplant controversy,scientists from Cornell University who livedin the communitywere the firstto raisequestions about the NYSE&G plan whenit was announcedin 1967. By mid4968, their activityhad builtup sufficientpolitical support to persuadeNYSE&G to postponeits plans,and to undertakefurther environmental research.

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A new sequenceof eventsbegan in March1973, whenNYSE&G againannounced its intention to buildthe plant and claimedthat it was imperativeto beginconstruction promptly. The company'sconsultants, Nuclear UtilitiesServices Corporation, had prepareda five-volume technicalreport. NYSE&G placedcopies in local libraries,circulated a summaryto itscustomers, and invitedcomments. The reportsupported NYSE&G's earlierplan fora plantinvolving a GeneralElectric boiling waterreactor with a once-throughcooling system. The studyconcluded that coolingtowers (which had been recommendedby powerplant criticsin 1968) wereeconomically unfeasible in thesize rangerequired forthe plant,unsuited to thetopography of thearea, and would have a tendencyto create fog. To develop an optimumdesign for a once-throughcooling system, consultants designed a jet diffuserto providerapid mixing of theheated discharge with the lake water. With this system,they arguedthat the plantwould have an insignificant effecton the aquatic environmentof CayugaLake. The consultants onlybriefly concerned themselves with the issueof radioactivewastes on thegrounds that this was nota problemunique to CayugaLake; the reportonly stated that the effectwould be substantiallybelow current radiationprotection standards. NYSE&G organizedan informationmeeting attended by 1,000 citizens,and fortwo hourssummarized the highlytechnical material supportingits plans.This, however, was followedby two and one-half hoursof angrydiscussion, and the utility'spresident announced that if publicprotest was likelyto cause delay,they would build the plant at anothersite. He hoped,however, that the decisionwould be 'basedon factand noton emotion'. The firstorganized response came fromtwenty-four scientists who volunteeredto providethe public with a reviewand assessmentof the utility'smassive technical report.' 4 Theirreview was highly critical and NYSE&G's consultantsresponded in kind (see below). Meanwhile, citizens'groups formed and the communitypolarized, as thecompany posedthe issue in termsof 'nuclearpower or blackouts'. The airportcase also involvedexperts on both sides of the controversy.Opposing forces mobilized in February1971, at a public hearingrequired by the Corps of Engineersin order to approve

14 Two hundredcopies of the critiquewere sent to libraries,citizens' groups, faculties at universitiesand colleges in the area, officialsin state and federal agencies, political representativesin local, state and federal government,and newspapers.

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Massport'srequest to fill in part of BostonHarbour. One thousand people attendedand for ten hours scientists,politicians, priests, schoolteachersand othersdebated the priorities which they felt should governairport decisions. Massport's staff was backedby consultants, who claimed that withoutthe runwaythe airportwould reach saturationby 1974. Consultantsprovided a brief environmental statementarguing that the new runway would have no direct detrimentaleffects of ecologicalsignificance. The onlyenvironmental costs would be the eliminationof ninety-threeacres of pollutedclam flatsand two hundredand fiftyacres of wildlifepreserve - which constituteda hazard in any case because birdsinterfere with jets. Furthermore,because of the added flexibility,the runwaywould relievenoise and congestioncaused by an expectedincrease in aircraft operations.Massport's claims were later buttressed by an environmental impactstatement commissioned from Landrum and Brown,Airport Consultants,Inc. at a cost of $166,000. The study documented Massport'scontention that the new runway was essentialfor safety and would be environmentallyadvantageous; it emphasizedthe positive contributionsof Logan Airport- its economicimportance to theCity of Boston,and the reductionof noisethat would result from increased runwayflexibility. The oppositionwas organizedby a coalitionof citizens' groups called the MassachusettsAir Pollution and Noise AbatementCommittee. The issues raised were diverse.Neighbourhood people spoke of the discomfortcaused by aircraftoperations, and of Massport'spiecemeal and closed decision-makingprocedures. Environmentalists feared the destructionof BostonHarbour, and plannersrelated airport decisions to generalurban problems.Legal, economic,and technicalexperts became involvedas the Mayor'soffice and the Governorevaluated Massport'sclaims. As in thepower plant case, theconflict polarized as Massportposed the issue in termsof 'airportexpansion or economic disaster'.

THE STYLE OF TECHNICALDEBATE'5

In both cases the technicaldebate involved considerable rhetorical

1 5 Unless otherwise noted, the quotations that follow are from local environmentalreports, memos, lettersand public hearings.They are statements by the opposingscientists involved in the controversy.

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PoliticalImpact of TechnicalExpertise 45 licence,with many insinuationsconcerning the competenceand the biasesof theinvolved scientists.' 6 NYSE&G emphasisedthat the need fora nuclearpower plant on CayugaLake was 'imperative',that there wouldbe a seriousenergy shortage if they did notproceed immediately with the plan, and that the impact of the plant on the local environmentwould be 'insignificant'.NYSE&G insistedon theirunique technicalcompetence to makethis decision.

Ourstudy is themost comprehensive study ever made on thelake. Opponents cancreate delays but are not required to assumeresponsibility.

However,the Cornellcritics called NYSE&G's data 'inadequate', 'misleading','non-comprehensive', and 'limitedin scopeand inadequate in concept'.Some of the criticsprovided data fromother research that contradictedNYSE&G's findings.They emphasizedthat therewas simplynot enough known about deep-water lakes to assessthe risks. NYSE&G consultantscountered by claimingthat Cornellcritics wereunfamiliar with the scope and requirementsof an environmental feasibilityreport; in particular,that the critics' reviewfailed to distinguishbetween the goals of pure and applied research.

From an academicposition a completeecological model that predicted all possiblerelationships would be desirable,but thiswas neitherfeasible nor necessaryfor assessing the minor perturbations caused by oneplant.

In fact,each groupused differentcriteria to collectand interpret technicaldata. The two studieswere based on diversepremises which required differentsampling intervals and techniques.NYSE&G consultants,for instance,claimed that theirwater quality studies focusedon establishingbase-line conditions to predictthe changes causedby the powerplant; Cornell studies focused on limitingfactors, suchas theimpact of nutrientson lakegrowth. Scientistsattacked each other with little constraint.Cornell reviewersaccused NYSE&G consultantsof valuejudgments that led to 'glaring omissions', 'gross inadequacies', and 'misleading interpretations'.Consultants referred to theCornell report's 'confusion resultingfrom reviewers reading only certainsections of the report', and 'imaginative,but hardlypracticable suggestions'. The NYSE&G presidentaccused the Cornell reviewers of bias:

16 Mazur, op. cit. note 9, also documents the use of rhetoricin technical debates.

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It is of some interestthat many of the individualswho participatedin the Cornell review have taken a public position in opposition to nuclearplants. Philosophicalcommitment in oppositionto nucleargeneration may have made it difflcultfor these reviewers to keep theircomments completely objective. 1 7

A similarstyle of debatecharacterized the technical dispute over the airportrunway. Expansion of Loganwas recommendedby consultants as 'the bestopportunity to realizea reductionof currentsocial impact'. Failureto expandthe airportas proposedwould cause delays, increase air pollution, reduce safety margins and have a 'drastic' and 'immeasurable'impact on the local economy- 'an impactwhich the Boston area could not afford'. Massport'senvironmental report describedand rejected,one by one, alternativesproposed by airport opponents.Banning specific types of aircraft'interferes with interstate commerce'.Limiting maximum permissible noise levels is 'legally questionable',since the airportfunctions as part of a coordinated nationalsystem. A surchargefor noisy aircraft would be 'useless'as economicleverage, since landing fees represent a negligiblepercentage of total airlineexpenses. Setting night curfews is 'precluded'by the interdependenceof flight schedules and aircraft utilization requirements:it would relegateBoston to a 'second-class'airport and have 'disastrouseffects' on serviceto sixtyfive percent of the267 cities servedby Boston. Moreover,seventy percent of the cargo business wouldbe 'negativelyaffected'. Soundproofing neighbouring houses and buildingwould be 'economicallyprohibitive' and have little effect. The only feasiblesolution to noiseand environmentalproblems, according to the consultants'report, was an expandedrunway system that would permitincreased flexibility. Massport insisted on the validityof its expertise:

We are closer and more knowledgeablethan any other group no matterwhat theirintention may be, on what Logan Airport... what MetropolitanBoston, what the entirestate of Massachusettsand New Englandneeds.1 8

And Massportconsultants suggested their agreement with their client when,in a technicalanalysis of the airport'seconomic impact, they

17 William A. Lyons, 'Recommendationsof the Executive Offices of New York State Electric and Gas Corporation to the Board of Directors' (13 July 1973). 18 Edward King, Massport Executive Director,Testimony at U.S. Corps of Engineers''Hearings on the Application by the M.P.A. for a Permitto Fill the Areas of Boston Harbour'(Boston, 26 February1971), mimeograph,101.

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It is inconceivablethat an enterpriseof thismagnitude can be treatedother thanwith the most profound respect.1 9

Airportopponents called the Massport technical reports 'the logical outcomeof effortsdirected toward narrow objectives'. City consultants contendedthat authorityto restrictaircraft noise was in factlimited neitherby the FAA nor by the Massportenabling act, and thatthe FAA actuallyencouraged airport operators to restrictairport noise independently.They arguedthat Massport'sassumptions concerning anticipateddemand for increasedairport capacity were questionable and in anycase weresubject to modificationby consolidatingschedules and dispersinggeneral aviation flights.Massport's own raw data suggestedthat with a reasonableadjustment Logan Airportcould accommodatea considerableincrease in actualbusiness, for aircraft were operatingat an averageof just underhalf capacity.Moreover, projectionswere based on the growthpattern of the 1960s. The decreasein air traveldemand in 1970 couldhave been regardedeither as a new data point or as an anomaly.Massport chose the latter interpretation,ignoring the 1970 slump.Their projections also ignored thepossibility of competitivealternatives to airtravel.20 Massport'sfigures concerning the economic impact of expansionand the consequencesof a moratoriumon expansionwere debunkedby criticsas 'blatantpuffery'. As forMassport's contention that the new runwaywould be environmentallyadvantageous, city representatives concluded that an expanded airfield would only expose new populationsto intolerablenoise. Instead, they recommended measures to increasecapacity at Logan throughscheduling adjustments and effortsto distributethe hoursof peak demandby economiccontrols suchas landingfees. Differenceswere to be airedat a secondround of publichearings scheduledfor July 10, 1971. However,on July8, followinga task-force studythat recommendedalternatives to expansion,Governor Sargent publiclyopposed the constructionof the new runway.Under these circumstances,the Corps of Engineerswas unlikelyto approvethe

19 Landrum and Brown, Inc., Boston-Logan International Airport EnvironmentalImpact Analysis(11 February1972), sectionix, 3. 20 A systematiccritique of Massport's data was made by a commission chaired by Robert Behn (Chairman of Governor's Task Force on Inter-City Transportation),'Report to GovernorSargent' (April 1971).

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project, so Massportwithdrew its applicationfor a permitand temporarilyput aside its plansfor the runway.A yearand a halflater, in February1973, Massportdeleted the proposedrunway from the masterplan for futureairport development. Citing projections that were close to thoseused by airportopponents two yearsearlier, the PortAuthority claimed that re-evaluation of futureneeds indicated that thenew runway was no longernecessary. Both disputesnecessarily dealt with a greatnumber of genuine uncertaintiesthat allowed divergentpredictions from available data. The opposingexperts emphasized these uncertainties; but in any case, the substanceof the technicalarguments had littleto do withthe subsequentpolitical activity.

THE IMPACTOF EXPERTISE ON POLITICAL ACTION

In boththe airport and power plant controversy, it was theexistence of technicaldebate more than its substancethat stimulated political activity.2 In each case the factthat therewas disagreementamong expertsconfirmed the fears of the community and directedattention to what they feltwas an arbitrarydecision-making procedure in which expertisewas usedto maskquestions of political priorities. This relationshipbetween technical disputes and politicalconflict was moststriking in thepower plant case. Cornellscientists assessed the NYSE&G reportwith the intentionof providingtechnical information to the public.They focusedalmost entirely on the issue of thermal pollution- the effectof the plant'sheated effluent on CayugaLake. The citizens'groups, however, were most concerned with the issueof radiation.They had followedthe considerablediscussion in the press and in popularjournals about the riskg associated with the operation of nuclearreactors - risksthat had not been as widelypublicized at the timeof the firstcontroversy in 1968. Thus,the thermal pollution issue (whichhad dominatedearlier controversy) became, in 1973,a relatively minorconcern. Citizens, in contrastto thescientists who were advising them,focused on problemsof transportingand disposingof nuclear wastes,on the reliabilityof reactorsafety mechanisms, on reactorcore defectsthat would allow the releaseof radioactivegases, and on the dangerof human error or sabotage.

2 1 For furtherdiscussion of this point,see Nelkin,'The Role of Expertsin a Nuclear SitingControversy', op. cit. note 12.

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Whenthe citizens'committee first met to establisha positionon the issue, its newsletterconcentrated entirely on the reactorsafety issue.22 This set the tone of subsequentdiscussion, in whichthree possiblecourses of actionwere considered: that the committee oppose constructionof any nuclearplant on CayugaLake untilproblems of reactorsafety and disposalof radioactivewastes were resolved; that it take up its 1968 positionand oppose onlythe current design of Bell Station;or thatit supportNYSE&G plans.The firstproposal, one of totalopposition, won overwhelmingsupport. The emphasisof citizens' groupsthereafter was on the risksassociated with nuclearpower, despitethe fact that the technical debate dealt mainly with the problem of thermalpollution. The disputesbetween scientists, however, served as a stimulusto politicalactivity. In the firstplace, thecriticism by Cornellscientists neutralizedthe expertise of the power company. Simply suggesting that therewere opposing points of viewon one dimensionof the technical problemincreased public mistrustof the company'sexperts, and encouragedcitizens to oppose the plant.Second, the involvementof scientistsgave moral support to communityactivists, suggesting that theirwork would be effective.The citizens'groups called attention to NYSE&G's statementthat if therewere concertedopposition, the companywould not go aheadwith its plans. The readysupport of local scientistsled to substantialexpectation in the communitythat the effortinvolved in writingletters and goingto meetingswould not be wasted. As for the detailsof the technicaldispute, they had littledirect bearingon thedynamics of the case. Citizenstrusted those experts who supportedtheir position. People who supportedNYSE&G voicedtheir trustin theconsultants employed by thepower company:

Let us allow the professionalsto make the decisions that they get paid to make.

And powerplant criticsused expertiseonly as a meansto bringthe issueback to itsappropriate political context. The case was one oflocal priorities,they claimed; it was nota technicaldecision:

22 CCSCL (Citizens Committeeto Save Cayuga Lake), Newsletter,6 (April 1973). This newsletterreprinted in full a selection of well-informedarticles - notably those by Robert Gillettein Science, 176 (5 May 1973); 177 (28 July;1, 8, 15 and 22 September1972); and 179 (26 January1973).

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To say thatour futureis out of our handsand entrustedto scientistsand techniciansis an arrogantassumption... We suggestthat the opinions of area residentswho caredeeply about their environment and its future are of equal ifnot greater importance.23

In the airportcase, the technicalarguments served primarily to reinforcethe existingmistrust of Massportamong those opposed to airportexpansion, and they were virtuallyignored by those who supportedMassport. Opinions about the necessityof the runwaywere well establishedprior to the actualdispute. In East Boston,Massport employeesand local sportsclubs which were supported by an airport communityrelations programme defended the PortAuthority's plans fora new runwayand maintained their trust in Massport'scompetence.

In termsof efflcientand competent operation, Massport is headand shoulders aboveother agencies.

Airportopponents, while benefitting from the adviceprovided by expertsfrom the Cityof Boston,claimed the issue was a matterof commonsense and justice. They defined the problem in termsof values (such as neighbourhoodsolidarity) which are not amenableto expert analysis.

We need no experts.These people will verify themselves the effect of noise. . . . Massportis extremelyarrogant. They do nothave the slightest conception of thehuman suffering they cause and could not care less.24

Airportcritics pointed out varioustechnical errors and problemsof interpretationin Massport'spredictions and environmentalimpact statements;but thissimply re-confirmed the community'ssuspicion of Massport,and furtherpolarized the dispute.Later, these same experts who were sympatheticto East Boston's noise problemfailed to convincethe communityto accepta Massportplan for a soundbarrier. Despiteadvice that this would help to relievetheir noise problem,- the communitychose to oppose constructionof thebarrier. Local activists

23 Statementby Jane Rice cited in theIthaca Journal, (14 May1973), 1. 24 These statementsare fromtestimony at U.S. Corps of Engineers' Hearings,op. cit. note 18. The ultimateexpression of this kind of sentiment was, of course,the remark alleged to havebeen made by formervice president Spiro Agnew,responding to the reportby the U.S. PresidentialCommission on Pornographyand Obscenity:'I don't care what the expertssay, I know pornographycorrupts!'

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fearedthat this was a diversion,and thatif theyaccepted this project the communitywould somehowlose out in thelong run. Thus, they disregardedexpert opinion that this was a favourabledecision, and the old mistrustprevailed.

SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS

The two conflictsdescribed above, over the sitingof a powerplant and the expansionof an airport,have several aspects in common.One can trace parallels,for instance,in the way the developersused expertiseas a basis and justificationof theirplanning decisions; how expertson both sides of the controversyentered the disputeand presentedtheir technical arguments; and how citizensaffected by the plan perceivedthe dispute. Similarities are evident in publicstatements, as developers,experts and citizensexpressed their concerns about variousaspects of the decision-makingprocess. These are comparedin Table 2. These similarities,especially with respectto the use of scientificknowledge, suggest several related propositions which may be generalizableto other controversiesinvolving conflicting technical expertise: First, developersseek expertiseto legitimizetheir plans and they use their commandof technicalknowledge to justifytheir autonomy.They assumethat special technical competence is a reason to precludeoutside public (or 'democratic')control. Second,while expert advice can helpto clarifytechnical constraints, it also is likelyto increaseconflict, especially when expertise is available to those communitiesaffected by a plan. Citizens' groups are increasinglyseeking their own expertise to neutralizethe impact of data providedby project developers.25Most issues that have become politicallycontroversial (environmental problems, fluoridation, DDT) containbasic technicalas well as politicaluncertainties, and evidence can easilybe musteredto supportor opposea givenproposal. Third,the extentto whichtechnical advice is accepteddepends less on its validityand thecompetence of theexpert, than on theextent to

25 For furtherdiscussion of the tactics of using expertise within the fluoridationcontroversy, for example, see Robert Crain et al., The Politics of CommunityConflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill,1969); and H. M. Sapolsky, 'Science, Voters and the Fluoridation Controversy',Science, 162 (25 October 1968), 427-33.

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Table 2. Perspectiveson DecisionMaking and Expertise

Powerplant dispute Runwaydispute

Developers On responsibility Ourstudy is themost Weare closer and more and competence comprehensivestudy ever knowledgeablethan any other forplanning madeon thelake. Opponents groupno matterwhat their can createdelays but are intentionmay be, on what notrequired to assume LoganAirport. . . what responsibility. MetropolitanBoston.... what NewEngland needs.

On publicdebate Wehave adopted a postureof Wehave competent staffs. . . I no publicdebate. can'tsee anysense in having a publichearing. .. If it is to be by consensusthat the authorityoperates ...

Experts(consultants) On impactof project Alternateapproaches would Adverseenvironmental impact haveundesirable effects on willresult from failure to thehuman environment. . . undertakethis project as theproposed design should contrastedwith the impact produceno significantimpact. ifthe Authority proceeds. Actualindividuals would be Noisemeasurements of typical exposedto muchlower doses urbannoise conditions. . . thanthat due to normal showthat street level habits. backgroundnoise overshadows taxi-waynoise.

On planning Althoughan ecologicalmodel A masterplan would be mightbe desirablefrom an nothingmore than an academic academicviewpoint it is not exercise... a studyof this feltto be necessaryto magnitudecould never be providean adequateassessment justifiedfor a smallproject of theimpact of theminor of thisnature. perturbationintroduced by theproposed plant.

Experts(critics) On developers'data Statementsand conclusions Analysisof theeconomic werenot justified and must impactof LoganAirport thereforebe regardedas showsdemonstrated 'blatant nothingmore than guesses... puffery'in thefigures The database is notonly appearingin thereport. inadequate,but misleading.

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Table 2 contd. Perspectiveson DecisionMaking and Expertise

Citizens (project supporters) On decision-making Let us allowthe professionals In termsof efficient and responsibility to makethe decisions that competentoperation, theyget paid to make. Massportis headand shouldersabove other agencies.

Citizens (project opponents) Citizens(project To say that our futureis We need no experts.These On decision-making out of ourhands and peoplewill verify themselves... responsibility entrustedto scientistsand Massportis extremelyarrogant. techniciansis an arrogant Theydo nothave the assumption...We suggest slightestconception of the thatthe opinions of area humansuffering they cause residentswho care deeply and couldnot care less. abouttheir environment and itsfuture is of equal ifnot greaterimportance.

On decision-making Werethey using the power Whatis reallyon trialhere process thepeople gave them to is notjust the Port supporttheir own feelings Authority,it is reallythe or thoseof private concerns? Americansystem. Will it Thereis representative listento spokesmenfor the governmentin ourcountry, peopleand thepeople who butit sureisn't in our speakfor themselves? county.

Sources: These perspectivesare directquotations from public hearings,letters or transcriptsof meetings.

whichit reinforcesexisting positions. Our two cases suggest that factors such as trustin authority,the economicor employmentcontext in whicha controversytakes place, and the intensity of local concernwill mattermore than the quality of characterof technicaladvice.26 Fourth,those opposing a decisionneed not muster equal evidence.It is sufficientto raisequestions that will underminethe expertiseof a

26 The relation between beliefs and the interpretationof scientific informationis analyzed in S. B. Barnes,'On the Reception of ScientificBeliefs', in Barry Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science (Harmondsworth,Midx.: Penguin Books, 1972), 269-91.

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:36:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 54 DorothyNelkin developerwhose power and legitimacyrests on his monopolyof knowledgeor claimsof specialcompetence. Fifth,conflict among expertsreduces their political impact. The influenceof expertsis based on public trustin the infallibilityof expertise.Ironically, the increasingparticipation of scientistsin politicallife may reduce theireffectiveness, for the conflictarnong scientists that invariably follows from their participationin controversialpolicies highlights their fallibility, demystifies their special expertiseand calls attentionto non-technicaland political assumptions thatinfluence technical advice.27 Finally,the role of expertsappears to be similarregardless of whetherthey are 'hard'or 'soft'scientists. The twoconflicts described here involvedscientists, engineers, economists and lawyersas experts. The similaritiessuggest that the technical complexityof the controversialissues does not greatlyinfluence the political nature of a dispute. In sum, the way in whichclients (either developers or citizens' groups)direct and use the workof expertsembodies their subjective constructionof reality- theirjudgments, for example, about public prioritiesor about the level of acceptablerisk or discomfort.When thereis conflictin suchjudgments, it is bound to be reflectedin a biaseduse of technicalknowledge, in whichthe value of scientificwork dependsless on itsmerits than on itsutility.

27 See discussionof how controversyamong scientists influences legislators in Barnes,ibid.

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