Effects of the Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake in 2004 on dams by Nario Yasuda1, Masafumi Kondo2, Takayuki Sano3, Hidetaka Yoshioka4, Yoshikazu Yamaguchi5, Takashi Sasaki6 and Naoki Tomita7 ABSTRUCT lowered at some facilities. Due to the Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake 2. OUTLINE OF THE SITE INVESTIGATIONS that occurred in October 2004, several embankment dams and other off-stream Fig. 1 shows the locations of the investigated impounding facilities for irrigation and power dams, which are shown in Table 2, and the generation located near hypocenter of the epicenter. The main purposes of the investigations earthquake were suffered some changes in were to verify the occurrence or nonoccurrence of condition or damage such as cracks on their dam earthquake-induced changes in the conditions of bodies. the dams in detail, collect earthquake motion In this paper, results of site investigations on records, investigate dam deformation and changes the changes in condition or damage found at dams in leakage/seepage rates, and identify the and regulating reservoirs after the earthquake are tendencies of such changes, if any. This report reported. The records of strong earthquake motion focuses on the earthquake-induced changes and observed at the dam sites near hypocenter of the damage to the regulating reservoirs for power earthquake are also indicated and discussed. generation of East Japan Railway Company (JR East) and the embankment dams built for KEYWORDS ： the Mid Niigata Prefecture irrigation purposes that have been suffered Earthquake in 2004, dam, site investigations, relatively large changes in condition. The report earthquake motion also deals with the recorded earthquake motions at dam sites located near the hypocenter of the 1. INTRODUCTION earthquake. Just after the main shock of the Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake that occurred at 17:56 JST on October 23, 2004, management office conducted emergency inspections. As a result, 1) Head, Water Management and Dam Division (WMDD), National Institute for Land and although many dams showed no changes in Infrastructure Management (NILIM), Ministry of condition or damage, six facilities located in the Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), 1, Asahi, area of Ojiya City, Tokamachi City and Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-0804, Japan Kawanishi Town showed changes in conditions 2) Director of Planning Division, Planning department, (see Table .1). The National Institute for Land and Japan Dam Engineering Center, 39MT BLDG, 2-4-5, Infrastructure Management (NILIM) and the Azabudai, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 106-0041, Japan Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) 3) Researcher, WMDD, NILIM, MLIT dispatched investigation team to detect changes in 4) Research Engineer, WMDD, NILIM, MLIT condition, details of changes, and the amounts of 5) Team Leader, Dam Structures Research Team (DSRT), changes in deformation and leakage/seepage Hydraulic Engineering Research Group (HERG), caused by the earthquake. The investigations at Public Works Research Institute (PWRI), 1-6, several dams revealed changes in the conditions, Minamihara, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8516, Japan such as cracks. In order to ensure the safety of 6) Senior Researcher, DSRT, HERG, PWRI dam bodies, therefore, reservoir water level was 7) Researcher, DSRT, HERG, PWRI 1 3. INVESTIGATION RESULTS AND the condition below the sediment level on the DISCUSSION upstream side cannot be observed. After the investigation conducted on October 3.1 Investigation Results 25, the cracked areas were covered with vinyl 3.1.1 Regulating Reservoirs for Power Generation sheeting, as a temporary measure, to prevent At JR East's Shinanogawa Power Station, water further progress of anomalous conditions caused diverted by Miyanaka Diversion Dam built on the by seepage of rainwater into the cracks (see Photo main stream of the Shinano River is sent to three 3). regulating reservoirs, which are Asagawara, It has been reported that JR East, managing Shin-Yamamoto and Yamamoto Regulating the reservoir, will investigate and analyze the Reservoirs. Stored water in these reservoirs is extent of the crack zone and the mechanisms of used to generate the power plants to supply the earthquake-induced changes and conduct electric power for the operation of Joetsu Line repairs accordingly. and other trains in the Kanto region including the Crest cracks parallel with the dam axis Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Fig. 2 shows the layout occurred at Makio Dam [2] during the Western of the main facilities related to the Shinanogawa Nagano Prefecture Earthquake in 1984 and at Power Station. Takami Dam [3] during the Tokachi-oki Earthquake in 2003. Crack depth surveys showed (1) Asagawara Regulating Reservoir that those cracks occurred only in the protective Fig. 3 shows a plan and a typical cross section surface layers and did not reach the impervious of the Asagawara Regulating Reservoir. core zones. So, after confirming these results, the At this reservoir, a number of cracks parallel protective layers were repaired. At these dams, with the embankment axis have been found at the there were open crest cracks caused by strong crest of the dam body. Cracks are staggered and motions in the upstream–downstream direction, are more or less continuous, and the crack but vertical displacement (stepping) as extensive occurred area extends almost over the entire as the one observed at the embankment of the length (292 m) of the embankment. These cracks Asagawara Regulating Reservoir was not have caused stepping so that the reservoir side of observed. The fact that vertical displacements of the embankment has subsided (see Photos 1 and up to 70 cm have occurred on the surface 2). The total difference in elevation at the cracks indicates that the cracked area inside the is up to about 70 cm, and the maximum crack embankment could be considerably deep. width of a single crack is about 40 cm. Elevation Detailed information can only be obtained from differences at the cracks and the magnitudes of the results of detailed survey investigations to be crack openings are larger in the middle section of conducted by JR East, but extensive repairs might the embankment and smaller in the sections closer be necessary depending on the degree of to both abutments, where dam height is smaller. impervious core damage. Currently, a committee Surveying performed by management office on detailed investigations of the embankment to investigate the deformation of the dam revealed damage of the three regulating reservoirs and that the earthquake did not cause significant countermeasures for rehabilitation is in session. settlement in the area downstream (opposite side The earthquake occurred while water was of the reservoir) of the crest cracks, and the being conveyed to the reservoir, and the survey results indicated the possibility of conveyance of water was stopped when the settlement to the upstream side (reservoir side). earthquake occurred. Because of stoppage of Since, however, the control points for monitoring power supply, however, the gate for emergency might have moved due to the earthquake, more discharge of drawdown from reservoir could not detailed investigation is necessary. be opened immediately. As a result, the water Neither the upstream face nor the downstream remaining in the water tunnel flowed into the face shows any earthquake-induced changes such reservoir so that the reservoir water level became as bulging or cracking. Since, however, reservoir high temporarily (see Photo 4). It has been sedimentation has already reached the riprap zone, reported that generators were then brought in to 2 open the gate for discharge, and the reservoir was analysis performed by the effective stress method. emptied in about one day, and in view of the The facts, however, will be revealed by detailed damage conditions and the water storage investigations to be conducted by management conditions, evacuation requests for adjacent areas office. were issued immediately. This case makes us The mid-elevation region of the outside slope recognize anew the importance of providing dams has a scarp zone that is thought to be the head of a with drawdown facilities and non-utility sliding block and a bulging zone that is thought to generation facilities. be the toe of the sliding block (see Photo 8). This With respect to seepage, neither changes in region measures about 5 m in the direction of the seepage rates nor turbidity caused by the embankment cross section by several tens of earthquake have not been reported, but because of meters in the embankment axis direction. From the repeated aftershocks, continuous seepage rate the fact that the trench at the toe of the measurement has not been conducted for ensuring embankment slope was not moved, it can be the safety of inspectors. inferred that the slip occurred only in a relatively Visual inspection did not reveal major small mid-slope region, but more detailed damage to intake facilities. investigation is necessary. The dam structure is a relatively new rockfill (2) Shin-Yamamoto Regulating Reservoir dam with center core completed in 1990, so the Fig. 4 shows a plan and a typical cross section dam is instrumented with various sensors and of the Shin-Yamamoto Regulating Reservoir. instruments for the purpose of monitoring Many cracks running across the reservoir to including embedded instruments, such as the outside were found on the asphalt pavement at piezometers, earth pressure cells and differential the crest of the embankment. The maximum crack settlement gauges, and a total of six seismographs opening width was 2–3 cm. (four at the crest and two at the toe of the There was also an area where the crest downstream slope). The results of behavior pavement is noticeably inclined toward the analyses being performed by the management reservoir (see Photo 5). office on the basis of the results of seepage rate There was also a 100-meter-long crack along and external displacement measurements, and the embankment axis at about one meter below also measured values obtained from the the outside edge of the embankment crest, and it embedded instruments are being awaited.