Libya and the Eu

Located at Central European University in Budapest, the Center for EU Enlargement Studies is dedicated to making recent and upcoming enlargements work, by contributing to the debate on the future of the EU and by exploring the results and lessons of previous EU enlargements. Research LIBYA AND THE EU activities, however, are not limited only to the analysis of previous enlargements, but also to the potential effects that a wider extension of the EU’s sphere of influence may Kinga Tibori Szabó have on bordering regions. Libya presents both opportunities and risks as a partner to the EU. It possesses great oil reserves and could act as a buffer zone in securing the external border of the EU. However, its notorious human rights violations and disrespect for the rule of law make the participation of the country in the ENP difficult.

“…The EU expects Libya to formally accept the Barcelona Declaration, which is the precondition for the start of negotiations over an Association Agreement with the EU.…Although keen on establishing formalized economic relations, when it comes to political cooperation, Libya is more in favor of informal or loose ties with the European Union. Keeping this in mind, there are certain actions that the EU needs to undertake in the near future for improving its relations with Libya…”

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The opinions reflected and presented in this paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University.

Editor: Péter Balázs, Director, Center for EU Enlargement Studies

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CENTER FOR EU ENLARGEMENT STUDIES CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY Nádor u. 9. H-1051, Budapest Tel: +36-1-327-3000 ext. 2391 Fax: +36-1-328-3444 e-mail: [email protected] www.ceu.hu/cens Contents

Executive Summary 5 1. Libya and the EU – History and Importance of Relations 6 1.1. Before Independence 6 1.2. The Libyan Monarchy 9 1.3. Qaddafi and Isolated Libya 10 1.4. Qaddafi’s New Approach 14 1.5. Why Is Libya Important for the EU? 15 2. How to Deal with Libya – Critique of Policy Options 17 2.1. The Benghazi HIV epidemic 20 2.2. Putting an End to Illegal Immigration 21 2.3. The Barcelona Process & European Neighbourhood Policy 22 3. Policy Recommendations 26 Bibliography 28 Appendix 1: Libya Country Profile 30 Appendix 2: Map of Libya 33

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CENS would like to thank Lóránt Balla of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Erzsébet N. Rózsa of the Teleki László Institute, Budapest and Magda Katona for their valuable insights and critical remarks on the draft paper.

Kinga Tibori Szabó was born in Romania. She graduated at Babes-Bolyai University, Romania and Utrecht University, the Netherlands. Currently she is a PhD student at the Department of International Relations and European Studies of Central European University, Budapest. Her research topics include international legal norms, international security and European foreign policy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the conditions and significance of the recent changes in Libyan foreign policy towards the Western world and especially towards the European Union, and to relate them to the already existent or planned EU policies regarding Libya. In order to do that, the present paper will first offer a short historical review of Libya (from ancient times to the 21st century). On the basis of this review, it will identify the most important aspects of the Libya-EU relationship and will discuss the policy options available for furthering cooperations and for tackling the remaining difficulties. Finally, the paper will offer a set of recommendations that summarize the examined policy options and will highlight the opportunity, feasibility and necessary time span for such endeavors.

1. Libya and the EU – History and Importance of Relations

Libya is situated in Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, and neighboring Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Algeria and Tunisia. It is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union and a founding member of the African Union. For the past few decades, it has been seen by Western powers as a “geopolitical outlaw of the Mediterranean.” However, after a long period of difficult relations with the US and Western European states, since 2003, Libya has taken important steps in order to nor- malize these relations, especially with the European Union (EU). The purpose of this paper is to discuss the background and significance of these changes in Libyan foreign policy and to relate them to the already existent or planned EU policies that are related to this topic. In order to do that, the paper will first offer a short historical review of Libya. On the basis of this review, it will identify the most important aspects of the Libya-EU relationship and will discuss the policy options available for furthering cooperations and for tackling the remaining difficulties. Finally, the paper will offer a set of recommendations that summarize the examined policy options and will highlight the opportunity, feasibility and necessary time span for such endeavors.

1.1. Before Independence The aim of this section is to offer a very basic overview of Libyan history from the first relevant accounts until the proclamation of the independent Libyan state. A brief description of the major historical events will follow. It is impor-

For more factual information on Libya, see Appendix 1. The Arab Maghreb Union is a Pan-Arab agreement concluded in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mau- ritania, Morocco and Tunisia, with the purpose of achieving economic and political union in Northern Africa. For more information visit: http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ The African Union is a federation consisting of 53 African member states that was founded in July 2002 in South Africa. For more information please visit http://www.africa-union.org/ Raymond, Rogue Regime, 1998: 122.

LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION tant to note that tracing Libyan history is a very difficult and complex task and is not the purpose of this article. Nevertheless, a short portrayal of the major events that took place before the independence of Libya is useful in order to provide a basic background picture of the evolution of this region. Libya – as we know it today – is composed of three provinces: Tripolitania in the North-West, Cyrenaica in the East and Fezzan in the South. The name “Libya” originally belonged to a Berber tribe and was subsequently used by the ancient Greeks for all of North Africa (with the exception of Egypt). The name was revived by Italy in 1934 when it was adopted as the official -de nomination of the new Italian colony, comprised of the three aforementioned provinces. The oldest accounts of the provinces are connected to Phoenician colonies established in the first half of the last millennium BCE. At that time, the most important Phoenician colonies on the territory were Leptis, Oia and Sa- brata. In the 6th century BCE, the ports on the Libyan coast were conquered by Carthage. In 107 BCE, North-western Libya was conquered by Rome; approximately thirty years later the province of Cyrenaica fell under Ro- man control as well. Between the 5th and 12th century AD, the three Libyan provinces have been invaded by Vandals, Arabs and Normans. From the 16th century onwards the three provinces have been under actual or nominal Ot- toman control. In 1551 Tripolitania became a vassal state under the Ottoman Empire, whereas Fezzan came under nominal Ottoman control only in 1842. Cyrenaica fell under nominal Ottoman suzerainty in the 15th century, but it became subject of actual Ottoman control only in the 18th century. Although under Ottoman power, the local/tribal rule remained strong in all the three provinces. The 19th century saw the rise of an increasingly powerful religious movement, the Sufist Sanusi order that had its leaders in Cyrenaica.

The review of Libyan history until the factual end of the Italian occupation has been adapted from the country-study of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress: Country Studies/Area Handbook Series. Ibid. The Sanusi is a Sufist order of great importance in Libya. The order was founded bySidi Muhammad ibn Ali as-Sanusi in 1843 in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi order is noted mostly for its missionary activities among non-Muslim peoples in Sahara and Central Africa, as well as for its involvement in Libyan politics. Early on, they were able to establish strong local governance. The Ottomans exempted the order from taxation, and allowed it to tax its supporters. Early in the 20th century, the head of the Sanusi at that time, and the grandson of Muhammad ibn Ali, Idris, became the first, and only, king of Libya (his reign will be discussed below).

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In 1911, Italy invaded Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. One year later, the Ot- toman sultan conceded all the three provinces to the Italians by signing the Treaty of Lausanne. Tripolitania was largely under factual Italian control by 1914, but both Cyrenaica and Fezzan were home to rebellions led by the Sanusi order. Resistance intensified after the accession to power in Italy of Benito Mussolini. From 1922 to 1928, Italian military forces waged a radical retaliatory campaign against the rebels. The Libyans continued to defend themselves under the leadership of Omar Al-Mukhtar, Sanusi sheikh from Cyrenaica. It is estimated that the number of Libyans who died - killed either through combat or starvation and disease - is at a minimum of 80,000 or even up to half of the Cyrenaican population. After Al-Mukhtar’s capture in Sep- tember 1931 and his execution in Benghazi (he was hanged before a crowd of 20.000 Arabs assembled to witness the event), the uprising died down. More limited, but constant resistance to the Italian occupation crystallized round the person of Sheik Idris, the Emir of Cyrenaica. Regarding administrative arrangements, from 1919 to 1929 the Italian government maintained both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with separate colonial organization. A system of controlled local assemblies with limited local authority was set up, but it was revoked in 1927. In 1929, however, Tripoli- tania and Cyrenaica were united as one colonial province. In 1934 the clas- sical name “Libya” was revived as the official name of the colony, which was organized in a federal structure of four provinces: Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna. During the Second World War, the territory of Libya was used by Italian, as well as British and French forces as battleground. In the early post- war period, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica remained under British administration, while the French controlled Fezzan. After almost three decades of Italian occupation, a quarter of Libya’s population had died. After multiple negotiations regarding the status of the Italian possessions and the future of the three Libyan provinces, on 21 November 1949, the United Nations General Assembly granted independence for a united Libya, to be realized within the span of two years. The following year, a national assembly convened in Tripoli designated Sheikh Sidi Idris king of the future state. On 7 October 1951, the new Libyan constitution was promulgated. On

In 1920 the Italian government recognized Sheikh Sidi Idris, the hereditary head of the Sanusi order, with wide authority in Kufra and other oases, as Emir of Cyrenaica, a new title extended by the British at the close of World War I. The emir would eventually become king of the free Libyan state.

LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

December 24 King Idris declared the independence of Libya from the United Kingdom.

1.2. The Libyan Monarchy The proclamation of independence was seen as the culmination of a tumultu- ous history that in the course of a half century had witnessed the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, Italian colonialism, and a highly uncertain transition period following World War II. Apart from this, as mentioned above, the three provinces were ruled by local tribes and there was no genuine internal political will for their unification. Although independence was welcomed in- ternally, the unification of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan can be seen as an artificial political construct that was accomplished by foreign powers. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the main purpose of the new king, Idris al-Sanusi, was to consolidate his power in all three provinces. A few months after independence, King Idris banned all political parties throughout the kingdom. In 1963 religious lodges (zuwaya) were re-introduced, and the federal organization of the country was abandoned in favor of a unitary structure. Regarding its foreign policy, during the monarchy, Libya remained seemingly friendly towards the Western world. In 1953 and 1954, the country signed two military agreements, with Great Britain and the United States, in which it granted rights to both countries to maintain military bases on Libyan territory for a period of twenty years. The country’s foreign affairs were also influenced by the discovery of oil in 1959.As a consequence, Libya changed abruptly from a barely self-sustaining agricultural society, dependent on international aid and the rent from U.S. and British air bases, to an oil-rich monarchy with a high-technology hydrocarbon economy. The discovery of oil in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica also explains – at least partially – the changes the administrative structure of the country has suffered: the income had to be proportionally distributed in all three provinces; a distribution that was made easier by a unitary administrative organization. Although the discovery of major petroleum deposits assured the country an income on a vast scale and established close links to the international economy, it must not be neglected that tribal/local rule in the three provinces remained very powerful during the 1950’s and 1960’s.10

Vandervalle, Libya since Independence, 1998. 10 Ibid.

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The Libyan monarchy had a relatively short life. On 1 September 1969, a coup led by young military officers against the royal palace overthrew the king – who at that time was in Turkey for medical treatment – and took over the country’s leadership. The Libyan Arab Republic was established, and Muammar Qaddafi became head of a revolutionary council. The overthrown king found refuge in Egypt. He was convicted in absentia for corruption by a Libyan court in 1974. He died in 1983, in Cairo at the age of 93.

1.3. Qaddafi and Isolated Libya Primarily an Arab populist, Qaddafi believed in the Bedouin code of egalitar- ian simplicity and individual honor. He rejected urban politicians because of their sophisticated, fundamentally corrupt nature. Qaddafi’s ideology, fed by Nasserian11 concepts, was essentially one of Arab nationalism put into a socialist framework. As one of his first measures after victory, Qaddafi demanded the withdrawal of all British troops and the liquidation of their military bases. By June 1970 the last remaining American and British troops had left Libya.12

Internal Political Structure13 Having secured the withdrawal of foreign troops, Qaddafi devoted himself to the reform of Libyan society. In 1973 he organized a so-called cultural or popular revolution that was envisaged to eradicate bureaucratic inefficiency. Qaddafi demanded that the people confront traditional (tribal) authority and to take over and make decisions within the framework of “people’s committees.” These committees were founded all over Libya in the next few months and were responsible for local and regional administration. Seats on the people’s committees at different administrative levels were filled by direct popular election. By mid-1973 estimates of the number of people’s committees ranged above 2,000. These committees were seen as embodying the concept of direct democracy that Qaddafi advocated in the first volume of his Green Book,

11 Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) was president of Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970. He is especially known for his Arab nationalist policy. Nasserism is a pan-Arabic ideology named after him that was very popular in Arab countries in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This ideology propa- gated a movement for unification among the Arab peoples and nations of the Middle East and North Africa. Its main characteristics were a secular and often socialist view on politics, and strong opposition against colonialism. 12 LexicOrient Series, Encyclopaedia of the Orient: Libya, http://www.lexicorient.com/e.o/ 13 The review of the Libyan internal political structure has been adapted from the country-study of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress - Country Studies/Area Handbook Series.

10 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION which appeared in 1976. The central authority of the committee system was the General People’s Congress (GPC). This new system gained formal expression in March 1977 when the GPC adopted the Sabha Declaration of the “Establishment of the People’s Author- ity” and proclaimed the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.14 Within the Jamahiriya, all adults had the right and duty to participate in the delibera- tion of their local Basic People’s Congress (BPC). The decisions of the BPC were then passed to the GPC for consideration and implementation as national policy. The BPCs were envisaged as the quintessence of direct “people’s power.” Besides these committees, beginning with 1977, “revolutionary committees” were also organized and assigned the task of “absolute revolutionary supervision of people’s power.” Their main purpose was to assist the people’s committees, in order to raise the general level of political consciousness and devotion to revolutionary ideals, and guard against deviation and opposition in the BPCs. The consequence of the imposition of these committee systems was that by the end of the 1970’s, a complex, hardly comprehendible system of coinciding jurisdictions was created in which lack of strict definition of authority and responsibility made cooperation extremely difficult. In March 1979 the GPC declared that the vesting of power in the masses and the sepa- ration of the state from the revolution were complete. Qaddafi was from this moment proclaimed as “the leader” or “Leader of the Revolution,” without maintaining any official function.

Economy A few weeks after his victory, in November 1969, Qaddafi began the nationalization of foreign banks and hospitals. Next year, in July 1970, the first major laws on the nationalization of the oil industry, initially limited to the internal distribution networks of Shell and Esso were adopted. One month later, the internal distribution networks of the remaining oil companies were also nationalized. In December the same year, all banks became subject to similar laws. The nationalization process continued next year, when in Octo- ber all Libyan insurance companies were nationalized.15 In 1978 the second

14 The term Jamahiriya is difficult to translate. Lisa Anderson (Anderson, “The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980” 1986) translated it as “peopledom” or “state of the masses” as describing the concept that the people should govern themselves free of any limita- tions, especially those of the modern bureaucratic state. 15 Vandervalle, Chronology 1951-1996, p. xxiv.

11 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ volume of the Green Book declared that private trade, rent and wages were forms of “exploitation” that should be abolished. As an alternative, workers’ self-administration committees and profit-sharing partnerships were set up to function in public enterprises.16 In March 1978, a property law was passed that forbade ownership of more than one private dwelling, and Libyan workers took control of a large number of companies, turning them into state-run enterprises.17As a consequence, the Libyan economy became highly central- ized and public property-based. Foreign Policy Libyan foreign policy soon came to be shaped by Qaddafi’s mind-set, which emphasized the need for a drastic assertion of domestic interests. The well- being and freedom of Libyans and other Arabs was seen as being securable solely through uncompromising endorsement of their own interests and independence against the outside world. The perception was that the outside world, especially the major Western powers and Israel, would always seek to undermine that freedom and well-being, and to harm the interests of Arabs, Muslims, and Africans in order to pursue their own interests.18 During the seventies, Libya further isolated itself from the outside world. Between 1969 and 1973, major Western powers still sought to cooperate with the new regime for strategic and economic reasons. Nevertheless, from 1973 onwards, relations between Libya and the Western world, as well as with some Arab countries, became increasingly hostile. Particularly, relations with Egypt suffered; Egypt’s friendly links with the US between 1977 and 1981 first led to a general relaxation of Libya’s relations with the Western world. Despite this, beginning in 1981, relations became confrontational again, mainly for two reasons: US determination to end radicalism and Libya’s support for radical organizations that used violence. Another reason for growing hostility between Western powers and Libya was Qaddafi’s expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As early as the mid-1970’s Qaddafi acknowledged its goal to gain nuclear-weapons capability to match that of Israel. Libya has also been accused of using chemical weapons against Chadian forces during clashes in 1986 and 1987.19

16 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress - Country Studies/Area Handbook Series. 17 Vandervalle, Chronology 1951-1996, p. xxvii. 18 Niblock, Pariah States, 2001. 19 In 1986 and 1987 the Government of Chad accused Libya of using toxic gas and napalm against central government forces and against rebel forces.

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The offensive nature of the relations further intensified during the 1980’s and the 1990’s.20 Three major events related to this are discussed below: the bombing of the La Belle discothèque in Berlin, the Lockerbie crash and the Benghazi epidemic.

Berlin - 6 April 1986 The La Belle discotheque, located in West-Berlin, was frequented by U.S. sol- diers. A bomb placed in a restroom at the club exploded, killing a Turkish woman and two U.S. servicemen and injuring 230 people, including more than fifty American servicemen. Libya was blamed for the bombing after telex messages were intercepted from the Libya’s East-Berlin embassy. U.S. President Ronald Reagan retaliated by ordering air strikes against the Libyan capital of Tripoli (Operation El Dorado Canyon). At least fifteen people died in the U.S. air strikes on Libya, including a 15-month-old girl said to have been adopted by Qaddafi, and more than 100 were injured. EC governments opposed the US bombing raid on Libya, although the US maintained that the raid was in self-defense for Libyan complicity of act of international terrorism.21 Never- theless, a meeting of foreign ministers of the EC in April 1986 agreed that all member states should reduce the number of Libyan nationals serving on their territory in official capacities, and would make it more difficult for non-diplomatic Libyans to obtain visas.22

Lockerbie – 21 December 1988 On 21 December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York exploded over Lockerbie in southern Scotland. All 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground were killed. In November 1991, two Libyans (A. B. al-Megrahi and A.-A. Khalifah Fhimah), were charged with the bombing in the US and in Scotland. Libya insisted on prosecuting the men in its own courts, an attitude which further damaged relations between the country and the Western world.23 In 1992, in order to press Tripoli to hand over the two suspects, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya. The sanctions were further

20 Niblock, 2001. 21 Regelsberger, et al Foreign Policy of the European Union, 1997. 22 Niblock, citing from the Guardian, 22 April 1986. 23 Tanter, 1998.

13 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ tightened in 1993.24 Referring to the resolutions of the UN Security Council, the European Union – in Regulation 3274/93 of 29 November 1993 – re- viewed its trade policy with regard to reducing export credits and ending the sale to Libya of subsidized goods.

Benghazi Epidemic – 1998 The scandal began in the summer of 1998, when – in a hospital in Benghazi, Libya - several infants died of unclear causes. During 1998 several health professionals were interrogated by Libyan authorities. In February 1999, twenty- three Bulgarian health professionals went missing, seventeen of them having been released later.25 Five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor remained in the custody of the Libyan police and a long trial began that was condemned by the Western world, and which reached its culminant point in May 2004, when the Benghazi Criminal Court delivered death sentences against five Bulgarian medics accused of deliberately infecting 426 Libyan children with HIV.26 These three events have played a significant role in subsequent years, being seen by the US and Western European states as profoundly condemnable of the Libyan government.

1.4. Qaddafi’s New Approach The new era in Libyan relations with the EU started in 1999, when Libya handed over for trial in The Hague the two Libyans blamed for the Locker- bie crash under Scottish law. As a consequence, the UN Security Council suspended (but did not lift) the sanctions imposed against Libya in 1992 and 1993. The same year the EU decided to provide Libya with an observer status in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP - detailed below). This was also the same year when, Libya arrested five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor for the allegedly deliberate infection of several hundred children. As mentioned above, the arrest attracted much criticism of the Libyan govern-

24 Resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992 imposed an arms and air embargo and a reduction of Libyan diplomatic personnel serving abroad. Resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993 tightened sanctions on Libya. In this resolution, the Security Council, among other items, approved the freezing of Libyan funds and financial resources in other countries and banned the provision to Libya of equipment for oil refining and transportation. 25 Niblock, 2001. 26 BBC World News, May 6 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3689355.stm

14 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ment. Notwithstanding this drawback, in 2002 negotiations started concerning the compensation for the families of the Lockerbie victims, and ended one year later, when the Libyan government paid damages to each family of $8 million and, as a result, on 12 September, 2003 the UN removed the sanctions imposed in 1992 and tightened in 1993. On 19 December 2003, the Libyan government declared its renounce- ment of the production of WMD. Following this decision, political contacts intensified and many leaders and high officials from EU member states and the European Commission visited Libya. On 27 April 2004 Colonel Qaddafi himself visited Brussels. On 3 September the same year, there was a further achievement in Libya’s path to openness: a settlement on compensation for the families of the 1986 Berlin attack victims was finally reached. As a consequence, on 11 October 2004 the General Affairs & External Relations Coun- cil27 of the EU adopted a conclusion lifting the EU sanction imposed on Libya in the application of UN resolutions. Nevertheless, all this time, the trial for the Benghazi medics went on. On 6 May 2004, the Benghazi Criminal Court delivered death sentences for those on trial. The decision was appealed, and as a result of international pressure, on 25 December 2005 the Supreme Court of Libya overturned the death sentences and sent the case down to a lower court for retrial.28 On May 15 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the United States was removing Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and would soon resume normal diplomatic relations with the country.

1.5. Why is Libya Important for the EU? The above outline of the major events in Libyan history and in its relations with the Western world was necessary to provide a political and economic background to the analysis undertaken in this paper. On the basis of this historical review, one has to answer a policy question: why is Libya important for the EU? Why is the EU so positive about waiting for Libya to join the Barcelona process and the ENP?

27 The General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) is composed of the Foreign Affairs Ministers from each member state, who are empowered to commit their Government. GAERC members deal with external relations and general policy questions, and are politically accountable to their national parliaments. 28 See BBC World News, 25 December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 4559406.stm

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From a geopolitical point of view, a country can be important for the EU (or any other international actor) if it represents some major opportunities and/or risks. Libya embodies both. The following paragraphs will highlight the major issues that relate to the relations between the EU and Libya. This inventory will be used as basis for the next section. There are undeniable advantages in strengthening cooperation with Libya. From an economic point of view, both parties can claim important interest for cooperation. In the 21st century, the EU – like its member states – is largely dependent on foreign oil and natural gas. Libya’s most important natural resources are its oil and natural gas reserves, which dominate its economy. A 2005 estimate put the country’s proven oil reserves at 39 billion barrels and its natural gas reserves at 52 trillion cubic feet. Moreover, the EU is Libya’s most important trade partner: an estimated 70 percent of foreign trade is done with EU member states. The primary destinations of exports in 2003 were Italy (39 percent), Germany (13 percent), Spain (13 percent), Turkey (7 percent), and France (6 percent). In 2004 Libya exported an estimated US$15.1 billion worth of products, and is forecast to export US$15.7 billion in 2005. 29Apart from these two considerations, the EU is also looking to adopt a fisheries agreement with Libya. From a political point of view, the partnership can also benefit both parties. Libya is on the periphery of the European Union; it can therefore play a very important role in securing the external borders of the EU. Although it is not the only country that acts as a buffer zone between African migrants and Western states, it can help control the migration flows through its territory. From Qaddafi’s point of view, friendly relations with the European Union are also important for maintaining internal political order. Securing the goodwill of strong external allies, Qaddafi envisages the continuity of his power and the preservation of the internal political structure he has built over the years. Nevertheless, there are certain risks involved in this relationship. First, the European Union has more than once expressed its worries regarding Libya’s notorious human rights violations. Participation in the neighborhood policies of the European Union – as will be discussed below – is conditioned by the acceptance and employment of certain principles: democracy, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights. Second, certain past scandals (notably the Benghazi issue) still linger on, waiting for a final solution.

29 Library of Congress: Federal Research Division Country Profile: Libya, 2005.

16 2. How to deal with Libya – a Critique of Policy Options

The rapid pace with which Libyan-EU relations have normalized can be ex- plained by common economic and security reasons mentioned above. Today this relationship is built on several tracks that concentrate on both past difficulties and future expectations. As mentioned above, by now, Libya has man- aged to resolve the remaining problems concerning the Lockerbie crash and the Berlin attack. Moreover, it has publicly renounced to produce WMD. The pressure exercised by the EU and its member states is undeniable in both cases. It is also important to note that Libya has various bilateral agreements with EU member states, especially with Italy, Germany and France. For this reason, the ties with Libya differ from member state to member state and one cannot refer to a unique foreign policy of the EU towards this country. Neverthe- less, there are certain more specific EU policies that relate to Libya and that deserve attention. These policies are stipulated in a landmark conclusion adopted by the General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) of the EU on 11 October 2004. In this document the Council repealed the restrictive measures adopted by the EU in application of UN Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), lifting also the arms embargo in effect since 1986. The conclusion made reference to all important matters concerning Libya (see Textbox 1 for details.) The present paper employs the Libya Council Conclusions as basis for discussing the most important EU policies towards Libya. Several points need to be made here. First, economic interests – especially those concerning the export of oil and natural gases – are extremely important in this case. How- ever, the EU does not have a common import policy for these goods; their import is based on bilateral agreements, which are outside the scope of this paper. Secondly, there are many other aspects of European-Libyan relation- ships that are important and deserve attention, but they do not have an institutionalized basis, in the sense that there is no common EU plan governing

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Textbox 1: GAERC, Libya Council Conclusions

“1. The Council reiterated its support for Libya’s announcement on 19 December 2003 that it would dismantle weapons of mass destruction programs. Libya is among the first countries to dismantle voluntarily its weapons of mass destruction programs under international supervision through a transparent and cooperative process. 2. The Council noted that a settlement was reached in Tripoli on 3 Septem- ber 2004 on compensation for dependants of victims of the 1986 Berlin discotheque attack. The Council considered this settlement further proof of Libya’s readiness to change its policies of the past and of its commitment to responsible government. 3. The Council regarded improvements in the human rights situation in Libya an essential element in the development of relations. Of immediate concern are serious impediments to the right of free speech and association, credible reports of torture of suspects and miscarriages of justice and inhuman conditions of detention. The Council reiterated its position against the death penalty. 4. The Council expressed its deep sympathy with those infected with HIV in the Benghazi hospital. 5. The Council expressed its grave concern over the plight of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medical workers arrested in 1999 as suspects in a criminal case and the death sentences handed down on 6 May 2004. The Council considered that Libya, upon re-examination of existing evidence, may wish to conclude that justice be served by their early release. 6. In reviewing the elements relevant to the development of relations with Libya, the Council recalled its conclusions of November 2002 that cooperation with Libya on migration is essential and urgent. It reiterated its concern about the level of illegal traffic across the Mediterranean from, or via, Libya. The loss of life at sea, maintenance of public order at the ports of entry and the burden of illegal immigration from, or via, Libya now require effective action by Libya. In this context, the Council also underlined that Libya should respect its international obligations. The Council considered important to the development of relations with Libya that cooperation materializes in areas where remedy is beyond Libyan capabilities or capacities.

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7. The Council agreed to embark upon a policy of engagement with Libya and decided upon the following steps: (a) To repeal the restrictive measures adopted by the EU in application of UNSCR 748(1992) and 883(1993). (b) To lift the arms embargo. The Council recalled that arms transfers to Libya will be subject to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and decided that a special post-embargo arms transfers regime (‘tool box’), which is presently being developed within the Coun- cil, will apply. (c) That a technical mission to Libya be conducted as soon as possible to examine arrangements for combating illegal immigration in accordance with the terms of reference elaborated in response to the Council’s mandate of 16 June 2003. (d) That an act of solidarity with those infected with HIV at Benghazi hospital be implemented as soon as possible. (e) To follow closely the human rights situation in Libya. 8. The Council is ready to examine a Commission mandate for negotiations on a fisheries agreement with Libya. 9. The Council regarded Libya’s full integration into the Barcelona Process the overall objective of engagement. It reiterated that participation in the Barcelona Process, and the subsequent progression towards an Association Agreement, remains subject to Libya’s readiness to accept in full and unconditionally the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27/28 November 1995 and the Barcelona acquis. 10. The Council invited Libya to respond positively to the EU’s policy of engagement as outlined above. In this light, it insisted that Libya resolves remaining EU concerns, notably the case of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medical workers and all outstanding bilateral issues with EU member states, and work together towards stronger relations in the future, bilaterally and in multilateral frameworks.” them. These fall outside the scope of this paper as well. The GAERC conclusion cited above lays down all the major strategies that already exist or that are planned to be implemented concerning the EU relationship with Libya. Below, I concentrate on the EU policies concerning the Benghazi tragedy, illegal immigration and Libya’s role in the Barcelona process and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

19 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ

2. 1. The Benghazi HIV Epidemic An important issue in EU-Libya relations is the HIV outbreak at the Benghazi hospital. This matter involves two aspects taken in consideration by the EU: the dramatic situation of the infected children, and the fate of the medics on trial. In November 2004, the EU launched the long-term “HIV Action Plan for Benghazi” that is being implemented by the Libyan authorities with support from the Commission and EU member states. Since then, the European Commission has been closely working with the Qaddafi Foundation30 and the Libyan Government to implement the action plan for the benefit of the infected children. In this framework, EU-funded technical medical assistance is provided to the Benghazi hospital with a view to assuring appropriate medical care to those infected. As part of the Action Plan, on 12 July 2005, the European Commission released €1 million to provide urgent support to Libya in its fight against the epidemic. The allowance was intended for urgent policy advice and technical support to the Libyan health authorities. Further, it was meant to upgrade the capacity of the Benghazi Centre for Infectious Diseases and Immunology (BCIDI) to international standards.31 The other aspect of the Benghazi crisis concerns the precarious situation of the medics tried in Libya for deliberately infecting the children. The EU has repeatedly expressed its grave concern over the plight of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medical staff sentenced to death in May 2004. While stressing its respect for the independence of the Libyan courts, the EU has repeatedly called for the re-examination of the evidence which led to the conviction of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medics. The case took a positive turn on 25 December 2005, when the Supreme Court of Libya overruled the death sentences of the lower court and ordered the retrial of the cases.32 Whereas the involvement of the EU in the relief provided for the infected patients is more than understandable, questions remain as to the influence it exercises on the ruling of the Libyan courts. It is more than obvious that the outcome of the retrial will affect Libya-EUrelations. Seemingly, the EU does not wish to interfere with the decisions of the Libyan courts, however, the

30 http://www.gaddaficharity.org 31 See also Information Note to the Council, European Commission, External Relations DG, Programme of Measures to Support the Benghazi Action Plan In Libya, July 5, 2005, RLEX/A4 REG PA (05), D/515261 32 Libya adjourned the trial of the Benghazi medics on 11 May 2006. The outcome of the retrial is yet to be seen.

20 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION substantial help provided to the Benghazi hospital and the numerous public statements of Commissioner for External Relations and European Neigh- bourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, on the matter are evidences of EU political involvement in this process.

2.2. Putting an End to Illegal Immigration Libya is home to more than 5 million people, more than 150.000 of whom are foreigners.33 Being an oil-rich country, it attracts many immigrants who are seeking better employment opportunities. It is also one of the main transit countries for a growing number of African refugees trying to reach the Euro- pean Union.34 The economic and political problems of Sub-Saharan countries have led to permanently increasing massive outflows of emigrants to other regions (having as final destinations Western Europe and North America). The Maghreb countries have thus become major transit points for the migrant Sub-Saharans. As a consequence, the free movement of people between Libya and the African states and Libya’s pan-African policy have helped turn this country into a point of transit as well as an immigration destination. It is therefore very important for the EU to establish friendly relations with Libya; this way, cooperation becomes possible with the scope of strengthening the Union’s external borders. The tightening of European migration policies (in the form of stricter rules regulating asylum and the entry and residence of foreigners in the Schengen area) has transformed North-Afri- can countries into “buffer zones”35 for stopping illegal immigration. The EU has consequently long recognized the need for a cooperative framework between it and these transit countries. Before 2003, Libya’s isolationist foreign policy precluded any form of institutionalized collaboration on this matter. The changing attitude of Qaddafi has since allowed the commencement of cooperation. On a bilateral level, for instance, Italy, at the beginning of summer 2003, signed a cooperation agreement with Libya to combat illegal cross- ings from the Libyan coast to Italy. The terms of the agreement have not been disclosed, but according to the press, the two countries’ security forces are to carry out joint patrols in Libyan territorial waters.36

33 July 2006 estimate, source: CIA World Fact Book, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/ly.html 34 Boubakri, “Transit Migration Between Tunisia, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa” 2004. 35 Ibid. 5. 36 Ibid.

21 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ

An EU-Libya framework for institutionalized cooperation is emerging as well. The first steps have already been taken. In its October 2004 conclusion, the GAERC stressed that cooperation with Libya on migration was essential and urgent, given the country’s important role on the African continent. It reiterated its concern about the level of illegal traffic across the Mediterra- nean from, or via, Libya. Further, it emphasized that the loss of life at sea, the maintenance of public order at the ports of entry and the burden of illegal immigration from, or via Libya, required effective action by the country. In December 2004 the Commission mission to Libya delivered a report on illegal immigration. On the basis of this report, the JHA Council adopted on 2-3 June 2005 a concrete orientation for co-operation with Libya in the field of migration.37 In this framework, consultations are being held with a view to stipulating an agreement on rescue at sea and in the desert, and adopting a joint action plan for cooperation on migration issues. Nonetheless, Qaddafi has made cooperation conditional on the delivery of speedboats and radar equipment. To sum up, the cooperation in the field of migration is of utmost importance to the European Union. As mentioned above, Libya is one of the main transit countries for African illegal immigrants, for that reason, the EU would greatly benefit from having Libya as a reliable partner in this matter.

2.3. The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy In 1995, at the time of the Barcelona Conference founding the Euro-Medi- terranean Partnership (see Textbox 238), Libya was not invited to join. In 1999, the third Euro-Med Conference of Foreign Ministers agreed to grant Libya observer status and they declared that it could become a full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions were lifted, and Libya had applied accepting the whole Barcelona acquis. The first condition was met in 2003, when the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions imposed on the country. The second condition however, is yet to be fulfilled. Therefore, as of today, Libya has not moved beyond its status of observer in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the EU has not started negotiations so far for the conclusion of an Association Agreement.

37 Conseil de L’Union Européenne - JAI, Luxembourg 3 Juin 2005, Cooperation avec la Libye en Matiere de Migration - Conclusions Du Conseil. 38 Raya, A Review of the Barcelona Conference, 1999.

22 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Textbox 2: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Bar- celona on 27-28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the Euro-Medi- terranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Part- ners of the Southern Mediterranean. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership embraces 35 members, 25 EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has observer status since 1999. The process has a bilateral and a regional dimension and its main financing framework is the MEDA programme. MEDA offers technical and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean partners and it is implemented by DG EuropAid From 2007 onwards, as part of the reform of EC assistance instruments, the MEDA (and TACIS - Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Indepen- dent States) will be replaced by a single instrument, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument

The EU has invited Libya at least twice (in 1999, when the country gained the observer status, and in 2004, through the GAERC conclusion) to join the Barcelona process. However, Libya is still hesitating to take this step, mainly because of the political requirements it involves. The Barcelona Dec- laration adopted at the 1995 Conference requires members of the Partnership to: “…act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party; develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system.”39 These conditions – although recognizing the freedom to develop freely a certain political or economic system – are linked to concepts of democracy

39 Barcelona Declaration.

23 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ and rule of law. The Western understanding of these principles (closely linked to other, economic concepts of free market, capitalism, and private property) is very different from the concept of direct democracy of the Jamahiriya. Ac- ceptance of the Barcelona conditions – and of the acquis communautaire of the EU – goes therefore against the internal political structure of Libya. Notwith- standing this, the GAERC emphasized that it regarded Libya’s full integration into the Barcelona Process as the overall objective of engagement, and it reiterated that participation in the Barcelona Process, and the subsequent progression towards an Association Agreement, remained subject to Libya’s readiness to accept in full and unconditionally the Barcelona Declaration and the Barcelona acquis. Having only an observer status, Libya does not benefit from financial -co operation under the MEDA program.

Textbox 3: The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP’s objective is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all con- cerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was first outlined in a Com- mission Communication on Wider Europe in March 2003, followed by a more developed Strategy Paper on the ENP published in May 2004. This document sets out in concrete terms how the EU proposes to work more closely with these countries. Current partners of the ENP are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Key elements of the ENP are the bilateral Action Plans mutually agreed between the EU and each partner country. These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. From 2007 onwards the new funding instrument of the ENP – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – will replace other funding programs (such as the MEDA and TACIS).

24 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (see Text- box 3), Libya is recognized as one of the partners. The ENP Strategy Pa- per, adopted in May 2004, stipulates that “..[t]he privileged relationship with neighbors will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighborly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.”40 As discussed above, it is obvious that the Jamahiriya is very different from the Western understanding of democracy and the rule of law. Nonetheless, the Partnership already has members whose human rights records, or internal political structure is not in compliance with the democratic principles (for instance, Algeria, Syria or Belarus). As a consequence, the question arises, whether the ENP and the Barcelona requirements are hard law that must be followed or just mere guidelines. De- veloping an answer to such a question exceeds the purpose and scope of this article. It is nevertheless obvious that the pre-conditions stipulated by the Bar- celona Declaration are not strictly followed by the Mediterranean members.41 The same thing can be said of the partners of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Despite this, through these instruments the EU has a genuine tool to influence domestic politics in these countries. The financial support provided can suffer significant changes if any of the members are found guilty of drastic measures against the population. It is worth noting that most of the countries involved in these partnerships are, at least publicly, striving for a more democratic and market-oriented state system. Consequently, it is evident that despite strong interests for economic and political cooperation and despite the rapid pace by which Libya-EU relations have improved, there is still a hesitance on the part of Libya to enter into the Barcelona process; this, in spite of the fact that it is already a partner of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The last section of this paper will provide a short list of recommendations for furthering the cooperation between the EU and Libya and for tackling the remaining difficulties in this relationship.

40 “ENP Strategy Paper” 41 Raya, 1999.

25 3. Policy Recommendations

The new Libyan rhetoric of reform must be interpreted in the light of the different interests at stake. The present brief has outlined the major events of Libyan history and the major issues in this country’s relation with the Western World, and in particular with the European Union. On the basis of the historical review, several interests on both sides have been discussed. The EU expects Libya to formally accept the Barcelona Declaration, which is the precondition for the start of negotiations over an Association Agreement with the EU. It is believed that, in this way, Libya will send at least a verbal signal that it is ready for domestic reforms and a cooperative multi-lateral regional policy. It is nevertheless obvious that, although keen on establishing formalized economic relations, when it comes to political cooperation Libya is more in favor of informal or loose ties with the European Union. Keeping this in mind, there are certain actions that the EU needs to undertake in the near future for improving its relations with Libya.

Benghazi and its consequences (short term: during the ongoing trial) The EU should monitor in an institutionalized framework not only the implementation of the Benghazi Action Plan, but also the fairness of the Beng- hazi medics’ retrial, without interfering with the decisions of the courts. The necessity and opportunity for such an action is quite obvious. Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent is it feasible to monitor, but not to inter- vene in the affairs of the court. The transparency, impartiality and operativ- ity of court proceedings are some of the basic principles that constitute the rule of law, considered as principal precondition for participation in both the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the ENP. Minimum standards in the fields of human rights (short term: 1-2 years) It is clear that many of the EMP and ENP partners do not share the Western concept regarding the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, the EU, as an international actor, is a promoter of certain values and principles.

26 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Therefore, the EMP and ENP should be more than mere forums where the partners can implement their foreign policies; mere willingness to cooperate economically or politically should not be sufficient for participation in these policies. For this reason, it would be opportune to establish a minimum standard of human rights protection that would be strictly employed in assessing the domestic politics of the partners. This might seem as an immixture in the internal affairs of a country; however, as long as the EU is providing funding for development of these states, it should make sure that the most basic human rights are respected. Consequently, the providing of funding in the ENP and EMP should be made strictly conditional on meeting this minimum standard.

Common catalogue of values (short term: 1-2 years) In the framework of the ENP, a country report should be delivered on Libya, highlighting both the major interests in cooperating with the country and the major concerns of its domestic politics and should offer guidelines for meeting the specific challenges. The opportunity of such a report is evident: whereas the EU still needs to elaborate on its neighborhood policies in general, it also has to establish the particular issues in the case of each of its partner. This paper has highlighted the geopolitical significance of Libya for the EU; hence, the report would be most useful in analyzing the ways in which the remaining problems can be addressed.

Preventing illegal immigration (medium term: 3-4 years) Through the Barcelona process and the ENP, the EU should develop a joint immigration policy with Libya. Within this policy, the EU should conclude an agreement with Libya on rescue at sea and in the desert, and it should adopt a joint action plan for cooperation on migration issues. The Libyan government should be encouraged to use its influence in sub-Saharan Africa for cooperation on limiting immigration to Europe, through a constructive role in solving African conflicts.

27 Bibliography

Anderson, Lisa. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830- 1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. “Barcelona Declaration” http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ euromed/bd.htm Boubakri, Hassen. “Transit Migration Between Tunisia, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa: study based on Greater Tunis” Regional Conference on “Migrants in transit countries: sharing responsibility for management and protection”, Council of Europe Report, Strasbourg, 3 September 2004 Commission of the European Communities. “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper.” Brussels. 12.5.2004. COM(2004) 373 final. http:// ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/pdf/strategy/Strategy_Paper_EN.pdf Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs Council, Luxem- bourg 3 June 2005. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. “Country Studies/Area Handbook Series.” http://countrystudies.us/libya/ Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. “Country Profile: Lib- ya.” April 2005, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Libya.pdf General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), 11 October 2004, “Libya Council Conclusions.” Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1963. Information Note to the Council, European Commission, External Relations Directorate General, “Programme of Measures to Support the Benghazi Action Plan in Libya.” July 5, 2005. Joffe, George. North Africa: Nation, State, and Region. London: Routledge, 1993. LexicOrient Series. Encyclopaedia of the Orient: Libya. http://www. lexicorient.com/e.o/ Muammar Qaddafi, “The Green Book.” 1975. Niblock, Tim. “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East. Iraq, Libya, Sudan. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

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Pripstein Posusney, Marsha, and Michele Penner Angrist. Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005. Raya, F. J., “A Review of the Barcelona Conference and a Summary of EU Policy Objectives,” In The European Union and Developing Countries. The Challenges of Globalization. Edited by Cosgrove-Sacks, C. Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999. Regelsberger, Elfriede. et al (eds.). Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Ronen, Y., “Libya’s Diplomatic Success in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.13/4, December (2002). Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and Proliferation. New York: St. Mar- tin’s Press, 1998. Vandervalle, Dirk. Libya since Independence. Oil and State Building, London: I. B. Tamis Publishers, 1998. Werenfels, I., “How to Deal with a New Qaddafi?” http://www.qantara.de/ webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-318/i.html

29 Appendix 1: Libya Country Profile

I. GENERAL PROFILE Formal Name: Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Al Juma- hiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uzma). Short Form: Libya. Term for Citizen(s): Libyan(s). Capital: Tripoli (also known as Tarabulus), with an estimated population of 1,223,300 in 2002. Administrative divisions: 25 municipalities or 13 regions Major Cities: Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Tobruk (according to decreasing size, 2000–2002 estimates) Independence: 24 December 1951 (from Italy) National holiday: Revolution Day, 1 September (1969) Constitution: 11 December 1969; amended 2 March 1977 Legal system: based on Italian civil law system and Islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

II. GEOGRAPHY Location: Libya is located in North Africa on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bordered to the east by Egypt; to the south by Sudan, Chad, and Niger; and to the west by Algeria and Tunisia. Size: Libya’s total area is 1,759,540 square kilometres of landmass, which is approximately three times the size of France. Land Boundaries: Libya is bounded by Algeria (982 kilometres), Chad (1,055 kilometres), Egypt (1,115 kilometres), Niger (354 kilometres), Su- dan (383 kilometres), and Tunisia (459 kilometres). Length of Coastline: Libya’s coastline totals 1,770 kilometres on the Medi- terranean Sea. Maritime Claims: Libya’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles and to the Gulf of Sidra closing line of 32º 30’ north.

30 LIBYA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Topography: Libya has narrow enclaves of fertile lowlands along its Mediter- ranean coast and a vast expanse of arid, rocky plains and sand seas to the south. Coastal lowlands are separated from one another by a pre-desert zone and backed by plateaus with steep, north-facing scarps. Libya’s only true mountains, the Tibesti, rise in the southern desert. Less than 5 percent of Libya’s territory is economically useful. Principal Rivers: Libya has several perennial saline lakes but no significant perennial watercourses. The only permanently flowing river is the two- kilometre-long Wadi Kiam. Climate: The Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert are the dominant cli- matic influences in Libya. In the coastal lowlands, where 80 percent of the population lives, the climate is Mediterranean, with warm summers and mild winters. The climate in the desert interior is characterized by very hot summers and extreme diurnal temperature ranges. The ghibli, a hot, dry, dust-laden desert wind, which can last one to four days, can change temperatures by 17° C to 22° C in both summer and winter. Precipitation ranges from light to negligible. Less than 2 percent of the country receives enough rainfall for settled agriculture. Natural Resources: Libya’s most important natural resources are its oil and natural gas reserves Environmental Factors: Desertification and very limited natural freshwater resources are the two important environmental issues facing Libya. Annual rainfall averages only between 200 and 600 millimetres in the most arable portions of the country. The Great Manmade River Project, designed to bring water from fossil aquifers beneath the Sahara, has no long-term vi- ability because of the finite nature of the fossil reserves. Time Zone: Libya lies in one time zone, which is two hours ahead of Green- wich Mean Time.

III. POPULATION 5,900,754 note: includes 166,510 non-nationals (July 2006 est.) Literacy (age 15 and over can read and write): total population: 82.6% male: 92.4% female: 72% (2003 est.)

31 KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ

Ethnic Groups: Berber and Arab 97%, Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, Tunisians

IV. ECONOMY GDP (purchasing power parity): $65.79 billion (2005 est.) GDP (official exchange rate): $31.49 billion (2005 est.) GDP - real growth rate: 8.5% (2005 est.) GDP - per capita (PPP): $11,400 (2005 est.) Current account balance: $14.44 billion (2005 est.) Exports: $30.79 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.) Exports - commodities: crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas Exports - partners: Italy 37.2%, Germany 16.6%, Spain 11.8%, Turkey 7.1%, France 6.2% (2004) Imports: $10.82 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.) Imports - commodities: machinery, transport equipment, semi-finished goods, food, consumer products Imports - partners: Italy 25.2%, Germany 11%, South Korea 6%, UK 5.4%, Tunisia 4.7%, Turkey 4.6% (2004) Debt - external: $4.267 billion (2005 est.)

Adapted from: The Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Libya, April 2005 and The CIA World Fact Book Country Profile of Libya

32 Appendix 2: Map of Libya

33 Located at Central European University in Budapest, the Center for EU Enlargement Studies is dedicated to making recent and upcoming enlargements work, by contributing to the debate on the future of the EU and by exploring the results and lessons of previous EU enlargements. Research LIBYA AND THE EU activities, however, are not limited only to the analysis of previous enlargements, but also to the potential effects that a wider extension of the EU’s sphere of influence may Kinga Tibori Szabó have on bordering regions. Libya presents both opportunities and risks as a partner to the EU. It possesses great oil reserves and could act as a buffer zone in securing the external border of the EU. However, its notorious human rights violations and disrespect for the rule of law make the participation of the country in the ENP difficult.

CENTER FOR EU ENLARGEMENT STUDIES

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY Nádor u. 9. H-1051, Budapest Tel: +36-1-327-3000 ext. 2391 Fax: +36-1-328-3444 e-mail: [email protected] www.ceu.hu/cens 7/06