Choices Made
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CHOICES MADE CHOICE MADE A Memoir by David T. McLaughlin with Howard J. Coffin HANOVER NEW HAMPSHIRE 2007 THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH AN INITIATIVE BY AND THE ONGOING ENCOURAGEMENT OF Frederick B. Whittemore ALSO CENTRAL TO PROJECTION OF THE BOOK HAVE BEEN Berl Bernhard, John L. Callahan Jr., and Mona M. Chamberlain AND OVERALL PREPARATION HAS BEEN COORDINATED BY Edward Connery Lathem Copyright © 2007 by Judith Landauer McLaughlin TITLE-PAGE ILLUSTRATION: DAVID T. MCLAUGHLIN in the entryway of the President's Office at Dartmouth College —1984 Photograph by Nancy Wasserman CONTENTS Introduction • vii 1: Doing the Right Thing • 3 2: The Beginning 1 • 14 3 : Formative Values • 25 4: The Test • 34 5: Service • 43 6 : The Beginning 11-50 7: Knowing When to Leave • 60 8: Knowing When to Arrive • 72 9: Transition • 90 10 : Hard Choices • 103 11: Pomp and Ceremony • 114 12: Priorities • 130 13: Reality 1 • 140 14: Reality 11 • 153 15: Using Authority • 169 16 : Providing for the Future • 187 17: Below the Line • 199 18 : Life Goes On • 208 Chronology • 225 Index • 229 BY WAY OF PREFACE AT his death in 2004, David McLaughlin left behind the text here pub- JLJL lished. In a statement he drafted regarding the nature of his projected volume, he characterized what had been written by him and his collabora tor as being "a personal memoir, one focusing centrally upon my relation ship during more than half a century to my alma mater, Dartmouth Col lege." However, it was of course, he emphasized, "not intended as a history of the college during the time discussed." He then went on to indicate that what had been produced was also, essentially, "about institutional gover nance within the context of higher education"—declaring: "It is hoped that this publication may serve to inform boards of trustees about certain criteria that can be employed in choosing presidential succes sors. It is also intended to illustrate and comment upon various manage ment philosophies and styles within the academic setting. Finally, the book is meant to emphasize the particular importance of the management style of the president and the role of trustees during periods of pronounced ex ternal pressures, and how the president s relationship with the trustees will affect the quality of governance that exists at such times." Introduction by Berl Bernhard DAVID MCLAUGHLIN, as I had occasion to say at the Aspen Institutes memorial service for him, by any measure embodied the mantra of the an cient Greeks: virtue in excellence; excellence in virtue. His was an indomi table and magnetic presence, engagingly articulate, driven to do well and good—always with a twinkle in his eyes, beneath that row of bushy eye brows. He was tough and sweet. He had the exuberance of a natural leader. We served together for a decade as Dartmouth trustees, first, during John Kemenys administration, then, during Davids own. The two men, Kemeny •[ vii ]• and McLaughlin, came to the position of president by very different paths. The former, being himself of the faculty, was by and large welcomed by its members; the latter, not of academe, was from the outset confronted by a substantial degree of faculty skepticism and distrust. When in 1981 he ascended to the presidency of his beloved alma mater, he set about on a bold and controversial course. He saw the economic dis tress of the college as an opportunity. Over five years, he grew the endow ment to an historic high. He renovated classrooms, raised faculty salaries, maintained the colleges "need blind" admissions policy, reinforced an ear lier commitment to ensure that fraternities that had racially discriminatory clauses not remain on campus, and fought entrenched interests, to create the new medical center now regarded as one of the nations finest. His accomplishments were legion, but the moment uneasy. Indeed, this was a period of widespread maximum tension between faculties and admin istrations—perhaps the legacy of the sixties, of Vietnam and racial strug gles; in any event, of near-universal social uproar. Demonstrations against Dartmouth's investments in apartheid South Africa were frequent and bois terous, the colleges Indian symbol was under attack, and the integration of growing numbers of minorities and women was complex and sensitive. At the same time, David faced a largely hostile faculty that, up front, did not appreciate being governed by one not their own. That he had previously been chairman of the colleges board of trustees was not helpful; it somehow tended to emphasize and reinforce faculty attitudes that a leader from the world of business could not serve successfully as president of Dartmouth. Running Dartmouth College, even in less turbulent times, was never easy. Davids predecessors, John Kemeny and John Sloan Dickey, had their own bouts with the faculty, and some of the searing issues that befell Da vid McLaughlin had in fact been generated before his presidency. However, David was not prepared to compromise his ambitious goals by listening endlessly to what he viewed as unreasonable carping. Criticisms of him, which he candidly addresses in this book, have largely to do with his management style, his impatience with seemingly never- ending debate, and his unstated slogan "Do it now." But Davids self-evalu ation on some of the pages that follow reflects, in my judgment, excessive mea culpa—frequently blaming himself, almost in isolation, when in large •[ viii ]• measure, during the time involved, there beset both the college and the country as a whole a fundamental and poisonous distrust of any adminis trative system. During an address delivered at his fiftieth Dartmouth class reunion, Da vid focused on the tension that had years earlier existed between him and the colleges faculty, saying: "Whether nationally or locally, it is evident that too often we fail to lis ten; we fail to consider critically the values of the arguments made by the opposition; we seem to have failed to learn the lesson of how to disagree civilly. The ability to disagree civilly is fundamental not only to the process of liberal learning, but also to the functioning of a democratic society. It is one of the lessons that I had to learn the hard way during my presidency, when dealing with the ROTC issue, divestiture, and even the relocation of the medical center." Business acumen, an awakened sensitivity to listening, and a recom mitment to change through civil dialogue led David to the presidency of the Aspen Institute at its most dire moment: its land sold; its campus and buildings in shambles; its very mission to develop values-based leadership compromised. During six of his ten years as president, I had the privilege to serve as chairman of the Aspen board and to witness the "Energizer Bunny" doing his thing. The land was reacquired; the quality of seminars was up graded; and over twenty million dollars was raised to complete the new campus. In the course of his Aspen tenure, he repeatedly emphasized that ". We need to focus more on the younger generation, and we need to accept that the Aspen mission must go beyond our borders." While he supported vigorously all of our international partners, over the years he and I pushed, sometimes literally, to establish Aspen in India, a country he knew and admired. He found the delay exasperating and was elated when at last, in 2004, Aspen India was born. Just a week and a half before he died, he was back in Aspen awarding degrees to graduating Crown Fellows, a program that selects each year twenty outstanding community-spirited young leaders and seeks to deepen •[ ix ]• their understanding of what values-based leadership demands. David con sidered the success of the Crown program to be the real jewel in the Aspen crown—and one of his most satisfying achievements. Never was our relationship more exhaustingly close than when, in 2001, he as chairman of the Red Cross asked Senator George Mitchell and me to help him revitalize that institution, then under harsh attack after 9/11. Our assignment: to help him manage the unmanageable and distribute fairly the billion dollars privately donated to the Liberty Disaster Fund. David had to respond to a torrent of national criticism against what appeared to be, in his words, "an arbitrary policy [which had been promulgated without his sanction or that of the Red Cross board] on how to use donated funds. The public lost faith in our ability to be faithful stewards of their generosity." It took almost a year to straighten out the categories of who should receive what level of financial aid. He listened to the complaints and needs of fami lies. He got it done. In addition to the fund-distribution controversy, he also had to design an organizational structure to ensure that the fifty-seven thousand volun teers from across the country who came to New York City to provide hu manitarian aid were deployed effectively. They needed to be housed, fed, organized, and directed—immediately. This was no small task; think about it. Together we met in Washington, D.C., and New York City with those who had been wounded and with families of the deceased. It was a sear ing exposure, but Davids capacity to reassure and comfort made it more tolerable for everyone. Unquestionably, his performance helped to regain the trust the Red Cross had so richly earned before the catastrophe put its reputation in jeopardy. Senator Elizabeth Dole, the Red Cross president who convinced David to join its board of governors, has reflected with regard to the impact of his leadership: "Davids contribution cannot be overstated.