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USFOR-A “We Can, We Will” USFOR-A “We Can, We Will” Afghanistan Trainers Community of Interest 21 Apr 10 1530-1700Z The overall classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO J7 / COL Barry Hadley, DSN: 237-1649 21 Apr 10 / [email protected] UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO Agenda 21 Apr 10 • Opening Remarks • Due-out Review • BG Leo Beulen (NDL): Chief, HQ ISAF CJ3 • CIVCAS Issues • Revised ISAF SOP 373 • USFOR-A Issues • Upcoming Events J7 / COL Barry Hadley, DSN: 237-1649 21 Apr 10 / [email protected] UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 2 UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO TCOI Due-out Updates # Date Lead Action Update 1 7 Apr 10 HQ ISAF CJ-37 Given statement, “51% of CIVCAS is caused by Compiling from multiple HQ IJC J7 EOF”, provide a top 10 list of examples that can be sources (CAAT, IJC, CJTFs) used for scenarios in pre-deployment training Will post to ISAF/IJC Wiki [COL Martin - NTC] and SIPR JKO Portal 2 7 Apr 10 USFOR-A J7 Provide information regarding EoF and CIVCAS to Posted JALLC studies from support a briefing to OPS DEPS and Tank [JS J7] Jun 09 – Feb 10 on SIPR TCOI Portal 3 7 Apr 10 HQ ISAF CJ-37 How do units link in with the Afghan Mission This topic has been Network (AMN) for pre-deployment operations? addressed in 2 previous [COL Deane – BCTP] TCOIs. Will hold for future TCOI once AMN goes live J7 / COL Barry V. Hadley, DSN: 237-1649 21 Apr 10 / [email protected] UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 3 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED COMISAF Training Directive AFG TCOI Conference 21 Apr 10 BG BEULEN Chief, HQ ISAF/CJ3 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 4 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Agenda • Introduction • COMISAF’s COIN Training Guidance • COMISAF’s Directives • Hot Topics • Parting Thoughts NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 5 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Introduction • Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires a shift in mindset from “enemy focused” methodology to “population centric” – All forces must understand and apply COIN in their missions – Very few of ISAF‟s Troop Contributing Nations have COIN Doctrine – NATO is still working on common COIN doctrine and training • COMISAF‟s COIN Guidance and COIN Training Guidance documents provide the foundation – JFCBS Directive 75-8 further delineates training guidance and tasks in accordance with OPLAN 30302 Annex BB All Forces are ISAF's Ambassadors throughout the country NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 6 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED COMISAF’s Training Guidance COIN Language Active Support Passive Support Neutral; “on the Passive Support Active Support Nuetral of GIRoA of GIRoA Fence” of Insurgents of Insurgents • Important as other soldier skills • Critical for partnering relationship • People are the Prize • Understand • Respect for country & culture • Change: think-act-opsOperational • 95% speak Dari, 65% speak Pashtu • Language Environment • US: “AFPAK Hands;” Others? • C-IED • Manage-Fuse Info • English: Be proficient Day 1 • Driving • Detainee Ops • Don’t get left behind! • Escalation of Force • Know Enablers • Fire Support • Decentralized Ops • Partnering • Money = effects Salaam ~ Chazh Bah Khigher ~ Tashakor • Civilian Gov & Dev • Learning Org… CTC-A Topics Counterparts Counter-IED • Inconsistent Basic Skills across National training programs • “Make-up” required in ISAF, Unsat • Need Operational-Strategic staff officer training Train the force before it arrives in theater to be COIN-ready Day 1! 7 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED COMISAF’s Directives Tactical Directive Driving Directive • Protect the Population--win support • We’re highly visible; dismount, talk, • Accept tactical risk & shop Avoid Strategic Failure • Slow down, don’t interrupt traffic, let • Disciplined use & escalation of force civilians pass • Battle damage assessment • No Hit & Run--do accident form, • Cultural Considerations unless immediate risk • Incidents: stay, assess, report, • Reckless & aggressive driving explain, settle, investigate • Alienates Afghan people Escalation of Force and ROE Civilian Casualties • Can win tactically but lose strategically • “CIVCAS is how we LOSE” • Insurgent math: -1 Civ + 20 INS • CIVCAS spike despite COM emphasis • Appropriate escalation & Positive ID? • Understanding/behaviour ingrained during training & ops? NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 8 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Hot Topics Partnering Civ-Mil • ISAF & ANSF: 1 entity--1 purpose • New Civ Dynamic • Habitual, not ad hoc • New NATO SCR and UN SRSG • Live, train, plan & execute together • Civilian Campaign Plans • NATO Pol-Mil Plan • Mutual trust, respect, & sharing • US Civ-Mil Plan (1) Explain • Plan: Build-Hold-Clear-Shape (2) Show (3) ISAF-lead • Civilian Counterparts in Training? • Civ Reps at all levels (4) ANSF-lead • District Delivery (5) ANSF lead w/ overwatch • Afghan Civilian Counterparts • COMISAF Partnering Shura • Ministries, staffs, & Independent • ID best practices & shortfalls Directorate for Local Governance Fixing Intelligence • DCOS Intel, MG Flynn published report ~ Jan 10 • Too focused on insurgents • Holistic understanding (See 21 Feb 10 Washington Post article and Jan paper by Center for a New American Security) NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 9 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Parting Thoughts Get better every day. • Adapt to the environment -- Shape the environment • Partner with Afghan leaders, security forces, and the population – Listen to the Afghans you meet – Listen to their stories and what they want to tell you – Ask how we can improve and help them achieve their goals • Take action to improve stability in your area. • You are authorized -- you are responsible -- adjust your actions within COMISAF‟s intent • COIN is the focus–change the way you think, act, & operate – Help GIRoA earn the support of the Afghan people Active Support Passive Support Neutral; “on the Passive Support Active Support Nuetral of GIRoA of GIRoA Fence” of Insurgents of Insurgents NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 1 0 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Questions & Discussion NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 11 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED CIVCAS Issues BRIEF AFG TCOI 21APR10 Sources: HQ ISAF CCTC, USJFC JCOA NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 12 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED AGENDA • Strategic Importance of CIVCAS • CIVCAS background • Lessons Identified from Theatre NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 13 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED CIVCAS CONTEXT – STRATEGIC ISSUE “Because of CIVCAS I think that we have just about eroded out credibility here in Afghanistan. The constant repeat of CIVCAS is now so dangerous that it threatens the mission…I want confirmation that every soldier in the command from every country understands the Tactical Directive” COMISAF (13 Apr 10) NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 14 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Civilian Casualty Comparison 2009 - 2010 450 CIVCAS 2010 2009 2008 Total AC Killed by CF 85 181 261 408 Total AC Wounded by CF 96 335 372 400 Total 181 516 633 Total AC Killed by INS 284 1,014 973 2009 2010 Total AC Wounded by INS 614 2,407 1,983 344 350 Total 898 3,421 2,956 Grand Total 398 3,954 3,589 300 275 250 217 215 205 203 200 183 170 150 154 149 150 134 111 112 104 106 109 94 96 100 89 91 77 74 78 66 70 71 48 44 44 44 44 50 41 35 37 31 32 28 27 30 32 23 24 22 24 24 21 17 13 17 17 14 12 16 15 14 15 18 5 7 8 7 11 0 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 Afghan Civilians Killed by ISAF/OEF Afghan Civilians Wounded by ISAF/OEF Afghan Civilians Killed by INS Afghan Civilians Wounded by INS Sources: HQ ISAF CCTC, USJFC JCOA NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 15 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED CIVCAS Events by Category - Challenges 16 14 2009-2001 12 Most frequent event Categories 10 8 • Most of CF CIVCAS related to 6 EOF/ROE 4 • Main cause of AC death is CAS 2 0 CAS CCA EOF ROE IDF DF RTA Unknown 25 35 21 30 Last 12 weeks 30 20 19 18 25 Other categories 16 20 15 14 14 • Indirect Fire with failing in targeting 13 15 12 10 9 • Direct Fire during offensive ops 10 Events Numbers Events CIVCAS Numbers 8 5 5 5 • RTA 4 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 0 2 0 -5 CAS CCA EOF ROE IDF DF RTA Unknown CIV Wounded CIV Killed Events Sources: HQ ISAF CCTC, USJFC JCOA NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 16 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED CIVCAS Reporting – IAW ISAF SOP – Serves 2 purposes: • Records the facts • Identifies Lessons – Done in parallel with National Investigations – NEEDS TO BE APPLIED NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 17 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Pre-Deployment Training 1. Train in accordance with ISAF Directives: reinforce mindset of non-kinetic solutions 2. Improve coordination with air assets and IDF 3. Practice Integration of Ground Assets (especially mounted becoming dismounted) 4. Better understanding of what PID means (confirm, confirm, confirm) 5. Force the practice of ground BDA JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN SHOOT DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU SHOULD NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 18 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Pre-Deployment Training 6. Partnering is key – understand how to partner 7. Patterns of life are key – go to school before you deploy 8. Thinking leaders - plan to succeed. Don‟t make lethal force the only option 9. Practice CIVCAS reporting – force them to identify lessons and take remedial action 10. Use Scenarios from Theatre 11. PRACTICE; PRACTICE; PRACTICE JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN SHOOT DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU SHOULD NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 19 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED ISAF Directives • COMISAF Tactical Directive (1 Jul 09) • COMISAF Driving Directive (29 Aug 09) • COMISAF Night Raids Directive (23 Jan 10) • HQ ISAF EOF SOP • HQ ISAF CIVCAS SOP • IJC FRAGO – Command Directed Warning Shot Policy (dated 21 Jan 10) NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 20 NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED Questions? NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED 21 SOP 373 Direction & Guidance for Escalation of Force COMISAF Briefing 21st Apr 2010 (Maj Brian Cleary – Theatre Force Protection) 22 Escalation of Force A process which seeks to determine the extent of a potential threat and then to match that threat with an appropriate defensive response Purpose Principles • ISAF, USFOR-A & • Use of Force – Effort to control without force Contractors • Valuing Life • Lays down the – Care, dignity, respect – as you principles and would your neighbours • Involve Afghan People procedures to employ – ANSF, KLE, Educate the force in a controlled & people.
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