06 Utrechtseweg

Near the Museum for Modern Art Arnhem in Utrechtseweg is an Airborne pillar in remembrance of the final attempt by British soldiers to reach the Rhine Bridge on 19 September 1944. The pillar marks the furthest point reached by most of the soldiers, who belonged to The South Staffordshire Regiment. During the morning one company, ‘A’, commanded by Major Henry Lane, reached the premises of the Provinciale Gelderse Electriciteits Maatschappij (P.G.E.M.- Provincial Gelderland Electricity Company) opposite the white Kraton building on the other side of Utrechtsestraat. Nowa- days the NUON office occupies the site which stands at the point where Utrechtseweg becomes Utrechtsestraat. Airborne House - also visible from here - and other adjacent buildings formed ‘A’ Company’s[1] final battle position. Sunday 17 September 1944 SS-Panzer Pionier Bataillon 9 Monday 18 September 1944 Tuesday 19 september 1944 Counter-attack by the Germans

Sunday 17 September 1944 To explain why fighting took place at this location we need to take a short step back in time. The scheduled advance route of Lieutenant Colonel John Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion originally ran from the 1st British Airborne Division’s landing zones at Heelsum and Wolfheze, via Utrechtseweg to the bridge. The battalion took the central route, codenamed ‘Tiger’. The 1st Parachute Battalion’s (commanded by Lt. Col. David Dobie) task was to enter Arnhem via Amsterdamseweg, the northern city limits thus. This route was called ‘Leopard’. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Parachute Bat- talion was ordered to advance to the bridge via Benedendorpsweg, Klingelbeekseweg and Onderlangs. His unit was to follow the so-called ‘Lion’ route, along a road bordering the Rhine and to the south of the 3rd Parachute Battalion. However, on that first day of Operation Market Garden, 17 September 1944, the advance didn’t go entirely as planned. By evening, after a number of skirmishes to the west of Oosterbeek, 3rd Para- chute Battalion had got no farther than the western edge of the village. Just one company managed to reach the centre of the city via the Utrecht-Arnhem railway line (see point 36). Half of the 2nd Parachute Battalion reached the Rhine Bridge, the exceptions being ‘B’ Company, which had become involved in fighting near Oosterbeek-Laag railway station, and Major Victor Dover’s ‘C’ Company. That evening Dover and his men were the first British combat troops to advance along Utrechtseweg in Arnhem. Two scouts, Lance Corporal William Loney and Private Norman Shipley were killed, and their bodies lay in the street just past the Kraton for some days. The rest of the company sought cover from the German machinegun fire a little further on in a villa on the north side of the road. They spent the night there (see also point 5). At that time the Verkerk family lived at Utrechtsestraat 53, directly adjacent to the Kraton, and had taken to the cellar. In 1953 H. Verkerk, the youngest son, wrote: “At about 10 in the evening, as if by agreement, a hellish noise of gunfire and machinegun fire began. We heard the British in the porch, smashing at the door. Heavy firing was coming from the front and rear. The house shuddered under the fire aimed at it by the Germans using light Flak guns, thinking it was full of British. Maybe it was: we had no way of knowing. If so they must have come in at the rear.”[2] Late in the afternoon the 1st Parachute Battalion met strong opposition on Amsterdamseweg, and at the close of the first day the commander decided to head off southwards and follow the most souther- ly route. On Monday morning the battalion again encountered strong resistance from German positions in a brickworks to the south of Klingelbeekseweg. Radio communication between the three battalions was a failure, and the British parachutists’ situation was anything but clear.

1 SS-Panzer Pionier Bataillon 9 For the Germans, too, the first day and night were chaotic, 39 year-old Hauptsturmführer Hans Möller being just one of the confused. Late in the afternoon of 17 September he set off for Arnhem with his SS-Panzer Pionier Bataillon 9. He was reasonably familiar with the area because in May 1940, while serving as an engineer officer with the SS-Regiment “Der Führer”, he had been sent to Grebbeberg. [3] Möller’s battalion was part of the 9. SS-Panzer Division ‘Hohenstaufen’, and consisted of an HQ company, a construction company for the making and repair of bridges, and three armed engineer companies: 1, 2 and 3. In addition he had a reconnaissance platoon and two armoured vehicles at his dis- posal. Möller deployed the armoured vehicles close to his command post which was located in a room beneath the St. Elisabeths Gasthuis’s chapel. The total strength of the battalion was approximately 250 officers and men.[4] Hauptsturmführer Möller realized that Utrechtseweg was undoubtedly part of the British plan of attack if they intended advancing from Heelsum and Oosterbeek to the Rhine Bridge. Therefore, he placed his 1. Kompanie, commanded by Obersturmführer Georg Steinert, between Onderlangs and Utrecht- seweg. 2. Kompanie, under Obersturmführer Erhard Voss, was deployed by Möller to the north of Utrechtseweg and the railway line. In this way he would be able to block the British advance. Möller sent Obersturmführer Engel to the railway to see if there were any British parachutists in sight. They were not (yet) to be seen, so Engel was ordered to take up a position ahead of 2. Kompanie.[5] The unexpectedly quick arrival of Major Dover’s ‘C’ Company of the 2nd Parachute Battalion took Möl- ler by surprise. An exchange of fire between British parachutists and some of his (Möller’s) men, who were de-bussing at St. Elisabeths Gasthuis, convinced Möller he needed to exercise caution. He had no idea of the opposition’s strength. Möller was uneasy despite the presence of SS-Flak Abteilung 9, armed with 20mm Flak guns, on the south side of the railway line. “One has to take into account an enemy breakthrough, seeing that my transport orderly was being fired on and was hardly able to withdraw. It was a very confused position. We had made contact with the enemy [at St. Elisabeths Gasthuis], but the situation seemed unclear. I then requested reinforcements, but that was out of the question. Nevertheless, Artillerie Regiment 9 with Sturmbannführer Spindler was sent to reinforce our position. The engineer battalion was placed under the command of Spindler’s artillery regiment. It was already getting light when units of the artillery regiment took up positions on my left flank (to the south of Utrechtseweg), so that at that point we had a virtually seamless front with which to hamper any further enemy advance.”[6]

Maandag 18 september 1944 Monday morning the situation around Utrechtseweg had turned to the Germans’ advantage. The attempt by ‘C’ Company of the 2nd Parachute Battalion to cross Utrechtsestraat had failed. Only a small group reached the other side. Major Dover then decided to withdraw in the direction of St. Elisabeths Gasthuis via the back gardens of the houses in Utrechtsestraat and try to cross the road there. This manoeuvre foundered close to a large house diagonally opposite the museum. The company held out there for a while but were then taken prisoner (see point 5). That same morning the 3rd Parachute Battalion approached from the Oosterbeek direction. A sub- stantial number of men had taken a wrong turning near Oosterbeek-Laag station, so less than half of it arrived in the vicinity of St. Elisabeths Gasthuis. They occupied houses west of the hospital and advanced no further that day (see point 8). H. Verkerk in Utrechtsestraat recalled later: “Monday morning we saw through binoculars that there was fighting on the other side of the Rhine. During Monday there was heavy fighting in Onderlangs. In the evening there was a knock on the back door. Thinking it was the British we opened the door. It turned out to be the neighbour. According to him, the Germans were in his cellar firing through the ceiling at the British on the floor above, and the British were replying to the Germans in a similar manner. The neighbour’s name was Henzen and he (…...) lived at number 31 [close to the P.G.E.M. office]. After the war he moved house to Noordelijke Parallelweg.”[7]

2 On Monday Möller was still uneasy and unaware of the strength of the British parachutists opposing him. That morning his battalion had captured the bulk of ‘C’ Company. Towards midday he was con- fronted by the 3rd Parachute Battalion which now numbered fewer than 200 officers and men, therefore fewer in number than his own battalion: “The enemy attacked along both sides of Utrechtseweg in great strength. He had set up an anti -tank gun and was treating us to a rain of aimed shellfire. The street was covered with glass splinters and ash, and the overhead power lines for the trams had been brought down and were lying all over the street. The enemy’s objective was clear: push through by all means possible to the road bridge in Arnhem, about two kilometres to our rear. (…..) Much later the enemy tried to bypass us to our left, along Onderlangs. At that time [Monday] my weak force didn’t allow me to prevent them from taking this road because we, on Utrechtseweg and to the right along the railway line [the Lombok district], had enough to do to prevent any further enemy advance….”[8]

Tuesday 19 september 1944 In the night of 18/19 September, Lt. Col. Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the bridge via Onderlangs (see point 11), and heavy losses were suffered. A re- grouping at the Rijnpaviljoen near the junction of ‘Bovenover’ (Utrechtseweg) and Onderlangs sho- wed that the battalion had been reduced to fewer than 100 men. The Rijnhotel now stands at this site. The survivors were met at the Rijnpaviljoen by Lt. Col. Dobie’s 1st Parachute Battalion, which had advanced along Klingelbeekseweg. Dobie had suffered huge losses the previous day and the strength of his battalion was now down to approximately 150 officers and men. Fitch’s colleague told him about a plan to mount a simultaneous attack along Utrechtseweg and Onderlangs, heading for the Rhine Bridge. The 2nd South Staffords and the 11th Parachute Battalion were to carry out the attempt along Utrechtseweg. ‘D’ Company of the South Staffords led the way but came under heavy mortar and machinegun fire. By the time it had reached the museum there was just one officer and less than half the number of men left.[9] Captain Reggie Foot’s ‘B’ Company was sent up ahead and managed to gain some ground, but they were unable to advance much further than the museum garden. Foot had his company take up positions in a shallow dell at the west side of the building, while ‘A’ Company occupied the museum premises and houses across the road. ‘A’ Company made preparations to capture the Provinciale Gelderse Electriciteits Maatschappij (P.G.E.M.) buildings on the north side of Utrechtse- straat. During a short pause in the fighting which occurred at about 7.30 am, two of H. Verkerk’s brothers went outside to see what was going on: “Early in the morning of 19 September it was [suddenly] eerily quiet and my brothers and the neighbour went outside to take a look in house number 31. My brother said there were three dead British in the street. Later we discovered that 70 British had been in the house opposite ours, and they therefore saw what my brothers were doing. One body lay near our porch, a pleasant-looking young chap with red hair. Later on I saw him too. A bit further up lay a big fellow [Private Norman Shipley, 26 years old], face down. You could only see from his helmet where he had been hit. The helmet had fallen from his head and a bul- let had gone straight through it. He could not have suffered. The Germans didn’t move the bodies until Friday, having first robbed them. By that time they were in a state of decomposi- tion.”[10] At about 8 am ‘A’ Company began its attack. It reached the P.G.E.M. building in Utrechtsestraat, but got no further. Lieutenant David Russell, a platoon commander from ‘C’ Company, 2nd Parachute Battalion, was at the ‘A’ Company HQ in the museum. His platoon was ordered to observe German movements. For a short time he himself was in the small tower on the roof of the building:

3 “We were ordered to occupy the rooms on the first floor and to observe, but since no one seemed interested in our reports we waged our own battle with any Germans we saw. We passed on a target to the South Staffords mortar officer [Captain Willcocks], who was in action with his group near the museum. After a few rounds to establish the position, and at minimum range, they hit a machinegun post, putting it out of action for good."[11] Because the 2nd South Staffords Battalion’s attack had come to a halt, the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Derek McCardie, went to the entrance of St. Elisabeths Gasthuis where he had a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel George Lea of the 11th Parachute Battalion. It was agreed that Lea and his battalion would try to bypass the Germans’ right flank via the railway line, at the rear of St. Elisa- beths Gasthuis, and then carry out a flank attack on the German position.[12]

The bodies of William Loney and Nor- Map showing the situation in the neighbourhood of the Municipal Museum on 19 man Shipley were photographed by a September 1944. (Copyright F. van Lunteren, from a map by Th. Boeree) German soldier on 19 September

1944. He was accompanying the troops during the counter-attack by Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 280. Imme- diately left is the home of the Ver- kerk family, Utrechtsestraat 33. (Photo Bundesarchiv)

Counter-attack by the Germans At around 10 am McCardie’s and Lea’s plan was disrupted by a German counter-attack supported by self-propelled guns from Major Kurt Kühme’s Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 280. The 11th Parachute Bat- talion was then given fresh orders: capture the Den Brink estate in support of another attack in the north. McCardie was to know nothing of these changes because the messenger did not arrive to tell him. Some time after midday the German attack began to gain ground when their tanks and self- propelled guns were able to operate unchallenged. The South Staffords had left their anti-tanks guns behind in Oosterbeek on the orders of the acting divisional commander. After a while the ammuni- tion for the British PIATS ran out and the threat to the German armour disappeared. Hauptsturmfüh- rer Hans Möller wrote later: “The force of the enemy attack slackened at around 10 am. They dug in, split up and became uncertain. [The enemy] was completely confused and, as a battle force, had become dispirited by their heavy losses. The parachutists had not expected to meet up with an elite SS division. They had counted on a light skirmish. The support from the Sturmgeschütze was something they had no means of countering.”[13]

4 H. Verkerk recalls this attack: “On Tuesday morning the Germans were moving about in the garden and above, inside the house. The front door was still barricaded. A machinegun had been set up in the garden and on the small flat roof. We looked down on the garden and saw wounded Germans and British [in] On- derlangs, sitting against the trees. They sat there dressing each others’ wounds. On the insisten- ce of our father we went back inside. My brother said he had seen a strange chap by the garden gate and shortly after we heard a short burst of fire in the garden. The German on the flat roof shouted “Mother, Mother” and was dragged away by his friends. When it came to dying the Germans were cowards. In contrast to the British they always shouted and groaned. Suddenly one of the Germans shouted: “Tommies, Tommies”, and the entire gang ran out of the house like madmen. There was a lot of wild shooting although there was not a single Tommie to be seen. All at once we heard a kraut shouting from the top of the cellar stairs: “Tommies down there? Tommies come up, quickly!” We dared not reply through fear. Furious, he came down, machine pistol at the ready, and shouted that we should have called out “Civilians” because he had almost thrown a hand grenade into the cellar.”[14]

Tuesday morning 19 September 1944. German counter-attack along Utrechtseweg from the Municipal Museum towards Oranjestraat (Bovenover). (Bundesarchiv Collection)

Lieutenant Russell in the museum: “Enemy tanks and self-propelled guns were now in action on all sides, and an 88mm gun was firing into the gardens around the museum from the other side of the river. The cellar filled up with wounded and all the surrounding buildings were on fire. A tank pushed forward and opened fire on our building. The first two shells exploded in the room we had just left. With little pro- spect of a successful breakout, the company commander from the South Staffords [Major Lane] and I decided that further resistance was pointless.”[15]

5 By about two in the afternoon the focus of the fighting had moved west and the British POWs were ordered to recover the bodies of their dead comrades. A number of dead soldiers lay in the small dell behind the museum. By chance Arnhemmer Wim van Lunteren arrived in Utrechtseweg that afternoon, unaware that heavy fighting had taken place there shortly before. “In the garden of the house at the corner of Bergstraat – Utrechtsestraat was a big pile of Ger- man helmets. In Utrechtsestraat, not far from the “Kraton” building, lay two dead British soldiers; one of them had reddish hair. At the highest point of “Bovenover”, between “Kraton” and the Municipal Museum [in 2008: the Museum for Modern Art Arnhem] is a steep, shrub-covered slope down to Onderlangs. Standing nearby was a high-sided Opel-Blitz lorry with its front poin- ting in the direction of the station. German soldiers with rifles at the ready allowed the British prisoners to recover the bodies of their fallen comrades from the shrubbery. Then, with a hefty swing the bodies were thrown over the high side into the lorry. This made a thudding sound. About that time a group of patients from St. Elisabeths Gasthuis passed by under a flag of tru- ce.”[16] Even now, historians assume that the fighting in the Lombok district and around Utrechtstestraat and Utrechtseweg ended during the afternoon of 19 September 1944. However, German battle reports and eyewitness accounts from the fifties by people who lived in the area tell a different story, although a new large-scale British attempt to reach the Rhine Bridge was out of the question. It is possible that small groups of parachutists did continue the fight, but this had virtually no effect on the Battle of Arnhem. In 1953 H. Verkerk wrote: “At ten o’clock precisely on Wednesday morning the final, and heavy, attack by the British in Utrechtsestraat began. One could assume that they probably wouldn’t get much farther than the museum, but they managed to reach our house anyway because they threw a hand grenade in- to the hall in order to open the front door. One of the three rails was blown off but the other two held out. With a thunderous din two large storm doors were picked up and thrown to the end of the passage. This was followed by heavy gunfire. That was the last we saw of the British. We fled the house, averting our eyes as we passed by the corpses there. The time was 1 o’clock on Wednesday afternoon. As we left the house I noticed that the lunch set out on 17 September was still on the table, and the Germans had arranged my toy soldiers in battle order on the floor.”[17]

6 Notes to top

[1] Alex Junier, Bart Smulders and Jaap Korsloot, By Land, Sea and Air. The history of the 2nd Bat- talion The South Staffordshire Regiment, 1940-1945 (Renkum 2003), 108. [2] Letter from H.A. Verkerk to Theodoor Boeree, 17 January 1953. Gelders Archive, Boeree Collecti- on, inventory number 18c. [3] Hans Möller, Die Schlacht um Arnhem und in Osterbeck (1978), 19. L.P.J. Vroemen Collection (Gelders Archive, 2867), inventory number D1-09. [4] Various historians have put the strength of Möller’s battalion at about 150 men. This total is incor- rect in view of the fact that the commander himself reported that the strength of his companies, despite receiving replacements during the fighting, amounted to just 50% at the end of the Battle of Arn- hem. He mentions a total of 35 to 40 men per company (Möller, Die Schlacht um Arnheim und in Os- terbeck, page 32b). Assuming a strength of about 80 officers and men per company, one arrives at a total of at least 240, excluding battalion staff, the construction company and the crews of two armoured vehicles. [5] Möller, Die Schlacht um Arnhem und in Osterbeck, 20-21. [6] Ditto, 22. [7] Letter from H.A. Verkerk to Theodoor Boeree, 17 January 1953. Gelders Archive, Boeree Collecti- on, inventory number 18c. [8] Möller, Die Schlacht um Arnhem und in Osterbeck, 24-25. [9] Junier and others, By Land, Sea and Air, 108. [10] Letter from H.A. Verkerk to Theodoor Boeree, 17 January 1953. Gelders Archive, Boeree Collecti- on, inventory number 18c. [11] David Russell, ‘7 Platoon in Arnhem’, 4. Report written by him after the war telling of his expe- riences at Arnhem. Gelders Archive, Freedom Trail Arnhem Collection, file Correspondence. [12] War Diary 2nd South Staffords, 19 September 1944. http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/ war_2ndStaffs.htm Consulted on 9 May 2007. [13] Möller, Die Schlacht um Arnhem und in Osterbeck, 26. [14] Letter from H.A. Verkerk to Theodoor Boeree, 17 January 1953. Gelders Archive, Boeree Collecti- on, inventory number 18c. [15] David Russell, ‘7 Platoon in Arnhem’, 4. Report written by him after the war telling of his expe- riences at Arnhem. Gelders Archive, Freedom Trail Arnhem Collection, file Correspondence. [16] Report Wim van Lunteren, 11 May 2007. Frank van Lunteren Collection [17] Letter from H.A. Verkerk to Theodoor Boeree, 17 January 1953. Gelders Archive, Boeree Collecti- on, inventory number 18c.