Index

Acocella, N. 35 blind men of Hindustan see knowledge action in society, logical vs. non-logical as invariably incomplete 94, 97–100, 126–7, 184 Boettke, P.J. 3, 5, 136, 207 behavioral economics as deceptive Bolsinger, E. 94, 142, 180 105–9 Bongiorno, A. 98 environmental influences and Bonini, C.P. 177 97–102, 105, 114–16 Boudreaux, D.J. 46, 180 reciprocal relation between cost and Boulding, K.E. 7, 30, 47, 99 choice 100–104, 138–9 Bourdieu, P. 88 agenda control 78 Bowles, S. 164 agent-based computational modeling Brennan, G. 48, 128 7, 18 Bruni, L. 47 agreement distinguished from Buber, M. 94 acquiescence 190–93 Buchanan, J.M. 2–3, 5, 7, 10, 17–18, Alchian, A.A. 146 21–2, 29, 36, 47, 68–70, 74, 92, Alexander, J.C. 47 100, 104, 120, 133, 138–9, 149, Aligica, P.D. 128, 133, 207 168, 195–6, 206 analytical narratives 86 Budziszewski, J. 199 anti-commons 70 Bueno de Mesquita, B. 19, 115 approbation as cousin of envy 91, 94–5 Camerer, C. 106 Aron, R. 184 Cantillon, R. 8 autonomy of the political 93–7 capital accounts and political entities Aydinonat, N.E. 40, 164 125, 146–9, 151–4 cities and hotels 44–6, Backhaus, J. 30, 127 154–60 Baier, A. 1 municipal bankruptcy 45–6 Barabási, A.L. 28, 76, 161 Caplan, B. 127–8 Bates, R.H. 86, 176 Castillo, A.M. 128 Bator, F. 13 centralized mindset 42, 144 Baumol, W.J. 3 civic association and civil society Becchio, G. 83, 94 47–9 Becker, G.S. 102, 187 Coase, R.H. 2, 15–16, 17 Beito, D.T. 130, 195 collective property as analytically Bergh, A. 135 incoherent 21–2 Berlin, I. 25, 85, 94, 96 Chaitin, G. 6, 60, 178 Bertalanffy, L. 60 Cheung, S.N.S. 122, 148 Besley, T. 113, 125, 155, 164 Clinton, H. 48 Big Players 62–3, 90 Coleman, J.S. 92 Bilo, S. 8 Collins, R. 5, 59, 80, 186, 206 Blankart, C.B. 18 Commons, J.R. 75, 153, 164

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Richard E. Wagner - 9781785365485 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/29/2021 02:49:22AM via free access 230 Politics as a peculiar business competition and selection through Eucken, W. 73, 120, 201 election 111–16 Eusepi, G. 4, 44, 68, 84, 162 form vs. substance in selection for extended present and history of qualities 116–27 economics 5–8 Congleton, R.D. 68–9, 149 Cristi, R. 94 Farber, H. 104 crooked timber of humanity 85, 94–7, Fasiani, M. 109 195 Faustian bargains 49–51, 187, 194, 207 Fausto, D. 3 Da Empoli, A. 68, 70, 149 Fawcett, H. 131 Damasio, A.R. 89 federalism as cartelized system of Davis, O.A. 107 governments 78–82 De Angelo, H. 155 federalism as competition among DeCanio, S. 7, 56 governments 78–80 De Jasay, A. 94 Fine, B. 1 De Jouvenel, B. 52, 70, 76, 116, 161 Fink, A. 141 democracy, generic form vs. particular Foldvary, F. 45, 157 instances 51–4 form vs. substance in economic theory democratic oligarchy 76–8, 116, 162, 83–5, 89–93, 115–16 170 Frank, R.H. 196 Demsetz, H. 86–7 Franklin, B. 72, 162, 187 Dennett, D. 85, 188 Franklin, J. 25, 95 De Tocqueville, A. 203 Friedman, A. 34 De Viti de Marco, A. 4, 68 Friedman, M. 3, 131 diamond–water paradox 8–9, 14 Friend–enemy distinction 96, 142 Dobb, M. 3 Downs, A. 103, 111 Garnett, R.F. 47 Durkheim, E. 187 Georgescu-Roegen, N. 74 dyadic relationships see triadic Gigerenzer, G. 97, 100 relationships in political economy Gintis, H. 164 Gödel, K. 6 Eckert, R. 17 Goldberg, J. 181 economic calculation Goode, D.K. 128 and collective action 138–43 Gordon, S. 206 and enterprise valuation 28–9, 103 Greve, M. 79, 162, 195 impossibility of for political Greyhound and Amtrak as alternative enterprises 29–30, 143 business ventures 84, 158–9 parasitical political calculation 136–8 Grice-Hutchison, M. 8 property rights and 142–3 Grossman, S. 7, 18 economic theory, distinguishing text and subtext 38–9 Hamilton, A. 193 Eisenberg, T. 104 Hanke, S.H. 204–5 Elias, N. 47–8, 87, 197 Hayek, F.A. 7, 18, 39–40, 63, 96, 135, eminent domain and American 186, 203 constitution 38 Hebert, D. 51, 142 Emmett, R.B. 186–7 Heller, M. 70 Emons, W. 30 Hilton, G. 175 Enelow, J.M. 36, 140 Himmelfarb, G. 131 Epstein, R.A. 38, 72, 79, 124, 164, 170, Hinich, M.J. 36, 140 181, 187, 194 Hirshleifer, J. 35, 206

Richard E. Wagner - 9781785365485 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/29/2021 02:49:22AM via free access Index ­231 history of economics, alternative Lerner, A.P. 3 orientations toward Levine, M. 78 classical vs. neoclassical 8–10 Levy, D.M. 2, 95 institutions vs. allocations as focal Lewis, P. 86 points 9–10, 16–17 liberalism and democracy 49–50, 76–9, Höijer, R. 135 201–2 Holcombe, R.G. 46, 128, 206 Liepold, H. 201 Hoover, H. 99 Lincoln, A. 99 Hoppe, H.H. 52 Lomasky, L. 128 Hotelling, H. 140 Lovejoy, A. 1, 6, 48, 91, 95, 189 Hughes, J. 28, 72, 120 Luttmer, E.G.J. 177 Huizinga, J. 92 human nature and political economy MacCallum, S. 45, 157 25, 34, 94 Madison, J. 206 Maine, H. 21 intelligence and democratic action majority voting and minority faction 127–9 53–4 invisible hands and spontaneous majority voting, qualified vs. simple ordering 12–13, 40–41, 44, 91–2, 20–21 144–5, 147, 164–5 Makowski, L. 155 Italian tradition of public finance 3–4 Makowsky, M.D. 204 Marberger, D. 168 Jacobs, J. 13, 44 Marciano, A. 3 Jaffé, W. 9 Marshall, A. 31 Jevons, W.S. 9 Martin, A. 37 Johnson, J. 39 McCaleb, T.S. 50 Johnson, M. 10 McChesney, F.S. 201 McCloskey, D. 132, 197 Kant, I. 25, 94 McCormick, R. 26, 150 Kenyon, D.A. 80 McIlwain, C. 205 Key, V.O. 127 McKean, R. 44 Kincaid, J. 80 McLure, M. 3, 126, 184 Kirzner, I. 17, 176 McNulty, P. 14 Klein, D. 136 Meade, J. 13 Klemperer, V. 124, 188, 191 Meade, L. 133 Knight, F.H. 10, 127–8, 187 Meadows, D. 59 Knight, J. 39 median voter 18–19, 41, 67 knowledge Menger, C. 9–10, 83, 94, 203 as invariably incomplete 7–8, 12, 18, method and substance, reciprocal 39–40, 63, 96, 133, 136, 186 relationship between 166–9, as assembled through transactions 188–90 16–17, 50–51, 67–8 Miceli, T.J. 103 Koester, G.G. 18 Michels, R. 76, 161 Koppl, R. 62–3, 90 micro–macro relationship as ecological Krause, M. 16 and not aggregative 42–3, 85–6 Mill, J.S. 8–9, 94 Lachmann, L. 152 Milonakis, D. 1 Lange, O. 3 Minasian, J. 15 Leeson, P.T. 71, 90 Mitchell, W.C. 36 Leibowitz, A. 150 Moberg, L. 45, 125

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Montemartini, G. 121 61, 64–5, 83, 85, 90, 114, 127–9, moral imagination 73–4, 195–202 164–6 global vs. local forms of 198–202 liberal 3–4, 8, 11, 22 moral syndromes, commercial and polycentrism and 52–3, 78, 202 guardian 44 progressivism and 5, 12–13, 15, 21, Mosca, G. 76, 161 39, 118, 181, 190 Mosca, M. 4 Virginia tradition of 1–5, 10–11, 13, Munger, M. 20 18–19, 26 Murphy, L. 21 see also human nature and political Murray, C. 132 economy; systems theory political property rights 25, 69 Nagel, T. 21 politics as peculiar business practice Nelson, P. 29 26–30, 84, 113, 150–51, 153–4 Neyman, J. 170 Polya, G. 11, 111 Niskanen, W.A. 80, 103 Portney, P. 46 Noteboom, B. 89 Potts, J. 58, 61, 167 Nutter, G.W. 2 power, etiology of 70–71, 93–4, 96 praxeology–catallaxy dichotomy O’Driscoll, G.P. 71 superior to micro–macro Ostrom V. 12, 18–19, 44, 49, 78, 145, dichotomy 87–8 162, 187, 194, 203 Prigogine, I. 60 other worldly vs. this worldly schemes Primo, D. 69, 145 of thought 189–90 property rights and self-ordered systems 66–71 Paganelli, M.P. 83 property rights as social relationships Pantaleoni, M. 138, 144, 147, 149, 151, 26, 69–70, 83 163, 167, 175 Pruett, D.K. 132 parades vs. pedestrian crowds, as public choice see political economy, templates for political economy Virginia tradition of 40–42, 55–6, 165 public goods theory parasitical political pricing 147–51, 167 in relation to plausible and Pareto efficiency 14, 67 demonstrative reasoning 16, Pareto, V. 29, 32, 35, 56, 70, 85, 94, 66 97–9, 106, 109, 126–8, 131, 169, lighthouses and 16–17 184, 188, 205 public policy as shell game 56, 59, Patrick, M. 28, 35 62–5, 202–5 Pauly, M.V. 154 purposive action 84, 88 Peart, S. 2, 95 practical rather than theoretical Persson, T. 37, 52, 113, 164 88–9, 104–5 Peterson, R. 168 see also sentiment in relation to Pettit, P. 48 reason Pies, I. 201 Puviani, A. 4 Pinker, S. 132 Plott, C.R. 78 raising vs. leveling as welfare principles Podemska-Mikluch, M. 64, 75, 116, 130–35 123–4, 137, 164 Rajagopalan, S. 56, 94 Polanyi, M. 38–9 rationality see action in society political economy Raudla, R. 104 additive 32–3, 35–40, 60, 68, 198 Rawls, J. 199 entangled 1, 28, 33–5, 40–44, 54–6, Read, L. 137

Richard E. Wagner - 9781785365485 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/29/2021 02:49:22AM via free access Index ­233 reasoning in economics, types of Spruynt, H. 45 demonstrative 11–15, 22, 25, 106 status vs. contract in governance of plausible 11–15, 22, 24, 25, 106–8 social interaction 21, 28 Reder, M. 1–2, 55 Staniland, M. 2 Redish, M.R. 154 Stigler, G.J. 187 Reiff, P. 48 Stiglitz, J. 7, 18 Reinert, E. 189 Storing, H.J. 191 Resnick, M. 42, 144 Storr, V. 34 Ricardo, D. 9, 10 Suits, B. 91–3 Richardson, S.O. 103 Sunder, S. 128 Riker, W. 23, 173 Sunstein, C. 84, 105 Rizzo, M.J. 71, 108 Susskind, L. 34 Robbins, L. 13 systems theory 2, 55–6 Rogowski, R. 54 action level vs. system level 62–3, Romer, P. 7 65, 92 Rowley, C.K. 201 controlling vs. influencing 59, Rosenberg, N. 9 61–2 Rubin, P. 113 creative systems 58, 59–61, 71–5 Runst, P. 153 robotic systems 56–61 Szasz, T. 89, 97 Samaritan’s dilemma 92, 133–4 Samuels, W. 13 Tabellini, G. 37, 52, 113, 164 Samuelson, P.A. 15, 47, 66, 68, 167 Tanzi, V. 63 scale-free polities 28, 75–8, 160–62 Tarko, V. 128, 133 Schelling, T.C. 203 Thaler, R. 84, 105–6 Schlicht, E. 200 Thirlby, G.F. 168 Schmitt, C. 38, 50, 69, 78, 94, 96, 120, Tinbergen, J. 35 142, 183, 193, 206 Tollison, R.D. 26, 59, 150, 204 Schmölders, G. 4 Tononi, G. 125 Schumpeter, J.A. 18, 92, 149, 182 triadic relationships in political self-governing systems see invisible economy 64, 74–5, 164–6, 168–9, hands and spontaneous ordering 172–3 Selgin, G. 180 and political money laundering sentiment in relation to reason 85, 169–71 188 Trump, D. 163, 170 Shackle, G.L.S. 61, 139 Tsepelis, G. 91 Shapiro, D. 133 Tullock, G. 2, 5, 17–18, 21–2, 36, 98, Shoeck, H. 48, 91 103, 173, 201, 206 Simmons, R.T. 36 turbulence Simon, H.A. 177 as intensified through political Simons, H.C. 69, 130 action and public ordering Skarbeck, D. 70 172–3 Smith, A. 3, 8–10, 34 as natural feature of healthy social Smith, D. 71 economy 171 Smith, V. 108 social contract see agreement ultimatum games 106–9 distinguished from acquiescence unfunded liabilities as systemic lying Somin, I. 116 126–7 Sonstelie, J. 46 Soros, G. 59 Vriend, N. 7, 18

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Wagner, A. 60 Whinson, A.B. 107 Wagner, R.E. 3–5, 8, 16–18, 20–21, White, L.H. 180 25, 28, 35, 37, 42, 44–6, 48, Wicksell, K. 21–2, 24, 150 50–51, 56, 59, 62, 64, 68, 71–2, Wicksteed, P. 100 75, 79–80, 84, 86, 94, 111, 116, Wieser, F. 70, 94 123–5, 130, 137–8, 141–2, 145, Wildavsky, A. 48, 145 151, 153, 157, 162, 164, 167, 171, Willett, T.D. 180 175, 187, 191, 195, 198, 204, Wilson, J.Q. 133 207–8 Wilson, W. 12, 19 Walker, G. 197, 207 Wittman, D. 113 Walker, R.A. 204–5 Walras, L. 9–10 Yazigi, D. 111, 125 Warren, C.O. 208 Yeager, L.B. 2 Webber, C. 48 Yoon, Y. 7, 70

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