House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism Fourth Report of Session 2005–06 Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 21 June 2006 HC 573 Incorporating HC 904–i Published on 2 July 2006 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 Foreign Affairs Committee The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the administration, expenditure and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies. Current membership Mike Gapes (Labour, Ilford South), Chairman Mr Fabian Hamilton (Labour, Leeds North East) Rt Hon Mr David Heathcoat-Amory (Conservative, Wells) Mr John Horam (Conservative, Orpington) Mr Eric Illsley (Labour, Barnsley Central) Mr Paul Keetch (Liberal Democrat, Hereford) Andrew Mackinlay (Labour, Thurrock) Mr John Maples (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Mr Greg Pope (Labour, Hyndburn) Mr Ken Purchase (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Ms Gisela Stuart (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston) Richard Younger-Ross (Liberal Democrat, Teignbridge) The following member was also a member of the committee during the parliament. Rt Hon Mr Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell) Powers The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Sarah Ioannou (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay, (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Catherine Jackson (Secretary) and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected] Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism 1 Contents Report Page Conclusions and recommendations 3 1 Introduction 15 2 The ongoing threat from terrorism 17 Continuing International Threat 17 Developments in al Qaeda 20 Public diplomacy and human rights 21 Guantánamo Bay 25 Extraordinary rendition 31 The International Rules-Based System 35 3 Saudi Arabia 39 Saudi Arabia and the ‘War against Terrorism’ 39 Background 39 The terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia 39 Counter-terrorism policy 42 Saudi Arabia and reform 48 Background 48 Tentative reform measures 50 Human rights 56 Bilateral relations 58 4 The United Arab Emirates 60 The United Arab Emirates and the ‘war against terrorism’ 60 Background 60 Counter-Terrorism Policy 62 The UAE and Reform 67 Democratisation 67 Human rights 68 5 Israel–Palestine 71 Developments in 2005–06 71 Political developments in the Palestinian Territories 71 Aid to the Palestinians 73 The Jericho incident 75 Political developments in Israel 76 Continued violence 76 The withdrawal from Gaza 77 International engagement 82 The future of the Road Map 83 2 Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism 6 Iraq 85 Security situation 85 Further deterioration 85 Iraqi Security Forces 88 Multi-National Force 90 Political developments 96 Further political milestones 96 Iranian influence 99 Reconstruction and economic development 99 Diplomatic representation 103 Relations in Basra 104 The decision to go to war in Iraq 106 7 Iran 108 Background 108 Nuclear standoff 109 Iran’s nuclear programme 109 Diplomatic process 111 Options for the international community 114 Iran and the ‘War against Terrorism’ 124 Links with terrorism 124 Position towards Israel 125 Involvement in neighbouring states 125 Iran and Reform 127 8 Afghanistan 131 Background 131 The Security Situation 132 Counter-Narcotics Strategy 133 Role of the United Kingdom 138 9 Non-proliferation 141 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 141 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 143 India 145 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 146 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 147 Chemical Weapons Convention 148 The G8 Global Partnership 149 The Missile Technology Control Regime 151 The Wassenaar Arrangement 152 The Arms Trade Treaty 153 Formal minutes 155 List of witnesses 165 List of written evidence 166 Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism 3 Conclusions and recommendations The ongoing threat from terrorism 1. We conclude that despite a number of successes targeting the leadership and infrastructure of al Qaeda, the danger of international terrorism, whether from al Qaeda or other related groups, has not diminished and may well have increased. Al Qaeda continues to pose an extremely serious and brutal threat to the United Kingdom and its interests. (Paragraph 15) 2. We conclude that the dispersal and fragmentation of al Qaeda into more autonomous local cells mainly linked together by a common ideology will make it more difficult to tackle the threat of international terrorism. We further conclude that the situation in Iraq has provided both a powerful source of propaganda for Islamist extremists and also a crucial training ground for international terrorists associated with al Qaeda. (Paragraph 21) 3. We conclude that propaganda is one of the major tools in al Qaeda’s arsenal. We further conclude that progress towards resolving key international conflicts would go some way to removing widespread feelings of injustice in the Muslim world that feed into the causes of and support for terrorism. Although the United Kingdom and its allies recognise this, and are working to resolve these conflicts, they are putting insufficient effort and funding into countering terrorist propaganda. Much greater effort needs to be made to communicate effectively with the Arab and Islamic world in order to bridge the gulf of mistrust that feeds into international terrorism. We recommend that the Government continue to engage with Muslim leaders and clerics who speak out against distorted and extremist versions of their faith. We commend the Government’s Engaging with the Islamic World Programme as well as the decision to set up an Arabic BBC World Service television station, but note that it will initially broadcast for only 12 hours a day and be much less generously funded than al Jazeera, which is heavily subsidised by the government of Qatar. We conclude that much more could be done. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what plans it has to expand its work in this field. We also recommend that the BBC World Service carry out an evaluation of the cost- effectiveness of this expenditure. (Paragraph 30) 4. We acknowledge that there is a problem of what to do with some of the detainees at Guantánamo and that those detained include some very dangerous terrorists. We also conclude that the continuing existence of Guantánamo diminishes US moral authority and adds to the list of grievances against the US. We further conclude that detentions without either national or international authority work against British as well as US interests and hinder the effective pursuit of the ‘war against terrorism’. We conclude that those who can be reasonably safely released should be released, those who can be prosecuted as criminals should be prosecuted and that as many others as possible should be returned to their countries of citizenship. We commend the British Government for its policy of urging the US government to move towards closing Guantánamo. (Paragraph 46) 4 Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism 5. We conclude that there has been a lot of speculation about the possible use of rendition to countries where torture can take place, so called “Black Sites” and the complicity of the British Government, all of which would be very serious matters, but that there has been no hard evidence of the truth of any of these allegations. The British and US governments have categorically denied that either UK airspace, or airports have been used by the US government for rendition or extraordinary rendition since 11 September 2001. We reiterate our strong view that the Government must deal with extraordinary rendition in a transparent manner with timely answers to questions from this Committee. We conclude that it is regrettable that far more detailed information has been given in parliamentary answers to opposition party spokesmen than has been given in response to questions from this Committee. (Paragraph 58) 6. We conclude that despite the reforms adopted by the 2005 UN General Summit, there remain uncertainties over the international legal framework for humanitarian intervention. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking to establish a consensus on whether and when intervention on humanitarian grounds is permissible. (Paragraph 66) Saudi Arabia 7. We conclude that there remains a serious terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia, and that this is directed at both the Saudi authorities and foreign interests. (Paragraph 77) 8. We conclude that Saudi Arabia is taking the threat of terrorism very seriously and is providing valuable assistance to the international community in this area. The Kingdom has put in place an effective security-focussed strategy targeting individuals and this has had a forceful impact on the al Qaeda presence in the Kingdom. However, we also conclude that the level of regional cooperation could be significantly improved, and recommend that the Government give assistance in this area, setting out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking. We further recommend that the Government pursue with its Saudi counterparts the possibility of a regional terrorism centre headed by Saudi Arabia.