Mongol and Tibetan Armies on the Trans-Himalayan Fronts in the Second Half of the 17th Century, with a Focus on the Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama* Federica Venturi (CNRS, CRCAO) t is well known that the formation of the Ganden Phodrang (Tib. Dga’ ldan pho brang) state was made possible by the in- i tervention of Oirat armies against the rivals of the Gelukpa (Dge lugs pa school) in Kham (Khams) and in Tsang (Gtsang). Without the military push and the generous and steady economic support of these Mongol groups, it is likely that the internal rivalries and skir- mishes for predominance on the plateau would have continued for some time, as the ongoing conflicts between Ü (Dbus) and Tsang in the first half of the 17th century demonstrated no clear dominance of one party over the other. In contrast, not only did the intervention of Oirat troops enable the establishment of the supremacy of the Fifth Dalai Lama (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1617–1682) and his school over a vast area of the plateau, but their continued support solidified his new government’s position against rebel provinces and strength- ened its hold on contested territories for the entire period of his reign. Mongol troops of both Oirat and Khalkha stock fought in combat against Karmapa rebels in 1642 and 1644, against Bhutan in 1648–1649 and 1656–1657, and against the kingdom of Ladakh between 1679 and 1684. 1 Similarly, Mongol generals were also at the head of troops * Research for this article was funded by the European Research Council (ERC) un- der the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement 677952 “TibArmy”). The content reflects only the author’s views and the ERC is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer along with Ge- dun Rabsal, Samten Karmay, Brian Baumann and the editors of this volume for providing help, comments and thought-provoking suggestions. 1 In 1642, reports describe 300 Mongol troops commanded by the Khalkha Dayan Noyon (Karmay 2014: 175); in 1644, sources (ibid.: 191; Shakabpa 2010: vol. 1, 350) mention a Tibeto-Mongol army (bod sog gi dmag); accounts of the war of 1656–1657 refer to the employment of Mongol soldiers as well as troops from Ü, Kham, and Kongpo (Kong po) (Karmay 2014: 374); in the war against Ladakh of 1679–1684 Mongol troops fought alongside reinforcements from Tsang (Petech 1977: 72). It is likely that at least some Mongol troops were employed also for the suppression of the 1659 rebellion of the depa Norbu and his nephew Gonashakpa (Sgo sna shag pa), as the advance platoon of 100 soldiers commanded by the Thaiji of Ukhere (U Federica Venturi, “Mongol and Tibetan Armies on the Trans-Himalayan Fronts in the Second Half of the 17th Century, with a Focus on the Autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama”, Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, no. 53, mars 2020, pp. 29–55. 30 Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines fighting for the Ganden Phodrang in Kham between 1674 and 1675.2 While on some of these occasions, especially the earlier ones such as the rebellions of 1642, Mongol soldiers seem to have fought unaided by local troops, already from 1644 Tibetan and Mongol fighters were employed side by side, sometimes under the double generalship of a Tibetan and a Mongol commander, and at other times led by a Mongol chief alone.3 Given this co-mingling of Tibetan and Mongol troops in times of war, one may wonder how reciprocal relations between these two groups unfolded on the battleground, and how their different ap- proaches to warfare coexisted. In particular, this paper examines what can be gleaned about the use of Mongol forces from the autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama himself,4 so as to ascertain at what level he was aware of the usefulness of the Mongols as a martial resource; whether he showed preference for the use of one army over another; and whether he was cognisant of the rivalries or disagreements between Mongol and Tibetan troops. The reasons for taking the autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama as a key primary source on this subject are multiple. First, the autobiog- raphy is written in a diary-like style, i.e. its entries are generally dated, thus allowing us to follow the temporal progression of a particular state of affairs. Secondly, sources on war in Tibet are often scattered and hard to find because of the prevalence given to religious-based topics even in Tibetan historiographical literature. The autobiography khe re’i tha’i ji) probably included (and might even have exclusively comprised) Mongol troops. The rest of the soldiers that fought to retake the fort of Shigatsé in 1659 were recruited in Ü (Karmay 2014: 412). 2 In 1642, Dayan Noyon of the Khalkha and Aldar Khoshorchi were in charge of Mongol troops; in 1644 Gushri Khan himself participated in the conflict; in 1656– 1657 two of the commanders were Dalai Baatur and Machik Taiji (Ma gcig tha’i ji); in 1674–1675 Uljö Taiji was among the commanders; in the war against Ladakh of 1679–1684 the general of the troops from Lhasa was Ganden Tsewang Pelzang (Dga’ ldan Tshe dbang dpal bzang), a grandson of Gushri Khan. 3 For a general overview of the wars fought in the period of the Fifth Dalai Lama see Venturi 2018: 23–47. For example, in the war against Bhutan of 1644 there was a dedicated Mongol division (sog dmag dum bu). The TibArmy project is preparing a timeline of the wars fought during the Ganden Phodrang, to be published online on the TibArmy website. 4 Za hor gyi ban de ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho’i ’di snang ’khrul pa’i rol rtsed rtogs brjod kyi tshul du bkod pa du kū la’i gos bzang, composed between 1667 and 1681 and comprising three volumes, of which only the first so far has been entirely trans- lated in English (see Karmay 2014). Although the Fifth Dalai Lama is technically the author, the drafting of the text itself involved the work of multiple hands, that combined handwritten notes, official records, and personal recollections into a co- herent whole. This process is illustrated in detail in Schaeffer 2010: 272–273. Mongol and Tibetan Armies on the Trans-Himalayan Fronts 31 of the Fifth Dalai Lama, although it too is of course predominantly con- cerned with religious questions, also contains comprehensive infor- mation on political and military situations requiring his own top- down attention, since he regarded himself as the spiritual and secular ruler of Tibet, and theoretically all major decisions taken by the Gan- den Phodrang were subject to his oversight.5 Last, the personal viewpoint of the Dalai Lama as expressed in his diary allows to focus on how a Buddhist figure at the head of a Bud- dhist government tackled issues of war and violence and justified their use, both in his own eyes and in the eyes of his prospective audience (including his immediate cabinet at the time of writing and those who would read his autobiography in the future). Naturally, one of the drawbacks of using a single source is that the particular viewpoint it represents, its bias, cannot be counterbalanced. But in fact this disad- vantage can be turned into an advantage when one considers that the single perspective it presents affords an insight into the official posi- tion of the Ganden Phodrang vis à vis the military confrontations in which it was involved. Thus, it allows us to reconstruct the formal pro- cesses by which the Ganden Phodrang endorsed the employment of violent methods which were theoretically proscribed by Buddhism. However, before delving into the theme of what the Fifth Dalai Lama may or may not have known about the various troops fighting on behalf of his government, it may be useful to look briefly at the gen- eral question of the reputation of Mongol troops. Among the more in- formative descriptions of the perils that Mongol troops posed for au- tochthonous Himalayan armies are a few passages from the early–18th century source, the Miwang Tokjö (Mi dbang rtogs brjod),6 which dedi- cates some space to describing the conflict between the Ganden Phodrang and Ladakh in the years 1679 to 1684. In particular, this text summarises the events preceding the first battle of the war in 1679,7 5 On the Fifth Dalai Lama’s self perception of his simultaneous secular and spiritual rule in Tibet see Schwieger 2015: 52–53; note however that determining who actu- ally wielded secular power in Tibet at this time (the Fifth Dalai Lama, Gushri Khan and his successors, or the regents of the Dalai Lama) is a much less clear matter. On this see again Schwieger (ibid.: 53–61). To this uncertain picture must be added, after 1652, also the influential figure of the Qing emperor, whose authority as the chief political figure in East Asia could not be easily dismissed (see ibid.: 61–64). 6 This is the biography of Pholhané Sönam Topgyel (Pho lha nas Bsod nams stobs rgyal, 1689–1747) composed by Dokhar zhapdrung Tsering Wanggyel (Mdo mkhar zhabs drung Tshe ring dbang rgyal, 1697–1763), who after 1728 was one of Pholhané’s most loyal friends and allies. It was completed in 1733, while Pholhané was still alive. For this paper I have used three editions of this text, but I limit ref- erences to the 2002 edition.