DOCSLIB.ORG

False Freedom Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
False Freedom Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa Human Rights Watch November 2005 Volume 17, No. 10(E) False Freedom Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa About this Report...........................................................................................................................................1 Summary ..........................................................................................................................................................2 Regional Overview .....................................................................................................................................3 Recommendations......................................................................................................................................7 Note on Methodology ...............................................................................................................................8 Legal Standards Pertaining to Online Freedom of Expression.............................................................10 Right to Freedom of Expression and Exchange of Information......................................................10 Right to Privacy ........................................................................................................................................14 Anonymity and Encryption ....................................................................................................................15 Assigning Liability for Online Content.................................................................................................16 Internet Cafés............................................................................................................................................17 Egypt...............................................................................................................................................................17 Access to the Internet..............................................................................................................................18 The Internet and the Human Rights Movement.................................................................................21 Internet Censorship Issues......................................................................................................................24 Morality..................................................................................................................................................25 Political Violence..................................................................................................................................26 Case Studies of Internet Repression......................................................................................................28 Shohdy Naguib Sorour........................................................................................................................28 Ashraf Ibrahim .....................................................................................................................................29 The Muslim Brotherhood...................................................................................................................30 Ahmad Haridi .......................................................................................................................................31 Iman Badawi .........................................................................................................................................32 Internet Cafés in Egypt .......................................................................................................................33 Blocking Web Sites ..............................................................................................................................34 The Library of Alexandria...................................................................................................................36 Entrapment ...........................................................................................................................................37 Legal Framework......................................................................................................................................37 Encryption.............................................................................................................................................40 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................41 Iran..................................................................................................................................................................42 Access to the Internet..............................................................................................................................43 Legal Constraints on Free Expression ..................................................................................................44 Encryption.............................................................................................................................................46 Mechanisms of Internet Control............................................................................................................47 Detentions .................................................................................................................................................49 The Group Detentions of August-October 2004...........................................................................49 Sina Motalebi ........................................................................................................................................53 Mojtaba Lotfi ........................................................................................................................................54 Mohammad Reza Nasab Abdullahi...................................................................................................55 Mojtaba Saminejad...............................................................................................................................55 Arash Sigarchi .......................................................................................................................................56 Censorship.................................................................................................................................................57 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................64 Syria.................................................................................................................................................................66 Testing the Limits of Repression ...........................................................................................................67 Access to the Internet..............................................................................................................................74 Internet Cafés .......................................................................................................................................76 Legal Framework......................................................................................................................................77 Emergency Law....................................................................................................................................77 The Press Law.......................................................................................................................................79 The Supreme State Security Court.....................................................................................................82 Detentions .................................................................................................................................................82 The Political Joke .................................................................................................................................82 `Abd al-Rahman al-Shaghuri ..............................................................................................................83 Yahya al-Ous and the Qutaish Brothers...........................................................................................83 Mas`ud Hamid......................................................................................................................................84 Habib Salih............................................................................................................................................85 Censorship and Surveillance...................................................................................................................85 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................89 Tunisia ............................................................................................................................................................91 Access to the Internet..............................................................................................................................92 Legal Framework......................................................................................................................................94 Internet Censorship..............................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran Page 1 of 43
    2010 Human Rights Report: Iran Page 1 of 43 Home » Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs » Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor » Releases » Human Rights Reports » 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices » Near East and North Africa » Iran 2010 Human Rights Report: Iran* BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices April 8, 2011 The Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of approximately 77 million, is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy, and political leaders vetted by the clergy, dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not directly elected but chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei's writ dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majles passes to ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also screens presidential and Majles candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, a member of the Alliance of Builders political party, was reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.
    [Show full text]
  • Anderson Cooper and Situation Room (CNN)
    US-Iran Media Resource Program National Iranian American Council 9 month report Program supported by: Connect US Fund, OSI, Colombe Foundation, Ploughshares Fund The US-Iran Media Resource Project is aimed at ensuring that the national media has the best information and interpretation available in a timely manner on the sensitive negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The project has provided the news media with objective, balanced and well-documented analyses of important developments, highlighting potential openings for a peaceful settlement that might otherwise be unnoticed and deepening the understanding of the motives of involved actors. The fundamental goal of the program has been to prevent war between the US and Iran. The proposed solution towards preventing war has been to push for direct US-Iran negotiations through overwhelming public and media support for such a shift in policy. Evaluation: The project has made a significant impact on the debate in the US by producing unique analysis disseminated widely both to the media and directly to decision makers, briefing journalists in order to improve the accuracy of their reporting, advising TV and radio producers, and giving interviews to the media. The evaluation of the project during its first 9 months is based on both qualitative and quantitative measurements. Quantitatively, the project has produced an impressive number of deliverables, including seven (7) in depth Issue Briefs, twenty-two (22) Editorial Memos, and eight (8) statements. These written analyses have addressed a variety of issues, all pointing to the superiority of direct US-Iran negotiations versus military or economic warfare. These analyses, in turn, were either quoted or influenced otherwise reporting in major newspapers as well as important news shows, such as Meet the Press (where NIAC’s analysis was directly quoted by Tim Russel).
    [Show full text]
  • Außenpolitischer Bericht 2004
    U2_U3.qxd 14.10.2005 11:37 Seite 1 Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten Minoritenplatz 8 A-1014 Wien Telefon: während der Bürozeiten an Werktagen in der Zeit von 9 bis 17 Uhr: 0 50 11 50-0 / int.: +43 50 11 50-0 für allgemeine Informationen: 0 802 426 22 (gebührenfrei; aus dem Ausland nicht wählbar) Fax: 0 50 11 59-0 / int.: +43 50 11 59-0 E-Mail: [email protected] Telegramm: AUSSENAMT WIEN Internet: http://www.bmaa.gv.at Bürgerservice: In dringenden Notfällen im Ausland ist das Bürgerservice rund um die Uhr erreichbar. Telefon: 0 50 11 50-4411 / int.: +43 50 11 50-4411 alternativ: (01) 90 115-4411 / int.: (+43-1) 90 115-4411 Fax: 0 50 11 59-4411 / int.: +43 50 11 59-4411 alternativ: (01) 904 20 16-4411 / int.: (+43-1) 904 20 16-4411 E-Mail: [email protected] Die Möglichkeiten zur Hilfeleistung an ÖsterreicherInnen im Ausland sind auf der Homepage des Bundesministeriums für auswärtige Angelegenheiten www.bmaa.gv.at unter dem Punkt „Bürgerservice“ ausführlich dargestellt. Außenpolitischer Bericht 2004 Bericht der Bundesministerin für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1 Medieninhaber und Herausgeber: Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1014 Wien, Minoritenplatz 8 Gesamtredaktion und Koordination: Ges. MMag. Thomas Schlesinger, MSc. Mag. Elisabeth Reich Gesamtherstellung: Manz Crossmedia GmbH & Co KG, Stolberggase 26, 1051 Wien 2 VORWORT Das Jahr 2004 war für Österreich und die Europäische Union zweifellos ein historisches Jahr: Am 1. Mai traten zehn neue Mitgliedstaaten der Union bei. Mit dieser Erweiterungsrunde, der größten in der Geschichte der Europäischen Union, wurde die jahrzehntelange Spaltung Europas endgültig überwunden.
    [Show full text]
  • Final List of Participants
    Final list of participants 1) States and European Community 2) Entities and intergovernmental organizations having received a Standing invitation from the United Nations General Assembly 3) United Nations Secretariat and Organs 4) United Nations Specialized Agencies 5) Associate Members of Regional Commissions 6) Other invited intergovernmental organizations 7) Non governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations 8) Business Sector Entities 1) STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Afghanistan Representatives: H.E. Mr Mohammad M. STANEKZAI, Ministre des Communications, Afghanistan, [email protected] H.E. Mr Shamsuzzakir KAZEMI, Ambassadeur, Representant permanent, Mission permanente de l'Afghanistan, [email protected] Mr Abdelouaheb LAKHAL, Representative, Delegation of Afghanistan Mr Fawad Ahmad MUSLIM, Directeur de la technologie, Ministère des affaires étrangères, [email protected] Mr Mohammad H. PAYMAN, Président, Département de la planification, Ministère des communications, [email protected] Mr Ghulam Seddiq RASULI, Deuxième secrétaire, Mission permanente de l'Afghanistan, [email protected] Albania Representatives: Mr Vladimir THANATI, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Albania, [email protected] Ms Pranvera GOXHI, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Albania, [email protected] Mr Lulzim ISA, Driver, Mission Permanente d'Albanie, [email protected] Algeria Representatives: H.E. Mr Amar TOU, Ministre, Ministère de la poste et des technologies
    [Show full text]
  • Nieman Reports the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University
    NIEMAN REPORTS THE NIEMAN FOUNDATION FOR JOURNALISM AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY Vm. 60 No. 2 SuMMER 2006 Five Dollars Journalists: On the Subject of Courage 'Courage, I discovered while covering the "dirty war" in Argentina, I I I I is a relatively simple matter of ! I I overcoming fear. I realized one day that I could deal with the idea that I would be killed, simply by accepting it as a fact. The knot in my stomach loosened considerably after that. There was, after all, no reason to fear being killed once that reality had been accepted. ! I It is fear itself that makes one afraid.' I I' I' I ROBERT Cox, ON TELLING THE STORY OF THE 'DISAPPEARED' " to promote and elevate the standards of journalism" -Agnes Wahl Nieman, the benefactor of the Nieman Foundation. Vol. 60 No. 2 NIEMAN REPORTS Summer 2006 THE NIEMAN FOUNDATION FOR JOURNALISM AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY Publisher Bob Giles Editor Melissa Ludtke Assistant Editor Lois Fiore Editorial Assistant Sarah Hagedorn Design Editor Diane Novetsky Nieman Reports (USPS #430-650) is published Editorial in March, June, September and December Telephone: 617-496-6308 by the Nieman Foundation at Hai-varcl University, E-Mail Address: One Francis Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-2098. [email protected] Su bscriptions/B us iness Internet Address: 1elephone: 617-496-2968 www.nieman.ha1-vard.edu E-Mail Address: [email protected] Copyright 2006 by the President and Fellows of Ha1-vard College. Subscription $20 a year, S35 for two years; acid $10 per year for foreign airmail. Single copies S5.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom on the Net 2009
    0100101001100110101100100101001100 110101101000011001101011001001010 011001101011001001010011001101011 0010010100110011010110010010100110 011010110010010100110011010110100Freedom 101001100110101100100101001100110 1011001001010011001101011001001010on the Net 0110011010110010010100110011010110 0100101001100110101101001010011001 1010110010010100110010101100100101a global assessment of internet 0011001101011001001010011001101011and digital media 0010010100101001010011001101011001 0010100110011010110100001100110101 1001001010011001101011001001010011 0011010110010010100110011010110010 0101001100110010010100110011010110 0100101001100110101101000011001101 0110010010100110011010110010010100 1100110101100100101001100110101100 1001010011001101011001001010011001 1010110100101001100110101100100101 0011001101011001001010011001101011 0010110010010100101001010011001101 0110010010100110011010110100001100 1101011001001010011001101011001001 0100110011010110010010100110011010 1100100101001100110101100100101001 1001101011010010100110011010110010 0101001100110101100100101001100110 1011001001010011001101011001001010 FREEDOM ON THE NET A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media April 1, 2009 Freedom House Freedom on the Net Table of Contents Page Overview Essay Access and Control: A Growing Diversity of Threats to Internet Freedom .................... 1 Freedom on the Net Methodology ........................................................................................................... 12 Charts and Graphs of Key Findings ..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Ali Khamenei: Iran's Most Powerful
    The Middle East Institute Policy Brief No. 10 March 2008 ‘Ali Khamene’i: Iran’s Most Powerful Man Contents Iran’s “Black Box” Policy Process 2 By Alex Vatanka ‘Ali Khamene’i: Iran’s Anxious Leader 4 Khamene’i’s Political Preferences and Constraints 6 Executive Summary As the nuclear standoff with Iran runs into its sixth year, prospects for a com- promise deal remains as remote as ever. The UN Security Council is preparing to implement the third set of sanctions against Tehran for non-compliance with its previous resolutions. In the meantime, President Mahmud Ahma- dinejad has dismissed Resolution 1803 as “invalid” and declared Iran’s nu- clear dossier at the UN a closed case. Still, despite a sense of dejection among Western officials, the likelihood that Ahmadinejad and his far right political base in Iran can be outflanked at home over this issue is a real possibility. For this scenario to materialize, the key is to influence the perceptions and preferences of Iran’s top authority, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i. That, however, will not be a simple task, as even this officially all-powerful figure has his own political and personal insecurities which are a major contributor to policy disorientation in Tehran. For more than 60 years, the Middle East Institute has been dedicated to increasing Americans’ knowledge and understanding of the re- gion. MEI offers programs, media outreach, language courses, scholars, a library, and an academic journal to help achieve its goals. About the Author The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in America and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and govern- ments of the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Meeting the Challenge: When Time Runs Out
    m e e t i n g t h e c h a l l e n g e when time runs out an update to the bipartisan policy center report on u.s. policy toward iranian nuclear development senator daniel coats, senator charles robb and general (ret.) charles wald dr. michael makovsky, project director June 2010 A myriad of national security challenges currently confront our country— the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, violent extremism in Pakistan and Yemen, North Korean belligerence. But due to its pivotal geographic position, its radicalism and its sponsorship of terrorism, none pose a graver threat than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. There are no easy solutions. Preventing a nuclear weapons-capable Iran will require making hard, unpopular, choices. That is why discussing these issues openly and understanding the alternatives is important. Fostering such informed debate has been the goal of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s series of reports on Iran’s nuclear development, which we have been privileged to co-chair. In Meeting the Challenge, published in September 2008, we put forth a bipartisan and realistic, yet robust and comprehensive, policy toward Iran—with the help of several experts who have since joined the Obama Administration, especially Ambassador Dennis Ross and Dr. Ashton Carter. Subsequently, we warned in our September 2009 report, Time is Running Out, that time was dwindling to thwart Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Now, with Iran on the brink of nuclear weapons-capability despite President Obama’s diplomatic engagement and a fourth round of United Nations Security Council sanctions, we felt it appropriate to consider what could happen if time does run out.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Culture and Collective Action
    Political Culture and Collective Action: Applying South Korea’s Democratization Model to Iran’s Green Movement Ko, Ro-Sa / CUK, Sung-Shim Campus ABSTRACT Why did Iran’s Green Movement in 2009 and South Korea’s democratization movement in 1987 led to divergent outcomes? This paper utilizes the within-case study analysis methodology called process-tracing to examine socio-political events that underlied these two movements. The analysis shows that both movements shared several conditions that led to the formation of social and political capital, yet this paper argues that the causal relationships between independent variables revealed two vastly different political cultures. Compared to Iran, South Korea’s political culture was homogenized, although a temporary one, with the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP)’s successful consolidation of the nation’s various civic groups, including radical student groups, for the purpose of eliciting support from the middle-class. South Korea’s dissident politicians formed a united opposition front and a consolidated protest theme. Therefore, the formation of the NKDP and its electoral alignment with civil-society groups led to a mass mobilization, which was focused and targeted with centripetal momentum. In contrast, Iran’s opposition forces were fragmented and lacked synchronized protest themes. While the Guardian Council’s enormous influence vetted the number of reform-minded candidates, Iran’s political culture witnessed a wide spectrum of differing political ideals and attitudes. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi advocated the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic while many of Iran’s young men and women aimed to bring down the very system of which the Green Movement leaders were a part.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the Weblog: a Case Study of the United States and Iran
    The Impact of the Weblog: A Case Study of The United States and Iran A Senior Honors Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for graduation with distinction in Political Science in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University By Erin Simmons The Ohio State University June 2005 I. Introduction For better or worse, technology has dramatically changed the way people interact with one another. The creation of an electronic media has revolutionized the way information is gathered and transmitted. The weblog, a type of online journal, stands as the latest in a series of technological developments that has the potential to induce societal change. The possible impacts of the weblog have yet to be defined. But blogs may be changing the nature of the media, politics and society because of their unique form, which allows them to circumvent traditional geographical and financial barriers, presenting new and novel opinions. However, it is equally possible that blogs may be irrelevant if they do not reach a large audience or present new opinions, instead being ignored by the vast majority. Or worse, blogs may be a mechanism to mobilize emotions and stereotypic hatred for out- groups. The proliferation of weblogs is a transnational phenomenon. Dramatic growth has been documented both in the United States and elsewhere around the world. The impact of the blog may differ depending on the political environment in which it is written. There is little reason to assume that the impact of the weblog will be the same everywhere. To understand the impact, I will examine the nature of blogging in two dimensions that represented opposite poles on a political spectrum.
    [Show full text]
  • How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
    How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Emanuele Ottolenghi, Saeed Ghasseminejad, Annie Fixler & Amir Toumaj October 2016 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES FOUNDATION How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Emanuele Ottolenghi Saeed Ghasseminejad Annie Fixler Amir Toumaj October 2016 FDD PRESS A division of the FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES Washington, DC How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Table of Contents INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................7 Understanding the JCPOA .....................................................................................................8 A HISTORY OF THE IRGC’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY ..................................................8 THE IRGC’S PERVASIVE CONTROL OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY ...........................11 Sector-by-Sector Analysis ......................................................................................................12 Oil and Gas ..........................................................................................................................13 Petrochemicals ....................................................................................................................13 Metals and Minerals ...........................................................................................................15 Automotive ..........................................................................................................................17
    [Show full text]
  • International Relations and the Iranian Post-Elections Show-Trials
    The Sovereign’s Confessions: International Relations and the Iranian Post-Elections Show-Trials Setareh Shohadaei, University of Victoria Abstract Following the controversial 2009 presidential elections in Iran, a series of mass trials were conducted publicizing the confessions of key reformist figures as well as other dissidents. The confessions were widely criticized as theatrical, based on reports of human rights abuses, torture, and judicial procedural offences. This critique, however, often labelled the trials as either barbaric acts of terror, or at best as unintelligent failures of the Iranian government. In this paper, I engage with the most serious of such analyses, arguing that the show-trials are not mere strategic errors on the part of the regime; rather, a more in-depth structural analysis of the concept of sovereignty is required to understand the enabling condition of the trials. Sovereignty both in its domestic and international functions operates paradoxically insofar as it cannot overcome the crisis of representation with respect to the question of foundation. It is thus necessary to understand the show-trials as a sovereign move towards a logic of simulation. Baudrillard’s concept of simulacrum is key to understanding the performance of the confession which postulates the unreal sovereign foundation as the latter’s hyperreal representation. I further propose that the disciplinary society of the international is not one simply judging the authenticity of the trials, but more importantly, it is judging the reality of statehood and thus sovereignty. In this sense, the Iranian trials can be conceptualized as sovereignty confessing itself into the hyperreal. 108 Illumine: Journal of the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society Graduate Students Association, Vol.
    [Show full text]