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CAPITULATION ENTRE ADULTES capitulation entre adultes grèce 2015 : une alternative était possible éric toussaint éditions syllepse (paris) DU MÊME AUTEUR Le Système dette. Histoire des dettes souveraines et de leur répudiation, Paris, Les Liens qui libèrent, 2017. Généalogie du CADTM et des politiques anti-dette, avec Benjamin Lemoine, Liège, CADTM, 2017. Bancocratie, Bruxelles, Aden, 2014. Procès d’un homme exemplaire, Marseille, Al Dante, 2013. AAA. Audit. Annulation. Autre politique, avec Damien Millet, Paris, Le Seuil, 2012. Un Coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur, l’idéologie néolibérale des origines jusqu’à aujourd’hui, Cuesmes-Mons, Le Cerisier, 2010. 60 questions 60 réponses sur la dette, le FMI et la Banque mondiale, avec Damien Millet, Paris, Syllepse, 2008. Banque du Sud et nouvelle crise internationale, alternatives et résistances au capitalisme néo- libéral, Paris, Syllepse, 2008. Banque mondiale : le coup d’État permanent. L’Agenda caché du consensus de Washington, Paris, Syllepse, 2006. Les Tsunamis de la dette, avec Damien Millet, Paris, Syllepse, 2005. La Finance contre les peuples : la Bourse ou la vie, Paris, Syllepse, 2004. Afrique : abolir la dette pour libérer le développement, avec Arnaud Zacharie, Paris, Syllepse , 2001. Le Bateau ivre de la mondialisation, avec Arnaud Zacharie, Paris, Syllepse, 2000. La Bourse ou la vie, Liège/Paris/Genève, Luc Pire, 1998. COMITÉ POUR L’ANNULATION DES DETTES ILLÉGITIMES www.cadtm.org 35 rue Fabry 4000 Liège, Belgique © éditions syllepse 2020 69, rue des rigoles, 75020 paris [email protected] www.syllepse.net isbn : 978-2-84950-832-9 Table des matières INTRODUCTION 7 1. Les propositions de Varoufakis menaient à l’échec 17 2. Le récit discutable des origines de la crise grecque 25 Varoufakis et le gouvernement de Georges Papandréou (Pasok) (2009-2011) Varoufakis et Antonis Samaras L’amitié entre Stournaras et Varoufakis 3. Comment Tsipras et Varoufakis ont tourné le dos au programme de Syriza 33 Les premiers contacts de Varoufakis avec Tsipras et Pappas Varoufakis, l’audit de la dette et la suspension du paiement Varoufakis contre le programme électoral de Syriza de mai-juin 2012 Malgré ce désaccord, varoufakis accepte de poursuivre la collaboration Une nouvelle « conférence de Londres » ? La suite des discussions avec l’équipe de Tsipras en 2014 Varoufakis contre le programme de Thessalonique de septembre 2014 4. Les conseillers du ministre des finances 57 Les conseillers du ministre Varoufakis Larry Summers, Jeffrey sachs et quelques autres collaborations incompatibles avec le programme de Syriza Spyros Sagias, un autre défenseur de l’ordre dominant aux côtés de Tsipras et Varoufakis 5. Une stratégie de négociation vouée à l’échec 67 Les débuts du nouveau gouvernement Tsipras Les premiers jours de Varoufakis comme ministre l’image radicale de Varoufakis Varoufakis et le programme de gouvernement de Syriza Les propositions faites par Varoufakis à la Troïka La stratégie de négociation adoptée par Varoufakis Dès le 4 février 2015, la BCE sort l’artillerie lourde contre le gouvernement grec 6. Vers l’accord funeste avec l’Eurogroupe du 20 février 2015 101 De retour à Athènes Yanis Varoufakis cherche l’appui de l’OCDE 11 février 2015 : la première réunion de l’Eurogroupe avec le gouvernement grec 12 février : une concession, vraiment ? Les 13, 14 et 15 février à Bruxelles 16 février à Bruxelles, deuxième échec de l’Eurogroupe Le tournant vers l’accord du 20 février et le prolongement du mémorandum Conclusion 5 7. Fin février 2015 : la première capitulation 127 Du 21 au 24 février 2015 : Varoufakis boit le calice jusqu’à la lie Le silence de Varoufakis au sujet des débats dans le groupe parlementaire de Syriza Le 27 février, nouvel acte d’allégeance de Varoufakis à l’égard de la Troïka Varoufakis maintient Chouliarakis à son poste Mon témoignage sur le processus qui a conduit à l’accord de février 2015 Conclusion 8. Diplomatie secrète et espoirs déçus 151 La diplomatie secrète de Tsipras et Varoufakis Varoufakis et le FMI La décision de suspendre le paiement de la dette au FMI Silence total de Varoufakis sur la Commission pour la vérité sur la dette De la tragédie à la farce : il n’y a qu’un vol d’avion Le dialogue de Varoufakis avec Obama Conclusions 9. Vers le dénouement 165 Les travaux de la Commission pour la vérité sur la dette grecque Yanis Varoufakis n’a pas aidé la Commission pour la vérité sur la dette grecque Le fameux plan X Malaise dans le gouvernement et dans Syriza Réunion avec Panagiotis Roumeliotis, ancien représentant de la Grèce au FMI Pourquoi le silence sur la Commission pour la vérité sur la dette grecque La Troïka renforce la pression sur le gouvernement La convocation du référendum du 5 juillet 2015 Malgré le triomphe du « Non », le gouvernement de Tsipras capitule Trahison du verdict populaire Conclusion 10. Oui, il y avait une alternative pour réussir 191 Qu’est-ce qui était le plus urgent à partir de janvier 2015 ? Leçons pour la lutte en Europe et ailleurs Chronologie (janvier 2015-août 2019) 213 Bibliographie 219 Index 221 encarts déclaration de la conférence d’athènes sur la dette et l’austérité (mai 2011) 54 programme de Thessalonique présenté par Alexis Tsipras (13 septembre 2014) 91 accord signé par Varoufakis lors de la réunion de l’Eurogroupe (20 février 2015) 123 INTERVIEW d’Éric Toussaint réalisée par Tassos Tsakiroglou (journaliste au quotidien grec Le Journal des Rédacteurs 145 témoignage de Zoé konstantopoulou concernant la collaboration pour la mise en place de la commission d’audit 147 6 INTRODUCTION Le 25 janvier 2015, alors que la Grèce subit depuis 2010 une sévère cure d’austérité imposée par ses créanciers et par les partis social-démo- crate (Pasok) et conservateur (Nouvelle Démocratie) qui ont alterné au gouvernement, le parti Syriza (acronyme signifiant en grec « coalition de la gauche radicale ») remporte les élections législatives en Grèce, avec 149 députés sur 300. Faute de majorité absolue au Parlement, Syriza forme un gouvernement de coalition avec ANEL (petite organi- sation de droite « souverainiste » qui annonçait, comme Syriza, vouloir faire une priorité de la sortie des politiques d’austérité). Le principal dirigeant de Syriza, Alexis Tsipras, devient Premier ministre, et nomme Yanis Varoufakis, économiste de gauche proche de Syriza, ministre des finances. Il est essentiel de prendre le temps d’analyser la politique mise en œuvre par Yanis Varoufakis et le gouvernement d’Alexis Tsipras car, pour la première fois au 21e siècle, un parti de gauche radicale a été élu en Europe pour former un gouvernement. Moins de six mois après avoir pris ses fonctions, ce gouvernement se pliait finalement aux exigences des créanciers, renonçant de fait à mettre fin à l’austérité. Comprendre les échecs et tirer les leçons de la manière dont ce gou- vernement a affronté les problèmes qu’il a rencontrés sont de la plus haute importance si on veut éviter un nouveau fiasco. Dans d’autres pays d’Europe, une majorité d’électeurs et d’électrices pourrait porter au gouvernement des forces de gauche qui promettent de rompre avec la longue nuit néolibérale et de réaliser de profonds changements. Des explosions sociales de grande ampleur peuvent aussi déboucher sur l’arrivée de forces de gauche radicale au gouvernement. Même là où les chances d’arriver au gouvernement sont très limitées, il est fondamental de présenter un programme cohérent de mesures qui devraient être prises par un gouvernement aussi fidèle au peuple que le sont les gou- vernants actuels à l’égard du grand capital. Il est également nécessaire 7 capitulation entre adultes introduction de proposer une stratégie pour affronter les ennemis du changement et de l’émancipation. L’année 2015 marquera l’histoire de la Grèce, de l’Europe et de la gauche en ce premier quart du 21e siècle. Le livre que vous avez entre les mains constitue un guide pour des lecteurs et des lectrices qui ne se contentent pas de la narration dominante présentée par les grands médias et les gouvernements de la Troïka ; des lecteurs et des lectrices qui ne se satisfont pas non plus de la version donnée par l’ex-ministre des finances du premier gouvernement Syriza. Si vous n’avez pas encore lu Conversations entre adultes1 de Yanis Varoufakis, commandez-le à votre libraire. Cela se lit comme un polar politique, il y a du suspense, des rebondissements, des trahisons… L’immense intérêt de ce livre, c’est que l’auteur donne sa version d’évè- nements qui ont influencé et influencent encore la situation interna- tionale, en particulier en Europe mais aussi au-delà car la déception provoquée par la capitulation du gouvernement dirigé par Alexis Tsipras a marqué profondément les esprits. En contrepoint du récit de Varoufakis, j’indique des évènements qu’il passe sous silence et j’exprime un avis différent du sien sur ce qu’il aurait fallu faire, sur l’appréciation de ce qu’il a fait et sur la stratégie adoptée par le gouvernement dirigé par Alexis Tsipras. Mon récit ne se substitue pas au sien, il se lit en parallèle. Pour comprendre mon livre, la lecture de celui de Varoufakis n’est pas indispensable car je résume systématiquement les opinions et les faits importants présents dans sa narration. La critique que je fais des choix opérés par Varoufakis et par le gou- vernement de Tsipras est précise et argumentée. Varoufakis a pris la peine de communiquer ce qu’il considère être sa part de vérité. Il a pris des risques en le faisant. S’il n’avait pas écrit ce livre, bien des faits importants seraient restés inconnus. Néanmoins, il a sélectionné les faits qui abondaient dans son sens et cela m’amène à compléter le tableau afin de permettre une meilleure compréhension de ce qui s’est réellement passé.
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